Madden & Finucane Bloody Sunday Closing Submissions

18.1.1 A convoy of soldiers from Support Company entered the Bogside on Bloody Sunday having driven through Barrier 12, across William Street and down Rossville Street. The convoy was led by the 2 Pigs occupied by soldiers from Mortar Platoon and these Pigs were followed in turn by: Major Loden’s command vehicle; the Ferret car; the 2 empty Pigs of Machine-Gun Platoon; the soft-skinned lorries occupied by Composite Platoon and bringing up the rear the 2 Pigs of Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.1.2 While the majority of Mortar Platoon debussed when their Pigs came to a halt in the waste ground: after they entered the Bogside and before the Pigs came to a complete halt, Sergeant O’s Pig stopped momentarily on Rossville Street at the end of Pilot Row and 5 members of Mortar Platoon de-bussed. These were Corporal P, Private 017, Private U, Private R and Private 006. Of these, Private R followed his Pig into the Rossville Flats car park and his involvement in the events of the day relates exclusively to Sector 2. Corporal P, Private 017, Private U and Private 006 were involved in Sector 3 and between them Corporal P and Private U fired 10 live rounds in Sector 3.

18.1.3 After the vehicles in Mortar Platoon stopped in the waste ground, Major Loden’s command vehicle stopped in the middle of Rossville Street in an exposed position and the remainder of the convoy stopped behind him. Despite the fact that they brought up the rear soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon were among the first to de-bus after Mortar Platoon. They de-bussed at a location just beyond the Rossville Street, William Street junction and P1116 shows Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers taking shelter in the lee of derelict buildings at the top of Rossville Street, prior to moving up the west side of Rossville Street.

18.1.4 The Composite Platoon consisted of 36 men and travelled in two Bedford 4 tonne soft skinned lorries. Each lorry comprised one half platoon. The first lorry comprised the half platoon known as Call Sign 71, commanded by Captain 200 who was in overall command of the unit and also two Colour Sergeants, Colour Sergeant INQ 147 and Colour Sergeant INQ 1318. Call Sign 71 debussed in the lee of the buildings at the north end of Rossville Street on the eastern side of the road. The second lorry contained the other half platoon known as Call Sign 71 Alpha, commanded by Colour Sergeant 002. Call Sign 71 Alpha debussed immediately behind the first lorry at the corner of Rossville Street and William Street. The ABC footage at V48/12.43 to 12.53 shows Composite Platoon’s position when they debussed.

18.1.5 Upon debussing Captain 200 sought advice from Major Loden in respect of how his platoon should be deployed. He was instructed to “Go and assist the Mortar Platoon” B2002E. Whilst Captain 200 was receiving his orders, Composite Platoon remained positioned at the lorries and buildings at that location and were “leapfrogged” by Anti-Tank platoon who advanced south to Kells Walk. 200 then deployed his troops away from the buildings. Call Sign 71 remained under his direct command. They deployed east to assist the Mortar Platoon in Sector 2 and then advanced across Eden Place, along the rear of the houses of Chamberlain Street and finally ended up near Block1.

18.1.6 A section of Call Sign 71 Alpha, including Sergeant K, Private L and Private M advanced south under the command of Colour Sergeant 002 and took up a position at the low wall at Kells Walk which had previously been occupied by the members of Anti-Tank platoon. A photograph of these soldiers can be found at EP2.8 at a stage where they were joined by Colonel Wilford.

18.1.7 A further section of Composite Platoon remained at the north end of Rossville Street and dealt with civilians who had been arrested

18.1.8 After speaking to Major Loden for a second time whilst at the north end of Block1, Captain 200 deployed Call Sign 71 back across to the west side of Rossville Street at Kells Walk and into the Columbcille Court area B1981, B1987, B2007 and B2022.008 paragraph 47. Some members of Composite Platoon, including Private C, Lance Corporal D and Private 024 took up position on the veranda at Kells Walk at a very late stage in the events.

18.1.9 As Support Company entered the Bogside, advancing beyond the junction of William Street, Rossville Street, civilians had run for cover. Some moved into the Rossville Street car-park, where they sought shelter in the Flats. Many others had run down Rossville Street where on the east-side of Rossville Street they either sought shelter in entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats or behind Block 2. On the west side of Rossville Street they moved into the area of Columbcille Court or sought cover behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.1.10 Upon reaching the Rubble Barricade, many civilians stopped believing that the Barricade represented a position of relative safety, a secure vantage point from which people could observe the soldiers. By the time the Support Company vehicles had come to a halt, approximately 40-50 civilians were taking shelter behind the Rubble Barricade and in a scene represented by EP27.6 there was a large gap between the majority of civilians standing at the Rubble Barricade and the soldiers who had debussed with little or nothing happening.

18.1.11 However that sense of security was shattered within seconds as Corporal P, Private U and soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon fired over the Rubble Barricade. Michael Kelly was the first person shot and killed He was killed by Soldier F, his death followed swiftly by the deaths of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash. All 4 were shot while behind the Rubble Barricade on the Glenfada Park side of the Barricade. Hugh Gilmore was shot and killed while running away from soldiers down the east side of Rossville Street. Kevin McElhinney was killed some time later while crawling away, in all probability shot by a member of Composite Platoon, at a point in time after Anti-Tank Platoon had advanced down Rossville Street from the low wall at Kells Walk and when at least some members of Anti-Tank Platoon were in Glenfada Park North.[1]

18.1.12 The order in which Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were killed has not been definitively established, nor has it been possible to establish the precise location at which they were killed. It will be submitted that the objective evidence demonstrates that they were killed while on the Glenfada Park side of the Rubble Barricade, at the edge of the footpath, very close to the spot where Michael Kelly was killed.[2]

18.1.13 The civilian evidence on this topic has been confused because civilians testify to a sustained volley of fire over the Rubble Barricade which caused them to run for their lives from the Rubble Barricade into Glenfada Park and towards the Rossville Flats. It was only upon reaching the relative safety of those locations that people realised that there were three young men dead on the Barricade. Civilians also testify to their inability to go to the bodies, to offer help or comfort because soldiers continued firing over the Barricade meaning that to offer assistance or succour to these three young men was to face certain death.

18.1.14 6 young men died at the Rubble Barricade, with Alex Nash injured at a later stage. However, in sharp contrast to the testimony of civilians who described sustained shooting over the Rubble Barricade, soldiers claim to have fired only 12 shots over the Rubble Barricade which could have claimed the lives of these men.[3] Moreover of those 12 shots, 4 were claimed by Composite Platoon, one of whom undoubtedly killed Kevin McElhinney, at a point in time after Anti-Tank Platoon had left Rossville Street. It will be our contention that the evidence supports the conclusion that Sergeant K murdered Kevin McElhinney. By this time the Barricade had been cleared, with Michael Kelly’s body having been removed to Glenfada Park North, Hugh Gilmore’s body lying behind Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash lying dead on the Barricade.

18.1.15 However even these 12 shots do not explain the killings. Corporal P fired two shots at a nail-bomber, on Rossville Street in the direction of the Rubble Barricade, he claims that one of those shots the nail bomber who was on Rossville Street near an alleyway and not behind the Rubble Barricade.[4] He fired 4 shots at a man he claims was firing a pistol from behind the Rubble Barricade, but he claims to have hit the barricade once and the man 3 times. This could account for the death of one of John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash except for the fact that none of these men was hit 3 times. Private U fired 1 shot from the north of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats at a man who he claimed had fired 2 pistol shots from the east pavement of Rossville Street, south of Block 1. This shooting could account for the death of Hugh Gilmore, although there is a possibility that Hugh Gilmore was hit twice. L/Corporal F eventually admitted to having fired a shot from behind the low wall at Kells Walk at a man behind the Rubble Barricade, who he claims was attempting to throw what he believed to be a nail bomb. We know that L/Corporal F is responsible for the killing of Michael Kelly because his bullet was removed from Michael Kelly’s body. Corporal E fired 1 shot from the low wall at Kells Walk at an alleged sniper in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, again it is possible that Hugh Gilmore was the victim of that shooting. L/Corporal J fired 1 shot from the low wall at Kells Walk at someone he claimed to have believed to be throwing a nail bomb, however he claims to have missed his target, thus accounting for none of the deaths. Sergeant K, Private L and Private M all claim to have seen 2 men ‘leopard crawling’ towards the doors of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and carrying weapons. There are significant discrepancies between their accounts of this event which will be dealt with in more detail below. They claim to have fired 4 shots between them from Kells Walk at one or other of these men. One of these shots certainly claimed the life of Kevin McElhinney.

18.1.16 There were further shots fired in Sector 3. Soldier P claims to have fired shots over the heads of a crowd on Rossville Street, however on his account these could not have claimed the lives of those killed behind the Barricade. Lance Corporal F and Private G claim to have fired shots in Rossville Street in the direction of the Flats after they had left Glenfada Park North but this was at a point when all of those behind the Barricade had been killed. To similar effect Private C and Lance Corporal D claim to have fired shots down Rossville Street, from their evidence this shooting occurred at a time when all of the victims were dead and injured.

18.1.17 Therefore on the soldiers’ accounts Soldier F, eventually, accounted for the death of Michael Kelly, whom he undoubtedly killed. Private U or Private G could account for the death of Hugh Gilmore. Only Corporal P and Lance Corporal J fired the shots which could have resulted in the deaths of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash. However, their accounts cannot be accepted in their entirety because Soldier P claims to have hit 1 person 3 times while Soldier J claims to have missed his target. One of Sergeant K, Private L or Private M is undoubtedly responsible for the death of Kevin McElhinney.

18.1.18 Therefore, not only is the soldiers’ account of 12 shots at the material time and location, entirely inconsistent with civilian testimony, it fails to account for the known deaths at the Rubble Barricade. If the soldiers’ account was to be accepted, it would mean that at least two of the young men, John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash were not in fact killed. Even disregarding the body of civilian evidence, the soldiers’ accounts cannot be believed. Their accounts fail entirely to explain the deaths behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.1.19 Soldiers have sought to justify their use of lethal force by claiming that they came under attack by gunmen and bombers located behind the Rubble Barricade. These accounts are completely undermined by the lack of a single shred of objective supporting evidence. No soldier in Sector 3 sustained any injury as a result of the alleged gunfire or bombings. If the soldiers’ account was to be accepted Sector 3 was awash with unexploded nail bombs. Nor, despite the large number of photographers positioned on Rossville Street and behind the Rubble Barricade, can soldiers point to a single photograph, a single video clip, or a single piece of objective evidence which lends support to their case that persons behind the Rubble Barricade were involved in the use of weapons of any kind.

18.1.20 However, that is to deal with the account of each individual soldier taken in isolation. The soldiers’ account collapses entirely when their accounts are read as a body of evidence. When one examines the testimony of soldiers, standing shoulder to shoulder, as on their account they came under hostile fire from the direction of the Rubble Barricade, their case is riddled with inconsistencies. The accounts given by the soldiers who admit firing over the Rubble Barricade are not corroborated in material respects by other soldiers. Where one soldier sees a nail-bomber, another sees a man with a rifle and a third sees a man with a pistol. Whereas for those soldiers who did not fire live rounds and were standing beside the shooters - the nail bombers, petrol bombers and gunmen shot by their colleagues were invisible and silent - for the large part unseen and unheard by those who did not have to justify the firing of live rounds. The soldiers’ accounts are inconsistent with each other in virtually all material respects and do not provide support or justification for even the limited firing which is admitted at the location at which 6 young men died.

18.1.21 This may be the reason why soldiers who fired over the Rubble Barricade, and particularly the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon, have been struck by collective amnesia. What is clear is that soldiers from Mortar Platoon and Anti-Tank Platoon in particular, fired more shots over the Rubble Barricade than they have accounted for, and that the shooting over the Rubble Barricade which left 6 young men dead was unjustified and unlawful. Moreover as this Inquiry concludes not a single soldier who fired live rounds, or who witnessed the firing of live rounds in Rossville Street has given a truthful account about the circumstances in which Michael Kelly, Michael McDaid, John Young, William Nash, Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney were murdered on Bloody Sunday.

18.1.22 In our submission, the material events that occurred in Sector 3 can be summarised as follows:

(i) Sergeant O’s Pig stopped momentarily in the waste ground and 5 soldiers dismounted, 4 of those remained on Rossville Street and were involved in the events of Sector 3.

(ii) Corporal P and Private 017 crossed Rossville Street to the west side and positioned themselves in front of the low wall at Kells Walk and advanced towards the Rubble Barricade. They had no cover from the Rubble barricade or the Rossville Flats.

(iii) Soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon de-bussed and moved down the west side of Rossville Street, initially moving in front of the low wall and then positioned themselves behind the Kells Walk wall.

(iv) Some civilians at the Rubble Barricade shouted abuse at soldiers and threw stones, albeit that because of the distance of the Rubble Barricade from the soldiers there was no prospect of their hitting any soldier. No action by the crowd at the Rubble Barricade posed a threat to soldiers, nor could it have been perceived by them as posing a threat. The majority of civilians stood around talking and watching the soldiers until the first shots were fired. Soldiers were not attacked with gunfire, nail bombs or petrol bombs from the Rubble Barricade.

(v) Corporal P and Soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, including, but not confined to Lance Corporal F and Lance Corporal J, opened fire over the Rubble Barricade.

(vi) The evidence suggests that the first two shots fired over the Rubble Barricade were fired by Soldier P shooting from the hip. These shots did not cause any casualties.

(vii) Michael Kelly was the first person to be shot and killed behind the Rubble Barricade. He was killed by Soldier F, he was unarmed when killed and no one around him was doing anything which could have led Lance Corporal F to believe his life was threatened by anyone positioned behind the Rubble Barricade.

(viii) Michael Kelly’s body was removed from the Rubble Barricade and taken into Glenfada Park North.

(ix) As Michael Kelly was being attended to, Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash had been shot and killed. They were shot and killed by either Corporal P or Corporal E, Lance Corporal F,Private G, Private H or Lance Corporal J from Anti-Tank Platoon. They were unarmed when killed and no one around them was doing anything which could have led the soldiers who murdered them to believe their life was threatened by the actions of any person positioned behind the Rubble Barricade. There followed sustained shooting over the Rubble Barricade as a result of which civilians at the southern gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North were unable to reach the Deceased.

(x) Hugh Gilmore was shot in the back as he ran down the east side of Rossville Street by Private U or a soldier from Anti-Tank Platoon. He was unarmed and running away when killed. Neither Hugh Gilmore himself nor anyone around him was engaged in activity which could have led the soldier/s who shot and killed him to believe that their life was in danger.

(xi) Anti-Tank Platoon moved forward from the low wall at Kells Walk into the alleyway leading to Glenfada Park North. They all left Rossville Street and some or all of them went into Glenfada Park North. In making their way to Glenfada Park North, they were completely exposed to the Rubble Barricade and the Rossville Flats from where they had claimed to be under fire.

(xii) Soldiers from Composite Platoon made their way to the low wall at Kells Walk, some positioning themselves behind the low wall and some positioning themselves on the pram way.

(xiii) One of Sergeant K, Private L or Private M shot and killed Kevin McElhinney as he crawled towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats seeking shelter. Kevin McElhinney was shot from behind, he was unarmed when killed and even on their own account the soldiers were under no threat from any person when Kevin McElhinney was murdered.

(xiv) Alex Nash went to the body of William Nash and sought help from the soldiers, he was shot by a solider as he held his dying son.

(xv) Anti-Tank Platoon returned from Glenfada Park North and while positioned in their vehicle Lance Corporal F and Lance Corporal G fired shots at a window in the Rossville Flats from which Fulvio Grimaldi was taking photographs.

(xvi) One of the Mortar Platoon Pigs was sent up Rossville Street and the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash were thrown into the back of the Pig. The soldiers handling the bodies showed no respect for the deceased and the bodies were loaded into the Pig one on top of the other. Priests and first aid personnel were subsequently denied access to the bodies when the Pig left the Rubble Barricade and was parked in the waste ground.

(xvii) Private C and Lance Corporal D fired shots down Rossville Street at the ambulances removing the deceased and injured.

(i) The deceased and injured in Sector 3, including Alex Nash, were shot by members of 1 Para Support Company from Mortar Platoon, Anti-Tank Platoon and Composite Platoon.

(iii) They were shot deliberately – not accidentally – and without justification.

(iv) None of the deceased or injured had handled a gun or a bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday. None of the deceased or injured had acted in support of any person handling or using a gun or bomb on Bloody Sunday.

(v) None of the deceased or injured was doing anything, at the time they were shot, which would have led the soldiers responsible for the shooting to believe that they posed a threat of any kind to their lives or the lives of their colleagues.

(vi) None of the deceased and injured was in the vicinity of civilian gunmen or bombers when shot. Nothing was taking place in the vicinity of the deceased or injured at the time when they were shot which would have led the soldiers to believe that their lives or those of their colleagues were at risk.

(viii) None of the deceased or injured was shot in crossfire or in the course of a ‘gun battle’ with civilian gunmen.

(ix) When the vehicles and soldiers of Support Company appeared on Rossville Street they did not come under fire. Soldiers opened fire without justification and not as a result of having been fired on first.

(x) There was no ‘gun battle’ nor any ‘exchange of fire’ as has been alleged by soldiers.

(xi) There were no ‘missing casualties’ behind the Rubble Barricade. Rather there are extra casualties killed by soldiers whom soldiers have failed to account for.

(xii) Soldiers fired more rounds over the Rubble Barricade than they have accounted for.

(xiii) Soldiers manhandled the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash. They were thrown into the back of the Pig, no attempt was made to have them medically examined. Moreover when priests and the Knights of Malta sought to medically examine the three young me and provide them with spiritual care they were obstructed by soldiers.

18.2.1 The Civilian evidence (including that from the clergy and journalists) in relation to the interests that we represent is dealt with below in detail on a case-by-case basis. However when taking this evidence as a whole, it supports the following propositions:

i) There was nothing other than stones thrown from the Rubble Barricade at the soldiers positioned at Kells Walk and the northern end of Block 1. There was no armed activity anywhere in this area. No shots were fired at the Paras. No bombs were thrown. Nothing exploded. There was no real or perceived threat to them.

ii) There was a crowd of approximately 30 civilians of all ages at the western side of the Rubble Barricade.

iii) Michael Kelly was standing on the footpath to the south of the Rubble Barricade on the west side of Rossville Street, looking towards the Paratroopers as they deployed near Kells Walk, when he was shot within a minute or so of the Paratroopers arrival at Rossville Street. He had nothing in his hands and did nothing to warrant being shot. No one else around him was engaged in any activity which merited the use of lethal force.

iv) Michael Kelly fell where he had been standing and was carried to the southern gable end of Glenfada Park North by a number of civilians and given the Last Rites by Father Bradley.

v) On the eastern side of Rossville Street, near the Rubble Barricade, Hugh Gilmore had thrown one or possibly more than one stone at the soldiers further north of his position. The soldiers were hopelessly out of range. Hugh Gilmore was then shot when he had nothing in his hands. It is not exactly clear according to the civilian evidence on which side of the Barricade he was standing or which direction he faced when he was shot. Hugh Gilmore ran to just south of the entrance to Block1 where he collapsed with a serious abdominal gunshot wound. He was dragged around the corner to the southern end of Block 1 where he died.

vi) On the western side of Rossville Street, John Young and Michael McDaid along with William Nash were shot. All of them were unarmed. Neither were they in close proximity to someone handling a weapon when they were shot and killed.

vii) John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed, probably within seconds of each other. They fell in close physical proximity to each other as Fathers Bradley and O’Keefe were attending to Michael Kelly at the southern gable end of the eastern Block of Glenfada Park North.

viii) They were probably located at the edge of the broad footpath on the western side of the Rubble Barricade when shot and killed, not far from the location where Michael Kelly was shot and killed.

ix) Alex Nash, William’s middle-aged father made his way from the gable end and held his son. Such was the level of fire that he was effectively pinned down on the Barricade. He was shot in the arm.

x) Civilians at the gable end tried but could not go to their aid because the gunfire over the Rubble Barricade was so sustained. Absolution was given from the gable wall.

xi) The civilians at this location watched helplessly as Kevin McElhinney either alone or with one other person crawled southwards along the eastern side of Rossville Street towards the entrance of Block 1. They spoke of bullets literally bouncing around the youth as he crawled for the doorway but was eventually shot just before he gained refuge. He had nothing in his hands and was unarmed.

xii) Paratroopers who were involved in shooting further civilians in Glenfada Park North then arrested the civilians who present at the gable wall.

xiii) Paratroopers then arrived at this position in an APC and removed the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash from the Rubble Barricade. The manner in which they were removed was shocking, disrespectful and contemptuous.

[2] This will be dealt with in more detail below, however in summary we make this submission on the basis of the following evidence. The video evidence which shows Alex Nash, the photographic evidence which shows the location of the Pig which eventually removed the bodies and the testimony of civilians and the soldiers who removed the bodies to the effect that all three men fell at the same location and at the same time.

[3] While a total of 30 shots were fired in Sector 3 the majority of those shots, if the soldiers account is to be believed, cannot account for the deceased and wounded in Sector 3, either they were fired down alleyways, at windows in the Rossville Flats or over the heads of the crowd.

[4] This account is based on his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and his trajectory photograph. In his account to the RMP, with the attached map, the nail-bomber was at a different location.

18.3.1 Personal Details

18.3.1.1 Michael Kelly was 17 years old on Bloody Sunday. He attended college in Belfast during the week and on a Saturday worked at a shirt factory as a sewing machine engineer. As a hobby he kept and flew pigeons. Michael came from a close knit family who were not involved in politics. It was his first march and he attended because his friends were going. His girlfriend at the time, Bernadette Ball, described Michael as a generous and kind person, she remembered how one day he’d actually helped a small British soldier carry a rucksack because he felt sorry for him. Michael was known as a very light-hearted person, always joking and smiling and the whole family were known as decent and good natured. Any involvement with guns and nailbombs would have been totally alien to Michael’s nature. He had no criminal record. The grief of the Kelly family like all the families of the deceased was insurmountable. His mother felt the blow particularly and her own health was particularly affected. She dealt with her grief as best she could in her own particular way. She was known to have brought blankets to the graveyard to put over his grave in an attempt to keep him warm.

18.3.2.1 Michael Kelly was standing on the footpath to the south of the Rubble Barricade on the west side of Rossville Street, looking towards the Paratroopers as they deployed near Kells Walk, when he was shot by Soldier F within a minute or so of the Paratroopers arrival at Rossville Street. A single bullet entered the lower left side of his abdomen and remained in his body. Neither he nor those around him were doing anything to warrant shooting by the soldiers. He was carried to the southern gable end of Glenfada Park North by Charles McLaughlin amongst others and was given the Last Rites by Father Bradley. From there he was carried by a number of people including Pearse McCaul, Joseph Donnelly, Patrick Doherty and George Downey and across Glenfada Park North and into 8 Abbey Park. Accompanied by his brother John amongst others he was taken by ambulance Altnagelvin Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

The series of photographs at EP27 were taken by Ciaran Donnelly of the Irish Times. EP27.6, EP27.7, EP27.8 and EP27.9 show events at the Rubble Barricade and EP27.10 and EP27.11 show the body of Michael Kelly being carried across Glenfada Park North. EP27.6 and EP27.7 shows the crowd on the west side of Rossville Street at the Barricade and what appear to be soldiers who are either getting out of or around the back of the command vehicle. EP27.7 shows a number of people behind the Rubble Barricade, some clearly crouching or ducking down. EP27.8 and EP27.9 show a number of people looking at the soldiers further to the north. A number of troops have de-bussed on to the west side of Rossville Street.

EP32.1 and EP32.2 were taken by Robert White. Both these photographs showing the body of Michael Kelly were taken from the Glenfada Park South pram ramp marked by the witness on the map attached to AW11.1.

The series of photographs EP23.4, EP23.5, EP23.6, EP23.7, EP23.8, EP23.9, EP23.10, EP23.11 and EP24.12 were taken by Liam Mailey. His photographs cover the Rubble Barricade, the deployment of troops on Rossville Street, movement of troops at the low wall at Kells walk and a group tending to Michael Kelly in Glenfada Park North.

18.3.2.3 The spot where Michael Kelly appears to have fallen is almost precisely the spot identified in Soldier F's trajectory photograph. P7 shows that the spot indicated is just to the west of the gap in the barricade on the western pavement of Rossville Street just to the south of the barricade. As appears in the photograph taken by Mr White at EP32 this is the location where Michael Kelly was shot.

18.3.2.4 Robert White took a series of photographs attached to his statement at AW11.23 which run from P27 to P29. These photographs show the passage of the first two Saracens up Rossville Street. Mr White confirmed that these photographs were taken in fairly quick succession. He believed they would have been taken within a few seconds of each other. Day 137/86/25 to Day 137/87/23. He confirmed that he then ran into Glenfada Park North up to the pram ramp and took his photographs there which are EP32.1, EP32.2 and EP32.3. He recalled it did not take him very long to get to the pram ramp, because he was afraid of missing something. He did not think the distance was as far as sixty yards. He thought he was standing at the pram ramp for a matter of seconds, but less than a minute, before he took the photograph we know as EP32.1. This is the photograph that shows Michael Kelly lying on the ground at the Rubble Barricade. He did not see anyone at the Rubble Barricade with a rifle or a pistol. Day 137/90/16 to Day 137/91/8. Mr. White was asked about the time lapse between taking EP32.2 and P32, which is his photograph of Hugh Gilmore running along Block 1 of Rossville Flats. He thought it would have been a very short time, even less than a minute, but he did not honestly know. Day 137/81/16 to Day 137/82/1.

18.3.2.5 Ciaran Donnelly took photographs from the north-eastern corner of the pram ramp north east corner of Glenfada Park South, marked on M22.24. At this point there were fifty to sixty people at the Rubble Barricade. Day 071/21/18 to Day 071/21/22. He witnessed an incident of an arrest of a youth. He thought EP2.5 taken by Jeffrey Morris and showing the arrest of William John Dillon looked extremely like it. He took EP27.6 and EP27.7 from this position. He heard two shots and about two to three minutes later he saw a youth fall on the left side of the barricade. He thought it was "definitely no longer than a minute to two minutes, maybe less than a minute even", when he saw another man fall on the Rossville Street side of the barricade. Day 071/28/7 to Day 071/29/2.

18.3.2.6 Professor Terence O'Keefe thought that by the time EP23.12 was taken, which was shortly after Michael Kelly had been brought to the gable end of Glenfada Park North, he had seen the other bodies at the barricade. Day 127/108/22 to Day 127/108/24.

18.3.2.7 George Downey, Michael Kelly’s brother-in-law, met Michael Kelly near a house in Kells Walk and was there when Michael Kelly’s mother shouted out to her son from the first floor verandah of Kells Walk. He thinks she was in her sister’s house at the southern end of Kells Walk. AD134.2 paragraph 12. He and Michael were talking when someone told George that two fellows had been shot and pointed out to George the direction of a house to which the two in question had been taken. Day 123/8/21 to 123/9/5. That was the last time he saw Michael until he was at the south side of the barricade in Rossville Street. Michael Kelly's mother, Kathleen Kelly saw him at the rear of no.2 Kells Walk in the area of the four garages seen in P200. She shouted to him but he did not hear her above the noise of the crowd. He ran south towards Glenfada Park along with the crowd although he seemed to be on his own. AK14.2 paragraph 15.

18.3.2.8 Michael Kelly was the first person to be shot at the Rubble Barricade. He was shot within a very short time of the deployment of the Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers at the Kells Walk wall. He was shot across the Rubble Barricade and fell to the left of the barricade and was then taken into Glenfada Park North, whilst shooting continued. It is submitted that the reliable civilian evidence demonstrates beyond doubt that Michael Kelly was unarmed at the time he was shot and presented no threat whatsoever to the soldier who shot him, or indeed any soldier. It is further submitted that there was no activity at the Rubble Barricade which justified the shooting by soldiers. The killing of Michael Kelly was wholly unjustified and he was murdered by Soldier F.

18.3.2.9 The evidence of Hugh O'Boyle is at AO1 and Day 131 to Day 132. His evidence, contained in AO1, is that he saw about ten or twelve men and boys gathered at the barricade. When he saw it first, some soldiers just to the south of the south end of Kells Walk and a few boys shouting and throwing stones at the soldiers, who were too far away to be hit. The witness said at Day 132/3/19 to Day 132/3/25 "When I say throwing stones they were probably shouting at them. I cannot remember if they were throwing stones, maybe one or two might have been, I just cannot recall." He heard a young lad shout out “I have been shot” and he fell to the ground immediately behind the barricade near to the west end. The young lad who fell had been standing in front of the witness, slightly to his left. The witness had not been throwing stones himself and at that time and place he could not remember other people around him throwing stones. Day 132/6/10 to Day 132/6/12. The witness confirmed the position of the young man by reference to P418 at Day 132/8/13 to Day 132/8/24. The witness accepted that he would have been positioned just off the right of photograph P637, which would have been two to three feet to the right of where Michael Kelly lay. Day 132/52/5 to Day 132/52/9. The young man, who was clearly Michael Kelly, was shot by soldiers possibly positioned near Kells Walk in Rossville Street. Day 132/6/22 to Day 132/7/21. Michael Kelly was not doing anything or saying anything when shot. Day 132/52/10 to Day 132/52/12. The relevant evidence of Soldier F was put to the witness. There were no explosions or nail bombs in front of i.e. to the north of the barricade. The witness saw no-one with a fizzing object or bomb at the barricade. The witness agreed that if somebody very close to him had had a fizzing object he would have seen this and he would not have been standing beside him either. Day 132/54/6 to Day 132/54/9. The young man had a very small red hole in his stomach. He was carried or dragged away from the barricade. He was then carried into the southeast corner of Glenfada Park North. Some people tried to go out and help casualties on the barricade and others said it was too dangerous to go out there. His statement to Eversheds is consistent with the statement that he gave to NICRA at the time. The NICRA statement is at AO1.1.

18.3.2.10 Jack Nash, whose evidence appears at AN27.1 and Day 137, was at the Rubble Barricade. He saw a number of soldiers at the north end of Rossville Street and others at the small flats at Kells Walk. He also may have seen some soldiers on or beside a pram ramp who were firing rubber bullets. AN27.2 paragraph 7 and Day 137/6/16 to Day 137/8/3. These rubber bullets came up against the side of the Glenfada Park North houses facing onto Rossville Street. Day 137/8/1 to Day 137/8/16. The witness confirmed there was stone throwing, including by himself, although it was not even close to a riot but more of a stand-off. AN27.2 paragraph 8. It was suggested that given the distance, there was no reasonable prospect of stones thrown from behind the barricade at the soldiers hitting anyone and that they must have been going further up Rossville Street to have a chance of hitting anyone. The witness stated that he was behind the barricade and threw to vent his frustration. Day 137/43/14 to Day 137/43/16.

18.3.2.11 Mr. Nash saw a youth fall behind the Barricade on the Free Derry Corner side slightly in front and to the north of him. Both the youth and the witness had been looking north. The youth had been doing nothing to attract his attention and the witness did not have a specific recollection of the youth throwing stones. The witness identified the youth in EP32.2 as the youth who fell. This was Michael Kelly. The witness thought the youth had been hit by a rubber bullet or had fallen down and did not believe at the time they were live shots, although he heard them. The witness went forward to the barricade and helped lift Michael Kelly to the gable end wall. He opened his coat and saw a small hole but no blood. Day 137/15/14 to Day 137/15/18. During his time at the barricade and at the Glenfada Park North gable, the witness saw no-one with a weapon or nail bomb. As far as he was aware, no-one fired a rifle, pistol or bomb from the barricade towards the soldiers. Day 137/15/25 to Day 137/16/7.

18.3.2.12 Charles Lamberton, whose evidence appears at AL3.1 and Day 183, was at the Rubble Barricade and saw soldiers on Rossville Street out of their Saracens and out from behind their riot shields. There was some chanting at the Barricade and the mood was quite confrontational. However the witness did not see the crowd moving north of the barricade to rescue a boy. He did not see stones being thrown from the Barricade and although someone might have thrown a stone they could not have reached the soldiers. AL3.5 paragraph 32 and Day 183/111/15 to Day 183/111/21. The witness recalled a volley of shots, possibly five or six, and everyone dived to the ground. He saw Michael Kelly fall. Michael Kelly was lying on his left side with his head pointing towards Free Derry Corner and his feet closer to the barricade, curled round slightly, bringing his knees in towards his stomach. Day 183/112/12 to Day 183/115/7. The witness confirmed that EP32.1 and EP32.2 showed the position as he remembered it. Day 183/113/8 to Day 183/115/14. The witness confirmed that he had seen Michael Kelly immediately before he fell and he was just standing where he was actually lying on the photographs, looking down towards the Army. The witness thought that Michael Kelly was helped by a group of people who had been on the south side of the barricade but who might also have come out from the gable end of Glenfada Park North. Michael Kelly was dragged to the shelter of the gable end of the eastern block and the witness joined them. He could see a small bullet wound in his stomach. AL3.6 paragraph 36. There was a fusillade of shots, apparently from the north. The witness recalled there then was a lull and Michael Kelly was taken to the gable end of Glenfada Park North. Day 183/115/15 to Day 183/115/23.

18.3.2.13 Ronald Wood, a witness who had spent twelve years in the Royal Navy, saw the soldiers arriving in Rossville Street. EP27.6 shows a picture fairly close to the account which Mr. Wood gave in his Widgery evidence at day 2. His Eversheds statement is at AW24.1 and Day 127. He had crossed over the barricade in a southerly direction and was standing at the entrance to Glenfada Park car park. He saw some of the Pigs go into the Rossville Street car park and others stay on Rossville Street itself. He saw the soldiers get out and take up cover around the Pigs and some go behind the wall at the south of Kells Walk. This was marked by the witness on AW24.25 and AW24.26.

18.3.2.14 He said that some of the people threw stones and that rubber bullets were fired in reply. Then live bullets started flying. He said that he did not see who fired the first two of them, but one of them -- and these were his exact words -- "downed a man next but one to me facing the soldiers in Rossville Street". The witness did not see anything at the barricade which would have justified the firing of live rounds and he was never told of any justification. Day 127/26/2 to Day 127/26/7. That man, he said, was hit in the front whilst standing at the barricade and hit in the lower left abdomen. The witness was certain that the boy he saw shot was shot in left hand side of his torso. Day 127/26/8 to Day 127/26/10. He described the man as wearing a sports jacket, slacks and a white T-shirt. The witness was shown F5.4 and F5.9, which were photographs of the clothes that Michael Kelly was wearing on the day. The witness stated that the t-shirt was very similar and the jacket was also very similar to the ones worn by Michael Kelly. Day 127/26/18 to Day 127/27/17.

18.3.2.15 The witness was reminded of his description to the Widgery Tribunal of the boy being shot as next but one to him and he accepted that, looking at P635, the witness could have been positioned just off to the right of the photographs (i.e. EP27.6 and EP27.7). The witness confirmed that the photographs suggested that his impression of the boy with a group of people standing together talking before he was shot was correct. Day 127/29/10 to Day 127/29/17.

18.3.2.16 He said that the man had not fired any shot or thrown any bomb and if he had thrown a stone earlier, Mr Wood had not seen him do so. He was not throwing stones when he was shot. The witness saw him at the moment he fell and there did not appear to be any action from him of throwing anything. The man was close enough to him that he would have seen or been aware of any action like that. Day 127/15/5 to Day 127/15/23. The witness heard no firing from Rossville Flats. Day 127/29/18 to Day 127/29/24. He heard no nail bombs that day at all. He did not see anyone attempting to throw a fizzing object that day. Nor did he see Michael Kelly with a fizzing object in his hand. Day 127/30/9 to Day 127/30/17.

18.3.2.17 The man shot was, as far as the witness was aware, was facing the army when he fell. Day 127/16/2 to Day 127/16/6. He fell a yard or two behind the barricade in a general area very nearly at the western extremity of the Barricade. Day 127/17/1 to Day 127/17/12. When shown P637 the witness indicated that the scene with a boy lying on the ground with his face up was a scene he could recall from what he observed on the day. The position of the person in the photograph corresponded with the position of the boy he saw fall with his head facing south in the direction of Free Derry corner. Day 127/18/11 to Day 127/19/2.

18.3.2.18 He and others went out to the body and four people picked him up and took him into the Glenfada Park North car park and put him on the ground. Day 127/19/3 to Day 127/20/4. P638 and P639 corresponded to scenes he recollected.

18.3.2.19 He said that he did not see any use of any weapon by a civilian nor hear any nail bombs, nor any automatic fire and saw no reason for the soldiers having fired. WT2 and AM24.3 paragraph 20.

18.3.2.20 Professor Terence Michael O'Keefe, who on Bloody Sunday was Father O'Keefe, gave evidence to the Widgery Tribunal. His Eversheds statement is at H21.44 and he gave evidence on Day 127. The witness had reached the southern gable end of Glenfada Park North on its east side, and at this time there were something like 25 or 30 people around the gable end, some people still in the centre of Rossville Street and some five or six young people on the barricade on the opposite side from the Army vehicles. The witness was able to identify himself in EP27.6 and EP27.7 and marked his location in H21.139 and H21.140. The witness believed the sequence of these photographs suggested to him that the soldiers who had debussed from the military vehicles in the background had opened fire. Day 127/89/21 to Day 127/90/14. The witness recognised himself in EP27.6 and marked himself on H21.129. The witness then confirmed EP27.8 as very much his recollection of the number of young men looking down Rossville Street towards the army somewhat challengingly. Day 127/90/15 to Day 127/91/4. It is to be emphasised that neither this witness nor any other witness identified Michael Kelly in this group. The photograph would seem to show, broadly speaking, the picture described by him in his oral testimony to Lord Widgery. EP27.9 again accorded with his recollection of the scene at the time he was located close to or at the gable end of Glenfada Park North. Day 127/91/5 to Day 127/91/11.

18.3.2.21 He saw men debus from the vehicles and about 10 run to their right, that is to say, to the west which would appear to be the scene in EP27.8. At H21.45 paragraph 10 the witness described soldiers jumping out of Saracens up Rossville Street and taking up positions left and right. Some soldiers took up firing positions pointing their rifles down Rossville Street with some standing and some kneeling. At Widgery he had said he heard some shots which he assumed were rubber bullets. His impression was that when the vehicles halted stones were thrown at the troops by people standing at the barricade, none of whom, he said, had firearms. He got the impression of youths picking up a few stones and firing them off rather aimlessly. At H21.46 paragraphs 11 to 13 the witness said he saw a small group of youths clearly intending to confront the soldiers. He had a vague recollection of them waving their arms and yelling at the soldiers. He had the impression stones were being thrown. Day 127/99/9 to Day 127/99/18. The witness accepted that EP27.7 and EP27.8 suggested to him that it was more likely that Michael Kelly was part of the main group of people, of whom he was one, standing around the entrance to Glenfada Park and not part of the group of youths challenging the army. Day 127/145/16 to Day 127/145/20.

18.3.2.22 At WT5.6 Professor O’ Keefe had been asked: “You have taken your narrative to this point, that soldiers have dismounted from the Saracens and adopted an aiming weapon with their weapons. Q: "How long after adopting that position do you suggest they opened fire?" Answer: "I got the impression it was all in one gesture. They adopted firing positions and opened fire and I heard the reports." The witness said that the soldiers got into position and started shooting "very swiftly indeed. Day 127/100/20 to Day 127/101/1. At no stage was the witness conscious of any firing from the barricade or any noise which he could have thought of as firing. Day 127/101/2 to Day 127/101/6. The witness had a vague memory or vision of stones being thrown but not conscious of anything else. Day 127/101/7 to Day 127/101/12. The witness did not see anyone behind the barricade with anything that was fizzing or hear anyone mention anything that was fizzing at the barricade. Day 127/146/4 to Day 127/146/9. The witness confirmed his testimony to Widgery and said he did not see any person take or ferry guns or weapons away from the Barricade and thought it would have been impossible for anyone to have got across to ferry weapons away. Nor did he hear any blast bombs. Day 127/151/5 to Day 127/151/12. When asked about the totality of the soldiers allegations about weapons at the barricade the witness stated: "I saw none of that and I think it would have been impossible for that to have happened without me having noticed." Day 127/150/11 to Day 127/150/20. At no stage did he see anyone in his vicinity or did in see anyone pass carrying a rifle right into Glenfada Park. Day 127/152/24 to Day 128/153/2. There was in his visual memory a fairly empty space between the Barricade and the soldiers. Day 127/101/13 to Day 127/101/21.

18.3.2.23 At WT5.6 D the witness had been asked: What was the first casualty you observed? Answer: One young man who dropped holding his stomach and four young people detached themselves from this crowd which was still on that gable end corner and ran over very fast indeed. They crouched and grabbed him by the arms and legs and ran back behind the gable end of the wall. At that stage the crowd more or less got in behind the wall to see what was wrong with the young man." Question: "Can you say whereabouts on that barricade that first casualty was?" Answer: "More towards my side of the barrier on the gable end ... nearer to the gable end of the maisonettes ... in Glenfada Park." The witness confirmed on Day 127/102/5 to Day 127/102/16 by reference to EP27.7 that the person he saw fall fell in approximately the position occupied by Michael Kelly in the photograph but he could not confirm that he was able to recognise the man in the photograph. He had the impression that the first casualty would have fallen three or four paces in from the gable end of Glenfada Park North. Day 127/102/25 to Day 127/103/2. He saw the young man fall in a cluster of three or four shots. Day 127/106/22 to Day 127/107/2. At Widgery he had said that the young fellow had been standing facing down Rossville Street towards the soldiers. This was confirmed at Day 127/101/22 to Day 127/102/4. He had seen him hold his stomach and double up and begin to fall, at which these four young people took him and carried him. It was very swiftly done. Day 127/106/4 to Day 127/106/15. The witness confirmed that the scenes in EP32.1 and EP32.2 brought back a memory though he could not say if the first casualty on doubling up fell forwards or backwards. Day 127/103/11 to Day 127/103/20.

18.3.2.24 At WT5.6 G he had been asked: “Was that the young man attended by Father Bradley?" Answer: Yes. At first I thought he had been hit in the stomach by a rubber bullet. I still thought it was rubber batons being fired but when they put him on the ground I saw a bullet wound in his lower abdomen and his eyes seemed to be glazed. I was not sure whether he was dead or not, but Father Bradley and I got down and Father Bradley attended to him." The witness was able to identify himself and Father Bradley in EP23.12. He was asked at WT5.7 A: "As a result of that firing was anybody else hit?" Answer: "I saw one man being hit and my attention was on him being carried away. When I left after Father Bradley to attend to him, I saw these three bodies behind the rubble barricade lying very still." The witness thought he had some memory of shots hitting the gable end wall where they were huddled after he had looked across and seen three more casualties at the Barricade. Day 127/105/23 to Day 127/106/3. At WT5.8 C he was asked to give an estimate of the sort of time between the first shot that he heard and when he peered round and saw this soldier apparently aiming a rifle in that direction. He replied: "I said in my statement a minute to a minute and a half, but it is a terribly subjective moment of time. I am trying to deduce that from the four people carrying him there to the time it would take to attend him, and then a discussion. It would perhaps be longer, three minutes or four minutes, but it certainly was not a long time." The witness recalled the scene at EP23.12 showing himself trying to persuade some young people not to run. He believed that he had seen the bodies on the barricade by the time this photograph had been taken. Day 127/108/2 to Day 127/108/24.

18.3.2.25 Charles McDaid gave a statement to Eversheds, which appears at AM161.1, and his evidence is at Day 060. He confirmed that the scene in EP27.6 was in accordance with his recollection of the scene as he approached the barricade. At WT5.46 C he said he turned round and saw that a soldier had a man on the ground just at the corner of the flats, and he was just holding the man by the arm. Then a second soldier came out from the side of the flats and kicked the man on the ground. At AM161.5 paragraph 28 he stated: "I had just managed to pass on to the southern side of the rubble barricade when I heard a voice of a young lad coming from my left and slightly behind me, crying 'Mister, I am shot. Help me'. I do not think he called out to me in particular but as far as I could tell I was one of the nearest people to him. I looked over my left shoulder and saw the young lad, maybe 15 or 16 years old, on the ground. The approximate point ... is marked K." At AM161.10, the point marked K can be seen as almost the spot where Michael Kelly died. The witness saw nothing, which would justify the shooting of the young lad who fell. Day 060/170/15 to Day 060/170/19. He did not see anything to justify the shootings of the other three persons he saw lying behind the barricade. He saw no-one take or ferry guns or weapons away and he did not hear any blast bombs explode. Day 60/170/24 to Day 060/171/3. He saw no-one with weapons of any kind at the Barricade. Day 060/170/8 to Day 060/170/14.

18.3.2.26 In AM161.5 paragraph 29 he stated: "The lad must have just fallen when I saw him and was lying partly on his side with one arm out to support him. His head was facing towards Glenfada Park and his feet towards the Rubble Barricade and his face was looking up in my direction." That is broadly consistent with the photograph EP32.2.[1] At AM161.5 paragraph 30 he stated that, "there was no weapon in the lad's hands" and he saw none removed from him. He stated that he was one of the four or five persons who carried the lad from where he lay to an area behind the south gable end of Glenfada Park North. He referred to the appearance of Father Bradley. The witness confirmed he could identify himself in EP23.11 and EP23.12. They carried him into the alley at Glenfada Park and Father Bradley administered the Last Rites of the church to the boy. There was shooting seemingly still going on at that time, but helping the boy in he could not see where the shooting was or whether anybody else had been shot at that particular time.

18.3.2.27 Mr McDaid said that he was about four or five yards away from the boy, who had, he said, no weapon in his hand or near him. Nor did he see anybody removing anything from the boy. He did not see anyone at the barricade throwing stones. The witness saw nobody with any form of weapon at the barricade or saw or heard any firing from behind the barricade towards the north end of Rossville Street. Day 060/159/5 to Day 060/159/11.

18.3.2.28 Gavan Duffy, whose statement appears at AD155.1 and who gave evidence at Day 126, was a friend of the witness Paul McGeady whose evidence is considered below. He accompanied him on the day. He identified himself in the middle of EP35.3 on the south side of the Rubble Barricade. The witness then described the movement of people towards the barricade and in front of the barricade and seeing a soldier hit a boy with a rifle butt. Some of the people threw missiles at the soldiers, more of whom had appeared. The boy to his left who had been either on the barricade or slightly to the south of it was blown backwards by a shot fired from around the bottom end of the Kells Walk/Glenfada Park side. There were about five or six soldiers in the area. Day 126/145/18 to Day 126/146/6. That was the first live shot the witness recalled hearing that day. The boy fell backwards and he had nothing in his hands. Day 126/146/12 to Day 126/146/19.

