Madden & Finucane Bloody Sunday Closing Submissions

20.1.1 Two people were killed and two people were wounded in the area behind block 2 of Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday. These shootings were the last on the day following the shooting of Hugh Gilmore on the eastern side of Rossville Street. Patrick Campbell was wounded first in this sector. He was assisted by Danny McGowan. Danny McGowan was then shot and wounded. Paddy Doherty was shot dead followed by Barney McGuigan, who had gone out to assist him. Given the location of these shootings, the only realistic candidates for these killings and woundings are members of the Anti-Tank Platoon who had arrived at the entrance of Glenfada Park North. Soldier F of the Anti-Tank Platoon has admitted in oral evidence killing Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan. The number of killings and woundings exceeds the number of shots admitted by a single solider in this area. It is clear that the soldiers have failed to account, even now, for those woundings.

iii. As well as the murder of Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan the weight of the evidence suggests that Soldier F shot and wounded Patrick Campbell and Danny McGowan.

iv. They were shot deliberately and not accidentally and without any justification.

v. None of the deceased or injured had handled a gun or a bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday

vi. None of the deceased or injured had acted in support of any person handling or using a gun or bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday.

vii. None of the deceased or injured was doing anything at the time they were shot, which would have led the soldiers responsible for shooting them to believe that they posed a threat of any kind.

viii. None of the deceased or injured was in the vicinity of civilian gunmen or bombers when shot. Nothing was taking place in the vicinity of the deceased or injured at the time they were shot, which would have led the soldiers to believe that their lives or the lives of their colleagues were at risk.

ix. Only one solider acknowledges firing two shots into this area at a man with a pistol behind block 2 of Rossville Flats. There was therefore no gun battle and no exchange of fire.

x. There was no man with a pistol behind block 2 of Rossville Flats fired at by Soldier F.

xii. It is an incontrovertible fact that due to the number of deceased and wounded, soldiers fired more shots into this area than they accounted for. This proposition is also supported by the civilian evidence.

xiii. There are no “missing casualties” in this sector. All of the persons killed and wounded have been accounted for.

Sequence of events.

20.2.1 In Sector 5, two people were shot and killed, Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan and two people were shot and wounded, Patrick Campbell and Daniel McGowan. The order of these shootings, as suggested by the civilian evidence, is that Patrick Campbell was the first to be shot, followed by Danny McGowan, then Patrick Doherty and lastly, Barney McGuigan.

20.2.2 Geraldine McBride was with Hugh Gilmore when he died. AM45.4 paragraph 21. She was still positioned at the gable end of block 1 of Rossville Flats, huddled by a telephone box with ten to twelve others, Day 146/30/3 to Day 146/30/16 and AM45.5 paragraph 22. One of this group of people was Barney McGuigan. At AM45.5 paragraph 25 she recalled how he stepped away from the group whilst waving a white handkerchief. Day 146/33/10 to Day 146/33/23. He moved out slowly and had travelled ten to twelve feet when the witness heard shots similar to the shots she had heard when Hugh Gilmore was shot. She remembered hearing two distinct shots, but it was the second of the two that she recalls hitting Barney McGuigan on the head. AM45.5 paragraph 26. Geraldine McBride was aware of shooting from the Glenfada Park area and across Rossville Street. Day 146/24/3 to Day 146/24/15 and AM45.6 paragraph 28.

20.2.3 Donna Harkin was located in a flat on the first floor of block 2 of Rossville Flats. AH13.5 paragraphs 26 to 28. She positioned herself at the kitchen window of the flat, which overlooked Joseph Place, to the south of block 2 of Rossville Flats. From there she saw a man lying on the ground, who she believed had been shot. AH13.5 paragraph 33. She then saw a group of five men crawling towards Joseph Place from the alleyway between block 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. AH13.6 paragraph 34. The witness believed that the ongoing shooting was coming from the Glenfada Park area, Day 171/123/8 to Day 171/124/5, AH13.6 paragraph 37, and it was shortly after that she saw Paddy Doherty shot as he was lying on the ground. AH13.6 paragraph 38. She then could see Patrick Walsh trying to make his way out to help Patrick Doherty, this took some five minutes, as there was continuous shooting going on at this time. Day 171/127/4 to Day 171/127/9. Once Patrick Walsh had reached Patrick Doherty he turned him over, it was then obvious to Donna Harkin that Patrick Doherty was dead. AH13.7 paragraphs 41 to 42.

20.2.4 Patrick Walsh recalled in his statement to this Inquiry, at AW5.2 paragraph 12 that he was running for shelter from the gunfire and heard what he described as a thud. He thought that it was the sound of a person falling or fainting. He saw a man lying on the ground. The witness could not recall exactly where the person was, but he remembered crawling out to help. Once Patrick Walsh had reached the man on the ground, he searched him for a form of identification. The witness believed that the man was already dead by the time he reached him. AW5.3 paragraph 14. The witness also searched the man for a weapon, as he thought he had been shot due to being armed. He did not have a weapon of any kind. While the witness was with the man, he could hear the "whoosh" of bullets as they passed over his head. AW5.3 paragraph 15. Patrick Walsh also recalled seeing the body of Barney McGuigan. AW5.3 paragraph 18.

20.2.5 Edmund Melaugh described at AM398.4 paragraphs 18 to 20 taking shelter behind the gable end of block 1 and still hearing the sound of gunfire after seeing people he thought had been shot at the Rubble Barricade. He thought there was still shooting coming from further north up Rossville Street. He could see soldiers advancing into Glenfada Park North Courtyard. He thought maybe four or five. They started to shoot across Glenfada Park South. Then one dropped to his knees near the centre of Glenfada Park North and started shooting towards the hexagonal flowerbed and the south gable end of block 1.[1] AM398.11 paragraph 20. He said at Day 170/116/15 to Day 170/116/24 that he did not see him fire but that was where he was aiming the gun. At AM398.4 paragraph 21 to 24 he described running along the back of block 2 to Joseph Place. He went into the alleyway and saw people hiding all along the alleyway. At AM398.4 paragraph 25 he heard someone behind him call out "I'm shot". He saw two people at the entrance to the alleyway who were both wounded. He thought the shots would have come from the soldiers in Glenfada Park North. One was in his thirties and one was in his fifties. One was wounded in the ankle and the other around the hip. Day 170/120/13 to Day 170/121/1. At the time he assumed they had been shot by the soldiers shooting towards Joseph Place from Glenfada Park North. Another man helped drag the two wounded men about half way down the alleyway before other people took them. He then went on to describe events surrounding the shooting of Patrick Doherty. He confirmed his recollection that he saw Patrick Doherty crawling after the two people were shot. Day 170/120/7 to Day 170/120/9.

20.2.6 Edward Dillon said in his statement to this Inquiry at AD45.1 paragraph 5 that he heard shooting begin almost as soon as he had witnessed the Army vehicles travelling along Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner. On hearing these shots the witness ran to take shelter and moved along the rear of block 2 of Rossville Flats, towards Joseph Place. He stood at the rear of Joseph Place close to the adjoining wall of Fahan Street East. AD45.2 paragraph 6. A few seconds later a man arrived in the same place, who told the witness that he had been shot. The man was holding his right leg and had a bad wound below the knee. AD45.2 paragraph 7. This man was unknown to the witness, but he has since learned that the man was Daniel McGowan. AD45.2 paragraph 8. As Edward Dillon went out to assist Danny McGowan, he saw another man who was lying on the ground facing towards Joseph Place. The man shouted to the witness that he would assist him to carry Danny McGowan. As he shouted this, he was shot. AD45.2 paragraph 9. The witness did not know the man at the time, but learned years later that it was Patrick Doherty.

20.2.7 The witness wanted to go out and help Patrick Doherty but did not as the shooting was too intense. He described assisting Danny McGowan after he had been shot. He helped Danny McGowan along the alleyway behind Joseph Place to the south eastern end of the alleyway just facing St.Columb's Wells and into a car. AD45.3 paragraph 10 to 11. Day 174/75/7 to Day 174/76/8. Edward Dillon then returned to block 2 of Rossville Flats, where he saw the body of Barney McGuigan lying on the ground, covered with a blanket or a jacket. There was a small crowd of people standing around at this point and the witness remained there and discussed what had happened with the group. AD45.3 paragraph 13.

20.2.8 John Hutton, at AH105.5 paragraph 7, described crawling into a house at Joseph Place, from where he watched events. From the living room window he could see in a northwesterly direction, across to Glenfada Park and the Rubble Barricade. His attention was caught by a soldier looking around the corner of Glenfada Park North, who stuck his head around the corner and then moved back out of sight. AH105.5 paragraph 8. Immediately after this, the soldier moved out from the corner and adopted a firing position, firing a shot towards the gap between block 2 of Rossville Flats and the northern end of Joseph Place. AH105.5 paragraph 9. The witness then saw the same soldier shoot Barney McGuigan from the same position at Glenfada Park North. AH105.6 paragraphs 10 to 11. A second soldier then joined the first one. Day 185/52/21 to Day 185/53/7.

20.2.9 John Davies was positioned at end of Block 1, beside the alley between block 1 and block 2 of Rossville Flats. He heard a “crack” sound whilst in that position. AD8.2 paragraph 12. He was beside Barney McGuigan when he was shot. AD8.3 paragraphs 14 to 17. He did not see any other bodies on the ground. AD8.4 paragraph 20

20.2.10 James Quinn was at the gable at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North when three soldiers arrived and told those there to put their hands on their heads. He decided to make a run for it and ran towards the houses in Joseph Place. AQ10.6 paragraph 32. As he did so three or four shots rang out. They seemed to come from behind him. He assumed the shots had been fired at him. Day 179/67/11 to Day 179/68/12.

20.2.11 Joseph Doherty said that he saw two soldiers at the corner of Glenfada Park North (when he gave evidence to the BSI he changed this to Glenfada Park South but agreed that this might be mistaken). One soldier moved out of sight, the first stayed at the opening. The first soldier dropped to his knee, took aim and fired one shot at Bernard Mc Guigan who fell to the ground. He fired two other shots. The second soldier had retreated at the time of the firing but returned and called the first soldier back. The soldiers went back in the direction they had come from. Day 138/149/1 to Day 138.

20.2.12 Thomas Harrigan saw a man fall, possibly injured, whilst running towards the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of Rossville Flats. AH39.4 paragraph 20. He also saw two men fall around the area of the telephone box at the rear of block 1 of Rossville Flats. AB39.4 paragraphs 23 to 26.

‘I was round the corner at the phone box when the shooting began…. Across the street there were 40 or 50 people with their hands above their head. Before this another man who had been shot was dragged around the corner. A soldier with the crowd of 40 or 50 turned round and fired across the street. The chap beside me, Mr Mc Guigan, fell dead.’

20.2.14 Brian Joseph McCool in his 1972 statement described the moving of Hugh Gilmore's body around the corner of Block 1. At that time the army opened fire from the direction of Glenfada Park at an acute angle. and saw Barney McGuigan being shot. AM133.4 paragraphs 21 to 25.

20.2.15 Patrick McCrudden saw the body of Paddy Doherty, AM153.4 paragraphs 22 to 26, and also saw the body of Barney McGuigan. AM153.5 paragraph 30. He did not see any civilian carrying weapons or bombs. AM153.5 paragraph 32. He remembered hearing perhaps five , eight or ten shots fired in quick sucession at Patrick Walsh as he crawled out to Patrick Doherty. He though the gunfire was coming from the general area of Glenfada Park. Day 204/39/17 to Day 204/41/18.

20.2.16 Sean McDaid witnessed the body of Hugh Gilmore. AM174.2 paragraph 11. He then saw soldiers running across balconies of Glenfada Park North. All of them were carrying guns, but the witness did not see any shooting. AM174.3 paragraph 13. He was beside Barney McGuigan when he was shot. The witness did not hear the actual shot due to the ongoing commotion around him, but believed that the shot was fired from the direction of Glenfada Park. AM174.3 paragraphs 15 to 17. The witness heard further intense shooting from Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner and from Glenfada Park across Rossville Street. AM174.4 paragraph 18. He saw a bullet hit the wall of block 2 of Rossville Flats while two men were running across the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of Rossville Flats. AM174.4 paragraph 19.

20.2.17 Thomas Bernard McDaid witnessed the events from 11 Joseph Place. He was a cousin of Barney McGuigan, who was in the house shortly before he was shot. AM176.1 paragraphs 1 to 2. He heard a commotion outside the house and then a “crackling” sound, but was unsure of direction of the crackling noise. AM176.1 paragraph 3. He looked out of a window towards block 2 of Rossville Flats and saw a large crowd of people gathered, some of which were lying on ground. He saw Barney McGuigan take steps forward then fall over. He could still hear the crackling noise, which at this time witness had realised was gunfire. AM176.1 paragraph 4. He then saw three soldiers moving down Rossville Street, they were not moving very quickly. One of the soldiers saw the witness looking out of window and raised his rifle towards him. AM176.2 paragraph 5.

20.2.18 Jean Marie McGeehan was positioned in 36 Garvan Place, in block 2 of Rossville Flats. AM228.1 paragraph 1. From there she saw three men moving across the wall from block 2 towards Joseph Place. AM228.3 paragraph 15 to AM228.4 paragraph 21. None of the three men were carrying anything. AM228.4 paragraph 24. She also witnessed a photographer exit the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats, holding up his camera and a white hanky. He was facing towards Rossville Street. AM228.4 paragraph 22. She did not hear any nail bombs or shots fired from Rossville Flats. AM228.5 paragraph 26.

20.2.19 Danny McGowan saw Hugh Gilmore fall whilst walking towards the gap between block 1 and 2 of Rossville Flats. AM255.1 paragraph 6. The witness then saw Patrick Campbell and went to help him. AM255.2 paragraphs 10 to 12. The witness was then shot in the leg whilst helping Patrick Campbell. AM255.2 paragraph 13. He was unsure of direction of the shot that hit him. AM255.3 paragraph 14. He was then taken to a car by two men, who tried to take him to Altnagelvin Hospital. The route was blocked by soldiers, so the car was turned round and the witness was taken home. AM255.3 paragraph 16. He was then taken to hospital by ambulance. AM255.3 paragraph 17.

20.2.20 Paul James McLaughlin was a member of the Order of Malta. He heard a loud bang while crossing Rubble Barricade on Rossville Street. He believes he was shot at. AM350.4 paragraph 22. He did not see any soldiers at Glenfada Park North or the Rubble Barricade at this point. AM350.4 paragraph 23. He then tended to Hugh Gilmore. AM350.4 paragraphs 25 to 27. He saw shots hitting a concrete plinth and believed that these shots were fired from Glenfada Park North. AM350.5 paragraph 30. The witness saw Paddy Doherty, AM350.5 paragraph 31, and witnessed Barney McGuigan shot. AM350.5 paragraph32 to AM350.6 paragraph 38. He also tended to Alana Burke. AM350.7 paragraph 40. The witness saw no civilian with a gun and did not hear any nail bombs exploding. AM350.7 paragraph 44.

20.2.21 Peter McLaughlin saw Paddy Doherty pulling himself along the ground, then shot. He placed shots as being fired from the direction of Rossville Street. AM352.3 paragraphs 18 to 21. A number of other witnesses saw firing into this area before Patrick Doherty was shot.[2]

20.2.23 John Martin Campbell saw Patrick Walsh behind block 2 of Rossville Flats. AC14.4 paragraphs 18 to 19 and also saw the bodies of Hugh Gilmore and Barney McGuigan. AC14.4 paragraph 22.

20.2.24 John Anthony Dunleavey made his way to the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats and pushed his way through crowds. AD167.3 paragraphs 16 to 17. He had heard six or seven shots fired in Rossville Street. AD167.4 paragraph 18. The witness saw Paddy Doherty being carried to an ambulance. AD167.4 paragraph 19. He also saw the body of Barney McGuigan on ground AD167.4 paragraph 20 and saw the body of Hugh Gilmore. AD167.4 paragraph 21.

20.2.25 John Gerard O'Connor heard live shots fired while he was positioned at Joseph Place. AO11.7 paragraph 10. He heard further shooting while taking shelter, but did not think that shooting was coming from City Walls. AO11.7 paragraph 12. He did not see any civilian with a weapon or hear any nail bombs. AO11.8 paragraph 15.

The civilian evidence indicates clearly the fear and terror of civilians as they sought shelter behind the gable end of block 1 of the Rossville Flats and also in the gaps between blocks 2 and 3 of the flats and the Joseph Place alleyway. There is a body of evidence which indicates considerably more army firing in the area than the two shots fired by Soldier F into the gap behind block 2 of the Rossville Flats. There is also consistent civilian evidence as to the lack of hostile activity in the area by civilians.

P298 Front of Joseph place looking down the alleyway that leads back into the car park. Blocks 2 and 3 and large retaining wall.

P300 Taken with photographer standing near to Block 3 of the Flats showing wooden slats of the staircase into Block 2.

P325 Taken from the opposite direction of the above photographs showing the steps leading from Fahan Street down to the space between Joseph Place and Block 2 of the Flats. Also showing the staircase into block 2 with wooden slats.

P429 Photograph not taken on the day showing the mouth of Gglenfada Park North and showing Block 1 and Block 2 in the distance.

P431 Photograph showing people in the vicinity of the blocks and around the lamppost.

P433 Photograph from the opposite direction looking into Glenfada Park north.

P721 Photograph taken on Bloody Sunday showing retaining wall and steps up toward Fahan Street east.

P816, P817, P818, and P819 showing the crowd at the gable end of Block 1 and the body of Barney McGuigan.

EP25.7 The view that the soldiers had from the walls showing the end of Block 1 and the corner of Glenfada with the lamppost.

EP25.17, EP 25.18 (P815) shown to Soldier 227 who identified Barney McGuigan as the man who fell.

EP32.3 Photograph of the group of people tending to Hugh Gilmore including Danny McGowan. Barney McGuigan is also in the photograph.

P233.2 Photograph taken from the city walls, along the southern side of block 2 of the Rossville Flats

20.4.1.1 Patrick Campbell was aged 53 on Bloody Sunday. He was a married man with nine children from the Creggan area of Derry. He worked as a docker for Pinkerton Ship Merchants. He had no criminal record or any political affiliations. When his son John was told on the day that his father had been shot he thought at first it was a mistake. When he got home the house was in utter chaos. They had heard people say that Patrick Campbell had been shot but no-one knew for certain. The family later learned he had been taken to Altnagelvin. After the events Patrick Campbell did not talk much about the events of Bloody Sunday. He told them he had been shot somewhere around Joseph Place. He told his family that the soldier who shot him had it on his conscience and that he had shot an innocent man. Patrick Campbell weighed 16 stone when he was shot and could do a good hard day's work. After he was shot he lost a lot of weight. His son John thought he was never the same man again and he seemed to go downhill day by day. At AC14.5 paragraph 29 John Campbell summarised the view of the family and the uncontested truth concerning the actions of his father on the day:

"I know for a fact that my father was a completely innocent man who would never have hurt a fly.."

20.4.1.2 Patrick Campbell was shot at about the time that the paratroopers were in Glenfada Park and he saw them in Glenfada Park. Bernard McMonagle took him from St. Columb's Wells at about 4.15pm to 4.20pm. They were stopped and taken to the Regimental Aid Post at Foyle Bridge. The journey had taken no more than ten minutes. From the Regimental Aid post he was driven by or with Captain 138 by army ambulance to Altnagelvin Hospital where he was admitted at 4.45pm. Temporary Document 20.3. Two soldiers and Joe Friel were also in the vehicle.

20.4.2.1 The balance of the evidence suggests that Patrick Campbell was shot somewhere south of block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He was then helped to the alleyway behind Joseph Place. There is some evidence he was taken to a house in Joseph Place. There is clear evidence he was taken to St. Columb's Wells and from there he was taken in a car, which was stopped at the Regimental First Aid Post at Craigavon Bridge.

20.4.2.2 Patrick Campbell, who has since died, was shot at the south of the Rossville flats. He did not give evidence to Lord Widgery, probably because of his condition after the shooting. He gave a statement to the police on Monday 7^th February at Altnagelvin at 12 noon.

20.4.2.3 In the statement at ED27.7 he described having a meal at home at about 1.30pm on 30 January 1972. After this he went to the big field near Saint Mary's church to where the civil rights march was starting from. When the crowd moved off he took up a position with his mates near the end of the march. They walked down Southway, along the Lone Moor Road, down Creggan Street into William Street. The crowd stopped in William Street and he was near Stevenson's bakery. He went down towards Little James Street. The gas was quite strong near Little James Street, so he went up Rossville Street out of the way of it. He stood for some time beyond the small barricade, which was outside the Rossville Flats looking down towards William Street.

20.4.2.4 The Army tanks then came into Rossville Street and the soldiers jumped out. At this he turned and ran towards the gable end of the Rossville Flats. This would appear to be south of block 1. He stood there for a few minutes and then ran across the waste ground towards Free Derry Corner. He then felt like a thud in his lower back and fell on to his knees. He put his hand to his hip and saw there was blood on it. He then put his hand up and called that he was shot. Some men then came and took him into a house near Free Derry Corner, and he was kept waiting here for a car to take him to hospital.

20.4.2.5 After some time a car took him to along Foyle Road under the bridge, where an Army medic took him out of the car and put him on a stretcher and dressed his wound. According to the descriptions of other witnesses this must have been the regimental first aid post of the Royal Anglians at Craigavon Bridge. They then put the witness into an ambulance and brought him up to the hospital. He was not a member of any organisation and only went to the civil rights march because everyone else was going. He was not carrying any object prior to being shot.

20.4.2.6 Notes of an interview with Patrick Campbell by the Sunday Times, dated 1^st March 1972 are at AC19.1. He said he had been on the march from the Creggan and got as far as the Rossville/William corner when he got a bad whiff of gas. He moved along Rossville Street and crossed the barricade outside the flats and stood there. As he looked back down Rossville Street he saw the Saracens coming in. He saw soldiers jumping out and when the shooting began he made a dive for cover behind a small gable near the telephone box. From there he could see soldiers milling about in Glenfada Park. He then made a dash for Joseph Place and was shot in the back (the wound is at the base of the spine). Originally the interview note read: "Medical evidence needed." Then, in manuscript, there has been added:

"Michael McClusker ran at same time. Recalls a man running with him, falling, and saw blood on his coat at the back."

The notes continued that after that Patrick Campbell remembered virtually nothing. Notes originally referred to a house in "St. Columb's Wells" but the words "St. Joseph Place" were inserted. He was then taken in a private car and on the way to Altnagelvin, just before the bridge at Barrack Street, the car was stopped by the Army and he was put into an Army vehicle. Joe Friel was there at the time. The notes then referred to whether it was the same car as Joe Friel and the driver being Mr. McMonagle. It was noted that he had been visited by Special Branch. His wife had his clothing, complete with the bullet hole in his trousers.

20.4.2.7 AC19.3 is the map that is attached to The Sunday Times notes of the interview of Patrick Campbell. The map shows where he initially stood in Rossville Street, where he dived for cover to the south of block 1 and an indication where he was when he was shot. The only direct account of the wounding of Patrick Campbell, appears in the statement of Patrick Campbell himself.[3]

20.4.2.8 A police report at ED27.3, from a Detective Inspector reads as follows:

"On Monday, 7th February at midday I interviewed the above named [Patrick Campbell] in the presence of Mr Bennett, consultant surgeon. Campbell was one of the persons more seriously wounded as a result of the troubles on 30th January and as a result could not be interviewed until the 7th inst. Campbell elected to make and sign a written statement which involves him in the civil rights march, which relates his action during the period in question. It will be noted from the medical report that he has sustained serious injuries and is likely to be in hospital for some time. He appears to be a jovial type notwithstanding his injuries and he was most co-operative."

20.4.2.9 Danny McGowan at AM255.2 paragraphs 8 to 12 of his statement to this Inquiry described the scene around the body of Hugh Gilmore at the gable end of block 1 of Rossville Flats. Danny Magowan can be seen in the photograph AM255.6 near the telephone box. When this photograph was taken he described the shooting continuing and people scattering in various directions to take cover. Some ran to Free Derry Corner. He, along with others, remained where they were, pressed up against the south gable of block 1. It was then that he saw Patrick Campbell, whom he knew, walking like a man who had a few bottles in him. When he first saw him, Patrick Campbell was in the area to the south of block 2 of the Rossville Flats, by the shops, which were on its ground floor. This area was marked C on the map at AM255.9. Patrick Campbell was leaning against the wall of the shops as if to prevent himself from falling, and was staggering in a southeasterly direction towards Joseph Place. In the witness' view he had emerged from the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville flats. He went over to Patrick Campbell and helped him to the alleyway to the east of Joseph Place, the entrance to which was marked D on the map at AM255.9. The witness only realised he had been hit when he saw him and he said 'I am shot, I am shot'. He could not see where he had been hit as he was wearing a heavy coat. His impression was that he had been shot in the market (Rossville Flats car park) before emerging through the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats.

20.4.2.10 The alleyway to which he helped Patrick Campbell was formed by the gap between the wall on the southern side of the houses in Joseph Place and a retaining wall for the steep banking which lead up to the city walls. It was packed with men, women and children taking cover from the shooting.

20.4.2.11 It was so packed that it was difficult for Patrick Campbell and the witness to fit in. He realised that he could not take Patrick Campbell much further (as he weighed some 15 stone) so he left him in the care of some people in the alleyway. He then decided to make his way up another set of steps which led from the entrance of the alleyway to Fahan Street East and which are shown on AM255.9. At AM255.2 paragraph 13 Danny McGowan then described how he was shot.

20.4.2.12 At AM189.5 paragraph 20, William McDermott described how half a dozen shots were fired while he was at Joseph Place, looking out of one of the windows. Women and children were also taking shelter in there and were panicking. He went down the stairs to the Rossville Street entrance of the alleyway between the two blocks of Joseph Place. He wanted to see what else was happening. He saw Patrick Campbell in the alleyway behind Joseph Place being 'oxtored' or carried by two other men, south along the alleyway. His legs were bent and he seemed to be dragging his toes along the ground. He was moaning, but the witness did not think he was badly hurt. He was wearing a gabardine dark beige raincoat. He did not speak to him.

20.4.2.12 He thought he was taken to the back entrance of someone's house in Joseph Place. At AM189.5 paragraph 22 he said that as he was peeping out of the alleyway, he heard a bullet pass close to his head which hit the wall overhead. He heard a thud above his head. The shot seemed to be fired from the area of Glenfada Park, although he did not see any soldiers there. Whoever fired the shot must have seen the witness before he saw him. He thought that the shot was aimed at. It was too close for comfort so he took cover again. The shooting then died down.

20.4.2.13 It is possible in the light of that evidence that Patrick Campbell was taken first to a house in Joseph Place and then in St Columb's Wells.

20.4.2.14 Edmund Melaugh gave evidence to this Inquiry at Day 170. In his statement to the Inquiry at AM398.4 paragraphs 18 to 20 he described taking shelter behind the gable end of block 1 and still hearing the sound of gun-fire after seeing people he thought had been shot at the Rubble Barricade. He thought there was still shooting coming from further north up Rossville Street. He could see soldiers advancing into Glenfada Park North Courtyard. He thought maybe four or five. They started to shoot across Glenfada Park South. Then one dropped to his knee near the centre of Glenfada Park North and started shooting towards the hexagonal flowerbed and the south gable end of block 1.[4] He said at Day 170/116/15 to Day 170/116/24 that he did not see him fire but that was where he was aiming the gun. At AM398.4 paragraphs 21 to 24 he described running along the back of block 2 to Joseph Place. He went into the alleyway and saw people hiding all along the alleyway. At AM398.4 paragraph 25 he heard someone behind him call out "I'm shot". He saw two people at the entrance to the alleyway who were both wounded. He thought the shots would have come from the soldiers in Glenfada Park North. One was in his thirties and one was in his fifties. One was wounded in the ankle and the other around the hip. Day 170/120/13 to Day 170/121/1. At the time he assumed they had been shot by the soldiers shooting from across towards Joseph Place from Glenfada Park North. Another man helped drag the two wounded men about half way down the alleyway before other people took them. He then went on to describe events surrounding the shooting of Patrick Doherty. He confirmed his recollection that he saw Patrick Doherty crawling after the two people were shot. Day 170/120/7 to Day 170/120/9.

20.4.2.15 Patrick Walsh gave an account in 1972 to the Sunday Times which appears at AW5.36. After he had assisted Patrick McDaid into the house in Joseph Place he came out again. The first thing he saw was Patrick Campbell staggering towards the entrance of the alleyway, groaning and clutching his back. He knew Patrick Campbell from work and Patrick Campbell shouted to him "Paddy, I'm hit, I'm hurt bad." Patrick Campbell fell forward into the mouth of the alleyway and was taken into one of the houses. He then gave a description of Danny McGowan being picked up by two men in the alleyway getting one arm each and dragging him along on his back. He seemed to be hit in the leg where Walsh could see blood. He then gave an account of seeing Patrick Doherty who was still alive at that point. At this Inquiry Patrick Walsh indicated that the events in this account had faded from his mind but at Day 171/37/11 to Day 171/37/15 he confirmed that the detailed account he gave of this incident would have been his recollection of events at the time he spoke to the Sunday Times.

20.4.2.16 At AT17.5 paragraph 32 Martin Tucker described two men running close together along the front of block 2 of the Rossville Flats by the shops. He thought they were running to the alleyway behind Joseph Place. They were shot at the point marked J on AT17.16. He thought both were shot in the leg. It was almost like watching a movie. He thought both got into the alleyway behind Joseph Place or into a house. He thought a couple of people helped them. They were in their thirties maybe not old but not teenagers. He did not remember what they were wearing. He did not see where the shots came but thought it was from the direction of Rossville Street and Glenfada Park South. At Day 098/119/1 to Day 098/119/3 the witness accepted that though both went down one may have been shot. At Day 098/117/9 to Day 098/1122/1, Mr Arthur Harvey QC examined the witness on this issue. It is clear that the witness, who even though he has wrongly described the age of Patrick Campbell, saw the movements of Patrick Campbell and Danny McGowan.

20.4.2.17 There is no civilian evidence which contradicts the fact that Patrick Campbell was shot from behind in the area of the rear of block 2 of Rossville Flats. He was unarmed and not engaged in any illegal activity. He was shot at a time and at a location where the civilian evidence indicated extensive Army fire.

20.4.3 Injuries sustained

20.4.3.1 Patrick Campbell was struck by a single bullet which entered his left buttock and caused serious intra-abdominal trauma before coming to rest either under the abdominal wall or in the abdomen. There was no exit wound. (E10.11)

20.4.3.2 As appears from a letter from a Senior Registrar to his GP dated 28^th March 1972, (D1013) Mr Campbell underwent a laparotomy on 31^st January 1972. He was found to have a perforation of the sigmoid colon and the bladder was perforated in two places with rupture of the ureter, which was transplanted in the bladder with colostomy.

20.4.3.3 The colostomy was closed on 6^th March and he was discharged on 18^th March, six weeks after his admission. However, as appears from a letter from the same Registrar to his GP dated 18^th April 1972, Mr Campbell was readmitted on 30^th March 1972 with a history of abdominal pain, dyuria and occasional vomiting. He was treated for a urinary infection and detained for ten days before being discharged again on 10^th April 1972. He continued to attend as an out-patient until he was finally discharged on 21^st November 1972. The bullet was never removed.

20.4.3.4 Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan note that the entry wound was described in the operation note as measuring one inch by half an inch. (E10.11) They also note that according to a letter dated 7^th February 1972 from Mr Bennett identified on x-ray was not recovered at the first operation. The x-ray reports were illegible and no x-rays were made available to them. There was nothing to indicate that the bullet (if it was present in the abdomen) had ever been removed. There was no record of a submission to DIFS relating to Mr Campbell. No comment could be made concerning the nature of the projectile.

20.4.4.1 Patrick Campbell's son, John, who was aged 22 at the time of Bloody Sunday, described how his father had told the family about his journey to hospital. Mrs. Doherty, a neighbour of theirs, had put Patrick Campbell into a car to take him to hospital. There were others in the car but he did not know whom. The car was stopped at a checkpoint and his father was put in a Saracen and taken to Altnagelvin Hospital. A soldier held his gun to his father's head all the way to the hospital. His father thought they were taking him to finish him off. AC14.5 paragraph 27.

20.4.4.2 Bernard McMonagle was the man who drove to the first aid post at Craigavon Bridge. At ED27.5 he described going up to his mothers house at 16 St. Columb's Walk. It was about 4.15 pm. He parked the car at the top of St. Columb's Walk and saw a crowd down on the Lecky Road. He walked down to St. Columb's Wells to see what was happening. He heard some of the crowd talking about people being shot. Several fellows approached him and two of them asked if he had his car with him; they obviously knew he had a car. The fellows told him that a man had been shot and asked him to bring him to bring the man to the hospital. He went and got the car and made his way up Hollywell Street and eventually got to Foyle Road. Mrs Doherty came in the back of the car with the injured man. He had passed a military road check earlier at Ferguson's Lane at about 4.10 pm when he was coming from work. The witness went towards the checkpoint and got out and approached the officer in charge. He told him what had happened. He then came to the car and saw the wounded man. He then brought him along to this centre.

20.4.4.3 At AM366.1 paragraph 2 of his most recent statement he indicated that he used to do some freelance photography and after finishing work at 4.00pm he headed from Dupont to the Bogside taking a camera with him. It was his intention to take some photographs. He drove to the Bogside. The route which he took to the Bogside is marked on the attached map A at AM366.5 which shows him crossing the Craigavon Bridge and getting in the end to a house on the west side of St. Columb's Wells.

20.4.4.4 At AM366.1 paragraph 4, he said he arrived at the approximate point which is marked X on map A. This was at around 4.20 pm. He was surprised when he reached St. Columb's Wells to see hundreds of people running from the north of St. Columb's Wells towards him as he approached in his car from the south. He had driven about halfway along St. Columbs Wells from the south when he saw the crowd. The road that runs through St. Columb's Wells is no more than 300 yards long.

20.4.4.5 At AM366.2 paragraphs 7 to 9 he said he drove slowly through the crowd. As he reached point X on map A, a person walked in front of the car with a hand raised. There may have been another person trying to flag him down as well, but he was not sure. He could not remember anything at all about that person. He wound his window down. He saw a man being carried towards the car by some other people. The man's face was pointing towards me and his legs were dangling. He was being carried from the eastern side of the road, which ran through St. Columb's Wells, to the west side of the road on which he had stopped the car.

20.4.4.6 He had a vague memory of a coat or jacket wrapped loosely around the man trailing along the ground as he was being carried, although it may have been that someone placed the coat or jacket on him after he had been helped into the car. The rear door on the right-hand side of the car, namely the side nearest to the east side of the road, was opened. One of the people who had carried the man to the car said to him that there had been a spot of bother and a few people had been shot. The witness was asked to take the injured man to hospital. He was wary about taking the injured man to hospital, but was reassured when he saw Kathleen Doherty amongst the people helping the man on to the back seat of the car. He knew Kathleen Doherty's husband who worked with him as a fitter at Dupont.

20.4.4.7 At AM366.2 paragraphs 10 to 13 he described how the injured man was placed on the back seat of the car face down. He could remember seeing blood pouring out from the front of the man's body. However, for some reason at the time he thought that the man had been shot in the bottom of his back. He could not say on which side of the back he had been shot. He did not know the identity of the injured man at the time. After the man had been placed into the car, Kathleen Doherty got into the back with him. She sat with the head of the injured man facing down on her knee. As far as he was aware the man was not carrying a weapon of any description and he did not think that Kathleen Doherty would have had anything to do with him if he had been armed. Another person may have got into the front passenger seat next to him, but he had no memory of this now. He turned the car around, as he intended to take the injured man to Altnagelvin Hospital. He had virtually reached the Craigavon Bridge when he came upon an Army barracks where the car was stopped.

20.4.4.8 His journey from St Columb's Wells to Craigavon Bridge probably took no more than ten minutes. During the course of the journey Kathleen Doherty told him that the injured man was her neighbour from the Creggan and that his name was Mr Campbell. No Christian name was ever mentioned to him. He only became aware a few weeks ago that the injured man's first name was Patrick. There was no mention at any time of the circumstances in which the injured man had been shot and he did not find out subsequently as they have never met since that day.

20.4.4.9 At AM363.3 paragraphs 17 to 18 he stated that when he reached the Army barracks on the Foyle Road close to the Craigavon Bridge he was asked by an Army officer where he was going. There was an armed soldier standing near the officer. He could not recall whether there were any more armed soldiers in the yard. He was directed by the officer into the yard of the barracks and instructed by him to get out of the car once he had driven into the yard. He got out of his car. He could not recall seeing the injured man's face as he did so. There were soldiers around the car almost immediately. Medical personnel had also arrived quickly on the scene. They said that they would look after the injured man. He did not see the injured man at all after that. At AM366.3 paragraph 19 the witness described being taken into a room at the Army barracks and interviewed. After he was released he witnessed an incident where apparently RUC officers were "having fisty-cuffs" with army personnel over the events of the day. He did not know whether he was interviewed by the Army or by the RUC and whether a statement was prepared.

20.4.4.10 It seems likely that Patrick Campbell was attended to by Soldier 138, who on the day was the medical officer with the 1st Battalion of the first Royal Anglian Regiment and was based at the post by the Craigavon Bridge. At Day 383/21/7 to Day 383/23/17 Soldier 138 described the man in P747 as looking very familiar. He recalled the man he treated was middle-aged, overweight and balding. The man was in a state of shock and sweating heavily having clearly lost a lot of blood. He was seriously ill and had been shot in the tummy. Counsel to the Inquiry pointed out that although Patrick Campbell was shot in the buttock the bullet had lodged in the abdominal wall or inside the abdomen so he might well have had acute pain in his tummy. The witness accepted that his recollection was entirely consistent with the evidence the Inquiry had about both Patrick Campbell and Joe Friel who Soldier 138 also saw.[5]

20.4.4.11 Joe Friel described at AF34.4 paragraph 25 being at the first aid post. He was put on a stretcher and then put into a Saracen. After receiving some treatment Patrick Campbell was then brought into the Saracen and put on the other side. He was wearing a cloth cap and a gabardine "Columbo" style coat. He did not know how long he had been in the Saracen before Patrick Campbell arrived but it was maybe just a matter of minutes. Patrick Campbell was chalk white and he thought he was dying. He had the impression of steam coming off his body. Patrick Campbell asked the witness was he ok and the witness asked Patrick Campbell the same. They held hands and cried. Two soldiers got into the back of the Saracen and the doors were shot. They seemed to be tending more to Patrick Campbell. At AF34.4 paragraph 26 he described being taken to hospital. He thought that he was taken in simultaneously with Patrick Campbell.

20.4.4.12 At AM252.2 William McGoldrick also provided evidence of the picking up of Patrick Campbell from St Columb's Wells. He stood at the point marked E on the map at AM252.5, which is just at the mouth of St Columb's Wells, about four houses down on the eastern side if travelling from Fahan Street. He stated at AM252.2 paragraph 3 that he stood there and there were perhaps about 100 people taking cover by the side of the houses in that area. He stood there for perhaps ten to fifteen minutes but he could not be accurate about the time. He remembered that as he stood there some people to his right, closer to the junction with Fahan Street, were shouting to the people who were crossing Fahan Street from Joseph Place to St Columb's Wells that they should hurry and come and take cover because the Army was shooting from the city walls. He could hear shooting but did not know which direction it was coming from. He did not see or hear anything which confirmed to him that the Army was shooting from the city walls. He did not look up at the walls at any time. At AM252.4 paragraph 4 he stated that after a time, he saw some people, about four, carrying a man. He did not know in which direction they had come from. They were shouting "Does anybody know anything about first aid?" Up until a few months before then, he had been in St John's Ambulance and he followed the men into a house.

20.4.4.13 He could not remember precisely which house it was, but it was possibly the one which he marked on the map as point F on AM252.5, which was about six houses down on the left hand side i.e. the west side of St Columb's Wells travelling south from Fahan Street, or one near there. The man was placed on a couch. He remembered that he was a big tall man, heavily built and bald. He could not remember if he was wearing glasses. He thought he was wearing a dark coloured suit. The witness pulled his shirt up and saw that there was a hole near his left kidney on the left-hand side of his back, about two and a half inches in from his side. It was a black hole with a blue ring around it. He could see that it was a bullet hole. It was not bleeding but he could tell that he could not do anything for the man, as he needed to be taken to a hospital as soon as possible. The witness asked whether anybody in the house had a towel or pad he could use. Someone passed him a towel and he pressed it against the wound. He said that someone had to get him to hospital. There were about twelve people in the house but he did not know any of the people there. He remembered that a man who was in the house got a car and drove the injured man to hospital. He later learned that the driver's name was Barry McMonagle.

20.4.4.14 A couple of the women and men from the house went with him. The witness did not go. He remembered that someone called the injured man Paddy when he was in the house. He remembered that the man said that he had been shot although he did not say where he had been standing when he was shot. Nobody in the house seemed to know where he had been when he had been shot. He did not know which hospital they took him to. They may have gone to Altnagelvin but he remembered that somebody in the house said that it might be difficult to get there because the soldiers might stop them. They may have gone to Letterkenny. It would have been one of the two.

20.4.4.15 In AM252.2 paragraph 5 the witness said that a few days later, he remembered reading the local journal which gave a list of the dead and injured. A friend of the witness remarked that the person that he had helped in the house must have been Patrick Campbell.

20.4.4.16 The passenger who accompanied Patrick Campbell to the Regimental Aid Post was Kathleen Doherty. Her statement to the police is at ED27.6, where she said that on 30th January 1972, she left her home to go down to the Lecky Road to see the parade passing. About 4.15 pm she was standing on the Lecky Road with a group of people. Everybody started to shout that the soldiers were shooting. She ran up to McKeown's Lane into St Columb's Wells. She could hear gunfire coming from Rossville Street. When she got into St Columb's Wells she heard someone shout that there was a man shot. A man shouted that it was Patrick Campbell from 4 Carrickreagh Gardens. A postman who was standing beside her said that as she knew him would she go in the car with him to hospital. The witness got into the car along with Patrick Campbell and the driver, who she knew to be Barney McMonagle. They stopped with the Army in Ferguson's Lane and told them what had happened. They brought them to the Army compound at Foyle Road.

20.4.4.17 At AC16.3 paragraph 19 Noel Campbell stated that he reached St Columb's Wells. He said he saw a man lying in the middle of the road at point H on the attached map at AC16.5, which is at the mouth of the Wells itself. At AC16.3 paragraph 19, the witness said that there was quite a large crowd of people standing around him. He looked over their shoulders. The man was lying on his back. Somebody rolled him over on to his chest as he watched. His head was pointing south. He was wearing a white shirt which was bloodstained. He thought he had been wounded in his lower back or shoulder. He did not see the wounds. Someone in the crowd said his name was Campbell. Someone else said that he was a docker. Other people were calling out for a doctor or an ambulance

20.4.4.18 Michael McKinney at AM309.3 paragraph 21 described taking cover at 38 St Columbs Wells and saw a car pull up along the street. Behind the car were two men carrying another man who was crouched over holding his stomach. The man looked as though he had been shot in the stomach. The man was in his fifties and had thin hair. He thought it was Patrick Campbell whom he met after Bloody Sunday. Mr. Campbell had been a customer in their butcher's shop.

20.4.4.19 John Leppard at Day 177/153/15 to Day 177/154/12 confirmed helping take a man out of a house in St Columb's Wells. He was a heavily built middle-aged man with a bald head. He believed at the time the man was dead but he was not limp or floppy and they had no difficulty getting him into the car. This incident appears clearly to refer to Patrick Campbell.[6]

20.4.4.20 Martin McShane at AM384.3 paragraph 16 described seeing a middle aged man he later learned to be called Campbell lying on the ground. He could see a bullet hole in his right hip, almost at his buttock. Mr. Campbell was groaning with pain. There was a group of around a dozen people there some of whom were applying pressure to the wound to try to control the blood loss. The position marked by the witness on AM384.4 at point "F" was near the entrance to St. Columb's Wells.

20.5 Danny McGowan

20.5.1.1 Danny McGowan was thirty-seven years old on the 30^thJanuary 1972. He lived at 10 Lonemoor Gardens with his eight children and his wife Teresa who was expecting their ninth child at the time of Bloody Sunday. A tenth child was also born after Bloody Sunday.

20.5.1.2 Mr McGowan was a hardworking man, dedicated to his family who was forced to go to England in search of work throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.

20.5.1.3 Danny McGowan returned to Derry and was employed n Dupont firstly in construction and then in production. Day 43/93/22 to Day 493/94/5.

20.5.1.4 Mr McGowan did not give evidence to Lord Widgery as he was not released from hospital until 20^th March 1972. No evidence was presented to the tribunal in relation to the circumstances in which Mr McGowan was shot, in fact, the only reference to Mr McGowan in Lord Widgery’s report was in Appendix A, “List of Deceased and Wounded.” The experience of having been shot and the tragedy of Bloody Sunday had a great impact on Danny’s life. Sadly, Mr McGowan died after a long illness on the 28^th January 2004, two days before the thirty-second anniversary of Bloody Sunday and without having witnessed the outcome of this Inquiry.

20.5.2 Injuries Sustained

20.5.2.1 Mr McGowan was shot between the knee and ankle on the inside of the right leg. His shin was shattered. The entry wound was halfway down the medial (inner side) of the right calf and the exit wound over the lateral (outer) side of the leg. E10.0011, D0847 and ED 29.3 The track of the wound is, therefore, more likely to be from left to right, which is consistent with Mr McGowan having been shot by a soldier located at the entrance to Glenfada Park North.

20.5.3.1 Mr McGowan gave an account of the circumstances of his unjustified wounding, in his statement of the 28th February 1972 at AM 255.10. In this account he makes it clear that he was at the telephone box at the end of Block One of the Rossville Flats, where he saw a young man lying on the ground. This young man, was we know, Hugh Gilmore to whom Mr McGowan, as can be clearly seen in P763, provided assistance. Mr McGowan in this statement refers to noticing a young girl, undoubtedly Geraldine Richmond, who was in hysterics. Significantly in this statement he refers to seeing two soldiers in firing positions at Glenfada Park:

"I also noticed two soldiers on their knees in firing positions at Glenfada Park. Then I noticed a man whom I now know to be Patrick Campbell staggering in a drunken fashion about 20 yards from me just above the butcher's shop at Joseph Place. He shouted to me "I'm shot, I'm shot". I ran over and caught him by the arm and helped him along towards the rear of the houses on Joseph's Place. Just as I pushed him around the corner of the rear of the houses my right leg folded underneath me and I realised that I was shot."

20.5.3.2 This statement provides the most accurate description of the material events which led up to the unjustified shooting of Mr McGowan. It is the most accurate account because it was made at the period of time closest to the events. From this account it would seem that the two soldiers who must be members of Anti-Tank Platoon had assumed firing positions at the corner of Glenfada Park North.

20.5.3.3 He goes on, in this statement, to describe how he was helped to a car in St Columb's Wells which took him home and taken, subsequently, to Altnagelvin hospital. In his Eversheds statement at AM255.3 paragraph 16 Mr McGowan describes how someone drove the car towards Altnagelvin, but on seeing soldiers in Bishop Street, drove him to his home in 10 Lone Moor Gardens instead.

20.5.3.4 John Radcliffe, a neighbour and friend, went into Mr McGowan’s house, Day 220/ 70/10 , where he met Teresa McGowan and Mrs Kitty Duffy, his sister-in-law who also lived in the same street. He saw Danny McGowan lying, conscious, on the couch with a wound to his right leg, just above the calf muscle. There didn’t seem to be much blood coming from the wound but he could see that the bullet had passed straight through Danny’s lower leg. Mr Radcliffe, telling Danny that he needed to go to hospital, went outside and stopped a Knights of Malta ambulance on Southway. As they were unable to take an additional casualty they called for an ambulance which arrived sometime later. Danny did not tell Mr Radcliffe how he became injured, other than telling him the army had shot him”. AR1.4 paragraph 14.

20.5.3.5 This version of events is supported by the statements of ambulance men John Rutherford and Ronald Moore in Ambulance 4, ED 29.5, who, arriving in Glenfada after having received a call at 17.14, were told to go to 10 Lone Moor Gardens. From there they collected a man, called Danny McGowan, with a broken leg who said he received the injury when playing football. According to Mr McGowan at AM 255.3 paragraph 17, his brother and a neighbour Walter Duffy¸ who has never made a statement, accompanied him to the hospital. The army stopped the ambulance on the Abercorn Road where they were all searched until they were permitted to continues after Mr McGowan’s brother, who was ex-army, intervened.

20.5.3.6 Mr McGowan was admitted to ward six in Altnagelvin Hospital at 17.45. D0845. His wound was cleaned by Dr Fenton and a pin inserted in his leg. The wound was sutured on 7^th February 1972 and on 20^th March 1972 Mr McGowan was discharged. He was to continue to receive treatment for the wound he sustained that day, on and off, right up until 10^th September 1980.

20.5.3.7 In his interview with the police at the hospital, at ED29.4, Mr McGowan says that he was injured next to Free Derry corner at his brother-in-law’s, Joseph McColgan, 27 St Columbs Wells. He said his brother in law and other ‘fellas’ he knows were with him at the time. In his Eversheds, statement he says he was not on the march but was just visiting his brother in law. AM255.1 paragraph 3.

20.5.3.8 The police comment, in their report, on the fact that whilst Mr McGowan said, in this interview, that he was injured at Free Derry Corner, he was picked up, one and a half miles away, at Lonemoor Gardens. Mr McGowan had told the ambulance driver, Mr Moore, that he had received his injuries as the result of playing football. Superintendent Michael J Finn believed that Moore must have mistaken someone else for Mr McGowan. However, Mr McGowan explains at AM255.3 paragraph 19 that he told the authorities that his injuries were sustained while playing football because he did not want to get arrested and because he was mistrustful of the authorities. This was an honest and understandable reaction from an innocent man in a climate where men were being regularly interned without trial.

20.5.3.9 In a supplementary statement to the Inquiry, at AM 255.16, Mr McGowan was asked to answer questions in relation to information contained in a document entitled “B.S. Summary of Irish Eye Witness Stories,” AM255.14. In particular he was asked whether he ran up Chamberlain street and whether he saw Father Daly’s Gunman / OIRA 4. In his supplementary statement Mr McGowan reiterates the position that he has taken over the years, that he was not on the march and did not make his way down Chamberlain Street, but rather made his way from Free Derry Corner towards Blocks 1 & 2 of the Rossville flats.

20.5.3.10 Mr McGowan admitted he did see OIRA 4 through the gap between Blocks One and Two of the Rossville Flats and that, contrary to what is stated at AM255.14, he did not see OIRA 4 fire a few shots around the gable end, only that he was holding a gun.

20.5.3.11 The above inconsistencies have been identified by Katherine Shepherd in her letter of the 18^th April 2002 as the basis for allegations that Mr McGowan:

(b) Came from the car park of the Rossville Flats (perhaps having been on the march and/or in the vicinity of Barrier 14.

(d) Is not consistent with his pre-Eversheds accounts in assuming that he was shot from the Walls.

20.5.3.12 Unless the above ‘allegations’ are coupled with the suggestion that Mr McGowan was shot justifiably, i.e. that he was armed at the time that he was shot, and that these inconsistencies are an attempt to conceal that fact, they should be viewed, in our submission, a simple mixture of inconsistent recollections and concern for ones liberty.

20.5.3.13 We would remind the Tribunal that Danny McGowan enjoyed the reputation of being a devoted family man and was not connected with any paramilitary organisation.

20.5.3.14 The central thrust of the suggestions in the Katherine Shepherd letter is that Mr McGowan is incorrect when he suggested that he was shot from the City Walls. It is accepted, as the evidence suggests, that the more likely explanation is that he was shot by a soldier located at Glenfada Park. Incidentally, the inconsistencies referred to in the Katherine Shepherd letter are in no way comparable to the glaring inaccuracies and inconsistencies that characterise the soldiers’ evidence on the central issues.

20.5.3.15 It is important that, in assessing Mr McGowan’s evidence, the Tribunal consider the effect that Bloody Sunday had on Mr McGowan and his response to these traumatic events as evidenced by the medical proofs which have been obtained as well as the evidence of Mr McGowan himself at AM 255.4 paragraph 19. Ultimately the conclusions which the Inquiry make in relation to how Mr McGowan arrived at the position indicated in P763 are of secondary importance to the conclusions that the Inquiry must make in relation to the circumstances surrounding his unjustified shooting. The soldiers failed to offer any explanation for the shooting of Danny McGowan in 1972 and they have failed to offer any explanation in 2003 because, we submit, there was none.

20.5.4 Civilian Evidence

20.5.4.1 There are three significant witnesses for the tribunal to consider in relation to Mr McGowan, They are Edmund Melaugh, AM398, Eddie Dillon AD 45 and Donna Harkin AH 13.

20.5.4.2 Edmund Melaugh was a witness who did his best to give an accurate account of the events surrounding the shooting of Mr McGowan, Mr Campbell and Mr Doherty. His NICRA statement at AM398.19 says as follows:

“I heard more shooting and saw two men fall at the end of the lane. The other man and myself went back to help these men. One was wounded somewhere round the hip. This man I helped away as far as some other men at the entry. I then went back to help the other man who could not drag the other wounded man who was shot in the lower part of the leg”.

The first man would in our submission appear to be Patrick Campbell while the second man is Danny McGowan.

20.5.4.3 His Eversheds statement at AM398.4 Para 25 provides a little more detail:

There were two wounded at the entrance to the Joseph Place alleyway at point K grid reference K19 AM398.18 AM 398.5 Paragraph 26 .One was in his fifties the other in his thirties. I remember one was shot in the ankle. They were very close together and they were just at the end of the alleyway. Day 170/122/01. In his statement to the Inquest, AM 398.22, Mr Melaugh states:

“This other man and I were in a lane behind the small flats in Rossville Street and I saw two men being shot at the end of the lane. One was shot in the ankle and the other about the hip. I went over to help them. Neither of them was armed,” and, on the Keville Tape, AM 398.23:

“We were in a little lane behind – the small flats in Rossville Street and I saw these two men getting shot at the end. One was shot in the ankle and the other was shot up in the arm.” “They were stationary and we were able to reach out and drag them in. We did not have to move out onto open ground.” Day 170/122/7 to Day 170/122/ 22.

20.5.4.4 Edward Dillon is also an important eye witness for Mr McGowan. He saw Mr McGowan immediately after he was shot and then assisted him:

“I was coming up to Free Derry Corner towards the meeting. My back was to Rossville Street. At the High Flats the soldiers started firing. I went to the steps which leads to a passageway into Faughan Street. A man came behind me and cried out he had been shot. I went back to see how badly he was shot had been shot. I went back to see how badly he was shot. He was shot in the right leg below the knee. The leg appeared to be broken to me and was bleeding badly.” AD 45.6

20.5.4.5 The NICRA version should be compared with the Eversheds statement at AD 45.1 Paragraphs 6 to 7. Here Mr Dillon made his way to the Joseph Place alleyway and, within a few seconds of reaching it, Mr McGowan arrived. Mr Dillon accepted, when questioned by Arthur Harvey QC on Day 174/72/11 to Day 174/73/4, that his memory had become confused and he had compressed a number of incidents.

20.5.4.6 He accepted when further questioned on Day 174/73/5 to Day 174/75/11 that his statement at AD 45.6 indicated that Dillon was on the steps leading to a passageway onto Fahan Street and Mr McGowan had come from behind him and cried out that he had been shot. This statement confirms Mr McGowan’s present belief that he was shot while on the very first step which lead from the alleyway to Fahan Street East shown on Mr McGowan’s map at AM 255.9 grid references K19 position E. Indeed it was pointed out by Lord Saville on Day 174/74/25 to Day 174/75/6. This location is a very short distance from the bottom of the Fahan Street steps and the beginning of the Joseph Place alleyway. In addition at Day 174/75/7 to Day 174/76/8 Mr Dillon accepted that it was possible that Mr McGowan was taken the full length of the Joseph Place alleyway and placed in a car in St Columbs Wells.

20.5.4.7 It is obvious that Mr Dillon did assist Danny McGowan from the Joseph Place alleyway to a car in St Columb’s Wells when one considers the following:

(a) The injury which Mr Dillon witnessed is consistent with Mr McGowan - shot in the right leg below the knee, breaking the knee and causing it to bleed badly. AD45.6.

(d) The reference at AD45.6 to a ‘young lad’ helping him with Mr McGowan is is consistent with Edmund Melaugh. AM398

20.5.4.8 Donna Harkin nee Friel

Donna Harkin was a 16 year old student who saw, from the front window of her flat in 19 Garvan Place, Mr McGowan being shot. Her recollection, on Day 171/104 to Day 171/133, was not challenged by those who represent the soldiers. It is important to note that in her undated NICRA statement at AH13.12 she makes it clear that, when she stuck her head out of the window, she noticed a group of men crouched at the edge of the Joseph Place flats at the end of the bakery trying to make their way to the back of Joseph Place flats. As the group ran forward an elderly man was shot in the leg and fell. The shot came from the Glenfada direction. Two of the men, in our submission, Edward Dillon and Edmund Melaugh crawled back to get him and two ran on. Donna Harkin then continues in this statement to describe the horrific murder of Paddy Doherty.

20.5.4.9 Donna Harkin’s Eversheds statement at AH 13.6 paragraphs 33 to 35 and her attached map at AH 13.24 provides valuable clarification of a number of matters. Firstly, she is able to identify with a degree of precision where she believes that Mr McGowan fell as being point 22 on AH 13.24 with his head facing towards the Joseph Place alleyway. In addition she believes that the ‘elderly man’ to whom she referred was aged 30 to 40, her parents’ age. Mr McGowan was 37 on Bloody Sunday. She believed that Paddy Doherty was behind Mr McGowan helping him to safety by pushing his feet.

20.5.5 Conclusion

20.5.5.1 There is no civilian evidence that contradicts the fact that Danny McGowan was shot in the area of the Joseph place alleyway. Three witnesses provide an accurate and honest account of the position and activity of Danny McGowan when he was shot and are consistent with his statement of the 28^th February 1972, at AM 255.10. He was unarmed and not engaged in any illegal activity.

(ii) Danny McGowan assisted Hugh Gilmore at the telephone box where he can be seen in Robert White’s photograph P763

(v) Danny. McGowan was shot in the area near to the steps which lead to a passageway into Fahan Street East. This is an area near to the entrance of the alleyway which runs behind the maisonettes at Joseph Place.

(vi) Soldier F was the only soldier who admits to having fired into the area in which Danny McGowan was shot. The evidence supports the suggestion that Soldier F shot Danny McGowan.

(vii)Danny McGowan was carried to a car in Columb’s Wells which brought him to his house in 10 Lone Moor gardens.

(viii) Danny McGowan was, eventually, brought by ambulance to Altnagelvin Hospital.

(x) Danny McGowan had not handled a gun or nail bomb or had acted in support of any person handling or using a gun or bomb on Bloody Sunday.

(xii)This soldier could not have believed that Danny McGowan could have posed a threat at the time he shot him.

(xiii) No other person near Danny McGowan posed a threat to the soldier who shot him.

(xiv) Danny McGowan was not in the vicinity of civilian gunmen or bombers when shot.

(xv) There were no missing casualties in the Joseph Place alleyway. On the contrary Danny McGowan is an injured person for whom the soldiers have failed to account

(xvi) Danny McGowan was not shot in crossfire or in the course of a 'gun-battle' with civilian gunman.

20.6.1.1 There is video and photographic evidence[7] before the Inquiry, which suggests that a substantial number of anti-tank Platoon soldiers entered Glenfada Park beyond those who admit to having done so. However we know for certain that Soldier F did and that he eventually admitted firing two shots from the corner of Glenfada Park North behind Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.

20.6.1.2 As has been seen in our submissions on Sector 3 and Sector 4 Soldier F admitted for the first time firing two shots behind Block 2 of the Rossville Flats in his statement to Lieutenant Colonel Overbury on 19 February 1972.

20.6.1.3 In that statement he described firing his two rounds at an alleged nail bomber in Glenfada Park. Immediately after this he ran along the “eastern” wall of Glenfada Park to the corner. As he did so he heard pistol shots coming from the area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville Flats. He shouted "there's a gunman" and he dropped to one knee and took an aim position. He saw a man near the wall facing his direction who turned as if to run. He saw he had an object in his hand. This man was the only person in the area from which gunfire had come. The object in his hand was large and black like an automatic pistol. He fired two rounds at the man and he fell to the ground. B135.

20.6.1.4 He then saw 20 people, 19 men and 1 woman standing near him huddled together at the end of the flats at Glenfada Park. He arrested these people with others including Soldier G who came up. B135.

20.6.1.5 His statements to the RMP and subsequently were utterly dishonest and designed to disguise the amount and the location of his firing on the day. He had already made four statements to the RMP[8] before he admitted to firing any shots behind block 2 of the Rossville Flats. This is utterly inexplicable except on the basis that up to that point Soldier F had concealed his shooting in anticipation of not having to account for it. At a very early stage the army must have been in possession of the information that two persons had been shot dead behind the flats and others wounded in that area. It would not have taken long by a process of elimination and a serious investigation that the soldiers likely to have fired in that area included Solder F. The first RMP statements of Soldiers134, 227, 040 and 025 were all made by 3 February 1972 presenting clear information of a Paratrooper firing in the area of the rear of the Rossville Flats. It appears that in spite of making four RMP statements between 30 January and 19 February 1972 Soldier F had still not been made to commit his actions to paper until 19 February 1972. The contention of Gerard Elias QC in respect of Soldier F's trajectory marking was considered in the course of the submission in relation to Sector 3. If Mr Elias is correct about the date error on the trajectory document the RMP had the information concerning Soldier F’s firing and did not act upon it. Lt.Colonel Overbury took the statement on 19 February 1972.

20.6.1.6 In his Treasury Solicitor statement he described asking G to cover him as he heard pistol shots in the direction of the Rossville Flats. He approached the southeast corner of Glenfada Park. He got down on one knee. He observed a man with a pistol at the far end of Rossville Flats. He thought the man was wearing darkish clothes. The man had a black object which looked like a pistol in his hand. He then shouted to Soldier G " there's a gunman down here" and took two aimed shots and the man fell to the ground. The man was in a half crouching position moving to the right as he shot him. B138.

20.6.1.7 Soldier F attempted to put forward a number of explanations as to why it had taken him to 19 February to mention both his shot at the Barricade and the shooting behind block 2 of the flats. When asked why he had not mentioned his shooting of the man behind the barricade or the man with the pistol behind the Rossville Flats one of his answers was:

All I can say was there is errors in the judgement of making the statements and they got confused." Day 375/138/25 to Day 375/139/6.

20.6.1.8 It was pointed out that in his first RMP statement he was not confused about the number of bullets he fired. He replied:

He continued to give further evasive and untruthful answers which are examined in our submission on Soldier F in Sector 3. It is submitted that Counsel to the Inquiry summarised the general truth about Soldier F’s failure to mention the shooting at the barricade and behind block 2 of the flats with the following question at Day 375/166/19 to Day 375/166/24:

Q “Is the position that by this stage it was becoming apparent in the course of the Investigation that the accounts given by the Anti-Tank Platoon did not fit with the number of victims?”

20.6.2.1 INQ 1826 was in the Ferret scout car on Rossville Street and described having heard a burst of shots coming from a position south of him. He marked this position and the direction of the shots on C1826.14. At Day 341/137/10 to Day 341/141/4 the witness described hearing five to eight single shots. He could not see a person but just puffs of smoke. The shots were to his front right and diagonally. From the angle he was viewing it looked like an alleyway. They were high velocity shots and were all fired at the same time. He could not say if they all came from the same area. He confirmed that the direction of fire was across Rossville Street and in the direction of Joseph Place and behind Rossville Flats. Day 341/145/1 to Day 341/145/10. At the time he assumed it was a civilian firing because he did not realise that soldiers were as far south as they actually were. The line of fire could not have been directed at soldiers. If the shots had been fired in his direction he would have seen the person firing the weapon. C1826.5 paragraph 30 and Day 341/145/11 to Day 341/145/21. It is submitted that the only factual and logical conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence of INQ 1826 is that he witnessed a member of Anti-Tank Platoon firing across from the direction of Glenfada Park North to the back of block 2 of the Rossville Flats and that those were the shots fired by Soldier F.

20.6.3.1 It is particularly notable that Soldier G did not mention Soldier F shooting from the southeast corner of Glenfada Park until his Treasury Solicitor statement. In that statement he described being recalled by their Platoon Commander and hearing F shout: “There’s a gunman or something like that.” He saw Soldier F down on one knee at the south east corner of Glenfada Park aiming in an easterly direction. He saw him fire one or two shots in a direction out of his sight. B187 paragraph 8.

20.6.3.2 It would be a remarkable coincidence, if it were a coincidence, that both Soldier F and Soldier G, who were paired on the day, independently forgot to mention Soldier F’s discharge of two shots eastwards from the south east corner of Glenfada Park. It is an obvious inference that Soldier G only offered this information once he knew Soldier F had by then admitted it. He also provided corroboration by including the information that he heard Soldier F say, "There's a gunman or something like that." There is a further possibility that he was told not to mention it up to that point. Soldier G had of course been engaged, as can be seen in our submissions on Sector 4, in his own particular activities at Abbey Park.

20.6.3.3 The question as to why it was not until his Treasury Solicitor's statement that Soldier G mentioned Soldier F's activity at the corner of Glenfada Park North can only have a limited number of answers. It is possible that he had witnessed Soldier F's unjustified firing there and chose not to reveal it until asked to provide a justification for it. It is also possible that he did not witness Soldier F's activities in this location at all but fabricated a corroborative account when asked to do so. Either of the above possibilities made Soldier G an utterly dishonest and unreliable witness to Soldier F's activities at the end of Glenfada Park North.

20.6.4 Soldier H

20.6.4.1 As we know Soldier H claimed to have fired 19 shots at a silhouette in a frosted window in Glenfada Park North. At Day 377/85/17 to Day 377/86/6 it was put to Soldier H by Counsel to the Inquiry that the account of these shots was untrue because he fired a large number of shots he would not be able to justify and that he had to come up with an account to explain them. He rejected this suggestion.

20.6.4.2 At Day 377/98/3 to Day 377/102/1 Soldier H was examined on the possibility that some of his shots were fired towards the rear of block 2. He said he did not fire in that direction.[9]

20.6.4.3 According to the notes of his Sunday Times interview Patrick Campbell described looking back down Rossville Street and seeing the Saracens coming in. He saw soldiers jumping out and when the shooting began he made a dive for cover behind a small gable near the telephone box. From there he could see soldiers milling about in Glenfada Park. He then made a dash for Joseph Place and was shot in the back (the wound is at the base of the spine) It is important to note that in a contemporaneous account Patrick Campbell was able to note soldiers in Glenfada Park just prior to his shooting.