18.3.2.29 It was put to the witness that Mr. McGeady had said he believed the boy had been moving forward to rescue the youth on the waste ground. The witness replied that everybody was sort of moving forward "maybe" to give assistance to the person that was being arrested. Day 126/146/24 to Day 126/147/4. However, he did not notice any people approach the soldier in an effort to rescue the boy who had been struck by the rifle butt. Day 126/145/15 to Day 126/145/17. The witness was shown P635 and Michael Kelly was pointed out to him on the photograph. The witness said he would have been maybe a matter of yards from him. The witness confirmed that the majority of people behind the barricade were not throwing stones and he agreed with the suggestion that P635A and EP27.7 suggested that Michael Kelly was one of the majority of people who were not throwing stones or doing anything at the barricade. Day 126/161/18 to Day 126/162/8.

18.3.2.30 Some relevant parts of the evidence of Soldier F were put to the witness. He stated that he heard no firing from the Rossville Flats at any time that day. He did not see or hear any nail bombs being thrown or exploding in front of the barricade. Day 126/164/5 to Day 126/164/8. He saw no-one with a fizzing object in his hand before Michael Kelly was shot. He did not see Michael Kelly throw a nail bomb as described by Soldier F. The witness was clear from his position he would have seen it if it had occurred. Day 126/164/21 to Day 126/165/8.

18.3.2.31 Paul McGeady was, according to his evidence at AM219.3 and Day 137, standing in Rossville Street to the south of the Rubble Barricade with Gavin Duffy whose own evidence was considered above. Mr. McGeady stated that they stood in Rossville Street at a point that has been marked E on the map attached to his statement. From this position, he looked north up Rossville Street to see what was going on. He saw about six soldiers standing behind the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk and recognised these soldiers as Paratroopers. He also saw about six more soldiers who were also Paratroopers behind the wall at the southernmost end of the pram ramp leading on to the first floor of Kells Walk.

18.3.2.32 At AM219.1 paragraph 17 he stated that: "Some of the lads who were standing to the south of the rubble barricade were throwing stones at both groups of Paras. The Paras responded with rubber bullets." He then described an incident where a young lad has been caught and assaulted by a soldier and a group of lads from behind the barricade intending to go out to his assistance. One of the young lads in the rescue group moved forward and was climbing over the barricade to go to the lad on the ground. He recalled that this boy was casually dressed and had dark shoulder length hair. He could not recall whether or not he had a stone in one of his hands. He was certainly not carrying a gun, a nail bomb or a petrol bomb. The witness did not see anyone at the barricade carrying a gun, nail bomb or petrol bomb. He did not see or hear any exploding. Day 137/129/14 to Day 137/130/4.

18.3.2.33 He was standing directly behind the boy and was looking at his back. The witness was directed to a photograph of Michael Kelly at P413. The witness thought the fellow he saw was more to the right but the person in the photograph did look similar. Day 137/130/14 to Day 137/131/2. As the boy climbed on to the top of the Rubble Barricade he was suddenly thrown violently backwards. The witness marked the point on a plan attached to his statement and it is right in the middle of the barricade in the middle of Rossville Street. The boy was thrown backwards both his arms went up in the air as he fell. He was not moving. The witness knew immediately that he had been shot, even though he had not heard a shot being fired. Nothing else could account for the violent way he was thrown backwards. There was a crowd of people around the lad who was lying just in front of him and so he did not actually see the lad on the ground or the position in which he was lying.

18.3.2.34 It seems clear the witness saw the shooting of Michael Kelly but his recollection of the location is mistaken. This witness ended his evidence by placing an arrow on AM219.9, marking the spot where he saw the person fall. As can be seen this is considerably further towards Rossville Flats than the known position where Michael Kelly fell as depicted in EP32.2 and as described by a number of witnesses. He confirmed the general location to the right towards Rossville Flats at Day 137/137/1 to Day 137/137/3 even though in his original statement he marked the spot on the plan on AM219.7 as the middle of the barricade. The evidence is clear that Michael Kelly was shot not far from the position he can be seen at in EP27.7 and not on top of or on the northern side of the barricade.

18.3.2.35 Soldier F, for what his evidence was worth, did not suggest that the person he shot was anywhere other than behind the barricade.

18.3.2.36 It is clear that the witness is attempting to describe the shooting of Michael Kelly but as with his location he is mistaken about his activity when shot. His evidence on this issue should be read in the context of the weight of civilian evidence above which suggests that Michael Kelly was not engaged in any hostile activity prior to being shot.

18.3.2.37 The following summary submissions are made on the civilian evidence considered above:

i. Michael Kelly was shot without any weapon or any other item in either of his hands.

iii. No other person was shot in the vicinity of Michael Kelly at or around the time he was struck.

iv. Michael Kelly was facing north towards the soldiers on Rossville Street when he was shot on the southern side of the Barricade.[2]

v. He had been standing close to the spot he fell for a period of time prior to being shot.

ix. There was no-one at or around the Rubble Barricade with a nail-bomb, petrol bomb or any other weapon.[3]

18.3.2.38 Paul McGeady was, according to his evidence at AM219.3 and Day 137, standing in Rossville Street to the south of the Rubble Barricade with Gavin Duffy whose own evidence was considered above. Mr. McGeady stated that they stood in Rossville Street at a point that has been marked E on the map attached to his statement. From this position, he looked north up Rossville Street to see what was going on. He saw about six soldiers standing behind the low wall at the south end of Kells Walk and recognised these soldiers as Paratroopers. He also saw about six more soldiers who were also Paratroopers behind the wall at the southernmost end of the pram ramp leading on to the first floor of Kells Walk. At AM219.1 paragraph 17 he stated that: "Some of the lads who were standing to the south of the rubble barricade were throwing stones at both groups of Paras. The Paras responded with rubber bullets. He then described an incident where a young lad has been caught and assaulted by a soldier and a group of lads from behind the barricade intending to go out to his assistance. One of the young lads in the rescue group moved forward and was climbing over the barricade to go to the lad on the ground. He recalled that this boy was casually dressed and had dark shoulder length hair. He could not recall whether or not he had a stone in one of his hands. He was certainly not carrying a gun, a nail bomb or a petrol bomb. The witness see anyone at the barricade carrying a gun, nail bomb or petrol bomb. He did not see or hear any exploding. Day 137/129/14 to Day 137/130/4. He was standing directly behind the boy and was looking at his back. The witness was directed to a photograph of Michael Kelly at P413. The witness thought the fellow he saw was more to the right but the person in the photograph did look similar. Day 137/130/14 to Day 137/131/2. As the boy climbed on to the top of the Rubble Barricade he was suddenly thrown violently backwards. The witness marked the point on a plan attached to his statement and it is right in the middle of the barricade in the middle of Rossville Street. The boy was thrown backwards both his arms went up in the air as he fell. He was not moving. The witness knew immediately that he had been shot, even though he had not heard a shot being fired. Nothing else could account for the violent way he was thrown backwards. There was a crowd of people around the lad who was lying just in front of him and so he did not actually see the lad on the ground or the position in which he was lying.

i. This witness ended his evidence by placing an arrow on AM219.9 marking the spot where he saw the person fall. As can be seen this is considerably further towards Rossville Flats than the known position where Michael Kelly fell as depicted in EP32.2 and as described by a number of witnesses. This witness confirmed the general location to the right towards Rossville Flats at Day 137/137/1 to Day 137/137/3 even though in his original statement he marked the spot on the plan on AM219.7 as the middle of the barricade.

ii. The suggestion that the person shot had been in a rescue group attempting to move forward and was climbing over the top of the barricade should be read in the context of the evidence of Gavan Duffy above who accompanied Mr.McGeady and his clear evidence that the majority of people who surged forward stayed on the Free Derry side of the barricade and did not throw stones. He agreed with the suggestion that Michael Kelly was one of those people.

iii. Not even Soldier F, for what his evidence was worth, suggested that the person he shot was anywhere other than behind the barricade.

iv. In addition the descriptions by Mr.McGeady of the location and timing of Michel Kelly's shooting should be considered in the light of the photographs EP27.6, EP27.7, EP32.1 and EP32.2. The evidence is clear that Michael Kelly was shot not far from the position he can be seen at in EP27.7 and not on top of or on the northern side of the barricade.

v. The recollection of this witness has to be considered as an attempt without the benefit of a contemporaneous statement to place scenes and incidents at the Rubble Barricade into an intelligible picture. His evidence should be read in the context of the evidence of Gavan Duffy above and the other witnesses considered as to the actions and location of Michael Kelly at the time he was shot. It is clear that if the witness is describing Michael Kelly he is wrong about his location and his activity when shot.

18.3.2.40 The witness Patrick Norris whose statement is at AN24.1 also gave evidence on Day 167/92. At AN24.2 paragraph 8 he stated that he walked down Rossville Street and passed the Rubble Barricade, where he met a young lad that he knew, Michael Kelly. He was standing behind the southern gable end of the east block of Glenfada Park North. He was standing in a position where he could see back north up Rossville Street. He was standing only a yard or so to the east of the gable. He refers to a photograph of the gable end. At AN24.2 paragraph 9 the witness described how he knew Michael Kelly and chatting to Michael Kelly for about ten minutes. At AN24.2 paragraph 10 he stated: “Michael Kelly said 'Here they come'. I did not see who he was looking at and did not see anyone coming myself. I heard no noise of gunshots or engines and just heard Michael Kelly say 'Here they come'. He must have seen the Army coming down Rossville Street. He did not sound shocked or surprised by this but when he said 'Here they come', he could possibly have been giving a warning shout.” This was described at Day 167/94/18 to Day 167/95/2 as just a “simple here they come” so people knew that the army were coming and they were going to come into the Bogside not a warning that people should get ready to take on the army. He continued: “Almost immediately after he said those words, he reached down to pick up a stone from the ground at his side. As he stood up again, he pulled his arm back and bent his body as if to throw the stone northwards up Rossville Street. It was then that he was shot. I did not hear the shot that killed him.” At AN24.2 paragraph 11 he stated:" he did not throw the stone that he had picked up and he was shot before he had even begun to throw it. It was only a matter of seconds between him shouting 'Here they come' and being shot. He fell backwards almost at my feet. From the way that he fell, I assumed that the bullet that had hit him had come north from the William Street direction. Not a sound left his body, but as soon as he hit the ground, there was no sign of life. He might have given a very small tremor or spasm just as he hit the ground. I saw no blood." The witness then described shouting for help and a group of six or seven men helping him to carry Michael Kelly to safety to the gable end wall. At AN24.5 paragraph 14 he stated: "He was eventually carried away into a house by others. I am unsure now where he was taken. I was still extremely shocked at this time. I do remember that a couple of men who were part of the group that carried Michael from where he had been shot were people I knew. One of them was John Kelly, who I knew quite well, and another was his brother-in-law".

i. The witness when shown EP27.6 did not remember seeing Michael Kelly as far out on the pavement or the number of people around immediately before he was shot as depicted the photograph. In fact his recollection was that there was no-one around Michael Kelly or no-one else with the two of them at the gable end wall. Day 167/96/6 to Day 167/97/11.

ii. A further point in relation to this photograph is that the person who is Michael Kelly is some considerable distance to the right from the gable end wall where the witness claimed to have been talking to Michael Kelly for some ten minutes before Michael Kelly was shot. The witness claimed Michael Kelly was shot half a metre to a metre from the gable wall Day 167/99/8 to Day 167/99/10 and AN24.16 or an arms length from the witness Day 167/147/25 to Day 167/148/5. According to the witness Michael Kelly fell at his feet Day 167/148/12 to Day 167/148/14 yet the witness had to accept that he himself did not appear anywhere in EP27.6 and P635.

iii. Again with EP27.7 and P635A the witness accepted he did not appear in the photograph. Day 167/151/10 to Day 167/151/12.

iv. In EP32.2 and P637 the witness accepted that the photograph fitted with where Michael Kelly was shot. Day 167/103/7 to Day 167/103/22. However he also had to accept that the kerb in the photograph P635 was nowhere near the point that he suggested Michael Kelly fell. Day 167/154/23 to Day 167/154/25.

v. The witness gave a description and demonstration in evidence of Michael Kelly being shot as he bent his body or back slightly backwards as if to throw a stone. Day 167/158/6 to Day 167/159/18. This is clearly inconsistent with the forensic evidence, which is more consistent with Michael Kelly bending forward and facing the direction of the bullet.

vi. The witness had to accept contrary to what he stated at AN24.3 paragraph 14 that in the light of the evidence of John Kelly, Michael Kelly's brother, that he was not involved in carrying his brother from the scene of the shooting of the Rubble Barricade. Also that he did not come across his brother until he saw him being carried out of a house in Abbey Park.

vii. The evidence from the witness of the position and movements of John Young and Michael McDaid, having been shot whilst running south from the gable end wall of Glenfada Park North and their shooting after Kevin McIlhenny, is not consistent with any other civilian evidence notwithstanding his position proximate to Glenfada Park North. AN26.1 and Day 167/126/5 to Day 167/126/15. In oral evidence he stated he was no longer sure if it was Young and McDaid .

viii. It is submitted in the light of the above and the evidence of other witnesses such as Jack Nash, Ronald Wood and Hugh O' Boyle that the witness is mistaken about Michael Kelly picking up a stone at the Rubble Barricade.

18.3.2.42 Danny Craig gave a statement at AC111.2 and evidence to the Inquiry at Day 135. At AC111.2 paragraph 10 he described moving back to the safety of the Rubble Barricade. He got talking to a young lad who introduced himself as Michael Kelly. He said he knew his brother John because he worked with him. The lad told him he was 17 and this was his first march. Because the witness was twenty-five at the time he started playing 'big daddy' (corrected by witness to more like brother Day 135/51/20 to Day 135/51/25). "I told him to run when I ran, to throw stones when I threw stones and to do everything I did and he would be all right. This is what he then did. I asked him where his brother John was and he said he was around somewhere. He also told me that his mammy had not wanted him to come on the march because she thought there might be trouble. I said as long as he stuck by me he would be fine and the worst that could happen was that he would get a rubber bullet.” He was wearing a suit in a darkish colour, maybe grey with stripes on it. The witness had his black bomber jacket on (corrected by witness to navy blue Day 135/52/1 to Day 135/52/5). At AC111.2 paragraph 13. the witness stated the following:" I said to Michael Kelly 'get down' and I bent down to pick up a stone and he did the same because he was doing everything that I did, but as he stood up he fell back and said 'Danny, I am shot'. I will never forget him falling back and saying my name like that. I looked at him and he seemed to have nothing but a pinhole (corrected by witness to mean small hole Day 135/52/15 to Day 135/52/19) in his gut.” The witness then described leaving Michael Kelly and running. He got into an area he thought was Glenfada Park North. Then he described two men running out and pulling Michael Kelly on to the footpath in the shelter of the southern gable end wall of the eastern block of Glenfada Park South." When they turned Michael over "his back was blown out and his guts had come out."

i. At AC111.1 paragraph 8 of his statement of evidence and at Day 135/54/22 to Day 135/55/2 he claims that the army came out from behind Barrier 14 pushing the rioters back up William Street and down Rossville street and then returning behind the barrier. There is no other civilian or army evidence to support this recollection.

ii. The witness recollected the "bigger soldiers" i.e. the Paras, taking over from the "little guys" i.e. non- paras in Rossville Street. On the weight of the evidence the witness cannot be right about the deployment of non-parachute regiment soldiers on Rossville Street. Day 135/97/8 to Day 135/100/11. The witness also indicated that at one point he had reached the Rubble Barricade and left it to go back up Rossville Street and engage in stone throwing but changed his evidence to state that it had occurred before he had moved back to the safety of the Rubble Barricade. Day 135/98/2 to Day 135/98/18.

iii. The witness stated at AC111.2 paragraph 12 that one of the "big guys" i.e. the paras got down on one knee in Rossville Street and fired at them. When it was put to him that in his 1972 statement at AC111.12 that he did not say he saw the paras take aim and fire the witness replied that he could remember nothing about that statement and could not answer on it.

iv. His evidence that two others were shot before Michael Kelly is clearly at odds with any other civilian evidence available and is inherently unreliable.

v. There are fundamental differences between the accounts given by the witness of the alleged shooting of another person or persons around the time of Michael Kelly's shooting in his NICRA statement at AC111.7, his Eversheds statement and his oral evidence to the Inquiry. The obvious inconsistency is the timing of the shooting of the man in the leg as in the NICRA statement which occurred after assisting Michael Kelly and the Eversheds statement before Michael Kelly was shot. The descriptions of the man's actions and location at the time are therefore also obviously contradictory. In addition the second person who appears in the Eversheds statement as falling and who was surmised to have been shot does not appear in the NICRA statement. At Day 135/59/23 to Day 135/60/3 the witness said when asked by Counsel to the Inquiry about this episode: "I can remember just what it says there. I can remember the second lad, the other lad was hit somewhere, where-things were happening so quick, just, you know. One of them definitely seemed to have been shot in the leg, that would have been on what it says there." (The witness is here referring to para 12 of his Eversheds statement dated 1 June 1999). The witness then stated that he did not know or learn later that the first lad was shot although it was his "guess" as time was going past and that he saw the second one clutch his leg. Day 135/60/4 to Day 135/60/11.

vi. It is clear from the NICRA statement and the words "I now know the first lad to be Kelly" that the witness could not have had the meeting and the introduction to Michael Kelly he claims in his Eversheds statement. The obvious inference of these words is that the witness only learned later that the man shot at the barricade was called Kelly. Day 135/88/22 to Day 135/89/16.

vii. A further point on the issue of his alleged meeting with Michael Kelly is that the witness appears to have told Paul Mahon at X447.16 that Michael Kelly told him who he was and: "it didn't dawn on me that I was working with his brother John then, but I know see that he has been talking to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, saying that his brother was shot". This interview was recorded on 20^th June 1998. In his statement to Evershed's at AC111.2 paragraph 10, made on 1^st June 1999, the witness claimed that he knew his brother John because he worked with him and that he asked Michael Kelly where his brother John was, and Michael Kelly said he was around somewhere.

vii. In his NICRA statement in 1972 the witness stated that Michael Kelly shouted to him "I am shot, help me". This can be contrasted with the words as they appear in the Eversheds statement: "Danny I am shot". It is a clear inference that the name did not appear in the NICRA statement in 1972 because at that stage Michael Kelly did not know Mr. Craig and could not have used his name. It is submitted the use of the name "Danny" is not credible and did not occur. AC111.2 paragraph 13.

viii. The witness does not appear in photographs EP27.6 or EP27.7. This is significant given the witness's claim to extremely close proximity to Michael Kelly when he was shot, at a time which must have been very shortly after EP27.7 was taken. Day 135/91/9 to Day 135/92/10.

ix. It should also be noted that the witness himself was "surprised" he did not appear in the photographs and gave the following response when questioned:

Q. Because if your evidence were true in that regard, (i.e. that the witness was with Michael Kelly at the time Michael Kelly appears in EP27.6 and EP27.7) you would be in that photograph?

x It may also be noted the witness Gavan Duffy who was able to recognise Danny Craig in P636 did not recall seeing him anywhere near Michael Kelly at the time Michael Kelly was shot. Day 126/165/21 to Day 126/166/14.

xi On a number of occasions the witness attempted to distance himself from his 1972 statement saying he did not remember it but also saying "If denial means I do not remember, I do not remember making it….I deny that I have made that statement.

A If I did my honest answer is I do not remember." Day 135/89/17 to Day 135/90/1.

He also claimed to have no memory of the second 1972 statement bearing his name at AC111.11. Day 135/124/17 to Day 135/125/22.

xii The witness appeared to suggest at AC111.3 paragraph 14 that he had run to a fence somewhere in Glenfada Park before Michael Kelly was brought to the gable end of Glenfada Park North, when the soldiers were coming into Glenfada Park North. At one stage in his evidence he suggested his location was Abbey Park where of course he could not have seen Michael Kelly at the gable end or indeed the other two people he claimed to have seen dragged to the gable end before Michael Kelly. Day 135/65/8 to Day 135/70/25.

There is also an internal contradiction in the witness statement at AC111.3 paragraph 14 where he says he doesn't know where the two others were dragged to and at AC111.4 paragraph 25, where he states that he thought they and Michael Kelly had been dragged to the same place i.e. the gable end of Glenfada Park North.

xiii As was pointed out to the witness at Day 135/108/10 to Day 135/108/19 there is no support for his proposition that the two males and Michael Kelly were taken to the gable wall by P638.

xiv The witness description of Michael Kelly's injury is not consistent with the close view and proximity that he claimed. Day 135/109/11 to Day 135/110/20. In addition his correction of his initial description of the wound from a pinhole to a small hole is still not credible on the nature of the wound given that he said in evidence it was about the breadth of a cigarette end maybe larger. Day 135/103/3 to Day 135/103/19.

xv His account of a tray of petrol or nail bombs is wholly unsubstantiated or corroborated at that time and location and is not credible. When questioned on whether they were nail bombs or petrol bombs he said that they were nail bombs even though he told Eversheds they were petrol bombs or nail bombs. He claimed he should not have said that to Eversheds. Day 135/110/21 to Day 135/115/15.

xvi The description by the witness of his exit and route from Glenfada Park through William Street etc. was the opposite direction from the account contained in his 1972 statement. Day 135/119/23 to Day 135/120/16.

xvii The witness indicated at AC111.4 paragraph 26 that he was "long gone" by the time of the scene depicted in photograph AC111.21 which had been taken before the soldiers had entered the square in Glenfada Park North. Earlier at AC111.3 paragraph 14 he appeared to indicate he had been there by indicating that he heard lads shout "the bastards are coming through."

xviii The witness was further challenged regarding AC111.4 paragraphs 27 to 29 and his account of a shooting incident on the night of Bloody Sunday in Beechwood Avenue. This is clearly a relevant matter for the Inquiry in assessing the general credibility of this witness. Day 135/129/20 to Day 135/137/23 and Day 135/153/12 Day 135/155/6.

18.3.2.44 The above submissions must cast considerable doubt on the reliability of the evidence of this witness and the Inquiry ought not to place reliance on his evidence, either in respect of seeing Michael Kelly bending down to pick up a stone, or engage in throwing stones with Mr. Craig and the alleged sighting of nail bombs in the location or locations suggested by the witness.

18.3.2.45 The witness Sean Eugene O'Neill, at AO65.8 claims to have been present at some stage in the afternoon at a number of important locations including the Rubble Barricade and was described by Counsel to the Inquiry in his opening statement at Day 24 as "a fleet-footed" witness. His testimony on Michael Kelly as a "regular rioter" is it is submitted utterly mistaken or false. The civilian evidence on the background and character of Michael Kelly is relied upon to oppose this suggestion. We also note his use of exactly the same description of some of the other deceased. In addition the weight of the civilian evidence clearly refutes such a suggestion. His failure to give evidence deprives the families of the opportunity to refute his suggestions directly and it is submitted that the Inquiry should attach no weight to his evidence.

18.3.2.46 The evidence of Ciaran Donnelly, the Irish Times Staff Photographer, appears at M22.21 and Day 71. At M22.21 paragraph 6 he stated: "I took up a position behind the barricade to take some photographs. This was on a pram ramp at the North Eastern corner of Glenfada Park South. The witness confirmed he would have taken EP27.6 and EP27.7 from this location. Day 071/30/16 to Day 071/32/6. He saw a lad in his late teens come out from behind block 1 of the Rossville flats and run towards the Pigs taunting the soldiers. At this point two soldiers came from behind one of the Pigs and chased him. He then saw two other soldiers, who had also come from the area of block 1, catch him and then drag him away. It was at this point that he heard what he thought to be two live rounds. People on the barricade ducked and he heard someone shout "don't run away - they are only firing blanks." The witness thought that it was the two shots he heard or baton rounds being fired which might have caused the figures to duck in the photograph. Day 071/32/7 to Day 071/32/18. There were about eight to ten youths standing on the top of the barricade and one of them, standing on the left of the barricade as he looked at it (the Glenfada Park North side) had his arms in the air and was taunting the Army. Whilst he did see some youths at the barricade throwing stones at the Army, at no stage did he ever see any weapons fired at the Army or any petrol or nail bombs thrown. Nor did he see any weapons at all at the barricade. Day 071/27/13 to Day 071/27/16.

18.3.2.47 At M22.21 paragraph 8 about two to three minutes after he heard the first two live rounds he saw the youth on the left of the barricade who was taunting the soldiers fall to the ground. The witness was at the barricade taking either EP27.8 or EP27.9 at the time. The witness stated: “This man was standing on the barricade, maybe just in front of it. I think he fell to the William Street side of the barricade. I am not sure though, it is a long time ago." Day 071/29/12 to Day 071/30/1. The youth had just been standing when he fell. WT2.82F. People immediately ran to help him. His reaction was that he could not believe the Army were firing live rounds. He then saw another guy fall on the other side of the barricade i.e. the Rossville Flats Block 1 side, and thought, "I am getting out of here". The interval between the shooting was maybe one to two minutes, maybe less than a minute. Day 071/28/15 to Day 071/29/2. He said that when the man fell on the west side, he, Mr Donnelly, took cover behind Glenfada Park North. Then, as the crowd rushed to the aid of the man who had been shot, he said that there was another two or four shots and a man fell on the opposite side of Rossville Street, that is to say on the east side. The witness confirmed he did not actually see the man fall. Day 071/36/17 to Day 071/37/3. Somebody shouted "they have got another man" and a crowd gathered around that man too. Mr Donnelly told Lord Widgery that he did not actually see the second man fall and he presumed that he was dragged into the Rossville Street flats. Then a crowd of youths ran around the corner of Glenfada Park, that must be the gable end, shouting that the Army was coming again and Mr Donnelly ran round the corner too. He then said that he saw the body of the man whom he had seen fall being carried out, over from the barricade to Glenfada Park and then across the car park of Glenfada Park North towards the west. He took a picture of that which appears at EP27.10.

18.3.2.48 At WT2.84 E the witness, in response to a suggestion from Counsel that shots were fired from the area where the man fell, answered: “I was there, and if I was 15 yards at the most from these people I would know if someone was shooting near me, and the first thing I would do would be to run away, because I would not want to be caught in it.” At WT3.7 he put the first shot towards the barricade some four or five minutes after the Paras came in and after the troops had gone into the Rossville flat courtyard on the eastern side.

i As the Inquiry will note Michael Kelly is not identified by any witness in either photograph EP27.8 or EP27.9. It is submitted that certainly close to the time he was shot he was not on or close to the barricade as part of this group facing the army.

ii With regard to the witnesses suggestion that the young man he saw shot on the west of the barricade had his arms in the air taunting the army it is noted the witness described it as “just the standard sort of what you see at football matches". Day 071/26/23. It is clear that the witness's suggestion of “taunting” whatever that amounted to did not appear in his Widgery evidence. At WT2.88 F the witness describes the man he saw as "not doing anything at all. He was not even throwing stones at that time".

18.3.2.50 Removal of Michael Kelly from Rubble Barricade

Michael Kelly was removed from the Rubble Barricade in circumstances where firing continued from the Army down Rossville Street. Whilst Michael Kelly was being carried through Glenfada Park, shooting resumed from soldiers who had entered the park from the north east entrance. These soldiers were the members of Anti-Tank Platoon, who had been at the Rubble Barricade.

18.3.2.51 Michael Kelly was lifted from where he fell by a number of people. Charles McLaughlin was one of the people who carried Michael Kelly from the Rubble Barricade into Glenfada Park North. At AM321.3 paragraph 8 of his statement he described his position at the gable wall (that is of Glenfada Park North) where he could see the rubble barricade going across Rossville Street from near where he was standing to block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He saw a young boy lying on his back on the concrete on the Free Derry Corner side of the rubble barricade, near to Glenfada Park North. The position as marked at AM321.6 with an X is close to where other witnesses have placed Michael Kelly. He thought there were other people near the rubble barricade but no one was near the boy. He thought that the boy had fallen with his head towards the barricade and his feet towards himself. He ran out and tried to lift him. The boy had long curly hair and was wearing a white shirt. He did not notice what else he was wearing. He could have been wearing a jacket over the shirt. He found him to be so heavy that he could not lift him on his own. He was crouched down and shots were being fired all around him at this point. He assumed it was the soldiers at the back of the APC’s parked in Rossville Street. Day 177/79/14 to Day 177/79/18. The six or seven people huddled against the gable wall were watching him. He shouted at them "Christ, will you fucking come out and help me?" A man he now knows to be Father Bradley came out to help. At AM321.3 paragraph 9 the witness described trying to lift the boy. "Bullets were whizzing down Rossville Street from a northerly direction and we were crouching low to avoid being hit." As he lifted the boy he saw blood start to stain red through the front of his shirt. The blood spread out in a large circle over his chest. He did not realise that the boy had been shot until they lifted him and he saw the blood. Until then he had thought that the soldiers had just been firing over people's heads. He was shocked when he realized that the boy had been shot. The boy was drifting in and out of consciousness when they picked him up. He never spoke.

18.3.2.52 At AM321.3 paragraph 10 the witness described the movement of soldiers and civilians at this time: “As we were lifting the boy, I saw Paras walking alongside the Saracens which were advancing south down Rossville Street towards the rubble barricade. Shooting was coming from all directions by this point. People were completely panicked. Some people were desperately trying to get into the entrance to block 1 of the Rossville flats. From the gable wall I had seen people lined up in the shelter of the shops at the rear (Free Derry Corner side) of block 2 of the Rossville flats. I had also seen hundreds of people hiding in gardens behind wooden fences in Glenfada Park North. All the people that I saw around the rubble barricade had their backs to the advancing soldiers. I did not see any civilian gunmen in the area. The people were clearly panicked and were running away from the Rubble Barricade towards Free Derry Corner.” Although this witness refers to being assisted by Father Bradley, Father Bradley himself referred to being restrained from going out to the boy, rather than carrying him. The witness recalls carrying the young boy with Father Bradley over the concrete flags towards the gable wall. As they were carrying the boy, one of the men sheltering there came out. The witness then recalls George Downey coming towards them and saying "Jesus that is my brother-in-law". The three of them carried the boy to the shelter of the gable wall.

18.3.2.53 At AM321.4 paragraph 12 he stated that after he had carried Michael Kelly to the gable wall he became aware of more firing into the courtyard of Glenfada Park North. He was still wearing his handkerchief and knew that he could be identified as a rioter. As the young boy was now in safe hands - with his brother-in-law and Father Bradley - he decided to escape from the area as fast as he could. As he left the gable wall, he heard Father Bradley begin to give the boy the last rites. He ran through Glenfada Park North to the southwestern corner running in a zig-zag pattern to avoid being hit by flying bullets. As he ran he saw two Paratroopers enter the Glenfada Park North car park through the northeast corner. Day 177/86/16 to Day 177/87/2. The witness said one was firing sporadically from the hip and the other from a standing position. The witness was aware of bullets from both soldiers coming past the witness, splitting the wooden fences while he was running behind him to the left and to the side of him. Day 177/87/18 to Day 177/89/7.

18.3.2.54 Father Denis Bradley, as he then was, gave evidence to Lord Widgery and his statement to this Inquiry is at H1.1 to 79. He gave evidence on Day 140. He told Lord Widgery that he reached Glenfada Park having come there from Columbcille Court to the north. Whilst he was there a number of people came rushing in off Rossville Street. When he asked what the matter was they said that the Army had come. Within seconds of his question he heard gunfire and saw a man, who turned out to be Michael Kelly, lying on the ground at the entrance to the car park of Glenfada Park, almost immediately opposite the entrance to the high flats, about ten yards away from him. He rushed over to Michael Kelly and administered the last rites. He saw no sign of a weapon. During the incident there was shooting going on which the witness had the impression was from the William Street end of Rossville Street. He then asked people to take Michael Kelly to some place to get attention and it was after that that he was lifted and taken to the far end of the Glenfada Park car park. A number lifted him up on their shoulders and began to carry him away down another small alleyway which exited out of Glenfada Park North to Abbey Park at the south western corner. H1.9 paragraph 23.

18.3.2.55 Joseph Donnelly was born and raised in Liverpool and after serving in the Royal Navy for nine years, moved to Derry in 1964. At AD124.3 paragraph 10 he described entering Glenfada Park North by the entrance at the north east corner, at grid reference I13 on the plan attached to his statement. He was facing south looking towards the wooden fence which ran west to east along the south side of the Glenfada Park North courtyard. There were very few people in Glenfada Park North at the time but he could see a group of people standing by the gable wall at the southern end of the east block of Glenfada Park North. Paddy Doherty (not the man shot on Bloody Sunday) and himself went over to see what was going on. He began to assist a man called Mr Liddy who was in difficulties. He was standing just south of the gable wall. He was hunched over in some pain and was being assisted by two men. He [Mr Liddy] told him he had been hit in the chest by a rubber bullet. There was a group of people standing at the Rubble Barricade but he did not pay much attention to them as he was helping Mr Liddy. He was also turned slightly away from Rossville Street in order to give Mr Liddy his full attention.

18.3.2.56 There was gunfire at this time but he thought it was just rubber bullets that were being fired. He was not aware of anyone throwing stones or other missiles from the area around the Rubble Barricade. He did not hear any nail bombs or other bombs going off. In fact, throughout the day, he did not recall seeing a single person carrying or throwing a nail bomb, acid bomb or petrol bomb. AD124.3 paragraph 12. He then heard the crack of three shots being fired, one after another, and he could tell these to be live bullets from the sound they made. He was not sure from where these bullets were fired. Mr Liddy looked over his shoulder towards the Rubble Barricade and said "That man needs you more than I do". He turned and saw a young man lying on his back, face up, next to the barricade. He had been shot in the stomach. He was told that this man was called Michael Kelly. He assumed that one of the shots that he had just heard had hit him. A group of men standing around Michael Kelly were going to pick him up to carry him to safety. He told them instinctively not to do so as they could increase the severity of his injury. He heard at least ten live shots being fired, which were directed at the people behind the Rubble Barricade. The witness confirmed these shots came down Rossville Street from the direction of William Street. Day 128/95/7 to Day 128/95/14.

18.3.2.57 There were no nail bombs or guns lying around Michael Kelly. He could see no reason why Michael Kelly should have been shot. AD124.4 paragraph 14. According to the witness about six men picked up Michael Kelly and ran with him from the Rubble Barricade west into Glenfada Park North despite his warning. They were going to carry him to the safety of Glenfada Park North. He did not recall seeing them put Michael Kelly down on the way but accepts that he was put down. Day 128/96/18 to Day 128/96/22. He followed them, taking off his tie as he went. He was going to use his tie to try to stem the bleeding from Michael's stomach. The witness confirmed this scene as it appeared in EP23.11 and identified himself in the photograph. There was then a large number of people in Glenfada Park North. He thought that most of these people had previously been standing by the Rubble Barricade and then sought shelter in Glenfada Park North. The witness also appears in EP27.11. He identified himself in this photograph as the man with quite a bushy sideburn, just to the left of the window. He also identified James Wray. This group appears to be carrying the body of Michael Kelly as Michael Kelly's body does not appear to the south of the gable end wall at this stage. EP27.10 shows Michael Kelly's body being carried across Glenfada Park North, with the witness, Joseph Donnelly, identifying himself on the right-hand side of the group as turning towards Michael Kelly. He is the figure with the sideburns and the tie to which he referred.

18.3.2.58 At AD124.4 paragraph 17 the witness described making his way west across Glenfada Park North, when three Paratroopers entered Glenfada Park North from the northeast entrance. The crowd carrying Michael Kelly almost dropped him in panic at the sight of the soldiers and he slipped down in between their arms. The witness took him in his arms and carried him on his own. He did not seem heavy. At AD124.4 paragraph 18 the witness described Michael Kelly as being still alive at this stage. As he got hold of him he noticed that one of the soldiers was taking up a firing position. He was kneeling on the ground with his rifle at his shoulder and was aiming towards them. The two other soldiers had their rifles at waist height. All three soldiers fired shots at the crowd. He thought that the soldiers who had weapons at waist height had, roughly, only a 20% chance of hitting him, but he was afraid of the third soldier who knelt down. The witness confirmed he thought the three of them were firing at them since the sound came from the three of them. Day 128/99/20 to Day 128/99/25. At AD124 paragraph 19 the witness described the scene thus: "I ran across Glenfada Park North towards the entrance to Abbey Park carrying Michael. Paddy was running beside me to my right and Michael's brother-in-law, George Downey, ran in front of us. I am sure that had there not been so many people in Glenfada Park North the soldiers would have had a clear shot at me and I am in no doubt that I would have been fired at. As it was bullets were flying past me and hitting the wooden fence, which was splintering. The soldiers seemed absolutely determined to hit someone. I was in no doubt that I was running for my life". The witness confirmed that there was no threat to the soldiers or anyone apart from a soldier with a firearm. Day 128/100/8 to Day 128/100/10.

18.3.2.59 Paddy Doherty, the man referred to in the evidence of Joseph Donnelly, gave evidence at Day 157 of the Inquiry and his statement appears at AD97.2. At the Rubble Barricade the witness saw a man struck by a rubber bullet in the chest. The witness identified himself in the photograph EP27.6 and marked himself on AD97.12. Also in P638, P641 and P642 and at AD97.14. The witness confirmed his presence with Mr. Donnelly in Glenfada Park North assisting with carrying Michael Kelly. After the shooting began people scattered, leaving about three of them, who continued to take Michael Kelly to a house in Abbey Park. He heard the shooting but did not see the soldiers himself. He was running for his life. AD97.3 paragraphs 7 to 11 and Day 157/159/7 to Day 157/160/5.

18.3.2.60 Pearse McCall was one of those who carried Michael Kelly across Glenfada Park North. His statement appears at AM93.1. He accepted in his oral evidence on Day 164 that he could be mistaken on a number of issues in his Eversheds statement, AM93.1. These included the number of soldiers in a snatch squad and whether he had seen soldiers coming down as far as free Derry Corner on Bloody Sunday, or on another date. He did maintain that he saw soldiers lined across Rossville Street north of the Barricade on the day. No stones were thrown from the Rubble Barricade, although there was some shouting at the soldiers which was not unusual. At AM93.3 paragraph 11 he described an intense burst of rubber bullet fire which lasted for a few minutes. Bullets were bouncing off the Rubble Barricade. After no more than three to four minutes Seamus Friel and the witness were about to leave the barricade, when live shots were fired. No more rubber bullets were fired. It was sustained live fire and worse than the intense rubber bullet fire.

18.3.2.61 At AM93.3 paragraph 12 he described running to the southern gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North as soon as the live shots were fired. There were about fifteen to sixteen people sheltering there. From his position he could see people sheltering behind fences of houses in Glenfada Park North. He then described the scene as follows: "I saw three to four bodies lying in Rossville Street to the south of the rubble barricade. One man was lying at the edge of the footpath near the gable end of Glenfada Park North. He had fallen forward with his head pointing north and his feet pointing south, although I am not certain about this. I cannot remember what he was wearing. Another man was lying about one to two feet further east along the rubble barricade, but I do not remember much about him. I did not realise that the two men had been shot because I could not see any blood on their bodies. I cannot remember anything about the other bodies on the Rubble Barricade". At AM93.3 paragraph 13 he went on to describe fetching one of the bodies lying near the Rubble Barricade with the help of one or two other people. He was not sure which body it was. They could not drag the man by his feet so they turned him over and dragged him away by holding him under his arms. He did not see his injuries and he did not remember seeing anything in the man's hands, not even a stone. He was not sure whether they dropped him and could not remember where they left him. He then went on to describe picking up another body, which he recently found out was the body of Michael Kelly. They each took hold of one of his legs and possibly his shoulder and carried him from the Rubble Barricade west toward and through the Glenfada Park North car park. He saw the bullet entry wound in his abdomen and he recalled the clothing on his back felt very wet. The witness identified himself in the photograph which shows him helping to carry Michael Kelly west through the Glenfada Park car park EP27.10. He identified himself as the man without a beard, whose face is facing the cameraman, carrying Michael Kelly.

18.3.2.62 At Day 164/87/9 to Day 164/88/11, the witness accepted that it could be the case that it was only one person that he helped to take from the barricade and across Glenfada Park, and that it could have been the situation that that he took in Michael Kelly and then picked him up again. As regards seeing a number of bodies at the Rubble Barricade the witness accepted that the persons he saw were just people who had simply fallen or dropped to the ground when the gunfire started. Day 164/106/16 to Day 164/106/22. He also accepted it could well be that rather than carrying two people from the Rubble Barricade it was likely that he helped carry Michael Kelly on the two occasions rather than two separate bodies on two occasions. Day 164/110/9 to Day 164/110/18.

18.3.2.63 At AM93.3 paragraph 15 he described being at a point just before the southwest entrance to the alleyway leading into Abbey Park. He looked up and saw two soldiers sauntering into the car park from the direction of Rossville Street through the alleyway at the northeast corner of Glenfada Park North. They were both tall soldiers, approximately the same height. The witness believes that they may have been wearing face paint but he may be wrong about this. He was unsure if they had facial hair or what they were wearing on their heads, although they may have been wearing helmets with the visors raised. The soldier on the left was holding his rifle at his chest in a very casual fashion "like John Wayne". The soldier on his right was holding his rifle higher up. The witness did not see them shoot, but had no doubt in his mind that they were about to start shooting. As soon as he saw the soldier, he must have either dropped Michael Kelly on the ground or put him down somewhere in the car park. Seamus Friel and the witness started to run towards the northwest corner of Glenfada Park North. He was unsure where the other person who had helped him to carry Michael Kelly was. The gunfire started almost immediately and the witness recognised different types of gunfire and the distinct crack of Army rifle fire[4].

iii. No-one at or around the barricade was carrying a nail-bomb or a petrol bomb.

iv. Shooting continued towards the barricade as Michael Kelly was being carried into Glenfada Park North.

v. There was no nail bombs or weapons near Michael Kelly lying at the barricade.

vi. As Michael Kelly was being carried through Glenfada Park North, civilians and those assisting him were fired on by a soldier or soldiers, who had emerged from the alleyway at the northeast corner of Glenfada Park.

At AD134.5 paragraph 25, George Downey described Michael Kelly being taken into 8 Abbey Park and described seeing two people, a man and a woman, looking out of the window of the first house in the row, which lay immediately to the west of Glenfada Park South. Although he did not know them at the time, the couple in the window was Mr and Mrs Carr. He motioned to Mr and Mrs Carr to open their front door. AD134.5 paragraph 26. He headed for the door and almost flattened Mrs Carr as he burst in with Michael and the Englishman. Michael was carried into the living room and laid down very gently. He still did not know where he was hit. He knelt down beside him and asked Mrs Carr to draw the blinds. He could still hear shots from outside and he did not want them to be seen by the soldiers.

18.3.2.66 As Michael lay with his head facing the living room window, he examined him and noticed a spot of blood on his shirt and pulled it out of his trousers where he had it tucked in. He saw a bullet entry wound which was no bigger than the tip of a little finger on the left-hand side to his waist line. He slipped his hand round his back to check for the exit wound. There was none. He then asked Mrs Carr for something to clean and bind the wound. She gave him a white baby-grow which he wrapped around Michael's waist and then knotted. He seemed to me to be in shock and his lower arms were extremely cold, he was drained white. AD134.5 paragraph 27. After between five and ten minutes a Knight of Malta girl came into the Carr's living room. He did not know the name of the Knight of Malta girl but he recollected that she had a bad leg and limped. She knelt down and examined Michael and his wound. They redressed the wound using bandages and cotton wool. He asked her how Michael was. She replied that he was not too good and was in shock. She told him that he had better start praying. He knelt forward and said an act of contrition in Michael's ear. AD134.6 paragraph 30.

18.3.2.67 At AD124 paragraph 20 Joseph Donnelly described running through the alleyway to the south-west corner of Glenfada Park North which leads into Abbey Park. George (Downey) ran to number 8 Abbey Park which was directly opposite the alleyway. George was shouting to the occupant to let them in. He described being let into the house and the lady of the house fetching a sheet which was torn into strips to use as bandages. At AD124 paragraph 23 he described Michael Kelly as wearing a shirt with a T-shirt underneath which he pulled up so that he could find out where he had been shot and put pressure on the wound to try the stop the bleeding. He could see the entrance wound of the bullet in the stomach. The skin around the entry wound was blue. Michael was still alive at this time.

Michael Kelly was the first person killed at the Rubble Barricade, in circumstances which provided no justification whatsoever for his shooting by Soldier F. He was unarmed and neither he nor any person around him was engaged in any activity which could have led Soldier F to conclude that his own life or anyone else's was in danger.

18.3.2.69 John Kelly, the brother of Michael Kelly, in his evidence at AK13.3 paragraph 9 and Day 167 described having been in the vicinity of the body of Gerard McKinney facing 8 Abbey Park. His brother-in-law George Downey shouted to him. George Downey was coming out of no.8 and was carrying a body. Mr Downey said it was Michael and he had been shot. Together with Mr. Downey and George Cooley, his other brother-in-law, he helped carry Michael through the alleyways between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South to an ambulance. John travelled in the ambulance to Altnagelvin hospital and Michael was pronounced dead at Casualty.

18.3.3 Injuries sustained

18.3.3.1 The post mortem examination was carried out by Doctor Marshall at 19.00hrs hrs.(E2.68) The report of Doctor Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.40, E2.41 with the accompanying diagram at E2.76. The morgue photographs are in Bundle P2 Tab2 (P41 to P54) inclusive.

18.3.3.2 Michael Kelly was struck by a single bullet which entered the left side of his abdomen “side on”, most probably with the nose of the bullet pointing upwards and to the right and the base downwards, indicating that the bullet was unstable. Internal injuries were caused to the bowel, main artery and vein supplying the left leg, lumbar vertebrae and the sacrum. The bullet lodged in the sacrum so there was no exit wound. Cause of death was internal haemorrhage. A 7.62 mm calibre bullet was recovered and later traced to Soldier F’s rifle.

18.3.3.3 No description of the angle of the wound track was given in Dr Marshall’s notes or in the main report but, as appears from the Opinion, the direction of travel of the bullet appears to have been from front to back, left to right at 20° and downwards at 30°. This is consistent with him facing the shooter and stooping slightly, not unlike the way he was seen stooping in photograph P635.

18.3.3.4 According to Mr O’Callaghan, the fact that the bullet was unstable when it struck Michael Kelly was consistent with it having struck someone or something before it struck him (Day 230/18/18 to Day 230/18/21). However, Dr. Martin found no evidence of damage to the bullet (D0040). According to Mr O’Callaghan, no conclusions can safely be drawn from the X-ray of the bullet. (Day 230/19/6 to Day 230/19/10).

18.3.3.5 Counsel to the Inquiry explored the possibility of the bullet having struck stone, wood, metal or human bone without sustaining visible damage. In each case, Mr O’Callaghan said that he would have expected damage but it all depended on the severity of the impact (Day 230/19/17 to Day 230/22/1). Dr Shepherd said that the most likely reason for the instability of the bullet was some prior contact but did not think it was possible to say whether this was because of a ricochet or because it had travelled through some object. (Day 229/7/7 to Day 229/7/11). However, he thought that the relatively pristine state of the bullet suggested that it was a very shallow contact or no contact at all. (Day 229/78/24 to Day 229/79/1).

18.3.4 Removal to hospital

18.3.4.1 George Downey described how, together with John Kelly and George Cooley, he subsequently carried Michael Kelly to an ambulance in Glenfada Park North and accompanied him to Altnagelvin Hospital. Gerard McKinney and possibly Joe Mahon were also taken in this ambulance along with a number of relatives and first aid personnel. The ambulance had been called at 4.30pm and arrived at Glenfada Park at 4.37 pm. The ambulance reached hospital at 5.00pm. The journey took about 10 to 15 minutes maybe shorter. Michael Kelly was examined by a Consultant in the casualty Department. His words were “I’m sorry.” AD134.7 paragraph 39.

18.3.5 Forensic Evidence

18.3.5.1 As appears from the table in Dr Lloyd’s report at E1.30 setting out details of Dr Martin’s tests, the tests for lead were positive in that one particle was found on swabs from the left hand, 29 on the jacket surface and 11 on the trouser surface. None was found on the right hand.

18.3.5.2 During his testimony at the Widgery Tribunal, Dr. Martin said the results were consistent with exposure to a firearm discharge and was prepared to accept the suggestion that these results could have been due to the use of a gun in a gloved right hand. (WT9/14B and WT9/31D) Dr Lloyd regarded that explanation as “of doubtful credibility” (E1.44 paragraph 8.7.2a). He thought it improbable that the distribution of particles could have been produced by Michael Kelly’s proximity to a person who was discharging a gun. (E1.44 paragraph 8.7.2b) More generally, Dr Lloyd concluded that the absence of controlled testing nullified any evidential significance that Dr Martin’s results might have had (E1.25 paragraph 8.1.g). Bearing in mind the likelihood of spurious contamination, he considered that Dr Martin’s results were “worthless” (E1.52 paragraph g) In his oral testimony, Dr Martin agreed. (Day 226/2/6 to Day 226/2/22)

18.4 Hugh Gilmore

18.4.1 Personal Details and Background

18.4.1.1 Hugh Gilmore was 17 when he was murdered on Bloody Sunday. He was from Block2 of the Rossville Flats at 21 Garvan Place. He was the youngest in a family of eight children, four sisters and four brothers. His ambition was to be a mechanic and he had been working for the Northern Tyre company for approximately 18 months before he was shot. Neither he nor his family had any political affiliations.

18.4.1.2 The photograph of Hugh Gilmore running fatally wounded with nothing in his hands towards the doorway of Block1 on Rossville Street is one of the most famous images of Bloody Sunday. EP23.9A

18.4.2 Civilian Evidence in relation to Shootings

Summary

18.4.2.1 The civilian evidence in respect of Hugh Gilmore’s actions and movements on Bloody Sunday is often confused in relation to location and whether or not he was involved in stone throwing. Two possible explanations can be advanced for these apparent inconsistencies.

Firstly, rioters were generally young fleet footed individuals who rarely, if ever occupied a static role. Traditional and acknowledged territorial positions permitted a fluidity of constant movement from one location to another. This was particularly so in a situation where soldiers had advanced to a position and in a manner which up until the events of Bloody Sunday was unprecedented.

Secondly, unlike the military witnesses, the civilian witnesses were exposed to sudden and unexpected incidents of horrendous violence. For virtually all, the experience was both traumatic and shocking. Most people who were present were gripped in fear as they watched unarmed teenagers being randomly shot with high velocity weapons.

18.4.2.2 The civilian evidence in respect of the exact location and position of Hugh Gilmore when he was shot appears at times to be confusing and irreconcilable. Twelve witnesses actually claim to have seen him shot. Of these, three placed him in a different position in their Eversheds statement than had appeared in their 1972 evidence (Sean MacDermott, Eamon Melaugh and Geraldine Richmond).

i) The preferred conclusion reached by the Inquiry’s experts was that Hugh Gilmore was shot twice.

ii) Hugh Gilmore continued running after being shot and at least one witness, Margaret Patterson appeared to have mistaken his falling over with his actually being shot.

iii) Hugh Gilmore appears to have shouted “I am hit” on at least two separate occasions, a factor which may have led to confusion over the timing and location of the shooting.

18.4.2.3 Four witnesses, namely Sean MacDermott, Eamon Melaugh, PIRA 14 and PIRA 26 place Hugh Gilmore just north of the Rubble Barricade when he was shot. Geraldine Richmond, when providing her first account of this incident also shared this belief but now accepts that she may have been wrong about this.

Three witnesses, namely James Donal Deeney, James Green and Frank Mellon gave evidence that he was shot at the Rubble Barricade.

Four witnesses claim that Hugh Gilmore was running south down Rossville Street at the time when he was hit by a bullet and that he was close to the entrance of Block1. Geraldine Richmond and Michael McCusker indicate that he was slightly north of the entrance.

Margaret Patterson believed that he was south of the Barricade and level with the southwest corner of Block1. It will be recalled that Eamon Melaugh thought he was running south but that Hugh Gilmore was on the north side of the Barricade at the point of impact.

18.4.2.4 Kathleen Brown is the only witness to suggest that Hugh Gilmore was shot south of Block1 of the Rossville Flats. Her evidence in this regard it is submitted is incompatible with all of the other witnesses who saw him shot and with those who heard him shout “I am hit” as he cleared the entrance to Block1. Furthermore, she made no reference to having seen him shot in her 1972 statement and claimed that there was no-body else sheltering at the gable end at the time of the shooting, which again contradicts the evidence of those who were in this location when the soldiers opened fire in Rossville Street.

18.4.2.5 Finally, Alexander McFadden uniquely asserts that Hugh Gilmore was shot in the Rossville Flats car park as he attempted to make his way between Blocks 1 and 2. He gave oral evidence on Day 401 and remained adamant that it was Hugh Gilmore that he saw hit though he assumed at the time that it was a rubber bullet and not a live round. Day 401/161/10 to Day 401/161/17

Most of the witnesses who claimed to have seen Hugh Gilmore shot (nine) testified that he had been facing away from the soldiers on Rossville Street when the bullet hit him.

18.4.2.6 Kathleen Brown, James Green, PIRA 14 and PIRA 26 are the only witnesses to suggest that Hugh Gilmore was facing north towards the soldiers. It will be recalled that James Donal Deeney who had been listed in Christopher Clarke QC’s “Summary of the Evidence in Relation to the Death of Hugh Gimore and Kevin McElhinney” is represented as suggesting that the deceased was facing north, in fact during his evidence the witness was unable to recall in which direction he was facing.

Six of the witnesses are clear that he was facing away from the soldiers at the time of the shooting. They include Geraldine Richmond, Frankie Mellon, Eamon Melaugh, Michael McCusker, Alexander McFadden and Margaret Patterson.

Sean MacDermott no longer claims to have actually seen him shot. In 1972 he claimed that Hugh Gilmore was at the Barricade when hit but did not specify the direction in which he was facing.

18.4.2.7 In summary, the evidence of those witnesses in respect of Hugh Gilmore who in our respectful submission are most important is illustrated in the table below:

² Unsure of direction in which HG was facing when shot; however, was facing south when shouted ‘I’m hit’

18.4.2.8 It seems reasonable to assume that Hugh Gilmore was shot when he was at or near the Barricade close to the west side of Block1 Rossville Flats. The fact that a number of witnesses claim to have seen him shot whilst running south down Rossville Street is consistent with the position adopted by Messrs O’Callaghan and Shepherd, viz, that Hugh Gilmore was shot twice:

18.4.2.9 Evidence shows that Hugh Gilmore commenced his “death run” from just north of the Barricade to just south of the entrance to Block1 where he collapsed with a serious abdominal gunshot wound. It may well be that Hugh Gilmore was shot first in the arm on or perhaps slightly north of the Barricade and then subsequently in the stomach, as he was running down the eastern side of Rossville Street. The first shot hitting the arm theory could be supported by Eamon Melaugh’s evidence in that he claims to have seen Hugh Gilmore suddenly bend over and clutch his arm just north of the Rubble Barricade. Although he is the only witness to expressly suggest this, none of the other witnesses who actually saw him shot, (with the exception of PIRA 14 and PIRA 26) give any indication to the Inquiry where on his body they thought he had been hit. It will be recalled that in 1972 Sean MacDermott thought that Hugh Gilmore clutched his stomach but no longer has any recollection of this.

18.4.2.10 There was no evidence to suggest that Hugh Gilmore could not have run the distance between the northern end of the Barricade and the southern corner of Block1. If indeed it was suggested that the deceased could not have run this distance then it would give weight to the theory that he was shot at or near the entrance to Block1. There is a two-fold problem with this theory however:

i) Firstly, James Greene who claims to have seen Hugh Gilmore shot on the Barricade and who sees him running south down Rossville Street, had no recollection of seeing him shot a second time. Day 149/21/4

ii) Secondly, PIRA 14 confidently asserted that he saw a soldier fire two shots and as he did so a young man standing in front of him, slightly to his right clutched his stomach in a spasm. APIRA14.4 paragraph 21

18.4.2.11 A second possible conclusion could be that Hugh Gilmore was hit by two bullets either fired simultaneously or in quick succession. A number of witnesses, namely Geraldine Richmond, Eamon Melaugh, James Greene and PIRA 14 claimed to have heard two bullets fired at the time that Hugh Gilmore was hit. These descriptions however do not explain the discrepancies that exist between the statements. An explanation has been partially averred to at the outset.

18.4.2.12 The sudden and dramatic nature of this particular event occurred in an extremely short period of time within a relatively crowded street over a distance of approximately 50 yards. It would be more surprising that in these shocking and traumatic circumstances all the witnesses supplied consistent and stereotyped accounts of this particular event.

18.4.2.13 Timing of Events

Virtually all of the civilian evidence indicates that Hugh Gilmore was shot before William Nash, Michael McDaid and John Young, but in light of the sequence of photographs taken by Robert White it is likely that he was shot very soon after Michael Kelly, although the witnesses do not recall any bodies being on the Barricade at this stage.

18.4.2.14 The majority of witnesses suggest that Hugh Gilmore was shot before Kevin McElhinney although Don Carlin claims that McElhinney was already on the stair well of Block1 as Hugh Gilmore ran past Day 134/54/7. It is virtually certain that Mr Carlin was confused about the sequence of these events.

It is also tolerably clear that Hugh Gilmore was shot some time after the shootings of Jackie Duddy, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley as a number of the witnesses who saw him running down Rossville Street had come from the Rossville Flats car park in an attempt to seek shelter from the shooting e.g. Mitchel McLaughlin, Donal Deeney and Patrick Kelly.

18.4.2.15 Position of the Soldier who Shot Hugh Gilmore

A number of witnesses claim to have actually seen the soldier who fired the shot or shots which struck Hugh Gilmore.

i) Kathleen Brown locates the soldier at the gable end wall of Glenfada Park North and describes him as quite a small soldier wearing a beret AB94.12 paragraph 11. Her evidence in respect of this matter is less that convincing and at best highly improbable given that it was unlikely that any soldier had made his way to that location at such an early stage in the events.

ii) Geraldine Richmond however AM45.4 paragraph 18 and Eamon Melaugh Day 143/84/3 to Day 143/84/7 shared the belief that the deceased was shot that the deceased was shot from the east side of the east block of Glenfada Park North or from the west side of Rossville Street.

iii) It will also be recalled that Michael McCusker AM160.5 paragraph 11, Donal Deeney and Robert White all thought that Hugh Gilmore had been shot by a soldier, positioned on Rossville Street north of the Rubble Barricade. Donal Deeney thought that the soldier was on the west side of the road AD26.12 paragraph 13 while Robert White suggested that the soldier was standing at the north gable end of Block1 Day 137/111/4 to Day 137/112/14, having seen a soldier in this location immediately after catching sight of the deceased.

iv) The most confident description of the soldier who fired the fatal shots into Hugh Gilmore came from PIRA 14 and PIRA 26. This evidence described Hugh Gilmore as being shot north of the Barricade APIRA 14.4 paragraphs 21 to 24 and APIRA26.4 paragraphs 25 to 27.

18.4.2.16 Movements After Being Shot

Witnesses concur that Hugh Gilmore died within minutes of being brought to the gable end, lying on the ground with his head resting in Geraldine Richmond’s lap. A number of people attempted unsuccessfully to assist him by stemming the flow of blood from his stomach wound and administering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

The civilian evidence relating to where the deceased actually fell is much clearer than the evidence relating to the location that he was shot. All the evidence suggests that the deceased collapsed at or about a southerly position of the entrance to Block1 and he was then carried from there to the gable end of Block1 by a number of people. Eight witnesses support this conclusion. (See Table below)

Four witnesses however, suggest that Hugh Gilmore made it to the gable end on his own and a further two suggest that he collapsed in Rossville Street level with the south gable end Block1 and that he was dragged round the corner by those already sheltering at the gable end. Only one witness, James Quinn, suggests that Hugh Gilmore was carried from the Rubble Barricade to the south gable end.

³ Saw HG’s body in Rossville Street; subsequently saw him carried round by those in Rossville Street rather than dragged round by those at the gable end

⁴ Claimed in BSI statement to have seen him collapse at gable end, but in 1972 said that he merely saw him on the ground in this location

⁶ Very confused; not sure whether he actually saw this happen or whether HG was already at the gable end when he arrived

18.4.2.17 Weapons

None of those who saw the deceased at any stage on Bloody Sunday before or after he was shot were asked by Counsel for the Soldiers whether or not Hugh Gilmore was carrying a weapon on the day. Counsel for the Inquiry asked this of this of only three witnesses, viz, Brendan Gallagher Day 147/208/16 to Day 147/208/22, Frank Mellon Day 151/144/25 to Day 151/145/16, PIRA 14 Day 421/48/17 to Day 421/49/1.

James Quinn and PIRA 26 were asked whether anyone at the barricade was armed but not whether the deceased was carrying a weapon. Both witnesses were clear that no-one was armed in this location. Day 179/57/9 to Day 179/57/19; Day 425/62/14 to Day 425/62/19.

This highlights a tacit understanding shared by everyone representing the interests of all parties that the deceased was unarmed.

18.4.2.18 Out of the twenty three witnesses who saw Hugh Gilmore alive, nineteen indicated that immediately before or after he was shot, he was unarmed. Twelve of these expressed these explicitly: Kathleen Brown AB94.14 paragraph 24, Don Carlin AC141.3 paragraph 15, Bernard Gallagher Day 147/208/22, James Greene AG54.4 paragraph 20, Liam Mailey M50.37, Geraldine Richmond AM45.8 paragraph 39, Eamon Melaugh Day 143/36/4 to Day 143/36/22, Frank Mellon AM399.13 paragraph 31 and Day 151/145/1 to Day 151/145/3, James Toye AT13.3 paragraph 12, Robert White AW399.6 paragraph 31, PIRA 14 Day 421/48/24 and PIRA26 Day 425/65/19 to Day 425/66/3.

18.4.2.19 It is also worth noting that two of these witnesses, James Greene and Bernard Gallagher also stated that there was no possible way that anyone could have mistakenly believed that Hugh Gilmore was armed with a gun or a bomb. A further nine of the twenty-three witnesses made a blanket statement that they had seen no civilian armed with guns or nail bombs on the day. None of the remaining witnesses claimed to have seen Hugh Gilmore armed, but merely made no mention of civilian weapons in their statements and were not questioned on this point by Counsel.

[1] The evidence of William Vincent Hegarty at WT7.23 that the boy he learned was Michael Kelly fell face down cannot be correct in the light of the weight of the medical and civilian evidence. His evidence of the boy crossing over the barricade and that of Noel McCartney at Day 157 cannot be accurate given the weight of the civilian, medical and photographic evidence. See Day 157/105/1 to Day 157/105/25 and also Day 157/136/1 to Day 157/136/25: "I just have this memory perhaps wrong of someone being shot as they came across the barricade".

[2] See also evidence of Don Mullan AM488.5 paragraphs 36 to 38

[3] See also evidence of Eamonn McAteer AM 41.5 paragraph 24 and Don Mullan AM448.5 paragraph 40.

[4] George Downey, who was Michael Kelly's brother in law, was at the gable end of Glenfada Park North and saw a body at the barricade, which turned out to be Michael Kelly. He also assisted in carrying Michael Kelly from the south gable of Glenfada Park North. He identified himself in EP27.10 with his face obstructed. He described extensive firing, he assumed, from a soldier who had emerged from the alley into the north eastern corner of Glenfada Park North. AD13.4 paragraph 22. At Day123/47/1 to Day 123/47/17 he described tripping and Michael Kelly being picked up by Joseph Donnelly.

¹ Witnesses in bold expressly stated that HG was unarmed; this is often in addition to making a blanket statement that they saw no IRA activity or civilians armed in any way on Bloody Sunday; non-bolded ticks indicate that witnesses did not discuss weapons specifically in relation to HG, but made a blanket statement that they had seen no civilians with weapons on the day; those with crosses did not say they saw weapons, but merely made no reference to weapons in their statements or oral evidence.

²Was asked whether HG was carrying anything that ‘looked like or could have looked like a weapon’

As a final point, not a single one of the twenty witnesses who saw Hugh Gilmore’s body at the gable end was questioned by the soldiers’ representatives or by the Inquiry as to whether there were any weapons on his person.

Sean MacDermott AM4 gave evidence on Day 144. This witness recalled that along with his friend Frankie Mellon, that he left the vicinity of Free Derry Corner and walked in a northerly direction to Rossville Flats. When they reached the flats they became aware of a riot in progress in or about the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. By the standards of the day this was not an unusual event and both he and Mr Mellon stood at the southern side of the Barricade and observed the riot from a safe distance. At or about this time, Hugh Gilmore approached their position from the doorway of Block1. They exchanged greetings and the deceased made his way in the direction of the riot. Mr MacDermott was unable to observe any soldiers within the vicinity at this point in time. However events were clearly moving quickly and within a short period someone shouted “They are shooting live rounds” AM4.3 paragraph 15.

18.4.2.21 The witness immediately crouched down, but was still unable to see any soldiers in or about his line of vision. Approximately thirty seconds later the witness provides the following description of events:

“He was running unaided in a semi-crouched position along the east side of Rossville Street when I first caught sight of him, he was almost level with us on our side (the south side) of the Barricade. His approximate position when I first saw him is marked “A” on the map (AM4.8) (grid reference K15). He shouted “I’m hit, I’m hit”. On hearing this, those gathered at the barricade turned to run towards Free Derry corner… but at that stage I assumed that Hugh Gilmore had been hit by a rubber bullet.” AM4.3 paragraph 17

18.4.2.22 The witness then relates how he and Mr Mellon ran after the deceased. They caught up with Mr Gilmore at the south west corner of Block1 just as his knees seemed to give way from under him. Both he and Mr Mellon each took an arm and carried him to a position near the south west corner of the south facing gable end wall of the same Block. He further recalls seeing Geraldine Richmond standing at or about Hugh Gilmore’s head and at some point Hugh’s head resting in her lap. Geraldine Richmond was later taken away as she was crying hysterically. AM4.4 paragraph 21

18.4.2.23 The witness was never questioned about whether Hugh Gilmore was carrying any weapon or weapons not whether any such weapons were present on the Barricade. It is clear from this evidence that Hugh Gilmore was deliberately shot in circumstances where he presented no threat to the advancing soldiers.

18.4.2.24 Frankie Mellon AM399 gave evidence on Day 151. He can be seen in P441, P445, P663, P664, E14.9. Curiously Mr Mellon has no recollection of accompanying his friend Mr MacDermott to Free Derry Corner nor indeed returning from that location northwards towards the Barricade Day 151/136/17; Day 151/137/9 to Day 151/137/20.

His first recollection involves the witness walking through a “mini riot” towards the Barricade. A number of rioters were throwing stones at soldiers who by this stage had entered Rossville Street and who had conveniently thrown their missiles to one side in order to allow him access to the Barricade. The witness could not recollect seeing any arrests being made at this point Day 151/139/24 or of hearing or seeing any rubber bullets being fired Day 151/140/5.

18.4.2.25 Interestingly this witness expressed the opinion that the stone throwing was in effect “an empty protest” AM 399.3 paragraphs 12 to 13; Day 151/141/5. He recognised Hugh Gilmore as a stone thrower, observing him run a distance of 40 to 50 yards north of the Barricade and throw a stone in the direction of the Army Day 151/141/15. The witness was asked directly if Hugh Gilmore had a weapon:

A. There was no weapons or any form of people

nothing of that sort. All I saw was stones.” (emphasis added) Day 151/145/1 to Day 151/145/7.

18.4.2.26 The witness went on to recall a number of Army vehicles speeding towards the Barricade. He remembered four to five soldiers jumping out of the lead pig via the back doors and beginning to fire immediately Day 151/148/2. When pressed on this matter he acknowledged he may have been mistaken about the timing of the arrival of the vehicles Day 151/148/23 to Day 151/149/13. However along with Geraldine Richmond the witness was adamant that the soldiers fired as soon as they emerged from the vehicles.

18.4.2.27 In relation to the location and timing of the bullet which struck Hugh Gilmore, the witness claimed that as he reached the Rubble Barricade that he heard two high velocity shots. He believed that he was on the southern side of the Barricade and that Hugh Gilmore was about three feet in front of him. He describes the event in the following way:

“When I heard the two shots Hugh Gilmore was running fast, directly in front of me looking straight ahead. He was about three feet or so in front of me and had just got over the Rubble Barricade. The second shot hit him and as it did so he jumped up with the force, grasped his right side and said “I’ve been hit”. He kept on running: it was the momentum that kept him going.” AM 399.4 paragraph 17

18.4.2.28 The witness further recalled examining Hugh Gilmore at the south end of Block 1 and observing a small hole on the right of his upper torso. During his attempt to provide artificial respiration the deceased exhaled a large quantity of blood into the witness’ mouth. This event caused Geraldine Richmond to scream hysterically. AM 399.4 paragraph 18

Mr Mellon went on to describe in graphic and distressing detail the full extent of Hugh Gilmore’s injuries and his attempts to treat them. AM 399.4 paragraph 18 Surprisingly it is only at this point that the witness recalls his friend Sean MacDermott being present.

18.4.2.29 The witness was very properly questioned by Mr Clarke QC about the fundamental differences in the accounts offered by him and Sean MacDermott. The witness dealt with this line of enquiry in the following way:

way, more than that I cannot give you really.” Day 151/204/14 to Day 151/205/10

The weight to be attached to this explanation is further enhanced by the fact that when asked whether he had discussed his evidence with Mr MacDermott, unlike the military witnesses, Mr Mellon immediately admitted that such discussions had taken place and that they had agreed to disagree. It should be noted that these two men prior to these discussions had not seen each other for ten years. Day 151/197/25 to Day 151/198/12

18.4.2.30 It is important to recall that Mr Mellon was an eighteen year old student nurse attempting to describe a deeply traumatic event which was sudden, brief and extremely violent. Others have described the incident as “the most terrifying experience they had ever encountered.”

Mr Mellon remains as consistent today as he was in 1972 in respect of the principal issue as it relates to Hugh Gilmore, viz:

“I did not see anyone at all with nail bombs or petrol bombs that day. Hugh Gilmore was not carrying a weapon. He had nothing in his hands or his jacket.

Hugh Gilmore’s death really upset me because I knew him. We were not friends but not enemies. I was glad it was me who was with him when he died as I said a lot to him. I saw people killed that day and I have never seen death like a saw in such a short time. I have not been back in Derry since 1974.” AM399.6 paragraphs 31 to 32

18.4.2.31 These sentiments were never challenged or questioned and therefore must be allowed to stand as a guiding beacon which highlights the truth of what really happened to Hugh Gilmore.

18.4.2.32 Geraldine Richmond AM45 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 145 and Day 146. She can be seen in photographs P818 and P820. She too was eighteen on Bloody Sunday. She recalled meeting Hugh Gilmore (who she did not know at the time) at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street. She went on to describe how along with Hugh Gilmore and another young man she ran in a southerly direction as the Army vehicles approached from Little James Street AM45.2 paragraph 9, Day 145/148/18 to Day 145/149/2.

She stated that the deceased and the other youth stopped and threw a single stone in the direction of the vehicles which were at this point stationary Day 145/146/20 to Day 145/147/13.

18.4.2.33 She recalled how three soldiers emerged from one of the vehicles, possibly the Ferret car. Day 145/151/21 to Day 145/152/3. As they fired, people began to run and shortly before they reached the Barricade Hugh Gilmore exclaimed “The bastards are killing us”. People who were already on the Barricade were either throwing stones or standing idly around. Day 145/154/15 to Day 145/155/23.

The witness confirmed that before reaching the doors of Block1 she heard two distinct shots Day 145/155/24 to Day 145/156/5. She stated that as she crossed the Barricade the shooting was very fierce.

18.4.2.34 Geraldine Richmond had a clear recollection of the deceased stating “I’m hit” Day 145/158/12 to Day 145/158/21 The witness accepted in her oral evidence to this Inquiry that Hugh Gilmore could have cried out on two separate occasions that he was hit Day 146/6/10 to Day 146/6/16. This would be consistent with what she told Lord Widgery WT6.49E to WT 6.50B. She failed to see any sign of the deceased being hit before this point Day 145/156/6 to Day 145/156/8.

18.4.2.35 Her testimony before Lord Widgery in relation to the location which she believed Hugh Gilmore to have been initially shot, namely north of the Rubble Barricade differed from her Eversheds statement insofar as she now believed that the deceased was shot whilst running in a southerly direction between the Barricade and the entrance to Block1. It may be recalled that Counsel to the Inquiry suggested that this confusion could have arisen from the fact that Hugh Gilmore may have been shot twice, one before reaching the barricade and once afterwards. In fact the witness accepted the possibility that the deceased could have been struck both before and after Day 146/21/25 to Day 146/22/25.

18.4.2.36 Position of Soldier Who Shot Hugh Gilmore

Geraldine Richmond told the Tribunal she thought that the two bullets may have come from a position to the right. Day 145/158/12 to Day 145/158/20. She went on to say in her oral evidence that she believed the shots came from the vicinity of Glenfada Park North AM45.4 paragraph18; Day 145/159/4. It is submitted that the witness is mistaken in this regard due to the fact that no soldiers would have entered the Glenfada Park area at this stage. When asked in 1972 about the likely location from where the fatal shot came from the witness in her NICRA statement was inclined to the view that it had been discharged by one of the soldiers, possibly the one in the kneeling position, in Rossville Street AM45.23. In her Treasury Solicitor statement and her oral evidence to Lord Widgery she appeared to express no view as to where the shot came from AM45.24, WT6.61D - E. It submitted that Geraldine Richmond was an impressive and truthful witness but whose recollection of the likely source of the shot fails to provide any real assistance to the Tribunal. However her importance in respect of the principal issues remains untouched.

18.4.2.37 In light of her evidence we submit that Geraldine Richmond was clearly a truthful witness who had been significantly traumatised by the events of the day. This has been independently demonstrated by the descriptions of her reaction to the deaths of Hugh Gilmore and Barney McGuigan. The Tribunal will recall that the horror of this moment has been graphically recorded on the Grimaldi / North tape counter reference 37 minutes 53 seconds to 39 minutes M35.58, E3.0059. The hysteria of this witness as recorded requires no words or description and its effects remind the listener of the collective panic which enveloped the civilians at that location[1].

18.4.2.38 The integrity of this witness can be measured by her frank description of Hugh Gilmore throwing a stone before he reached the Barricade Day 145/31/14 to Day 145/31/25. It is worth noting that it was never suggested to her by anyone that the deceased was a gunman or that he was carrying anything such as a weapon.

18.4.2.39 It will be recalled that she categorically confirmed that the deceased was not carrying any weapons, that she saw nobody else with any form of weapon and that she did not hear any nail bombs explode. AM45.8 paragraph 39

PIRA 14, who on Bloody Sunday was “a very senior member[2]” of the PIRA attached to the command in Dublin, gave evidence to the Inquiry under subpoena on Day 421. His statement is found at APIRA 14.1.

18.4.2.40 PIRA 14 was in the area of Free Derry Corner along with his brother PIRA 26 and Colm Keenan. All three men were members of the Provisional IRA. He then approached the area of the Rossville Flats after hearing shots from the William Street end of Rossville Street. He assumed that these were rubber bullets and that something was happening in Rossville Street. Out of curiosity, Colm, his brother and PIRA 14 ran south towards the Rossville Flats to see what was going on.

18.4.2.41 When he got to the barricade he was told that people had got shot although the witness did not see anyone who had been shot at that stage. He saw armoured vehicles at the William Street end of Rossville Street and soldiers moving towards Kells Walk APIRA 14.3 paragraph 16. He was also aware of other soldiers at the north end of Block1. APIRA 14 moved north of the Rubble Barricade whilst his brother and Colm Keenan stayed on the southern side of the Barricade APIRA 14.3 paragraph 17. All these men stayed on the eastern side of Rossville Street.

18.4.2.42 The witness confirmed that neither he, his brother or Colm Keenan were armed nor on active service and that he saw no other armed civilian at the Barricade or anywhere else APIRA 14.4 paragraph 22. Moreover there was nothing that could be mistaken for a gun Day 421/35/7 to Day 421/35 21. At no stage was it suggested to PIRA 14 by any of the Soldiers’ Counsel that either he or any of his group was carrying or using weapons of any type.

There had been some stone throwing from the Rubble Barricade at the soldiers at the north end of Block1.

The witness said in his statement that there were about 50-60 people in the general area of the Barricade but in his oral evidence he said that he could not be sure although there were “upwards of 30” persons present Day 421/34/22 to Day 421/ 35/3.

18.4.2.43 Position of Soldier Who Shot Hugh Gilmore

PIRA14’s brother drew his attention to one soldier in particular Day 421/42/21to Day 421/42/22. This soldier, who was near the ramp at Kells Walk, fired his rifle in the direction of Free Derry Corner from a position out in the open. Other soldiers were close by APIRA 14.3 paragraph 19. This same soldier then turned his rifle “in an arc” so that it pointed in the witness’ general direction. The soldier’s gun recoiled and the witness’ impression was that the same soldier fired two shots in rapid succession. At this time PIRA 14 was standing on part of the Rubble on the northern side of the Barricade, close to Block 1 Day 421/40/16 to Day 421/40/25. Suddenly, Hugh Gilmore, who was slightly in front of the witness and to his left[3], clutched his stomach in a spasm. The witness’ recollection was that Hugh Gilmore was facing towards the soldiers at the north end of Block1 when he was shot Day 421/48/25 to Day 421/49/17.

18.4.2.44 The witness thought that Hugh Gilmore had been shouting at the soldiers at the north end of Block1 and that he may have been throwing a stone at them although he could not be absolutely sure about this. He was standing either on the barricade itself, or just on the northern side standing on some rubble when he was hit APIRA14.4 paragraph 23. As soon as he was shot turned and ran southwards along the western side of Block1 APIRA14.4 paragraph 21. PIRA14 saw Hugh Gilmore stumble as he got to the end of Block 1 and he was then pulled around the corner.

18.4.2.45 As Hugh Gilmore ran off further bullets were fired that struck around and south of the Barricade APIRA14.4 paragraph 21;Day 421/50/19 to Day 421/ 51/21. PIRA14 was able to point out Colm Keenan in photographs EP23.9 and EP38.9 as being the man with his back to the camera, just to the right of Hugh Gilmore.

18.4.2.46 PIRA14 next saw Hugh Gilmore near the telephone box at the southern side of Block1. The witness provided a graphic and accurate account of Gilmore’s stomach wound APIRA14.4 paragraph 24.

It was not suggested by any of the interested parties that PIRA14 was giving untruthful or inaccurate evidence in respect of any of the events he described near the area of the Rubble Barricade.

Arguably the most confident description of the solder who fired the fatal shots was provided by this witness and his brother who gave evidence under the cipher PIRA 26. Surprisingly, neither witness was challenged about the very dramatic and thoroughly unjustified circumstances, which their description of the event disclosed.

18.4.2.47 PIRA 26 gave evidence on Day 425. He estimated that around 30 people were present in the area of the Rubble Barricade when soldiers opened fire. These civilians were generally milling about. The only person he saw throw a stone was Hugh Gilmore. He saw no-one in the vicinity of the Barricade who was armed with a weapon or anything which might be mistaken for a firearm such as a piece of wood or metal Day 425/62/8 to Day 425/62/19.

The witness could not recall seeing any army vehicles, however he did have a vivid recollection of seeing a soldier standing at the south end of Kells Walk by the pram ramp. This soldier appears to have already occupied this position when the witness arrived at a location just north of the Barricade Day 425/62/20 to Day 425/63/21.

18.4.2.48 He saw the soldier fire an estimated two to three shots Day 425/24/24 to Day 425/24/25. He was unable to say what this soldier was firing at. He then saw soldiers at the north end of Block1 Rossville Flats, it was at this group that he believed Hugh Gilmore “fired” a stone Day 425/65/8 to Day 425/65/20. This description was probed at some length by Counsel to the Soldiers however, it was difficult to identify the justification for this approach given that the expression enjoyed popular use among a number local witnesses[4].

18.4.2.49 He was directly asked if Mr Gilmore was armed with a weapon. He was also asked if Hugh Gilmore had any sort of weapon and the witness replied that he had not Day 425/65/25 to Day 425/66/3.The witness claimed that he was unable to see where the stone landed. However he did recall that as Hugh Gilmore threw the stone the soldier whom he had observed at Kells Walk and who was now standing with his rifle at his shoulder swung around in an arc and began shooting at their position Day 425/69/1 to Day 425/69/16.

PIRA 26 gave evidence to the effect that he did not see anyone other than Hugh Gilmore being shot Day 425/70/25 to Day 425/71/4.

18.4.2.50 Questions put on behalf of the Soldiers tended to focus upon general matters concerning the IRA rather than events of the day. The witness was never challenged in respect of his account outlining the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was shot. It was never at any time suggested to him that the size of the stone, shape or otherwise could have been mistaken for a more lethal device. It was never suggested that there were people in the vicinity of the Barricade brandishing weapons or items or objects which could have been mistaken for weapons. It was never suggested that nail bombs, blast bombs or petrol bombs were thrown or handled by anyone in the vicinity of the Barricade. Finally no attempt was made to justify the circumstances which led to a soldier or soldiers who fired the fatal shots at Hugh Gilmore.

18.4.2.51 Thomas Eamon Melaugh AM397 gave evidence on Day 143. This witness recalled the Army debussing in Rossville Street and in particular two rubber bullets being fired at him. He stated that he saw Hugh Gilmore walking down Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner in a group of between two and five people. He stated that Hugh Gilmore appeared to suddenly bend over and touch his elbow at a location to the north of the Barricade on the eastern footpath running the length of Block1 AM397.4 paragraph 39. He recalled that Hugh Gilmore had not reached the level of the Rubble Barricade Day 143/37/14 to Day 143/37/24.

18.4.2.52 Although in his contemporaneous account which was a recorded interview that the witness listened to and confirmed that it was his own voice that could be heard, he placed Hugh Gilmore at the Barricade facing the Army when he was shot and that he heard two shots rang out. Hugh Gilmore then lurched forward from the waist AM397.70.

18.4.2.53 During the course of his evidence before this Inquiry he agreed that his 1972 account might be more accurate Day 143/39/10 to Day 143/39/22.

The witness confidently confirmed that as he was standing only a matter of feet from the deceased when he was shot, Hugh Gilmore at the time of impact was not involved in stone throwing, petrol bombing or shooting Day 143/36/13 to Day 143/36/22.

Eamon Melaugh stated that after being shot the deceased called out that he had been hit AM397.4 paragraph 41; AM397.70.

18.4.2.54 James Greene AG45 gave evidence to the Inquiry on Day 149.This witness confirms that he was at the Rubble Barricade when the soldiers first entered Rossville Street. He frankly admitted throwing stones in the direction of the soldiers in Rossville Street. He alleged that although the soldiers were safely out of range from stone throwers they nevertheless opened fire with high velocity weapons upon the group from which the stones were being thrown. He believed that there was approximately twenty to thirty people at the Rubble Barricade when Hugh Gilmore was shot Day 149/7/14. He stated that Hugh Gilmore was standing next to him facing north when he turned and said that he was “hit”. Both of them immediately began to run southwards down Rossville Street. At some time the witness overtook Hugh Gilmore. He did not notice whether the deceased was a second time although he accepted it was possible that this may have happened when he was running ahead of him and before he looked back from the area of the entrance to Block1 Day 149/20/25 to Day 149/21/8.

This witness was unable to say which soldiers were firing Day 149/4/2 to Day 149/4/18 and did not specifically see the soldier who shot the deceased Day 149/17/1 to Day 149/17/8.

18.4.2.55 In keeping with the other witnesses, Mr Greene did not see any civilian with guns or nail bombs. He went on the express the very positive opinion that Hugh Gilmore was unarmed:

“I did not see any nail bombs or guns during the day, other than the guns carried by the soldiers. I do not believe that Hugh Gilmore could have been mistaken as someone who was about to throw a nail bomb at the army when he was shot.” AG54.4 paragraph 20

18.4.2.56 Michael McCusker AM160 gave evidence to the Tribunal on Day 148. He stated that he entered Rossville Street via the gap between Block1 and 2 and made his way to the Rubble Barricade where there was approximately ten to twelve people standing around. He briefly engaged John Young in conversation and was advised that a mutual friend, Michael Bradley had been shot in the Rossville Flats car park and had been moved to a house in Joseph Place. The conversation was interrupted when he heard live Army fire from the northerly direction in Rossville Street. He ran southwards along Block1 and in accordance with his Eversheds statement he saw a youth resembling the description of Hugh Gilmore place his right hand to his back, stagger and fall forward at a point short of the south west corner of Block1. He then watched the youth being grabbed by four or five man who carried him around the corner. Medical assistance was unsuccessfully rendered and the youth appears to have died. AM 160.2 paragraphs 9 to 11. His description of the location and circumstances in which the youth appears to have been shot is arguably undermined by its omission or absence from the interview he apparently conducted with Kathleen Keville in 1972 X2.35.48.

“I did not see anyone on the march with a gun with a gun or with a nail or petrol bomb save for those throwing stones” AM160.3 paragraph 15

The witness was never challenged in respect of this issue nor in respect of any other matter attaching to the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore met his death.

18.4.2.57 Margaret Patterson AP2 gave oral evidence on Day 185. Margaret Patterson provided a detailed outline of how she and her husband had attended the march and then made their way to the vicinity of the southwest corner of Glenfada Park North. From this position she observed hundreds young people running in a southerly direction ahead of what she estimated to be five Army vehicles. When the shooting started she decided to run across Rossville Street to Block1 as she believed it would be safer within that location. Her husband assisted her across the street and at some point told her that they were firing live rounds AP2.3 paragraph 18.

18.4.2.58 During the course of her evidence she claimed to have seen ten to twenty young men at the Barricade as she ran across Rossville Street. She did not see anybody lying down or shot Day 185/77/5 to Day 185/77/15, she conceded that some of the young men had previously been throwing stones Day 185/93/14 to Day 185/94/9.

When she arrived at the south west corner of Block1 her attention was drawn to a young man who was approaching from the direction of the Rubble Barricade, just as she thought he was about to over take her and her husband she saw him spin around and start to fall although she did not actually see him hit the ground. She described what happened next in the following way:

“As he spun around I saw green matter coming out of him which I thought was his insides. I knew he had been shot by the way he fell, but I did not see anything actually hit him. He was wearing a denim jacket and a shirt. I cannot remember very much what he looked like but I remember he was young and not particularly tall. I felt terror then because I knew for certain that live bullets were being fired. I know I was screaming my brains out.” AP2.3 paragraph 19

18.4.2.59 In reply to questions during the course of the Inquiry the witness confirmed that she saw nobody with weapons at the barricade. When pressed by Counsel for most of the Soldiers about whether this was a matter she was likely to provide an honest account upon the witness dealt with the suggestion in a spontaneous and highly credible manner:

18.4.2.60 Robert White AW11 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 137, to the effect that he was an amateur photographer and that he was on the march that day. He took a series of photographs attached to his statement at AW11.23 which run from P27 to P29. These photographs show the passage of the first two Saracens up Rossville Street. Mr White confirmed that these photographs were taken in fairly quick succession. He believed they would have been taken within a few seconds of each other. Day 137/86/25 to Day 137/87/23. He confirmed that he then ran into Glenfada Park North up to the pram ramp and took his photographs there which are EP32.1, EP32.2 and EP32.3. He recalled it did not take him very long to get to the pram ramp, because he was afraid of missing something. He did not think the distance was as far as sixty yards. He thought he was standing at the pram ramp for a matter of seconds, but less than a minute, before he took the photograph we know as EP32.1. This is the photograph that shows Michael Kelly lying on the ground at the Rubble Barricade. He did not see anyone at the Rubble Barricade with a rifle or a pistol or throwing nail bombs. Day 137/90/16 to Day 137/91/8. Mr. White was asked about the time lapse between taking EP32.2 and P32, which is his photograph of Hugh Gilmore running holding his side along Block 1 of Rossville Flats. He thought it would have been a very short time, even less than a minute, but he did not honestly know. Day 137/81/16 to Day 137/82/1.

18.4.2.61 The witness did not see what happened to Hugh Gilmore after he took the picture. However after taking the picture he looked to see if he could observe the soldier who had fired what he thought was a rubber bullet at the deceased. The only soldier he saw was standing behind the north gable end of Block1 Day 137/82/17. He believed that this soldier was responsible for shooting the Hugh Gilmore as he was unable to see any other soldiers in the vicinity Day 137/111/19

An indication of the anarchic and reckless behaviour of these soldiers is illustrated by what happened next:

“I saw him put his rifle up to his shoulder and aim in my direction. Instantly Mr McAteer and I both dropped down below the wall so that the soldier could not see us. As soon as we had got down I heard the whine of a bullet as it passed straight above me. It was unmistakably the sound of a bullet passing close by. I have no doubt that if I had been standing up I would have been killed.” AW11.5 paragraph 24

i) Photograph P32 / EP23.9A confirms that Hugh Gilmore was unarmed and that if he was shot at a point between the Rubble Barricade and the entrance to Block1, it was whilst he was running for the safety of the gable end.

ii) The witness confirmed during the course of his evidence that he saw nobody throwing nail bombs or carrying weapons Day 137/90/1 to Day 137/91/17

iii) Hugh Gilmore is very much likely to have been shot at the Rubble Barricade after Michael Kelly as Michael Kelly is already lying on the pavement in Rossville Street in EP32.1 before Hugh Gilmore is pictured at P32 /EP23.9/ P662 / P663

18.4.3 Removal to Hospital

18.4.3.1 Hugh Gilmore was carried or dragged around the southwest corner of Block1 from Rossville Street. He was there treated by a student nurse Frank Mellon AM 399.4 paragraphs 17 to 21 and Knight of Malta Paul McLaughlin AM350.14 paragraphs 25 to 29. He died in Rossville Street. Some time after 4.28pm, he was taken to Altnagelvin hospital in an ambulance VRM 5986 UZ manned by Harry Wray (driver) and John Gilchrist (attendant) AG65.1 to AG65.15, D500.26, D500.27. Others present in the same ambulance were Patrick Doherty, Michael Bradley, Alexander Nash, Patrick McDaid and Father O’Gara.

18.4.4 Injuries Sustained

18.4.4.1 The post mortem examination was carried out by Dr Carson at 11pm on 31^st January 1972. The report of Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.005, E2.006 with the accompanying diagram at E2.0082. The morgue photographs are in Bundle P2 TAB6.

18.4.4.2 Hugh Gilmore sustained four gunshot wounds. He received an entry and an exit wound to the left arm. He also received two gunshot wounds to the chest. According to Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan it is “much more likely than not” that Hugh Gilmore was shot twice.

An elliptical 2.0 x 1.2 cm defect in the right side of the chest 14 cm below and 7 cm behind nipple. E2.005, P99, P103

18.4.4.4 A gaping wound on the left side of the chest 13 cm below nipple and measuring 6 x 5 cm. E2.005, P98, P100, P105

The entry wound bearing an abrasion ring lay on the ulna side (little finger) side, 12 cm from the wrist. It was 6mm in diameter. E2.0058,E2.0059, D0180, P98, P100

18.4.4.6 The exit wound lay on the front surface slightly lower than the entry wound. This injury was ragged and measured 2.0 cm x 1.1 cm. E2.0059. “It was surrounded by an irregular rim of abrasion 2-3mm. wide and lay within a vague zone of bruising 5 cm. x 2 ½ cm. There was a fracture of the underlying ulna.” D0180, P101, P102

18.4.4.7 No track for the chest injury was given by Dr Carson who performed the autopsy in either the note or report. Nor were any X- rays taken which could have indicated the direction of the track in the chest and abdomen.

18.4.4.8 The cause of Hugh Gilmore’s death was stated to be laceration of the diaphragm, left lung, the liver, spleen and stomach due to the gunshot wound to the trunk. “The liver injury was particularly extensive. Massive bleeding into the chest and abdominal cavities would have caused rapid death.” D0184 D0164

18.4.4.9 Doctor Carson was of the opinion that all the holes were consistent with the path of the same bullet. D0184 However in his statement to this Inquiry he conceded that he cannot “entirely rule out the possibility that the wound in the right chest was an entrance wound” though he still stood by his conclusions of 1972.

“It is our opinion that the injury to the right side of the chest is, more likely than not, an entry wound and that the injury to the left side represents an exit wound… However the injury to the left side of the chest is not photographed clearly and in the absence of X rays that might have given information about the direction of fragmentation of the ribs this cannot be stated with certainty… it is therefore much more likely than not that Hugh Gilmore was struck by two bullets; one striking the right side of the chest and the other the left forearm… Clearly the shot to the chest, if we are correct in the orientation of this shot, has come from a point to the right of the chest at the moment of discharge.” E2.0061

18.4.5 Forensic Evidence

18.4.5. In respect of clothing, lead particle density on the anorak was within the normal range D0169. Swabs were taken from Mr Gilmore’s hands and tested for the presence of lead. No lead was detected D0169. Dr Martin concluded that “the absence of significant numbers of lead particles on the hand swabs and clothing indicates that the deceased had not been using a firearm” D0169.

i) Hugh Gilmore was shot without any weapon or any other item in either of his hands.

ii) Hugh Gilmore never presented as a perceived or real threat to the Parachute Regiment soldiers in Rossville Street or its environs.

iii) The behaviour of the Hugh Gilmore did not exceed the standards of teenage defiance normally demonstrated during military confrontations or incursions at the time.

iv) No other person was shot in the vicinity of Hugh Gilmore at or around the time he was struck.

vi) There was no-one at or around the Rubble Barricade with a firearm, nail-bomb, petrol bomb or any other weapon.

ix) No civilian at or around the barricade was carrying a nail-bomb or a petrol bomb.

x) Hugh Gilmore was the victim of a capricious and random act, deliberately committed by an unnamed member of the Parachute Regiment.

xi) If the Tribunal accept the unchallenged expert testimony of Messrs Shepherd and O’Callaghan, then such evidence should be viewed, as highlighting a concerted level of determination, which is more consistent with a deliberate act as opposed to a tragic accident.

xii) There is no evidence capable of justifying the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was murdered.

xiii) Hugh Gilmore was the victim of a military mindset, which, for the purposes of operational considerations on Bloody Sunday, failed to make any proper distinction between politician, civil rights marcher, defiant teenager or perceived gunman.

xiv) No challenge to the unlawful circumstances surrounding the death of Hugh Gilmore was made on behalf of any of the interested parties.

xv) Those responsible for Hugh Gilmore’s murder have had numerous opportunities over the last 32 years to step forward and say “I am responsible and this is why…” The Tribunal must ask itself why this opportunity has never been seized.