20.6.4.4 Soldier J of Anti-Tank Platoon was also in Glenfada Park. He denied seeing Barney McGuigan, Patrick Doherty, Danny McGowan or Patrick Campbell being shot and denied seeing Soldier F fire from the corner of Glenfada Park or seeing any soldier in that position. Day 370/65/23 to Day 370/68/6.

20.6.4.5 David Longstaff had no recollection of Soldier F's shots from the south east corner of the gable end of Glenfada Park North although he had moved into Glenfada Park North. It was suggested to him that according to the evidence of Soldier 227 there were three paratroopers coming to the corner of Glenfada Park North. It was suggested to him he must have seen Soldier F on one knee shoot Barney McGuigan. He had no recollection of that at all. Day 374/185/12 to Day 374/185/18.

20.6.4.6 Soldier E also arrived at the gable end of Glenfada Park North where he claimed to have been involved in a number of arrests.

20.6.4.7 It is abundantly clear that given the location and activity of Soldier F and the movements of his colleagues, a number of them, apart from Soldier G, must at least have witnessed his activities. None of them have admitted to doing so. It is clear that at least some of the evidence from soldiers on the City Walls indicates the presence of more than one soldier at the point of firing. The evidence of these soldiers is examined in further detail below.

20.6.4.8 There is also civilian evidence of further shooting into the area than the shots admitted by Soldier F. This shooting could only have come from members of Anti –Tank Platoon. A number of civilian witnesses who were located in the area reported seeing soldiers positioned in Glenfada Park aiming and firing across the rear of block 2 of the Rossville Flats towards the Fahan Street steps some of which was later than even the shooting of Barney McGuigan.

20.6.4.8 Denis Bradley gave evidence of a soldier firing from the entrance to Glenfada Park North car park at the east. He feared for the people on the pram ramp leading down from Glenfada Park South onto the street. The soldier was firing above head height in a haphazard manner. He was firing in a generally southerly direction. He fired about six to eight shots in total. His general body direction was not towards the back of block 2 of the Rossville Flats H1.13 paragraphs 32 to 33. Mr. Bradley confronted him. Day 140/137/11 to Day 140/142/24.

20.6.4.9 John Porter is now deceased. He was looking out of the window of 8 Abbey Park. He said that he saw two separate sets of paratroopers firing towards Joseph Place. The first group fired three shots towards block two. The second group fired seven shots towards the south of block two. Both incidents occurred after Evelyn Lafferty was shot at in Abbey Park.

20.6.4.10 The witness described seeing two paratroopers appear at the corner of Glenfada Park North. The first fired two shots in the direction of Joseph Place and the second fired one shot in the same direction. Then the two paratroopers moved off the group of arrestees. His evidence about the second set of paratroopers was of one paratrooper firing four shots from the hip in a fanning movement and a second paratrooper firing two shots from chest height. A third paratrooper then fired one shot from his shoulder. WT8 50A to 51G.

20.6.4.11 Hugh Barbour described three or four soldiers coming out of the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South after Barney McGuigan was shot. They came onto Rossville Street, took up kneeling positions and put their rifles to their shoulders. He marked their position at point L on AB10.1. He decided to make a run for it to Joseph Place and heard intense shooting coming in his direction. He saw a couple of shots strike the steps leading to Fahan Street. AB10.5 paragraph 29 and Day 88/75/19 to Day 88/78/2.

20.6.4.12 Simon Winchester was unable to remember his 1972 account when he gave evidence to this Inquiry. In 1972 he said that he saw a soldier in front of the Glenfada Park flats firing four, five or six shots towards Joseph Place.M83.18 paragraph 21.

20.6.5.1 Soldier 227 was located on the City Walls as an Observer in Charlie OP. At Day 371/150/4 to Day 371/152/17 he indicated that he stood by the contents of his 1972 statements describing three paratroopers emerging from behind the rear of the flats in Glenfada Park. Whilst the other two were making arrests the other Para was kneeling next to a lamp-post which was positioned between him and the eastern block of Glenfada Park. His rifle was aiming parallel with Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. Once he saw him fire the witness saw somebody lying near the telephone box.[10] The witness identified the man shot from the relevant photographs of the body of Barney McGuigan at the Widgery Inquiry. Day 371/201/3 to Day 371/204/6.

20.6.5.2 In his first RMP statement, apparently made in the early hours of 1 February 1972 and which is in hand-written form at B2186.1, B2186.2 and B2186.3, he had described seeing three soldiers appear from the rear of the flats in Glenfada Park and one of them knelt on the corner facing the Rossville Flats. The other two soldiers were making arrests. At this point he heard two or three pistol shots being fired from the area of the Rossville Flats. The soldier in Glenfada Park then fired two rounds towards Rossville Flats and he saw a man fall at the corner of block 1 of the flats. He then described his attention being attracted by the man lying on the ground in front of Joseph Place who had been shot in the lower part of the body and while doing so heard a number of SLR shots and other high velocity shots but he did not know from what area they came.

20.6.5.3 In his second RMP statement, dated 2 February 1972, he again described the three soldiers. One of them kneeling at the corner of the building facing towards the Rossville Flats and the other two making arrests. At this time he heard two or three pistol shots being fired from the area of Rossville Flats. The shots were fired in rapid succession. The soldier kneeling then fired two aimed shots towards the Rossville Flats. He saw him do this and he also saw a man at the corner of block 1 of the Rossville Flats fall to the ground. B2185.

20.6.5.4 The witness told Lord Widgery that he heard three to four pistol shots. He did confirm that he did not notice any shots coming from the position that Soldier F had placed himself in before Barney McGuigan was shot. WT16. 40E , WT16.49D

20.6.5.5 In his Eversheds statement at B2204.008 paragraph 41 he described his present recollection as the pistol shots being fired prior to the paratroopers appearing from Glenfada Park North. He was reluctant to confirm that hearing the pistol shots and seeing the paratrooper kneeling and firing two aimed shots were actually connected although his RMP statement gives this impression.

20.6.5.6 On Day 371/167/19 to Day 371/175/17 the witness, in response to Counsel for some of the soldiers, marked the position where the pistol shots came from. He had of course never seen the firer. B2204.036. This directly contradicted the witness’s testimony to Lord Widgery when he said that not only did he not see anyone down where Soldier F had fired as it was out of his view but he did not notice any shots coming from that position before Soldier F’s firing had occurred. The marking on this map is in complete contradiction of the evidence of the witness from his first RMP statement through to his evidence to Lord Widgery.[11]

20.6.5.7 He had also described at B2204.006 paragraphs 28 to 29 his attention being drawn to a man that seemed to be dragging himself along by his arms on the eastern side of Joseph Place. He was going from the witness' left to his right towards the Rossville Flats. He could see no obvious wound or reason why he should be dragging himself along rather than walking or crawling. He could not see any weapons on him although he would not necessarily have been able to see a handgun. The witness described him progressing towards the northern end of Joseph Place. This direction of movement would not in any case have taken the man to the northern end of Joseph Place but towards the Rossville Flats. At Day 371/155/6 to Day 371/159/3 it was suggested to him that the person he saw could have been Danny McGowan or Patrick Campbell. He could not make that connection because the man was crawling from his left to his right before he was taken away in the direction he had come by two men. He further stated in evidence that he made no connection with the soldier firing and this man. It is clear that the witness is describing a person who was simply crawling along Joseph Place or is in error regarding the direction of movement of Patrick Campbell and Danny McGowan.

20.6.5.8 The witness missed up to 103 SLR shots which were fired in the Bog-side by the army that afternoon although he did apparently hear Thompson sub-machine gunfire, sounds of an explosion like a nail bomb, three SLR shots, then pistol shots followed by two SLR shots. Day 371/175/19 to Day 371/200/12. His observations on this issue clearly do not represent an accurate picture of events. For further submissions on the evidence of this witness see submissions on Observation Posts Sector 3.

20.6.6 Soldier 040

20.6.6.1 This witness was located in Magazine Street accompanied by Soldier 134. He made a first statement to the RMP on 2 February 1972, which is at B1652. He described seeing 3 members of the Parachute Regiment arresting a number of people at the end wall of Glenfada Park Flats. He saw two other Parachute Regiment members take up position on the corner where the arrests had taken place. One of them adopted a kneeling position and fired a shot along the rear of block 2 Rossville Flats. He saw a man waving his arm leap in the air and land on his back. A priest came out and tended to the man.

20.6.6.2 At almost the same time he saw the man shot he saw a further two men fall to the ground in front of the Rossville Flats but about fifty yards further along towards Rossville Street. One of the men got up but fell again and was helped to a position under the veranda at the front of block 2 of Rossville Flats. At the time he thought that the two men had been struck by rubber bullets because one of them got to his feet. He did see three bodies being taken away and a further four casualties removed from somewhere in front of Joseph Place which was outside his field of vision.

20.6.6.3 His second statement was taken on 16 February 1972 by Lt.Colonel Overbury at Lisburn. It appears at B1656. In this statement he indicated he wished to correct some points having studied photographs of the scene he observed on 30 January 1972. The kneeling soldier was now said to be pointing his rifle at a man facing him with his arms above his shoulders and his fists clenched. The man fell by the trees between the end of Joseph Place and the end of Rossville Flats nearest to the observer. Soldier 040 then described two men running from the crowd as fast as they could. One was in a crouching position and held his right arm under his left armpit. The other man had his arm around the first man’s shoulder. They ran extremely fast into the ground floor flat, second from the right of the Joseph Place flats.

20.6.6.4 Just after the first man had been shot he saw another man lying on the ground in the area between blocks 1 and 2. He could still the paratrooper who had fired but could not say if he had fired again. Almost immediately he saw another man fall a few yards to the left. He started to get up but fell again. He did not know from which direction he was shot but he was facing up Rossville Street towards William Street.

20.6.6.5 In his first RMP statement at B1652 he had said: “Sometime later I think I heard the sound of automatic fire but I am not certain on this point.” About ten minutes after that he saw a crowd of people who were standing in Rossville Street suddenly scatter and about 20 of them, who didn't appear to know where to run, stood near the end wall of Colmcille Court (he later corrected this to Glenfada Park North in his second RMP statement.).

20.6.6.6 In his second RMP statement at B1656 he stated that it was just after 20 people had been arrested and taken away that he heard what he thought was automatic fire coming from the area of Glenfada Park. Assuming he was talking about the same twenty people he had described in his first RMP statement who he now classified as arrestees he significantly altered the timing of the firing. He also now placed the source of the firing in the area of Glenfada Park whereas previously he had not placed the source of the firing.

20.6.6.7 In his Treasury Solicitor statement at B1659 he said he “heard automatic fire from the direction of Glenfada Park.” He was by then saying not only that he heard it but also from what direction it came.

20.6.6.8 In his Eversheds statement at B1661.005 paragraph 28 and B1661.006 at paragraph 38 he stated that he could no longer recall automatic fire. He thought that it was more likely he was referring to single shots fired by an automatic weapon rather than machine gun fire. He stated: “ I do not remember hearing machine gun fire. I therefore believe that the reference to automatic fire is single shots fired from an automatic weapon. He corrected the location of the soldier mentioned in his Treasury Solicitor statement from the southwest corner of Glenfada Park North to the southeast corner. The following issues arise:

(i) In his first statement in 1972 the witness explicitly said he was not certain he heard the sound of automatic fire.

(ii) It is therefore difficult to see how in his second RMP statement to Lt. Colonel Overbury he was able to state independently that he heard what he thought was automatic fire and place the area it was coming from as Glenfada Park when he had not mentioned a source area in his first RMP statement.

(iii) By the time of his Treasury Solicitor statement he had become even firmer stating he heard it and gave the direction it came from. This cannot be credible.

(iv) His Eversheds statement again cannot constitute credible evidence on this issue. He never mentioned single rounds from an automatic weapon in 1972 and it is clear he is trying to rationalise the fact that he is now sure he did not hear machine gun fire.

(v) The Inquiry should find that the first recollection of this witness is nearer the correct one namely that he thought he heard automatic fire but could not be certain. It is submitted the evidence of the witness suffers by the fact that the further he is removed from the incident in his statements in 1972 the more assertive he becomes in his description. It may be that the witness was prompted or encouraged in this growing assertiveness but it is not credible evidence.

20.6.6.9 It is notable that the witness described two men run from the crowd in a crouching position to the first house in Joseph Place for the first time in his second RMP statement taken on 16 February 1972. One of them had his right arm under his left armpit as if he was hurt or holding something. The other man had his arm round his shoulder. A very similar account of this incident appeared in the second statement of Soldier 134 considered below, who was in the derelict building at Magazine Street Upper with Soldier 040 and who was also interviewed by Lt. Colonel Overbury on 16 February 1972 for the purposes of his second statement. The Inquiry is aware that Patrick McDaid was helped into a house in this area by Patrick Walsh and Michael Bradley was also assisted to a house in this area.

20.6.6.10 The witness does not report seeing any civilian gunmen or hearing any low velocity gunfire in Sector 5. B1652 to B1654.

20.6.7.1 Soldier 134 gave his first RMP statement on 3 February 1972 at B1822. The witness described a male civilian “trotting” across Glenfada Park towards the Flats with a Paratrooper behind him. The Paratrooper then knelt down behind a lamppost and fired one round from his SLR at the man who then fell to the ground. At Day 363/38/25 the witness confirmed he believed the Paratrooper was on his own. About two or three minutes later he heard about five or six more shots from SLR’s, which came from “Lecky Street/William Street” area. In his evidence to this Inquiry the witness explained he thought that Lecky Street was the William Street area. After these shots were fired he saw three civilians fall to the floor in the same area as the previous shooting. He presumed these three people had been shot. Most of the people dispersed leaving only about two hundred people in cover around the flats. He then saw two civilian ambulances arrive and the bodies were put inside. He again heard another SLR round being fired from the area of William Street and the people around the ambulance immediately took cover. B1822 to B1824.

20.6.7.2 The witness next made a statement on 16 February 1972 to Lt. Colonel Overbury. In this statement his description of the incident is modified. He saw the paratrooper kneeling in the aim position pointing his rifle in his direction. As the witness heard the sound of his rifle firing a single shot he saw a man sprawled on the ground between the two trees between Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. He did not see the man fall but he appeared to be the same man he saw “trotting” across Rossville Street. The witness also said he had made this statement after a conversation with Soldier 040 who had described the man as turning back towards the soldier with his hands raised. He concluded that he could not have seen the man at the moment he fell because he had not seen the man facing the soldier. He accepted at Day 363/48/15 to Day 363/48/19 that the man he saw “trotting” and the man shot might have been a different man but his conversation with Soldier 040 was clearly based on him believing it was the same man.

20.6.7.3 He saw a priest and a crowd gather. Then he described seeing two men running together one with his arm around the other. One was holding his hand under his jacket. They ran into one of the Joseph Place Flats. This description is very close to the description which appeared in the second RMP statement of Soldier 040 examined above. According to the evidence of Soldier 134 he did discuss matters with Soldier 040 in advance. Again as with Soldier 040 this incident is described by the witness for the first time at Lisburn on 16 February to Lt. Colonel Overbury. Around this time he also saw two men, not three as he said earlier at the corner of blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He saw one fall and as he looked to see where the shot came from he saw another man near him on the ground. He did not see where the shots came from. B1826 to B1827. The position of the two men he saw who fell is marked at C and D on B1831.014.

20.6.7.4 The second statement to Lt Colonel Overbury contains important changes. In his first RMP statement he saw a man being shot running away from the Paratrooper. That has been altered by the time of the second statement to not seeing the man fall. The witness was asked was it because of the difficulty his first account would have created for the army at the time was that why he was invited to change his account or was that the reason his evidence was suppressed. He denied these suggestions. Day 363/88/20 to Day 363/88/24.

20.6.7.5 The first statement described a man being shot then a gap and three other men being shot. The second statement and subsequent statement to the Treasury Solicitor indicated that he had meant to describe three people instead of four as having been shot. When asked was it in fact really the suggestion of the Treasury Solicitor staff that he alter his evidence to suggest that he had mistaken three people for four he replied “ I cannot honestly say sir.” Day 363/93/6 to Day 363/93/9.

20.6.7.6 The change in the accounts of this witness is remarkable considering he was deployed as an observer of relevant events from the City Walls. The change in sighting of the first man falling having been shot from behind is not a credible explanation even in the light of a conversation with 040. The change in number of persons seen is inexplicable since that was not an issue discussed with Soldier 040. The fact is that what emerged by the process of statement taking was an account very much more favourable to the army than his first statement.

20.6.7.7 This witness claimed in his 1972 RMP statement to have heard Thompson sub-machine gunfire in the Stevenson’s Bakery/William Street swimming pool area on Bloody Sunday about fifteen minutes before the gathering of the crowd at Free Derry Corner. In his Treasury Solicitor statement he had changed it to at a time when the marchers had arrived at Free Derry corner. At Day/363/29/22 to Day 363/29/23 he said the location was only an assumption. In his Eversheds statement at B1831.005 paragraph 33 he claimed to have heard it whilst the crowd were at Free Derry corner. When asked why there was a difference he replied that he had no idea but that was what he believed at the time of the statement. Day 363/26/10 to Day 363/28/9. Neither could he explain the difference between his RMP and Treasury Solicitor statement[12].

20.6.7.8 There is thus a body of evidence confirming the presence of one or more soldiers at the corner of Glenfada Park North and one firing behind block 2 of the Flats. The evidence also supports the proposition that a number of other members of what must have been Anti-Tank Platoon were in the vicinity of Soldier F when he was firing. The civilian evidence indicates a greater volume of firing in the direction of the rear of block 2 of the flats than any military witness. Indeed that must be so since there were four casualties in this location but only two admitted shots from one soldier. On that simple but irrefutable proposition it must follow that the civilian evidence must be more accurate than the military evidence.

20.6.8.1 This witness was located on the platform. His observations in relation to the blocks of Rossville Flats are dealt with in our submissions on Observation Posts in Sector 2. As described in his first RMP statement made on 2 February 1972 following the observations at the Rossville Flats, he saw a body lying by the telephone box. He heard a burst of what in his opinion was Thompson sub machine gun fire. He claimed Soldier 001 then directed his attention to a 5ft wooden fence on the left-hand corner of Glenfada Park. He described a soldier engaging the gunman, the gunman disappearing and automatic fire from that position ceasing. The soldier in Glenfada Park turned and aimed his SLR in the direction of the platform. He then heard a number of single low velocity shots from below him. This was followed by one shot from the soldier in Glenfada Park. He then glanced down and saw a body below him. He described four bodies after the shooting stopped. B1590.

20.6.8.2 He made his second RMP statement on 16 February 1972 to Lt Colonel Overbury. In this statement the number of pistol shots below him have become a volley. He then saw the paratrooper fire one shot in his direction from which the shots had come. When he looked over the wall he saw a man lying on the ground. This statement was clearly crafted to make a closer connection between the low velocity shots, the paratrooper and the man lying on the ground. B1597.

20.6.8.3 In his Treasury Solicitor statement he described the soldier in Glenfada Park then turned and aimed his SLR in his direction. Immediately after this he heard single low velocity shots from below him but he could not see who was firing since his view was obstructed by the city wall. However he looked down and could see a body lying below him opposite the gaps between blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats. B1612.019 paragraph 5.

20.6.8.4 At the Widgery Inquiry, as he had done in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement, he described these events as occurring after seeing the body of Barney McGuigan. He was also clearly adding details to his evidence at Widgery, which were patently untrue. See his evidence to this Inquiry at Day 366/142/2 to Day 366/147/6.

20.6.8.5 The witnesses Eversheds statement was in complete contradiction of his earlier accounts. The witness therein claimed not to have seen a soldier aim his rifle in his direction but a civilian gunman. The gunman was dressed in combat gear and had long straight black hair. The gunman fired not from Glenfada Park but south of Joseph Place and fired at the city wall south of Charley OP. B1612.003 paragraph 14 to B1612.005 paragraph 30.

20.6.8.6 The witness' accounts of events are inherently unreliable and stem from an attempt to justify shooting by a soldier into the area which he was observing. None of the amount of dramatic activity he witnessed was reported by him to his Sergeant 001 who was close by. None of these events were recorded in any report or log available. No military or police witness on the walls corroborates his account of events.

20.6.9.1 Given the volume of firing claimed by Soldier S into the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of Rossville Flats, the Inquiry will be alive to the possibility of Patrick Campbell having been wounded as a result of one of those shots. However, it is submitted that Soldier F, on the clear weight of the evidence, wounded Patrick Campbell on Bloody Sunday. Further, he wounded Danny McGowan. Although these acts were not admitted by Soldier F, the above conclusions are suggested by the evidence given by the military witnesses before the enquiry. He then murdered Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan.

20.6.9.2 The only soldier who acknowledged firing into Sector 5 was Soldier F. It is submitted that contrary to Soldier F's evidence, he fired more than the two shots he claimed into this area. Soldier F lied about seeing a man with a pistol. This was a fiction to cover his unjustified shooting in Sector 5. It is further submitted that Soldier F’s evidence of the number of shots he fired in this area and indeed his overall total of 13 is unworthy of belief. Having lied consistently in 1972 about where he fired and how many shots he fired in particular areas the Inquiry should place no weight of any kind on his evidence of the location and number of shots he discharged.

20.6.10.1 Soldier F was the only soldier who admitted firing into Sector 5 on Bloody Sunday. He claimed to fire at a man with an object in his hand, which was large and black like an automatic pistol. He fired two rounds at this man, who then fell to the ground.

20.6.10.2 The sight lines from a number of Observation Points on the City Walls would have given a clear view into the area behind block 2 of Rossville Flats and would have given an excellent view of any activity by civilian gunmen or indeed any activity by soldiers. The evidence of soldiers relevant to this sector has been considered in detail in our review of Military Evidence in Sector 5. It is clear from the evidence that soldiers on the Platforms Charley Op[13] and Magazine Street Upper had excellent views into Sector 5.

20.6.10.3 None of the soldiers at any of these locations, who made statements, reported gunfire from civilians in their direction. None of the soldiers reported a sighting of a civilian gunman or indeed a bomber on the area behind block 2 of Rossville Flats[14]. The regimental logs of 22^nd Light Air Defence Regiment and The Royal Anglian Regiment do not contain any such reports. The 8^th Brigade log does not contain any such report.

20.6.10.4 The soldiers who did report seeing a Paratrooper fire into this area, namely Soldier 030, Soldier 040, Soldier 134 and Soldier 227, gave limited accounts of a single soldier firing one or two shots. This cannot be correct, given:

20.6.10.5 The limited evidence from soldiers on the City Walls of low velocity or pistol fire is not credibly connected with any event in Sector 5.

20.7.1 The evidence of Nigel Wade, at M79.4 paragraph 15, is that in front of Free Derry Corner, he heard more shooting and with about a thousand others he went flat on the ground. It was impossible to tell where the shooting was coming from but it sounded to him that the closest shots were from nearby buildings, which he thought were called “Joseph Flats”. At Day 109/140/23 to Day 109/141/3, he was asked did he have any recollection now of having a perception that these shots came from Joseph Place flats. He answered that he did have that sense, but would not put it any stronger than that:

“Since you mention it, it could have been an echo effect, I do not know. But I did have that sense. But I could not be more definite.”

At Day 109/222/1 to Day 109/222/25, he acknowledged that this had been a personal impression, for which he lacked any evidence. In his article at L34[15], he stated that they were pinned to the ground and there was firing from the Para’s and “snipers in the R.F.” This witness’ perceptions, which he even acknowledges could have been an echo effect, do not constitute reliable evidence to establish shooting from the Joseph Place flats, or indeed any location.

20.7.2 The Sunday Times, at S37, described an Official firing two .32 pistol shots from the lane behind Joseph Place up at the Observation Post near Walker monument. It was hopelessly out of range and it was also risky since he was in full view of the City Walls and the lane was crowded with panicking people. At Day 414/63/25 to Day 414/64/25, Reg Tester denied any knowledge of this incident, although Peter Jacobson had indicated that Tester would have confirmed the incident took place. In any event, a purported account of an incident of pistol shots at this location and at an undetermined time could not be relied upon as credible evidence of such an event actually occurring. In addition there is no military evidence which ties a sighting or records a reaction to this alleged incident. Even if the report is authentic, it did not and could not impact on the actions of soldiers on the day.

20.7.3 It is clear that alleged civilian gunmen or bombers played no role whatsoever in the killing and wounding in Sector 5. Soldier F’s pistol man behind block 2 of Rossville Flats was a creature of invention designed exclusively to conceal the fact that he had no lawful or valid reason to fire shots behind block 2 of Rossville Flats.

20.8.1 This section is prepared and presented as a response to the Lawton and Aiken team documents at OS7.34 and OS8.42.

At AG17.7 paragraph 15 to 16 in his original statement to the Inquiry, the witness indicated he saw Patrick Doherty shot crawling towards the alleyway which ran along the eastern side of Joseph Place by three soldiers at the entrance to Glenfada Park North. Another man who went out to Patrick Doherty's aid was shot at. The witness gave oral evidence at Day 424/122/24 to Day 424/124/10. He indicated that the second man who was also shot at but who he did not think was injured may have been Patrick Walsh. He later found this out by seeing a photograph of him. He had described in his statement at AG17.7 paragraph 16 a further man who he was later told was Alexander Nash going out to their aid. The witness was told later it was Alexander Nash although he did not know it at the time. This man was shot in the hip or buttock. At Day 424/124/21 to Day 424/125/10 the witness was asked did he see someone shot in the hip or buttock. He replied no. He explained that people were saying it was Alex Nash and he had been shot in the hip. He had not known that at the time and he had seen no-one else shot in the area apart from Mr. Doherty. He confirmed to Counsel to the Inquiry that the position was he heard some time after the events of the afternoon that Alex Nash had been shot and for some reason he believed he was the man who had come to assist Mr. Doherty. The witness further confirmed at Day 424/139/4 to Day 424/139/6 that he could not remember seeing the third man shot. It is clear from the examination of this witness that he presents no credible evidence of a "missing casualty."

At AG17.1 paragraph 23 this witness gave a detailed description of seeing the body of Patrick Doherty including position, clothing, age and later knew it was Patrick Doherty. He described a second body but could not visualise him as clearly as Paddy Doherty. At the date of his statement he did not know how the second body was lying or his approximate age. He recalled " thinking both men were dead" although he didn’t see any wounds on either man. The witness gave evidence and was examined at Day 076/138/16 to Day 076/146/6. It is submitted that the scene described by the witness was as in the P714-717 showing Paddy Walsh beside the body of Patrick Doherty rendering assistance.

At AT17.5 paragraph 32 he described two men running close together along the front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats by the shops. He thought they were running to the alleyway behind Joseph Place. They were shot at the point marked J on AT17.16. He thought both were shot in the leg. It was almost like watching a movie. He thought both got into the alleyway behind Joseph Place or into a house. He thought a couple of people helped them. They were in their thirties maybe not old but not teenagers. He did not remember what they were wearing. He did not see where the shots came but thought it was from the direction of Rossville Street and Glenfada Park South. At Day 098/119/1 to Day 098/119/3 the witness accepted that though both went down one may have been shot. At Day 098/117/9 to Day 098/1122/1 the witness was examined on this issue by Mr Arthur Harvey QC. It is submitted that the description the witness gave was that of Patrick Campbell being assisted by Danny McGowan.

At AN17.5 paragraph 21 to 22 the witness described the shooting of Patrick Doherty whom he assumed had been shot by two soldiers at Joseph Place. Patrick Doherty had been crawling towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place. There was a group of people at the entrance of the alleyway to which he had been heading. They had already got across the open space and were urging him on before he was hit. One of the group came out to try to rescue Patrick Doherty after he had been shot and the witness believed the rescuer was then shot in the leg and was dragged back into the group in the alleyway. A second person then came out and again appeared to be shot around the legs and dragged back. Finally a man he now knew to be Paddy Walsh crawled out to Patrick Doherty. At Day 78/45/13 to Day 78/45/20 the witness confirmed he did not see the persons afterwards to confirm they had been hit. At Day 78/45/8 to Day 78/46/12 on examination by Counsel it was suggested that Danny McGowan had come out of the alleyway and assisted a person into the alleyway who was Patrick Campbell. It was put to him that given the passage of time his sequence of events was a little askew and whether persons were hit as opposed to taking protective actions to save them from being hit he could not now say. He replied it was possible. Further at Day 78/49/19 to Day 78/50/6 an extract from his 1972 interview with the Sunday Times journalists at AN17.20 was put to him. " Nicholas watched Walsh crawl out twice. And also saw the rescue of McGowan after he was shot helping Campbell. Nicholas thinks Walsh beckoned for help." It was suggested that those two and Patrick Doherty added up to the three men he saw shot which the witness accepted.

20.8.6.1 At AT15.20 this witness, who was 12 at the time, made a statement in which he described a number of youths running behind the maisonettes through a small alleyway. He described these youths as being fired on by troops in the observation posts on the Derry Walls. As the last three youths entered the alleyway the first two crawled with shots in the legs but crawled on in. The last one was crawling in and a shot rang out and he fell. He lay still but there was no sign of a wound. After describing attempts to assist this person the men carried him down to an ambulance. He was dead. He then described men being carted into the ambulance soldiers fired even though the white handkerchief was being waved by Father Mulvey.

20.8.6.2 At Day 99/26/17 to Day 99/27/20 the relevant contents of this statement were put to the witness. He was asked did he have any recollection now of two people apparently shot in the legs. His answer was "I honestly cannot say." He replied yes when it was suggested to him that the third man must have been Patrick Doherty. He confirmed one of the men attempting to assist must have been Patrick Walsh. At Day 99/33/24 to Day 99/36/15 the witness was further examined and confirmed that some people would have thrown themselves to the ground without being shot. Others would have stood up in bewilderment and others would have carried on. He assumed but he did not see the two persons shot in the leg. The witness agreed that a description put to him of an incident from Danny McGowan was consistent with what he saw. That description was of Danny McGowan helping Patrick Campbell across the open ground and being shot just as he was getting into the alleyway and then pushing Patrick Campbell into the alleyway and dragging himself eventually in. The witness also confirmed at the time his assumption was that the persons were being shot at from behind i.e. Rossville Street as opposed to the City Walls. He further confirmed the men were not carrying weapons and they were not doing anything to give rise to soldiers shooting at them.

At AM247.3 paragraph 13 the witness, who was 15 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday, described some men running up the entrance way of one of the first three houses in the north block of Joseph Place marked at AM247.10. They had their backs to him and he didn't know where they came from. As one of the men was seven or eight yards from the front door he called out "I'm hit" and "seemed to reach around his back". The witness believed he had been shot in the back. He had black or brown hair and was wearing a jumper rather than a coat and "trousers of some sort." In examination at Day 388/79/5 to Day 388/79/25, the witness claimed his impression was that the man shouted out when he actually realised he had been hit. No one was supporting him or assisting him. It is submitted this evidence amounts to an "impression" of a 15 year old boy. Whilst no doubt honestly held someone shouting " I am hit" and seeming to reach round his back is hardly sufficient to lead to a finding of an additional casualty on Bloody Sunday. His statement the man "seemed" to reach around his back. The witness saw nothing of the aftermath and what he did see was a fleeting moment of a running man with others. It is noted that there is no other evidence before the Inquiry concerning a casualty occurring in this location. It is also instructive to note that if the man was running up one of these driveways there is no claimed army firing or targets in this location. Therefore no known soldier fired in this location. If a gunman or person engaged in such activity had been shot the soldiers would no doubt have claimed it. The Inquiry will also be aware that a number of known casualties were taken into houses in this location, including Patrick McDaid, who had sustained a wound to his back. The Inquiry should treat this evidence with the utmost caution.

At AM.5 413 paragraph 24 the witness, who was in the group at the telephone box at Block 1 of the Rossville Flats saw Barney McGuigan shot. He then described a lad in his teens or early twenties crawling along the kerb “doggie fashion” along an alleyway by a garden wall in front of the Joseph Place maisonettes. As he crawled he gave a cry of pain and rolled over onto his side. He did not know what happened to him after that. In examination at Day 89/141/17 to Day 89/160/21 the witness accepted that the person he saw could have been Paddy Doherty. His I972 statement had indicated that the man was crawling away from his position. It is submitted that the balance of the evidence is such that the witness was describing the crawling figure of Patrick Doherty.

At AM284 paragraphs 1 to 2 the witness was ten years old on Bloody Sunday. He gave evidence on this issue at Day 171/144/1 to Day 171/154/5. He described seeing a male aged about 17 shot in the face or the eye in the area of the steps between Joseph Place East and Fahan Street East. The witness corrected this to "the upper body" at Day 171/139/18. It was a single shot. Another man went to try to help him. This man was about 17 or 20 years old. Another single shot sounded and the man fell down. Both points are marked at D and E on AM284.3. At Day 171 the witness declined to take the oath or affirm. In examination at Day 171/148/21 to Day 171/148/22 the witness was asked could the man have been a significantly older man. He replied that the first man could have been an older man. The witness said he was looking "for a matter of seconds". As regards the second man's age it was put to the witness that he had said the man was perhaps between 17 and 20. He replied:" No, from a distance that is what he looked but I know he was not." At the time of his statement he did not know who the people were but he was told it was someone called Mr. Doherty and the other man was called McGowan. He insisted that it was Mr. Doherty he saw shot and that both men had been shot from the City Walls. Given the tenor and content of the evidence of this witness it would be difficult either to rely on him as identifying the persons he believes he saw at all.

20.8.10.1 The Aiken team document, at OS8.42, refers to a number of casualties or bodies said to have been removed by car from St. Columb’s Wells.

20.8.10.2 Nigel Wade, in his Treasury Solicitor statement at M79.4, described seeing three or four others come out of St Columb’s Wells waving white handkerchiefs. There were more shots and they and the bystanders flattened out again. After some minutes, four wounded men were brought across the road by the flats, at a low run, and put into private cars. They were not fired upon as they moved this time. At M79.22 paragraph 18, the witness described standing at point E, marked on M79.25, which is in St Columb’s Wells. As he was standing at that point he remembered seeing three or four people, who had apparently been shot and were bleeding, being loaded into cars and driven off. It can be noted that although Mr. Wade had mentioned the matter in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement he was not asked about this at the Widgery Tribunal when he gave his evidence. Clearly the issue of so-called missing or unknown civilian casualties was not then exercising the minds of the soldiers representatives.

20.8.10.3 It is notable that his account at M79.22, signed on the 2^nd June 1999, states that the people had “apparently been shot and were bleeding”. This description did not appear anywhere in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement in 1972, which merely used the term “wounded”. The witness was asked about this matter at Day 109 at this Inquiry. At Day 109/139/7 to Day 109/139/23, the witness described cars being commandeered or backed up and a great crowd in the street. There was a great fuss about getting cars through to the top of the street near the Joseph Place area:

“A number of bleeding people, I had no idea whether they were, you know, lightly or heavily wounded or even dead, were brought out and put into cars and the cars made their way down the crowded street toward, I assume, the hospital”. He was not able to see the nature of their injuries but he said he could see a lot of blood.

20.8.10.4 It should be noted that the witness, when asked about this matter at Day 109/142/16 to Day 109/142/19, stated:

20.8.10.5 Of course, what appears to have happened to some extent is that his memory has expanded the incident into one where he sees a lot of blood. This cannot be reconciled with the fact that he currently has no idea if these individuals were lightly or heavily wounded or even dead. The witness therefore cannot have seen wounds on the people described as “wounded” in 1972. This may be a snapshot recollection of a known casualty being assisted into a car by those who had come to his aid. However there is nothing in his recollection which would allow a conclusion that he saw additional wounded casualties on the day.

20.8.10.6 Simon Winchester in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement at M83.20 spoke of seeing 2 casualties lying in the gap between Joseph Place and Rossville Flats. He then walked down to Free Derry Corner and met Mr Wade once again and with him saw “seven casualties being put into cars in Leckey Road and driven off to hospital”. This issue was not pursued with the witness at the Widgery Tribunal by Counsel for the army.

20.8.10.7 It is notable that Mr. Wade described the incident as occurring in St. Columb’s Wells between the cross and point E, on his map at M79.25. Mr Wade had also placed it in St. Columb’s Wells in his 1972 Treasury Solicitor statement. It is indicative of the difficulties for witnesses in giving evidence of such a scene that even in their 1972 Treasury Solicitor statements they have pinpointed two clearly distinct locations even whilst in each other’s company.

20.8.10.8 The evidence of Mr Wade was put to the witness at Day 116/87/13 to Day 116/88/10. Mr. Wade’s evidence was that what he saw were three or four persons being put into cars in the vicinity. When asked if he was certain that he saw seven casualties as opposed to a number of persons being put into cars, Mr Winchester replied that it was certainly more than four. He was asked regarding his use of the word “casualties” was he able to discern that the people had visible injury or did they appear to be people who distressed as well as persons who had injuries. His answer was as follows:

“I cannot say that I saw blood on all of them, so it is conceivable that some just could have been distressed and were getting out of the area, yes”.

20.8.10.9 Both the above witnesses are clearly relating an incident in the St Columb’s Wells/Joseph Place area where it is known that two casualties were removed by car to hospital. In the light of the events that they had both just witnessed, Mr Wade and Mr Winchester have clearly formed a mistaken impression. This is a fact amply demonstrated by the changing estimates of numbers given by both witnesses even though they apparently witnessed the same incident in each other’s company,

“Only one anecdote of interest. He says that he arrived in St Columb’s Wells having walked slowly and deliberately down the road from Butcher’s Gate behind the flats (which rather knock the firing from the walls theory on the head). And got to the Wells as they were in the process of collecting bodies.... Say a bloke called Tony Harken was directing this transportation of bodies across the alleyway and screaming at everyone else to get back for fear of getting shot. K says he saw 5 or 6 people being carried across that road of whom at least 2 dead”.

20.8.10.11 This is a story reported to Mr. Barry. In itself it is clearly incorrect in the detail of what occurred at either Joseph place or St. Columb's Wells. There may be a number of explanations for this. The story in itself may be a complete fiction. It may be a description of events occurring somewhere other than that particular location. It may be an incorrect description of the scenes witnessed with regard to what were described as “bodies”. However John Barry himself in the note described it as an “anecdote”. It is submitted that the Inquiry ought not to be invited to rely on an “anecdote” to establish the truth on this issue.

20.8.10.12 Mr Barry was asked about this matter at Day 193/169/5 to Day 193/169/5. His evidence was that he could not help because he could not remember. He did offer the following comment:

“…if it were something different as opposed to the collecting of the bodies that everyone knew were lying around, as it were, if indeed something different, I would have made much more of it than this, I would have made some note to inquire who the bodies were and so on.” Day193/168/25 to Day 193/169/5.

20.8.10.13 Quite clearly, at the time, John Barry saw nothing in this story which required or even suggested further investigation. It is clear also he never found anything to make him return to the story. This is perhaps yet another indication that the fiction of Missing Casualties had yet to find any credible supporters in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday.

20.8.10.13 Anthony Harkin gave a statement to Eversheds at AH11.6 paragraph 32. There, he described having arrived in St Columb’s Wells and could hear shouting coming from the area of Joseph Place. People were shouting and there were wounded and injured and they were asking for help. There was a large number of other people already in St Columb’s Wells with his brother when he arrived but none of them made any move to go and help the wounded. After a while he decided to go and help. He carried a hankie and he retraced his steps North until he was standing in the middle of the open ground between Joseph Place and St Columb’s Well. As he stood there the people who had been hiding at the back of Joseph Place dragged or helped about 3 or 4 wounded people over the open space and into St Columb’s Well. At AH11.6 paragraph 33, he continued that he did not remember very much about the wounded or exactly how many there were, although he did remember in particular an old man of between 40 and 45 who was carried by the arms and legs as if he was in a chair:

20.8.10.15 He also remembered a woman being one of the wounded and he took it for granted that one of the others was the body which he had seen lying prone between the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. Once all the wounded were over the road he followed them back to St Columb’s Well and watched as they were put into cars and driven away. He did not remember anything about the cars or the people carrying the wounded.

20.8.10.16 It is notable that in his 1972 statement at AH11.19 he had said the following:

“I helped lead a crowd of panicking people along the Wells. A priest pulled up in a Red Cross car. He was looking for injured people…. We waited for ten minutes and then went away to safety. I helped to put about seven of the injured into cars.”

He mentioned only injured people not wounded as he had done to Eversheds. There were seven in his 1972 account but in his Eversheds statement he only then remembered three or four.

20.8.10.17 When the witness gave evidence on Day 177/39/1 to 177/42/9 he was asked which number was more accurate. He answered:

The witness also indicated that he found out that the name of one of the injured people was Alex Nash. He then went on to say that he there was a house in St. Columb’s Wells that somebody was taken into. This was not additional to the people brought into St. Columb’s Wells. When shown P747 the witness confirmed it looked like the man he saw being carried. It was Patrick Campbell.

20.8.10.18 It seems that the witness saw the movement of Patrick Campbell and those giving him assistance to St. Columb's Wells. His reference to seeing Alex Nash would appear to indicate that he has accumulated various pieces of knowledge about the day after initially mistaking the number of people in actually saw wounded in the area of St. Columb's Wells.

20.8.10.19 Noel Doherty, at AD91.7 paragraph 36, also described reaching St Columb’s Well. He stood there for about two or three minutes. While he was standing there he saw people being carried across Fahan Street from Joseph Place and some of them seemed to be injured. He saw two or three people being put into cars which drove off in the direction of the hospital. He could not recall what colour cars they were nor what make they were. He recalled particularly one man who seemed to have been injured in the hip. He would say he was about 40 – 50 years old, he was placed on his stomach in the car and driven away. Given the description of the injury Mr Doherty is in all likelihood describing Patrick Campbell. It is wholly understandable given the passage of time that precise locations and numbers of people who were actually being assisted as opposed to giving assistance may be inaccurate.

20.8.10.20 Thomas Ralph Dawe described at AD5.5 paragraph 29 seeing the back door of a car open with two bodies in it. One was in the well of the car and the other one was in the back seat propped up on the left-hand side of the seat. Another person was put on the right hand side of the back of the car. The witness gave evidence to the Inquiry at Day 94. He accepted that his statement in 1972 had not mentioned this issue. The Inquiry is referred in particular to the examination of the witness by Mr Finnegan QC at Day 094/152/19 to Day 094/173/14. The witness accepted it as a possibility that he had amalgamated the sighting of the car driven by Mr Bernard McGonagle taking Patrick Campbell to the Regimental Aid Post and the car which was driven by Mr. Raymond Rogan containing the body of Gerard Donaghey.

20.8.10.21 Mr Colm O'Domhnaill, who was in the same location as Mr. Dawe, had described, at AO19.4 paragraph 23, a car, which was a Cortina, possibly a Mark II. The witness described what was obviously the body of Gerard Donaghey and he had also said that the car did not go fast and he was able to look in. At Day 094/169/18 it was put to Mr. Dawe that this was the car that apparently did not stop. He was asked “Is that close to what you are remembering?” Answer “It is similar”. It is clear that what the witness saw was the car containing the wounded Patrick Campbell in the St. Columb's Well’s area and the car driven from the Well’s area containing the body of Gerard Donaghey. Mr Glasgow asked the witness a further question about this matter at Day 094/177/2 to Day 094/177/9: “Is it still your recollection that the car you saw had a body which you believed to be dead lying in the well of that car in front of the passenger seat?” Answer, “There were 2 people in the back of the car, one was lying across the well and one was in a certain position at the far side of the car sort of sitting angle”. The answer again reflects perhaps the difficulty that the witness had in placing events from 1972 in the context of his current recollection.

20.8.10.22 Ciaran Gill, whose statement appears at M105.9 paragraphs 39 to 44 described making his way towards St. Columb's Wells and was near Fahan Street. He observed a teenager with a leg/thigh wound being carried by several men into the street, one of those carrying the wounded man shouting loudly: “Has anyone got a car to take him to hospital?” Eventually a car was found and he was driven away. The witness gave evidence on this issue at Day 203/142/1 to Day 203/146/2. The witness saw him in a position at “the entrance to the street” which would be the “Free Derry Corner or Rossville Flats end.” The teenager seemed to be “late teens, early 20’s”. The witness confirmed that he did not actually see the wound but somebody was shouting “be careful about his leg, he has been wounded.” Day 203/143/9 to Day 203/143/13. Although the witness described a teenager the injury described and the location and circumstances of this incident suggest it may be a report of the movement of Danny McGowan.

20.8.10.23 The witness then described in his statement at M105.9 paragraph 41 “another wounded young man was brought into the street by two or three men moving as fast as they could with cries of help us ” The witness stated that he had walked across the street and supported this young man as he was manoeuvred into a car. The man was wearing blue jeans, a dark sweater, and in his late teens. He was unconscious but saw no visible signs of injury on him at all. The witness did not recognise any of the men carrying him. It was his “assumption” that the young man had been wounded by gunfire. In his Eversheds statement the witness described three people being put into cars but referred to “five” in his article in 1972. At M105.9 paragraph 44 the witness acknowledged that some of those being placed in cars might not have been wounded by gunfire. When asked to put his “assumption” aside the only one he saw with visible injuries was:

20.8.10.24 However just a short time before in the course of his testimony the witness had said the following:

A No, somebody was shouting “be careful about his leg, he has been wounded. I have not said that in the statement, but that is what they were saying.” Day 203/143/9 to Day 203/143/13.

20.8.10.25 That the witness gave such a completely contradictory answers in the course of a short period of oral testimony must suggest significant doubt about the reliability of his testimony on this issue. It would appear on his first answer he did not personally see a deceased or wounded person in the course of these events.

20.9.1 The deceased and wounded were all shot whilst they were unarmed and were not engaged in any unlawful activity on Bloody Sunday. They were shot when they presented no threat of any kind to soldiers. They were the only persons shot in Sector 5. The soldiers have only admitted a total of 2 shots being fired into this area. This in itself renders the military evidence in this sector wholly unreliable and wholly untruthful. This can only be because the military activity in this area was unjustified and unlawful.

20.10.1.1 Soldier F wounded Patrick Campbell and Danny McGowan. Shortly afterwards he murdered Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan. In all probability, following these shootings, other members of the Anti-Tank Platoon fired shots in the direction of the rear of block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place.

20.10.1.2 Some of the soldiers on the walls gave a partial description of these events. Their accounts were at the very least defective in that they failed to provide a full account of the murder of two men and the wounding of two others in an a confined area. Given the sight lines and visual aids available it is remarkable that not one soldier gave a full account of these shootings.

[1] He marked the position on AM398.25, which he confirmed as closer to the entrance to Glenfada Park North. Day 170/115/14 to Day 170/115/20.

[2] Charles McLaughlin, AM322.4 paragraph 24 and Day 90/114/12 to Day 90/115/15. Joseph Nicholas AN17.20 and Day 78/34/16 to Day 78/34/24. Derrick Tucker AT15.4 paragraphs 27 to 28 and Day 99/19/5 to Day 99/20/19.

[3] V25/ 01.07.34 Patrick Campbell interview.

[4] He marked the position on AM398.25, which he confirmed as closer to the entrance. Day 170/115/14 to Day 170/115/20.

[5] Patrick Campbell was brought to the location at Craigavon Bridge between 16.40 and 16.45 and placed in an ambulance at 16.45. Day 383/40/4 to Day 383/41/2.

[6] The witness Anthony Harkin described a man of between 40 and 45 carried by the arms and legs as if he was in a chair. He thought the man was hit in the back or hip and was alive. He confirmed at Day 177/42/1 to Day 177/42/9 that P747, which is of Patrick Campbell, looked like the old man he saw in St. Columb's Wells.

[7] V48/11.35 - 11.41 and EP2.8.

[8] He had also made a statement to the RUC on issues arising out of arrests on 15 February 1972 at AN28.10.

[9] He also rejected a suggestion from the evidence of Soldier 027 that he may have fired in the area of Joseph Place. Day 377/106/14 to Day 377/106/24.

[10] Also in Charlie OP was Soldier 025. His RMP statement at B1536 indicated a soldier had taken up a position facing them and a small crowd after coming round the corner of Glenfada Park. At Day 361/50/7 to Day 361/51/23 he said that this soldier went towards a body on the barricade in Rossville Street.

[11] See also WT16. 43E to WT1644B.

[12] Acknowledged in examination by Arthur Harvey QC that not only did the distance make considerable distortion of sound possible but that he could be mistaken it was low velocity shots. Day 363/75/10 to Day 363/75/13 and Day 363/75/7 to Day 363/75/12.

[13] EP1.1 shows Charley Op. P233.2 is taken from the City Walls, along the southern side of block 2 of Rossville Flats.

[14] It is notable that the evidence of police officers in and around the walls confirms this position. JH10.2, JH10.5, JC4, JM19, JH7, JE2, JC12, JH5.1, JM43, JW6, JM30.

[15] “Leaders of March Lost Control” by Nigel Wade (31^st January, 1972)

21. ARRESTS

21. 1 Introduction and Summary of Submissions

21.1.1 According to the Soldiers’ case, the sole purpose of the Paratroopers’ incursion into the Bogside on Bloody Sunday was to arrest those engaged in rioting at Barriers 12 and 14. If General Ford is to be believed, the intention was to arrest 300 – 400 rioters. However, the operation was launched at a time when the rioting had largely subsided and the 56 arrests that were made by 1 Para were patently bogus. In our submission, the evidence concerning the arrests establishes the following:

21.1.2 None of those arrested was lawfully arrested and the vast majority had not even been present at Barriers 12 and 14, let alone involved in rioting there or anywhere else. No more than 6 people were even arrested by being “snatched” in open ground. Most of the arrestees were marchers and bystanders doing nothing more than sheltering either at the gable end at Glenfada Park North (25) or in 33 Chamberlain St. (20) when they were arrested.

21.1.3 There was never any plan or genuine intention to carry out a major arrest operation in which 300 - 400 rioters would be detained and prosecuted, as Ford suggested. The Army had clearly given no consideration to the logistics of arresting even 50 since they only had two lorries available for transporting prisoners to Fort George and one of these had to do two runs. It is also clear from the evidence of Sergeant Graham and Constable Black in particular that the RUC was not informed of such a plan and was not prepared for the 50 or so who arrived at Fort George.

21.1.4 Masquerading as an arrest operation, the Army’s action amounted to a general assault on the civil rights march and an attack on the Bogside. Devised by General Ford and implemented by 1 Para, the operation had a number of related and overlapping objectives: to demonstrate a new “get tough” policy in Derry; to appease Unionists by satisfying their demands for more repressive measures against the “Derry Young Hooligans” as well as civil rights marchers and Nationalists generally both in Derry and in Northern Ireland as a whole; and in the process to show 8th Brigade how public disorder and civil protest should be dealt with in future. It was for this reason that the operation was launched even though the rioting at the barriers had subsided, the rioters had largely dispersed and there was no effective separation between rioters and the general mass of civilians in the area. By the time the Paratroopers went in, there was little prospect of apprehending any of those who had been engaged in rioting at the barriers, let alone 300-400, and if that had been the true objective the Paratroopers would not have been deployed at all.

21.1.5 Quite apart from the shooting of innocent civilians, the general conduct of the Paratroopers in the Bogside and at Fort George is an indication that they had in effect a licence to use gross and excessive force against civilians in the area. As was anticipated and intended by General Ford, once the Paratroopers were let loose into the Bogside they meted out gratuitous violence to the civilians they encountered, including journalists, first-aiders and middle-aged bystanders. As they debussed, soldiers fired baton rounds indiscriminately into the fleeing crowd. They then chased and clubbed civilians with batons and rifles, sometimes showing little interest in carrying out arrests at all, as demonstrated in the sequence of Coleman Doyle’s photographs at EP24.1, EP24.2, EP24.3
and EP24.4 showing a soldier striking a civilian with his rifle and then leaving him motionless on the ground before moving on, apparently in search of another target. Their conduct towards those civilians they did arrest ranged from verbal abuse to various forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. INQ179, a Major in the Coldstream Guards on duty at Fort George when the arrestees were brought there, described the treatment of the arrestees by the paratroopers as “most appalling” (C179.3 paragraph 15) and “very brutal” (C179.3 paragraph 21). He was so appalled by what he saw the paratroopers do to the civilians that he told his commanding officer, INQ598, and then wrote a lengthy report detailing specific instances of brutality that he had witnessed. (C179.3 paragraph 17) This report has not been disclosed by the MOD.

21.1.6. The paratroopers systematically lied about the identification of marchers as rioters as well as the location of and reasons for the “arrests”, to the extent that they made formal statements of (fabricated) evidence for the purpose of supporting criminal charges against the marchers - charges that, if proven, would have led to mandatory 6-month prison sentences. Soldier F, for example, made a statement alleging that he had seen Father O’Keefe rioting. He also identified Patrick M Norris as a rioter when we know that he was going about his lawful business as a taxi driver[1], picking up a fare in the Bogside after the shooting was over, when he was arrested. The soldiers’ readiness to invent evidence for this purpose also undermines their credibility generally and their evidence concerning their roles in the shootings. Incidentally, not one of the soldiers suggested that any of the persons arrested had been firing a weapon or throwing nail or petrol bombs.

21.1.7. The Royal Military Police colluded and participated in this systematic fabrication of evidence concerning the arrests.

21.1.8 RUC officers also participated in the processing of prisoners at Fort George. Apart from being in a position to witnesses the brutality of soldiers towards their prisoners, it was they who charged the prisoners on the basis of statements they must have realised or believed were false. As one of the Police officers in question readily conceded, if he had tried to arrest a Paratrooper or even report to the outside world that paratroopers had assaulted the prisoners, he would have been ostracised within the RUC. He agreed that the Paratroopers were above the law in the sense that they were able to carry out assaults with impunity. (Day 211/155/24 to Day 211/156/2) This and other evidence indicates that the RUC as a body cannot be trusted to tell the truth about what they witnessed on Bloody Sunday. The reality is that they were a sectarian force whose members had not only been engaged themselves in direct conflict with Bogsiders (for example, during the Battle of the Bogside) but had a track record of closing ranks and suppressing evidence (for example, in the “conspiracy of silence” that the Chief Constable of the day said blocked the internal investigation into the attack on Samuel Devenney[2]).

21.1.9 The civilian evidence of the events concerning arrests is to be preferred in every material respect.

21.2. Documentation

21.2.1 The Army’s plans for arrests were stated in the Operational Order No.2/72 (Op Forecast) as follows

(i) Under the heading “Concept of Operations” and the sub-heading “Dispersal of the Marches” it was stated:

(1) Initially we intend to deal with illegal marches in as low a key as possible and for as long as possible. Generally speaking the front men will be moderate and non-violent – the second rank will be those to start any violence that may erupt. The security forces are to take no action against the marches until either:

(b) violence against the security forces, in the form of stone, bottle and nail bombing, takes place.

(2) Illegal marches are to be halted and dispersed on ground of our own choosing. If possible, ring leaders are to be arrested on the spot. Where it is impracticable to make such arrests, photographs of ring leaders and participants are to be taken, for identification and arrest at a later stage.” (G95.567)

(ii) In the same section, under the sub-heading “Hooliganism”, it is stated:

“….. . an arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points and launched in a scoop-up operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible”.(G95 568)

(iii) In section 9 (“Tasks”), 1 Para is characterised as the Brigade arrest force with the task of conducting a scoop-up operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible. The operation was only to be launched, either in whole or in part, on the orders of the Brigade Command and was expected to be conducted on foot. (G95.570)

(iv) In the same section under the heading “Arrest Procedures” it was specified that “if arrests subsequently become necessary the following form of words should be used when the arrest is made: “I arrest you for having committed acts prejudicial to the peace” (G95.573)

(v) In paragraph 3(a) of the Notes to Col Wilford’s orders (under “Execution”) at G94.562, the General Outline is specified as follows:

“ .. .. If the march takes place and confrontation becomes hostile the Battn will deploy fwd to break up the rioters and make the max number of arrests.. At this stage I cannot give a detailed technical plan. I will give the coy deployment in our FUP and then give my concept of how I think the battle could go.”

(vi) Also in Col Wilford’s Notes is the following provision for the arrest procedure:

“…..The arrest team of RMP with RSM and Paddy Wagon and escort will move Fwd to a loc in Great James Street. Normal arrest procedure, will then take prisoners and documentation to Fort George or to Craigavon Bur (sit) (G94.563).

21.2.2. The suggestion that the army intended to deal with the march in “as low a key as possible and for as long as possible” suggests that the arrest operation would only be launched if necessary to prevent either a breach of the blocking points or serious violence against the security forces. However, it is clear from the Order as a whole that some form of violent disorder was regarded as inevitable and that 1 Para would be deployed into the Bogside whatever the scale of violence or objective need for their deployment. There is no indication in the documentation that any special plans were made to cater for an unusually large number of arrestees. The head of the Royal Military Police in Northern Ireland (INQ1383, the Assistant Provost Marshall) made no specific arrangements for the march. (Day 304/78/11 to Day 304/78/13) Although INQ 1383 initially claimed that he was aware that it had been proposed that up to 300 to 400 people might be arrested (Day 304/77/21 to Day 304/77/23) he eventually conceded that he had “no idea .. .. that there would be 300 or 400, there could be any number” (Day/304174/9 to Day 304/194/17). According to Col. Steele, the Brigade Major who drafted the Op Order, he and the Brigadier had already agreed at some stage before the Order Group Conference that the proposed figure of 300 – 400 was “ridiculous” (Day 266/87/11 to Day 266/87/21). General MacLellan said that General Ford had initially suggested 300 – 400 but he himself “speculating on far less” (Day 262/9/10 to Day 262/9/15).

21.2.3 The Soldiers’ counsel have produced a document entitled “Transportation of Detainees to Fort George” at OS7.55-57, discussed further below.

(ii) a list of 44 names of arrested persons who appeared at Londonderry Petty Sessions on 3^rd February 1972 (ARR2: there are 24 people on the “A” list, i.e. those released on police bail, and 20 on the “B” list, those released without recognisance) (ARR2.1 to ARR2.10)

(iii) a letter from the police to the DPP about prosecution of the arrestees (ARR3.1 to ARR3.4);

(iv) an internal memo to the DPP about the prosecutions (ARR4.1 to ARR4.10); and

(v) 53 individual files (ARR5.1 to ARR57.4) containing, in relation to each arrested person, a photograph of the arrestee with his “arresting officer”, a Royal Military Police pro forma statement form in which the soldier explains the circumstances of the “arrest” and a police arrest report form.

21.2.5 The Army schedule contains the personal details of 51 arrestees and purports to show the location and time of each arrest, reasons for the arrest and the identity of the arresting soldier. The names of John Barry Liddy and Myles O’Hagan appear as numbers 52 and 53 respectively but no other details are given in relation to these two individuals.

21.2.6 The Petty Sessions list (ARR2) contains the personal details of 44 arrested persons, the names of the arresting soldiers and the names of the Police Officers who processed each prisoner.

21.2.7 Exhibited to the statement of Inspector Gardner is a list of the RUC personnel involved at Fort George (JG1.11). At JG1.3 paragraph 20 of Inspector Gardner’s statement, he says that he interviewed the arresting soldiers at Palace Barracks and that a contemporaneous note would have been taken of the interviews which would have been typed into statements. Neither the notes nor the statements are available.

21.2.8 Christopher Clarke’s opening statement concerning arrests is transcribed at Days 40 and 41. Our case concerning the arrests is set out in Arthur Harvey’s opening statement at Day 46.

21.2.9 Some photographs showing arrested persons at or near Rossville St are contained at Tab 12 in Bundle P5 (P503.1 to P503.47) and at Tab 5 in Bundle P8 (P1069-1083).

21.2.10 On the basis of the above documentation and the civilian evidence, we have prepared a number of tables for ease of reference, as follows: Appendix 1 shows the names of all those arrested on Bloody Sunday, both recorded and unrecorded, grouped by the location of their arrest, with details also of the soldiers who arrested them and the stated reasons. There were 63 arrests in total but only 53 were recorded and of these only 46 were made by 1 Para at the material time. The tables show the 46 recorded arrests and a further 10 unrecorded arrests by 1 Para. The other 7 recorded arrests were made in the Long Tower area by the Royal Anglian Regiment either before or after the main “scoop-up” operation.

Appendix 2 shows the recorded arrests arranged by reference to the arresting soldiers grouped by platoon, with details of the location of arrest (alleged and actual) and reference numbers of relevant photographs or video footage.

Appendix 3 is a summary of the evidence of some of the soldiers who refer to mistreatment of prisoners at Ft George.

21.3. Overview

21.3.1 According to the Army Schedule (ARR.1), 53 people were arrested by the Army.

21.3.2 There are 63 names listed in Appendix 1 as persons arrested but this list includes Winifred O’Brien, Denis Bradley and 8 others who are not on the Army list because they were released at an early stage or, in at least one case, escaped. The full list of those arrestees who are not recorded as such is as follows:

Denis Bradley (Arrested at Glenfada Park North, released at Little James St) H1.14 paragraph 33 to H1.15 paragraph 36

Patrick O’ Donnell (Arrested at Glenfada Park North, wounded, released at Lt James St) AO35.3 paragraph 21

Winifred O Brien (Arrested at Glenfada Park North, released at Ft George: AO.4) AO4.3 to AO4.4

William Leo Carlin (Arrested at 33 Chamberlain St: AC40.2 paragraph 14 to AC40.4 paragraph 26 and see P501)

21.3.3 From the total of 53 recorded arrests, the following 7 persons should be deducted as not relevant since they were not arrested in the Rossville St area at the material time:

Eugene O’Donnell (arrested by Soldier 150, Royal Anglian Regiment. at Barrack St in the car taking Joe Friel to hospital)

James Deehan (arrested by Soldier 150 at Barrack St in the car taking Joe Friel to hospital)

Hugh Young (arrested by Soldier 150 at Barrack St in the car taking Gerry Donaghey to hospital)

Raymond Rogan (arrested by Soldier 150 at Barrack St in the car taking Gerry Donaghey to hospital)

James Gallagher (arrested in Barrack St at 1 p.m. by INQ 2142, probably Royal Anglian)

Daniel Esler (arrested in Henrietta St for being in possession of a rubber bullet and Militant)

21.3.4 This leaves 46 people recorded as arrested by paratroopers in or around the Rossville St area at the material time. In his opening statement, Christopher Clarke said there were 45 people arrested by 1 Para and taken to Fort George. We are not sure which arrestee was not included in his total but it may have been Barry Liddy, who was “arrested” by Soldier E, or he may simply have been wrong about the number. Of his 45, he said that:

7 were arrested by the Mortar Platoon at the Rossville Street wasteground,

3 by the Composite Platoon, i.e. Soldier 229 (Joseph Lynn at Rossville Street and Patrick McGinley and Denis McLaughlin at Glenfada Park North).

21.3.5. The Army lists cannot be relied upon for accurate information about the number or location of the arrests. As appears from Appendix 1, 1 Para arrested 56 people in total, as follows:

21.3.6 It is common case that those arrested at 33 Chamberlain Street were inside the house when soldiers entered and arrested them as a group. Those arrested at Glenfada Park North were sheltering behind the gable wall when Soldier F and others arrived and arrested them also as a group. In other words, the vast bulk of those arrested were rounded up in two groups when they were taking shelter from the soldiers and were clearly not engaged in any riotous behaviour.

21.3.7. Lt. 026 of C Company says in his Eversheds statement that he went into 33 Chamberlain Street and saw no fewer than 30 occupants. He radioed back to his Company Commander (Major 221a). He was ordered to detain the occupants and take them back up Chamberlain Street. B1545.003 paragraph 26. This officer does not suggest that any of them were identified rioters but other members of C Company later identified them as such at Fort George. The group arrested at the gable end of Glenfada Park North included 2 priests (Fr. O’Keefe and Fr Bradley - Fr Bradley was released in William Street), a woman (Winifred O’Brien, who was released without charge from Fort George), a boy (Myles O’Hagan, who was also released from Fort George without charge) and one of the wounded (Patrick O’Donnell, who was released with Father Bradley). Barry Liddy was also released without charge after being seriously beaten.

21.3.8 As appears from the Soldiers’ document, “Transportation of Detainees to Fort George”, prisoners were transported to Fort George in three trips. The first group (including persons arrested at Glenfada Park North) were taken by the 1 Para Regimental Police (Provost Sergeant and Provost Detachment, as opposed to the Royal Military Police) from the wire fence by the GPO Sorting Office in Little James Street to the Provost Sergeant’s lorry which was parked in Sackville Street and from there to Fort George. This detachment of regimental police then returned to collect a second group from Little James Street. According to INQ1335, a Lance Corporal in the 1Para Regimental Police, there were only half a dozen Regimental Police to each Battalion. They were not trained as Police like the RMP but were soldiers with special police duties. C1335.1 paragraph 2. None of the 1 Para Regimental Police admits to seeing any ill-treatment of any prisoner.

21.3.9. Although it is no more than a technical point in the context of what happened on Bloody Sunday, it should noted in passing that, put at its lowest, the method by which civilians were rounded up, transported to Fort George and then herded into pens there whilst awaiting identification was even in breach of their own procedures and instructions, according to the head of the RMP in Northern Ireland, INQ1383 Assistant Provost Marshall (Day 304/170/23 to Day 304/173/11). The “arresting” soldiers from 1 Para did not accompany either of these two groups to Fort George. The third group consisted of those arrested at 33 Chamberlain Street and they were taken in a “C” Company lorry by the C Company soldiers who arrested them.

21.3.10.Because they were accompanied by their “arresting” soldiers, the third group was processed first. The first two groups were processed when the “arresting soldiers” from Support Company arrived later in the evening. The Soldiers’ document suggests that these “arresting soldiers” got to Fort George about 9.00pm. This corresponds with Father O’Keefe’s evidence but, according to Constable O’Neill’s notebook, one of the first group (William John Doherty) was processed by him at 7.45 pm and another (Christopher James Doherty) was processed at 8.30 pm. (JO2.6 paragraph 26) We have not yet seen Constable O’Neill’s notebook but he refers to its contents in his statement.

21.3.11. It appears from the Civilian evidence that the first two groups of prisoners were made to run the gauntlet by soldiers. If these were the soldiers who had accompanied the prisoners in the lorry, they would appear to have been 1 Para’s own regimental police. The third group of prisoners does not appear to have been required to run the gauntlet in the same way. On arrival in the hangar at Fort George, the prisoners appear to have been herded into holding pens surrounded by barbed wire. Many of the civilians allege that they were subjected to various acts of brutality including being beaten with batons, punched, kicked, required to hold the barbed wire, made to stand spread-eagled against the wall and forced to stand close to heaters (later in the evening).

21.3.12. Support for at least some of the allegations of rough treatment can be found in the statements of INQ1224 and INQ 18. Constable Black (Day 211/173/17) also confirms the presence of barking dogs and the intimidating atmosphere. The evidence of soldiers who refer to ill-treatment of prisoners at Ft George is summarised in Appendix 3.