18.5.1.1 Michael McDaid was 20 years old when he was murdered on Bloody Sunday. He was killed alongside John Young and William Nash, only a matter of seconds after the shooting of Michael Kelly. The image of Michael McDaid unarmed and bewildered and moments from death, walking through the Rubble Barricade, as those nearby attended to the dying Michael Kelly, is one of the poignant images of Bloody Sunday. EP32.2

18.5.1.2 Michael left school in 1967 at the age of 15 and began working for John Bradley immediately. John Bradley ran a grocery shop and a bar. Michael started in the grocery shop as a messenger boy and over the years worked his way up to the position of barman. He had been in full-time employment since leaving school and up until his death on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.2.1 John Young was 17 years old when he was murdered on Bloody Sunday. He was killed alongside Michael McDaid and William Nash, only minutes after the shooting of Michael Kelly.

18.5.2.2 John was born in May 1954, the youngest of the 6 children of Thomas and Lilly Young. He went to Rosemount Primary School and successfully sat the Qualifying Examination for the Municipal Technical College in Derry, although he subsequently decided to attend St. Joseph’s Secondary School in Derry. He was considered to be bright and intelligent, a description ascribed to him by a former English teacher of St. Joseph’s, John Anthony Dunne, in his statement to this Tribunal. AD174.3 paragraph 14

18.5.2.3 John left school in 1969 at the age of 15 and began full-time employment at ‘Tailorfit’ a men’s outfitters in Shipquay Street, he had been working there on a part-time basis since the age of 14. He remained in this employment until he was killed on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.2.4 However John’s family did not only have to deal with the distress of John’s death on Bloody Sunday. That evening his older brother Leo was still missing. Leo who had gone to the assistance of Gerard Donaghy was arrested along with Raymond Rogan when the car taking the dying Gerard Donaghy was stopped by the Army. Leo had been arrested and was taken to Ballykelly.

18.5.2.5 During his detention at Ballykelly Leo was questioned about his family and in the early hours of the morning while those who had arrested and detained him knew that his brother was lying dead made him made to brush the floor of the alleyway before releasing him. As he was leaving he was asked by a police officer how many brothers he had and answered two. The police officer in response said ‘you only have one now’. When Leo arrived home he discovered John was dead.

18.5.3.1 This section looks at the civilian testimony about the circumstances in which John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed.

18.5.3.2 As will be seen below, the circumstances in which John Young and Michael McDaid were killed, after the shooting of Michael Kelly and while a sustained volley of gunfire came over the Rubble Barricade has contributed to immense confusion about how these young men came to die.

18.5.3.3 The confusion has been added to by the failure of soldiers from the Parachute Regiment to account for their deaths. Not one soldier who accounts for the firing of live rounds over the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday, with the possible exception of Soldier 027 has sought to give a truthful account of the circumstances in which these young men died. That issue is addressed in section 18.7 below.

18.5.3.4 However, while at the outset of this Inquiry the picture was one of complete confusion, the conclusion of the oral evidence has served to illustrate the truth about the circumstances in which these young men died.

18.5.3.5 In that respect it should be noted at this stage that it is our contention that Soldier P came close to making an admission to the killing of John Young and Michael McDaid in the course of his oral evidence. It will be alleged that Soldier P was guilty of the murder of John Young and Michael McDaid. See Section 18.7 below.

18.5.3.6 It is our submission that the civilian testimony, when considered with: the photographic and video evidence, the forensic, medical evidence and the ballistics evidence demonstrates the following:

i) Michael McDaid and John Young were shot and killed by a member of the Parachute Regiment, shooting down Rossville Street.

ii) The circumstances in which the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment fired were unjustified.

iii) Contrary to the conclusion of the Widgery Tribunal, John Young and Michael McDaid were unarmed when shot. Neither John Young, nor Michael McDaid handled, nor were in close proximity to someone handling a weapon when they were shot and killed.

iv) At no time were there nail bombs thrown from or shots fired from the Rubble Barricade at soldiers. There were no weapons of any description at the Rubble Barricade.

v) John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed, probably within seconds of each other and in close physical proximity to each other.

vi) They were probably located at the edge of the broad footpath on the Glenfada Park side of the Rubble Barricade when shot and killed, not far from the location where Michael Kelly was shot and killed.

vii) They were shot and killed after Michael Kelly had been shot and in all probability while he was being attended to by Frs. Bradley and O’Keefe at the southern gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.

viii) After they were shot and killed civilians at the gable end tried but could not go to their aid because the gunfire over the Rubble Barricade was so sustained. The people at the gable end were subsequently arrested by soldiers from the Parachute Regiment who entered Glenfada Park North.

ix) The bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash were removed from the Rubble Barricade by soldiers of Mortar Platoon. The manner in which they were removed was disrespectful and contemptuous. They were denied access to spiritual or medical aid and were eventually taken to Altnagelvin Hospital after a considerable and unexplained delay.

18.5.3.7 At the outset of this Inquiry, there was an issue about whether John Young and Michael McDaid, along with William Nash, had in fact been shot by soldiers from the City Walls, as opposed to soldiers from the Parachute Regiment firing down Rossville Street.

18.5.3.8 In 1997 the Breglio Report was published by the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign in New York City. The Report drew on the written testimony from eye-witnesses collected by NICRA and the NCCL in 1972 in which almost 30 witnesses testified to the belief that there had been shooting at the crowd by soldiers positioned on the City Walls. TmpD17.6

18.5.3.9 The Breglio Report which followed was the professional opinion of one of New York City’s most experienced and highly qualified ballistics experts. Mr Breglio also concluded that:

“After examining the autopsy and medical reports of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid and noting the similarities and consistencies of the angle of the trajectories of the fatal wounds sustained by these three young men, I will further concluded that, in my professional opinion, the projectiles that struck William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid originated from an area high up in the vicinity of Derry’s Walls and were fired by a high powered weapon using telescopic sights.”

18.5.3.10 The Inquiry’s experts, Doctor Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan were asked to consider the likelihood that John Young and Michael McDaid were shot from the City Walls because of the downward track of the injuries.

18.5.3.11 Doctor Shepherd and Mr. O’Callaghan had the benefit of assistance from the Northern Ireland Ordnance Survey in determining the distances and angles from Rossville Street to various points on the walls. It was determined that whether shot from the City Walls or from ground level on Rossville Street, the Deceased “would have had been bending forward for the shots to have caused the tracks that were found.” E2.0065 paragraph 11.1

“nothing in the pathology of the wounds lends greater weight to this proposition then that the shots were fired [from] ground level.” E2.0065 paragraph 11.1

“it is clear from the injuries that all three men were facing in the general direction from where the shots came. It follows that if the shots originated from the City Walls the deceased would have had their backs towards Kells Walk at the time they were shot. Conversely if the shots originated from the Kells Walk side of the barricade they would have to have been facing in that direction. Witness testimony and not pathology or ballistics is therefore the key to resolving this matter.” E2.0065 paragraph 11.1

18.5.3.14 Michael McDaid and John Young were shot dead south of the Rubble Barricade. In light of the forensic medical evidence it is clear that they were bent over when shot.

18.5.3.15 This Inquiry has had the benefit of hearing extensive civilian testimony in relation to the events of the Rubble Barricade. As a body of evidence the civilian testimony demonstrates that:

i) They were shot by soldiers positioned on Rossville Street because that is where firing was coming from; and

ii) They were facing in the direction of the soldiers on Rossville Street when shot.

18.5.3.16 The witness testimony before this Tribunal establishes that John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed by soldiers firing down Rossville Street. They were therefore shot and killed by a member of the Parachute Regiment.

18.5.3.17 As a body of evidence the civilian evidence also suggests that the Deceased were shot within a very short time of each other, possibly a matter of seconds, and in close proximity to each other and to William Nash. A number of civilians who witnessed this shooting speak of three young men falling together.[5]

18.5.3.18 In terms of timing, they were undoubtedly shot after Michael Kelly as evidenced by the photograph which shows Michael McDaid walking through the Rubble Barricade, as people tended to the fatally wounded Michael Kelly. P636 & P637

18.5.3.19 They were probably shot as Michael Kelly’s body reached the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North and was being anointed by Frs. Bradley and O’Keefe. As Denis Bradley testified:

“I had been dealing with, I believe, Michael Kelly, but after he had been taken away it was the first time I saw the bodies” H1.12 paragraph 29

18.5.3.20 There are no photographs of Michael McDaid and John Young after they were shot at the Rubble Barricade. It is difficult, therefore, owing to the lack of objective evidence to pinpoint with precision the exact point where they fell. However, overwhelmingly the civilian evidence suggests that they were shot close together.[6] Alex Nash can be seen on Video 48 at V48/10.35 to 11.35 tending his son. The Tribunal’s attention is also drawn to Michael Rodgers’ cine-film at V52/1.00 to 2.00. This shows blood stained pieces of rubble on the Barricade. It would appear that this area of rubble is on the western side of the Barricade.

18.5.3.21 It is our submission, relying upon the video evidence, which finds support in the civilian evidence, that John Young and Michael McDaid were shot close to the edge of the footpath that can be seen in P428 on the Glenfada Park North side of the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.22 Michael McDaid and John Young were certainly shot after Michael Kelly was murdered by Lance Corporal F. In P636 and P637 Michael Kelly can be seen lying on the footpath, having been shot. Michael McDaid can be seen walking in a southerly direction through the Rubble barricade. In EP27.11, Michael Kelly is seen being carried by several persons in a northerly direction along the western side of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. John Nash, the brother of William Nash, positively identified his brother in that photograph, standing with his back against the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, apparently facing in a southerly direction. Day 097/89/11 to Day 097/89/20

18.5.3.23 It is not entirely certain if Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were shot dead before, or after, Hugh Gilmore. However none of the witnesses who saw Hugh Gilmore murdered on the eastern side of Rossville Street were conscious of one or more bodies in very close proximity to each other on the southern side of the Barricade at the time when Hugh Gilmore was shot.

18.5.3.24 Also Robert White, who photographed Hugh Gilmore as he ran, apparently wounded towards the main doors of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, was not aware of dead bodies on the Barricade. Mr White gave evidence that a “short time” (Day 137/81/16 to Day 137/81/22), (anything up to a minute Day 137/81/23 to Day 137/82/1), had elapsed between taking photographs of Michael Kelly lying prostrate on the pavement of Rossville Street and taking the photograph of Hugh Gilmore on Rossville Street. Mr White’s evidence is that a bullet then passed close over his head as he made his way to safety via Glenfada Park South. It seems probable that if there were a number of dead bodies on the Rubble Barricade at that stage, Mr White would have sought to capture that image.

18.5.3.25 It does seem certain that Kevin McElhinney was the last person shot dead near the Rubble Barricade. This is clear from the evidence of a number of witnesses, including Fergus McAteer[7] and Barry Liddy[8], who were aware of the bodies on the Barricade when they saw Kevin McElhinney crawling for his life in a southerly direction along Rossville Street towards the safety of the Rossville Flats.

18.5.3.26 John Young was shot through the left cheek, just to the left of the nose, one centimetre from the inner corner of his left eye. The bullet exited the left side of his back, four and a half centimetres to the left of the midline D0150. His injuries are discussed in more detail below.

18.5.3.27 Michael McDaid was shot through the left cheek. The bullet exited through the right side of his back D0089. His injuries are discussed in more detail below.

18.5.3.28 John Young and Michael McDaid were taken to Altnagelvin Hospital in the rear of a Mortar Platoon pig. They left the Rossville Street area at approximately 4.45 pm, arriving at the Hospital at approximately 5.30pm. The issue of the removal of the bodies is addressed in detail below.

18.5.3.29 There are a number of photographs showing both Michael McDaid and John Young a short period before their death.

18.5.3.30 Michael McDaid is photographed both in the general William Street area and subsequently on Rossville Street.

18.5.3.31 The sequence of photographs showing Michael McDaid in William Street near Barrier 14 appears to be as follows:

P645: Photograph taken by A Brown of the RUC, showing Michael McDaid in the centre of William Street, just to the east of the junction with Chamberlain Street.

P644: Photograph taken by R Simpson of the RUC, showing Michael McDaid side on to the camera, linking hands with Joseph Martin Gallagher (AG19).

P646: Photograph taken by A Brown of the RUC, showing Michael McDaid close to Barrier 14 on William Street.

P647: Photograph retrieved from the Sunday Times Archive showing Michael McDaid on waste ground in the proximity of persons sheltering behind sheets of corrugated tin.

18.5.3.32 Michael McDaid was then photographed in Rossville Street. Two of those photographs were taken by Liam Mailey. They are photographs EP23.5 and EP23.6.

18.5.3.33 According to Mr Mailey’s evidence, EP23.5 is the first in the sequence. It is a heavily foreshortened photograph in which the outline of Michael McDaid’s face can be seen. He is on the footpath on the eastern side of Rossville Street, just south of Pilots Row. EP23.5 also shows the armoured command vehicle, the ferret car and the soft skinned lorries of Composite Platoon. The Pigs of Anti Tank Platoon are further to the north, close to the junction with William Street. There are perhaps a dozen or more soldiers on the western side of Rossville Street in the vicinity of the derelict buildings, other evidence suggests that these were soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.5.3.34 EP23.5 was soon followed by EP23.6. This shows Michael McDaid, again on the eastern side of Rossville Street, but probably just on the road, rather than the footpath. He would appear to be looking north towards the soldiers on the footpath on the western side of Rossville Street in the vicinity of Kells Walk.

18.5.3.35 The last picture which shows Michael McDaid alive is the photograph taken by Robert White at P650 showing Michael McDaid walking through the gap in the Rubble Barricade in a southerly direction, and looking in a south westerly direction at the fatally wounded Michael Kelly.

18.5.3.36 There are no photographs of John Young on Rossville Street before he was shot. He was however photographed by the RUC while at Barrier 14. Those photographs can be found at P657 and P658. In P659 John Young appears to be throwing a stone at the troops behind the Barrier.

18.5.3.37 P660 is taken from the western side of Barrier 14 by Fulvio Grimaldi. John Young appears to have a stone in his right hand. In each of these photographs, John Young is wearing a hat. [9] This hat was not handed over for forensic analysis by the RUC Scenes of Crime Officer, and it is not clear if he was wearing it when he was shot, although Matthew Connolly described John Young was wearing a “combat hat” when he went out onto the Rubble Barricade from the gable wall. AC76.15

18.5.3.38 None of the photographs taken of people at or about the Rubble Barricade show civilians in possession of weapons. The Tribunal has received a Booklet of Enhanced Images (Copy No.6) from Network International Forensic Sciences Division.

18.5.3.39 Photograph EP27.6 has been significantly enhanced to zoom into sixteen separate objects in the possession of persons on Rossville Street and the area to the south of the Rubble Barricade at its western end.

18.5.3.40 Photograph EP27.8 has been enhanced to zoom into a similar number of objects in the hands of civilians standing on top of the Rubble Barricade, or on Rossville Street to the eastern side of the gap in the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.41 Photograph EP27.9 has been enhanced to consider four further objects in the hands of three civilians to the south of the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.42 Finally EP35.9 and EP35.10 focussed on objects in the hands of persons in or about the vicinity of a fatally wounded Michael Kelly.

18.5.3.43 Network International have been unable to confirm the presence of anything more sinister than a stone in the hand of anyone in the vicinity of the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday.

Movements of John Young and Michael McDaid

18.5.3.44 In this section we seek, via the civilian testimony and the photographic evidence to create some picture of the movements of John Young and Michael McDaid before they reached the Rubble Barricade. The photographic evidence shows both of them on the Civil Rights March, both are also seen at Barrier 14, John Young was undoubtedly throwing stones and it is accepted that Michael McDaid may also have been throwing stones at soldiers at the Barrier.

18.5.3.45 John Young had gone on the march on Bloody Sunday with, among others, Eugene Roddy[10] and Brian McCay.[11]

However, he had become separated from his friends by the time he reached the eastern end of William Street. Little is known of John Young’s movements from when he left Barrier 14 on William Street to his arrival at the Rubble Barricade on Rossville Street.

18.5.3.46 Jerry Mallett was also 17 years on Bloody Sunday. He has a recollection of messing around with John Young near Free Derry Corner. AM21.1 paragraph 4 It is not clear, however, at what point in the day this occurred.

18.5.3.47 Michael McCusker spoke to John Young on Rossville Street. He recalls that after making his way through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats, he went onto Rossville Street:

“I stayed at the Rubble Barricade for about five minutes. A man I knew, John Young, who was a tailor whose services I had used, tapped me on the shoulder and told me that two people had been shot. He went on to say that he thought one of them was my friend Michael Bradley. I asked him whether he had been killed and Young told me that he had not but that he had been taken to the first, that is the northern most, house in Joseph Place…” AM160.2 paragraph 10

18.5.3.48 Mr McCusker gave oral evidence to the Tribunal. His evidence was that John Young had come towards the Barricade from the direction of Free Derry Corner.[12] This would lend some support to the evidence of Jerry Mallett, who did not give oral evidence, that John Young was at Free Derry Corner area at some point in the afternoon.

18.5.3.49 Matthew Connolly knew John Young. He saw John Young at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street but left him there and did not know where John Young went after that. AC76.2 paragraph 11. It is not clear whether this was before or after John Young was at Barrier 14. Matthew Connolly later saw John Young again when he was at the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North and was a witness to his murder. AC76.4 paragraph 26.

Michael McDaid

18.5.3.50 Donal Moran has given evidence to this Inquiry. In his written statement, he stated that he had been on the march with Michael McDaid. AM421.1 paragraph 5 In his oral testimony he stated that he had met Michael McDaid somewhere on William Street. Day 153/50/4 to Day 153/50/9

18.5.3.51 Martin McGilloway has also given evidence to the Tribunal. He had been in William Street and made his way to Rossville Street via the courtyard of the Rossville Flats and the gap between Blocks 1 and 2:

“I was stood at the position marked C on the map (grid reference J16) [map is at AM236.4] Here I could see about a dozen people to the south of the Rubble Barricade, including Michael McDaid. He was crouched down on one knee behind the barricade. I knew Michael as I worked with his brother, Kevin. Michael was well dressed and did not look like he was going to riot. I did not know him to be a rioter. He was just talking to people around him. He did not have a weapon.” AM236.2 paragraph 9

18.5.3.52 Before dealing with the shooting of John Young and Michael McDaid, it is proposed to deal with a number of discrete issues which have arisen in the course of the written evidence received and oral testimony heard by this Tribunal. In particular:

i) The question of whether Michael McDaid was arrested and escaped from a saracen prior to being shot and killed.

ii) The issue of whether there was a ‘foray’ over the Rubble barricade prior to the shooting from soldiers, and the significance, if any which should attach to that fact.

iii) The question of whether youths were throwing stones from behind the Rubble Barricade.

“Arrest” of Michael McDaid

18.5.3.53 There is a body of evidence before the Tribunal that Michael McDaid was arrested on Bloody Sunday, but somehow managed to escape from the back of an armoured personnel carrier on Rossville Street, before being shot. At least three witnesses attest to having witnessed this event.

18.5.3.54 John Begley stated in 1972, in both his NICRA statement AB30.1 and the statement made by him to the RUC on 23^rd February, 1972 AB30.2 that he saw Michael McDaid arrested and placed in a Saracen on Bloody Sunday. He has in his evidence to this Tribunal distanced himself from those statements stating that he was drunk when he made the statements and that he does not seek to stand over their contents AB30.5.

18.5.3.55 Frankie Boyle, was a near neighbour of Michael McDaid and claims to have spoken to him at Barrier 14. (AB48.2 paragraph 8) He has given evidence that Michael McDaid was throwing stones on Rossville Street at soldiers, who had entered Rossville Street from the alleyways and side streets from William Street, Kells Walk, Columbcille Court and Glenfada Park. (AB48.2 paragraph 13) He recalls that Michael McDaid wiped his hands on a handkerchief after throwing stones on Rossville Street (AB48.3 paragraph 14) and then went towards soldiers on the waste ground in the area between Pilots Row and the northern gable of Block 1. According to Frankie Boyle, Michael was then arrested by three soldiers, and thrown into the back of an armoured vehicle positioned on waste ground facing the Rossville Flats. He claims that two or three others were also in the Saracen and that a soldier fired CS gas into the back of it when the civilians ‘kicked up’. Michael and one or two others then escaped, rubbing their eyes from the effects of the gas. (AB48.3 paragraph 14)

18.5.3.56 He then claims that Michael McDaid ran away from the Saracen in towards Rossville Street and the Rubble Barricade. Day 127/63/2 to Day 127/63/9 When he had got 20 yards away from the Saracen Michael McDaid was shot in the back by a soldier. Frankie Boyle believed that at that stage Michael McDaid was on Rossville Street near the Rubble Barricade. AB48.3 paragraph 15

18.5.3.57 In oral evidence Mr. Boyle gave evidence that he was at Kells Walk when he saw Michael McDaid being arrested. Day 122/61/20 to Day 122/61/22 He stated that there were no soldiers in or around Kells Walk at the time Michael McDaid was arrested. Day 122/63/21 to Day 122/63/23 He also stated that the Saracen into which Michael McDaid was placed, and from which he escaped, was on the south side of the Rubble Barricade. Day 122/62/2 to Day 122/62/7

18.5.3.58 Significantly according to Frankie Boyle Michael McDaid was in his continuous sight from the point at which he was arrested to the point at which he was shot. Day122/65/8 to Day122/65/17

18.5.3.59 Mr. Boyle’s evidence is demonstrably unreliable for the following reasons:

i) Fundamentally Mr. Boyle’s evidence must be wrong given that he states that Michael McDaid was in his sight from the point at which he was arrested until he was shot. We know from P650 that Michael McDaid walked through the Rubble Barricade alive, and that he did so when there were soldiers at Kells Walk. Mr Boyle’s description is therefore completely inconsistent with objective photographic evidence which he cannot explain.

ii) It is evident from P650 that Michael McDaid is not suffering from the effects of CS gas having been fired at him within the confines of an armoured vehicle.

iii) Contrary to Mr. Boyle’s evidence, Michael McDaid was not shot in the back. AB48.3 paragraph 15

iv) The only time a Saracen went behind the Rubble Barricade was to pick up the three bodies, one of whose was Michael McDaid.

v) The other arrestees who allegedly escaped, have never come forward and never been identified by anyone.

vi) No handkerchief was recovered from the clothing of Michael McDaid or handed over by the RUC Scenes of Crime Officer for forensic analysis. D0072

18.5.3.60 It will also be our case that Mr. Boyle’s evidence about his dealings with Patsy O’Donnell is at best confused and is certainly unreliable. In those circumstances, the Tribunal ought to find that this witness’ account of Michael McDaid’s arrest is inherently unreliable[13].

18.5.3.61 Liam Lynch also gives evidence about Michael McDaid’s arrest. He did not personally know Michael McDaid, but knew him from being around the district. The youth who he described as having been being arrested, had long hair, wore a brown jacket AL26.2 paragraph 13, and stood approximately five feet, nine inches tall. AL26.2 paragraph 15.

18.5.3.62 The description that Mr. Lynch provides does not fit Michael McDaid, who was five feet five inches, and wore a green checked sports jacket. It is apparent from the photographs available to the Tribunal that Michael McDaid did not have long hair.

18.5.3.63 Mr Lynch rejected a suggestion from Arthur Harvey QC that what he had in fact witnessed was William John Dillon being arrested by two soldiers on the waste ground, as depicted in EP2/7, Day 145/16/18 to Day 145/19/23. It is submitted however, that Mr Lynch is mistaken and that the person he saw being arrested by two soldiers was either John Dillon, James Charles O’Doherty or Charles Canning, all of whom were arrested and escorted across Rossville Street to the corner of William Street and Rossville Street.

18.5.3.64 Eamonn Melaugh also gave evidence to this Tribunal. Mr Melaugh was a local amateur photographer and he gave evidence about a photograph which depicted Michael McDaid alive and well, and clearly not injured, standing in the middle of the Rubble Barricade, after the shooting had ended. AM397.8 paragraph 72 He maintained that this photograph was given to John Lloyd of Time Out Magazine and never returned to the owner.

18.5.3.65 Mr Melaugh continued: “A couple of weeks after Bloody Sunday I was on the street in the Bogside area talking with a friend and showing him the photographs that I’d taken on Bloody Sunday when 2 members of Sinn Féin came up uninvited and listened in.” AM397.8 paragraph 77

“When I came to the photograph of Michael McDaid the 2 men became very excited, saying that he was still alive when I took the photo. They then told me that he was one of the men that had been shot on Bloody Sunday. The penny still didn’t drop and they went on and then I finally understood that there was a real question over how Michael McDaid had died that day. This was because when I took the photo I thought that the shooting had stopped and for the time thereafter that I stayed in the vicinity I can’t recall hearing any further shooting.

Although John Lloyd failed to return the photograph of Michael McDaid to me I believe that I have seen it recently, so there may be a copy of it still around. I will make some inquiries and if I manage to get a print of it I will supply it to the Inquiry.” AM397.8 paragraphs 78 to 79

18.5.3.66 It is our contention that the evidence of Mr Melaugh in this regard is clearly mistaken. Mr Melaugh is the source of a number of invaluable photographs of Bloody Sunday. His photographs can be found from P600 to P612 inclusive. Such a photograph has never been supplied to the Inquiry and no further evidence has ever come to light about the existence of such a photograph.

18.5.3.67 When he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal he stated that it was his belief that this photograph was taken: after the shooting had stopped; after he had photographed the fatally wounded Hugh Gilmore, Paddy Doherty and Barney McGuigan; and, after he had spoken to and photographed Patsy McDaid in Joseph Place. Day 143/51/13 to Day 143/52/19

18.5.3.68 Mr. Melaugh confirmed that he did not actually see Michael McDaid being shot on Bloody Sunday, nor did he see his body. Day 143/54/10 to Day 143/54/16 Mr Melaugh also believes that he photographed Michael McDaid from much the same position as the position from where Mr Robert White took P650. It is submitted that Mr Melaugh is essentially confused in his belief that he took such a photograph, particularly since all the evidence suggests that Michael McDaid was shot well before Paddy Doherty and Barney McGuigan were killed in Sector 5. It should also be noted that Mr Melaugh gave a lengthy interview to the Sunday Times Insight Team in 1972, “within days” of Bloody Sunday. (Day 143/23/22 to Day 143/24/1) The interview spanned some twelve pages of notes and at no stage during that interview did Mr. Melaugh state that he had photographed Michael McDaid alive, and on top of the Rubble Barricade. AM397.19 to AM397.30

18.5.3.69 As Counsel to the Inquiry has pointed out, the photograph described has never been published in any newspaper or journal since Bloody Sunday. Day 143/59/14 to Day 143/60/2

18.5.3.70 Few witnesses have been asked about this issue in the negative, so to speak but Brendan Harley was asked whether he had seen anyone arrested to the north of the barricade and subsequently escape from a Saracen and rejected the notion. Day 121/150/2 to Day 121/150/6

18.5.3.71 It is apparent in our submission that upon consideration of the above evidence and the photographs available to the Tribunal there is no sensible or objective basis upon which it could be concluded that Michael McDaid had been arrested and escaped from custody on Bloody Sunday, prior to being shot.

18.5.3.72 A number of civilian witnesses have been questioned about ‘forays’ over the Rubble Barricade. In effect whether groups of youths advanced, either once or repeatedly, onto or over the Rubble Barricade and down Rossville Street, throwing stones at soldiers. There were also suggestions that this group of youths were chanting “Hey, hey IRA” at the soldiers. It has also been specifically suggested to witnesses that Michael McDaid may have been a participant in such a foray. Day 127/54/16 to Day 127/56/15

18.5.3.73 The suggestion has generally been put in the context of the arrest of William John Dillon on the waste ground, as seen in photos P486, P487. The suggestion being that the crowd became enraged at the manner of his arrest and advanced with the intention of rescuing him. Day 127/57/12 to Day 127/60/6 However, it is clear that while in the course of questioning, reference is made to the arrest of William John Dillon, the issue is being put because of evidence given by Soldiers P and 017. Day 127/73/14 to Day 127/74/2

18.5.3.74 It should be noted that this was also a feature of the case put on behalf of the soldiers in 1972. A number of witnesses were asked by Mr. Gibbens whether they had seen relays from the Rubble Barricade, groups of 40 to 50, “coming up to the barricade and throwing missiles at the troops, then going back and bringing more missiles and coming up again and throwing them at the troops”.[14] WT4.62F

18.5.3.75 It is our submission that this issue is something of a ‘red herring’ as regards the conduct of civilians. It was put apparently because of the case being advanced on behalf of Soldiers P and 017, however:

i) The soldiers involved in the arrest of William John Dillon, Soldiers 006 and 037 were unaware of what was happening at the Rubble Barricade. (Day 334/20/12 to Day 334/20/15 and Day 357/133/6 to Day 357/133/9)

ii) Soldiers P and 017 had no involvement in the arrest of William John Dillon, which was taken place some distance away.

iii) No civilian witness has suggested that any advance from the Rubble Barricade was directed at Soldiers P and 017.

18.5.3.76 However, the most significant reason why this issue is a ‘red herring’ is because what has been suggested to witnesses is entirely inconsistent with the case advanced by Soldiers P and 017.

18.5.3.77 It is necessary in relation to this issue to refer briefly to the evidence of soldiers about this matter. Soldiers P and 017 have given evidence of soldiers coming under attack from stone-throwing rioters while they were positioned on Rossville Street. Their evidence is addressed in more detail in Section 20.7.1 below.

18.5.3.78 However the following points about their evidence should be noted at this juncture:

i) In P’s first RMP statement he refers to 20 rioters who advanced towards Soldier P and his companions, immediately upon their debussing, throwing stones and missiles constantly as they approached. It was from this crowd of rioters that P’s first target, who he claims was a nail bomber was identified and at whom P fired 2 shots. B577 From his description these rioters must have been advancing from Kells Walk across Rossville Street.

ii) In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Soldier P claims that along with 017 he took cover along-side the east-facing wall at the Kells Walk pram-ramp, a group of people came along an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court, throwing stones and bottles at them. Soldier 017 fired a number of baton rounds into the crowd, splitting them up. According to his Treasury Solicitor statement it was from this crowd of rioters that P’s first target, who he claims was a nail bomber was identified and at whom P fired 2 shots. B592

iii) In his evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier P could see people behind the Barricade who were either throwing stones or moving towards Free Derry Corner. WT13.46A There is no description of forays over the Rubble Barricade. Then a group of people came out from the Columbcille Court alleyway and began throwing stones and bottles at the soldiers. Soldier 017 again fired baton rounds and dispersed the crowd. It was from this crowd of rioters that P’s first target, who he claims was a nail bomber was identified and at whom P fired 2 shots. WT13.46C

iv) P subsequently fired 4 shots at a man who he claimed was a gunman, positioned behind the Rubble Barricade, hitting him 3 times. Soldier P fired 4 live rounds, 1 hit the Rubble Barricade and the others hit the man who fell back. WT13.50A-E

v) Finally Soldier P stated that after he had shot and killed a man at the Rubble Barricade, he fired a further 5 rounds over the heads of rioters in an attempt to disperse them. B578 Soldier P then went on to make a second RMP statement on the 1^st February 1972 in which he claimed that instead of having fired 5 rounds over the heads of rioters he had in fact only fired 3, because he had only fired 9 rounds in total. B588

18.5.3.79 Soldier P now claims to have no independent recollection of the events of the day and invites the Tribunal to accept his 1972 accounts.

ii) In his first account rioters advanced upon him from Kells Walk B577, in his subsequent account from an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. B592

iii) He describes rioters behind the Rubble Barricade, but does not allege that they advanced on him or his colleague, either once or repeatedly. WT13.46A

iv) He does claim that a crowd advanced upon him from the Rubble Barricade, B578 but only after, on his own account, he had fired two sets of shots over the Rubble Barricade, the first two at a nail bomber WT13.46C and the next 4 at a gunmen. WT13.50A-E

18.5.3.81 It cannot therefore be correct to suggest that on P’s evidence he fired shots over the heads of the crowd before firing at targets with the aim of killing them.

18.5.3.82 Soldier 017 also gave a number of accounts of events, it is not proposed to deal with his RMP statements as they are dealt with in greater detail below. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor at the relevant portions he stated as follows:

i) There was a crowd of about 50 people in front of the Rubble Barricade, they rushed towards Soldier 017 so he fired 1 round which split them up. B1482 paragraph 3

ii) Soldier P then warned Soldier 017 to look out as he had seen a man come from behind the crowd, Soldier 017 then goes onto describe Soldier P shooting someone who he claimed to believe was a nail bomber. B1482 paragraph 3

iii) The crowd then went behind the Rubble Barricade and continued to throw bottles and stones in the direction of the soldiers. B1482 paragraph 4

iv) People were also running in and out of an alleyway which led to Columbcille Court, throwing bricks, bottles and stones at the soldiers. Soldier 017 then describes firing rubber bullets at a man with a pistol/revolver. B1482 paragraph 4

18.5.3.83 Soldier 017 has also given evidence to this Tribunal, in his statement prepared for Eversheds, dealing only with the relevant portions he stated as follows:

i) There were thousands behind the Rubble Barricade and he was showered with bricks and stones from there. B1484.004 paragraph 22

ii) A group broke away from the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade and made approaches towards Soldier 017, he stated that the crowd “would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me. Crowds had killed soldiers before. I felt very vulnerable there on my own.” B1484.004 paragraph 23

iii) Soldier 017 fired 2/3 rubber bullets at the crowd and was then joined by Soldier P. B1484.004 paragraph 24

iv) 40 – 50 people came out from an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court, they ran south to join the main group of rioters and Soldier 017 fired rubber bullets at them. B1484.004 paragraph 27

v) Soldier P then shouted a warning about a nail bomber, who was in the midst of a crowd just north of the Rubble Barricade. Soldier 017 goes on to describe Soldier P shooting an alleged nail bomber. B1484.004 paragraph 27

vi) Shortly after that Soldier 017 looked down an alleyway immediately to his right, he could see rubble, 4/5 youths were throwing bottles or bricks towards Soldier 017 and he went forward to arrest someone, when he saw a man with a pistol at whom he fired his rubber bullet gun before making his escape. B1484.005 paragraph 29 and B1484.005 paragraph 31

18.5.3.84 Thus Soldier 017 does give evidence of rioters advancing from the Rubble Barricade. B1484.004 paragraph 23 That incident is followed by a crowd advancing from an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. He does not describe the incident which apparently resulted in Soldier P firing rounds over people’s heads.

18.5.3.85 It has been necessary to go through that evidence in some little detail because of the case which was put by Counsel acting on behalf of Soldiers P and 017 to civilian witnesses.

18.5.3.86 During the course of Ronald Wood’s evidence to the Tribunal the following photos were put to Ronald Wood EP32.1, EP 32.2, P648, EP35.04, EP23.04, EP23.07 and EP21.02. The following suggestion was then put to Ronald Wood:

“Q. I want to suggest that there was firing of high velocity rounds from the north of where you were, but none of those rounds hit anyone at the barricade at all?

Q. Is it your recollection that when Michael Kelly is hit, he is hit by one of the very first high velocity rounds?

Q. Do you remember witnessing arrests or an arrest happening in the wasteground north of you?

Q. Do you remember a lot of people at the barricade getting very angry at that arrest?

A. I said in my statement that they were shouting obscenities at the army when they came in, yes.” Day 127/57/3 to Day 127/57/22

“What I am suggesting, while you were at the barricade, for whatever reason, you have missed or forgotten a whole episode in where everyone at the barricade gets incredibly angry at what the army were doing and surged forward over the barricade?

18.5.3.88 Mr. Clarke was then asked to clarify what case was being made in relation to the high velocity rounds purportedly fired before the killing of Michael Kelly and stated:

“What I hope we made clear a few days ago is that Soldier P in his statement has said he fired shots over the heads of a crowd of people who came out of Glenfada Park North, the northeast corner, and 017 says that from those people emerged a man with a handgun who fired towards 017. 017 fired a baton round and fled and P discharged high velocity rounds over the head of that crowd.

Now, it is that discharge of shots that I have put to Mr. Wood, and I hope made clear, was not responsible for the deaths of any people on the barricade.” Day 127/73/14 to Day 127/74/2

18.5.3.89 The difficulty is of course, that this is an attempted amalgamation of different aspects of the evidence of Soldiers 017 and P and is not consistent with the case they have ever made, either collectively or individually for the following reasons:

i) Soldier P claims to have fired over the heads of a crowd after he had killed two people, one of whom was positioned behind the Rubble Barricade, and the other positioned according to his trajectory photograph P22 on Rossville Street. Thus, regardless of where the shooting of Soldier F fits into the sequence, this firing took place after, on his evidence, two people had been shot and killed on Rossville Street, one in front of and one behind the Rubble Barricade.

ii) The crowd from which 017 claims the gunmen he saw came from, was a crowd which came from an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. In his evidence to this Inquiry he maintains that this gunman never made it onto Rossville Street, moreover, Soldier P did not fire at this gunman. In fact reading any of Soldier P’s accounts, he neither saw, nor was made aware of this gunman.

18.5.3.90 On Soldier 017’s evidence the attack or ‘foray’ described by him, did not result in any response from soldiers other than the firing of baton rounds. On Soldier P’s account, the attack or ‘foray’ described by him occurred after at least 2 men had been shot and killed by him. Moreover this evidence ignores the fact that at this time, soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon were also positioned behind the Kells Walk Wall and on the evidence it would appear had fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade before Soldier P left the area.

18.5.3.91 It therefore appears that the entire premise upon which this line of questioning was conducted is flawed. The issue is not without significance however, as will be seen below when dealing with civilian evidence about the conduct of soldiers on Rossville Street, there is evidence which suggests that the first two shots fired at the Rubble Barricade were fired by Soldier P. They were fired from his hip, they were not fired at a nail-bomber and they did not in fact result in any casualties. That fact is however inconsistent with the evidence which has been given by Soldier P about the circumstances in which he fired live rounds.

18.5.3.92 There is certainly evidence of at least one move from a group of youths over the Rubble Barricade, throwing stones at soldiers. Inasmuch as there has been evidence about this, it appears to relate to the arrest of William John Dillon. It would also appear from the photographic evidence that when the Saracens came into Rossville Street some youths were positioned in advance of the Rubble Barricade and may have been throwing stones. EP23.4, EP27.6, EP27.7, EP27.8

18.5.3.93 Other witnesses, who can be regarded as reliable have rejected this account. It is our submission that while there was in all probability, some slight advance made by a small group of youths over the Rubble Barricade and some stone-throwing from the Rubble Barricade, the incident was of a relatively minor nature and went unnoticed even by people at the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.94 In any event, this incident took place at an early stage, prior to the shooting of Michael Kelly and neither put soldiers under threat, nor provided any basis or justification for the firing of live rounds, either at civilians, or over their heads.

18.5.3.95 Ronald Wood was asked about this issue, not only in the course of this Inquiry, but also when he gave evidence in 1972 to Lord Widgery. While Mr Wood accepted that there had been stone-throwing from the Rubble Barricade he rejected the suggestion that 40 or 50 youths were running back and forward throwing stones. (AW24.21E-F) It should be noted that in 1972 it was not being suggested that these persons advanced forward of the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.96 Ronald Wood has also given evidence to this Inquiry. On his own account he was present at the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North when the soldiers took up position on Rossville Street. He witnessed Michael Kelly being shot and then saw two further people shot and killed by the soldiers. AW24.12 paragraphs 11 to 12

18.5.3.97 He has always acknowledged that there was stone-throwing from the Rubble Barricade at soldiers and that people shouted obscenities at soldiers. AW24.2 paragraph 9 As can be seen from the extract of the transcript of his evidence quoted above, he rejected the suggestion of a foray put to him by Peter Clarke QC. Day 127/5712 to Day 127/57/22

18.5.3.98 It is our submission that, given that he was at the Rubble Barricade when the soldiers arrived and remained there until after Michael Kelly was shot, had this incident been of any significance he would not have missed it. Day127/59/23 to Day 127/60/6

18.5.3.99 George Downey gave evidence that he saw people advance south of the Rubble Barricade and that:

“A. The reason why they done this, there were some fella got arrested that was on the waste ground and I think it was a rioter that jumped over, started throwing stones and stuff like that, you know, and they were swearing at them, you know, but no-one ever got up that far, you know.” Day 123/15/21 to Day 123/16/5

“A. . . . there were three or four guys, and they got about, say, five or six foot over the barricade, that is about as far as they got, and they started to throw stones at them.” Day 123/18/24 to Day 123/19/7

18.5.3.101 He subsequently confirmed that this occurred before the first live rounds were fired. Day 123/24/3 to Day 123/25/1

18.5.3.102 Having, after detailed questioning by Mr. Clarke QC on behalf of the tribunal, given evidence that the sequence of events was first the foray and then the shots, including the one which killed Michael Kelly, it was put to him by Peter Clarke QC

“Q. But if there was that short sally over the barricade, would it have happened after the shot at the high?

Q. Do you remember how that abortive attempt to help the man who was being arrested, do you remember how that stopped and how it ceased?

A. The man getting arrested was actually too far away from the barricade . . . I think there was just . . . a gesture of their anger . . . but they were not up far enough . . . to do any damage.” Day 123/65/21 to Day 123/66/10

18.5.3.103 George Downey also gave evidence that he never saw any incident involving rioters and Soldiers P and 017. Day 123/68/20 to Day 123/69/4

18.5.3.104 In relation to the issue of sequencing of events, it is clear that Mr Downey’s evidence is confused. It is submitted that, if witnessed by George Downey, this incident could only ever have occurred prior to the shooting of Michael Kelly because of Mr. Downey’s involvement in removing Michael Kelly from the Rubble Barricade. In any event, after the shooting of Michael Kelly such an incident would simply not have occurred.

18.5.3.105 What is being described is a relatively minor incident, involving a small number of youths, it did not justify the firing of live rounds by any soldier.

18.5.3.106 Gavan Duffy, who was accompanied by his friend Paul McGeady, describes a similar incident. He witnessed a youth running away, being assaulted by soldiers and falling to the ground. People behind the Barricade surged forward to help, some throwing stones. AD155.2 paragraphs 10 to 11 He then witnessed Michael Kelly being shot. AD155.2 paragraphs 12

18.5.3.107 Mr Duffy, estimated that this event prompted around 80 persons to surge forward in an effort to rescue the boy, although must of those moved forward towards the Rubble Barricade, with 20-30 crossing the Barricade. Day 126/144/7 to Day 126/144/10 and Day 127/145/2 to Day 127/145/8 Some of them threw missiles at the soldiers, more of whom were now visible at the waste ground, around the Flats, and at Kells Walk. However, none of those persons actually approached the soldiers to rescue the boy. Day 127/145/9 to Day 127/145/17

18.5.3.108 While this incident certainly appears more significant than that described by George Downey, it must be remembered that this incident occurred just prior to Michael Kelly being shot, and the photographic evidence, showing Michael Kelly, at EP27.6, EP27.7 undermines the suggestion of a significant move across the Barricade as described by the witness. Again the incident appears to bear no relationship to Soldiers P and 017, focused as it is on the waste ground and again it is apparent that people did not advance any significant distance, or pose any real threat.

18.5.3.109 Paul McGeady had been on Rossville Street, south of the Rubble Barricade with his friend, Gavan Duffy. Mr. McGeady’s evidence was that he saw a youth stumble across the waste ground on the east of Rossville Street and then saw a soldier strike the young man on the left hand side of the face with his rifle, causing the man to fall at the feet of the soldier. AM219.3 paragraph 19 He then witnessed three to four youths, of about 20 years old, south of the Rubble Barricade say that they would go out and try to rescue the young man from the soldier. AM219.4 paragraph 20

18.5.3.110 In oral evidence he recalled that ‘several dozen’ surged towards the Rubble Barricade from the south Day 137/128/1 to Day 137/128/4 and that between six to twelve persons crossed the barrier to the north. Day 137/128/10 to Day 137/128/12

18.5.3.111 Mr. McGeady also describes the shooting immediately afterwards of Michael Kelly. While this witness was somewhat confused about Michael Kelly’s location and actions prior to being shot, it is nonetheless our view that the person he saw shot was Michael Kelly.

18.5.3.112 Mr. McGeady and Mr Duffy were in each others company at this time. While Mr. McGeady’s original statement spoke of 3/4 youths advancing towards the Rubble Barricade, on having Mr. Duffy’s account put to him, he increased it to several dozen. It is submitted that the incident was, as per Mr. McGeady’s evidence of a more insignificant nature than that described by Mr. Duffy. Again the incident appears to bear no relationship to Soldiers P and 017, focussed as it is on the waste ground and again it is apparent that people did not advance any significant distance, or pose any real threat.

18.5.3.113 Alphonsus Oliver Cunningham in the transcript of his Keville tape stated that at the time of the arrest on the wasteground about ‘ten or fifteen’ went over the barricade. AC125.11

18.5.3.114 A witness who has not come to give evidence to this Tribunal Brendan Carlin has made a statement to the effect that two soldiers, on his account, probably soldiers P and 017 were being stoned by a crowd coming out of an alleyway eastwards from the north of Glenfada Park North. According to this witness the soldier with the rubber bullet gun, (Soldier 017) was “loading his gun as fast as he possibly could and was firing at the youths who were coming back and forth from the alley.” He claims that the other soldier, Soldier P fired a live round “with his right elbow at the hip but with the gun pointing over the heads of the youths.” AC30.7 paragraph 12

18.5.3.115 According to this statement the soldiers were attacked, not from the Rubble Barricade, but from an alleyway leading on to Rossville Street and in response (Soldier P) fired a live round, in breach of the yellow card and more seriously, from the hip. His account is inconsistent with the soldiers’ version of events, it is also uncorroborated by civilians. In the absence of seeing the witness give oral testimony it is difficult to make an assessment as to the reliability of this account. We are unaware of the reason for his failure to come forward and invite the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference from his failure to give oral testimony in the event that no good reason for his non-attendance has been advanced.

18.5.3.116 A number of witnesses also reject the suggestion of a ‘foray’ over the Rubble Barricade, a few are dealt with below. These witnesses are discussed, not to suggest that the witnesses above are lying, but because it demonstrates that whatever the nature of the incident, it was relatively insignificant in that it went largely unnoticed by a significant number of civilian witnesses.

18.5.3.117 Charlie Lamberton, who is in fact the only witness to contend that people behind the Barricade were chanting “Hey, hey IRA” rejected the suggestion that there people had advanced north of the Rubble Barricade. Day183/111/22 to Day183/112/11

18.5.3.118 Brian Rainey (AR3) was also questioned about this matter. Brian Rainey was standing on a small wall which ran around the gardens on the south east side of Glenfada Park South, from where he had a good view of the Rubble Barricade and down Rossville Street. Day 132/106/17 to Day 132/106/19 From that location he could see a number of youths throwing stones. Day 132/107/2 to Day 132/107/10

18.5.3.119 Brian Rainey had a specific recollection of the two arrests conducted in the waste ground and was asked:

“Do you remember, did that have the effect of thoroughly annoying and infuriating particularly the young men at the rubble barricade?

A. I could not say that it had any more that they had seen this sort of thing before. I do not think this in particular would infuriate them.” Day 132/154/3 to Day 132/154/8

18.5.3.120 There are also other witnesses who make no reference to any such incident and were not asked about it. The photographic evidence, showing the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade before the shooting of Michael Kelly and in particular, photographs P635A also undermine the suggestion that this was a major incident.

18.5.3.121 In our submission, while an incident may have occurred in that youths advanced north of the Rubble Barricade in response to the arrest of William John Dillon, it was of a relatively insignificant nature and posed no threat to any soldiers. None of the witnesses lend support to Soldier 017’s suggestion that he believed that the crowd “would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me. Crowds had killed soldiers before. I felt very vulnerable there on my own.” B1484.004 paragraph 23 In fact consistently the witnesses speak in terms of the actions of civilians as amounting to a gesture, rather than posing any threat. Moreover, on their account it was not directed at Soldiers P and 017.

18.5.3.122 None of these witnesses lend support to the soldiers’ case that there were nail bombs thrown from, or gunfire coming from the Rubble Barricade, which was the basis upon which soldiers claimed that they used lethal force. All of them give clear evidence that the persons they saw shot and killed were unarmed and were posing no threat to soldiers. Moreover, all of the witnesses testify to the fact that no one at the Rubble Barricade was posing a threat to soldiers.

18.5.3.123 The issue has been elevated by those acting for the soldiers into a major issue out of all proportion to its importance and, while it lends support to the evidence that people at the Barricade were engaged in stone-throwing and were hostile to the soldiers, it tells us little more. However, the incident is not insignificant given the evidence dealt with below in relation to Soldier P which suggests that, unprovoked by any significant attack or threat, Soldier P fired off 2 rounds from his hip prior to the firing of the round by Soldier F which killed Michael Kelly. This firing, while it did not in fact, claim any casualties was completely unjustified.

18.5.3.124 There is evidence, not merely from the witnesses identified above, but from other civilian witnesses that some youths were involved in stone-throwing at soldiers from behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.125 Father O’Keefe can be seen in P412 and P413, with his back to the camera, surveying the scene on Rossville Street. He recalled that there were perhaps 35 people in the general area of the Rubble Barricade. His recollection was that a

“small group of youths, about 7 or 8, towards the middle of the barricade on the Free Derry Side…clearly intended to confront the soldiers. As the soldiers dispersed, I have a vague recollection of these youths waving their arms and yelling at the soldiers. I do not remember actually seeing them throwing stones – I was watching the Saracens – but I had the impression that stones were being thrown. The boys were calling out to other people in the area to join them. I assume that they must have been thinking that the soldiers were not going to come right in and that there could be another confrontation.” H21.46 paragraph 11

18.5.3.126 Matthew Connolly, who was at the southern gable of Glenfada Park North, also recalled about 20 to 30 people throwing stones at an armoured vehicle on the waste ground AC76.2 paragraph 13, and some people throwing stones in the general direction of the soldiers, although there was nothing close enough to throw stones at. He also recalled the crowd shouting obscenities at the soldiers. AC76.2 at paragraph 16

18.5.3.127 Margo Harkin recalled that at least one youth was to the north of the Rubble Barricade, throwing stones Day 416/7/10 to Day 416/7/18. She also remembers that a young man with long shoulder length hair, which may have been dirty fair, stood slightly to the north of the Rubble Barricade and entertained the crowd at the Rubble Barricade by putting on a show of bravado AH 23.13 paragraphs 21 to 22. She went on:

“A few of the younger lads were throwing stones at the army, which they were picking up from the ground and from the Rubble Barricade. It was nothing unusual to see fellas of this age throwing stones in Derry at this time and on this occasion, at this point; it wasn’t on any great scale. They would have been between say 14 and 18 years old.” AH23.14 paragraph 24.

18.5.3.128 In her oral evidence to the Tribunal, she suggested that there could have been anything from 5 to 15 people gesticulating or throwing stones from the Barricade area. Day 416/9/15 to Day 416/9/22

18.5.3.129 George Roberts candidly admits to throwing stones[15] from the Rubble Barricade towards soldiers who, he says, were coming in their armoured cars. He says that maybe 15 to 20 people were throwing stones, but that the soldiers were too far away for his stones to reach. Day 151/69/20 to Day 151/70/4

18.5.3.130 It is not in dispute that there was stone-throwing and some name-calling from youths behind the Rubble Barricade. While, as will be seen below, there is evidence from some of the persons who witnessed the shooting of John Young and Michael McDaid that one or more of those shot may have been throwing stones, or were part of a group throwing stones. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to establish conclusively that either of these deceased were involved in stone-throwing. In any event, stone-throwing did not pose a threat to soldiers and could never have justified the use of lethal force by soldiers on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.3.131 The soldiers’ case to this tribunal is dependent on demonstrating that there were lethal weapons behind the Rubble Barricade, even if not used by the Deceased. On the military evidence, Soldiers P, F and J were firing at nail bombers, Soldier P also fired at a gunman, Soldier E fired at a sniper, Soldier U fired at a pistol man. Other soldiers give evidence of gunfire coming from behind the Rubble Barricade, including Soldier 028 who states that there was a man with a machine-gun firing live rounds.

18.5.3.132 Not one civilian lends support to the case made by the soldiers. The issue of civilian evidence about civilian gunmen and bombers in Sector 3 is dealt with separately. Here it is proposed to deal briefly with some of the evidence, representative of the body of civilian evidence, from people positioned behind the Rubble Barricade and at the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. That evidence demonstrates conclusively that there were no weapons behind the Rubble Barricade, at the time that Michael Kelly, John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash met their deaths.

18.5.3.133 Terence O’Keefe who gave evidence to both the Widgery Inquiry and this Tribunal was asked about the case being made by the soldiers:

“You may or may not know that the case which has been made by the soldiers before this Tribunal is that in and around the southern side of the rubble barricade, there were as many as three persons with rifles; there were two persons with pistols; there was one person with a sub-machine gun; and there were three people with nail bombs; did you see any of that?

A. I saw none of that and I think it would have been impossible for that to have happened without me having noticed.” Day 127/150/11 to Day 127/150/20

“It is also their [the soldiers’] evidence that there was something like 13 gunmen and 3 blast bombers operating out of Rossville Street between Rossville Flats and Glenfada Park. Did you see or hear any of that?

A. No, that I will give evidence about very definitely. From the view from Glenfada Park was a very panoramic of Rossville street right across into Joseph Place; there were no gunmen on Rossville Street; there were no petrol bombers on Rossville Street by the time I got there to that gable end, which was within 30 seconds of Michael Kelly having been anointed by me and me being aware of bodies on --- at the barricade on Rossville Street; there were certainly no gunmen on Rossville Street; there were no bombers in Rossville Street; there was no-one responding to fire out of that Rossville Street area.” Day 140/181/17 to Day 140/182/8

18.5.3.135 Ciaran Donnelly a photographer for the Irish Times on Bloody Sunday witnessed Michael Kelly fall, having been fatally wounded by Soldier F. he was questioned in the following terms at the Widgery Tribunal:

“Q. It may be suggested here that shots were fired from the area where this man fell – from the people behind the barricade? A. No.

Q. What would you say to such a suggestion? A. I was there, and if I was 15 yards at the most from these people I would know if someone was shooting near me, and the first thing I would do would be to run away, because I would not want to be caught in it.

Q. Did you see anything from that crowd behind the barricade which would justify anyone in shooting that man? A. No. That man at the time, he might have thrown stones, but he did not seem to be doing anything at all. He was not even throwing stones at that time.” WT2.84E-G

18.5.3.136 Ciaran Donnelly was also questioned in the course of this Tribunal about this issue and confirmed that he had not seen any weapons behind the Barricade. Day 71/27/7 to Day 71/27/16

18.5.3.137 Matthew Connolly who witnessed the murder of John Young stated that:

“Nobody was shooting from the Rubble Barricade at the army. I was not aware of any civilians at the barricade with guns. If I had seen a civilian gunman, I would have remembered.” AC76.5 paragraph 29

“At no time during the day did I see any civilians with firearms or petrol or nail bombs. I only saw some civilians throwing stones, bottles or bricks. Similarly, I do not think I heard any explosions.” AC76.7 paragraph 47

18.5.3.138 Albert Faulkner a former member of the Royal Navy, who gave evidence at the Widgery Inquiry and made a statement to this Tribunal stated that:

“ . . . I heard no sound which could have been an explosion. The only guns I saw were those carried by the army. Whilst I would not necessarily have been able to distinguish between the sound of an army rifle and a civilian rifle or small hand gun, I do believe that the sharp cracks I could hear all came from army rifles.” AF4.4 paragraph 18

18.5.3.139 Hugh Anthony Duffy stated in the account given by him in 1972 to NICRA that

“None of us had any signs of arms, nail bombs or petrol bombs. The truth is those people who so easily could have included myself were gunned down unnecessarily . . . For them to say they were met by a hail of bullets is a lie. They opened fire indiscriminately, they hit everybody. There was no nail bombs, no petrol bombs and nobody opened fire at them. I swear that”. AD157.9

“I swear that, apart from he British soldiers, I saw no other person with a gun that day, neither did I see or hear any nail bombs or petrol bombers.” AD156.5 paragraph 28

18.5.3.141 The truth of the matter is, as it was so eloquently put by Bishop Daly, when being questioned about the IRA in Derry:

A. And men of violence on that particular day, certainly were those in uniform.” Day 75/72/2 to Day 75/72/9

18.5.3.142 It is not proposed to identify every civilian witness who gave evidence about the fact that, not merely were the deceased unarmed, but those around them, on the Rubble Barricade were unarmed and posing no threat, real or imagined to the soldiers. The civilian testimony demonstrates without more that those killed behind the Barricade were gunned down mercilessly without justification or excuse and that what happened to John Young and Michael McDaid was murder.

18.5.3.143 In relation to the conduct of the crowd at the Rubble Barricade, it is our submission that the civilian evidence can be summarised as follows:

(ii) There is no evidence, photographic, or otherwise, before the Tribunal (including the expert analysis of photographs) to support the conclusion that the civilians at the barricade were armed.

(iv) None of the civilians saw a lethal weapon in the vicinity of the Rubble Barricade.

(v) A number of civilians threw stones in the direction of the army on Rossville Street.

(viii) A small number of civilians may have advanced towards, onto or over the Rubble Barricade, throwing stones and shouting at soldiers, at the time of the arrests in the waste ground.

(ix) Because of the distance between the Rubble Barricade and the soldiers, the stones were never going to reach soldiers and posed no appreciable threat.

(x) The soldiers on Rossville Street were never under threat from the crowd at the Rubble Barricade, nor could they have perceived themselves to be under threat.

Civilian Evidence about Soldiers Firing at Rubble Barricade

18.5.3.144 While civilians came under live fire within a short time of the arrival of soldiers on Rossville Street, some civilians have been in a position to assist the Tribunal as to the actions of those soldiers, both in terms of their positions on Rossville Street, how they fired and whether they took cover. What follows is a brief review of that body of civilian evidence.

18.5.3.145 Fr. O’Keefe gave a very vivid account of the soldiers dismounting from their Saracens and getting into firing positions almost immediately. Such evidence sits uneasily with the suggestion that the soldiers were there to conduct an arrest operation.

18.5.3.146 “As the Saracens stopped and I stopped, and I turned to look north back up Rossville Street, I saw groups of soldiers jumping out of the Saracens and taking up positions. They were all carrying rifles. Some moved swiftly to my left (their right) and took up positions at Kells Walk. Others took up positions across Rossville Street, in front of the Saracens. Some of those soldiers kneeled in firing positions, others stood in firing positions with one foot in front of the other. All the soldiers were holding their rifles to their shoulders. I could not see whether any soldiers went behind the Saracens. It was like a movie scene – men silhouetted against the backdrop, moving very fast with rifles. As the soldiers ran towards their positions, they had their rifles pointing up in the air, but as they adopted their positions, they pointed their rifles down Rossville Street towards the barricade.

18.5.3.147 Very quickly after the soldiers had got into position, the shooting started. The shots were coming from the soldiers I had seen adopting firing positions. I assumed, at first, that the soldiers were firing rubber bullets to drive the crowd further back. It never occurred to me that the soldiers might be firing live ammunition as the crowd had done nothing to justify that.” H21.45 paragraphs 10 to 12

18.5.3.148 When questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry Professor O’Keefe felt that EP23.8 resembled the group he saw running between the two vehicles. He believed that by the time EP23.9 was taken the firing had started and along with other people he had begun to take shelter at the gable wall. In an image preserved as H21.141 the pink arrow depicts the direction in which soldiers were running, while the turquoise arrow depicts other soldiers coming around to stand in front of their vehicles. The blue arrow represents the vehicles. Day 127/98/7 to Day 127/98/12

18.5.3.149 Ronald Wood, also gives an account of the soldiers actions as they debussed:

18.5.3.150 “The doors of the Saracens were thrown open and soldiers disembarked and took up positions . . . One or two soldiers stayed near the vehicles, while a few soldiers took up kneeling positions at a small wall at the north east corner of Glenfada Park North [the witness later identified the wall as “the higher brick wall running parallel to Rossville Street” Day 127/11/9 to Day 127/11/18] . . . using the wall as cover. The remainder positioned themselves between the vehicles and the small wall in kneeling positions facing southwards towards the Rubble Barricade, with their rifles held in an aiming position at their shoulders. . . .” AW24.1 paragraph 7

18.5.3.151 While Ronald Wood’s evidence refers to soldiers apparently taking cover, there is a substantial body of evidence that many soldiers got into firing positions without cover.

18.5.3.152 Alphonsus Oliver Cunningham describes the conduct of one soldier in particular, at about the time that soldiers were involved in the arrest of William John Dillon:

“I then noticed a soldier standing in front of a ramp on the southern end of Kells Walk . . .The soldier was standing in full view. There may have been other soldiers near him but I did not notice any. He was wearing a helmet – I cannot say whether it had a visor, and I don’t remember any other details about his appearance or what he was wearing. He raised his rifle casually to his shoulder and fired a shot in the direction of the rubble barricade. . . “ AC125.2 paragraph 7

18.5.3.153 Under questioning the witness remained clear that the soldier was standing in front of the wall of the ramp leading through to Columbcille Court, close to the end of the gable and that he had fired the first high velocity shot the witness heard that day, fired within a few minutes of the arrival of the Saracens. Day 150/9/16 to Day 150/11/23

18.5.3.154 Liam Mailey took photographs EP23.6, EP23.7, EP23.8, EP23.9 in all of which Soldiers P and 017 can be seen. Liam Mailey was asked about EP23.7 in the course of his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal and was asked about Soldier P, who is the soldier with the rifle in that picture:

“Q. When you saw him what was he doing? A. He was holding a gun about his hip and pointing it towards the barricade.

Q. Was he doing anything with the gun as far as you could see? A. My attention was attracted to him by the sound of two shots and I imagine that he being the only one there with a rifle, he was the one who fired them.

Lord Widgery: You mean he fired them down the entry? No, he fired them towards the barricade. He had just turned round at this stage.

Mr. Hill: As a result of his having fired these two bullets at the barricade did you then try to take his photograph? A. Yes.

Q. So the time the photograph was taken was he in the position he is in photograph 7, just turned and looking down the entry? A. Yes.

Q. Did he then give any signal to other soldiers who were in the background and not shown in photograph 7? A. He gave me that impression, that he was signalling other soldiers, yes.

Q. As a result of that did a number of soldiers come round the wall towards him, and have you shown them in photograph No. 8 (EP23.8) A. Yes.

Q. In photograph No. 9 (EP23.9) is it clear that the soldiers who have come forward in apparent order and have failed to gain entry to the back of Kells Walk have gone back again and between the two walls in order to go up the ramp towards the back of Kells Walk? A. Yes.

Q. Did some of the second group of soldiers appear already to have taken up a firing position at the back of the wall? A. That is right.” WT7.36A-G

18.5.3.155 Liam Mailey no longer has a clear recollection of the events of the day, but his evidence to the effect that Soldier P fired two shots from the hip is consistent with the evidence of two other witnesses to this Inquiry.

18.5.3.156 Eamonn Melaugh in the account he gave to the Sunday Times also refers to a paratrooper firing two rounds from the waist:

“There were three troopers who came the furthest up Rossville St. One was a rubber bullet man who was at the front and he was shooting his rubber bullet gun almost as quickly as he could load it. Immediately behind him and slightly further away because they were standing tight into the brick wall one of the troops I know now to be a paratrooper fired two rounds. He didn’t take aim. He fired from the waist. . . “ AM397.23

18.5.3.157 On Soldier P’s account the first two shots he fired were at a nail bomber. According to his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and the Trajectory Photograph prepared for the Widgery Tribunal P22 Soldier P was at the east facing wall of the Kells Walk pram ramp, as depicted in EP23.7 and the nail bomber was on the same side of the road, on the footpath adjacent to the alleyway leading to Glenfada Park North. Thus on his Treasury Solicitor’s account he fired straight down Rossville Street in the direction of the Rubble Barricade as described by Liam Mailey. The distinction is of course that there was no nail bomber and he fired from the hip.

18.5.3.158 Brendan Carlin also describes soldiers in the positions of Soldier P and 017, one with a rubber bullet fun. On his description the soldiers were being stoned by rioters coming from an alleyway “eastwards from the north of Glenfada Park North . . . These two were under pressure and the other soldier with a rifle fired a live round. He did this with his right elbow at the hip but with the gun pointing over the heads of the youths.” AC30.7 paragraph 12

18.5.3.159 This witness did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry and we are not aware of the reason for his non-attendance. No civilian corroborates his account of these two soldiers being stoned, and the photographs do not tend to support that account. Nonetheless he also gives an account of Soldier P firing two shots from the hip.

18.5.3.160 Ciaran Donnelly’s account of the sequence of shooting lends support to the proposition that the first two shots fired were fired by Soldier P and that this was followed by the shot from Soldier F which resulted in the death of Michael Kelly. He was questioned about the shooting over the Rubble Barricade in the course of the Widgery Tribunal:

“Q. … It is not true to say that you heard any quantity of firing going on after the troops came in? A. Not immediately after they came in.

Q. Until that one shot at the barricade. A. there were first of all two shots and no-one fell and then about a minute later another shot and one man fell.” WT3.8D-E

18.5.3.161 His account to this Tribunal was the same, he heard two shots, nobody fell and then he saw Michael Kelly and possibly Hugh Gilmore fall. Day 71/ 28/7 to Day 71/28/14

18.5.3.162 He also suggests that photograph EP27.7 which is the photograph in which people behind the Rubble Barricade begin to crouch, was taken at the time he heard the two shots. Day 71/32/7 to Day 71/32/18

18.5.3.163 A number of witnesses also give an account of firing from soldiers at the northern gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, where Soldier U was positioned. Given that soldier U is the prime candidate for the shooting of Hugh Gilmore it is not proposed to address that evidence in this section.[16]

18.5.3.164 A number of witnesses describe sustained firing from the soldiers positioned in and about Columbcille Court and behind the Kells Walk Wall. However once the firing started in earnest people took cover and the evidence about the volume of firing after the shooting of Michael Kelly and at the time of and after the shooting of Michael McDaid and John Young is dealt with below.

18.5.3.165 The shooting of John Young and Michael McDaid at the Rubble Barricade took place in the immediate aftermath of the shooting of Michael Kelly. Broadly speaking witnesses to their shooting fall into two categories: those sheltering at the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North; or, those observing from the windows of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Others witnessed it from Joseph Place.

18.5.3.166 The fact that they were shot just a short time after Michael Kelly was shot has added to the confusion in the evidence about the circumstances in which they were shot. The reaction of those around him, to the shooting of Michael Kelly was one of shock. In its initial aftermath, many people had difficulty in believing that he had been shot with a live round, and there was some confusion.[17] Inevitably many people panicked and tried to get way from the Rubble Barricade as quickly as possible.[18]

18.5.3.167 A number of people became involved in moving Michael Kelly from the Rubble Barricade to the relative safety of the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, while others looked on. The evidence would tend to suggest that as Michael Kelly was being tended to at the gable end wall, Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were shot and killed[19].

18.5.3.168 Because of the conditions under which it occurred, with people panicking, running for shelter, or either assisting in or watching the removal of Michael Kelly, the evidence provided by the civilians in respect of the events at the Rubble Barricade is confused and often mistaken.

18.5.3.169 Many witnesses also testify to a sustained volley of shooting over the Rubble Barricade in the aftermath of the shooting of Michael Kelly, this operated to prevent people from watching what was happening and also prevented people from going to the assistance of those shot and killed at the Rubble Barricade[20]. Day127/22/20 to Day 127/23/8

18.5.3.170 An additional problem for witnesses to the murders at the Rubble Barricade is that absent personal knowledge of the victims, it would have been difficult for witnesses to distinguish one youth from another. Under conditions of sustained live fire, where the victims were close to each other in age, in terms of the location at which they were shot and given the proximity of the times of their shooting, understanding what had happened was difficult for those involved.

18.5.3.171 It is apparent from P638 that the body of Michael Kelly was taken to the relative safety of the entrance to Glenfada Park North. It is also clear from the demeanour of some persons at the southern gable of Glenfada Park North that their attention has been drawn to an incident to the east. Two persons can be seen pointing towards the Rubble Barricade, and Mr Barry Liddy, who can be seen in the cream raincoat and hat kneeling close to the body of his fatally wounded nephew, is also watching the Barricade.

18.5.3.172 P639 was taken before P638 and shows a similar scene. Christopher Doherty can be seen at the western edge of the southern gable of Glenfada Park North. He has a white handkerchief tied around his neck, covering his mouth and nose from gas. In P640, Mr. Doherty can be seen walking in an easterly direction, towards the Rubble Barricade, closely followed by Fr Denis Bradley[21], who has just anointed the body of Michael Kelly. Professor Terence O’Keefe, his back to the camera, can be seen standing on the cobble stones, comforting Denis McLaughlin, who was in a distressed state. He is the youth in the camouflaged jeans.

18.5.3.173 Matthew Connolly’s evidence has been looked at briefly in this section in regard to his meeting with John Young at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street (AC76.2 paragraph 11) and in respect of the stone throwing from the Rubble Barricade. (AC76.2 paragraph 13) It is Mr Connolly’s evidence, however, that when the shooting began towards the Rubble Barricade, there was no stone throwing immediately before the troops opened fire. AC76.4 paragraph 23

18.5.3.174 As Mr. Connolly stood behind the Rubble Barricade, close to Glenfada Park North, a small boy in front of him jumped and screamed as if he had been shot. Matthew Connolly initially did not believe he had been shot. Mr. Connolly, was unable to identify the person but was later advised that the person may have been William Nash or Michael McDaid AC76.3 paragraph 17.

18.5.3.175 He gave a description of a youth of 15 or 16 years old, wearing a shirt (which may have been light blue in colour) but no jacket. He believes his hair was dark and of average length. He was shot high up in the left hand side of the chest and it took the witness a couple of minutes to see blood. (In his oral evidence he confirmed that this was just his impression of what the youth was wearing; he couldn’t be sure. Day 151/13/7 to Day 151/13/10) There were two or three people around him. He was still screaming. The group stayed around the boy for about two minutes, during which time there was no shooting AC76.3 paragraph 18. In his deposition to the Coroner, he said that the youth was wounded high up on the left hand side of his chest. It should be noted that Denis McLaughlin’s evidence was that the first person he recalled shot, was also screaming. (AM326.5 paragraph 17)

18.5.3.176 In his interview with Peter Pringle and Peter Jacobsen on March 14, 1972, he said:

“I was standing on the Glenfada Park side of the barricade on the pavement when I heard a single rifle shot a young fellow of about 16 or 17 fell in front of me. He had been shot in the chest on the left side. I learnt after that it was Willie Nash. I could see the bullet hole in his light coloured shirt. The shot appeared to come from the soldiers who were about 40 yards away up Rossville Street on the same side crouched behind the door of a pig. Nash squealed. He was not dead. He was moaning AC 76.14.

The Tribunal will be aware that William Nash was wearing a light coloured shirt.[22]

18.5.3.177 After this youth was shot at the barricade, the witness saw about four soldiers at the low wall at Kells Walk. There was a Saracen almost level with them. He could see that its back doors were open as they projected beyond the sides of the Saracen. The soldiers were aiming their guns south down Rossville Street. He could not say whether they had shot the boy. He described a soldier standing behind the left-hand (as witness looked at it) door of the Saracen. AC76.3 paragraphs 19 to 21 In a deposition for the Inquest, he said he had the impression that this soldier at the rear of the Saracen had fired. AC76.26.

18.5.3.178 The Sunday Times account suggests he then saw John Young for the first time that day. This conflicts with his evidence to this Tribunal at AC76.1 paragraph 9, which suggests that he had met John Young earlier in the day before the Army came in.

18.5.3.179 There was then a volley of automatic shots and the impression that these shots were very close to him. The impact sounded as if it was hitting stones, perhaps the stones in the Rubble Barricade. He believed that there were more than ten or fifteen shots. (In his deposition provided to the Coroner, he estimated that 12 – 15 shots rang out AC 76.26)

“Immediately, I got down flat on the ground. Nobody had been throwing stones immediately before these shots. The soldiers near the Saracen were too far away to throw stones at. Although there had been ten or fifteen of us behind the Rubble Barricade before these shots, it is my recollection that there were only four or five of us lying down behind the barricade after these shots. The others must have moved away, perhaps south down Rossville Street, although I do not know.” AC76.3 paragraphs 22 to 23

18.5.3.180 Mr Connolly then gave a detailed account of the shooting of John Young:

“…I think I was about ten or twelve feet south from the end gable wall but I am not very sure how far east or west along the gable wall I was. I heard someone in the crowd shout “come back in”. I saw somebody on his honkers move out from the gable end of the wall where we were sheltering towards the Rubble Barricade. I thought that the person who had shouted “come back in” had shouted at this man. There was also another man behind him and slightly to his left as I was looking at them and I will describe him later. The first man who I had seen then fell over. He was between the gable wall and the Rubble Barricade, to the south of the Rubble Barricade, approximately at the point marked 2…[almost in centre of Barricade]. He fell to his right. He had been crouched down with his left side towards the Rubble Barricade and he fell to the south away from the barricade onto his right side, facing east. I then saw him plainly and I saw that he was John Young. He had been shot in the head. The wound was in the left hand side of the head. He lay on his side with his feet towards the Rubble Barricade, still in a crouched position. He did not move. Although I heard shots at the time, there was no specific shot which I could say hit him. At no time had I seen John Young throw stones.” AC 76.4 paragraph 26.

18.5.3.181 In his deposition to the Coroner, he said that John Young was about two foot from the end of the garden wall. AC 76.26 This garden wall is best captured in P502. Although Mr. Connolly said in oral evidence he could not be sure about that exact position Day 151/22/3 to Day 151/22/8, in his NICRA statement, Connolly stated his belief that John Young crawled out and was about a yard from the shot youth, when he too was shot. AC 76.13 John Young wore a combat hat and jeans AC 76.15 and the witness confirmed that John Young’s hands were empty Day 151/20/24 and he was making no attempt to call to the soldiers, to signal or wave a white handkerchief. Day 151/21/5 to Day 151/21/8

‘There had been sporadic shooting ever since the first boy had been shot. Occasionally, there would be clusters of heavier shooting too. John Young fell during the sporadic shooting as did the man who was behind him when he was shot’. AC 76.5 paragraph 30

18.5.3.182 He also confirmed that he had heard a single shot and saw John Young fall Day 151/25/20 to Day 151/25/22, and just before he had heard that single shot, there was no shooting going on. Day 151/25/23 to Day 151/26/1

18.5.3.183 Mr. Connolly believed that John and the second person who had fallen, fell “either on the pavement or very close to it”. Day 151/25/1 to Day 151/25/4

18.5.3.184 Counsel for the Families questioned Mr. Connolly as to the timing between the different shootings and the identity of the first person he saw shot and killed. Mr. Connolly said that he believed, but could not swear to it, that five or ten minutes had elapsed before John Young went out to the first body. Day 151/44/7 to Day 151/44/9

18.5.3.185 Mr. Connolly was also questioned about the accuracy of his identification of the first person he saw shot. Specifically it was suggested to him that the first person he had seen shot was Michael Kelly but that he had seen John Young go to the aid of William Nash, lying shot on the Rubble Barricade. Matthew Connolly accepted that this was possible. Day 151/40/11 to Day 151/40/19 He also accepted that the first casualty might have been Michael Kelly when this was suggested to him by Counsel to the Inquiry. Day 151/13/3 to Day 151/13/6

18.5.3.186 Mr Connolly then gave evidence about the possible shooting of a third person:

“Immediately after this, the second man who had been behind John Young and to his left, that is nearer to the Glenfada Park North side of Rossville St, seemed to stumble. He was approximately at the point marked 3 [south of the barricade, almost near the gap] … I think, therefore, that he was further out on the road than the first boy marked 1 I had seen shot. I would say this man was about eighteen or nineteen years old. I think that he wore something dark, maybe jeans, although I am not sure. He was not tall (average height, 5’4” or 5’5” (Day 151/23/17)) and I cannot recall what his hair was like. After I saw him stumble someone then blocked my view and I never saw him again. I do not know what happened to him, but assumed he had been shot. I did not know who he was, but afterwards have discovered that he may be either William Nash or Michael McDaid, because I learned that they, too, were shot there.” AC76.4 paragraph 27.

18.5.3.187 In his NICRA statement at AC76.13, witness says this youth was shot, stumbled back towards the wall and taken onto a house (sic). When this second man went out he did not appear have been carrying anything that looked like a weapon. Day 151/23/21

18.5.3.188 It is clear that Mr Connolly is unable to give a reliable account of what happened to the third person that he saw “stumble”. He told Counsel to the Inquiry that he was not 100% sure, but that he did not think that he saw this person again. Day 151/24/6 to Day 151/24/10 He accepted that in relation to this aspect of his evidence he is reliant upon information that he received after Bloody Sunday, based upon which he made an assumption that it must have been Michael McDaid or William Nash. Day 151/24/3 to Day 151/24/5

18.5.3.189 It was Matthew Connolly’s belief that the shooting he had heard had been coming south down Rossville Street from where he had earlier seen the soldiers at Kells Walk. He accepted that he could not tell the difference between a high or low velocity shot, but could tell the difference between the sound of a rubber bullet and live shots. AC76.5 paragraph 28

18.5.3.190 Mr Connolly could not state conclusively whether John Young and the second man had gone out towards the Rubble Barricade to help the boy he now believes to be William Nash, or not. As stated above John Young and William Nash had been classmates at St Joseph’s school. In addition, William Nash lived at Dunree Gardens, which was a street leading off the street where John Young lived, Westway and was probably therefore known to John Young.

18.5.3.191 It is clear that having witnessed more than one person shot at the Rubble Barricade, and only recognising one, the evidence of Matthew Connolly in relation to the casualties, other than John Young behind the Rubble Barricade is confused. His account has also undoubtedly been influenced by what he was told about the identities of the casualties in the aftermath of the shooting. However his evidence about the circumstances of John Young’s shooting is clear and in our submission reliable. John Young was shot and killed while going to the aid of another person shot and killed at the Rubble Barricade, in all probability William Nash. That submission finds some support in the testimony of Denis McLaughlin below.

18.5.3.192 Denis Mc Laughlin is an important witness to the shooting of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash. He was 16 years old on Bloody Sunday and has identified himself as the youth wearing the distinctive camouflaged or bleached jeans in P640. He had run through Glenfada Park North and stopped at the gable wall where he estimates that 20 or 30 people were already gathered. He describes a scene of panic at the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and stated that he could hear high velocity shots coming from the northern end of Rossville Street. AM 326.4 paragraph 15 Mr McLaughlin did not witness any soldier shooting towards the Rubble Barricade. Day 159/32/12 to Day 159/32/14

18.5.3.193 According to Denis McLaughlin’s evidence William Nash was the first person he witnessed being shot at the Rubble Barricade. If his evidence is correct, William Nash must have left the position in which his brother John had identified him in EP27.11, because Denis McLaughlin recalled that William Nash was running over the loose stones of the barricade at a point he has marked as ‘10’ on the plan attached to his statement at AM326.23.

18.5.3.194 Mr. McLaughlin has provided an accurate description of the clothing worn by William Nash on Bloody Sunday, of a brown suit. William Nash was crossing the Rubble Barricade in a southerly direction towards Free Derry Corner, and was approaching the Barricade from the direction of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. “He was not holding anything in his hands and did not look as if he was about to pick anything up. He was in a brisk walking posture but crouching from the shoulders with his head slightly bent, as if to make himself smaller to avoid the firing. He was running towards Free Derry Corner.” AM326.5 paragraph 16

“As I caught sight of him he fell back and rolled over on his mouth and nose, on the Free Derry side (southside) of the Rubble Barricade. He lay no more than three to four yards from me and closer to the Glenfada Park pavement side. There is no doubt that he was unarmed. He began to start screaming, at which point I realised that he had been shot.” AM326.5 paragraph 17

18.5.3.193 According to Denis McLaughlin, George Roberts, who is the long haired person on his hands and knees, slightly to the north east of Michael Kelly in P418, wearing jeans and a denim jacket, threw himself to the ground and began to crawl over to see if he could do anything for the man. Mr. McLaughlin then described how he

“threw himself on to the ground and out into the Rubble Barricade over to the side of the man in the brown suit who had been shot. Just as I reached him the screaming died away to a moan. I began talking to him hysterically, telling him, “Don’t worry, you’ll be alright; we’ll get you in”. I cannot remember seeing a wound anywhere on his body. I looked at George and he told me the man was dead.”’ AM326.5 paragraph 18.

“Since Bloody Sunday I have seen pictures of the men who were killed that day, and can confirm that William Nash is the man I saw in the brown suit on the Rubble Barricade. I still have a clear picture of his face today.” AM 326.6 paragraph 20

18.5.3.196 In oral evidence, he said he was sure that George Roberts was running with William Nash Day 159/14/7 to Day 159/14/20 and that Nash was facing Free Derry Corner when he fell face down Day 159/15/17 to Day 159/15/25. At the time that witness and George Roberts went out to the aid of the man, he recalls that no other casualties were at or near the Barricade and is certain that both he and Roberts went to the aid of the same person. Day 159/16/11 to Day 159/16/17 The position where the witness believes he saw William Nash fall was on the left hand side of what is shown in photograph E14.12 (Day 159/21/1 to Day 159/21/16) and the body was on the Glenfada Park North side of the gap in the barricade. Day 159/21/17 to Day 159/21/25

18.5.3.197 Mr. McLaughlin described the shooting which followed the death of William Nash in the following terms:

“After a brief moment everything happened very suddenly. As I turned away in fear from the man in the brown suit, I saw another person fall and I later found out he had been shot dead. He was four or five yards away lying on the road while I lay on the wide pavement. Another person walked out slowly and cautiously to this second person who had been shot. More shots rang out and he fell on top of me. People over at the flats were calling out and roaring “There’s men dead”, meaning us. I also heard someone saying “They’re shooting from the Derry Walls”. I then turned on my back and saw a person’s head burst open and blood was pouring out. All I saw was red. This person fell on my side and blood came all over me and covered my hands. At no time did these people have anything in their hands. At this point I became totally hysterical and began roaring at George “Look at the blood”. He replied “There’s nothing we can do, we’ll get in out of the road”. I cannot remember anything about the position in which those bodies fell, from where they were shot, where they were shot in their bodies, what they were wearing or anything about their appearance. I can only say that they were shot very close to me.” AM 326.5 paragraph 19

18.5.3.198 Mr. McLaughlin was not able to remember where the second person he saw shot was before he fell save that he was on the Free Derry Corner side of the Rubble Barricade. Day 159/23/15 to Day 159/23/24 McLaughlin places himself in the area of the photograph marked with a block, which can be found at AM326.36, but he could not remember exactly where the person fell. (Day 159/26/14 to Day 159/27/7) His statement at AM326.5 at paragraph 19 states that he was four or five yards away, and on the road. He did not see from where this person came but presumes he walked out from the Glenfada Park side. Day 159/29/8 to Day 159/29/15

18.5.3.199 He did not see any sign of injury on the third man but knew he was shot by the way he fell. Day 159/30/7 to Day 159/30/12

18.5.3.200 Mr. McLaughlin then goes onto describe the volume of fire coming over the Barricade:

“At this point it was total chaos and shooting was really heavy. The bullets were bouncing off the barricade above our heads. George started crawling back towards the gable wall. A man who at the time I knew only as ‘Smiler’ was crouching at the gable end. He grabbed George’s feet, and George grabbed my hands and pulled us to safety. I sat down with my back to the gable wall at the point marked 8 on the map (grid reference I15). Emotionally, I was in a real state.

. . . I noticed Father Bradley about to head out to the bodies at the barricade, but the people at the gable wall held him back. I pulled him down towards me and said, “Father forgive me”, as by that stage, I thought that I was going to be shot and killed too. Father Bradley said, “Don’t worry, I’m here”. There is a photograph of me near the gable end wall attached to this statement marked A. I was wearing bleached jeans and a denim jacket, and had long hair.” AM 326.6 paragraphs 21 to 22

i) William Nash was shot, and then 2 young men who went to his assistance were also shot, one in the head.

iii) People at the gable end were confused about what was happening and some believed that both he and George Roberts had also been shot.

vi) Because of the volume of firing none of the three persons he described was removed from the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.202 Mr. McLaughlin gave an account of events in 1972 which is slightly different account to that given to this Inquiry;

“I was hit with a rubber bullet and I fell and two men dragged me up. I went on down to see what was happening and I saw a body on the barricade. There was another fellow along with me and he was over with the body. I went over along with him and this boy came out and he was shot in the stomach. (He can no longer recall the wound to the stomach but stands by the account given in 1972. Day 159/34/13 to Day 159/34/17) He fell. Then this other man came out and he was shot and he fell. A boy came out and he was shot in the head. None of them were armed at all. They just came out to help this boy who had been shot. They thought we were shot also as we were lying beside him because we didn’t want to get up. He was hit in the head. The blood came over my hand. There was a boy come over and he dragged this boy by the feet in order to get him out of the road. He said for us to get out of the road as we would only get shot. We said, what about these bodies. He said, you’ll have to get over here or you’ll get shot. He grabbed this first boy by the feet and he grabbed me by the hands and dragged me across. We were all against the wall with Fr Bradley…’ AM326.24.

18.5.3.203 He clarified the latter part of the above account. PIRA 1 grabbed George Roberts by the feet and started to pull him towards the gable. Day 159/36/8 to Day 159/36/14

i) He saw a body and went to give assistance and one of the persons who accompanied him was shot.

ii) Two more persons went to the aid of the person who had been shot and both were shot, one in the head.

18.5.3.205 Mr. McLaughlin was questioned by Counsel to the Tribunal about the sequence of events:

Q. To summarise this so far: you saw first of all a man fall who you believed to be William Nash. Then a second man fell four or five yards away; that is right?

Q. Another man came out, you thought, to assist that man and fell on top of you?

Q. You turned away and a fourth person came and fell on you again; is that your recollection?

A. The only recollection of a fourth person is the red at this time now sitting here today, yeah.

Q. Are you certain that is a different person from the one who first fell on you?

18.5.3.206 Mr McLaughlin can offer no details regarding the sex, age or clothing about this fourth person. Day 159/32/20 to Day 159/33/6

18.5.3.207 Counsel to the Tribunal raised the suggestion that the first person shot behind the Rubble Barricade was not in fact Michael Kelly and that “the bullet might have gone through one and into the second man, Michael Kelly.” Day 159/22/12 to Day 159/22/15 and that it was this first man who was attended by Denis McLaughlin.

18.5.3.208 Mr. McLaughlin, rejected the suggestion that two men fell at about the same time and stated that he did not see anyone else in the area. Day 159/22/17 to Day 159/23/2

18.5.3.209 Counsel for a majority of the soldiers questioned Mr McLaughlin relating to the Barricade and suggested that if a person was removed from the area of the Barricade, while McLaughlin was at the gable, then it must have happened either before witness arrived in that area or after he had left it. Day 159/80/22 to Day 159/81/5 The witness did not see anyone carried away from the Rubble Barricade and he is photographed at that gable end wall and was later arrested there.

18.5.3.210 On his evidence before the Inquiry, therefore it seems that he accepts that:

i) He may have seen 4 people shot, one of whom was shot in the stomach and one to the head. Michael Kelly was shot in the stomach, William Nash in the chest and both John Young and Michael McDaid in the head.

ii) It is not in fact entirely clear that he did see 4 persons shot, because given the live fire coming over the Rubble Barricade, it does not follow that the fact that someone had fallen meant that they had been shot and killed. His account becomes very vague in respect of the supposed third and fourth man, in that he can only say that two men fell on top of him and one was shot in the head. He can give no other description. Moreover his considered recollection prior to hearing the Keville tape was that he had only seen three men shot.

iii) The men were shot in sequence and there was not a shoot-through as suggested to him, because the second man shot had gone to the attendance of the first man and could not therefore have been shot and killed at the same time as the first man.

18.5.3.211 It is our submission that the evidence of Denis McLaughlin amounts to the following: he witnessed three people shot and killed behind the Rubble Barricade. He must also have seen the body of Michael Kelly, probably at the Rubble Barricade and certainly by the time he got to the gable wall.

18.5.3.212 Denis McLaughlin has candidly accepted that the event was extremely traumatic and that he had blocked parts from his mind. On his own account:

“I was not in – I was not in full mind at that particular time.” Day 159/29/22 to Day 159/29/23

18.5.3.213 Given the traumatic events witnessed by him, there is undoubtedly room for confusion. In essence his evidence is reliable. He was at the Rubble Barricade at a time when we know four young men were shot. He did not see the first man shot, but saw the body, but he did witness the shooting of the other three. The confusion caused by a traumatic event and a gap of 30 years should not be used to justify the suggestion that he witnessed the killing of someone whose body was somehow, spirited away and the fact of whose death has been kept hidden for the last 30 years.

18.5.3.214 There are moreover a number of difficulties with the proposition that the person who Denis McLaughlin saw first, was a missing casualty.

i) While he witnessed the shooting of the missing casualty and then the shooting of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid, he managed to completely miss the shooting of Michael Kelly who, on the case being suggested to him, was shot and killed with the same bullet as the missing casualty.

ii) It is the consistent evidence of the civilians at and about the Rubble Barricade that the first person to fall at the Rubble barricade was Michael Kelly. If there was a shoot-through, all of these witnesses have to be wrong and a substantial body of them must be lying.

iii) He has consistently stated that the people he saw shot were not removed from the Rubble Barricade. In those circumstances they must have been the three people picked up by Mortar Platoon.

iv) According to his evidence there was no ‘shoot-through’, this means that the alleged missing casualty was not killed with the bullet fired from Soldier F’s gun. However as it is the soldiers’ accounts cannot account for all of those killed behind the Rubble Barricade. The question thus arises how could they have killed yet another person, when they cannot even account for the known deceased.

v) Moreover the suggestion put to him, that the ‘missing casualty’ was a person shot before Michael Kelly implies that the person shot was F’s actual target. However on the evidence of both Denis McLaughlin and George Roberts the person was unarmed. The entire premise of the soldiers’ case with regards to missing casualties is dependent on the missing casualties having been persons engaged in the use of lethal force.

18.5.3.215 There are other difficulties with the suggestion. If the shoot-through theory were to be accepted it means either that: one of William Nash, Michael McDaid or John Young was the first person shot on the Rubble Barricade, or that the person shot was a ‘missing casualty’ and the person identified by Soldier F as his nail bomber. However, this extra casualty went unnoticed by those who went to the aid of Michael Kelly, with the possible exception of George Roberts.

18.5.3.216 There is a large volume of evidence to the effect that after the removal of Michael Kelly from the Rubble Barricade, no one was able to gain access to the other bodies. This means that this ‘missing casualty’ had to have been removed at or about the same time as Michael Kelly. Alternatively this ‘missing casualty’ is in fact one of the three persons removed from the Rubble Barricade by Mortar Platoon.

18.5.3.217 If the body was removed at the same time as Michael Kelly, then despite the extensive photographic coverage of the Rubble Barricade and Glenfada Park North before and after the shooting this person was brought from the Rubble Barricade unnoticed. The removal was also unnoticed by the people at the gable wall of Glenfada Park North. Alternatively witnesses like Fr. Bradley, Barry Liddy and Fr O’Keefe have participated in a massive conspiracy, which has included the unidentified people who removed the body, a conspiracy which went into motion within minutes of this man’s death and which has gone uncovered for 32 years.

18.5.3.218 George Roberts was 23 years old on Bloody Sunday. His evidence is that he was at the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North with Danny McGilloway. He amended this when he gave oral evidence, to say that this person was PIRA 1. Day 151/69/14 to Day 151/69/15

18.5.3.219 In 1972 George Roberts’ evidence seems to be to the effect that he had witnessed at least 3 people being shot:

“…I was standing at the barricade and the army started shooting and the fellow standing beside me fell. He was hit and I got down beside him to try and pull him into the gable house. I called to the crowd and 6 of them ran forward to help us and 3 of them were shot. They fell towards me and another boy. I crawled behind the barricade behind this small wall. This person pulled me behind the wall and the shooting continued.” AR13.8

[1] Voice authentication in oral evidence of Susan North Day 130/71/4 to Day 130/71/16

[2] Day 421/17

[3] PIRA14’s Eversheds statement recorded that Gilmore was to his right but in oral evidence he said that this was incorrect and that he was in fact positioned to his left Day 421/45/4

[4] Day 135/126/22 evidence of Danny Craig; Day 135/126/22 evidence of Frankie Boyle

[5] See for example, Brian Rainey Day 132/112/9 to Day 132/112/17 “a group seemed to fall at the one time.” Bernard Feeney AF8.4 paragraph 22 “All three fell together, or at least within a few seconds of each other.” James Patrick McNulty AM377.11 “the next thing I see was the three of them falling. They lay with no movement at all, they were dead an all,. . .”