21.3.13. The exact processing procedure followed by the police and army in Fort George is not entirely clear. There is even disagreement in the evidence about the physical layout of the hangar and the location of various processing rooms. However, the procedure seems to have been as follows. On arrival, the police took names and particulars of the prisoners in the pens, the “arresting” soldiers (at some stage) picked out prisoners from the holding pens, made them stand against a wall until they were ready to be photographed, statement forms were filled in by the Royal Military Police (as opposed to the Parachute Regimental Police) after the photographs were taken, prisoners were presented to Sergeant Graham and a number of constables then filled out arrest report forms, following which prisoners were charged and released either on police bail or otherwise.

21.3.14. According to the Soldiers’ document “Transportation of Detainees to Fort George”, Fort George was manned by the Coldstream Guards and the processing of prisoners was carried out by 6 soldiers from the Royal Military Police.

21.3.15. Log entries indicate that between 5.04 pm and 7.02 pm three attempts were made from Fort George to secure the attendance of the 1 Para arresting personnel. When they arrived, they appear (from the Civilian evidence) to have picked out prisoners at random and claimed to have witnessed them engaging in various forms of riotous behaviour, mainly throwing stones. The Civilian evidence of random identification is confirmed in his own case by David Longstaff (INQ 23) (C23.7 paragraph 41) and Sergeant Graham (Day 188/60/7 to Day 188/60/11) was prepared to accept that this may have happened in a number of cases.

21.3.21. All the prisoners from Fort George appear to have been released late in the evening or in the early hours of the following morning. As appears above, 44 of the 46 recorded prisoners were prosecuted. Myles O’Hagan and Barry Liddy were never charged. All the charges were eventually dropped.

21.4. Civilian Evidence

21.4.1 As appears from Appendix 1, twenty civilians were arrested at the Nelis’ home at 33 Chamberlain Street. These arrests were all carried out by members of 8 Platoon of C Company, who had come through Barrier 14. The householders and many of those arrested at 33 Chamberlain Street made statements to the Police about the conduct of the soldiers who entered the premises and arrested them. These are summarised in the Police Report at AN9.21 to AN9.18. By way of example, James McDermott, a 52 year old retired man, stated: “a wee Scots soldier came into the house and used dirty language about all and every F.. … Irish pig of an Irishman was under arrest”. AN9.18 He remonstrated with this soldier, who immediately attacked him with his baton, striking him several times about his shoulders. Similar accounts are given by other civilians arrested in the house.

21.4.2. Twenty-five civilians were arrested at the southern gable end of the east block of Glenfada Park North. Among them were Terence O’Keefe and Denis Bradley, both then Catholic priests. Father O’Keefe was also a lecturer in Philosophy and Dean of the School of Humanities at the New University of Ulster. On 20^th February 1972 he wrote a letter of complaint to the GOC, General Tuzo, reproduced at H21.27 to H21.29. His contemporaneous account reflects the experience of this group of arrestees:

“I was then placed against the wall of a maisonette, being struck several times in the process. I saw many people being savagely beaten by your troops for no apparent reason. I was then taken in a line of civilians to the foot of Rossville Street. We were forced to run with hands on head, while soldiers ran beside us, striking us with rifles and screaming the most foul abuse. (At this stage let me say that your soldiers seemed quite beside themselves and in a highly elevated mood). After being placed in line against a wire fence – again with threats, beatings and abuse – I was batoned into an Army lorry in William Street. There were 29 people in the lorry (28 males and 1 female). One soldier came to the foot of the lorry, loaded a baton round and said: “I want you fuckers in half that space”. We were forced to kneel facing the front of the lorry, crushed against one another. Those at the back of the lorry (where I found myself) were struck repeatedly in the back and on the head. .. .. When we arrived at the Army Centre in the Strand Road, I, along with the others, was kicked from the lorry and forced to run between two lines of Paratroopers wielding batons, hoses and rifles. Each soldier struck a blow at me as I ran to the door, and most of these blows connected. We were then forced to stand for several hours in a search position against the walls. Anyone who shifted position was threatened and at times beaten. After members of the R.U.C. had taken names and particulars of the prisoners, we were forced alternately to hold barbed wire, hold our hands behind our heads or to stand in search positions against the wall, over long periods of time. [During the period after 9.00 pm when soldiers from the Parachute Regiment arrived] I witnessed conduct that was both sickeningly brutal and a disgrace to any uniform. Assaults were committed in a sadistic manner on a number of people, particularly youths aged from about 15 to 19 years. These assaults continued over a period of 1 to 1½ hours. These consisted of:

(1) Deliberate and systematic provocation of the prisoners by the paratroopers by verbal means and by physical assault, such as stamping on feet, kicking shins, kneeing on the thigh or in groin, severe hair-pulling, striking with fists in the body, stomach and groin etc. Such actions occurred continuously over this period.

(2) More serious examples of physical assault place. One youth (aged about 21 or 17 years) was struck in the groin and lower abdomen twice with such severity that he collapsed. On being kicked and hauled to his feet, he was unable to stand upright and fell backwards, striking his head on the concrete floor. He was kicked to his feet again and had to be placed against the wall in order to keep him upright.

(3) There were also cases of deliberate torture. Two youths were forced to hold their heads back in an unnaturally strained position, in order to bring their faces as close as possible to the electric heaters, which were on stands about 6’6” above floor level. They were forced to keep in this position for about three-quarters of an hour and were struck if they shifted position. The smaller youth was forced to stand on the taller youth’s feet during this time, in order to raise his face nearer the heater. When one youth was asked if he wanted a drink, he replied that he did and was told to open his mouth. The paratrooper then spat into his mouth.”

21.4.3 Included among the seven civilians arrested in or around Rossville Street was Joseph Lynn, who was arrested by Soldier 229. In his statement (AL39.1), Mr Lynn describes Soldier 229 as a sadist who repeatedly kicked and punched him in Fort George. “Throughout the beating, the RUC and the other paras were standing in the same room and were watching. The RUC took no part in the beatings but that was the point, they didn’t even try to stop it. They did nothing” (AL 39.6 paragraph 28) Indeed the RUC “seemed highly amused by the whole thing” (AL 39.7 paragraph 32).

21.4.4. General Tuzo promised to investigate Fr O’Keefe’s complaint but no investigation was carried out. As for the complaints to the police, the Chief Inspector in charge of the investigation felt that “it would be in the best public interest at this stage not to bring prosecutions against the members of the military concerned, therefore I would recommend no further action”. (AN9.19)

21.5. The Police at Fort George

21.5.1 The Police team consisted of Inspector Gardner, Sergeants Grey and Graham and 9 constables. Eversheds took statements from Gardner, Graham, Grey, Hutchinson, Black and O’Neill. We are unsure of the position concerning the remaining constables. The prisoners processed by the three constables who gave oral testimony are set out below together with the “arresting” soldier in each case:

21.5.2 None of the Police Officers admitted witnessing any ill-treatment. Constable Hutchinson does not even recall seeing or hearing dogs even though Constable Black said it was bedlam with the noise of barking dogs echoing round the building.

21.5.3 Sergeant Graham was one of the Police Officers in charge of the processing of prisoners at Fort George. He gave his evidence on 11^th February 2002 (Day 188). Like Constable Black, he was taken aback by the numbers of prisoners that arrived. He agreed that he was not prepared for the 50-60 prisoners that arrived and he would have been hopelessly ill-prepared for 300 – 400. (Day 188/46/1 to Day 188/46/9) He claimed that the police were running the compound at Fort George, they were responsible for what was going on there and they were allowed to walk around inside the hangar.(Day 188/48/5 to Day 188/48/21) From the offices used by the police, he was able to hear what was going on in the holding areas and he also saw some prisoners arriving (Day 188/51/8 to Day 188/52/24) He accepted that a number of prisoners were picked out at random by soldiers (Day 188/60/7 to Day 188/60/11) and that, in particular, the soldier (F) who claimed to have identified Father O’Keeffe as a rioter was telling lies (Day 188/59/9 to Day 188/59/13). He agreed “with the benefit of hindsight” that the procedure of filling in statements to the effect that Paratroopers had arrested the prisoners and brought them directly to Fort George and then personally handed them over to the police appeared to constitute a systematic deceit (Day 188/64/5 to Day 188/64/8) but he claimed not to have been aware of that at the time (Day 188/65/1 to Day 188/65/6). He did not admit to seeing any ill-treatment of prisoners. When pressed to admit that he did witness brutality on the part of Paratroopers, he replied: “I am not denying that. I cannot recall it. Thirty years is a long time unfortunately”. (Day 188/75/5 to Day 188/75/6)

21.5.4 Constable Hutchinson (Day 211) claimed in his Eversheds statement (JH14.3 paragraph 12) that he could not recall anything in particular happening at Fort George to suggest that prisoners were treated badly by the military, even though he said at JH14.2 paragraph 10 of his statement that he saw prisoners “leaning forwards holding on to barred wire” and he accepted that they would not have been in that position voluntarily (Day 211/104/20 to Day 211/104/23).

21.5.5 Constable O’Neill said in his statement to Eversheds (JO2.4 paragraph 19) that the Paras were very angry and the place (Fort George) was “very unpleasant”. They exhibited their anger “the very opposite to the way you should be dealing with matters in my view” (Day 211/149/22 to Day 211/150/6). He saw an incident where a small ginger-haired man was struck in the groin with the butt of a rifle by a young paratrooper. (Day 211/150/15 to Day 211/150/18) This was done in full view of quite a number of police officers and soldiers. (Day 211/151/12 to Day 211/152/1). He did not see any “high-ranking commissioned officer ventilating any instructions at all” and did not see any NCO’s making any attempt to restrain the soldiers who were exhibiting their anger (Day 211/152/8 to Day 211/152/17). When asked why he did not arrest the paratrooper responsible for the unprovoked assault on the ginger-haired man, he said: “Well, the realities would have been that it would have been very impractical for me to proceed with an arrest against an Army man who had brought in a prisoner from the Bogside following a march”. (Day 211/154/11 to Day 211/154/14). The questioning continued as follows (Day 211/155/14 to Day 211/156/2):

“Q. If you had tried to arrest this Paratrooper or indeed report to the outside world that this had happened, you of course would have been ostracised, would you not, within the RUC?

Q. Of course, the upshot of that was that the Paratroopers were effectively above the law on this day, were they not?

Q Not just running the show in a proper legitimate sense, but they were obviously above the law in the sense that they could commit acts of assault with impunity?

When it was put to him that what he witnessed was soldiers committing acts of brutality without being restrained in any way by NCO’s or other senior officers he replied: “I did not see anyone being restrained”.

21.5.6. Constable O’Neill was the only police officer who gave his evidence with any degree of candour. More typical of the standard of evidence of former police officers was that of Constable Black who said he saw no evidence of misconduct by paratroopers, heard no evidence of misconduct by paratroopers and never even heard tell of any misconduct by paratroopers. The first he heard of any such suggestion was at the Inquiry. (Day 211/182/4 to Day 211/182/9)

21.6. Soldiers’ evidence

21.6.1. The table at Appendix 2 provides a breakdown (by platoon) showing the arresting soldiers, the pig they were in (where known), the civilians they arrested, the alleged location and time of the alleged riotous behaviour, the location suggested by the arrestee and (where available) the reference numbers of the best photographs or video clips of the civilians before and at or near the point and/or time of arrest.

21.6.2 As appears from this table, the 53 arrests recorded by the Army were claimed by 23 soldiers, viz Soldiers O, E, F, G, J, U, 150, 007, 104, 37, 229, 33 and 112 and INQ’s 1918, 2143, 2000, 2142, 23, 635, 2194, 627, 12 and 1237. Four of these soldiers were Royal Anglians (104, 150, 2143 and 2142). 21 of the 53 arrests were claimed by 5 soldiers. INQ 12 claimed 6, INQ 2000 claimed 4, Soldier 150 claimed 4 (Barrack St), Soldier F claimed 4 and Soldier E claimed 3. Incidentally, this pattern must have been detected by the processing police officers. INQ12 claimed to have arrested 4 of the 5 prisoners processed by Constable Simpson. Soldier 007 claimed to have arrested 3 of the 7 prisoners processed by Constable Black. INQ 23 claimed 2 of the 3 processed by Hutchinson. Soldier G claimed 2 of the 3 processed by Constable O’Neill.

21.6.3 Lance Corporal 003 was a member of 7Platoon, C Company. As such he was one of the very first soldiers through Barrier 14. He gave evidence on Day 309. With regard to the question whether it was necessary for the Paratroopers to go in at all, Soldier 003 accepted that at the time the Paras went through Barrier 14 the crowd had moved back up the street to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. (Day 309/107/2 to Day 309/211/13) In answer to the specific question whether at the time of the Paratroopers’ deployment there was any pressure on the barrier, in the sense of crowds rioting there, he replied “No, the crowd had moved back” (Day 211/110/9). He agreed that there was no prospect of Paratroopers catching anyone because they had moved so far away from the barrier (Day 211/110/14 to Day 211/110/17).

21.6.4. All the arrests in Chamberlain Street were made by members of 8 Platoon, C Company: 6 by Private INQ 12, 4 by Sergeant INQ 2000 and 3 by Corporal 007.

21.6.5. The commander of 8 Platoon was 2^nd Lieutenant 026. He claims to have sent an NCO to check the occupants of 33 Chamberlain Street and discovered that no fewer than 30 people were gathered at the location. He radioed back to the Company Commander (Major 221A) and was ordered to detain the people and take them back up Chamberlain Street. (B1545.003 paragraph 26) He did not suggest that the occupants of the house had done anything to justify their arrest or that they resisted arrest. In his oral testimony to this Tribunal, he initially tried to suggest that the people withdrawing along Chamberlain Street were throwing stones at soldiers (Day 315/127/17 to Day 315/127/21). He had to resile from this when it was pointed out to him that he had said in his 1972 statement that “nothing was thrown at us” (Day 315/128/2 to Day 315/128/5).

21.6.6 The Platoon Sergeant, INQ 2000, claimed in his Eversheds statement to have “absolutely no recollection of the events of 30^th January 1972” (C2000.1 paragraph 1). Although he confirmed that the signatures in the RMP statements relating to William McCloskey, Charles McCarron, James Patrick Ferguson and Paul Whoriskey were his, he had no recollection of making any arrests that day or signing or completing any of the documents (C2000.1 paragraph 5). In his 1972 RMP statement (C2000.2) he makes no reference to being ordered into 33 Chamberlain Street but claims that a woman came out of the house and asked if they could call an ambulance for a person who had been shot. He then detailed Corporal 007 and Private INQ 12 to enter the house and they reported that it was full of people. Those people, he said, were the ones they had chased up Chamberlain Street after having seen them throwing stones at Security Forces in William Street. He claimed to recognise them and had them taken to Fort George so that they could be “screened and positive identifications made”. On arrival at Fort George, he positively identified Paul Whoriskey, Charles McCarron and William McCloskey as people he had seen throwing stones. He signed statements to this effect. Paul Whoriskey and William McCloskey were in the house because they had carried Michael Bridge there from Rossville Flats courtyard.

21.6.7. INQ 12 arrested more civilians than anyone else. Notwithstanding this, when first interviewed by Eversheds, he had pretended not to remember having any role in arresting civilians (OS.1.819 paragraph 18). Once the arrest documentation was produced, he said that he now “vaguely” recalled the patrol being approached by a woman who asked them to call an ambulance as there was an injured person in her house. He remembered that he and the Platoon Corporal (007) were detailed by the Platoon Sergeant (INQ 2000) to enter the house and when he did so he saw approximately 20 – 30 people, some of whom he recognised as having been involved in the Civil Rights demonstration and rioting. (C12.4 paragraphs 18 to 19) He also remembered going to Fort George, although this had also been left out in his draft statement. Apart from accepting that he swore at civilians in the house, he denied the allegations made by Mr Nelis and the other civilians in their statements to the RUC.

21.6.8 INQ 12 gave oral evidence on Day 351. Ad the beginning of this evidence he said that although he claimed in paragraph 1 of his Eversheds statement that he had not been out of Belfast before going to Derry on 30^th January 1972, he had in fact been at Magilligan the previous weekend. He had been “caught on television” kicking a civilian on the ground and was subjected to a disciplinary inquiry. His recollection of his excuse differed from that of Col Wilford given at the Widgery Inquiry. (Day 351/5/11 to Day 351/6/19). He claimed to remember petrol bombs being thrown at Barrier 14 despite being shown the evidence of Major INQ 2079, the OC of A Company of 2 Royal Green Jackets, the company manning the barrier, to the effect that “no bombs of any description were thrown.” (Day 351/6/19)

21.6.9 INQ 12 claimed that when he went into number 33 Chamberlain he recognised some of the occupants as having been involved in the Civil Rights demonstration and rioting. He recognised them by their clothing and their “general description” (Day 351/29/15 to Day 351/29/21). When asked whether he believed he was entitled to go into a private house and just order everybody to get out of the house, irrespective of whether they had been breaking the law or not, he replied: “We were in an area that was (sic) an illegal riot going on and there was 22 people in a house that was – well everybody was jammed in like sardines, sir” (Day 351/30/12 to Day 351/30/14). Among the six occupants he later identified at Fort George as rioters were Joseph Hutchman and Maurice McColgan, who had also helped carry Michael Bridge there.

21.6.10. Another of those he identified at Fort George as a stone-thrower was George Nelis. During oral testimony, he could not explain why he had made this statement in circumstances where, on 10^th March 1972, he made a statement to the police (C12.9) in which he said that he could not identify Mr Nelis as one who had been throwing stones. (Day 351/36/20 to Day 351/36/25). In a statement to the RMP on 19^th May 1972, he had recounted how he positively identified George Nelis, among others, as persons he had seen throwing stones, without saying that this was untrue (C12.11) but in a further statement on 17^th November 1972 he reverted to the position that he could not “say positively that Mr Nelis was throwing stones.” (C12.14). INQ12 could not explain these discrepancies.

21.6.11 When it was pointed out to him that he did not say in any one of the six statements he made about the six persons he purported to identify that he had seen the individuals in question engaged in a riot or as part of a riotous crowd in William Street or anywhere else, he explained that this was because “they were not arrested as such, they were arrested to be screened.” (Day 351/42/24 to Day 351/42/25)

21.6.12. Allegations of brutality and ill-treatment on the part of INQ 12 were made by a large number of civilians including George Nelis (AN 9.4), Joseph Hutchman (AH91.7), Maurice McColgan (AM124.5), Matthew Campbell, a 50 year old docker (AC140.1), William Carlin (AC40.4), James McDermott a 52 year old retired person (AM184.2), the late Thomas Meehan, then a 44 year old cable joiner (AM393.2), Mrs Bridget Nelis, the householder at 33 Chamberlain Street (AM26.1), George O’Neill, a 43 year old docker (AO77.1) and Otto Schlindwein, a 44 year old pharmacist (AS2.3), among others. He denied all the allegations even though he fitted the description given by each complainant. One of the allegations made by Mr Nelis was that INQ 12 had told him he had been wounded in Belfast and had then got his revenge by killing four Irishmen and he was going to kill Mr Nelis that day. INQ 12 agreed that he had been wounded in Belfast and could not explain how Mr Nelis could have known this unless he had heard INQ 12 say it. (Day 351/48/1 to Day 351/48/6)

21.6.13. INQ12’s evidence was demonstrably false. He lied even about peripheral matters. For example, he claimed in C12.2 paragraph 8 of his Eversheds statement that there were thousands of people about 8 feet from Barrier 14 as he looked at it. He said he was positive about this but in his 1972 RMP statement (C12.9) he had said that there were approximately 60 people about 25-30 yards away from the barrier. He claimed in C12.2 paragraph 11 of his Eversheds statement that only two men from his platoon carried rifles but the best photograph of his platoon (P253) shows most, if not all, of the soldiers pictured carrying rifles at the junction of Chamberlain Street before they entered Chamberlain Street. To explain this, INQ 12 had to suggest that this picture was taken after all the shooting had stopped. (Day 351/85/9 to Day 351/85/10) In support of this, he suggested that his platoon had not stopped at this junction after they crossed the barrier but had gone directly into Chamberlain Street even though the video footage shows otherwise. (Day 351/86/9 to Day 351/86/23) He even suggested that the photograph had been taken after he had come back from Fort George (Day 351/88/3 to Day 351/88/8). He also claimed in paragraph 12 of his Eversheds statement (C12.3 paragraph 12) that he came under fire as he went in but he made no reference to coming under fire in any of the three statements made in 1972, either to the police or to the RMP.

21.6.14 When pressed about the circumstances in which he had failed to mention his involvement in arrests at 33 Chamberlain Street, he first of all said that it was just a question of forgetting about having anything to do with the prisoners (Day 351/104/14 to Day 351/104/18) and then he said that there were about 5 previous draft Eversheds statements in which he did say that he went to the end of Chamberlain Street and arrested some prisoners (Day 351/106/5 to Day 351/107/5).

21.6.15 With regard to the circumstances in which he arrived at 33 Chamberlain Street, INQ12 had said in his police statement on 10^th March 1972 (C12.9) that he and other members of his snatch squad followed George Nelis along William Street and up Chamberlain Street and saw him run into the house where he (INQ 12) then found 2 injured people and 22 other male persons. However in his statement to the RMP on 19^th May 1972 (C12.10) he said that the soldiers gave chase to a group of rioters who ran into Chamberlain Street and on their arrival in Chamberlain Street the group had disappeared. “The patrol continued along Chamberlain Street in an effort to locate the rioters but without success”, he had said. It was only as a result of being approached by a woman from 33 Chamberlain Street that they went into the house. When asked which of these diametrically opposed statements was true, he replied “both of them really.” (Day 351/110/9).

21.6.16 As for the conduct of the civilians in 33 Chamberlain Street, INQ 12 justified his own coarse language in the house by alleging that the civilians in the house had been aggressive and abusive to him. However one of his companions, Corporal 579, said that the civilians in the house were “quiet and they did not give me any trouble .. .. everyone was calm and not threatening” (C579.4, paragraph 19).

21.6.17 Soldier 007 went into 33 Chamberlain Street with INQ 12 and arrested 3 civilians: William Duddy, James McDermott and Otto Schlindwein, who was there administering medical assistance. He conceded that although he signed arrest forms at Fort George stating that they had been engaged in riotous behaviour, he had not in fact seen them throwing stones but had only seen them in the crowd. Presence in the crowd was enough, he said, to warrant arrest. (Day 310/41/9 to Day 310/44/7). He agreed that the soldiers would have manhandled the prisoners but he did not recall any physical abuse. He was one of the soldiers in the lorry taking prisoners from Chamberlain Street to Fort George. Among the events that occurred in the lorry, according to William McCloskey (AM120.4 paragraph 25) was an incident when one of the prisoners was shot by a paratrooper in the face from very close range with a rubber bullet. He denied that anything like that happened. (Day 310/48/14 to Day 310/48/21)

21.6.18 Soldier 007 agreed that by the time he went to the barrier the crowd had already dispersed some distance away from them (Day 310/64/12 to Day 310/64/17). At Fort George, Soldier 007 signed three statements alleging that each of his three arrestees had thrown stones when this was not true. As was pointed out by the Chairman, he knew this to be untrue in 1972 because on 19^th May 1972 he made a statement to the RMP saying that he did not see any of these three people actually throw any stones. (B1384.10 and Day 310/73/18 to Day 310/74/12).

21.6.19 As appears from Appendix 2, the arrests in Glenfada Park were carried out mainly by members of the Anti-tank Platoon. Of the nine members of the Anti-tank Platoon involved in these arrests, three are now deceased: Soldier E (who claimed 4 arrests), Soldier G (who claimed 3) and INQ 2194 (who also claimed 3). It is not seriously disputed by the Soldiers’ counsel that the civilians arrested at Glenfada Park North were simply rounded up as a group and eventually transported to Fort George.

21.6.20 Soldier 229 was a member of the Composite Platoon and “arrested” two civilians who had been at the gable wall of Glenfada Park North (Patrick McGinley and Denis McLaughlin) and also Joseph Lynn, whom he and soldier L apprehended at a derelict building in Rossville Street. With regard to Joseph Lynn, Soldier 229 made a statement to the RMP on 15^th February 1972 (B2211.014) in which he had said he chased Joseph Lynn but made no suggestion that he had seen him do anything wrong. When he was asked about this during his oral testimony to this Inquiry, he accepted that it was possible that he had just debussed and gone after anyone he could catch in the area (Day 341/33/8 to Day 341/33/10). With regard to Denis McLaughlin and Patrick McGinley, he accepted that although he had signed formal statements to the effect that he had seen both throwing stones, he had not and simply arrested them because they were “part of a group” (Day 341/53/21 to Day 341/54/10, Day 341/57/8 to Day 341/57/11, Day 341/100/11 to Day 341/100/17). Solider 112, who was in the waste ground as a member of Mortar Platoon, claimed to have arrested Eamon McAteer in Rossville Street (ARR30.2; ARR30.3) even though Eamon McAteer is clearly seen in the photographs at Glenfada Park North (P638).

21.6.21. The civilians arrested in Glenfada Park North were not escorted to Fort George by their “arresting” soldiers. The soldiers from Support Company who purported to carry out arrests arrived at Fort George some time later. INQ 23 claimed two arrests, those of James Kelly and George Roberts. In his Eversheds statement (C23.7 at paragraph 41) he described the process of identification at Fort George as follows:

“I remember the military police pointing at one or two people and asking me if I remembered them. The gist of what they said was “You remember them don’t you”. Frankly, they all looked the same to me and I probably said no, I did not remember them. There were hundreds of them. However, I probably agreed in the end that I had arrested some of them and probably signed something although I do not know remember the details”.

21.6.22 This, we suggest, gives a true flavour of the way in which the civilians detained in Glenfada Park North were identified and then charged as rioters.

21.6.23 Only 6 civilians were arrested in open ground in Rossville Street. The details are set out in Appendix 1. It is apparent from the civilian evidence that each of those arrested was simply arrested because they were running away across the waste ground. Again, the “arresting” soldiers have made little effort to justify these arrests.

21.6.24. Nearly all the soldiers and police officers who were present in Fort George deny witnessing any ill-treatment of prisoners. Some, such as INQ18 (C18.6 paragraph 40) are prepared to concede that prisoners were treated “roughly” but only one, INQ1224, has given a candid account of what he witnessed at Fort George. This soldier was a guardsman in the 1^st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards. In his Eversheds’ statement he describes how, on arrival at Fort George, the prisoners were made to run the gauntlet of paratroopers who were striking them with batons and were threatening them with Alsatian dogs which were at the full extent of their leashes and “going bananas.” (C1224.1 paragraph 8) Inside Fort George, Paras were hitting prisoners with batons on the arms, legs and head. What shocked INQ1224 about the running of the gauntlet and what stuck in his mind about the conduct of the Paratroopers was not just the brutality exhibited by them but the fact that it was systematic. It seemed to be the style and attitude of the Paras as a unit, he agreed, to engage in this sort of brutality towards civilian prisoners and it was plain in the hangar for all to see. (Day 304/220/24 to Day 304/221/13) The fact that no police officer and no other soldier admits to having seen such systematic brutality by the Paras as a unit at Fort George speaks volumes for the reliability of their testimony on this issue.

21.7 Conclusion

21.7.1 The evidence concerning the circumstances in which civilians were arrested and subsequently detained is in many ways the least contentious of the evidence received by the Inquiry. In our submission, the Tribunal should have little difficulty determining that the submissions summarised at the beginning of this section are well-founded.

[1] AN28.1 paragraph 1; Day 150/119/20 to Day 150/120/6

[2] E6.0025 to E6.0026 (Report of Professor Arthur)

Introduction

22.1 The allegations of the presence of civilian gunmen, gunfire or bombers contained in the Lawton Team’s Civilian Gunmen Table, dated 31^st May 2002 and attached to Counsel’s Report Number 3, have been deliberated upon in so much as they relate to each sector i.e. the main events and shootings on Bloody Sunday. However, those areas outside the sectors in which our clients were killed or wounded have not been considered to be directly relevant to the main events of Bloody Sunday. Whilst they have been included in the Lawton document, it is with the caveat, which indeed, it should be noted, relates to the document in its entirety, that accuracy or completeness is not guaranteed and that there is “no implication as to the weight which the Tribunal may attach to any of the evidence cited.” We, therefore, await receipt of the author’s submissions in relation to what the Tribunal should consider assists it in relation to its task of finding the truth about Bloody Sunday.

22.2 “Derry Noise”

22.2.1 In addition to the caveat attached to the Lawton Team’s document, the Tribunal should be aware that there are other reasons for treating the evidence of those witnesses who make reference to low velocity or automatic fire with caution. The army admits to having fired, at least, 108 7.62 rounds, 324 baton rounds, 15CS grenades and 65CS canisters, many of which were fired in rapid succession during a short period of time. Day 288/93/10 to Day 288/93/12. The Tribunal must attach considerable weight to the evidence of Colonel R L Jackson, who, as Commanding Officer of the Royal Green Jackets in Derry since 1970, Day 285/3/13, is best placed to proffer the following opinion:

A. Can I say that I had spoken with Colonel Ferguson previously, when he arrived, because I handed over the city to him on 21st December, and it was either on 21st December or before that that I mentioned the business of the Derry noise? . . . It was very difficult in Derry because of typography and geography to isolate shooting points, or points of explosions, unless you either saw the flash or the smoke. And Derry had this unfortunate echo principle between the castle walls and the Bogside and the Creggan and so on. So he was aware that there was a problem, I am sure. Day 287/7/23 to Day 287/8/12 (computer version)

22.2.2 Similarly, Soldier 128, a Captain in the Royal Green Jackets describes how:

“It was always very difficult to identify from where shots were being fired in the Bogside because of the layout of the area and the Rossville Flats which would distort sounds.” B1802.004 paragraph 20

INQ 831, a Lance Sergeant and Section Commander in the Coldstream Guards, describes how difficult it was, with everything that was going on, to tell from how far away or from what area the single, spaced, high velocity, shots he could hear were fired from because, “Noise used to bounce off the buildings around us which gave a false impression of where the shooting was coming from.” C831.2 paragraphs 13 to 14.[1]

22.3 Blade Slap

22.3.1 The evidence of Mr David Capper is important in relation to automatic fire. He succinctly explains the mistaken belief that there had been automatic fire on Bloody Sunday as follows:

Q. If we could look at your statement under cross-examination by Mr Gibbens at the Widgery Tribunal, M9.14 -- could we go to the bottom of the previous page, M9.13. You were asked the question:

Answer: What I did hear about four minutes before the Saracens came in was the sound of a helicopter going overhead. This is also on the tape-recording. Under certain conditions of the rotors, I do not know whether it is when they are opposed, there is a noise not unlike machine-gun fire. This is on the tape-recording, you can hear something like a machine-gun."

22.3.2 Mr Capper’s evidence is supported by that of Mr Chartres, at WT3.72C in the following exchange:

Q. I think you are aware that some witnesses have said that they heard automatic fire in the Bogside on this particular afternoon. In your experience is it any rate possible to mix up that noise, namely, the noise of automatic fire, with any other noise?

A. Yes, I think it is. It is very easy to confuse with is with a noise which is made by a helicopter when a certain manoeuvre is being carried out. I first experienced this phenomenon soon after the Army entered the arena and in fact thought I was hearing machine-gun fire. I have frequently noticed that, particularly I think the Army Sioux helicopter. I am informed when the pilot alters the pitch of the blades it emits a noise which is very similar to a burst of machine-gun fire in the distance. In fact on this occasion I did say to a colleague when he heard this noise, "I wish these helicopters wouldn't make that sort of noise".

22.3.3 Mr Edmonds, an RUC Constable based in Belfast but present in Derry on 30^th January 1972, not only accepts that he had heard it said by police and soldiers, that a particular type of army helicopter, when it is making a certain manoeuvre, makes a noise like automatic gunfire and can be mistaken for such, but states that he had directly experienced this noise. Day 208/41/7 to Day 208/42/1

22.3.4 Finally, an expert report has acknowledged that helicopters engaged in this type of activity can produce sharply impulsive sounds, a regular series of beats or thumps commonly known as “blade slap”. “Blade slap” most frequently occurs during transient manoeuvres and is often associated with steep turns, shallow descents and with the “flare” approaching a hover. E9.0019

22.3.5 The report prepared for the Inquiry by ISVR Consultancy Services reached the following conclusion on this issue:

“Our opinion is that, under conditions where a helicopter or submachine gun is clearly audible above any background noise, their sounds would be sufficiently distinctive that the likelihood of confusion would be small. However, taking into account that the repetition rate of blade slap is similar to the rate of firing of some submachine guns, it might be possible under some conditions for an observer on the ground to mistake a brief period of helicopter blade slap for the firing of a submachine gun at a moderate distance.” E9.0020

22.4.1 The civilian evidence referred to in the Lawton Team’s document as evidence of automatic fire should be considered with a significant degree of caution,[2] if, indeed, not disregarded, in this respect, altogether for the following reasons:

i) There is no evidence of automatic fire on any of the available audio material or television footage

iii) Senior military figures have acknowledged the confusing effect of the “Derry Sound”

iv) Many of these civilians were involved in what was to be one of the most traumatic experiences of their lives

v) Many of these civilians were, being fired upon themselves, effectively fleeing for their lives

vi) Single shots fired in quick succession from an SLR could be mistaken for automatic fire, a fact acknowledged by INQ 1045, C1045.2 paragraph 9

vii) The rapid firing of gas canisters, gas grenades and rubber bullets could be confused for automatic fire

viii) The noise of helicopter blades could have been mistaken for automatic fire

22.4.2 Whilst the above factors contribute to the confusion amongst the civilian and military evidence in relation to having heard automatic fire and or low velocity fire, two further potential reasons must be considered in relation to the military witnesses. One is that a significant number of soldiers have maliciously, in the knowledge that there was no such fire, invented incidents of civilian fire in an attempt to provide some form of justification for what the Paras did that day. Another is that, out of loyalty for the army and in the genuine belief that there must have such fire, despite the fact that they did not hear it, soldiers have invented incidents of civilian fire as explained by Soldier 160 at B1956.5 paragraph 31:

“The thought that the Paras must have been shot at developed like osmosis. The virtues of loyalty and honouring the Code were drilled into us in training and we did not question whether the Paras had been fired upon – that’s where the loyalty comes in, we all simply assumed that they had been fired at. We knew that the Yellow Card did not permit us to fire at anybody unless we positively identified a gunman. To us, it had to be the case that if the Paras fired they had been fired upon.”