[6] See above

[7] AM42.8 paragraphs 23 to 26

[8] AL13.7 to AL13.8

[9] Jerry Mallett, an acquaintance, describes this as “an Australian khaki coloured combat hat, of a type which was all the rage at the time” AM21.1 paragraph 4

[10] Eugene Roddy was last with John Young at the eastern end of William Street. In the time he had been with John Young, he had not thrown any stones, and had obviously become separated from him by the time P659 was taken. AR17.2 paragraph 9

[11] Brian McCay was last with John Young on Lecky Road AM100.1 paragraph 4

[12] Day 148/54/3 to Day 148/54/23

[13] The Tribunal will also recall that Mr Boyle gave an account of the removal of a substantial amount of armaments involving a not inconsiderable number of persons on 29^th January which has not been supported by any other witness before the Tribunal or by any Intelligence in the possession of the Security Forces.

[14] The issue was also raised with James Chapman, who gave evidence at Widgery and Fr. O’Keefe at WT5.17E-F

[15] See also James Quinn AQ10.5 paragraph 24

[16] Don Mullan AM448.4 paragraphs 29 to 33, Ciaran O’Somachain AO70.3 paragraph 14

[17] See for example, Fr. O’Keefe at WT5.6G See also AW 24.16E-F

[18] See Charlie McLaughlin AM321.4 paragraph 12; Day 177/86/10 to Day 177/86/15

[19] See Denis Bradley H1.9 paragraph 23 to H1.10 paragraph 24; also Terence O’Keefe H21.46 paragraph 14

[20] See Ronald Wood AW24.12 paragraph 12 (statement in 1972 to Treasury Solicitor); Terence O’Keefe H21.47 paragraph 16 and Denis Bradley H1.12 paragraph 28

[21] Christopher Doherty says that he had drawn Father Bradley’s attention to the bodies on the barricade. Day182/137/22 to Day 182/138/4

[22] D0102: William Nash wore a yellow flowered shirt, and underneath, a white T Shirt.

18.5.3.220 However in his evidence to this Tribunal, he has stated in relation to referring to 3 people being shot:

“I had probably heard this after, only the next day that three were shot at the barricade” Day 151/81/8 to Day 151/81/9

18.5.3.221 In his evidence to this Tribunal he has given an account of the shooting of a young man, slightly in front of him, and to his left. He describes him as wearing an arran sweater and states that he was shot below the eye. AR13.1 paragraph 7

18.5.3.222 Mr Roberts then identifies himself in EP 27.6, EP 32.1 and EP 32.2 EP 32.1 and EP 32.2 show Mr Roberts kneeling on the ground, over the person he believes was shot in the eye. To the rear of Mr Roberts’ position is Michael Kelly who has been shot.

18.5.3.223 Mr Roberts stated that at the time Robert White took P637, showing the body of Michael Kelly, he was kneeling over the body of the other young man: “I was focusing on the other young fella, my head was away from that area there.” Day 151/72/17 to Day 151/73/1

18.5.3.224 He rejected the possibility that he could have been simply kneeling in that position when P637 was taken, but rather he only went down because of the young man being shot. Day 151/73/7 to Day 151/73/14

18.5.3.225 However Mr. Roberts changed his position in relation to that issue over the course of his evidence. He confirmed that he had only a recollection of one person being shot behind the Rubble Barricade and that, the person had been shot below the eye. Day 151/97/4 to Day 151/97/11

18.5.3.226 When questioned by Mr Harvey QC on behalf of the Families he was asked in reference to John Young who was shot below the eye, on the Rubble Barricade:

“Q. Could it be that is the person that you have seen shot but it is in a later sequence than in the photograph on which you can be seen crouching?

Q. And that simply because of the shock you were in, you have missed quite a considerable number of events that went on before the person was shot in the eye?

18.5.3.227 When questioned by Mr Glasgow the witness was clear, as he had been with Mr. Harvey, Day 151/91/10 to Day 151/91/20 that the person he saw shot in the eye was not the first person shot, but was the first person he had seen shot. Day 151/106/15 to Day 151/106/18

18.5.3.228 However when the witness was re-examined he was shown photograph E14.12, an enhanced copy of P636. He was asked which of the two persons which he appeared to be kneeling over was the person who had sustained the wound to the eye. His answer was that “it could be neither of them” Day 151/117/8 to Day 151/117/10, and that he could not be sure if it was either of the two. Day 151/117/16 to Day 151/117/23 At the conclusion of his evidence he was asked:

A. I am not too sure now, I could not say, looking at it at that time, you know, a split second on a photo, it could be moved back or forward, whatever you know.

A. (Pause) Well, I could not be sure after all this time, you know. It does not look as though any of the two is the young fella was shot, you know what I mean.” Day 151/118/17 to Day 151/119/11

18.5.3.229 The witness recalls sheltering behind the rubble and puffs of smoke from rounds hitting the Barricade. He suggests that there were perhaps an interval of a few seconds between the rounds hitting the barricade. AR13.2 paragraph 9 He then describes how he crawled to the safety of the gable wall, urged on by PIRA 1, and apparently oblivious to what was happening behind him at the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.230 Mr. Roberts accepted that when he had returned to the safety of the gable wall, he was “in shock” and “could not believe what was happening”. Day 151/77/14 to Day 151/77/15

18.5.3.231 Denis McLaughlin has given evidence that he was with George Roberts when he witnessed a person shot in the head. Both have also given evidence of George Roberts being assisted from the Rubble Barricade by PIRA 1.

18.5.3.232 It seems probable that both witnesses witnessed one or more of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash being shot. It is also clear that the conditions under which they witnessed the incident were frightening and distressing and life-threatening for both of them and confusion in relation to the accounts is understandable. One issue upon which both witnesses are absolutely clear is that they did not see anybody at the Rubble Barricade with a weapon and none of the people behind the Rubble Barricade were armed. The people who they saw shot and killed were shot without justification.

18.5.3.233 Ronald Wood, gave evidence to Lord Widgery that after Michael Kelly, who was the first person murdered at the Rubble Barricade, had been hit, people continued for a few seconds to stand in amazement until they collected their wits about them. “The shooting started and two more went down.” AW 24.16E to F

18.5.3.234 Mr Wood sought to make his way to assist the two but states that there was further live fire, “a bullet passed close to my head . . . I therefore retreated. It was evident that if anyone tried to help the two youths who had fallen they would also be shot. . . no-one managed to get out to the two youths who had fallen because of the continuous shooting.” AW24.3 paragraph 18

18.5.3.235 Mr Wood gave clear evidence that he saw no weapons on the deceased or around their bodies and was clear that there had been no firing from the barricade. AW24.12 paragraph 12 He was quite clear that:

“not only did you not see anything at that barricade which would have justified live rounds being fired, but neither have you ever heard anyone tell you that there was anything at the barricade which would have justified that?

A. That is correct.” Day 127/26/2 to Day 127/26/7 (See also Day 127/43/1 to Day 127/43/7)

18.5.3.236 Brian Rainey has also given evidence to this Tribunal about the shooting behind the Barricade, as has been seen above he was standing on a small wall which ran around the gardens on the south east side of Glenfada Park South, from where he had a good view of the Rubble Barricade and down Rossville Street. Day 132/106/17 to Day 132/106/19

18.5.3.237 He states that he heard a shots or shots before he heard the shots over the Rubble Barricade, he recognised them as live rounds and got down from the wall. Day 132/111/2 to Day 132/111/9 Then he heard further shots ring out and saw three or four young lads fall at the rubble barricade. AR3.2 paragraph 14 He was of the view that they fell behind the Rubble Barricade, rather than on it. Day 132/112/23 to Day 132/113/3 He had stated in his statement that they had all been throwing stones and stated in relation to the youths he had seen at the barricade that “Most of them, I feel, were throwing stones, but I could not say all of those who were shot were throwing stones.” Day 132/113/12 to Day 132/113/17

18.5.3.238 Mr. Rainey was specifically asked about whether the youths were engaged in any offensive action, other than stone-throwing and replied:

“None whatsoever. That was the surprising thing about it. In fact, if there had been any form of either petrol bombs or nail bombs, I certainly would not have been standing where I was. The only thing I can say is, with my hand on my heart is, yes, there was some stone throwing taking place, but nothing else.” Day 132/149/19 to Day 132/150/2

18.5.3.239 A number of witnesses missed the shooting of the three young men but saw the bodies on the barricade in the aftermath. There is a consistent body of evidence about the inability of those at the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North to get to the bodies, because of the firing over the Rubble Barricade.

18.5.3.240 Fr. Denis Bradley (as he then was) has given evidence that he administered the last rites to Michael Kelly and therefore did not see Michael McDaid or John Young being shot at the barricade.

18.5.3.241 Having anointed Michael Kelly, Denis Bradley can be seen walking along the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North in P435. Denis McLaughlin can be seen in this photograph, in the bleached or camouflaged jeans, having returned to the safety of the gable wall.[1] However, both Fr Bradley and Fr O’Keefe were unable to go out to the bodies on the Rubble Barricade because of the continuous firing over the Barricade by the soldiers. Bradley recalls:

“As people started to lift him [Michael Kelly] up, I started to walk beside him, and I became aware of something behind me, in the direction of Rossville Street. It was pure panic. People were shouting, running. There was shooting and the penny was beginning to drop. I began to understand that something terrible was happening out there in Rossville Street.

I looked over towards the Barricade from the edge of the wall and saw bodies on the Barricade. They were on the road south of the Rubble Barricade. It was really not much of a barricade at that stage, more a pile of rubble about 1 ½ - 2 feet high, perhaps a bit more. It obviously had been a barricade at one stage but there was more rubble then. I remember seeing three bodies although there may have been four. I remember their contorted positions. I drew the conclusion that they had been shot because they were not lying behind the barricade as if taking cover. They were in different contorted positions. There was certainly an older man and two others. The older man called out. He was obviously alive. He may have put up his arm. The others were not making any movement and were more likely dead. They were only 15 to 20 feet away. I was very close. The Barricade was slightly north up Rossville Street from the gable end in the direction of William Street. I have the strongest memory of wanting to go out to these men. I had just anointed a young boy. I wanted to do the same to these bodies. I made as if to step out from the gable end but was very conscious of firing down Rossville Street as I looked left. H1.9 paragraph 23 to H 1.10 paragraph 24

18.5.3.242 Fr Bradley’s recollection was that the bodies were at the middle of the barricade. Day 140/119/12 to Day 140/120/15

“I was aware of the dead boy nearest to me on the barricade. I did not see anything in his hands. He was only a few yards away but it was just not possible for anyone to have taken away a weapon he might have had. I knew that if I got out there I would be dead. No-one went out there. There was too much firing. The gunfire was intensive. That was definitely its heaviest period that afternoon.” H1.12 paragraph 28.

18.5.3.243 Fr O’Keefe (as he then was) gives similar evidence. He was with Fr Bradley as he attended Michael Kelly. He then saw the bodies of three young men on the Barricade although his memory of the positions of these bodies is no longer clear. He then witnessed the shooting of Alex Nash. O’Keefe then recalls:

“Father Bradley and I were anxious to go out to the three boys and the older man to anoint them, but the shooting was still continuing. I would describe the shots as single shots, being fired relatively continuously. It was not automatic gunfire. I could hear the whining of bullets as they whizzed by. It was just too dangerous to go out…” H21.47 paragraph 16.

18.5.3.244 He estimated to Mr Clarke that in the region of 20 – 40 shots were fired Day 127/113/4 to Day 127/113/15 and there was nothing which would remotely justify the discharge of those shots by the Army. Day 127/114/3 to Day 127/114/8 Fr O’Keefe did not see any soldier actually fire at the Barricade but assumes that the shots he heard came from the soldiers whom he had seen adopt firing positions, earlier on. Day 127/100/1 to Day 127/100/13

18.5.3.245 Frank Lawton gave evidence that he “saw three young men lying still on the southern side of the Rubble Barricade.” AL6.26 He states that two were identified to him as John Young and William Nash and he recognised the third young man as Michael McDaid. AL6.4 at paragraph 17 He gave evidence that none of the young men had anything in their hands as they lay on the barricade and they were not approached by anyone other than Alex Nash. AL6.4 paragraph 19

18.5.3.246 There is a large volume of evidence about the bodies at the Barricade, some of it inconsistent and much of it confused. What emerges is a consistent picture of three young men, eventually tended to by an older man, Alex Nash, who was then shot and injured. It is not proposed to deal with the circumstances of the shooting of Alex Nash in these submissions, save to say that it is our submission that he was shot by soldiers and that his location on Video 48 pinpoints as closely as possible the location at which John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed.

18.5.3.247 It is submitted that the civilian evidence taken as a body demonstrates that, contrary to the conclusions of Lord Widgery, the shooting of John Young and Michael McDaid was entirely without justification. In fact, the shooting of unarmed civilians behind the Rubble Barricade: some of whom may have been throwing stones: none of whom posed a threat to any soldier: was an act of gratuitous violence and wilful murder.

18.5.3.248 It is clear as will be seen from the testimony of soldiers, that no soldier admits to the shooting of these men and the reasons for this failure is their knowledge that the shooting over the Rubble Barricade was unjustified. It is clear, from the fact of the deaths alone, that more shots were fired over the Rubble Barricade than have been admitted. The issue in Sector 3 is not a question of Missing Casualties, but a surplus of casualties for which soldiers have refused to account. The testimony of civilians about the level of firing over the Rubble Barricade at and after the shooting of John Young and Michael McDaid and their consequent inability to reach these bodies, demonstrates that there was more live fire over the Rubble Barricade than has ever been admitted and that soldiers fired more that 108 live rounds on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.3.249 The actions of the soldiers who fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday constituted murder and attempted murder and was without justification.

18.5.4.1 Uniquely the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid along with William Nash, were removed from the southern side of the Rubble Barricade on Rossville Street by members of 1 Para and placed in the rear of one of the Mortar Platoon pigs. The bodies were eventually brought by soldiers from Mortar Platoon to Altnagelvin Hospital.

18.5.4.2 The manner in which the bodies were removed, kept in the Pig on Rossville Street for a period, denied access to medical or spiritual aid and eventually and belatedly removed to Altnagelvin Hospital has been the source of great distress for the families of the deceased.

18.5.4.3 After the shooting of Michael Kelly civilians were unable to gain access to the bodies because of the ferocity of the shooting over the Rubble Barricade. Eye-witnesses who saw the bodies being removed from the Rubble Barricade believed that they were treated with disrespect bordering on contempt, a frequent description is that they were thrown into the rear of the Pig like sacks of potatoes. Nobody who picked up the bodies was medically qualified and no attempt appears to have been made to obtain medical assistance, in the eventuality that one or more of these young men was still alive. The bodies were removed from the Rubble Barricade and then left in a Pig on Rossville Street and initially Catholic priests and the Knights of Malta were denied access to the bodies and denied the opportunity of rendering medical or spiritual aid. There was a significant delay in these bodies being removed from the Bogside and they were the last to arrive at Altnagelvin Hospital. No explanation for the delay has ever been given.

18.5.4.4 In his statement to the RMP on the 31^st January 1972 Lieutenant N stated that he had been ordered forward by his Company Commander, Major Loden:

“I took the Humber to the Barricade and drove through it. There were five members of Mortar Platoon section and all were armed. I caused the vehicle to be stopped and reversed towards 3 bodies which were lying on the south side of the barricade. I dismounted from the Humber and looked at the bodies. They were all huddled together. They were all young men. 1 was aged about 16 yrs the other two about 20 yrs. One of these youths I saw with a wound to his head on the left side. The other two appeared to have body wounds. Their complexion was very pale … I supervised the section loading those bodies on to my vehicle.

I caused the Humber with the 3 bodies to return to the Coy location at the north end of the Rossville Flats. There 15 minutes later I gave the Humber with the bodies to ‘O’ and 5 members of his section. He was instructed to deliver the bodies to the Altnagelvin Hospital.” B384 to B385

18.5.4.5 It appears from the evidence given by members of Mortar Platoon that those who played an active part in lifting the bodies were Soldier 006 (B1377.006 paragraphs 27 to 33) and Soldier 013 (B1408.004 paragraphs 20 to 28). Soldier 162 claims to have provided cover to his colleagues (B1962.004 paragraphs 24 to 26) and Soldier 112 remained in the Pig in order to ‘help’ bring the bodies in, despite his faulty recollection that only one body was collected from the Rubble Barricade (B1732.006 paragraph 27).

18.5.4.6 It is not clear who drove the Pig to the south side of the Barricade. Soldier S drove Lieutenant N’s Pig into the Bogside but claims to have no recollection of being involved in the incident involving the bodies Day 332/101/16 to Day 332/102/14. However, he also claims to have recollection of little else. Soldier 006 recalls, however, that S was the driver for this task. Lieutenant N believes that the soldier who drove the Pig into the Bogside ought also have been the soldier who drove the Pig forward to collect the bodies. Day 322/104/23 to Day 322/105/14 Sergeant O, on the other hand, told the Tribunal that it need not necessarily have been one of the regular drivers who performed this task, and that up to ten members of the eighteen-man platoon were capable of driving the Pig. Day 335/99/5 to Day 335/99/19.

18.5.4.7 Neither of the other two regular drivers in Mortar Platoon, INQ 1579 or INQ 768 claim to have driven N’s Pig south of the Rubble Barricade, although INQ 768 does admit to having driven the bodies from the Company location at the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to Altnagelvin Hospital. C768.3 paragraph 22

18.5.4.8 It seems probable therefore, that Soldier S, fresh from having fired a dozen rounds at one or more alleged gunmen in the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats then drove Lt. N’s Pig forward to the Rubble Barricade to pick up the bodies.

18.5.4.9 Sergeant O was also involved in the task of retrieving the bodies from the Barricade. He did not however arrive at the Barricade in Lieutenant N’s Pig. He chose instead to walk close by the Pig as they were under fire at the time. Consoled by his notion that the IRA ‘hard men’ were in the Creggan and that only ‘second raters’ with low grade weapons were in the Rossville Flats (B1575.122 paragraph 87), he would prefer to walk in the open, in unfamiliar territory, rather than have the benefit of travelling in an armoured vehicle, while ‘under fire’. Day 335/99/25 to Day 335/100/8

18.5.4.10 The expert evidence makes it clear that John Young and Michael McDaid were dead by the time that the soldiers picked up their bodies. The autopsies of John Young and Michael McDaid were conducted by Doctor Press on 31^st January, 1972 and in his conclusions on both deaths, he found that death would have been rapid due to the injury to their spinal cords (D0154 (John Young) and D0092 (Michael McDaid)).

18.5.4.11 Both Lieutenant N and Sergeant O observed the bodies before they were lifted. Sergeant O took the view the bodies had been moved after they had been killed. All their heads were facing north towards ‘Aggro Corner’ Day 335/98/4 to Day 335/98/14. Lieutenant N recalls that they were heaped together, almost lying on top of each other. Day 322/105/23 to Day 322/105/24.

18.5.4.12 Soldier 162, who it would appear also approached the Barricade on foot, has described the position of the bodies in the following terms:

“I saw three bodies on the southern side of the rubble barricade. They were lying side by side on their backs with their hands on their chests. They had definitely not fallen in that position. I believe that they were all men but I cannot remember anything else about them.” B1962.004 paragraph 25.

18.5.4.13 It is noteworthy, that despite the soldiers’ collective case that the only people shot at were gunmen, the soldiers sent to remove the bodies did not search them for weapons. Neither did they search the Rubble Barricade for weapons, nor did they see any weapons en route to the Barricade or on their way back from the Barricade. Day 323/38/19 to Day 323/39/2. Soldier 006 confirmed that he had received no orders to search the bodies, and went further suggesting that there would be no point in searching their bodies, despite the fact that army firing was supposedly at armed men and bombers, the result of which was three dead youths at the Barricade. Indeed, he did not even think it would be interesting to search them (Day 334/65/17 to Day 334/66/14) which leads one to the inescapable conclusion that he did not expect to find anything of significance.

18.5.4.14 Soldier 112 who was inside the Pig as the bodies were put inside, confirmed in oral evidence that he did not search the bodies as he did not expect to find weapons or nail bombs. Day 320/146/20 to Day 320/147/10 Not one soldier involved in the retrieval of the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash has given evidence, either in 1972 or to this Inquiry, of finding or seeing any expended cartridges at or near the Rubble Barricade. This in circumstances where soldiers claim to have been under sustained attack from gunmen operating under the cover of that Barricade.

18.5.4.15 If the soldiers’ case that soldiers only fired at identifiable targets was true then the failure of Major Loden, or Lieutenant N to order the soldiers to search for weapons, and the failure of the soldiers themselves, including the Platoon Sergeant to search for weapons, is inexplicable. It is not of course inexplicable because contrary to the case made to the Widgery Inquiry and this Tribunal, there was no expectation that weapons would be found because the soldiers from the Parachute Regiment knew they had not been under fire and did not believe that they had fired at gunmen or bombers.

18.5.4.16 In respect of the civilian evidence, there is some confusion with regard to the position of the Pig when it stopped. Some civilians have said that the Pig stopped to the north west of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats,[2] others have said that the Pig stopped to the north of the Barricade,[3] while still others describe the Pig as having driven south through the Barricade and reversing back up towards the bodies, a description consistent with the evidence of Lt. N.[4]

18.5.4.17 Despite this apparent confusion, however, there is a plethora of evidence that the soldiers handled the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash, in a manner which can be described at best as with complete and utter contempt. Residents of both Glenfada Park North and Block 1 of the Rossville Flats had a panoramic view of this event as if unfolded. Those witnesses included a number of former British servicemen.

18.5.4.18 Frank Lawton was visiting his mother-in-law in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He was 33 years old on Bloody Sunday and had previously served for 10 years in the Royal Navy. From a window of her flat, he observed the following:

“The three bodies were thrown, unceremoniously, into the Saracen by two of the soldiers. They were lifted one by the leg and either the armpit, scruff of the neck or clothing on the upper body. I did not see any of the bodies lifted by the hands or hair. The soldiers who lifted them did so with one arm; they carried their rifles in the other…All three were thrown head first, but I cannot remember in what order they were thrown. There was no sign of movement from any of them and there was no sign of life in them as far as I could see. It did not take very long for the soldiers to lift them and throw them into the Saracen.” AL6.5 paragraph 23

18.5.4.19 Albert Faulkner served with the Royal Navy during World War II. He witnessed the deaths of Young and McDaid and then described the removal of their bodies from the Barricade, witnessed from his flat in Garvan Place, Block 1, in the following terms:

‘The next thing I remember is that a Saracen came out on to Rossville Street and drove south towards the Rubble Barricade. It stopped on the Glenfada Park side (the west side) of Rossville Street, adjacent to the pavement and a foot or so north of the Barricade. . . . There were, however, about four soldiers following it on foot down Rossville Street. . . . The soldiers grabbed the bodies of the three youths who had fallen and slung them in back of the Saracen, as if they were sacks of potatoes. I distinctly remember that each body was lifted by two soldiers, each of which was holding it by a leg and an arm. I cannot remember exactly where the soldiers had hold of the bodies, specifically whether it was directly by the limbs or through the clothing. I think that each body was carried face down and, therefore, that they must have been slung in the back of the Saracen face down. The soldiers didn’t appear to take any notice of the fourth man who was still alive – I do not know what happened to him. It appeared to me that the soldiers wanted to get the bodies and themselves away from the area as quickly as they could. I saw no sign of movement from any of the three bodies.” AF4.3 paragraph 13

18.5.4.20 George McGinley was 14 years old on Bloody Sunday and observed the bodies being removed from the Rubble Barricade by the Paras:

“The two Paras took one arm and one leg each and threw the body into the back of the Saracen like a sack of coal.” AM238.4 paragraph 23

18.5.4.21 He saw this repeated once or twice and the Saracens then left the barricade. AM238.4 paragraphs 24 to 25

18.5.4.22 The one aspect of all the civilian evidence that is constant, regardless of where the civilians say the incident took place, is that the bodies were treated with appalling disrespect.[5] It should be noted that those opinions are not exclusive to civilian witnesses. Indeed, two military witnesses have given evidence to the Tribunal that the bodies were handled in an unsatisfactory manner. This shall be explored further below. Taken together, the eye-witness accounts demonstrate conclusively that the bodies were handled with disrespect and that the soldiers’ evidence to the contrary should not be accepted.

18.5.4.23 Of the two soldiers who have admitted handling the bodies, Soldier 006 gave evidence on Day 334. Soldier 013 also attended at the Inquiry on Day 334, as scheduled, but apparently an issue suddenly arose in respect of his health and at the last minute the parties were informed that he would not give oral evidence. The Solicitor to the Inquiry, in correspondence dated 9 July, 2003, informed Madden & Finucane Solicitors of the Tribunal’s refusal to provide more information in respect of this sudden turn of events.

“I definitely picked up one or two of them. With another soldier I grabbed them by their ankles and he grabbed them under their armpits and put them in the Pig. We did not touch their hands/forearms. I am not sure if there was a soldier already in the Pig who helped to pull their bodies in. They were placed one on top of the other, although I cannot say exactly how; I was outside the vehicle.’ B1377.006 paragraphs 27 to 33

18.5.4.25 Soldier 006 told the Tribunal that he can not explain how an onlooker could have formed the impression that the bodies were treated in a disrespectful way. His evidence is that the bodies were ‘lifted’ in, rather than thrown, and in giving oral evidence he casually recalled:

“…we just picked `em up and pulled `em in…” Day 334/32/15 to Day 334/32/21

18.5.4.26 Unlike Soldier 006, who was very keen to point out the fact that he did not touch the hands of the victims at the Barricade, Soldier 013 recalled:

“I could not carry the bodies with one hand. I needed both. I put my SLR on my back and used both hands. I was worried about getting shot from the flats, but no one was shooting at us. Together with one of the others (who I do not wish to name), we picked them up by their hands/wrists and put them in the Pig. We did not check their pulses but there was no movement from the bodies in the Pig. I am sure that they were dead.” B1408.004 paragraph 22

18.5.4.27 Soldier 013 has not provided any explanation for his failure to name the other soldier concerned with these events. If, as the soldiers contend, the bodies were not treated with disdain, there should be no reason why 013 need be reluctant about identifying his colleague.

18.5.4.28 Soldier 118 was an observation specialist in the 22^nd Light Air Defence Regiment posted on observation duties on the Embassy Ballroom. He recalled the bodies being lifted from the Barricade. In his statement to the Inquiry, he recalled that the bodies were carried across the waste ground to a three tonne army lorry. When he gave oral evidence on Day 359/181/16 to Day 359/181/21 he confirmed that he had no recollection of seeing an army vehicle drive south through the Rubble Barricade but was prepared to concede that it may have done. He described the event as follows

“It looked pretty callous from where I was. They were throwing the bodies in like bits of wood. I remember I was shocked and could not work out how the bodies could have been killed. I was sure it had not been by Army fire because the bodies had been on the south side of the rubble barricade.” B1752.004 paragraph 23

18.5.4.29 Soldier 028 was a Captain in 22 LADR. He was also their press officer. He did not see the bodies being lifted from the Barricade, but was present later in Rossville Street and witnessed the bodies in the Pig. He described what he saw as:

“I went over and looked into the Pig. What I saw was an horrific scene; bodies piled on top of each other, heads, arms and legs at strange angles and blood all over the bodies and the walls of the Pig.” B1582.4 paragraph 15

18.5.4.30 By virtue of the way the bodies were placed in the Pig Soldier 028 concluded that:

“I didn’t see the bodies being put into the Pig but at the time, my impression was that the bodies must have been thrown in to the Pig very hurriedly whilst the soldiers were under live fire and that is why they hadn’t been laid in an orderly manner or their limbs arranged neatly. I knew that if any of the press did start taking photographs it would look terrible in the papers the next day. Consequently, I pushed the priest to one side and slammed the doors shut, saying that no one was allowed to take pictures.” B1582.4 paragraph 15

18.5.4.31 While the scene he saw suggested to him that the troops who placed the bodies in the Pig must have been under live fire, in fact no soldier claims to have been under live fire when the bodies were thrown into the Pig. Soldier 028, whose evidence will be dealt with in more detail below when dealing with the military evidence in relation to Sector 3, was in our submission a witness whose bias in favour of the army and against the citizens of Derry was remarkable even by military standards. Nonetheless even he recognised that the manner in which the bodies were in the Pig would create an unfavourable impression should it go into the public domain.

18.5.4.32 It is clear that after the bodies had been loaded into the Pig that the Pig then returned to the area of the northern gable of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Lieutenant N’s Pig can be seen in P774. The Pig has reversed into Glenfada Park North. Alexander Nash can be seen in the flat cap and dark coat at the southern gable of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.

18.5.4.33 Fr Irwin gave written evidence to the Tribunal (H9.1 to H9.30) and gave oral evidence on Day 153. His evidence is that, while inside Block 1 of the Rossville Flats attending to the body of Kevin McElhinney, he was approached by Ms Eileen Gallagher and asked to go to the Pig containing the bodies. (Ms. Gallagher’s handwritten, contemporaneous statement can be found at AG10.1.) In his written statement prepared for the Widgery Tribunal he stated as follows:

“When I came out onto the corridor of the flats a woman in a very distraught state told me that she had seen three bodies being thrown into a Saracen. I rushed down the backstairs of the flats which led into Rossville Street. I was accompanied by a member of the Knights of Malta. At the entrance of the backstairs there was a soldier standing with a gun. I asked him if there were three bodies in one of the Saracens and he said he did not know.” H9.5

"I asked him who was in charge and he nodded towards a group of soldiers a few feet away. I shouted to this group 'Who is in charge here?', and an Officer, I presume, wearing a red beret, came forward. I asked him if he had any dead or injured in a Saracen. He answered that none of his soldiers was injured. I said 'I didn’t ask you about your soldiers; I am asking you if you have any dead or injured bodies in one of the Saracens, as I wish to anoint them.' He said 'No we haven’t'.” H 9.6

"The Knights of Malta member and myself, believing the officer to be telling the truth, returned up the backstairs again. We again met the lady who had told us about the three bodies. She asked us if we had got to the bodies. When I told her the officer had denied that there were any bodies in a Saracen, she brought me into a flat, went to the window looking onto Rossville Street, and pointed out the Saracen. The Knights of Malta member and myself rushed out and ran down the backstairs again. I shouted to the Army officer that there were three bodies in a Saracen. I saw Father Anthony Mulvey of Pennyburn a little beyond the officer. I shouted at him 'Father, there are three bodies in a Saracen that need anointing.' He shouted 'Come on'. Father Mulvey, the Knights of Malta member and myself ran towards the Saracen. The Army officer followed and when we all reached the Saracen the lady in the flats had pointed out, the officer flung open the door and there were three bodies piled one on top of the other. I climbed into the Saracen and anointed the two bodies. I then held up these two bodies to enable Father Mulvey to anoint the bottom body. The bottom body, that of John Young, was lying facedown in his own blood, and even if he had been living would have been smothered; the middle body was that of Michael McDaid, who was lying face outwards; and the top body was that of Nash. From the way the bodies were lying in the Saracen it was obvious that they had been flung into it like bags of potatoes. When I climbed out of the Saracen again I said to the Army officer 'You deliberately lied to me' and he just shrugged his shoulders and smirked. Just as I and the others were leaving the Saracen, one of the top officers in the Knights of Malta came running towards the Saracen to examine if any of the three were living, but the door of the Saracen was slammed shut, and an Army officer said 'You can’t go in there'.” H9.6

18.5.4.34 The Order of Malta volunteer who accompanied Father Irwin is Bernard Feeney. He has provided a statement to the Inquiry at AF8.1 to AF8.18 and has given oral evidence. His account of the incident corresponds broadly with that provided by Father Irwin:

“Father Irwin and I went to speak with him. At this stage there was no shooting at all. We asked him whether there were any bodies in the back of the Saracen. He said 'There is no fucking way there are any bodies'. We asked him if he was sure and he repeated his comment. We therefore went back into block 1 of the Rossville flats.” AF8.5 paragraph 25

18.5.4.35 Sergeant O denied that he was the soldier who had smirked at the priest. When the evidence of Leo Day in 1972 was put to him, of the soldier wearing three stripes and a crown on his uniform, he confirmed that was the insignia on the uniform of a Colour Sergeant. Day 335/108/1 to Day 335/108/24 Three colour sergeants from Guinness Force, INQ 1318, INQ 147 and Soldier 002 were present on Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.4.36 Like Fr. Irwin, Feeney also recollects that John Young was on the floor of the Pig and Michael McDaid was the body in the middle. William Nash lay on top of both Michael McDaid and John Young. AF 8.5 paragraph 27

18.5.4.37 Father Mulvey gave evidence to Lord Widgery, he is now deceased. His evidence was also that John Young lay face down on the floor of the Pig, in a pool of his own blood. He recalls that Father Irwin anointed the man on top, who Fr. Mulvey was later told was Michael McDaid while he himself tried to get the body on the floor. He had to grope to find the head of the body on the floor in order to administer the last rites of his church. Fr. Mulvey could not positively say if any of the three were dead but was of the opinion that the boy on the bottom – John Young – would have suffocated bearing in mind his own injuries and weight of the bodies on top of him. WT4. 29 A-E

18.5.4.38 There is no evidence to suggest that any of the soldiers involved in the removal of the bodies from the Rubble Barricade was medically qualified. Lieutenant N, in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal at B 400, said that he asked a corporal in the Royal Medical Corps, to look at the bodies. That corporal was Soldier 221, attached to C Company and held a first class qualification as a paramedic. He gave evidence that the bodies were side by side in the rear of the Pig, in such a way that each would have been able to breathe freely. Ms McGahey pointed out to him the evidence of Irwin and Mulvey that the bodies had to be manhandled in order to facilitate their anointing. Day 361/132/6 to Day 361/132/24.

18.5.4.39 Soldier 221 was in no doubt that the bodies were dead when he examined them. Day 361/133/14 to Day 361/133/19 It is also his recollection that about 2 to 3 minutes after he had examined them that the Pig drove off with the bodies inside B 2164. If this evidence and the evidence of Lieutenant N is correct, this means that the bodies remained in the Pig for some 10 to 12 minutes after arriving back at the Company location at the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and prior to receiving any medical attention. There is thus no evidence that any urgency was attached to the request for medical attention, despite Soldier 221’s confirmation that in any operation involving a 300 strong battalion, it would have been normal practice for a full medical team, including doctors to be present. Day 361/139/13 to Day 361/139/21 In addition, 221 confirmed that the bodies ought to have been treated before their bodies were moved. Day 361/139/22 to Day 361/139/25

18.5.4.40 It has been seen above that as well as refusing Fr Irwin and Fr Mulvey access to the Pig to render spiritual assistance, Bernard Feeney of the Knights of Malta was also denied access to the Pig.

“Just as I and the others were leaving the Saracen, one of the top officers in the Knights of Malta came running towards the Saracen to examine if any of the three were living, but the door of the Saracen was slammed shut, and an Army officer said 'You can’t go in there'.” H9.6

18.5.4.42 Fr Mulvey told Lord Widgery that he called to Leo Day, who in 1972 was the most senior member of the Order of Malta in Derry to have a look at the bodies:

“…I went with him to the armoured car. The soldier had half opened the door to admit him, when one helmeted soldier who said he was in charge – he may have been an NCO – called to him to close the door and not to open it again. So that by that time no medical attention was permitted to be given to the dead men inside or to the men inside if they were dead.” WT4.29 F-G

18.5.4.43 This evidence is broadly corroborated by Mr Day, who is also deceased. His evidence is that a sergeant opened the door and he could see a tangle of bodies lying on each other and blood all over the floor. As he was about to climb inside the Pig the sergeant said ‘Nobody is allowed inside’ and pushed the door closed again. AD13.3

18.5.4.44 Therefore having failed to administer medical attention at the Rubble Barricades, or even carry out anything more than a cursory check, having failed to seek immediate and urgent medical attention when the vehicle was parked near Block 1, soldiers from the parachute Regiment denied the three young men access to medical attention from medically qualified civilians. No medical attention was afforded John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash, save that provided by Bernard Feeney, a seventeen years old member of the Order of Malta who was not professionally qualified and who managed to check Michael McDaid’s ankle for a pulse and to check John Young, who in his view was clearly dead. AF8.5 paragraph 28.

18.5.4.45 Alice Doherty, who on Bloody Sunday was known as Alice Long, was also a member of the Order of Malta. She is one of a number of witnesses[6] who suggest that at least one of the bodies may have been alive while in the rear of Lieutenant N’s Pig. AD50.12 paragraph 15 It is not our case that either John Young or Michael McDaid were alive and we rely upon the expert evidence that both would have suffered a rapid death. (D0154 (Young) and D0092 (McDaid))

18.5.4.46 Neither is it our case that Alice Doherty’s evidence is reliable when she states that soldier fired three live rounds into the rear of the Pig. AD50.13 paragraph 18 There is a preponderance of evidence that the 3 bodies placed in the Pig had already been shot, and in the absence of any of them having sustained more than one bullet wound, we do not consider the account reliable and we do not invite the Tribunal to accept her account about this issue. It should also be noted that she herself admitted an element of doubt in respect of live rounds being fired in to the rear of the Pig. Day 135/171/10 to Day 135/171/19.

18.5.4.47 With regard to the evidence which states that John Young would have suffocated had he been alive. We do not make the case that John Young suffocated or that either John Young or Michael McDaid were alive when placed in the Pig.

18.5.4.48 However: none of the soldiers who picked up the bodies was medically qualified; no attempt was made to get the bodies medically examined; and, a member of the Knights of Malta was refused access to the bodies. What is clear is that the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment did not care to establish whether the lives of one or more of those young men could in fact have been saved, demonstrating an attitude towards the lives of three young men, murdered by their colleagues, which was nothing short of callous.

18.5.4.49 It was not only that the bodies of these young men were treated with disrespect and contempt, but that the soldiers involved simply did not care whether they were alive or dead.

Removal to Altnagelvin Hospital

18.5.4.50 Sergeant O was ordered by his platoon commander, Lieutenant N to take the bodies to Altnagelvin Hospital. Soldier 112 says in his RMP statement at B1732.013 that withdrawal from the Bogside happened at approximately 4.45pm.

18.5.4.51 The Pig was driven by INQ 768, in what he has described as his most vivid recollection of the day. Day 323/165/20 to Day 323/166/7 Sergeant O was in the passenger seat. Day 335/104/18 to Day 335/104/21 It is not entirely clear if Sergeant O is the person described by Bernard Feeney, the Knight of Malta, when Feeney was attempting to aid the bodies at the Company location at the northern end of Block 1:

“I remember that there was a soldier sitting in the passenger seat of the Saracen (there was no division between the front and back of the vehicle). He was sitting sideways across the seat with his back to the passenger door and his legs stretched out very casually into the back of the Saracen. His legs would have been very close to the head of the middle body.” AF8.5 paragraph 29

18.5.4.52 Soldier 112 who ‘helped’ lifted the bodies in to the Pig also travelled to Altnagelvin. He thinks that Corporal P and INQ 768 took one of the bodies out of the Pig when they reached there. B1732.006 paragraph 27

18.5.4.53 INQ 1918, Lieutenant N’s radio operator was also involved. He made his statement to the Inquiry on 3 July, 2000. When he gave evidence on 10 June, 2003 he claimed that he could no longer recollect the incident, save for some tiny recollections in what was the first and only time in which he has assisted in transporting several dead bodies in a Pig to a mortuary. Day 342/119/25 to Day 342/123/22

18.5.4.54 Soldier P, who is the most likely person to have murdered Michael McDaid and John Young was also a rear seat passenger as the bodies were taken to Altnagelvin Hospital. B593 He claims not to have been involved in taking them out of the Pig at hospital. B623.002 paragraph 15

18.5.4.55 Soldier 006, one of those who threw the bodies into the rear of the Pig gives an insight into the manner in which the soldiers coped with the limited room in the rear of the Pig:

“We then got in the back and had to sit with our feet on top of them, it was the only way we could get in because of the lack of space.” B1377.007 paragraph 33

18.5.4.56 Not one of those soldiers offers a satisfactory explanation for the wholly unjustified delay in getting these bodies to hospital. It is apparent from the evidence of SOCO McCormac at ED40.6 that the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash did not arrive at Altnagelvin Hospital until around 5.30pm.

18.5.4.57 There is also evidence before the Inquiry that the bodies were then removed from the Pig in similar fashion to the manner in which they were thrown in. Ivan Cooper, the MP for Mid Derry was at Altnagelvin Hospital:

“The soldiers carried each of the bodies in the same way. No stretcher was used. There was a para taking each end of each body. A para took hold of each body by the palm of the hands or the wrists and another para took hold of each body by the ankles. The bodies were all handled as if they were “stuck pigs”. The arms of each body were stretched out above the head and the body was sagging. I was standing close to the Saracen just watching without saying a word. It seemed to me that arrangements must have been made over the radio between the army and the hospital staff for the paras to bring the casualties to the hospital through the rear entrance.

As the bodies were lifted out of the Saracen each soldier who was doing the carrying handed his weapon to a soldier who was not doing any carrying. The soldiers were joking with each other and laughing and were talking about the events of the day as the bodies were carried from the Saracen. The soldiers were jubilant and gave me the impression that they were thinking that they had busted an IRA unit in the Bogside. I could hear some of the soldiers talking about how they had shot people and that there had been people carrying nail bombs…

The bodies were taken into the hospital and then quickly brought back out again and thrown back into the Saracen. The whole operation of carrying the bodies into the hospital and back out of the hospital was conducted by the soldiers in a very matter of fact way with the soldiers acting throughout in a jubilant manner.

The soldiers got back into the Saracen with two soldiers in the front and the other soldiers in the back. The Saracen was driven away. I assumed that the Saracen was being driven to the hospital mortuary. I made this assumption as I had taken it that whoever in the hospital had looked at the bodies as they were brought in by the soldiers had certified the young men dead and had directed the soldiers to take the bodies to the mortuary. My memory of the Saracen driven away is, however, hazy.” KC12.27 paragraphs 81 to 85

18.5.4.58 There appears to be some confusion about the timing in which the bodies were received at the mortuary. The mortuary register is at D500.20, D500.21 and states that Michael McDaid’s body was received at 9.30pm but that the bodies of John Young and William Nash were received at an earlier unspecified time. Father Irwin, however, checked his watch when the Pig arrived at the morgue, his evidence is that it was 6.15pm. WT5.37 E-F

18.5.4.59 INQ 768 has described what he calls a detailed memory of what happened when they reached the morgue. He claims the soldiers were conscious of finding a ‘quiet moment’ in order to take the bodies out:

“I went to the back of the PIG and opened the doors. There was a body facing me with it’s head towards the doors. I cannot now describe this body in any detail. I grabbed the body under the arms to slide it out. As I was doing this, a soldier told me that someone was coming, so I immediately pushed the body back so as not to upset anyone. As I pushed the body back into the PIG and shut the door I heard the head hit the back of the doors and I remember subsequently seeing blood at the bottom of the PIG doors which I believe came from this incident.” C768.4 paragraph 24

18.5.4.60 William McDermott made a statement to the Inquiry, but passed away before giving oral evidence. He was at the morgue and observed the following:

“The last body to have been pulled out of the Saracen was lying on his stomach on the floor of the morgue. I stood near his head. I turned the body onto his back. Father O’Gara was standing nearby as the body was turned over and said “Jesus Christ.” I said as he walked out “I don’t think his mother would even recognise him”. The young man’s tongue was protruding from his mouth and was swollen and blue. His eye was a mess and was also blue. I think he had been shot in the eye, because I didn’t see any other wound on his body but I thought he had been suffocated rather than shot because his tongue was blue. The other priest, Father Irvine, asked me if I recognised him. I said I thought he looked like one of the O’Hagan’s from Rosemount. They searched his pockets. From his pocket, they took out a rubber bullet and a one pound note and a sixpence. They also took out a payslip from his pocket which was from John Collier tailors. It showed them that the man’s name was Young. He was actually a cousin of the O’Hagan family. I then got a lift from the hospital.” AM189.7 paragraph 34

18.5.4.61 The manner in which the bodies were removed from the Rubble Barricade, kept in a Pig and eventually transported to the Hospital and then the morgue, is of course an issue which undoubtedly contributed to the findings that positive findings for lead on the clothing and bodies of John Young and Michael McDaid. That aspect of the evidence is addressed in more detail in the Forensics Section below.

18.5.4.62 The manner in which the bodies of John Young and Michael McDaid were treated was disrespectful. The soldiers involved demonstrated a level of callousness which for many people was as distressing to witness as the wilful murder of these young men. The issue is important in demonstrating the lack of concern felt, not merely by the individual soldiers but their officers, about the men shot and killed on Bloody Sunday.

18.5.5.1 The post mortem examination on Michael McDaid was carried out by Dr Press at 12.00 noon. (E2.68) The report of Doctor Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.24, E2.25 with the accompanying diagram at E2.71. Photographs taken in the mortuary can be found at P2.55 to P2.68.

18.5.5.2 In summary, a single bullet which entered his left cheek struck Michael McDaid. The bullet penetrated his neck and right chest before exiting the right side of his back. There were no other apparent injuries.

18.5.5.3 Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position, the initial track passed from downwards, backwards and from left to right. The most significant aspect of the injury is the downward track of 45°. It was this angle and the fact that John Young and William Nash, killed alongside Michael McDaid both had injuries with a downward track of 45°, which resulted in the opinion of some commentators that Michael McDaid along with John Young and William Nash had been shot by a sniper from the City Walls.

18.5.5.4 There were undoubtedly points from the City Walls and Naylor’s Row from where shots could have been fired at the Rubble Barricade. However as Dr Shepherd and Mr. O’Callaghan have pointed out, if shot from the Walls the Deceased would have to have bent forwards at a 40° angle while if shot from ground level, from either Rossville street or the Kells Walk Wall, the deceased would have had to have been bent forwards at a 45° angle. In those circumstances “nothing in the pathology of the wounds lends greater weight to this proposition then that the shots were fired [from] ground level.” E2.0065

18.5.5.5 What is however beyond dispute is that to sustain the injuries he did, Michael McDaid would have had to have been facing in the direction from where the shots had come from. It is our submission that the preponderance of civilian evidence supports the conclusion that Michael McDaid was shot from Rossville Street or the Kells Walk Wall as he faced in the direction of the soldiers from 1 Para who had entered the Bogside.

18.5.5.6 Michael McDaid’s injuries are consistent with his having taken cover behind the Rubble Barricade as soldiers from Rossville Street and the Kells Walk Wall fired shots over the Rubble Barricade. His injuries do not directly correspond with any of the accounts of the soldiers who admit firing from Rossville Street or the Kells Walk Wall, however it is clear that if the accounts of the soldiers were to be accepted, Michael McDaid was not killed on Bloody Sunday. His injuries could correspond with the following account put to Soldier P who fired shots over the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday:

“Q. You are a good enough shot, if someone was crouching behind the barricade, you are a good enough shot to pick them out and hit the target; are you not?

Q. What happened in fact was that three young boys were crouching behind this barricade and they were, two of them, hit in the face. You are a good enough shot to have done that; are you not?

18.5.6.1 The post mortem examination on John Young was carried out by Dr Press at 2.20pm. E2.68 The report of Doctor Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.28, E2.29 with the accompanying diagram at E2.73. Photographs taken in the mortuary are in P2.81to P2.93

18.5.6.2 In summary, a single bullet which entered his left cheek at the inner corner of the left eye struck John Young. The bullet penetrated his neck and right chest before exiting the left side of his back.

18.5.6.3 John Young also sustained abrasions on his right cheek, his left cheek, his chin, his right hand, the knuckles of fingers on the 3^rd and 4^th fingers of his left hand and his left thumb. The injuries to John Young’s face were consistent with his having fallen, the other injuries are also consistent with his having fallen but may have been caused by other blunt trauma.

18.5.6.4 Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position, the initial track of the bullet passed from downwards, backwards with only slight deviation to the left. As with Michael McDaid the most significant aspect of the injury is the downward track of 45°.

18.5.6.5 As with Michael McDaid and for the reasons set out in Sections 20.6.3.

“nothing in the pathology of the wounds lends greater weight to this proposition then that the shots were fired [from] ground level.” E2.0065

18.5.6.6 It is our submission that the preponderance of civilian evidence supports the conclusion that John Young was shot from Rossville Street or the Kells Walk Wall as he faced in the direction of the soldiers from 1 Para who had entered the Bogside.

18.5.6.7 As with Michael McDaid, John Young’s injuries are consistent with his having taken cover behind the Rubble Barricade as soldiers from Rossville Street and the Kells Walk Wall fired shots over the Rubble Barricade. His injuries do not directly correspond with any of the accounts of the soldiers who admit firing from Rossville Street or the Kells Walk Wall, however it is clear that if the accounts of the soldiers were to be accepted, John Young was not killed on Bloody Sunday. His injuries could also correspond with the account put to Soldier P during the course of his evidence to this Inquiry. Day 353/117/14 to Day 353/117/20

18.5.7.1 As appears from the table in Dr Lloyd’s report at E1.30 setting out details of Dr Martin’s tests, the tests for lead were positive in that one particle was found on swabs from the right hand, 17 on the jacket surface and 15 on the trouser surface. None was found on the left hand.

18.5.7.2 Inasmuch as any weight could ever have been attached to Dr Martin’s tests, the absence of particles on Michael McDaid’s left hand is significant. The evidence of Michael McDaid’s former employer to the Widgery Tribunal was that Michael McDaid was left handed. AB60.2(C-D)

18.5.7.3. During his testimony at the Widgery Tribunal, Dr. Martin said the results were consistent with Michael McDaid having been handling firearms. He also gave evidence that it would not make any difference to his conclusion if he were told that Michael McDaid were left handed, although he did acknowledge that “the absence of lead on the left hand is unusual if he had been firing with the hand uncovered.” (WT9.12D-E)

18.5.7.4 As a general observation Dr Lloyd noted that “it is profoundly disturbing that a single particle of lead on a hand swab should have been considered as significant evidence that a person had been handling a firearm or been in the vicinity of a discharging firearm.” E1.0027 (8.2.c) In the course of his evidence to this Inquiry Dr. Martin accepted that the adverse conclusion reached by him in relation to Michael McDaid on the basis of one spot was “pushing interpretation to the limit.” Day 226/88/15 to Day226/88/21

18.5.7.5 Moreover he concluded that the absence of controlled testing nullified any evidential significance that Dr Martin’s results might have had E1.25 (8.1.g). Bearing in mind the likelihood of spurious contamination, he considered that Dr Martin’s results were “worthless”. E1.52 (g)

18.5.7.6 In any event as has been seen, Michael McDaid was transported to Altnagelvin Hospital on the floor of a Pig, having first been thrown into the Pig by soldiers and having been removed from the Pig by soldiers. Without reference to either the soldiers or the Pig as potential sources of contamination Dr Lloyd was of the view that the “result from the hand could well be due to contamination from the clothing, and does not support the use of a firearm by McDaid or his being a bystander”. E1.0044 to E1.0045 (8.7.3.a)

18.5.7.7 However in his view the results of the testing of Michael McDaid were explicable solely on the basis that Michael McDaid had been transported in a military vehicle which was likely to have been “heavily and continuously contaminated with firearms residue.” E1.0045 (8.7.c)

18.5.7.8 In his evidence to this Tribunal Dr Martin was asked whether he agreed with this proposition to which he replied “Oh, entirely, yes.” Day 226/98/5 to Day 226/98/11

18.5.7.9 Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by Lord Widgery, there is not a shred of evidence to support his conclusion that Michael McDaid was “in close proximity to someone firing.”

18.6.8.1 As appears from the table in Dr Lloyd’s report at E1.30 setting out details of Dr Martin’s tests, the tests for lead were positive in that 4 particles and 1 smear were found on swabs from the left hand, 15 particles on the jacket surface and 34 on the trouser surface. No particles were found on the left hand.

18.6.8.2 During his testimony at the Widgery Tribunal, Dr. Martin said the results were consistent with John Young having been handling firearms. (WT9.13A)

18.6.8.3 The basis upon which Dr Martin came to this conclusion is not without significance. In the course of the Widgery Tribunal Dr Martin was questioned about the possibility that firearms discharge could have resulted in contamination leading to the presence of lead particles. In response to questions from Mr. McSparran he stated:

“A. It could possibly happen. But the amounts on the hands here rather suggest that they are in fact nearer the source in all cases than the clothing is. It is more consistent with the hands being in the forefront of the contamination. . . .

LORD WIDGERY: Could you say that in these cases the hands indicate that they were nearer the source than the clothing?

18.6.8.4 However, as is clear from John Young’s results, the opposite was in fact the case, and the number of particles on his clothing, far exceeded those on his hands.

“Q . . . You appear to have been telling Lord Widgery that the results showed that the hands were nearer the source of the particles than the clothing. Was not the precise opposite the case?

Q. Do you know how you came to the say the opposite of what was correct to Lord Widgery?

18.6.8.6 During the Widgery Tribunal Dr Martin was specifically questioned by Mr. McSparran QC about the possibility that, given that John Young had been “in a situation near to where guns were being discharged or bullets fragmenting” could have caused a higher lead particle density than normal. In response Dr Martin stated:

“So far as contamination to the clothing is concerned. I think his hand level is rather too high. His left hand level is too high to be consistent with exposure which covered the clothing as well.” WT9.30F

18.6.8.7 However, when Dr Martin was questioned about this aspect of his evidence in the course of this Inquiry, given the number of particles on the jacket surface, Dr Martin was unable to explain his evidence in this respect.

“Q . . . the hand level for Young was 4. If you take the jacket surface it was 15, which is over three times the hand. I do not quite understand what you were meaning by saying that the hand level was too high?

18.6.8.8 Mr. Read, followed on from Mr McSparran’s questions as to the possibility that bullet fragmentation in the area of the Rubble Barricade had resulted in the positive readings, in response to which Dr Martin stated:

“In the case of Young there is rather too much on the hand. It would imply that the hand for some reason for a dense pocket of lead specks from within the general discharge, the probabilities must be very remote.” WT9.35E-F

‘The trousers were in fact examined [for surface particles] but much after the original report was prepared. The trouser levels are within the same range as the coat levels . . . Yes, they do not contradict or add to the coat evidence.’ WT9.36A

18.6.8.10 However the opposite was in fact the case, in that there were a significantly higher number of lead particles on John Young’s trousers, than on his jacket or his hands. As Dr Lloyd pointed out

“The statement is at odds with Dr. Martin’s own results. On Young’s trousers for example, the number of particles was nearly twice the number on the jacket, although whether Dr. Martin would have considered this to be within the same range is uncertain.” E1.0033, E1.0034 (8.4.1.e):

18.6.8.11 Consequently Dr. Martin’s evidence to the Widgery Tribunal in relation to the conclusions which ought to have been drawn from the presence of lead particles on John Young’s hand, jacket and trousers was, at best misleading and contributed directly to the conclusion that John Young had either handled a gun or been close to someone firing a weapon. In circumstances where “The distribution is not consistent with Young’s use of a firearm or his role as a bystander.” E1.0049 (8.7.9.a)

18.6.8.12 In any event as has been seen, John Young, as with Michael McDaid was transported to Altnagelvin Hospital on the floor of a Pig, having first been thrown into the Pig by soldiers and having been removed from the Pig by soldiers. Dr Lloyd has stated that his conclusion that Michael McDaid’s results were “explicable solely on that basis” E1.0045 (8.7.3.c) were equally pertinent to John Young. E1.0050 (8.7.9.c) This has now been accepted by Dr. Martin Day 226/98/5 to Day 226/98/11

18.6.8.13 Thus, not only is there not a shred of evidence to support Lord Widgery’s conclusion that John Young had been handling firearms, it is at least questionable whether, if Dr Martin had not given misleading evidence to Lord Widgery, that conclusion would ever have been arrived at.

18.6 Kevin McElhinney

18.6.1. Personal Details and Background

18.6.1.1. Kevin McElhinney was 17 when he was murdered on Bloody Sunday. He was single and lived with his parents. He was the middle child in a family of three sisters and one brother. He was the youngest boy. He had no criminal record or political affiliations.

18.6.1.2. Kevin’s father, Laurence McElhinney worked as a Fitter in the Ulster Transport Company, a job that he occupied for over 50 years. The family would have been known as quiet, industrious and trustworthy. They had no interest in politics and would not have been perceived as having any Republican or Nationalist sympathies or associations. Kevin was born and reared in Philip Street near Fort George, which was a religiously mixed area at the time. When he left school, Kevin secured a job in Lipton Supermarket on the Strand Road directly opposite the RUC Station. He would travel to and from work approximately four times per day six days a week. Kevin’s youth, easy going and kindly manner made him popular with the rest of the workforce. His enthusiasm and willingness enabled him to gain the rapid respect of his employers and the appreciation of his fellow employees Catholic and Protestant alike. He would be equally happy stacking shelves, filling customers bags or conducting casual security checks at the doors. At the time of his death Kevin had been learning to drive and indeed had arranged a driving lesson with his father later that afternoon.

18.6.1.3. It should be noted that at no time prior to his death or afterwards was the McElhinney household subjected to any form of security intrusion. This fact alone reflects the very neutral attitude that this family enjoyed. The tarnished reputation and lingering doubts which were created by the findings of Lord Widgery are not only confined to Kevin but have for over 30 years placed the McElhinney family in a position where they must defend the innocence of their brother in respect of the events of Bloody Sunday. For this reason the controversial circumstances surrounding the death of Kevin McElhinney have created an ongoing burden for his immediate family.

18.6.1.4. Relevant Photographs

In addition to these photographs, Kevin McElhinney can be seen walking on the march in his brown suit on Michael Rodgers cine film V52/40 to 49.

18.6.2. Civilian Evidence in relation to shooting

18.6.2.1. Summary

It has been established throughout the relevant civilian and military evidence that Kevin McElhinney either alone or together with at least one other person left the vicinity of the Rubble Barricade for what was undoubtedly perceived as the greater safety of the entrance to Block 1.

Only two witnesses recalled seeing Kevin McElhinney at the Rubble Barricade prior to the soldiers opening fire. The first, Liam Lynch who at the time did not know the deceased but who later identified him from newspaper photographs stated that he had not seen him throwing stones but had remembered him standing in the middle of the Rubble Barricade Day 145/9/4.

18.6.2.2. Daniel Morrison however admitted that both he and Kevin had been throwing stones at soldiers from the Rubble Barricade Day 143/149/17, despite having said the exact opposite in a statement to the Inquiry at AM 429.5 paragraph 9. It is also worth noting that this witness stated that he had a “fleeting memory of Kevin McElhinney bending down and picking up a rubber bullet somewhere in the vicinity of the Rubble Barricade” somewhere on the southern side AM 429.5 paragraph 9. The witness highlights the “fear” and “pandemonium” which he experienced once the shooting had started. This response compelled him to run towards the safety of the entrance to Block1 Rossville Flats. He at all times assumed that the deceased had followed him. Moments later he confronted the body of Kevin McElhinney but did not immediately recognise him, however when he realised who it was he became completely traumatised and recalls very little of what actually occurred subsequently apart from his overwhelming desire to go home. The witness remained traumatised for weeks thereafter AM429.5 paragraphs 11 to 15.

18.6.2.3. Sean Eugene O’Neill, aka “The General”, a witness whose credibility and standing remains in serious doubt provided a statement to the effect that the deceased was “a regular rioter” but was not a member of the IRA AO65.9 paragraph 44, AO65.10 paragraph 45. This description was corroborated to a degree by Kevin’s friend Paul Coyle in an interview he gave to Maureen Shiels which later featured in Eamon McCann’s book “Bloody Sunday in Derry: What really happened.” Paul Coyle told the Inquiry he had seen Kevin at the beginning of the march with a paint bomb, which he intended to throw at an Army vehicle AC105.5 paragraph 2. Counsel for the Soldiers attempted to confirm that in fact the paint bomb was an acid bomb. Mr Coyle denied any such suggestion Day 152/90/7 to Day 152/91/14, as did Paddy Kelly in his statement who described the deceased in the following way:

“Kevin was not the sort of boy who carried guns and nail bombs… he might have thrown a bottle or a stone in a riot but he would not have carried any guns.” AK20.2 paragraph 12

18.6.2.4. In any event, whether or not Kevin was engaged in low level rioting on Bloody Sunday it is, in our respectful submission, beyond doubt that he was not engaging in behaviour that would have justified being shot.

18.6.2.5. Location Where Kevin McElhinney was Shot

All of the fourteen civilian witnesses who saw Kevin McElhinney make his way from the Rubble Barricade to the entrance of Block1 claim that he was crawling on the ground, (a fact which has not been disputed by the military witnesses). The majority of civilian witnesses, along with all the military witnesses suggest that he was crawling on his stomach, although three of the civilian witnesses claim that he was on his back or in a sitting position.

18.6.2.6. Of those who witnessed his arrival in Block1, James Norris of the Knights of Malta is the only civilian who stands by the suggestion that Kevin McElhinney was upright as he crashed through the doors Day 147/95/14 to Day 147/95/18. Curiously, it may be recalled that Colour Sergeant 002 of Composite Platoon adopted a similar description in his Eversheds (but not his RMP) statement B1363.005 paragraph 35.

18.6.2.7. Liam Mailey changed his evidence on the stand and accepted that it was more likely that Kevin McElhinney crawled to the entrance of Block1 than ran Day 163/127/8.

Evidence surrounding this issue is further confused by the recollections of Gerard Grieve who it will be recalled, made had his way from the Barricade ahead of Kevin. He believed that he was shot whilst running, and then he had crawled to the entrance, although the witness did not actually see him shot Day 147/24/2 to Day 147/25/7.

18.6.2.8. All the witnesses who actually saw Kevin McElhinney shot agree that he had almost reached the entrance of Block1 when the bullet struck. Three of those who saw him crawling Robert Devine, Christopher Doherty and Fergus McAteer thought that he had already been shot when they first saw him. By inference in other words suggesting that he was already wounded or injured in some way when hit by the bullet that killed him or alternatively of course that they only saw him after he was shot. Father O’Keefe and Helen Johnston maintained the opinion that he was shot twice, the latter actually claiming to have seen two bullets strike, the first when he was mid-way between the Rubble Barricade and the end of Block1 and the second as he reached the doorway. Messrs Shepherd and O’Callaghan in their reports and evidence to the Inquiry remain unconvinced that he was struck by two bullets.

18.6.2.9. The Table below highlights the various descriptions which relate to the manner in which Kevin McElhinney made his way from the Rubble Barricade to the entrance of Block1:

³Statement is not detailed, but says he was ‘crawling’, presumably on his front

⁵Saw Kevin McElhinney suddenly stop moving amidst a volley of shots hitting the pavement around him, but did not specifically see the bullet that hit him

⁶Did not give statement, only interview with Sunday Times which records that Kevin McElhinney was ‘crawling’, presumably on his front AM340.12

⁸Statement is not detailed, but says he was ‘crawling’, presumably on his front

18.6.2.10. Of the twelve people who saw him crawling from the Barricade to the entrance of Block1, six claim that the deceased was alone when he was shot. Both Paul Coyle and Helen Johnston however refer to seeing two men crawling while Clifford Lancaster spoke of three men in total. Gerard Grieve claimed in 1972 to have been at the Rubble Barricade and was one of a group of five young men `who crawled from the Barricade to the entrance of Block1, although his evidence before this Inquiry was to the effect that Kevin McElhinney was crawling on his own at the time he was shot being one of the last, if not the last to make his escape from this location in this manner.

18.6.2.11. It should be noted that representatives for the Soldiers made no attempt to suggest to any of these witnesses that there was an armed man crawling next to, behind or in front of Kevin McElhinney at the time he was shot. The Table below illustrates in summary form the evidence of all the witnesses in respect of this aspect of the circumstances surrounding the death of Kevin McElhinney:

¹Did not see Kevin McElhinney making his way to Block 1 so unable to comment, save to say that nobody came into block after Kevin McElhinney

²Did not see anybody else in the vicinity as was focused on Kevin McElhinney

18.6.2.12. Who shot Kevin McElhinney?

Kevin stands almost uniquely among all the victims of Bloody Sunday because the circumstances surrounding his death serve to provide a corresponding account to that offered by three of the soldiers who have confessed to firing shots that day. These have been dealt with in our submissions concerning Soldiers K, L and M. In relation to the civilian evidence, only two of the witnesses claim to have seen the soldier who shot Kevin. Gerard Grieve was shown photograph P261 gave evidence to the effect that it was one of three soldiers who were positioned at the Kells Walk wall Day 147/19/25 to Day 147/24/2. Margaret Healy claims to have seen the soldier fire from the north western end of Block1 AH51.4 paragraph 21.

18.6.2.13. Repeated Fire

Some of the most significant evidence concerned the descriptions of repeated fire in the direction of Kevin McElhinney, James Barry Liddy AL13.8 and Christopher Doherty Day 182/140/10 to Day 182/141/25. It is clear that deliberate and sustained gunfire was directed at Kevin as he crawled down Rossville Street.

18.6.2.14. Bullet Striking the Doorway Entrance of Block1

Both Liam Mailey WT7.39.E-F and Gerard Grieve spoke of a bullet striking the doorway of the entrance to Block1 as Kevin McElhinney was being dragged into the building. The latter goes so far as to say that he believed the shots were being fired by the same soldiers positioned at Kells Walk:

“I pulled him into the Flats. As I did so, more shots rang out and a bullet hit the doorway. I thought and still think that those shots were fired by the soldiers at the wall near Kells Walk.” AG55.4 paragraph 17

18.6.2.15. The Issue of Weapons

Not one of the twenty one witnesses who saw Kevin McElhinney’s body or attended to him in any way was questioned by the Soldiers’ legal representatives or by Counsel to the Tribunal as to whether there were any weapons on his person though the Tribunal should be reminded that no less than five offered this evidence independently and voluntarily (see table below). This included Patrick Friel who searched Kevin’s body at the request of Father O’Doherty H17.2 paragraph 14, H17.8 and found only a rubber bullet AF32.24 paragraph 27; Day 118/142/23 to Day 118/143/9.[7]

²Smaller ticks indicate that witnesses did not discuss weapons specifically in relation to Kevin McElhinney, but made a blanket statement that they had seen no civilians

with weapons on the day; those with crosses did not say they saw weapons, but merely made no reference to weapons in their statements or oral evidence.

³Claims to have pulled Kevin McElhinney into stairwell and was yet not questioned about weapons by Inquiry or soldiers; he did not refer to weapons at all, but said that
Kevin McElhinney had no stones on his person.

18.6.2.16. Despite the differences shared amongst the fourteen witnesses who saw Kevin McElhinney making his way from the Rubble Barricade to the entrance of Block1, all of them are unanimous in relation to the point that he was not carrying any weapons. In addition, seven of the ten witnesses who gave evidence about seeing Kevin crawl towards Block1 categorically state that the way in which he was moving made it impossible for him to have been carrying a weapon (See Table below).

18.6.2.17. Clifford Lancaster described Kevin using his hands to pull himself along the pavement AL4.4 paragraph 17. Both Paul Coyle Day 152/104/10 to Day 152/105/3 and Margaret Healy claimed to have clearly seen both his hands the latter stating that they were flat on the pavement and therefore could not have been holding anything AH51.4 paragraph 20.

18.6.2.18. Fergus McAteer was clear that Kevin could not have passed any weapons to those in the doorway of Block1 AM42.9 paragraph 27. Liam Mailey was adamant that Kevin McElhinney had no weapon when he carried him up the stairs and there was no-one present who could have removed the gun from him MM19.5 paragraph 28. It will be recalled that the only witness who was asked about a weapon in the possession of the deceased was Paul Coyle Day 152/90/7 to Day 152/91/14 and this was confined exclusively to whether the paint bomb that Kevin had at the start of the march could have been an acid bomb.

¹Witnesses in bold assert positively that the manner in which Kevin McElhinney was crawling precluded the possibility of his carrying a weapon

18.6.2.19. Key Witnesses

Civilians in the Area of Rossville Street / Block1 Rossville Flats

Margaret Healy AH51 did not give oral evidence to the Tribunal. This witness was a 37 year-old married woman who along with her sister had joined the march at Bishops Field. She later described how she was making her way southwards along Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner when the soldiers approached in armoured vehicles. In her panic she ran to a flat at the north eastern end of Glenfada Park North, where she was admitted by the occupant. From this position she was able to observe a young man who “seemed to be frightened” crawl along the pavement with his hands flat out in front of him AH51.4 paragraph 20.

18.6.2.20. She immediately observed two soldiers positioned at the north western end of Block1. One of the soldiers was kneeling holding his rifle as if ready to shoot. The second was standing behind him holding a baton and smoking a cigarette. This soldier appeared to instruct the kneeling soldier to fire at the young man who was crawling southwards towards the entrance of Block1. The soldier rose to his feet and fired at the young man who appeared to jerk. The witness concludes by saying she was horrified by what she saw and cried out to other people in the flat although she could not recollect their response AH51.4 paragraph 21.

18.6.2.21. Margaret Healy appears to be suggesting that the fatal shot which killed Kevin McElhinney was fired by a soldier at the north-western end of Block1. Regrettably the Inquiry was prevented from testing the reliability of her account in evidence. The issues of restrictive sight lines, the presence or absence of the injured or deceased within the vicinity of the Barricade and the overall timing of the incident continue to remain uncertain and untested.

18.6.2.22. It is acknowledged that at least one soldier, namely Soldier U has admitted to discharging a weapon at this location, around this time, and in the same direction albeit at an allegedly different target. It may well be that given the traumatic impact of the events that she has witnessed that she has somehow transposed her recollection of one incident onto another.

18.6.2.23. Alternatively, her recollection may be entirely accurate albeit in a limited sense because her position within the room prevented her from seeing the Composite Platoon soldiers in the vicinity of the low wall at Kells Walk. The fact that no such description is contained in either of her statements might well support this approach. It is accepted however that in the absence of an opportunity to question the witness about these matters then her evidence must be approached with caution.

18.6.2.24. Gerard Grieve AG55 gave evidence to the Tribunal on Day 147. He alleged that he had been standing at the northern end of the Rubble Barricade on the footpath adjacent to Block1 Rossville Flats. He heard a heavy burst of gunfire coming from the direction of Pilot Row. The witness lay flat on the ground. The shooting continued for some time. After discussions with an unidentified males lying in the same vicinity the witness along with other people took advantage of a lull in the firing and individually made their way to the safety of the entrance of Block1 Day 147/19/15 to Day 147/20/14. When Mr Grieve’s opportunity to move arose he noticed a number of soldiers at the low wall at Kells Walk, in particular a third soldier who occupied, a position in Rossville Street, and who appeared to be aiming his rifle directly at him Day 147/20/14 to Day 147/23/25. The witness ran for the safety of the doorway and as he entered, he heard a thud. He was aware that there was another civilian running behind him although he did not know his identity at the time. It later transpired that this was the deceased Kevin McElhinney AG55.3 paragraphs 16 to 17. In his oral evidence before the Inquiry the witness confirmed that he pulled the deceased into the entrance of the doorway and remained with him for some time before going up to the second floor of Block1 where he found a Knight of Malta who attended to Kevin Day 147/29/5 to 147/30/17.

18.6.2.25. The witness assumed at all times that Kevin McElhinney was running rather than crawling when he was shot AG55.4 paragraph 17; Day 147/24/2 to Day 147/24/13. However he did acknowledge that he actually saw Kevin McElhinney crawling towards the entrance calling out to him for help and that he was on his stomach using both hands to drag himself along Day 147/25/19 to Day 147/26/5.

18.6.2.26. An element of support for the accuracy of this account can be derived from his 1972 interview with Kathleen Keville where the witness said that he saw Kevin McElhinney “creeping into the doorway” AG55.7. Significantly this witness was not asked by Counsel to the Tribunal or the Soldiers whether Kevin McElhinney was at any time carrying a weapon.

i. It would appear that he was the last person to leave the vicinity of the Barricade and make to it safely, to the entrance to Block1 in front of Kevin McElhinney.

ii. If there is a grain of truth in the evidence of the Composite Platoon soldiers positioned at the Kells Walk low wall and who stated that two men crawled towards the entrance to Block 1, it is respectfully submitted that on the evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Grieve must have been the man in front.

18.6.2.28. Liam Mailey M50 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 163. This witness was an amateur photographer who submitted photographs to the Widgery Inquiry. They can be found at EP23. They are also attached to his Eversheds statement M50.11 to M23.

18.6.2.29. The series of photographs EP23.4, EP23.5, EP23.6, EP23.7, EP23.8, EP23.9, EP23.10, EP23.11 and EP24.12 were taken by him. His photographs cover the Rubble Barricade, the deployment of troops on Rossville Street, movement of troops at the low wall at Kells walk and a group tending to Michael Kelly in Glenfada Park North.

18.6.2.30. In 1972 he said that after he took these photographs a number of people ran into the doorway of the flats and the witness went back to the stairwell. He was on the stairs for about a minute when Kevin McElhinney collapsed in the face down on the ground in the doorway. Mr Mailey then assisted in carrying him up to the first landing. M50.58 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that the reference to “a minute” should perhaps not be taken literally as he would only have to run up and down a short staircase. Day 163/123/14 to Day 163/124/20

18.6.2.31. In his statement to this Inquiry he said that he heard a shout that someone had been injured and this caused him to go back down the stairs. The witness pointed out that it was not necessarily in reference to Kevin McEhinney and agreed with the possibility that it might have been someone talking about Hugh Gilmore Day 163/124/21 to Day 163/125/4.

18.6.2.32. The witness’ recollection is that as he made his way down the stairs he saw Kevin McElhinney fall forwards towards the entrance door and a fresh splinter of wood flew from the doorpost causing a “very slight graze” to the ankle of a man called Paddy O’Hagan WT7.39.E-F, EP23.9A. The witness pointed out in oral evidence to this Inquiry that he did not know Paddy / Pat O’Hagan and that this was something that he had been told later Day163/148/11 to Day 163/148/25.

18.6.2.33. He believed that he saw Kevin McElhinney actually being shot just as he arrived at the door. Kevin McElhinney was “very close to the ground” “or possibly on the ground” as he came down the stairs Day 163/125/13 to Day 163/125/25; Day 163/126/6 to Day 163/128/6

18.6.2.34. The witness then carried Kevin up the first flight of stairs into the small landing, half way up to the first floor. He sat with his back to the wall with Kevin’s head resting on his left hand. There was a lot of blood. He assisted a Knight of Malta who arrived (Jim Norris). Mr Mailey recalled that an old man called Artie Orr stayed with him and did not want to leave M50.4 paragraphs 19 to 27 According to his Widgery testimony, Kevin “died about four minutes after he was shot” WT7.33 E.

18.6.2.35. Mr Mailey stayed with the body until the ambulance arrived outside Block1. Although he did not carry Kevin McElhinney, he followed behind the group who were when suddenly there was a burst of further shots which caused everyone to fall to the floor M50.5 paragraphs 34 to 36.

18.6.2.36. In respect of the issue of whether Kevin McElhinney was armed the witness said the following in his Eversheds statement:

“I do not believe that the wounded men was carrying a weapon of any sort. I did not search him but I did not see a weapon around him when I picked him up. There was no-one around him with a gun or who could have moved a gun, and I did not notice one about his person. If he had a gun it was well concealed but my impression was that he did not and that he had been running to get away from the firing.” M50.5 paragraph 28; See also WT7.39 G

18.6.2.37. If this witness is to be believed, and Counsel for the Soldiers did not challenge his honesty in any way, a number of consequences follow:

iii. Kevin McElhinney was shot very close to the doorway and was clearly unarmed;

iv. No Lee Enfield rifle or Thompson SMG was brought into the flats via this entrance;

vi. There was no-one around Kevin McElhinney either with a gun or who could have moved a gun.

18.6.2.38. Alan Harkens AH8 gave oral evidence on Day 96. Whilst not directly concerned with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Kevin McElhinney, he did come across his body in the Rossville Flats afterwards. Curiously the witness claims to have seen two bodies in the stairwell of Block1, the first on the landing between floors one and two, lying flat on the ground, covered with a coat, with his shoes next to him AH8.4 paragraph 15. He alleged that the second body was propped up against a wall with his boots on in the foyer entrance AH8.4 paragraph 16.

18.6.2.39. Although it is virtually certain that one of these bodies was that of Hugh Gilmore (given the fact that his shoes were removed), the witness refused to acknowledge that he might be mistaken though he was prepared to concede that he was in a state of shock at the time and broke down when he returned home Day 96/29/9 to Day 96/29/19. It is also worth recalling that this witness did not make a statement in 1972 and therefore was denied the assistance of a contemporary document when drafting his statement for this Inquiry. Whilst we do not challenge the witness’ honesty in any way we respectfully submit that his recollection is mistaken and should not be relied upon.

Civilians at Glenfada Park South

18.6.2.40. Robert Devine AD42 in his 1972 account he was one of a group of about six men taking cover behind the ramp leading up to the upper level of the Glenfada Park Flats AD42.7. In his Eversheds statement he elaborated on his positioning and confirmed that it was at the bottom of the pram ramp at Glenfada Park South AD42.2 paragraphs 15 to 16. He described how he was able to look across to the entrance to Block1:

“…I saw a youth with dark hair who seemed to have been wounded in his lower body, lying on the ground. He looked distressed as he was pulling himself into the doorway of Block1 of the Rossville Flats and others grabbed him and pulled him to the doorway.” AD42.3 paragraph 18

18.6.2.41. Clifford Lancaster AL4 was from Norwich and had been living in Derry since 1956. He did not give oral evidence to the Tribunal. He was positioned under the stairs at the Glenfada Park South pram ramp AL4.4 paragraphs 14 to 15, AL4.12.

In his 1972 statement he said that at no time was anybody firing from the Rubble Barricade AL4.8. He attached a diagram to his 1972 statement at AL4.11 and described what he saw in the following terms:

“I saw three young fellows lying alongside the flats hugging the ground for cover.

I saw A crawl into the flats door, a few moments later B started to crawl to the same door but was struck in the back or lower part of the body while still trying to belly crawl to the door. I saw the bullet strike him and he was unarmed. A second shot splintered the doorway of the flats.

He managed to crawl nearer the door and I saw A grab his hands and drag him in his white shirt was covered in blood and the blood was running out of the doorway.” AL4.9

18.6.2.42. His account to this Inquiry in respect of the shooting can be found at AL4.4 paragraphs 16 to 17. In that account the witness remarked:

“I could see that the man that I had just seen shot had nothing in his hands. He was using his hands to pull himself along the pavement and was also grabbed by his hands by other people inside the doorway.” AL4.4 paragraph 17

Civilians at the Glenfada Park North Gable

18.6.2.43. Paul Coyle AC105 gave oral evidence on Day 152. At the material time this witness occupied a position in the vicinity of the southern gable end of Glenfada Park North. He saw between six and twelve boys on either side of the Rubble Barricade. They appeared to be exchanging abuse with the soldiers who had arrived in Rossville Street. This scene was interrupted by “a sudden hail of SLR shots” AC105.2 paragraph 10.

18.6.2.44. The witness then saw a man crawling in a southerly direction along the pavement on the eastern side of Rossville Street towards the entrance to Block1. His first thought at the time was that this man had foolishly given up the cover of the Barricade itself. AC105.3 paragraph 11. He could clearly see that he was not carrying anything in his hands and was unarmed. During the course of his evidence he stated that he recalled two men as described in a Praxis interview in 1991 O5.16, Day 152/70/20 to Day 152/71/24.

18.6.2.45. The witness confirmed that he did not see any civilian with a gun, petrol bomb or nail bomb AC105.4 paragraph 17.

18.6.2.46. Even though he had spoken to Kevin McElhinney, who was a close neighbour and friend, at the Creggan roundabout earlier that day he had failed to recognise him as one of the men that he later saw crawling towards the safety of the doorway of Block1. It will be recalled that Counsel for the Soldiers attempted to cast doubt on whether the deceased’s possession of a paint bomb earlier that day was not in fact an acid bomb. The witness however remained resolute in his recollection that Kevin McElhinney was unarmed Day 152/90/7 to Day 152/91/14.

18.6.2.47. Patrick Joseph Norris AN24 gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on Day 167. Whilst looking from the south gable end of Glenfada Park North he saw another man shot. He said that the man was crawling on his belly for the entrance to Block1. The witness did not hear the shot but saw the man’s body jerk and jump off the ground a little. “When he was shot, he had almost reached the door of Block1, and some brave people came out and dragged his body into the doorway.” AN24.4 paragraph 19.

18.6.2.48. In our submission that this account is consistent with the description of events as provided by him in 1972. When questioned before his Tribunal the witness confirmed that he saw the deceased crawl on his stomach from the Rubble Barricade and no-one else was near him when he was shot Day 167/123/12 to Day 167125/6. The witness was not asked in the course of his evidence whether the deceased was carrying a weapon of any sort.

18.6.2.49. John McLaughlin provided an interview to the Sunday Times Insight Team AM340.12. He is deceased. It records that he witnessed “the youth McElhinney crawling towards the doorway of the flats and I saw him shot.” Again the witness made no mention of the deceased having any weapon at all.

18.6.2.50. Eugene Bradley AB113 gave evidence on Day 169. He can be seen in EP23/12. He was positioned at the area of the south gable wall at Glenfada Park North. The witness recalled how he looked out east across Rossville Street towards the southwest entrance of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He saw a man crawling backwards on his hands and feet towards the entrance. The man was looking towards William Street. There was nothing in the man’s hands and he could not have moved in the way that he was moving if he had been carrying anything. As Mr Bradley watched, the man was knocked backwards and stopped. AB113.2 paragraph 12

18.6.2.51. Eamon McAteer AM41 gave oral evidence on Day 135. In his Eversheds statement he described what he saw whilst positioned at the Glenfada Park gable:

“I also saw a man close to the west wall of Block1 of the Rossville Flats crawling south towards the safety of the flats approximately at the position marked “E” (see map AM41.34)… He was very close to the edge of the flats. He was making a long painful crawl on his elbows pressing himself low down. He was moving quite slowly and then he stopped. I could see the chips and bullets coming off the pavement around him. I was sure that he was being shot at. It was heart rending to see. I do not know whether he remained there or what happened him. I was caught between what was happening to him, what I had seen on the Rubble Barricade and what was going on in Glenfada Park. I cannot describe this man in detail. I was 17 and he seemed older. I felt he was well dressed in a blazer or jacket, something like that. He was obviously trying to get away. I could not see any weapon, and again, if I had seen one I would say so. These images are like snapshots to me. There are gaps but they are truthful images. There was shooting going on all the time…” AM41.4 paragraph 26

18.6.2.52. In his oral evidence he conveyed the feeling of helplessness that enveloped the civilians at the Glenfada Park North gable who saw Kevin McElhinney crawling towards the entrance to Block1:

the -- bullets were still coming down Rossville Street.” Day 135/40/14 to Day 135/40/23

18.6.2.53. When asked why he did not include this in his statement that he drafted in 1972 AM41.33 he explained that he did not write it down because he was concerning himself with civilians who he knew were shot dead. As he saw Kevin McElhinney still crawling he did not think that he was actually shot Day 135/41/14 to Day 135/41/21.

18.6.2.54. Fergus McAteer AM42 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 168. He can be seen in photographs EP2/11; EP3/5; EP27/11. This witness stated he arrived at Glenfada Park North just as Michael Kelly’s body was carried into that location. He believed that about ten minutes later he had a clear and uninterrupted view of a man crawling south along the footpath next to Block1. The man was approximately ten yards from the entrance when he first saw him Day 168/54/7 to Day 168/54/14. In his Eversheds statement he recorded that the man was on his own and was crawling in a painful way AM42.8 paragraph 25.

18.6.2.55. In his 1972 statement he recorded that the man had no weapon and that he used both hands to manoeuvre himself through the door of Block1. His impression was that he was shot in the right side or leg AM42.17.

Significantly, Mr McAteer was never challenged in respect of his assertion that the deceased was not carrying any weapons.

18.6.2.56. Helen Johnston AJ11 gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on Day 228. She can be seen in photographs EP23/10 and EP23/11. It will be recalled that having run down Rossville Street she took up a position on the south eastern end of Glenfada Park North. From there she could see three young men lying on the Rubble Barricade along with Mr Alex Nash who was waving a white hanky.

18.6.2.57. She described in her contemporaneous account a sustained level of fire coming from a northerly direction towards her position[8]. At this point she saw two boys leaving the relative safety of the Barricade and start to crawl southwards along the western side of Block1. She recorded the incident in the following way:

“The fire continued. On the opposite side of the street two boys were crawling along the road. The first one made it up to the doorway. The second one appeared to get shot he was jerking and when he got to the door he stopped altogether. We were all screaming to the boy inside the doorway to reach out and pull the other lad in, which he did.” AJ11.1

18.6.2.58. The witness was not asked about the issue of weapons although it should be noted that she stated that it would have been impossible for either of the men saw to have been carrying anything given the manner in which they were crawling AJ11.4 paragraphs 13; Day 228/42/14 to Day 228/43/24.

“The young lads were scrambling with their hands out in front of them. I not believe there was any possibility of them having a weapon. I certainly saw none. Someone must have been a good shot that day. I do not know how you shoot someone on the ground so effectively.” AJ11.4 paragraph 11

What the witness did not know at the material time was that one of the soldiers responsible for firing at Kevin McElhinney was the Regimental marksman and also a Bisley Champion.

18.6.2.60. Christopher Doherty AD58 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 182. This witness although originally occupying a position in Rossville Street ran for the cover of Glenfada Park North when the Army opened fire AD58.19 paragraph 20. From this location he observed a number of bodies lying dead near the Rubble Barricade along with Mr Alex Nash.

“I then noticed another fellow, lying beyond Mr Nash and the two fellows near Block1 of Rossville Flats. The fellow was trying to crawl on his back towards Block1. He was moving very slowly. I could see bullets bouncing off the ground around him. He was pushing himself with his feet and was making a lot of effort to move himself while all the time being shot at. I cannot say how many bullets were fired towards him but there were several. I thought he must have been shot because he was on his back and therefore had to be injured. I cannot now recall what he looked like or what he was wearing. He was close to the entrance to the Flats and he managed to pull himself around the pole supporting the canopy at the door of Block1 of the Rossville Flats. I think he may have been on his side as he pulled himself around. My last memory of him is being half inside and half outside the door. I could see the man clearly and could not see any weapon on or close to him.” AD58.19 paragraph 22

This witness was never questioned about the issue of weapons and gave evidence consistent with the description outlined above which was in turn equally consistent with his evidence in 1972 AD58.1.

18.6.2.61. Father (now Professor) Terence O’Keefe AH21 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 127. After witnessing Father Bradley anoint Michael Kelly and then observing Alex Nash on top of the three bodies (Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash) on the southern side of the Barricade the witness related to the Treasury Solicitor how:

“During all this time there had been shots and the whine of bullets going past. All the shots seemed to come from the position of the soldiers down Rossville Street. My impression was that they were all single shots.

Looking across towards Rossville Flats there was a young man pulling himself along the ground towards the doorway at the southern end of the wing closest to Rossville Street. As he got to the doorway he seemed to jerk as though he had been hit by a bullet. He twitched. He nevertheless managed to get inside the doorway.” H21.80

18.6.2.62. The Tribunal will note that on this account the witness only appears to have seen Kevin McElhinney twitch once as if struck by a bullet. This is completely consistent with what he told Lord Widgery on oath:

“Q. Going away from the barricade in the line of Rossville Street and in the direction of Derry Corner? A. Yes, but there was a doorway. He was obviously heading for a doorway there which was open – I think a metal doorway.

Q. What happened? A. I got the impression he was dragging himself on his back and I thought he may have been hit in the leg. When he reached the door he was half way hauling himself in the inside, and he twitched; his body jerked once and he disappeared in the doorway then.

18.6.2.63. The witness’ impression thirty years later was that Kevin McElhinney was already wounded and was then a second time at the doorway. In our submission this is an honest mistake due to the passage of time but the sentiments expressed in his Eversheds statement appear to sum up the desperate poignancy of Kevin McElhinney’s final moments:

“His movement was very odd and awkward and he was making very slow progress. I and the other people at the gable wall were urging him on, willing him to get into cover. Just as he got to the doorway and seemed to heave himself up over, I assume, a little step, he seemed to twitch and jerk and then lie still. It seemed to me that he had been shot a second time. Some people who were taking cover in the doorway dragged him in. It was a tragic moment. He was almost there, but didn’t quite make it.” H21.47 paragraph 17

Issue of the “Leopard Crawl” and whether Two Males crawled towards the doorway

18.6.2.64. The Tribunal will recall that by the time the members of Composite Platoon came to make their statements to the Treasury Solicitor they were all describing Kevin McElhinney’s crawl from the Barricade towards the doorway as being a “leopard crawl” in an obvious attempt to imply that the deceased was employing some type of military technique that he had been trained in to adopt whilst under fire. (This reasoning of course is inherently flawed, insofar as if Kevin McElhinney had received any sort on military training, then it is hard to understand why he would have left the cover of the Barricade at all.)

All of the relevant Composite Platoon soldiers had also told the RMP that two men had crawled from the Barricade.

18.6.2.65. These issues were raised when Mr Gibbens QC at the Widgery Tribunal was examining Father O’Keefe. In our submission the answers to Counsel’s questions are very important:

“Q. You saw a man crawling down from the barricade to a doorway in the block of flats? A. Not crawling so much as dragging himself.

Q. It is crawling with your posterior rather higher in the air because of being on your hands and using your legs to crawl along, rather in the form of a four-footed animal. A. No, this is not my impression of the way it was. He was dragging himself rather more on the side and back.

Q. Did you not in fact see two men crawling along the way to that doorway? A. No, I only saw one man.

Q. If that were so, of course, it may have happened while you were giving the last rites to this man down here. A. My impression is only of one man very definitely.

Q. At any rate, I am suggesting to you , and there will be evidence, that two men crawled along there dragging guns – I use the word loosely, it may be rifles, an implement of that kind – towards the door in the Rossville Flats.

My impression is one man who was dragging himself, as I say, on his back or side rather.

Q. Even allowing that you saw him on his back, did you see him dragging something as it were along with him with his feet or with his hands?

Not with his feet. I could only see one hand clearly, that is the hand towards me. There was certainly nothing in that hand. I got the impression as he was levering himself up from the door he certainly did not seem to have left anything behind. So I would deduce from that that he was not carrying anything.

Q. He was the only man you saw crawl along? A. He was, yes.” (emphasis added) WT5.18 D-F; WT5.19 A

18.6.2.66. This is consistent with what he told this Inquiry namely that it would not be accurate to describe Kevin McElhinney’s movements as a “leopard crawl” and that Kevin was on his own when he was shot Day 127/180/5 to Day 127/184/22.

We respectfully submit that the Tribunal should draw a number of conclusions from this evidence, viz:

ii. That Kevin McElhinney was not crawling in a “leopard crawl” or performing any similar type of military manoeuvre;

iii. That he was isolated, to a degree, from other civilians on the east side of Rossville Street as he crawled for the doorway;

iv. That the “descriptions” of his movements provided by the military witnesses are untruthful;

v. The expression “leopard crawl” as adopted by soldiers when supplying statements to the Treasury Solicitor, raises the issue of collusion between them, and provides a clear indication of the recognition that the justification for firing required enhancement.

Inside the Stairwell of Block 1

18.6.2.67. Jim Norris AN20 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 147. He can be seen in EP26/10. Mr Norris had been on the second floor of the Block1 where he had been treating a man who had been hit in the face with a gas canister. His 1972 statement said that when he reached the bottom stair he saw a photographer (who must be Liam Mailey) and just at that point a youth fell in the doorway. The boy was bleeding profusely. Both he and Liam Mailey dragged and carried him upstairs where he applied a gunshot wound to side. AN20.25.

Mr Norris’ current recollection is of a boy crashing through the doors from Rossville Street as though in full flight. Mr Norris caught the boy as he fell. He said that he does not recall the boy being dragged in. Mr Norris said that he is not mistaken in thinking that the boy was wearing a green suit. (Kevin McElhinney was in fact wearing a brown suit with a green pullover.) He searched Kevin and did not find anything in his pockets. AN20.9 paragraphs 13 to 14.

The witness’ current recollection is that Mr McElhinney’s body was in the foyer when he left him. He does not remember anyone carrying Mr McElhinney up the steps Day 147/101/11 to Day 147/101/18.

18.6.2.68. Mr Norris’s 1972 account states that whilst he was treating Kevin McElhinney, a man told him that someone had been injured in the head AN20.25. He does not now know which block he went to in order to treat the man. Day 147/108/16 to Day 147/109/1.

By the time he came back to Kevin McElhinney he was dead and a coat or a blanket was placed over him AN20.10 paragraph 18, AN20.25

As Kevin lay on the stairwell of Block1 Patrick Friel searched him at the request of Father Irwin who anointed him. Mr Friel found a rubber bullet in Kevin’s pocket. A number of other witnesses saw him there including Greg Doherty, Bernard Feeney, Don Carlin and John Barrett.