22.4.3 In light of the above, the following soldiers have been selected as an example of those military witnesses whose evidence in relation to automatic or low velocity fire should be treated with the utmost caution:

22.4.4 INQ 2016 was positioned on Bishops Street Without and has not previously made a statement about the events of Bloody Sunday. He did not give oral evidence either and therefore his account has not been tested.

“Later on between 3.45 to 4.15 pm things began to happen. It may have been 15 minutes either side. I also definitely heard the sound of a couple of nail bombs exploding (I cannot recall hearing many of them), I have no doubt about it I heard more than one during my time in Northern Ireland” C2016.4 paragraph 14

It is submitted that this witness may be mistaken when he claims to have heard nail bombs exploding. There are a number of possibilities

ii) He may be confusing events that took place on another day with the events of Bloody Sunday.

22.4.5 Whatever the reason for the written evidence given by this soldier we submit that he did not hear nail bombs exploding on Bloody Sunday because none did explode. In addition we have not had the opportunity of testing his recollection and therefore submit that the Tribunal cannot place any reliance on the evidence he gives about this.

22.4.6 INQ 1298 was positioned at Barrier 24 has not previously made a statement about the events of Bloody Sunday. He gave oral evidence on Day 301.

“being somewhere in the area of the City Walls close to the Apprentice Boys Hall (Masonic Lodge) and seeing a number of soldiers posted as lookouts over the Bogside…. I believe that whilst I was in this area I also looked down into the Bogside and saw civilians with weapons moving about in the area. I no longer recall exactly what I saw, it is more of a feeling I have been left with. This was earlier in the day” C1298.3 paragraph 15

“The other thing I remember which occurred before I took up my position at Barrier 24, was two shots being fired from the vicinity of the Creggan Cemetery…These shots would have been at about 11.15am and were probably aimed at an Engineers Unit. I could identify it as enemy fire.” C1298.3 paragraph 16

22.4.8 INQ 1298’s statement also records that he heard shots at some time during the afternoon. He describes them thus

“…My memory of hearing the shooting is pristine. The first shots were from a light automatic weapon which I identified as some form of carbine. These weapons have a very distinctive sound which I would describe as “tic-a-tac-tac, tic-a-tac-tac”. I could not say how many shots were fired. I could not say exactly where the shots were fired from, but it was from the general direction of the Bogside which was northwest of my position. I know they were fired away from my position because I heard the “thump” of the weapon but not the “crack” of the bullet travelling through the air. Because of this, and the fact that the weapon sounded like an automatic carbine, I assumed that this was terrorist fire and not army fire.” C1298.4 paragraph 21

22.4.9 INQ 1298 then says that “Within two seconds I heard the first SLRs start firing” C1298.4 paragraph 22. When INQ 1298 gave evidence he confirmed that he was on duty at Barrier 24 at the junction of Foyle Road and Ferguson Street on Bloody Sunday Day 301/156/20 to Day 301/157/2. Barrier 24 can be seen on Q10 as one of the furthest barriers from Rossville Street and the area where the deceased and wounded were shot.

22.4.10 INQ 1298 indicated that he had been with INQ 1030 on Bloody Sunday Day 301/158/19 to Day 301/159/9. He also said that he was clear that he had heard two short bursts of automatic fire with two to three bursts in each Day 301/162/7 to Day 301/162/10. He had not reported hearing this Day 301/164/20 to Day 301/164/22.

22.4.11 When INQ 1298 was questioned by Mr Harvey QC inaccuracies in terms of his timing of some of the incidents were pointed out to him. Day 301/165/4 to Day 301/167/11. It is submitted that given that (i) INQ 1298 did not make any statement in 1972 (ii) he was located some distance away from the Bogside at Barrier 24 and (iii) his memory of events and their timings is somewhat muddled, he is mistaken when he says he heard automatic fire from the Bogside. [3]

22.4.12 Further there is no report of “civilians with weapons moving about in the area” of the Bogside and given the vagueness of his memory it is submitted that this evidence cannot be relied on. Finally, there is no report in the logs of any shots being fired at any Army position at 11.15 in the morning so INQ 1298 is, at the very least, mistaken about the timings of those shots and therefore for this reason, and the reasons outlined above his evidence in this regard cannot be relied on either.

22.4.13 INQ 0960 was tasked with escorting the commanding officer Lt Col 1512 has not previously made a statement about the events of Bloody Sunday. He did not give oral evidence either and therefore his account has not been tested.

i) At about midday when he was at “Tactical HQ” at Craigavon Bridge. It was difficult to say where they were coming from but it sounded like the Creggan/Bogside area C960.2 paragraph 8 and;

ii) While he was at the Masonic Hall car park (perhaps between 1 and 2 pm) where he heard shooting going on which was nothing but low velocity. Also at this position he claims to have heard a couple of explosions C960.2 paragraph 10.

22.4.15 That this witness’ evidence is confused is clear. He later gives an account of seeing a body half on half of the back seat of a red vehicle at the “Tac HQ” location C960.3 paragraphs 14 to 16. However, when the witness was shown photographs of Mr Rogan’s car and Gerard Donaghey’s body he said that it was not the car he saw and he could not be sure if that was the body he saw C960.4 paragraph 17. In our submission his evidence that he heard low velocity gunfire and explosions is wrong and cannot be relied upon.

22.4.16 INQ 767, who was on standby and located in a Pig in the car park of the Masonic Hall, has not previously made a statement about the events of Bloody Sunday. He did not give oral evidence either and therefore his account has not been tested.

22.4.17 He states “At some stage I heard shots. I cannot remember precisely when but it was certainly a good number of hours after we had gone on duty, perhaps in the late afternoon. I heard both automatic fire and single shots. I cannot remember whether I heard both together or one before the other and I cannot say what types of weapons were being fired. I cannot remember how long the shooting lasted for, nor whether it was sporadic or all came at the same time. I formed no impression as to where the shooting was coming from, whether it was in front of me, behind me, to my left or to my right. I expect I assumed, however, that it came from wherever the marchers were. I cannot remember how many single shots I heard, nor whether they appeared to me to be from high velocity or low velocity weapons. I don’t remember if I formed any impression as to who was firing; I do not expect I would have been able to tell from my position in the Pig.” C767.2 paragraph 11

22.4.18 It is submitted that INQ 767’s memory of events is so vague that his evidence cannot be relied upon. In addition, he is not clear that it was non-army fire that he heard. In any event it may be that the “Derry sound” distorted what he heard or that INQ 767 has mistaken the large number of army shots the Tribunal knows was fired simultaneously on the day for automatic gunfire.

22.4.19 INQ 2025 was positioned on the City Walls from where, having seen the Paras deploy down Rossville Street, he heard SLR fire. C2025.5 paragraph 16. The firing seemed to be constant; someone said the Paratroopers had opened fire. At that stage he claims that he could hear SLRs and some small arms. “Everything was going very fast. Up on the walls there was a sense of panic as if something was going wrong. I knew the Paras were firing their SLRs as I could hear them.” It is not clear from the evidence of this soldier, wheat he meant by small arms fire. It may be a mistaken reference to rubber bullets being fired. It would have been difficult in any case, given the amount of SLR firing he describes, to have made the distinction between that fire and small arms fire. This witness was not called to give oral evidence. His reference to some small arms fire has not, therefore, been tested.[4]

22.4.20 INQ 707 was a soldier in the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment positioned on the City Walls. He places himself in and about his vehicle at Bishops Street Within, which means that he would in effect have been located under the Walls with no view of the Bogside and with an extremely limited ability to hear what was going on. C707.1 paragraph 5, C707.2 paragraph 8

22.4.21 He claims to have heard gunfire, some automatic and some single shots, but was unable to identify the type of weapon, nor how many shots were fired. C707.2 paragraph 10 He also claims to have heard explosions. C707.2 paragraph 11

22.4.22 He expressly states that he does not recall anything coming over the radio at this time. C707.2 paragraph 12. His evidence about hearing automatic fire and explosions should be regarded as inherently unreliable given his location.

22.4.23 INQ 947 was a soldier in the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment positioned on the City Walls. He places himself to the right of the Platform on the City Walls at the position marked A on his attached map. C947.4. However this witness was located at or near his Pig and was on standby, although other soldiers were manning the post and using periscope-like equipment to observe the Bogside. C947.1 paragraph 4

22.4.24 Sometime after seeing a crowd at FDC he claims to have heard people shouting, baton rounds being discharged and 4-5 low velocity shots fired from the eastern part of William Street. C947.2 paragraph 8 He also claims to have heard nail bombs exploding as well as hearing radio transmissions reporting what was going on. C947.2 paragraph 9. Sometime after hearing calls for assistance to the effect that the Barriers were going to be overrun he heard high velocity firing, maybe 2 – 5 rounds. C947.2 paragraph 10. The witness is unreliable in relation to civilian gunfire for the following reasons:

i) His location could have placed him in a poor position to distinguish the sounds heard. See Col. Jackson, Soldier 128, Soldier 139

ii) He failed to hear 103 live rounds fired from SLRs. He either deliberately omitted that fact making him a particle witness whose evidence cannot be relied upon. Alternatively he heard those rounds and mistakenly believed that they were low velocity rounds as described by him.

iii) His suggestion about what he heard over the radio is undermined by the radio logs.

iv) There are no reports over the radio of incidents of civilian shooting as described by him.

[1] INQ 564, a Coldstream Guard on the Walls, concurred with that view, Day 318/124/23 to Day 318/124/25, as did INQ 171 at C171.2 paragraph 8

[2] Shaun Austin – AA5.3 paragraph 16 and AA5.13 paragraphs 4 to 6, Dermot Carlin – AC32.3 paragraphs 17 to 18 and Day 60/56/21 to Day 60/57/11, Father Carolan – H3.12 and H3.3 paragraph 10, William Doherty – AD180.4 paragraph 16, Ciaran Donnelly – M22.2, Daniel Dunn – AD172.8 and AD172.2 paragraph 10, Hugh Foy - Day 146/101/1 to Day/146/106/1 and AF29.4 paragraphs 19 to 20 and AF29.9. Father Mulvey – H15.2 to H15.3, Robert Hammond - M37.1 paragraph 2 , Danny McGowan - AM255.10 to AM255.11, Sally Moran – AM423.2, Gerald Seymour – M72.2, M72.5 and M72.6, Peter Wilkinson – M82.4 and M82.2, David Phillips – Day 139/10/1 to 139/23/2 and Day 139/137/1 to Day 139/150/1 (This evidence should be considered with caution as, in light of his close contacts with the army, his neutrality is questionable. He was unable to provide a plausible explanation as to why the purported machinegun fire did not appear on his tape).

[3] Similarly, the Inquiry should treat with caution the evidence of INQ 1957, C1957.2 paragraph 8, Soldier 164, an administrative soldier with limited experience of gunfire, at Day 349/50/13 to Day 349/53/11, INQ 93 at C93.3 paragraphs 10 to 14 and Soldier 153 at B1926. The evidence of INQ 1259, who also claims to have heard a burst of Thompson submachinegun, pistol shots and the explosion of petrol and nail bombs should be discounted outright. C1259.2 paragraphs 11 to 16

[4] The evidence of INQ 1883, C1883.2 paragraphs 16 to 17 and INQ 254, C254.2 paragraph 12 in relation to small arms fire, should also be treated with caution.

23. Missing Casualties

23.1 “Missing Casualties”

23.1.1 “I accept that none of the soldiers whom we represent has ever said that he was able to recognise as having been a person at whom he fired any of the individuals who have been publicly identified and named, and accordingly, we are not instructed to contend, and we will not contend, unless of course some new evidence that you produce alters the position, that those individuals who have been identified were armed with lethal weapons. It follows, as has rightly been accepted for a long time, that innocent people were killed on Bloody Sunday.”

Day 51/21/14 to Day 51/21/25

23.1.2 Despite this assertion, the Lawton and Aitken teams, representing the majority of the soldiers, do maintain, at OS7.2/6, Day 51/22/17 to Day 51/26/22 and OS5.8 respectively, that gunmen and bombers, who have never been publicly identified, were killed and injured on Bloody Sunday. These people have been labelled ‘missing casualties.’

23.1.3 The soldiers have had to resort to this implausible fiction because the alternative was to persist with the case made in 1972 that soldiers were justified in wounding and killing people. Soldiers would thus have their credibility tested against the civilian testimony, the testimony of photographers, journalists and priests and the objective photographic and video footage of the events of the day. The fiction of ‘Missing Casualties’ enables the soldiers to persist in maintaining that their use of force was justified while not having to challenge the evidence which demonstrates that those killed and injured were innocent. We submit, for the reasons outlined below, that the Tribunal should reject this submission for what it is, a stratagem designed to avoid testing the credibility of soldiers against the credibility of those unjustifiably shot.

23.2 Diverting Responsibility

23.2.1 The document entitled, ‘Claimed Hits at Ground Level,’ (appended to Counsel Report No. 1), identifies only 23 people to have been, potentially been, hit by army fire in the Bogside, (given that L and M claim to have fired at the same two men crawling from the barrier). Since 25 people were wounded or killed by gunfire on Bloody Sunday in the Bogside, (excluding Alana Burke, who was knocked down by Sergeant O’s Humber pig and Patrick McDaid, who was hit by a doctored rubber bullet), the list is already two short. This certainly does not allow for the numerous ‘missing casualties’ allegedly killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday and necessitates that the soldiers who fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday confess to firing a substantially greater number of shots than they have, until now, admitted. As argued by counsel for the families on a number of occasions, the only ‘proof’ of the ‘missing casualties’ theory is the soldiers’ word that they fired at identified gunmen and bombers. The Paras have been exposed as unreliable and untruthful witnesses.

23.2.2 The concept of ‘missing casualties’ was not advanced in 1972. Indeed, whilst for the purposes of the current Inquiry the concept of ‘‘missing casualties’’ is being used to ‘prove’ that the IRA and/or civilian gunmen were active on Bloody Sunday, on the evening of 30^th January 1972, precisely the opposite case was being made. The following extract from the SitRep transmitted at 23:59 pm on Bloody Sunday demonstrates the point:

“As for the 13 civilians killed, there is an obvious discrepancy between the 5+ claimed hit by 1 PARA and the total number dead. A possible explanation lies in the nature of the indiscriminate fire from the gunmen, coupled with ricochets, possibly from both sides.” G99.600

23.2.3 This suggestion was short-lived and was not advanced to explain the deaths and injuries suffered by the Bloody Sunday victims. In any event, the ballistic evidence demonstrated that all those killed were killed by soldiers. The army preferred, instead, to tarnish the reputations of those innocent civilians by labelling them gunmen and bombers. Now that such a pretence is no longer sustainable, soldiers have opted for the ‘missing casualty’ theory in an attempt to divert responsibility for their actions onto the IRA, rather than onto the deceased and wounded. In 1972 it was suggested that additional casualties were caused by the IRA or by soldiers having killed more than one person with the same shot. Now it appears to be suggested that soldiers shot at least twice as many people as those known to have been killed and injured. The desperate readiness with which some soldiers have adopted this fiction serves only to highlight the reality that innocent people were killed on Bloody Sunday without justification.

23.2.4 A number of soldiers who did not fire shots on Bloody Sunday refer to the concept of ‘missing casualties’ in their statements illustrating, even now, the preparedness of soldiers to close ranks in support of each other and of the army. For example:

i) Captain Conder believes that he was told a few days after Bloody Sunday, by a member of the RUC, that the bodies of several men killed on Bloody Sunday had been secretly buried in Buncrana, CC1.6 paragraph 33

ii) INQ 1924 has stated his belief that that more people were shot on Bloody Sunday than were actually recorded and were secretly buried C1914 paragraph 4

iii) INQ 1800 infers that he was sent to Altnagelvin in plain clothes to ensure that no bodies were spirited over the border C1800.2 paragraph 12

iv) INQ 2023 describes conversations with other soldiers during which it was inferred that IRA men were spirited away C2023.2 paragraph 11

v) INQ 486 said that, having discussed the matter with men in his platoon, he ascertained that about ten gunmen were hit and taken over the border. C486.4 paragraph 19

vi) INQ 1021 believes that he heard an intelligence report that the IRA were going to try to remove bodies from the morgue in Altnagelvin C1021.3 paragraph 21

vii) INQ 2033 gave evidence that he heard a report over the radio from Brigade that a vehicle containing a number of bodies had attempted to cross the border and that the message had been purposely edited from the Porter tape. C2033.2 paragraph 9

23.2.5 Only two soldiers purport to have had direct experience of a ‘missing casualty’. INQ 2002 says that, having been chased by a helicopter, a car turned back from the border making its way to the city. When the car arrived at the city gate, INQ 2002 stopped it, aimed his gun at the driver and ordered him to proceed to the checkpoint at a walking pace with the window open. The body of a man, who had clearly not died that day, was then found in the back of the car. Conveniently, INQ 2002 is unable to recall the date of this incident”. C2002.7 paragraph 70 This witness was not called to give evidence but, considering that he alleges that the men on the lorry wore masks, C2002.3 paragraph 15 and that Barney McGuigan was on their wanted list, C2002.6 paragraph 38, His evidence is so ridiculous that it requires no further submission from us.

23.2.6 The tendency to adopt similar, farfetched notions is exemplified by the suggestion from soldiers of the 22^nd Light Air Defence Regiment, at W48, in relation to the body of Jackie Duddy:

“1 child’s body brought out and dumped on street. People accused 14 & 15 of shooting child. Not accurate, may connect with yesterday.”

23.2.7 INQ 1766 states that, two days after Bloody Sunday, he was ordered, with a section of men, to dig up seven or eight fresh, unmarked graves in Craigavon Cemetery. The graves contained the bodies of men, all with gunshot wounds! This fact was never recorded by the army and no other member of INQ 1766’s section of men has ever come forward with a similar tale. It is clearly fantastical and unbelieveable and no weight can be given to INQ 1766’s testimony. When this evidence was put to Bishop Daly he pointed out that the Cemetery in Derry is called the City Cemetery, Day 75/53/20 to Day 75/54/8, and, when asked if he had ever heard of such a thing in the thirty years since Bloody Sunday, stated:

“No, I have not. I think, if one looks at the distress there are over the disappeared in Belfast for example, that has gone on over 30 years, where a few people have disappeared, one can get the sense of annoyance in families. The part of our culture is to have a grave to go to and to give respects to those who are dead and, um, I think it is unthinkable, it is a figment of the imagination that the type of thing described by this witness could have taken place. I do not think it is credible.” Day 75/54/10 to Day 75/55/13

23.2.8 The reality is that the concept of bodies being spirited away by the IRA was part of army folklore, ‘believed’ and/or adopted as a means of justifying what otherwise, were unjustified killings. According to Tony Geraghty, the issue was part of “regimental mythology.” Day 210/87/8 Soldier 021 claims that he later heard, from talking to a member of the RUC, a Captain and a Military Intelligence Officer, that perhaps five people had been taken across the border to hospital with gunshot wounds. B1509.005 paragraph 36.

23.2.9 INQ 2225, in his evidence to this Inquiry, denied this stating, during oral evidence, that he never heard the suggestion that bodies had been taken over the border. Day 384/123/17 to Day 384/124/21 . He was “always somewhat sceptical about the idea that large numbers of bodies were taken across the border. Troops tended to assume that when they fired their weapons and saw targets move that they had hit them. When no evidence emerged of a body, they assumed that they had hit the person and that the body had been spirited across the border,” C2225 paragraph 42.

23.2.10 Furthermore, there is no suggestion in any Special Branch document that there were any dead people spirited over the border and Martin Ingram states that he saw no official documentation suggesting that dead bodies had been secretly buried across the border in the Republic.”KI2.4 paragraph 8.

23.3 Thirty-two year conspiracy of silence

23.3.1 It is implausible to contend that the IRA and its sympathisers managed, in the midst of what was a life-threatening and traumatic situation, to spirit away all of the soldiers’ ‘real’ targets on Bloody Sunday, bringing to hospital only those killed by ricochet / mistake. For this to have occurred necessitated a conspiracy involving the randomly selected witnesses to the shooting, the civilians, photographers, journalists and priests, unknown to each other prior to this incident. The conspiracy involving this disparate group was set in motion within minutes of the deaths of these ‘‘missing casualties’’ and has gone uncovered for 32 years. The fact is , however, that nobody could simply disappear from as close-knit a community as the Bogside / Creggan without people knowing about it. Also, as a number of priests and journalists have testified, it would be completely contrary to Catholic ideology to bury people in unconsecrated graves.

Father Denis Bradley states that the idea of bodies being spirited away is not possible for cultural, religious and factual reasons. “In 1972, one young man could not have left the Long Tower parish without me being aware of it within days if it had been in any way under a cloud or shadow.” Day 140/172/6 to Day 140/172/21. As he also points out, for this to have occurred everyone who knew the deceased, family, friends and acquaintances as well as the priests of the City would have had to maintain a lie. Day 140/174/13 to Day 140/174/16. Bishop Daly also found the suggestion incredible, Day 075/53/13:

Q. Bishop, that came with the assertion that there are 34 unidentified or untraced or unknown civilian casualties which may include individuals engaged in what was described by Mr Glasgow as "terrorist activity". Bishop, the inference behind that -- is that there were in effect secret and private burials that may have taken place of people killed by the army that day. The first question: were you aware of any such event taking place?

Q. Is the suggestion that it even might have happened a credible one, and I ask you to speak with the experience of 31 years of service to this community?

23.3.2 When the concept was put to Eamonn McCann during oral testimony, he dismissed it as “wholly fanciful, patently ridiculous.” Day 87/75/25. The idea that the people of Derry, including family members, conspired to allow the names of those innocent people who were killed and wounded on Bloody Sunday to remain stained is not considered plausible by Professor O’Keefe:

Q. If I can take you to the point I want you to comment on shortly: if there were untraced casualties, that view must be sustained by persons colluding in hiding and families agreeing to hide or disguise or perpetuate a lie. In your experience, do you think that a likely scenario?

A. No, I think that is what I would find inconceivable, for example in an area like Derry with a very close Catholic community that a number of young men might in fact disappear and never be buried or heard of again.

Q. And that that untruth in consequence could be protected, participated and promulgated for 10, 20 and 30 years thereafter?

23.4 Contrary to Republican Ideology

23.4.1 It is also entirely contrary to Republican ideology to have secret burials, allowing those killed to go unacknowledged or to omit them from the roll of honour.

23.4.2 It should also be noted that the practice of burying IRA members with military trappings is acknowledged in a Special Branch Assessment, dated 16^th December 1971 to 4^th January 1972, which describes how, on 30th December 1971, an IRA officer named Jack McCabe, who was killed in an explosion in a workshop in Dublin, was buried with full honours near Shercock, Co. Cavan.” G47A.298.6.

23.4.3 Professor O’Keefe found it “inconceivable” that there would be ‘missing casualties’, Day 127/158/1, because:

“In Republican ideology the dead are honoured. The paramilitary trappings with which civilians were buried caused many problems with the church. In the 1980s Father Daly led the way in insisting that no burial was to be carried out with any paramilitary trappings or with the Tricolour flag. The IRA would get around this by leading the coffin to the church in a tricolour flag and then taking the flag off the coffin just before it got into the church. The only people the IRA buried without a church service to my knowledge were informers. The Republican dead were always acknowledged. The IRA would also issue a statement claiming that the dead person had been on “active service”. . . Accordingly, in 1972, I do not believe that the IRA buried anyone without a church funeral. I also do not think the IRA would have wanted this” H21.100 paragraphs 98 to 99

23.5 ‘Disappeared’ as punishment for disobeying orders

23.5.1 The soldiers’ representatives, in an attempt to bolster their ‘missing casualty’ claims, have pointed to the ‘disappeared’ as a parallel to their scenario of people being spirited away and buried. To counter the indication that only those considered to be informers were shot by the IRA, they have endeavoured to suggest that a similar fate was meted out to those members of the IRA who disobeyed orders. To this end, Mr Glasgow put the case of Patrick Duffy to Father Bradley during oral evidence. Day 140/243/8 to Day 140/243/12.

23.5.2 The example was unworkable for two reasons. The first was pointed out by Father Bradley himself, i.e., that, along with the rest of the ‘disappeared,’ Mr Duffy’s identity and disappearance were known to the populace of Derry and to the church at that time. Day 140/243/12 to Day 40/243/15. (In fact, far from attempting to hide his death, the IRA put a notice in a local paper announcing that they had killed him, OS8.45). Secondly, although Father Bradley was not to know, Mr Glasgow’s representation of Mr Duffy as someone suspected of having disobeyed the IRA in 1971 was incorrect and misleading. It is clearly recorded, in Lost Lives, that Mr Duffy was executed for being an alleged informer in 1973. [1]

23.5.3 Mr Glasgow QC also referred to Mr Duffy when questioning Mr Eamon McCann. Mr McCann’s memory of the case was also that Mr Duffy was killed by IRA who regarded him as a traitor. Mr McCann knows nothing, however, of such a demise for those who defied an IRA order, for example, by firing on British troops and causing the deaths of innocent bystanders. Day 087/136/19 to Day 087/138/9. We can find no record of a case in which the motive given by the IRA for “disappearing” someone was disobeying orders. To suggest that the disappearance of casualties on Bloody Sunday was merely a continuation of this trend is tenuous to the extreme. Moreover, according to Professor Terence O’Keefe, the only people to be buried by the IRA without a church service were informers. H21.100 paragraph 98.

23.6 Treatment of Bloody Sunday casualties in hospitals in the Republic

23.6.1 There is some evidence to support the suggestion that people were, on occasion, taken over the border to obtain treatment in an attempt to avoid arbitrary detention. The fact remains, however, that, other than Hugh Hegarty who attended Letterkenny hospital on 1^st February 1972 and was discharged on the 2^nd February 1972, there is no evidence that any other person sustaining any kind of injury as a result of Bloody Sunday attended Letterkenny hospital. Indeed, INQ 2225, a Military Intelligence Officer, states that he had not heard the proposal that one or more people had been taken over the border for medical treatment until recently, when the suggestion was put to him by his legal team. Day 384/123/17 to Day 384/124/21.

23.6.2 The Aitken Team, in support of their ‘missing casualties’ theory quote, at OS8.42, an Irish Times report on 31^st January 1972 that “one man was taken to Letterkenny Hospital in Co. Donegal suffering from a leg wound. It is believed he will be released today”. It is suggested that this report receives corroboration from the evidence of Patrick Clarke at AC154.4 paragraph 29.

23.6.3 Mr Clarke’s memory is that he was contacted on the Tuesday or Wednesday by Commandant McGonigle, of the Garda Síochana, who told him that he had sent an ambulance to the border which had picked up one man and taken him to Letterkenny Hospital. Day 204/73/1 to Day 204/73/5. The Irish Government, however, have informed the Inquiry that, whilst ambulances did go to the border, they returned to base empty because nothing happened. Mr Clarke’s evidence in relation to this matter is, therefore, rendered suspect. Day 204/74/21 to Day 204/75/2, . The Derry Journal, on 1^st February 1972, said that one Derry man was detained in Letterkenny Hospital with injuries received during Sunday’s disturbances.” L130.2..

23.6.4 The Derry Journal article of the 1^st February 1972, L130.2, also states that a spokesman for Letterkenny Hospital said that a very small number of people from Derry had been treated on Sunday but that no one treated by them had died. The name of the “spokesman” is not quoted and neither is the number of people treated or the supposed injuries sustained. It is important to emphasise that the article commences with “the rumours were widespread.”

23.6.5 Joseph Hanley, the sole surgeon for Co Donegal at the time of Bloody Sunday (and therefore permanently on call), based at Letterkenny Hospital, has told the Inquiry that he has no recollection of any patients admitted on Bloody Sunday or immediately afterwards with gunshot wounds or of being informed by his Registrar or any other member of staff that any such patient had been admitted to the hospital. AH100 paragraphs 9. It is Dr Hanley’s evidence that the practice of injured people from Derry being taken to hospital in Donegal virtually ceased following the death of Séamus Cusack, who bled to death on his way to Letterkenny Hospital on 8^th July 1971. AH100 paragraph 11. Rosemary Doyle, of the Knights of Malta, confirms that they were informed that a casualty had to be taken to the most expedient hospital which, in Derry, would have been Altnagelvin. Day 101/35/15

23.6.6 In February 1972, the Sunday Times Insight Team examined the possibility of additional casualties being taken to Letterkenny following a suggestion made by the Army to this effect. Philip Jacobson of the Insight Team spoke with a contact at the hospital who told him that no casualties had been admitted as a result of Bloody Sunday Day 191/107/1 to Day 191/107/25. Mr Jacobson believed his contact on this matter, given that they had been frank in 1971 in discussing the admission of Séamus Cusack to the same hospital.

23.6.7 Geraldine McIntyre, Consumer Services Officer at Letterkenny General Hospital, conducted research into the theatre register of 30^th January to 2^nd February 1972 and has told the Tribunal that there is no evidence of any surgical procedures performed relating to gunshot injuries. She was able to locate the case file relating to Hugh Hegarty, D1108 to D1111, which confirms that “he was suffering from multiple injuries caused by a gas canister... Mr Hegarty was admitted straight into the main surgical ward and was discharged the following day” AM275.6.

23.7 Additional casualties

23.7.1 In addition to the ‘official’ fourteen dead and thirteen wounded on Bloody Sunday, the Inquiry has established that a number of other people were ‘wounded’ in some way on the day. These were:

23.7.2 Official documentation exists relating to the treatment of those shaded in grey in the above table. All of those, save Hugh Hegarty and Red Mickey, feature in the letter written to the Widgery Inquiry by E.T. Watson, the Patients’ Services Officer at Altnagelvin on Bloody Sunday, along with all fourteen of the ‘official’ wounded, D1093-1094, and Geraldine Richmond who was admitted for shock. In other words, other than Red Mickey, those with even relatively minor injuries were taken to hospital and the records of their treatment survive.

23.8 ‘Red’ Mickey Doherty

23.8.1 According to the Inquiry’s letter dated 11^th March 2004, Mr Mickey Doherty was unable to assist the Inquiry for medical reasons and later died. It appears that Mr Doherty, a member of the “Official” IRA admitted in an interview to Mary Holland during the week after Bloody Sunday that:

“ he was posted in an empty house on the corner of Cooke Street and Joyce Street with orders to cover Bishop Street. He was wounded by a soldier returning fire from a house opposite after he himself had fired at a soldier in the street beneath. He thinks his bullet grazed the soldier’s flak jacket, but did not injure him… He was hit in the thigh by one bullet and another ricocheted off a wall to graze the flesh of his eye.” M42

23.8.2 The incident is also recorded, at 16.35, on the ‘Porter Tape,’ at W2 serial 135, and on the Royal Anglian log at 16.41 as follows:

54 Alpha (Call Sign of Royal Anglians, located on the Walls): …“Hello, Zero this is 54 Alpha. Reference report from call Sign 90 Alpha on shooting. Our call sign Quebec 23 has had one low velocity shot fired at them from Charlotte street. Hit one of our soldiers in the flak jacket. Ah, we don’t believe he is a casualty. One round was returned. No hit. Subsequent to that our call sign Quebec 21 had one round fired at it and two shots were returned. No casualties on either side. Over. W137 serial 196

Although she cannot now recall the detail, Day 200/69/18 to Day 200/69/23 , Ms Holland clarifies at L182 that, “the marksman I quoted says he fired his shot at 5pm - after the confrontation with the Army had taken place and more than a mile away from where it occurred.”

23.8.3 Soldier AA, who was positioned in Barrack Street, states that, about 30 minutes after the arrival of the cars holding Joe Friel and Gerard Donaghey, which he puts at 4.05pm, B908.006 paragraphs 11 to 13, he saw a dark haired man standing at the corner of Joyce Street and Windmill Terrace armed with either a rifle or an M1 Carbine. He states that he and the man fired simultaneously and that the gunman’s bullet went past his ear hitting Soldier 042 in the flak jacket. Day 378/168/3 to Day 378/172/17. Whilst he goes on to assert in his statement at B908.008 paragraphs 27 to 28, that he then fired at a second gunman, he accepts, at Day 378/183/17 to Day 378/184/2, that it could have been the same person, i.e. the first gunman. Soldier AA fired a total of eight rounds at the gunman, one of which was from the hip, Day 378/187/21 to Day 378/187/23, at a time when he could not clearly see his target. Day 378/191/4 to Day 378/191/17. Soldier AA has a clear memory of being informed by his Sergeant Major about two weeks after Bloody Sunday that “he had received confirmation from Special Branch that [Soldier AA] had made contact with an IRA gunman and had shot him through the kneecap and in the jaw.” Day 378/194/2 to Day 378/194/10,

23.8.4 In his 1972 statements, B909 to B916, Soldier AB states that, at approximately 16.15, a gunman appeared on at the junction of St Columb’s Walk and Joyce Street and fired one round at Soldier AA. He states that he returned one round as did Soldier AA. The round fired by the gunman bounced off the wall and hit Soldier 042’s flak jacket. Soldier AB now states that he can remember only two incidents that day, namely that he heard up to ten rounds from a Sterling Submachine Gun and Soldier 042 falling to the ground. B918.002 paragraphs 12 to 14. He cannot remember Soldier AA returning fire nor can he remember firing himself. Soldier AB did not, in 1972, make reference to the fact that Soldier AA had fired eight rounds at the gunman and that one of those rounds was fired from the hip. It could be suggested that he has feigned memory loss to this Inquiry in an attempt to maintain this suppression of evidence. However, we have been unable to test this as he was not called to give evidence. The time at which Soldier AB places this incident is clearly wrong as shown by the logs referred to above; his recollection of machinegun fire is clearly incorrect as he mentions only one round in his contemporaneous statement and it is probable that had Soldier 042 been fired at with a machinegun he would have been killed.

Soldier 042 (hard copy version throughout) states that two shots, then a third and then a fourth were fired at his location from buildings on the wasteground at Charlotte Place, the last of which hit the left hand side of his flak jacket. He did not at any stage see the gunman but it is his memory that Soldier AA fired between the third and fourth shot. Day 379/97/1 to Day 379/99/18. He does not recall hearing any Thompson Submachine gun fire, Day 379/97/12 to Day 397/97/17 contrary to Soldier AA’s assertion, Day 378/189/13 to Day 378/189/25.

23.8.5 This sequence of events is acknowledged by the Official IRA who, along with witnesses from the Provisional IRA, state that this gunman was the only known member of either wing of the IRA to be injured on Bloody Sunday. Corroboration can also be found in the evidence of Vincent Browne, at M8.3, Father Dolan, at H7.2 paragraph 13, Antony Fry, M27.3 paragraph 12, Kieran Gill, M105.11 to M105.12 paragraphs 48 to 51, Simon Winchester, Day 116/68/24 to Day 116/69/18 ,Nigel Wade at 143/8 to day 109/148/3, Mr Eugene O’Donnell, Day 155/199/23 to Day 155/201/14, Mr Hugh Leo Young, Day 388/43/1 to Day 388/45/7, and in a note by the Sunday Times which refers to Red Mickey as “Mary Holland’s lad”AD89.1. Red Mickey Doherty was treated for the injuries he had sustained to his leg and eye by Jim Deehan, Attracta Simms, both from the Knights of Malta, and Dr McDermott, in Vinny Coyle’s house at Lisfannon Park, Day 182/72/1 to Day 182/75/25, Day 142/1/7 to Day 142/3/22 and Day 176/186/12 to Day 176/194/5 respectively. Ms Pauline Ferry was also in the house, Day 154/202/1 to Day 154/205/25.

23.8.6 Although Mr Doherty was never on what is considered to be the official list of wounded in relation to Bloody Sunday, with such an overwhelming wealth of information about his whereabouts that day, the shots he fired, those returned at him, the injuries sustained by him and their treatment, it is obvious that he cannot be considered to be a ‘missing casualty’ in the sense outlined by the Lawton Team. The evidence in relation to Red Mickey Doherty also serves to illustrate how inconceivable is the suggestion that it would be possible to conceal from civilians, journalists, priests, soldiers, Knights of Malta, doctors and even Special Branch, the fact that another person in addition to those on the “official” casualty list was injured on Bloody Sunday

23.9 Table of ‘missing casualties’

23.9.1 In advance of their opening statement, the Lawton Team provided a map and table of evidence of so-called ‘missing casualties.’Mr Glasgow QC said in his opening statement:

“It is not of course suggested that every one who is marked on that map and who was referred to by my learned friend Mr Clarke in his opening as having been untraced or with some similar description, was a gunman or was necessarily present in the position in which a witness or witnesses have described in their statements. Some witnesses obviously may well have been genuinely mistaken.” Day 51/25/22 to Day 51/26/8

23.9.2 It is our submission that the witnesses referred to at OS7.35 are, for all kinds of reasons, mistaken about what they saw.. The ‘Missing Casualties’ identified in the document by the Lawton Team are examined by Sector and in the table below:

Those supposed ‘Missing Casualties’ identified by the Aitken Team, at OS8.42, that supplement the Lawton Team document are dealt with according to Sector and in the summary below:

23.11.1 Soldier AD, who was positioned in a house in 21 Long Tower Street, fired two rounds at what he claimed was a civilian armed with a rifle in the vicinity of the Bogside Inn at around 16.45. B943.001. Soldiers 004 and 022 also place the time at which Soldier AD fired his shots at 16.45, B1369.004 and B1510 respectively. Soldier AD accepts that serial 511 on W137 is probably a record of the shots he fired. Day 382/99/18 to Day 382/100/23. It is important to note that, contrary to Soldier AD’s claim stated at B943.003, this serial records no hit as a result of his shots. Very soon after this incident, Soldier AD states that he saw a grey Ford Escort reverse into Meenan Square. Having been shown the Royal Anglian Log, W106.7 serial 93, Soldier AD accepted that he could have confused Doctor McCabe’s car for the grey Escort. Day 382/101/13 to Day 382/102/5. Importantly, and in support of Soldier AD’s evidence in relation to the time at which he fired his shots, the Royal Anglian Log records Dr McCabe’s grey station wagon travelling down the Lecky Road at 16.59.

23.11.2 Soldier AD, in his RMP statement at B933, claims that one round was fired by the gunman and that two rounds were returned. This is not what is recorded at serial 396 W130: “We have just had four shots at our call sign Quebec 21 on the Walls.” Furthermore, Soldier AD was not on the Walls, he fired his two rounds from a house in Long Tower Street. It is, therefore, clear that W130 and the subsequent references contained in OS8.42 at W131 W132 W133 do not relate to the shots fired by Soldier AD and that there was no ‘missing casualty’ in the area of the Bogside Inn.

i) There are no ‘missing casualties’ in the sense outlined by the Lawton and Aitken Teams or at all

ii) ‘Red Mickey’ Doherty is not a ‘missing casualty’ given that it was known, even shortly after Bloody Sunday, that he had fired shots at soldiers and was injured by return fire. The Tribunal has a large body of evidence about his actions.

24. Military and Police Intelligence after the March

24.1 Introduction and Summary of Submissions

24.1.1 As appears from the INTSUMs and other intelligence documentation generated in or around January 1972, the Army and RUC Special Branch were in receipt of a steady flow of information about the structure of both the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA, their respective structures and personnel, their weaponry, their activities and their plans: see, for example, the 8^th Brigade INTSUM 102 of 2 February 1972 G108.653, the HQNI INTSUM 5/72 of 3^rd February 1972 G110.673 and the Special Branch assessment for the period ended 3^rd February 1972 G112.607. The Tribunal has also been led to believe that Observers B and C provided reliable intelligence to James and Julian during this period. However, intelligence suggesting that either IRA faction, or indeed maverick civilian gunmen, played any significant role in the events of Bloody Sunday is conspicuous by its absence.

24.1.2 Much of the intelligence documentation is redacted but, as far as we can tell, there is literally nothing in the INTSUM’s and Special Branch assessments in the weeks following Bloody Sunday suggesting that any information had been obtained from informants or other sources to the effect that IRA or other civilian gunmen or bombers had engaged in any material activities during the period of ten minutes or so between the paratroopers’ entry into the Bogside and the shooting of the last casualty on Bloody Sunday.

24.1.3 Apart from the Observer B material, dealt with above (12.5.6), the only intelligence claimed to have been received to the effect that the IRA had any involvement in the material events of Bloody Sunday is that attributed to “Witness X” and “Infliction”. The material concerning Witness X has been heavily redacted to the extent that only the year (1972) is specified but if this is the material to which Col. Tugwell referred it would appear to have been generated following interviews in or about the summer of 1972 (B133.70 paragraph 48). It was not until April 1984 that Infliction made his allegation about Martin McGuinness. That was not information provided to either the police or the Army but to the Secret Intelligence Service in the Hague.

24.1.4 Apart from the various features of these accounts that mark them as worthless, it should be noted that neither these nor any other accounts implicating civilian gunmen or bombers emerged in the weeks immediately following Bloody Sunday. The evidence of INQ2225, a military intelligence officer at HQNI, is typical of the recollections of those directly involved in intelligence-gathering at the time. Before the Widgery Inquiry took place, he said, there was a lot of pressure on the RUC to find information that would have supported the Army case that the paratroopers were fired on as they deployed in Rossville Street, but “none was yielded”. (Day 384/161/9 to Day 384/161/14).

24.2 “Infliction”

24.2.1 According to Officer A, a member of the Security Service, he handled an agent code-named “Infliction”, who told him during a debriefing in April 1984 that “Martin McGuinness had admitted to Infliction that he had personally fired the shot (from a Thompson machine gun on single shot) from the Rossville Flats in the Bogside that had precipitated the Bloody Sunday episode” (KA2.2 paragraph 8 and KA2.6). It is submitted that even if the documentation is genuine, which is not conceded, the information from Infliction was patently false. First and foremost, the information allegedly supplied by Infliction should be regarded as false because it is completely at odds not only with the civilian evidence but also with the soldiers’ evidence. Not one soldier claims that the events of Bloody Sunday were precipitated by a Thompson sub-machine gun on single shot. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to understand why a Thompson should be fired on single shot, those soldiers who refer to Thompson machine-gun firing refer to this as bursts of automatic fire.

24.2.2 Secondly, although Officer A regarded Infliction as a reliable agent (KA2.1 paragraph 5), there is compelling evidence that he was quite the opposite. Officer A himself concedes that “some recipients of [Infliction’s] information viewed Infliction’s reporting with scepticism”. (KA2.1 paragraph 5) This is an understatement. According to David Shayler, a former member of the Security Service who also worked in T Branch, Infliction was regarded within the Service as “a bullshitter” (KS2.1 at paragraph 3, and KS2.2 at paragraph 7 and Day 327/78/21 to Day 327/79/2) According to Annie Machon, another former member of the Security Service who worked in T Branch, her predecessor thought everyone in T Branch knew that Infliction was a “bullshitter” (KM12.1 paragraph 7) and he was “notorious for being unreliable”. (Day 327/92/12 to Day 327/92/22)

24.2.3 Officer E, who was David Shayler’s line manager, said that he had a “general recollection that [Infliction’s] reporting was considered by others to be of mixed reliability”. (KE1.2 paragraph 4) but when he was asked about this during his oral testimony he claimed to be unable to remember anything that could assist the Tribunal in understanding how he gained this impression. (Day 328/25/18 to Day 328/26/8). Officer F claimed not to recall ever discussing an agent called Infliction with David Shayler or hearing anyone else discuss him. (KF1.1 paragraphs 3 and 6) Officer F was a friend of Shayler and he regarded him as an honest and straight-forward individual. (Day 328/43/10 to Day 328/43/13) Officer G was another Security Service Officer who sat opposite David Shayler. He also claimed not to recall ever referring to Infliction as a “bullshitter” or hearing David Shayler ever discussing Infliction’s reliability with anybody else. (KG1.2 paragraph 6) Officer N was Annie Machon’s predecessor but he did not recall describing him as a “bullshitter” or indeed, he said, having any view of Infliction’s reliability or hearing any other officers referring to him in these terms. (KN1.1 paragraph 1) David Shayler believed that any serving officer would be “inclined to plead memory failure or tell outright lies to investigators as they know that telling the truth might embarrass or expose their bosses”. (KS2.4 paragraph 16) It is respectfully submitted that Officers E, F, G and N were pleading memory failure for such reasons.

24.2.4. Even Officer A had to concede that Infliction had lied on occasions, that he had engaged in “bullshitting” in “a few instances” and that others in the Security Service had suspected him to be a fabricator. (KA.2.21 paragraph 5 and Day 327 7/24 to Day 327/8/9).

24.2.5 Moreover, according to the debriefing notes, Infliction believed it unlikely that Martin McGuinness had made his admission about firing the first shot to anyone apart from himself (Infliction) (KB3.3 to KB3.4 and Day 327/35/9 to Day 327/38/19). The inference that Officer B certainly drew was that either Martin McGuinness had told no one apart from Infliction or that he had told very few people indeed. (Day 327/38/20 to Day 327/39/2) If this were true, the disclosure of these debriefing notes would therefore have revealed Infliction’s identity since Martin McGuinness would obviously know that Infliction was the only person (or one of the very few persons) to whom he had made this “confession”. Since the Security Service have been at pains to protect Infliction’s identity, the inescapable conclusion is that they knew perfectly well that Martin McGuinness had not made any such confession to Infliction, so that the release of debriefing notes suggesting that he had would not compromise Infliction’s identity at all.

24.2.6 Nor is there any other evidence of any kind to support Infliction’s account. The Security Service recognised this themselves when they commented at the time that there was “no collateral” for the report (KA2.14). Peter Pringle, an independent journalist who has conducted extensive research into Bloody Sunday, also testified that he found no evidence whatsoever to support Infliction’s report. (Day 190/146/21 to Day 190/147/3) Nor, apparently, have the RUC heard such a report if any reliance is to be placed on the indirect evidence of a “reliable” “senior Police officer” whose understanding has been transmitted via the journalist Liam Clarke to Martin Ingram. (KI2.41 paragraph 9)

24.2.7 Martin Ingram is a former member of the Force Research Unit who had the highest level of security access to Intelligence material in that unit. (KI2.2 paragraph 4) He gave evidence that he saw Intelligence documents to the effect that Martin McGuinness was under surveillance on the day, there were records of his activities before and after the march and there were none that suggested that he had a machine gun or that he fired a shot. (KI2.41 paragraph 7, KI2.4 at paragraph 8 and Day 329/78/12 to Day 329/78/25)

24.2.8 Finally, in this regard, Martin McGuinness has specifically denied Infliction’s claims (KM3.6) and explained his movements at the material time. (KM3.4) There is no evidence inconsistent with his account. Whereas he has given oral testimony and been subjected to cross-examination on this issue (Day 390 to Day 391), Infliction did not even make a statement and did not give oral or any evidence of this claim. On this basis alone, it would be wrong to place any weight on this report.

24.3 Witness X

24.3.1 The primary document concerning Witness X (AX1.1 to AX1.2) consists of what we understand to be a police officer’s note of an interview with a suspect in custody in 1972. It is heavily redacted but it appears that the suspect claimed to have joined the Provisional IRA just after Mr Cusack was shot. Witness X is recorded as saying that he was in action on Bloody Sunday at Rossville Street. He is recorded as saying that he was on a joint operation, that he was firing a carbine from Glenfada and that he used two full magazines.

24.3.2 Witness X has made a statement (AX1.3). Apart from pointing out that the date of birth on the police note is not his, he denies ever having been in the IRA or handling weapons. Even if the document were an accurate record of what Witness X told police, it immediately gives rise to a number of questions concerning the reliability of the recorded claims. First, the suggestion (which is made by no one apart from Witness X) that the Provisional IRA and Official IRA were engaged in a joint operation is difficult to reconcile with all the other evidence about the relationship between these two organisations. Secondly, although Witness X suggests that two identified Provisional IRA members and three identified Official IRA members were in Rossville Street, he did not apparently indicate what, if anything, they were doing or even whether he was with them. Thirdly, the claims are devoid of detail about such fundamental matters as when he fired, where exactly he fired from, the direction he fired, whether he believed he hit anyone and (since we know that he could not have hit any soldier) how he could have failed to hit anyone if he had discharged two full magazines.

24.3.3 Even taking Witness X’s recorded claim at its height, there was no suggestion that he fired at soldiers “as the army came down Rossville Street” (as INQ 2225 believed: C2225.10 paragraph 58) or at any time before the last civilian casualty was shot. The related documentation confirms this. In the redacted extract from paragraph 16 of an undated 1972 headquarters INTSUM, the army noted that the information provided by Witness X “does not amount to an admission that the IRA fired first” (G134C.906.12). In what appears to have been a subsequent letter from the Col. GS Intelligence at HQ Northern Ireland to a military intelligence liaison officer at RUC Head Quarters, the Army indicated that it would like Witness X to be asked a number of questions, including whether he was in Rossville Flats, whether he opened up as the soldiers got out of their armed vehicles, whether his firing was at the start of the shooting, how many other gunmen were firing at the time, who such other gunmen were and whether nail bombs were thrown. (G134B.906.9). It can reasonably be inferred that Witness X had not provided the answers to any of these questions in his initial interview. On foot of this request, a Detective Chief Inspector and Detective Sergeant in the RUC Special Branch did re-interview Witness X but he apparently refused to talk any more about Bloody Sunday and no further information was forthcoming. (G134B.906.8)

24.3.4 On the last day of the hearing, the Tribunal announced that Witness X was too ill to attend to give evidence. We have, therefore, been denied the opportunity to subject him to questioning.

(ii) even taking them at their height, they do not constitute a claim that civilian gunmen fired on soldiers at any time before the last civilian casualty was shot, so that they are largely irrelevant.

25.1.1. For the reasons set out in section 9 soldiers on active service in Northern Ireland have been able to exercise deadly force with virtual impunity, particularly during the “militarist” phase of 1969-1974.

25.1.2. The apparent absence of a criminal sanction against the use of lethal force by the Army in Northern Ireland has been the subject of sustained and determined criticism by a variety of organisations at home and abroad[1]. Statistical evidence confirms the lack of accountability of members of the military and security forces.[2]

25.1.3. It is the purpose of this section, however, to outline the legal framework within which the culpability of members of the military involved in Bloody Sunday must be assessed, bearing in mind also the general legal and constitutional considerations which applied in 1972 and which have received a detailed analysis in section eight above.

25.1.4. This section will outline the relevant domestic law on the use of force as well as relevant European and International Standards.

i) The use of lethal force by soldiers on Bloody Sunday was in contravention of domestic criminal law in that the individual soldiers who fired shots were (and remain) guilty of murder and/or attempted murder and/or wounding with intent.

ii) The use of lethal force by soldiers was also a breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in that it was not ‘absolutely necessary’ within the meaning of Article 2.

iii) The use of lethal force by soldiers was a breach of International Treaty obligations and in particular: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘Universal Declaration’)[3]; the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR)[4] and the United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (UN Principles)[5].

iv) The operation was not planned and controlled in a manner designed to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk of the use of lethal force. The responsibility for planning and controlling the operation lay with 8^th Brigade, General Ford and his immediate superiors. The essential elements of Operation Forecast and those which contributed directly to the use of lethal force were sanctioned by both the Stormont and Westminster Governments.

v) In breach of the UN Principles[6], the operation was not planned and controlled in a manner that prevented extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions. Nor did the respective Governments plan the operation as to prohibit orders from superior officers authorizing or inciting other persons to carry out such extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions.

vi) The arrest operation and detention of suspects was in breach of Article 3 (ECHR) in that the arrestees were subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

vii) The arrest operation and detention of suspects was in breach of International treaty obligations and in particular: the Universal Declaration; the ICCPR, the UN Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’)[7], and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Declaration against Torture).[8]

25.2.1. The exercise of force in Northern Ireland by members of the Security Forces at the time of Bloody Sunday was governed by section 3 of the Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967.

(1) “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

(2) Subsections (1) shall replace the rules of the common law as to the matters dealt with by that subsection”

“ section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 meant that the question to be determined when such a defence was put forward in, inter alia, a criminal action was whether the accused had used such force as had been reasonable in the circumstances in which he had been placed in the prevention of crime or in bringing about the lawful arrest of an offender or suspected offender.”

25.2.4. This provision came into existence following the recommendations of the Seventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC).

25.2.5. Before the concept of ‘reasonableness’ was imported into the statutory structure as a result of the CLRC Report, the law required ‘apparent necessity’ before an officer of justice might use deadly force.[10] The move to this broader definition was intended to relax the restrictions on the use of force in that ‘reasonableness’ as a broad and malleable concept facilitated a broad interpretation in the light of the emergency situation.[11]

25.2.6. When analysing the reasonableness concept, academic writers have partitioned it into two primary subcomponents:[12] first, a proportionality requirement, and second, a necessity element.

25.2.7. Proportionality implies an equality of response to the threat posed between individuals in that the reaction to a threat should not be excessive, but measured to respond to the danger posed. The question is whether, on an objective assessment, the harm that might result from the use of lethal force, i.e. death, is less than the harm that may follow from allowing an individual to escape arrest or continue to carry out an unlawful act. ‘Necessity’ can be interpreted as meaning that the least violent measures must be used to avert the threat encountered. Glanville Williams argues that the averting theory has two sub-components: the immediacy principle and the non-excessive force principle.[13] The immediacy principle requires that the threat must be actual and at hand whereas non-excessive force implies that minimal rather than maximal force should be exercised.

25.2.8. However generously the requirement of reasonableness is construed, the individual soldiers on Bloody Sunday had no reasonable grounds to believe that the use of lethal force was necessary in the prevention of a crime or to effect an arrest. Section 3 of the 1967 Act does not, therefore, provide them with a defence to criminal charges arising from their use of such force

25.2.9. Moreover, it is an elementary principle of criminal law that anyone who aids, abets, counsels or procures an offence is liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender: s. 8, Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 and see generally Archbold 2004 at paragraph 18.2 et seq. Where two or more persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts done in pursuance of that joint enterprise: see generally Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2004 at paragraph 18.5 et seq.

1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

25.3.2. Article 2 imposes a positive obligation on the government to protect the right to life. This positive obligation requires domestic legislation to regulate the permissible use of lethal force; the intentional lethal use of firearms should be compatible with the ECHR and should occur only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.

25.3.3. The European Court has held that Article 2 of the Convention does not define situations where it is permissible intentionally to kill an individual, but rather defines situations where it is permissible to use force that may result in deprivation of life as the unintended outcome of the use of force.[14]

25.3.4. Moreover, where death results from the State’s use of lethal force, a violation of Article 2 will be established unless the state, and it is the state which bears the onus, shows that one of the exceptions set out in Article 2(2) is met. Any claim of justification under these exceptions must be strictly construed (as is made clear by the “absolutely necessary” test) due to the fact that Article 2 “ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention.”[15]

25.3.5. The Court has stated that a test of the "necessity" of the use of lethal force includes an assessment as to whether interference with the Convention right was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued; and that in establishing whether the use of force was "strictly proportionate" regard must be had "to the nature of the aim pursued, the dangers to life and limb inherent in the situation, and the degree of the risk that the force employed might result in loss of life".[16]

25.3.6. It is our submission that the actions of those soldiers who fired lethal shots did so in breach of Article 2 of the Convention, in that their actions were not “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2.

25.3.7. This submission is strengthened by the decision of the European Court in Gulec v. Turkey.[17] In this case the Court held that the use of lethal force to disperse demonstrators by state officials in reaction to what they did not deny was a very violent demonstration was not absolutely necessary within the meaning of Article 2. Given that it is our submission that all of those targeted by the use of lethal force on Bloody Sunday were innocent unarmed civilians, the use of lethal force was neither strictly necessary nor proportionate to the NICRA demonstration and ensuing violence.

25.3.8. The European Court in the case of Ergi v Turkey[18] considered that, in keeping with the importance of the provision of Article 2 in a democratic society, the Court must, in making its assessment, subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the state who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination. Furthermore, under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1, the state may be required to take certain measures in order to "secure" an effective enjoyment of the right to life.

25.3.9. The concept of planning and control of the use of lethal force was also approached by the Court in the case of McKerr v United Kingdom:[19]

". in determining whether the force used was compatible with Art.2, the Court must carefully scrutinise not only whether the force used by the soldiers was strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting persons against unlawful violence but also whether the anti-terrorist operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force".

25.3.10. Therefore in considering the compatibility of national law and practice with the European Convention and specifically Article 2, the Court has provided that national law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of life by agents of the state. The state must also give appropriate training, instructions and briefing to agents who may use force, and exercise strict control over any operations that may involve use of lethal force.

25.3.11. It is our submission that such strict control, instructions and planning were absent in the period leading up to Bloody Sunday.

25.3.12. The foundation of the international human rights legal system, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides in Article 3 that

25.3.13. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights elaborates upon the provision for the Right to Life within the Universal Declaration and states in Article 6

Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

25.3.14. The UN Principles again elaborate upon the Right to Life provided for in the Universal Declaration:

Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences. Exceptional circumstances including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. Such executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but not limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, excessive or illegal use of force by a public official or other person acting in an official capacity or by a person acting at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence of such person, and situations in which deaths occur in custody. This prohibition shall prevail over decrees issued by governmental authority.

25.3.15. Echoing the European Court’s emphasis on the importance of proper military control, instruction and planning, Article 2 of the UN Principles provides:

2. In order to prevent extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, Governments shall ensure strict control, including a clear chain of command over all officials responsible for apprehension, arrest, detention, custody and imprisonment, as well as those officials authorized by law to use force and firearms……

3. Governments shall prohibit orders from superior officers or public authorities authorizing or inciting other persons to carry out any such extralegal, arbitrary or summary executions. All persons shall have the right and the duty to defy such orders. Training of law enforcement officials shall emphasize the above provisions.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

25.4.2. The prohibition on torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute and generally enforced by the Court with rigour. There are no exceptions and it cannot be derogated.[20]

25.4.3. The ECHR organs have adopted what can best be described as a 'vertical' approach to Article 3, which is seen as comprising three separate elements, each representing a progression of seriousness, in which one moves progressively from forms of ill-treatment which are 'degrading' to those which are 'inhuman' and then to 'torture'. The distinctions between them are based on the severity of suffering involved, with 'torture' at the apex.

25.4.4. What is also clear is that mistreatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to fall within the cope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative and depends on such factors as duration of the treatment, effects, age, sex and state of health of the injured party.[21]

25.4.5. Moreover, treatment causing mental suffering is sufficient to fall within Article 3, provided a sufficient degree of intensity is reached.[22] Provided it is sufficiently real and immediate, a mere threat of inhuman or degrading treatment may itself violate Article 3.[23]

25.4.6. Owing to their particular vulnerability to assault and violation of their rights, the Court has adopted a necessarily low threshold for the minimum in the case of individuals who have been assaulted by a member of the security forces whether during an arrest or in detention.[24] The Court has repeatedly held that where a person is taken into custody in good health, found to be injured at the time of release, and alleges ill treatment, it is incumbent on the state to provide a plausible explanation as to the cause of his injuries to avoid liability under Article 3.[25] Furthermore, the court has declared that states are:

strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to impose their will on subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected.[26]

25.4.7. The term ‘strict liability’ used in that liability will attach unless it can be clearly shown that all reasonable measures have been taken to prevent such acts occurring, and to investigate and punish where appropriate.[27]

25.4.8. In this context, the European Court has observed that: “the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.”[28]

25.4.9. It is our submission that the arrest, detention and abuse of individuals by soldiers on Bloody Sunday constituted a breach of Article 3. The severity of the assaults sustained by detainees reached the minimum standard required. Moreover it is clear that all reasonable measures were not taken to prevent such assaults occurring and that reasonable measures were not taken to investigate and punish those responsible.

25.4.10. The prohibition contained in Article 3 is closely modelled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of which provides:

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.

25.4.12. More detailed measures adopted by the International community, including the United Kingdom, to combat torture and inhuman treatment are contained in the United Nations Declaration Against Torture which provides as follows:

Article 2

Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 3

No State may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 4

Each State shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Declaration, take effective measures to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from being practised within its jurisdiction.

Article 5

The training of law enforcement personnel and of other public officials who may be responsible for persons deprived of their liberty shall ensure that full account is taken of the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition shall also, where appropriate, be included in such general rules or instructions as are issued in regard to the duties and functions of anyone who may be involved in the custody or treatment of such persons.

Article 6

Each State shall keep under systematic review interrogation methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in its territory, with a view to preventing any cases of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

25.4.13. The UN Convention Against Torture again expands upon the right not to be subjected to torture and offers a distinct definition as follows:

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.

Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.

No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.

An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.

25.4.15. Thus according to the Convention, for an act to 'qualify' as torture it must (a) cause severe physical or mental suffering (b) be inflicted for a purpose and (c) be inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, an official (that is to say, it can be attributed to the state).

25.4.16. Within the Convention Against Torture a separate definition is offered to those actions, which would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as:

1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.

25.4.17. It is our submission that the actions of the Army leading up to and on Bloody Sunday did not comply with these international standards[29].

25.5.1. The use by the Army of lethal force on the streets of Derry on Bloody Sunday to control a civilian population entailed taking the lives of 13 people and the wounding of others who were unarmed and who provided no threat to the security forces or anyone else.

25.5.2. The use of such force in the circumstances that prevailed amounted to murder and/or attempted murder and/or wounding with intent in breach of U.K. domestic law. Criminal liability for the offences committed rests not only with the individual soldiers who pulled the triggers but also with the other soldiers who acted in concert with them in their joint enterprise and with those in authority who pulled their strings.

25.5.3. Nor was such force an ‘absolute necessity’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the European Convention so that the use of lethal force was a flagrant violation of the European Convention, as well as of relevant international obligations.

25.5.4. The arrest operation was not conducted so as to “minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force”. McCann v. United Kingdom (1966) 21 EHRR 97

25.5.5. The arrest, detention and ill-treatment of marchers also amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention. The planning and execution of the entire military operation on Bloody Sunday involved wholesale violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, for which the United Kingdom Government must bear responsibility.

[1] As the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights points out: “Unfortunately, ongoing concern has been expressed by human rights organizations and others in Northern Ireland in relation to the Judicial treatment of cases involving the exercise of lethal force by members of the security forces subsequently charged with serious offences including murder, manslaughter and grievous bodily harm.” Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads: Human Rights and the Northern Ireland Peace Process 74 (1996).

[2] See “Shooting with impunity” in section nine for a more detailed account.

[3] Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948.

[4] Ratified by the United Kingdom Government in May 1976.

[5] Adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65.

[6] Principles 2 & 3.

[7] Ratified by the United Kingdom on 8 December 1988.

[8] Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975.

[9] Farrell v Secretary of State for Defence; House of Lords, [1980] 1 All ER 166, [1980] 1 WLR 172, 70 Cr App Rep 224, 19 DECEMBER 1979.

[10] R v Roy Alun Jones [1975] 2 NIJB 1 at 16.

[11] Derived from Fionnuala Ní Aoláin; The Politics of Force Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland; Blackstaff Press Belfast 2000 p102.

[12] See generally Glanville Williams, Textbook on Criminal Law 50 2^nd ed., 1983.

[13] Glanville Williams, Textbook on Criminal Law 494 2^nd ed., 1983.

[14] Kathleen Stewart v. U.K. [1984] 7 EHRR 453; Application No. 10044/82. D.R. 39/162).

[15] Jordan v. UK. Application No. 24746/94

[16] Kathleen Stewart v U.K (as above)

[17] Application No. 21593/93

[18] Application No. 23818/94 ( 28^th July 1998 unreported)

[19] Application No. 28883/95/[1996] 21 EHRR 97.

[20] European Convention on Human Rights, Article 15; See also Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors Appointed to Consider Authorised Procedures for Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism.

[21] Ireland v United Kingdom Application No. 5310/71; [1978], 2 EHRR 25at para 162.

[22] Kurt v Turkey. Application No. 24276/94; European Court of Human Rights 25 May 1998. The Court held that a mother who suffered anguish as the result of the disappearance of her son following his detention by the authorities was herself to be regarded as the victim of a violation of Article 3.

[23] Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom. Application No. 7511/76, 7311/76; [1982] 4 EHRR 293, para 26.

[24] In Ribitsch v Austria the court stated that any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the applicant’s conduct diminishes the human dignity and is in principle a breach of article 3; Application No.18896/91; [1995] 21 EHRR 573 at para 38.

[25] Tomsai v France Application No. 12850/87; [1992] 15 EHRR 1.

[26]Ireland v United Kingdom (as above)

[27] Derived from Human Rights Law and Practice; Lord Lester of Herne Hill& David Pannick; Butterworths 1999.

[28] Selmouni v France [GC] Judgement, 28 July 1999; Application No. 25803/94; 29 EHRR 403, para 101.

[29] The position of the rights protected by the European Convention in domestic law after the Human Rights Act 1998 has been clarified by the recent decision of the House of Lords in In Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12

This Section contains allegations against the Shooters in 1 Para. It also contains allegations against Lieutenant 119 and Colour Sergeant 002 on the basis of their roles arising out of their command of soldiers engaged in particular shootings. This Section is in addition to the Sections on the Role and Responsibility of Individual Soldiers contained within the Conclusions in each Sector.

(i) Corporal A fired at least 2 shots unlawfully, recklessly and without justification. He did not believe that either Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or any other person in proximity to them posed any threat to life. The circumstances in which he claims to have fired do not match any of the circumstances in which victims in the laundry waste ground in William Street were shot. However, his shots may have hit Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or both, in which case his conduct amounted to attempted murder or, at least, causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.

(ii) Corporal A was, and remains, in collusion with Private B and invented an account of a nail bomber in order to justify the live rounds he fired and those fired by Private B

(iii) In view of the lies told by Corporal A in his subsequent statements, and on oath, in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private B cocked his rifle in breach of the Yellow Card before there was any justification for doing so.

(ii) His action in cocking his rifle in breach of the Yellow Card demonstrated a willingness to use lethal force on the slightest pretext.

(iii)Private B fired at least 3 shots unlawfully, recklessly and without justification. He did not believe that either Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or any other person in proximity to them posed any threat to life. The circumstances in which he claims to have fired do not match any of the circumstances in which victims in the laundry waste ground in William Street were shot. However, his shots may have hit Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or both, in which case his conduct amounted to attempted murder or, at least, causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.

(iv) Private B was, and remains, in collusion with Corporal A and invented an account of a nail bomber in order to justify the live rounds he fired and those fired by Corporal A.

(v) In view of the lies told by Private B in his subsequent statements, and on oath, in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private C claimed to fire 2 rounds at a man with a rifle at the south-west corner of Block 1 and 3 rounds at a pistol man firing from a window on the third storey of Block 1 Rossville Flats. He fired those shots unlawfully, recklessly and without justification.

(ii) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Lance Corporal D claimed to fire 2 rounds at a pistol man firing from a window on the third storey of Block 1 Rossville Flats. He fired those shots unlawfully, recklessly and without justification.

(ii) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice

(i) Corporal E claimed to have fired 1 shot from the Kells Walk Wall in the direction of the southwest corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He is a suspect for shooting Hugh Gilmore. There was no justification for the firing of these rounds and Corporal E’s conduct amounted to murder.

(ii) Acting in concert as he was with other members of his Platoon and members of Mortar Platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(iii)He fired 2 shots towards the southeast corner of Glenfada Park North. He is a suspect for shooting Patrick O’Donnell. There was no justification for this shot. Corporal E’s conduct in doing so amounted to attempted murder and causing grievously bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861.

(iv) In view of the fact that he not only engaged in a joint enterprise with other members of his platoon but was in charge of the brick that entered Glenfada Park, he is also criminally liable for the murders of Gerard McKinney, Gerard Donaghey, William McKinney and James Wray and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Patrick O’Donnell, Joseph Mahon, Joseph Friel, Michael Quinn and Danny Gillespie.

(v) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Lance Corporal fired 1 shot from the Kells Walk Wall over the Rubble Barricade, hitting and killing Michael Kelly. There was no justification for the firing of this round and Lance Corporal F’s conduct amounted to murder.

(iii)Contrary to his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry Lance Corporal F fired more than 1 shot from the Kells Walk Wall over the Rubble Barricade, he is a suspect for hitting and killing one of those killed behind the Rubble Barricade. Again this shooting was in concert with other members of his Platoon and members of Mortar Platoon in a joint enterprise and his is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(iv) Lance Corporal F also claimed to have fired two shots at a target in Glenfada Park and killed that person. Those shots probably killed Willie McKinney and, having passed through him, injured Joseph Mahon. He fired without justification and therefore murdered Willie McKinney. His conduct in respect of Joseph Mahon amounted to attempted murder and causing grievously bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861.

(v) Since Lance Corporal F was acting in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise and also as a junior NCO with a leadership role, he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murders of Gerard McKinney, Gerard Donaghey, Willie McKinney and James Wray and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Patrick O’Donnell, Joseph Mahon, Joseph Friel Michael Quinn and Danny Gillespie.

(vi) Lance Corporal F also fired a number of rounds at the window of 12 Garvan Place, Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Those rounds were fired without justification. Lance Corporal F’s firing of those shots, fired as they were at the window of an occupied flat amounted to attempted murder.

(vii) Lance Corporal F fired without justification in Sector 5, behind block 2 of Rossville Flats. He wounded Patrick Campbell and Danny McGowan. He is criminally liable for the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of both. He murdered Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan.

(viii) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private G fired at least 2 shots while on Rossville Street. There was no justification for the firing of these rounds. Acting in concert as he was with other members of his Platoon and members of Mortar Platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(ii) Contrary to his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry Private G fired shots from the Kells Walk Wall over the Rubble Barricade, he is a suspect for hitting and killing one of those killed behind the Rubble Barricade. Again this shooting was in concert with other members of his Platoon and members of Mortar Platoon in a joint enterprise and his is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(iii)Private G claimed to have fired three shots at one target in Glenfada Park. He claimed that after he had fired his shots two people fell. Those shots may have injured Joseph Friel. If so his conduct in respect of Joseph Friel amounted to attempted murder and causing grievously bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861.

(iv) Private G’s weapon was conclusively linked to the bullet recovered from Gerard Donaghey. The evidence is clear that the same soldier shot both Gerard Donaghey and Gerard McKinney. Private G therefore murdered Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghey.

(v) Since he was acting in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murders of Gerard McKinney, Gerard Donaghey, Willie McKinney and James Wray and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Patrick O’Donnell, Joseph Mahon, Joseph Friel, Michael Quinn and Danny Gillespie.

(vi) Private G also fired at least one round at the window of 12 Garvan Place, Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. That shot was fired without justification. Private G’s firing of that shot, fired as it was at the window of an occupied flat amounted to attempted murder.

(vii) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private H fired 22 rounds on Bloody Sunday and claims to have fired all of these rounds in Glenfada Park. It is not accepted that all of the rounds fired by Private H were fired in Glenfada Park North and it is alleged that some of those rounds were fired over the Rubble Barricade. There was no justification for the firing of these rounds.

(iii)On the basis of the shots Private H claimed to have fired at targets in the outdoors in Glenfada Park he is a suspect for the murder of Willie McKinney and the wounding of Joseph Mahon and Joseph Friel. If so he murdered Willie McKinney and his conduct in respect of Joseph Mahon and Joseph Friel amounted to attempted murder and causing grievously bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861.

(iv) Since he was acting in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murders of Gerard McKinney, Gerard Donaghey, Willie McKinney and James Wray and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Patrick O’Donnell, Joseph Mahon, Joseph Friel, Michael Quinn and Danny Gillespie.

(v) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Lance Corporal J fired 2 shot from the Kells Walk Wall. The first shot was fired over the Rubble Barricade and the location at which Lance Corporal J has placed his first target is the location at which Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were killed, shortly after the killing of Michael Kelly. That shot was fired without justification. Lance Corporal J claims not to have hit anyone with that shot. Lance Corporal J is a suspect for the shooting of Michael McDaid, John Young or William Nash and his conduct amounted to murder. In any event his conduct amounted to attempted murder.

(ii) Lance Corporal J’s second shot from the Kells Walk Wall was fired in the direction of the south-west corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. That shot was fired without justification. Lance Corporal J claims that he did not hit his target. If that shot hit Hugh Gilmore, Lance Corporal J’s conduct amounted to murder. In any event his conduct amounted to attempted murder.

(iii)Acting in concert as he was with other members of his Platoon and members of Mortar Platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(iv) In view of the lies told by Lance Corporal J subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Sergeant K fired 1 shot by his own admission and expressed confidence that he hit his target. He claimed to have fired at a man with a rifle who was crawling (behind another man) from the Barricade towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He is a suspect for shooting Kevin McElhinney. He fired without justification and therefore murdered Kevin McElhinney.

(ii) Since he was acting in concert with Private L and M in a joint enterprise and also as an NCO with a leadership role, he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murder of Kevin McElhinney.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private L cocked his rifle in breach of the Yellow Card. He fired at least 1 round into the rafters of a derelict building in order to terrify a prisoner when there was no justification for doing so. This was a further breach of the Yellow Card.

(ii) Private L claimed to have fired 2 rounds at a man with a rifle who was crawling (in front of another man) from the Barricade towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He believed that he may have shot both men. He fired without justification.

(iv) Since he was acting in concert with Sergeant K and Private M in a joint enterprise he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murder of Kevin McElhinney.

(v) He also claimed to fire 2 rounds at a man with a rifle in a burnt out factory on the west side of the junction of Kells Walk and Abbey Street. The circumstances in which he fired his shots do not match the circumstances in which any of the victims were hit. He fired without justification.

(vi) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private M claimed to fire 1 round at the first of two men crawling from the Barricade towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He then fired a 2^nd round at the second of the two men. He believed that he hit both men. These shots were fired without justification.

(iii)Since he was acting in concert with Soldiers L and K in a joint enterprise he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murder of Kevin McElhinney.

(iv) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice..

(i) In breach of the Yellow Card, Lieutenant N fired 3 shots at or above the heads of civilians in Eden Place. Apart from being reckless firing that endangered the lives of civilians, these were probably the first shots fired after the paratroopers debussed and probably triggered at least some of the shooting which followed.

(ii) Lt N fired 1 shot towards the Rossville Flats courtyard. He is a suspect for wounding Michael Bridge although it is also possible that he hit Peggy Deery. There was no justification for this shot. Lieutenant N’s conduct in doing so amounted to attempted murder and causing grievously bodily with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861.

(iii) The additional effect of his conduct was to encourage his subordinates to continue firing at civilians. In view of the fact that he not only engaged in a joint enterprise with other members of his platoon but was in charge of that platoon, he is also criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iv) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

26.14 Sergeant O

(i) Sergeant O fired at least 8 shots at civilians without justification. The circumstances in which he claims to have fired do not match any of the circumstances in which victims in the courtyard were shot. However, at the very least, he is criminally liable for the attempted murder, alternatively causing grievous bodily harm, of civilians in the courtyard.

(ii) Moreover, as in the case of Lieutenant N, he was not only engaged in a joint enterprise with members of his platoon but also occupied a command role and is therefore criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Corporal P cocked his rifle in breach of the Yellow Card, probably before debussing, but certainly before there was any justification for doing so.

(ii) Corporal P fired 2 shots from the hip at the crowd at the Rubble Barricade. These shots did not cause any casualties. Nonetheless those rounds were fired without justification, in circumstances where they endangered life and Corporal P’s actions amounted to attempted murder.

(iii)The additional effect of his conduct was to encourage the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon to fire live rounds at civilians. In view of the fact that he engaged in joint enterprise with soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon he is criminally liable for the deaths of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash.

(iv) Acting in concert as he was with other members of Anti-Tank Platoon and Private U in a joint enterprise, he is also criminally liable for the murders of Hugh Gilmore and Michael Kelly.

(v) Corporal P fired at least 4 more rounds at the crowd at the Rubble barricade. These shots probably hit one or more of Michael McDaid, John Young or William Nash. There was no justification for the firing of those rounds. Corporal P’s conduct in doing so amounted to murder. Even in the event that the shots fired by Corporal P did not hit and kill Michael McDaid, John Young or William Nash acting as he was in concert with the members of Anti-Tank Platoon in a joint enterprise, he also is in any event criminally liable for their murder.

(vi) Corporal P fired a further 3 to 5 shots over the Rubble Barricade in circumstances which were in breach of the Yellow Card and which were unjustified.

(vii) In view of the lies told by Corporal P subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private Q fired at least one shot by his own admission, and claimed that he hit his target. The circumstances in which he claims to have fired do not match the circumstances in which any of the victims were hit. He fired without justification. However, he is a suspect for murdering Jackie Duddy.

(ii) Acting as he was in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise, he also is in any event criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private R fired four shots by his own account, one at a civilian in the Rossville Flats courtyard close to Block 1 and three at a civilian between Blocks 2 and 3. He believes he hit his first target on the right shoulder but is not sure whether he hit his second target. The circumstances in which he fired his shots do not match the circumstances in which any of the victims were hit. He fired without justification. Based on the site of the wound he claimed to have inflicted, his first target may have been Jackie Duddy. If so, he is guilty of the murder of Jackie Duddy. Since he acted in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise, he is in any event criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(ii) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) By his own account Private S fired 12 shots at a target or targets at the same location between Blocks 1 and 2. He believed that he hit his target on at least 2 occasions. The circumstances in which he fired his shots do not match the circumstances in which any of the victims were hit. He fired without justification.

(ii) Bearing in mind the number of shots fired by him and the fact that he fired a number of them from the hip as he advanced towards the courtyard, he is a suspect for the shooting of any one or more of the victims in the courtyard.

(iii)Since he acted in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iv) In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private T claims to have fired 2 shots at an acid bomber on the balcony of Block 1 but does not know whether he struck his target. The circumstances in which he fired his shots do not match the circumstances in which any of the victims were hit. He fired without justification.

(ii) Since he acted in concert with the other members of his Platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Private U claims to have fired 1 shot at a pistol man south west of the southern end of Block 1. The man fell backwards and a man behind him fell clutching his head. He is the main suspect for the shooting of Hugh Gilmore. He fired without justification and therefore murdered Hugh Gilmore.

(ii) Acting in concert as he was with other members of his Platoon and members of Anti-tank Platoon in a joint enterprise, he is criminally liable for the murder of Hugh Gilmore, John Young, Michael McDaid, Michael Kelly and William Nash.

(iii)In view of the lies told by Private U subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice

(i) Lance Corporal V claims to have fired 1 shot at a petrol bomber at a petrol bomber in the car park and hit his target in the stomach. He is the main suspect for the shooting of Jackie Duddy. He fired without justification and therefore murdered Jackie Duddy.

(ii) Since he was acting in concert with the other members of his platoon in a joint enterprise and also as a junior NCO with a leadership role, he is in any event criminally liable on this basis for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

(i) Colour Sergeant 002 was the Senior NCO in charge of Call Sign 71 Alpha. He was at the Kells Walk Wall along with the other members of the Composite Platoon and as such was able to see that Kevin McElhinney was unarmed. He ordered Soldiers L and M to open fire when there was no justification for doing so. In view of his role as the NCO in charge of this half-platoon he is criminally liable for the murder of Kevin McElhinney. In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perverting the course of justice.

(i) Lieutenant 119 was the officer-in-charge of Anti-Tank Platoon and briefed his Platoon in a manner designed to encourage the use of lethal force in circumstances which were unjustified. On his own admission he was also one of the first soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon to reach the Kells Walk Wall and as such was in a position to: see that the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade was unarmed; and, order his soldiers to stop firing. In view of his role as officer-in-charge of his platoon he is criminally liable for the murder of Michael Kelly, John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash and Hugh Gilmore.

(ii) Lieutenant 119 did not order his men to advance into Glenfada Park and failed to stop them from entering Glenfada Park and Abbey Park. On his own admission he was present in Glenfada Park when F opened fire and therefore should have been in a position to also see G, E and H firing into a fleeing crowd at unarmed civilians. He did not order his soldiers to stop firing. In these circumstances and in view of his role as officer-in-charge of his platoon he is criminally liable for the murder of Gerard McKinney, Gerard Donaghey, Willie McKinney and James Wray and the attempted murder and grievous bodily harm of Patrick O’Donnell, Joseph Mahon, Joseph Friel, Michael Quinn and Danny Gillespie.

(iii)In view of the lies he told subsequently in statements and on oath in order to conceal his own and other soldiers’ crimes, he is also guilty of perjury and perverting the course of justice.

28 Allegations against the Governments

(i) That in the planning, control, organisation, approval and conduct of the military operation on Bloody Sunday, the British Government, by acts or omissions of its servants or agents, violated domestic and international law standards protecting the right to life, including Article 2 of the European Convention.

(ii) That the respective governments violated their obligation to protect the right to life of the marchers and others and failed to take all feasible measures to vindicate the right to life and to minimise to the greatest possible extent the risk to innocent lives.

(iii) No adequate weight or consideration was attached to the right to life of the citizens of Derry and the prevailing culture, politically and militarily, was one which endorsed the perception that the citizens of Derry were hostile to the State and consequently were not to be regarded in the same light as the State would normally regard its own citizens. Rather they were to be treated if not as enemies of the State certainly as persons with no reciprocity of interests with the State.

(iv) Both governments allowed the view to be disseminated without censure that “NICRA was being taken over by the IRA and hooligans” thus, in effect, dangerously conflating these three diverse elements into a common enemy. The failure or refusal to recognise and reinforce the vital distinctions between these disparate groups was dangerous and culpable.

(v) The British Government allowed the Stormont Government, which “shamelessly discriminated” against Catholics, to exercise disproportionate influence over security matters and succumbed to self-serving pressures from the Stormont Government in relation to the use of its armed forces. In the weeks leading up to Bloody Sunday, in the face of mounting pressure from Unionists, who regarded the failure to enforce the ban against Catholic marches as a “final surrender to the IRA”, the GOC was, without censure or disapproval, representing NICRA as “the active ally of the IRA”.

(vi) Both governments tolerated, if not encouraged, in Northern Ireland, the use of unlawful violence including lethal force. For example,

(a) Prior to Bloody Sunday there were many instances where lethal force had been used by the army in highly controversial circumstances. Uniquely in this part of the UK, as a matter of practice and policy, allegations of the use of unlawful force against military personnel were not properly investigated because the police duty to investigate was unlawfully delegated to the Royal Military Police for the purpose of rendering military personnel who had been guilty of wrongdoing unlikely to be made amenable to the law. Since the underlying objectives of a proper police investigation are to underpin the right to life it is apparent that the State operated and applied a policy which was incompatible with the respect for the right to life itself;

(b) Prior to Bloody Sunday the British Government and the Stormont Government countenanced and implemented measures which violated fundamental rights and freedoms including the non-derogable rights contained in Article 3 of the European Convention (prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment).

(c) Prior to and in connection with Bloody Sunday the contemplation and implementation of measures involving the use of unlawful lethal force such as;

ii. Option 3, as it became known, which, it was acknowledged would “necessarily involve numerous civilian casualties”;

iii. Shooting of “selected ringleaders” of what was characterised as the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans);

v. Without censure (31 January 1972) reporting “only shooting into crowds was directed against hooligans”;

vi. Without censure (4 February 1972) regarding Bloody Sunday as “an outstandingly successful military operation”.

(vii)The military operation on Bloody Sunday was a political decision approved by the Stormont Government and the British Government.

(viii) Both governments foresaw, as a possible outcome, that the military operation might endanger the lives of innocent civilians. This was a risk that, in respect of the lives of the marchers and the citizens of Derry, they were prepared to run.

(ix) If they did not foresee such a risk they ought to have foreseen it and such a failure is culpable.

(x) They permitted an “arrest” operation which should never have been contemplated.

(xi) Alternatively any such operation should have been put on a highly contingent basis subject to stringent conditions and under constant review at the highest level before launching

(b) The decision to have a major military operation involving British armed forces;

(e) The decision to allow a major military operation to proceed in which they foresaw, as a possible outcome, that the lives of innocent civilians might be endangered;

(f) The decision to run the risk that the lives of innocent civilians might be endangered.

(xiii) Both governments neglected to take steps to ensure that the operation was conducted in a manner designed to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk to the lives of innocent civilians.

(xiv) In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday the British Government were party to a massive cover-up involving, inter alia, the smearing of innocent victims and the shameless promotion of a false case on behalf of the army. They misled both Houses of Parliament and the public.

Civilian No	Civilian Name	Soldier	Ref
A1	Otto Schlindwein	007	ARR.54
A2	James McDermott	007	ARR.38
A6	Eamon McAteer	112	ARR.30
A7	Joseph McColgan	E	ARR.35
A17	John Gormley	J	ARR.23
B7	William Duddy	007	ARR.17
B17	Anthony Coll	J & INQ301	ARR.10

Civilian No	Civilian Name	Soldier	Ref
A14	George Roberts (ARR58)	INQ23	ARR.51
A 20	James Kelly (ARR 26)	INQ 23	ARR.26
A24	William Dillon	037	ARR.13

Civilian No	Civilian Name	Soldier	Ref
A21	Patrick Joseph Norris	G	ARR.45
B18	Christopher Doherty	G & INQ301	ARR.14
B19	William Doherty	O & T	ARR.21

Constable	Processed	Remarks
Bohill	5
Eade	6
Christie	6	Inc F (twice) & G
Curran	4 inc O’Keefe	Inc F
Calvert	5
Simpson	5	Inc INQ12 4 times

Name	Nature of Injury	Location at which injury was sustained?	Where taken?	Medical treatment?	Mentioned by?
Pius McCarron	Hit on head by falling masonry loosened by a ricochet	Alleyway between Blocks 1 & 2	House in Joseph Place (where Alana Burke was)	?	Eamon Baker (Day 96) James Deeney (Day 75) Patrick Kelly (Day 75) Joseph Doherty (Day 138) Patrick Clarke (AC64.6)
Hugh Hegarty	Hit in the face by a gas canister	Barrier 14 / junction of William St & Rossville Seamus Treacy	Flat on 2^nd floor of Block 1	Dr McCabe Letterkenny Hospital (subsequently)	Hugh Hegarty Day 98 Patrick Moore (Day 98)
Patrick Brolly	Grazed on his head by a bullet	Flat on 2^nd floor of Block 2	Ambulance in Rossville Street	Altnagelvin	Patrick Brolly (AB90) Celine Brolly (Day 91)
Rosemary Doyle	Hit in face by rubber bullet	Rossville St	N/A	Checked by nurse Robert Cadman	Rosemary Doyle (Day 101) Mary Gallagher (Day 70)
Mary Smith (now Breslin)	Facial injuries and eye injury	?	?	Altnagelvin
Mickey Doherty	Shot in the leg; bullet graze to face	Derelict house on the corner of Joyce St and Cooke St	Vinny Coyle’s house in Lisfannon Park	Dr MacDermott Pauline Ferry Attracta Bradley Hugh Deenan	See section below re: Red Mickey

No. on Map	Name of Witness	Reference in Statement	Summary of Response
1	Kevin Barrett	AB26.5 to AB26.5 paragraphs 27 to 30	If the person described was indeed wounded it was in all likelihood Joe Friel or Michael Quinn. However, this witness provides insufficient detail to allow the Tribunal to consider the person he describes as a ‘missing casualty’. For further detail see Section 19.
2	Paul Coyle	AC105.3 paragraph 15	This is a reference to Joe Friel who matches the description and was shot in the chest in the alleyway between Glenfada Park north and Abbey Park. For further details see Section 19
3	Paul Coyle	AC105.3 paragraph 15	This is a reference to Michael Quinn who was shot in the face at area referred to. For further details see Section 19
4	PIRA 25	AG17.3 paragraphs 14 to 16	During oral evidence this witness explained that the second man he believed was shot was actually Patrick Walsh who was not in fact injured. He stated that he did not see a third casualty who had been shot in the hip/ buttock but had heard people say that Alex Nash had sustined such an injury. For further detail see Section 20
5	John Gormley	AB46.3 to AG46.4 paragraphs 12 to 14	This witness makes no reference to this incident in his 1972 statement. Indeed, he does not refer to being in Glenfada Park South in his 1972 statement and is obviously mistaken in this regard. For further details see Section 19
6	Alan Harkens	AH8.4 paragraphs 12 to 14	Duplicated in Aitken Team’s document. Alan Harkens is the only witness to suggest that there were two bodies in the stairwell of Block 1 and is clearly mistaken in this regard. In all likelihood his memory is of Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney. For further detail see Section 18
7	Patrick Kelly	AK21.7 paragraph 20	Duplicated in Aitken Team’s document. The witness’s concession that he did not see a wound, merely presuming the person in question was injured, coupled with the lack of corroboration of this evidence, clearly suggests that the man seen by Mr Kelly may not have been shot at all. For further details see Section 19
8	Michael Love	AL21.3 paragraphs 14 to 16	Mr Love, without the assistance of a 1972 statement, is obviously confused, not only in relation to this matter, but others including timings and locations. His evidence in relation to this matter cannot, therefore, be relied upon. Either the description is that of Gerard Donaghey, who should have been in his line of sight, or the boy to whom he refers was not shot at all. For further details see Section 19
9	Michael Love	AL21.3 paragraphs 14 to 16	Mr Love, without the assistance of a 1972 statement, is obviously confused, not only in relation to this matter, but others including timings and locations. His evidence in relation to this matter cannot, therefore, be relied upon. Either the description is that of Gerry McKinney who should have been in his line of sight, or the man to whom he refers was not shot at all. For further details see Section 19
10	Pearse McCaul	AM93.3 paragraph 13	This witness accepted the likelihood that, rather than carrying two people from the Rubble Barricade, he helped carry Michael Kelly on two occasions rather than two separate bodies on two occasions. For further detail see Section 18
11	Derek McFeeley	AM217.3 paragraphs 11 to 13	Mr McFeeley conceded in evidence that the man to whom he referred could have been William McKinney. For further details see Section 19
12	Patrick McGlinchey	AM247.3 paragraph 13	The memory of a man shouting out and holding his back as seen by a fifteen year old is insufficient to suggest a missing casualy particularly as there is no corroborative evidence. For further detail see Section 20
13	Thomas McGlinchey	AM250.2 paragraphs 10 to 11	This witness conceded that one of the men he saw could have been Gerry McKinney. It is, therefore, probable that Mr McGlinchey is referring to the body of Gerry McKinney. For further details see Section 19
14	Thomas McGlinchey	AM250.2 paragraphs 10 to 11	This witness conceded that one of the men he saw could have been Gerry McKinney. It is, therefore, probable that Mr McGlinchey is referring to the body of Gerard Donaghey. For further details see Section 19
15	David McIntyre	AM284.1 to AM284.2 paragraphs 7 to 9	This witness was 10 on Bloody Sunday and was looking for only a matter of seconds. It is impossible, therefore, to rely upon his evidence. For further detail see Section 20
16	David McIntyre	AM284.1 to AM284.2 paragraphs 7 to 9	This witness was 10 on Bloody Sunday and was looking for only a matter of seconds. It is impossible, therefore, to rely upon his evidence. For further detail see Section 20
17	John McIntyre	AM286.3 paragraph 16	An unchallenged reference to Jackie Duddy. For further detail see Section 17
18	John McIntyre	AM286.4 paragraph 23	The witness accepted that the body he saw was probably that of Michael Kelly. For further detail see Section 18
19	Joseph McKinney	AM304.5 to AM304.6 paragraphs 23	This was a description of Paddy Walsh adminstering aid to Patrick Doherty. For further detail see Section 20
20	Denis McLaughlin	AM326.6 to AM326.7 paragraph 23	This witness, who was hysterical and traumatised at the time concedes that, while he can only now remember one person fall, three men may have fallen as he said in his statement in 1972. For further details see Section 19
21	Joseph Moore	AM413.5 paragraph 24	This witness accepted that the person he saw could have been Paddy Doherty. For further detail see Section 20
22	Joseph Nicholas	AN17.5 paragraph 22	A description of Paddy Walsh rendering aid to Patrick Doherty and Danny McGowan helping Patrick Campbell. For further detail see Section 20
23	Joseph Nicholas	AN17.5 paragraph 22	A description of Paddy Walsh rendering aid to Patrick Doherty and Danny McGowan helping Patrick Campbell. For further detail see Section 20
24	Sean O’Neil	AO65.12 paragraph 57	This evidence is untested. This body was not a “missing casualty,” rather may have been one of the three men who fell along the southern side of Glenfada Park. For further details see Section 19
25	Sean O’Neil	AO65.12 paragraph 57	This evidence is untested. This body was not a “missing casualty,” rather may have been one of the three men who fell along the southern side of Glenfada Park. For further details see Section 19
26	John Porter	AP11.5D	Deceased. Given the injury that the man had sustained to his face and the location in which he was seen by Mr Porter it is submitted that this is not a “missing casualty” but rather that the person the witness saw may have been Michael Quinn. For further details see Section 19
27	John Quigg	AQ1.2 paragraphs 8 to 9	Giving evidence, Mr Quigg acknowledged that a lot of events have faded in his mind, that at the time he was not familiar with the Glenfada Park area. Indeed, his 1972 statement records that he was in the “Glenfada Park area.” It is submitted that the bodies this witness saw were of Gerry McKinney and Gerard Donaghey. For further details see Section 19
28	John Quigg	AQ1.2 paragraphs 8 to 9	Giving evidence Mr Quigg acknowledged that a lot of events have faded in his mind, that at the time he was not familiar with the Glenfada Park area, indeed, his 1972 statement records that he was in the “Glenfada Park area.” It is submitted that the bodies this witness saw were Gerry McKinney and Gerard Donaghey. For further details see Section 19
29	Michael Quinn	AQ11.1 to AQ11.11	Duplicated in Aitken Team’s document. Mr Quinn’s account of when this witness was shot varies. His description is not corroborated by any witness, military or civilian. We submit that Mr Quinn is mistaken when he says he saw a man shot in the leg. Alternatively this boy is not a “missing casualty” in the sense that is intended by the Lawton team because he was not a threat to soldiers (or anyone else) when he was injured. For further details see Section 19
30	Derrick Tucker Jnr	AT15.16	A description of Patrick Walsh, Patrick Doherty and Danny McGowan helping Patrick Campbell. For further detail see Section 20
31	Derrick Tucker Jnr	AT15.16	A description of Patrick Walsh, Patrick Doherty and Danny McGowan helping Patrick Campbell. For further detail see Section 20
32	Martin Tucker	AT17.5 paragraph 32	A description of Patrick Campbell being assisted by Danny McGowan. For further detail see Section 20
33	Martin Tucker	AT17.5 paragraph 32	A description of Patrick Campbell being assisted by Danny McGowan. For further detail see Section 20
34	Robert Wallace	AW3.2 paragraph 8	Duplicated in Aitken Team’s document. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the man described was wounded even if the witness's recollection were to be considered in any way reliable and the incident is not mentioned by him in 1972. This cannot be relied upon. For further detail see Section 18

No. on Map	Name of Witness	Reference	Summary of Response
1	Hugh Duffy	AD156 and Day 150	Considering that Mr Duffy did not mention this in his 1972 statement, that he accepted it could be a reference to Joe Mahon and that he did not actually see any injury this cannot be relied upon as evidence of a ‘missing casualty’. For further detail see Section 19.
2	Derry Journal, Irish Times & Mr Patrick Clarke	L69.2, L130.2 and AC154.4 paragraph 29	This material does not amount to evidence of a ‘missing casualty’. See Section 23, i.e. this section, under the title “Treatment of Bloody Sunday casualties in hospitals in the Republic” above.
3	Jim Norris	AN20 and Day 147	The account that this witness gave in 1972 is more reliable than his current memory and is a clear description of Kevin McElhinney. For further detail see Section 18
4	Nigel Wade Simon Winchester John Barry Anthony Harkin Noel Doherty Thomas Ralph Dawe Kieran Gill	M79.22 paragraph 18 and 109/139/7 to Day 109/139/23 Day 116/87/13 to Day 116/88/10 AO75.2 and Day 193/168/25 to Day 193/169/5 AH11.6 paragraph 32 AD91.7 paragraph 36 AD5.5 paragraph 29 and Day 094/152/19 to Day 094/173/14 M105.9 paragraphs 39 to 44	This witness confirms that time shrinks one’s memory. He is inconsistent in relation to whether or not he saw wounds and there is nothing in his account that can be relied upon as evidence of ‘missing casualties.’ For further detail see section 20. Mr Winchester’s account does not correspond with Mr Wade’s, who accompanied him, in terms of location or number of ‘casualties.’ He accepts that some of these people may have merely been distressed rather than wounded. As such this is not reliable evidence of a ‘missing casualty.’ For further detail see section 20. This evidence is based upon a story related to Mr Barry that he describes himself as an anecdote which did not merit further investigation. As such it can not be considered as the basis for identifying ‘missing casualties.’ For further detail see section 20. This witness confirmed that the man he saw being carried by the arms and legs looked like Patrick Campbell. It seems that the witness has been confused by the number of people tending to Mr Campbell and by pieces of information he has gained over the years. For further detail see section 20. Given the description of the timing, location and description of the injury, with understandable inaccuracies considering the time passed, Mr Doherty is, in all likelihood, describing Patrick Campbell. For further detail see section 20. Mr Dawe did not mention this incident in his 1972 statement.He now accepts that it is possible that he has amalgamated the sighting of the car driven by Mr Bernard McGonagle taking Patrick Campbell to the Regimental Aid Post and the car which was driven by Mr. Raymond Rogan containing the body of Gerard Donaghey. For further detail see section 20. This witness did not actually see a leg wound but states that people were saying to be careful of the young man’s leg. Although he describes someone in their late teens, early 20s, this is, considering the timing and location, a reference to Danny McGowan. For further detail see section 20.
5	Soldier AD		See immediately below
6	George Roberts Photographs Forensic evidence	Day 151/97/16 to Day 151/97/24 E D14.12 and ED14.16 Day 229/6 to Day 229/7	It is probable that this witness saw John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash being shot but, due to the distress and resultant confusion has erred in describing their shooting. For further detail see Section 18 There is no photographic evidence of what could be termed a ‘missing casualty’. For further detail see Section 18 This does not amount to evidence of a ‘missing casualty’. For further detail see Section 18

Sequence of events.

20.5 Danny McGowan

20.5.2 Injuries Sustained

20.5.4 Civilian Evidence

20.5.4.8 Donna Harkin nee Friel

20.5.5 Conclusion

20.6.4 Soldier H

20.6.6 Soldier 040

21.4. Civilian Evidence

Introduction

22.2 “Derry Noise”

22.3 Blade Slap

22.3.1 The evidence of Mr David Capper is important in relation to automatic fire. He succinctly explains the mistaken belief that there had been automatic fire on Bloody Sunday as follows:

23. Missing Casualties

23.1 “Missing Casualties”

Day 51/21/14 to Day 51/21/25

23.2 Diverting Responsibility

23.3 Thirty-two year conspiracy of silence

23.4 Contrary to Republican Ideology

23.5 ‘Disappeared’ as punishment for disobeying orders

23.6 Treatment of Bloody Sunday casualties in hospitals in the Republic

23.7 Additional casualties

Name

23.8 ‘Red’ Mickey Doherty

23.8.2 The incident is also recorded, at 16.35, on the ‘Porter Tape,’ at W2 serial 135, and on the Royal Anglian log at 16.41 as follows:

23.9 Table of ‘missing casualties’

24.3 Witness X

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

Article 5

Article 6

26.14 Sergeant O

28 Allegations against the Governments