Susan North and Fulvio Grimaldi also passed his body on the stairs and Mr Grimaldi took a photograph which can be found at P674.001.

18.6.3. Injuries Sustained

18.6.3.1. Kevin McElhinney was shot from behind as he crawled for his life from the Rubble Barricade towards the relative safety of the entrance to Block1 Rossville Flats.

The post mortem examination was carried out by Doctor Marshall, State Pathologist, at 8pm on 31^st January 1972. The report of Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.0051 to E2.0055. The addendum report appears at E2.0084. The morgue and X-ray photographs are in Bundle P2 TAB7.

18.6.3.2. Kevin McElhinney sustained one entry wound and four other wounds. The entry wound was in the left buttock and measured 0.3cm in diameter P111, P115, P116. The four other wounds lay above each other on the left side of his trunk P112, P113, P114, P117.

Wound 1: An oval split measuring 7 x 4 cm. No abrasions were recorded. P110, P112, P113, P114, P115

Wound 2: 2.5 cm above Wound1 was a circular laceration 0.4cm with an area of “abrasion” measuring 1.2 x 0.4cm at its upper border. P112, P113, P114, P115

Wound 3: 8 cm above Wound 2 was a circular laceration 0.4cm with an arch of abrasion of the left upper border 0.4cm wide. P112, P113, P114, P115

Wound 4: 3.5cm above Wound 3 was a laceration 0.5 x 0.4cm. P112, P113, P114, P115

18.6.3.4. In addition to these injuries there also was an abrasion 6 x 1cm on the outer left thigh which was thought to represent the track of the bullet before it struck the buttock. D0218 This injury was not photographed. The Inquiry’s experts were of the view however that as Dr Martin recorded the damage to the left trouser leg as being a “tear” and the drawing indicating a right angled defect, “these features do not indicate that the damage was due to the passage of a bullet, they are more in keeping with contact by or against a point.” E2.0053

The track of the bullet was upwards and from back to front at 45 and slightly from right to left.E2.0054, D0215

18.6.3.5. The bullet which killed Kevin McElhinney passed into the left side of the pelvic cavity causing “considerable laceration of muscle, fracturing of bone and a tear in the bladder. It had then divided a segment of large intestine, lacerated the artery supplying the left leg and torn open two segments of small intestine before entering the left side of the abdominal wall.” D0218

18.6.3.6. Kevin McElhinney’s death was precipitated by the bleeding into the abdomen from the lacerated artery. D0218

18.6.3.7. Dr Marshall was of the opinion that the bullet fragmented and the four wounds on the left side of the truck were caused by exiting bullet fragments. D0218

18.6.3.8. Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan were of the view for reasons stated in E2.0054 to E2. 0055 that the bullet did not in fact fragment and that it exited through Wound 2 then re-entered via Wound 3 and finally left via Wound 4. After leaving Wound 4, the bullet did not pass through the jacket or its lining until it exited through the hole near the shoulder.

18.6.3.9. In conclusion, this is the opinion of the Inquiry’s experts:
”Dr Marshall formed the opinion that all of the injuries were caused by one bullet and we would concur with that conclusion; we differ only in the behaviour of the bullet at the time of exit and in our opinion that it did not fragment.

Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position it is clear that the track of the bullet was from below upward and from right to left.

The same track could be achieved if Kevin MCELHINNEY was bending over or on all fours and the shot was fired from behind and to his right.” (Emphasis added) E2.0055

18.6.4. Removal to Hospital

18.6.4.1. Some time after 4.51pm Charlie Downey AC 133.5 paragraph 26 to 29; EP196/3,EP4/49, EP5/23 and Jim Norris of the Knights of Malta AN 20.3 paragraphs 13 to 15, AN 20.4 paragraphs 18 to 19 put Kevin McElhinney in an ambulance VRM 7689 EZ which was parked in Rossville Street near the entrance to the Rossville Flats P674.3. Also placed in the same ambulance were Barney McGuigan, Alana Burke and Patsy Brolly. The ambulance was manned by John Rafferty (driver) and Samuel Hughes (attendant). It arrived in Altnagelvin Hospital at 5.15pm. ED39.6; D500.26, D500.27; D948

18.6.5. Forensic Evidence

18.6.5.1. Dr Martin said in 1972 that the lead particle density on the back of Kevin McElhinney’s jacket was “significantly above the range normally encountered.” D0201 Two lead particles and a smear were also found on the back of his left hand. Notwithstanding this Dr Martin said in evidence that was not safe to conclude that this was positive evidence of handling firearms as a fragmenting bullet may have been the cause of the lead. WT9.15B-E

18.6.5.2. It is further submitted a possible source for the lead on Kevin McElhinney’s jacket may have been due to the bullets that according to the witness Christopher Doherty were “bouncing around” him as he crawled towards Block1.

18.6.5.3. The Inquiry’s own expert, Dr Lloyd who described Dr Martin’s work as “worthless” concluded in his report that “the particles on the hand could have been derived from the clothing and, therefore, are not acceptable evidence of McElhinney’s use of a gun.” E1.0046

18.6.5.4. Dr Lloyd in oral evidence amplified his opinion in this regard. He said that if Kevin McElhinney was crawling on a surface which was contaminated with fragmentation debris, then this also could account for the presence of lead on his jacket. Day 227/46/25 to Day 227/47/2

ii. Kevin McElhinney was shot without any weapon or any other item in either of his hands.

iii. Kevin McElhinney never presented as a perceived or real threat to the Parachute Regiment soldiers in Rossville Street or its environs

iv. No other person was shot in the vicinity of Kevin McElhinney at or around the time he was struck.

vi. There was no-one at or around the Rubble Barricade with a firearm, nail-bomb, petrol bomb or any other weapon.

viii. Not even stones were thrown at the soldiers in Rossville Street when Kevin McElhinney was shot.

ix. Kevin McElhinney was the victim of a capricious and random act, deliberately committed by an unnamed member of the Parachute Regiment.

x. There is no evidence capable of justifying the circumstances in which Kevin McElhinney was murdered.

xi. The forensic evidence does not support the allegations of the military witnesses.

xii. The civilian evidence overwhelmingly confirms, that Kevin McElhinney was unarmed at the time he was murdered. The inconsistent and contradictory nature of the military evidence could not with reason be relied upon for the purposes of supporting any other conclusion.

xiii. There is no evidence to suggest that the deceased behaved in an unlawful or provocative manner either immediately prior or at the time of his death.

xiv. The likelihood is that Kevin McElhinney was driven from the comparative protection of the barricade by an overwhelming fear for his safety and that this decision almost certainly cost him his life.

xv. Kevin McElhinney was the victim of a military mindset, which, for the purposes of operational considerations on Bloody Sunday, failed to make any proper distinction between politician, civil rights marcher, defiant teenager or perceived gunman.

xvi. Kevin McElhinney was subjected to an ill-disciplined fusillade of sustained gunfire, in circumstances were no perceived or actual risk to the Paratroopers in Rossville Street existed.

xvii. No challenge to the unlawful circumstances surrounding the death of Kevin McElhinney was made on behalf of any of the interested parties.

[1] Professor O’Keefe also believes that he had, by this time, also seen the bodies on the Barricade Day 127/107/22 to Day 127/108/24

[2] See Ann Gallagher AG1.3 paragraph 10 and Dolores MacFarland AM8.4 paragraph 20

[3] For example, Albert Edward Faulkner AF4.3 paragraph 13, who says that the Pig came to a halt about a foot or so to the north of the Rubble Barricade

[4] See Margo Harkin AH 23.18 paragraph 47

[5] See also the evidence of Ann Gallagher AG1.3 paragraph 11; Marie Kopiak AK39.11; Olive Mottram AM441 paragraph 38 and AM441.13; Letty Donnelly AD125.2 paragraph 15; William McDonagh AM192.4 paragraph 24; John Barrett AB21.1; Kevin McGonagle AM254.11 paragraph 18; Lila Fleming AF21. 3 paragraph 17

[6] See also William Patrick McDonagh and Margo Harkin

[7] It will be recalled that there is evidence to show that rubber bullets were collected routinely by young people either as momentos or to be sold to foreign journalists.

[8] Although Helen Johnston’s 1972 statement bears the names Helen and Margaret Johnston (sister of the witness) she makes clear in her Eversheds statement that the 1972 statement is her own. AJ11.6 paragraph 27

This section deals with the evidence of the soldiers in (i) Mortar Platoon, (ii) Anti-Tank Platoon, (iii) Composite Platoon, (iv) the Observation Posts overlooking the sector and (v) Soldier 028 a ‘witness’ to events in Sector 3. In each sub-section, we first provide an overview of the soldiers’ accounts and then examine the activities of the most relevant soldiers in each category.

18.7.2 The deployment of Mortar Platoon is dealt with in section 17.8 and it is not proposed to re-visit that evidence in detail. The Mortar Platoon Pigs were the first two Pigs from Support Company to enter the Bogside. The second of those Pigs, commanded by Sergeant O stopped briefly on the roadway at the North end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, before turning into the waste ground at Pilot’s Row. A number of soldiers from Sergeant O’s Pig debussed at that point, Soldiers P, U and R armed with SLRs and Soldiers 017 and 006 both armed with baton guns.

18.7.2.1 These soldiers can be seen debussing on V48/12.14 to 12.30 which shows that prior to debussing a rubber bullet was fired from inside the Pig and that soldiers then debussed to the right and left side of the Pig.

18.7.2.2 Of these soldiers, Soldiers R and 006 joined the rest of their Platoon in the waste-ground and the car park of the Rossville Flats, while Soldiers P, U and 017 moved down Rossville Street. Their actions on the day are relevant to the events in Sector 3, rather than Sector 2 and will be dealt with below.

18.7.2.3 Soldier P was a Corporal on Bloody Sunday and was one of the soldiers in Mortar Platoon who debussed from Sergeant O’s Pig at the North end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Accompanied by Soldier 017, Soldier P moved across Rossville Street towards Kells Walk.

18.7.2.4 Soldier P is one of only a small number of soldiers who admit to having fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade. In the evidence given by soldiers to Lord Widgery in 1972 he is one of only two soldiers, the other being Soldier J, whose firing of live rounds could account for the deaths of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash. His firing could also account for the death of Hugh Gilmore.

18.7.2.5 On Soldier P’s own account he shot and killed 2 men in Rossville Street, one at a location in front of the Rubble Barricade and the other man behind the Rubble Barricade. While soldiers U, K, L and M admit to having fired rounds over the Rubble Barricade and claim to have hit their targets, the targets they claim to have hit were not at the Rubble Barricade. Other soldiers, such as Soldier J and E claim to have fired live rounds over the Barricade but to have missed their targets. Thus with the exception of Soldier F, who eventually admitted to having shot and killed Michael Kelly, Soldier P is the only soldier who admits to having shot and killed a man at the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.2.6 Soldier P admits to having fired at least 9 live rounds down Rossville Street, although in the first account he gave to the RMP he accounted for firing a total of 11 shots. B576, B577, B578. Of the shots fired by Soldier P, all were fired down Rossville Street and over the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.2.7 With the exception of the account given by Soldier 027, this Tribunal has heard no account from any soldier which explains how Michael McDaid, John Young, William Nash and Hugh Gilmore came to be shot and killed behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.2.8 On the evidence before this Tribunal, Soldier P remains, along with Soldier J, the prime suspect for the murder of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash. He is also a possible suspect for having shot and killed Hugh Gilmore, although the evidence would suggest that Soldier U is the most likely person to have killed Hugh Gilmore.

18.7.2.9 A feature of this soldiers’ evidence, and a particular feature of the evidence of soldiers who under grave suspicion of murder is their inability to recollect anything about the events of Bloody Sunday.[1] In both his written and oral evidence to this Tribunal Soldier P claims to have virtually no recollection of the events of the day.

“I have had a look at some statements which are in my name and the evidence I gave to the Widgery Tribunal . . . However, they did not bring anything back to me. It all went in a blur and I do not recall anything else about it. It is like it disappeared. . . .

I have no recollection of firing my weapon or of seeing or hearing others firing weapons. I do not recall hearing any other, non military, types of rifle discharge. I must have been fired at, but I do not remember it at this time.”.” B623.002 paragraphs 11 to 12

18.7.2.11 This despite the fact that, on his own admission, he killed at least two people on Bloody Sunday and this was the only occasion, in a 14 year career in the army,[2] that he had ever fired live rounds.[3] Day 353/3/2 to Day 353/3/4

18.7.2.12 It is submitted that Soldier P suffers not from a failure of memory but a “failure of conscience”. Soldier P came to this Tribunal, unprepared to tell the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday because he is guilty of unlawful killing and he took “refuge in a failure of memory as being the easiest way to cope with the difficult situation and questions” that he knew he would have to face. Day 353/120/1 to Day 353/120/10

18.7.2.13 By claiming that he had no recollection of the events of Bloody Sunday Soldier P was able to avoid having to deal with:

ii) The discrepancies between the accounts given by him and the objective photographic and video evidence available to this Tribunal.

iii) The fact that his account of the circumstances in which he fired live rounds is uncorroborated by soldiers who were in the perfect position to witness his actions on that day.[4]

iv) The fact that, although positioned close by soldiers who fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade, he claims neither to have seen nor heard those rounds, nor seen the alleged targets who, on the account of these soldiers, were positioned directly in front of him.

18.7.2.14 Claiming to have no recollection of the events of the day was the most effective way in which Soldier P could obstruct this Tribunal’s search for the truth about Bloody Sunday, a truth which would identify Soldier P as being guilty of murder.

18.7.2.15 Because of what was in effect, a refusal by Soldier P to co-operate with this Tribunal, the focus of a consideration of Soldier P’s evidence relates to the accounts given by Soldier P in 1972, which he has invited this Tribunal to accept as truthful.

18.7.2.16 It is our submission that none of the accounts given by Soldier P in 1972 were truthful. There are significant discrepancies as between these accounts, discrepancies which are explicable by reference to Soldier P’s need to provide an explanation of how he came to fire live rounds, without incriminating himself.

18.7.2.17 The first account given by Soldier P about the events of Bloody Sunday was in a statement made to the RMP at 22.30 hours on the 30 January 1972.

18.7.2.18 According to his RMP statement at the time of his deployment a riot, involving 4,000 people, was taking place at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street. B576

18.7.2.19 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Soldier P stated that, on crossing Barrier 12, there was a crowd of approximately 2,000 in the area of the open ground between William Street and Prince Arthur’s Street and the car park on the other side of Little James Street. This crowd began to run away towards the general area of the Rossville Flats. B591

18.7.2.20 When questioned by Counsel for the Inquiry about his estimate of 4,000 Soldier P accepted the explanation offered to him that the number of 4,000 would have been an estimate of “the people that were in the march.” Day 353/15/9

18.7.2.21 However, Soldier P’s RMP statement is unambiguous in its assertion that at 16.10 hours “a riot was taking place at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street, Londonderry. There were about 4,000 people involved in the riot and comprised both men and women of all ages.” B576

18.7.2.22 Yet, as Soldier P acknowledged himself, “[m]y vision was very limited at this time owing to the fact that I was at the back of the vehicle.” B591 Soldier P could not on any account have witnessed the scenes of rioting depicted in either his RMP or his Treasury Solicitor statement. Nonetheless in both statements Soldier P willingly provided dishonest accounts tending to depict scenes of thousands of civilians engaged in unlawful and violent behaviour and posing a real threat to the security forces who entered the Bogside.

18.7.2.23 Soldier P’s picture of riotous civilians and soldiers under attack was developed in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor wherein he states that, as the vehicles deployed into the Bogside, “we could hear stones bouncing off our vehicles.” B591 No such reference can be found in his RMP statement. Moreover Video 48 which shows the Pig in which Soldier P entered the Bogside, demonstrates clearly, that contrary to Soldier P’s evidence “there was no continuous stream of people throwing bricks or stoning you or your platoon in that vehicle.” Day 353/74/11 to Day 353/74/15

18.7.2.24 Soldier P then describes what happened upon debussing from the Pig. The descriptions of what happened vary from account to account and are briefly summarised below.

i) Soldier P accompanied by 2 other soldiers debussed to the right of the vehicle and “immediately came under heavy stoning and bottling from rioters.” B576, B577

ii) 20 rioters then advanced towards Soldier P and his companions, throwing stones and missiles constantly as they approached. B577

18.7.2.26 According to the accounts given for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry:

i) When soldiers debussed there was a crowd of people around the waste ground at Eden Place and Pilot’s Row and another crowd across Rossville Street, both sets were rioting, throwing stones, bottles and other missiles. WT13.45F-G

ii) The crowd across Rossville Street would appear to have been located at or about the east-facing wall of the Kells Walk pram ramp.[5] This crowd were throwing missiles in the direction of troops on the ground. B592 In oral evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier P stated that this crowd numbered about 50-70 people throwing stones and bottles. WT13.46B

18.7.2.27 Quite apart from the discrepancies as between the accounts it is in our submission quite clear from Video 48 that the scenes described by Soldier P, simply did not occur. The Tribunal is referred to V48/12.14 to 13.01 which demonstrates that:

i) While a small number of people threw stones at the outset, there were not two rioting crowds, and certainly nothing like the 50 to 70 people claimed by Soldier P in his evidence to Lord Widgery. WT13.46B

ii) When Soldier P de-bussed he encountered, not rioting civilians, as he claimed in each of his statements, nor civilians advancing on soldiers, B577 but fleeing civilians.

18.7.2.28 Another issue which arises is the admission contained in Soldier P’s RMP statement that his rifle was cocked with a round in the breach and the safety catch on. B576 This admission was retracted in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor wherein he stated that he did not cock his rifle until after debussing. B592

18.7.2.29 While it is our submission that the evidence points to the fact that Soldier P had cocked his rifle prior to debussing, even if he cocked his rifle after debussing, there was no justification for this action. On Soldier P’s own account, the first occasion upon which he came under fire was when he reached the east-facing wall of the Kells Walk pram ramp, after he had crossed Rossville Street. B592 This of course is an account which is not contained in his RMP statement and appears for the first time in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor. In those circumstances, even if Soldier P did not cock his rifle until after debussing, his action was a breach of the Yellow Card which stated:

“…Unless you are about to open fire no live round is to be carried in the breech and the working parts must be forward. Company Commanders and above may, when circumstances in their opinion warrant such action, order weapons to be cocked, with a round in the breech where appropriate, and the safety catch at safe.”[6]

18.7.2.30 In the course of evidence to this Tribunal Soldier P was unable to explain why there was a difference between the two accounts given in 1972. Day 353/16/5 to Day 353/16/7

18.7.2.31 Sergeant O gave evidence that he cocked his rifle in the Pig before going through Barrier 12 and that he believes the rest of the men followed suit, B757.110 paragraph 23. In our submission Soldier P did cock his rifle while in the Pig and prior to debussing.

18.7.2.32 That Soldier P had cocked his rifle prior to debussing is also consistent with the evidence of Sergeant Major Lewis at B2111.013 paragraph 86, albeit the timing is different, in that according to Sergeant Major Lewis Soldier P had cocked his rifle, even prior to getting into the vehicle.

18.7.2.33 It is our contention that Soldier P cocked his rifle prior to debussing. He retracted that admission in his Treasury Solicitor statement because he realised that the admission was: a breach of the Yellow Card; and given his subsequent discharge of at least 9 live rounds, tended to point to a willingness to use lethal force, in circumstances which were unjustified.

18.7.2.34 However, regardless of which account is accepted, Soldier P’s actions in cocking his rifle was a breach of the Yellow Card and did demonstrate his willingness and eagerness to fire live rounds on Bloody Sunday. A willingness which probably resulted in the deaths of one or more of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash.

18.7.2.35 While Soldier P has consistently asserted that the first two live rounds fired by him were fired at a man whom he believed to be a nail-bomber. That is probably the height of the consistency as between the different versions given by Soldier P about this issue. In his statement to the RMP, Soldier P stated that:

i) 20 rioters advanced towards Soldier P and his companions, they were throwing stones and missiles constantly as they approached. B577

ii) One of the soldiers with Soldier P was armed with a baton gun and fired rubber bullets at the rioters in an attempt to disperse them. Having come under fire from a rubber bullet gun, the rioters split up. B577

iii) As the rioters split Soldier P saw a man, aged about 23-25 years, wearing a light coloured jacket behind the crowd. Soldier P saw this man light an object in his hand and saw the object fizzle and saw sparks coming from it. B577

iv) Soldier P shouted a warning to the soldiers with him and then fired 2 aimed shots at the man. He saw the first round strike the ground near the man’s feet and the second struck the man on the chest and he fell to the ground. B577

v) The crowd pulled back, the nail bomb failed to explode and the crowd moved forward again removing the man’s body. B577

18.7.2.36 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor, Soldier P dealt with the incident as follows:

i) After debussing Soldier P signalled to Soldier 017 to advance towards the crowd at the east-facing wall at the Kells Walk pram-ramp in order to make arrests. B592

ii) As Soldier P and Soldier 017 moved across Rossville Street the crowd dispersed up an alleyway into Columbcille Court and another alleyway to the left of Columbcille Court. Upon reaching the wall the crowd had dispersed. Soldier P and 017 then came under fire from the direction of the Rubble Barricade. Soldier P could not see who was firing at them, but he heard 2 shots which he believed to be high velocity and which appeared to go over the soldiers’ heads. B592

iii) Soldiers P and 017 took cover along-side the wall, and noticed a group of people coming along the alleyway throwing stones and bottles at them. Soldier 017 fired a number of baton rounds into the crowd, splitting them up and Soldier P noticed a man taking cover behind the crowd lighting an object which “I would describe as an explosive missile and which seemed to me to be a nail bomb which began to fizz.” B592

iv) Soldier P told Soldier 017 to watch out and fired 2 aimed shots at the man. The man fell, dropping the object which did not explode. B592

v) Soldier P’s direction was diverted but when he looked again, the body had been removed and he could not see the object on the ground. B592

18.7.2.37 Soldier P also gave evidence to Lord Widgery about this incident, in the following terms:

i) Soldier P and 017 advanced across the road towards Kells Wall and as the crowd was stoning them Soldier 017 fired 1/2 baton rounds and dispersed the crowd. WT13.46D

ii) Shortly after Soldiers P and 017 reached the wall they came under fire from the direction of the Rubble Barricade. WT13.46E Soldier P could see people behind the Barricade who were either throwing stones or moving towards Free Derry Corner. WT13.47A

iii) Then a group of people came out from the Columbcille Court alleyway and began throwing stones and bottles at the soldiers. Soldier 017 again fired baton rounds and dispersed the crowd. When they split up Soldier P noticed a man standing behind the crowd and attempting to light an explosive missile, which Soldier P identified as a nail bomb. WT13.47C

iv) Soldier P shouted a warning to his companion and fired 2 aimed shots. WT13.47E Soldier P then identified himself in EP23.7 as the soldier looking up the alleyway and explained he was looking up the alleyway because a person had come out from the alleyway at Kells Walk. WT13.48D It appears from Soldier P’s evidence that EP23.7 was taken almost immediately after he had fired the 2 live rounds.[7] WT13.48B

i) In his RMP statement Soldier P describes a crowd of rioters coming from the Kells Walk direction advancing towards himself and Soldier 017. B577 By way of contrast in both his Treasury Solicitor statement and his evidence to Lord Widgery, it was P’s decision that Soldier 017 and P should move towards the rioters in order to make arrests. B592, WT13.46C-D This is significant because in the face of advancing rioters in the RMP statement, Soldier 017 fires a baton round which disperses the crowd, exposing the nail bomber to Soldier P. B577 In his Treasury Solicitor statement it is the decision of Soldier P and Soldier 017 to move towards the crowd in order to make arrests which results in the crowd dispersing and there is no reference to Soldier 017 firing baton rounds. B592 While, in the version given to Lord Widgery Soldier 017 does fire baton rounds which disperse the crowd, albeit the nail bomber does not appear at this juncture. WT13.46D-E

ii) This discrepancy is the result of a significant change as between Soldier P’s RMP account and the statement and evidence given to Lord Widgery. In the account given by Soldier P to both the Treasury Solicitors and Lord Widgery, after crossing Rossville Street, Soldiers P and 017 came under fire from the direction of the Rubble Barricade, prior to any incident involving a nail bomber. B592, WT13.46E-F Soldier P’s RMP statement contains no reference to coming under fire from the direction of the Rubble Barricade as Soldiers P and 017 reached Kells Walk. It was because of the inclusion of this incident, apparently forgotten when Soldier P made his RMP statement later that night, and when he made his second RMP statement on the 1^st February, that other aspects of Soldier P’s accounts had to be adapted to accommodate this change.

iii) In both his Treasury Solicitor statement, and his evidence to Lord Widgery, it was as Soldier P and 017 took cover from this live fire, that a second group of rioters advanced on them. Soldier 017 fired his baton round in response, splitting up the crowd, and exposing the nail bomber to Soldier P. B592, WT13.47C-D

iv) In an attempt to blend the two accounts, Soldier P’s evidence to Lord Widgery contains references to Soldier 017 firing baton rounds on two occasions, prior to the arrival of the nail bomber, while the RMP statement and the Treasury Solicitor statement, each contain only one such reference, albeit at different times and locations. In Soldier P’s evidence to Lord Widgery the first account of Soldier 017’s shooting of baton rounds, occurs, as it does in his RMP statement, B577 as Soldier P and 017 cross Rossville Street, albeit the nail-bomber does not appear. WT13.46D-E The second shooting by Soldier 017 occurs, as it does in Soldier P’s Treasury Solicitor statement, B592 when a second group of rioters attack the soldiers and Soldier 017 shoots down Rossville Street. WT13.47C-D

v) That the two accounts are significantly different in terms of location is demonstrated by the Plan appended to Soldier P’s RMP statement and the Trajectory Photograph prepared for the Widgery Tribunal. The Plan appended to Soldier P’s RMP statement places Soldier P at a location on the footpath beside Glenfada Park North with the nail-bomber positioned further down Rossville Street on the Rossville Flats side of the road. B623.008 By way of contrast the aerial photograph marked by Soldier P, P22 places Soldier P at the east facing wall of the Kells Walk pram ramp and places the nail bomber on the same side of the road, on the footpath adjacent to the alleyway leading to Glenfada Park North. The trajectory of these shots is quite different. On Soldier P’s RMP account he would have fired down and across Rossville Street in the direction of the Rossville Flats, while on his Treasury Solicitor’s account he fired straight down Rossville Street in the direction of the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.2.39 There are in consequence very significant differences in the accounts given by Soldier P of shooting a nail bomber. Soldier P’s location changes, that of the nail bomber changes, the trajectory of the shot changes, and in his later accounts he suddenly recollects an incident of coming under fire, which he apparently forgot, not once but twice, when being interviewed by the RMP.

18.7.2.40 It is submitted that the discrepancies, render his account both unreliable and incredible.

18.7.2.41 Soldier P was questioned in some detail about his shooting of the nail bomber by Mr. Hill acting on behalf of the Families of the Deceased and the Wounded in the course of the Widgery Inquiry:

“Q. This nail bomb, was it fizzing at the time when the man had it in his hand? A. Yes sir.

Q. If he did not strike it on a box, what did he strike it on? A. I could not be certain, sir.

Q. Could you show me know how you think the man with the nail bomb in his left hand lit it with his right? A. Well, he had the nail bomb and, as I say, I don’t know how he struck the match. He just lit the fuse.

Q. Would you just go back? Two seconds before you see a lighted match in this right hand. Can you tell me how that match materialised in his right hand? A. No, I couldn’t say, sir.

Q. Did it appear as if by magic? A. I shouldn’t think so, sir.” WT13.58C-F

18.7.2.42 Although Soldier P then appeared to suggest that the nail bomber may have struck the match off a wall, he accepted under further questioning that, given the location at which he had placed the nail bomber, apparently some remove from any wall, the nail bomber could not have struck the match off a wall. WT13.58F-G

18.7.2.43 Significantly, Soldier P was re–examined by Mr. Gibbens, acting on the Army’s behalf on this very issue, he told Mr. Gibbens that:

“I did not see the match being lit. I just seen the object spluttering and a certain amount of smoke coming from it.” WT13.71A-B

18.7.2.44 As is clear from the exchange between Soldier P and Mr. Hill, Soldier P gave evidence that he had witnessed the nail bomber actually light the fuse of the nail bomb before he fired his two rounds. However, when pushed about the matter Soldier P was unable to explain how he could have seen this. When re-examined by Counsel for the Army, Soldier P changed his evidence. In the course of his evidence to this Tribunal it was pointed out to Soldier P that: “You appear both to have said that you did see the match being lit and that you did not see the match being lit . . .” Day 353/42/22 to Day 353/42/24 Soldier P was unable to assist the Tribunal as to this discrepancy.

18.7.2.45 In our submission, Soldier P’s account of shooting a nail bomber is a complete fabrication. When Soldier P’s account was subject to scrutiny by Mr. Hill the account fell apart, because the incident had never happened. Then realising the mess he had gotten himself into, when given the opportunity by Mr. Gibbens, Soldier P simply changed his evidence.

18.7.2.46 Another aspect of Soldier P’s testimony in relation to the shooting of the nail bomber which fails to stand up to scrutiny is his account of what happened the body of the nail bomber and the nail bomb itself, after he had shot and killed the man. In his statement to the RMP, Soldier P describes a scene in which he witnessed the crowd of rioters removing the man’s body. B577 By way of contrast, neither his statement to the Treasury Solicitors, nor his evidence to Lord Widgery, provide an account of the crowd removing the man’s body. Rather Soldier P claimed that his attention was diverted by the actions of persons at Kells Walk, and that when he looked back both the body and the object had been removed. B592

18.7.2.47 However, the discrepancies between these accounts are not the only matters which undermine Soldier P’s account. As Mr. Hill, pointed out to Soldier P in 1972, despite the fact that the nail bomb, which he had seen fizzing had fallen to the ground, Soldiers P and 017 did not withdraw. WT13.59G to WT13.60A

18.7.2.48 Moreover, if Soldier P’s account were to be believed it would mean that:

“people who had witnessed you kill a man at a distance of approximately 12 to 15 yards . . just came back out and took the body and nail bomb away without [Soldier P] doing anything about it . . . Without [Soldier P] advancing, firing another shot over their head, and retrieving the nail bomb.” Day 353/102/2 to Day 353/102/13

18.7.2.49 The evidence given by Liam Mailey who took photographs EP23.6, EP23.7, EP23.8, EP23.9, to the Widgery Tribunal is relevant in this respect. Liam Mailey was asked about EP23.7 and the conduct of Soldier P. He described him as having fired two shots from the hip towards the Rubble Barricade, from the location at which he is seen in EP23.7, Soldier P then turned around immediately after those shots had been fired. WT7.36A-F There is other civilian evidence that lends support to this testimony and it is our submission that the first two shots fired by Soldier P were fired from his hip at the Rubble Barricade and did not in fact claim any casualties.

18.7.2.50 Soldier P’s account of his shooting of a nail bomber does not bear scrutiny of any kind because it is a complete fabrication. It is moreover submitted that the evidence of Soldier 017 about Soldier P’s shooting of a nail bomber tends to further undermine, rather than corroborate in anyway, Soldier P’s testimony on this issue.

18.7.2.51 Soldier 017 made a statement to the RMP in the early hours of the 31^st January at 1.30am. B1472, B1473 During the course of that statement, he makes no reference to Soldier P having shot a nail bomber, in circumstances where when this incident occurred, according to Soldier P, Soldier 017 was 5 metres ahead of him. WT13.58B-E In fact Soldier 017’s first statement makes no reference to Soldier P having fired any live rounds. This in circumstances where we know that EP23.7, which shows both soldiers, was taken almost immediately after Soldier P had fired live rounds. WT13.49B Moreover, a whole series of photographs, show Soldiers P and 017 as they accompanied each other on the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street, demonstrating that they were in each other’s company for a substantial period. P1118, P1119, P1120, P1121 and EP24.6

18.7.2.52 Soldier 017 made his second RMP statement on the 4 February 1972. We would refer the Tribunal to Sections 5 of these submissions wherein we make the case that a significant number of soldiers made statements on that date which were expressly designed to corroborate and justify the use of lethal force by other soldiers.

18.7.2.53 In our submission that was precisely the purpose of Soldier 017’s second statement. In his second RMP statement Soldier 017 inserted a completely new incident, not referred to at all in his previous statement, that of Soldier P shooting a nail bomber. B1479, B1480

18.7.2.54 The discrepancies, as between the various accounts of this incident given by Soldier 017 will be dealt with in more detail when dealing with the evidence of Soldier 017.

18.7.2.55 It is our submission at this stage that the reason Soldier 017 did not give an account of Soldier P firing at a nail bomber on the 31^st January 1972 was because he never witnessed any such incident. According to Soldier P the nail bomber appeared as a direct result of Soldier 017 having fired baton rounds at a rioting crowd. This man, who had been exposed by the crowd, was positioned only a short distance from Soldier 017, closer to him than he was to Soldier P and was about to throw a nail bomb. The only thing which prevented the man from throwing the nail bomb, with potentially fatal consequences for Soldier 017, was Soldier P’s swift action in shooting and killing the man. The suggestion by Soldier 017 that he neglected to account for Soldier P shooting at a nail bomber because he “thought seeing the gunman was more important so that is what I mentioned”, B1484.008 paragraph 47.5 is in our submission, both ludicrous and untrue.

18.7.2.56 It should also be noted at this juncture that Soldier 017’s accounts in relation to Bloody Sunday are also significant in terms of what has been left out with regard to Soldier P. According to the accounts Soldier P has given, he was accompanied by Soldier 017 at all significant events, and specifically, when he came under fire from the Rubble Barricade, resulting in his firing live rounds, B592, B593, and when he came under attack from people coming from the Rubble Barricade, resulting in his firing live rounds over the heads of the crowd. B593 Yet neither of these incidents was apparently witnessed by Soldier 017, the soldier to whom he was giving cover and the soldier with whom he was paired throughout this part of the incident. Specifically:

i) Soldier 017 has no recollection of hearing any shots fired from the Rubble Barricade, and never gave any account of shots fired from the Rubble Barricade in any statement made by him. Day 358/165/18 to Day 358/165/21

ii) Soldier 017 has no recollection of any bullets striking a wall just above his head and P’s head, nor did he ever make any reference to any such incident in any of the statements he gave about Bloody Sunday. Day 358/166/3 to Day 358/166/5

iii) Soldier 017 never saw a man fire shots from the Rubble Barricade, nor did he see Soldier P fire shots in the direction of the Rubble Barricade. Day 358/166/9 to Day 358/166/13

iv) Soldier 017 has no recollection of being attacked by a crowd who advanced upon himself and Soldier P as they made their way across Rossville Street towards their Pig, nor did he ever give an account of any such incident in any of the statements he has made about Bloody Sunday. Day 358/167/12 to Day 358/167/17

18.7.2.57 It is our allegation that, whether with the active assistance of the RMP or not, Soldier 017 colluded with Soldier P in trying to justify at least some of the rounds fired by Soldier P and by failing to account for Soldier P’s other live rounds, knowing as he did that they had resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians.

18.7.2.58 Soldier P claims that he fired 4 further shots at a gunman behind the Rubble Barricade. He claims that one shot hit the Barricade and that the other three shots hit the gunman.

18.7.2.59 These shots are arguably the most significant shots fired by soldier P given his admission that he shot and killed a man behind the Rubble Barricade. Moreover, in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry about this incident, Soldier P came close to accepting responsibility for the killing of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash.

i) Soldier P and the 2 soldiers accompanying him advanced towards the Rubble Barricade.[8] As they advanced they came under fire, Soldier P believes the fire came from a pistol but could not be certain. 2 bullets struck the wall just above the soldiers’ heads. B577, B578

ii) The soldiers then went to ground and while lying down Soldier P saw a man get up from behind the Rubble Barricade with “what appeared to be a pistol in his hand. He held it like a pistol and he pointed it in our general direction.” B578

iii) Soldier P fired 4 aimed shots at this man, he saw 1 shot strike the barricade and the following 3 shots hit the man with the pistol, who fall backwards behind the Rubble Barricade. B578

iv) Soldier P then saw a group of people run to where the man had fallen and some of them bent down and picked something up. Soldier P assumed that they picked up the weapon. B578

v) Soldier P and the soldiers accompanying him stayed at that location until the rioters dispersed.

18.7.2.61 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Soldier P stated as follows:

i) Several shots came close to Soldiers P and 017 from the direction of the Rubble Barricade. Soldier P observed a man crouching behind the barricade. “He was holding something which I took to be a pistol. He then stood up and pointed the region (sic) down Rossville Street and fired a number of shots, although I cannot say how many.” B592, B593

ii) Soldier P knelt down and fired 4 shots at the gunman, one of which hit the Rubble Barricade. The man fell to the ground. B593

iii) Soldier P claims that at the time he fired the shot there were no other people in his line of fire. B593

iv) A group of people then came from Glenfada Park and ran across Rossville Street. One of them bent down and Soldier P saw him pick something up, although he could not be sure what he picked up, and saw him run across the road. B593

18.7.2.62 Soldier P gave evidence to Lord Widgery about this incident in the following terms:

i) Soldier P and 017 came under fire from the Rubble Barricade and several shots passed them. WT13.50A

ii) Soldier P saw the gunman who was crouched down and aiming a pistol at the soldiers. WT13.50A-C “He stood up before [I fired my 4 rounds] and pointed the pistol again and fired another couple of shots, not particularly in my direction, but I believe in the direction of Guinness Force.” WT13.50D-E

iii) There were 5/6 people at the barricade at the time, positioned on either side of him, who were throwing stones. WT13.50A-C

iv) Soldier P fired 4 live rounds, 1 hit the Rubble Barricade and the others hit the man who fell back. WT13.50E

v) Then a crowd of people came out from Glenfada Park and ran across the road towards the Rossville Flats, as they crossed they picked something up, which P believes to have been the pistol and carried it towards the Rossville Flats. WT13.51A

18.7.2.63 There are significant discrepancies as between the various accounts given by Soldier P about the circumstances in which he fired 4 live rounds at the Rubble Barricade.

i) In his RMP statement two shots hit the wall above the soldiers’ head. B577, B578 In the accounts given to the Treasury Solicitor and the Widgery Inquiry, while the soldiers came under fire, the suggestion that the shots hit a wall above the soldiers’ heads did not appear. B592, WT13.50A-C When questioned about that discrepancy by Counsel to this Inquiry, Soldier P was unable to provide any explanation. Day 353/47/13 to Day 353/47/19

ii) In Soldier P’s RMP statement Soldier P saw a man with what appeared to be a pistol which he pointed in the direction of the 2 soldiers. It was based upon this sighting that Soldier P fired 4 live rounds, killing the man. B578 When he came to give an account to the Treasury Solicitor and to Lord Widgery the gunman stood up and fired a number of rounds down Rossville Street, and it was in response to coming under fire from the gunman that Soldier P fired live rounds. B592, B593, WT13.50D-E Again when questioned about this discrepancy, in the course of his evidence to this Tribunal, Soldier P was unable to provide any explanation. Day 353/47/20 to Day 353/47/23

iii) In Soldier P’s RMP statement, as a result of coming under fire, Soldiers P and 017 “went to ground” and Soldier P was lying down when he saw the gunman and fired his 4 rounds. B578 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors and Lord Widgery, it is apparent that Soldier P was initially standing and it was only after Soldier P saw the man fire live rounds that Soldier P knelt down and fired 4 shots at the gunman. B592, B593, WT13.50F

iv) In both his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and in his evidence to Lord Widgery, Soldier P was anxious to assert that there were no other people in his line of fire. B593, WT13.50F-G There is no such assertion in his RMP statement. It is submitted that this is because by the time he came to make his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and to Lord Widgery Soldier P was aware that he was the prime candidate for having shot and killed the people behind the Rubble Barricade and was anxious to distance himself from the unjustified shooting of unarmed men.

18.7.2.64 Thus there are discrepancies as to the shots fired before Soldier P saw the gunman, the gunman’s actions, and Soldier P’s position when firing at the gunman. Of most significance is the discrepancy as between Soldier P’s RMP statement where he sees what “appears” to be a pistol and his subsequent accounts where he saw the gunman fire live rounds. In our submission this progression in his evidence was a firming up of his evidence, in order to justify his firing of live rounds.

18.7.2.65 While Soldier P asserted throughout his evidence that he had no recollection of any of the shooting incidents he was involved in on Bloody Sunday, it is alleged that he lied about this in order to avoid any effective scrutiny by this Tribunal of the truthfulness of his version of events. It is further submitted that Soldier P does have a clear and vivid recollection of the events of Bloody Sunday and that he specifically remembers the shots he fired over the Rubble Barricade, shots which killed one or more of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash.

18.7.2.66 Soldier P was questioned by Counsel for Michael McDaid and John Young about the fact that given that he had fired at least 9 shots across the Rubble Barricade he could not have failed to hit a target:

“Q. You are a good enough shot, if someone was crouching behind the barricade, you are a good enough shot to pick them out and hit the target; are you not?

Q. What happened in fact was that three young boys were crouching behind this barricade and they were, two of them, hit in the face. You are a good enough shot to have done that; are you not?

18.7.2.67 What the transcript fails to capture, but what in our submission, anyone present at the testimony of Soldier P could not have failed to capture, was that in answering “Um, no, I – well, yes.” Soldier P came as close to facing up to his responsibility for the murder of John Young and Michael McDaid as he was capable of doing.

18.7.2.68 In his statement to the RMP Soldier P stated that after he had shot and killed a man at the Rubble Barricade, he fired a further 5 rounds over the heads of rioters in an attempt to disperse them. B578

18.7.2.69 Soldier P then went on to make a second RMP statement on the 1^st February 1972. He now claimed that instead of having fired 5 rounds over the heads of rioters he had in fact only fired 3, because he had only fired 9 rounds in total. B588

18.7.2.70 When he made a statement to the Treasury Solicitor about this issue he gave a fuller account of this incident. Soldier P maintained that he had noticed that his vehicle was on the waste ground in front of the North end of the Rossville Flats and told Soldier 017 to move back across the road to cover the vehicle. Soldier P followed Soldier 017. When he was halfway across a group of people came out from Glenfada Park and started coming down the road towards the Rubble Barricade. They were throwing missiles at Soldiers P, 017 and the vehicle. Soldier P took the view that the crowd was too close and fired 3 shots over the heads of the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. Again he asserts that there was no one in his line of fire. B593

18.7.2.71 Soldier P’s account to Lord Widgery was in broadly similar terms. He stated that the group which came from Glenfada Park were attempting to cross the Rubble Barricade WT13.51G and that they numbered 50-60. WT13.52D He stated that he was justified in firing at them because he believed their actions were “endangering a lot of life”, specifically his life and the lives of the soldiers at the vehicle. WT13.50C-D

18.7.2.72 However when questioned by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Deceased and Wounded about this incident, Soldier P’s account of events appeared to fall apart. Soldier P accepted that when he fired shots over the head of the crowd that there were soldiers positioned on the west side of Rossville Street and that this was a “Heaven-sent opportunity for those men to arrest rioters if this was an arrest operation?” WT13.66C-D

“Q. So between you and the hostile crowd, although slightly to your side, there was a group of soldiers? A. Yes.

Q. So when you fired three rounds at this hostile crowd you were not in fact alone and unprotected, but between you and them there was a group of soldiers? A. I was on my own, so I count that as being alone and unprotected.

Q. With nothing between you and this hostile crowd but a group of armed soldiers? A. That is possible.

Q. Those soldiers, according to your evidence, were there for the specific purpose of arresting rioters? A. In the beginning, yes, sir.” WT13.67F to WT13.68B

18.7.2.74 Our primary submission is that this incident is a fabrication, designed to account for the firing of live rounds without giving a true account of the circumstances in which they were fired. As it was put to Soldier P in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry:

“can you account for the fact that if anyone was behind that barricade . . . they would have witnessed you killing two people using your SLR rifle and up to this point, according to you, having discharged six shots. Why do you think they would come forward throwing bottles and stones at you. Knowing what you were capable of?

18.7.2.75 Nonetheless the incident is significant in a number of different respects. Firstly, because if true, it is a further example of a breach of the Yellow Card. Secondly because of the issues it raises about ammunition checks and the availability of extra ammunition. Thirdly because if true, as Mr. Hill’s questioning demonstrates, the account raises serious questions about the genuineness of the arrest operation. The alternative, is of course that the incident is, like so much of Soldier P’s evidence a complete fabrication, and simply another attempt to explain away the firing of live rounds and to avoid having to make an admission of murder.

18.7.2.76 In relation to the first issue it is our submission that Soldier P’s account, true or otherwise, evidences a complete disregard by soldiers within Support Company of 1 Para for the Yellow Card. We state true or otherwise, because, even if Soldier P fabricated this account in order to explain away 3/5 of the rounds fired by him, the fact that Soldier P would advance a breach of the Yellow Card, as an explanation to the RMP demonstrates that this was not a matter in respect of which he expected censure.

18.7.2.77 It is not without significance that Soldier P was a Corporal on Bloody Sunday. Given the reliance which has been placed by more senior officers on the Yellow Card as controlling the circumstances in which lethal force would be used by soldiers on the ground, Corporal P’s disregard for the Yellow Card, on two separate occasions raises major issues. On the evidence before this Tribunal Corporal P had already interpreted the Yellow Card as authorising him to cock his rifle in circumstances where he was not so authorised, possibly following the lead given by his Sergeant, Sergeant O. He also claims to have fired shots over the heads of unarmed civilians, in circumstances which were unjustified, yet which are analogous to the circumstances in that his Lieutenant, Lieutenant N fired 2 live rounds. Clearly, the Yellow Card, carried little weight within Mortar Platoon, and as will become clear, carried as little, if not less weight in Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.7.2.78 If ranked soldiers within a Regiment blatantly disregard the Yellow Card it is rendered ineffective as a method of preventing the unlawful use of force. Moreover, as became apparent during the questioning of Soldier P by Mr. Hill in 1972 Soldier P’s claim that his life, and the lives of other soldiers, were endangered by the crowd, was entirely without substance.

18.7.2.79 The second reason why this issue is of importance is because of the discrepancy between Soldier P’s first RMP statement in which he claims to have fired 5 rounds and his second RMP statement in which he claims to have fired only 3, reducing the total number of rounds fired from 11 to 9.

18.7.2.80 While Soldier P claimed that this was simply a mistake in the total, the mistake is more fundamental than that. Soldier P, not only claimed to have fired a total of 11 rounds, after he had conducted his own ammunition check, he also accounted for firing 5 rounds in circumstances where he now claims to have fired only 3. If proper ammunition checks had in fact been carried out, as has been claimed by Company Sergeant Major Lewis, then it is submitted that this error could not have occurred.

18.7.2.81 The issue raises questions about whether Soldier P had access to excess ammunition and in fact fired 2/more rounds in excess of the 9 eventually claimed. It also raises a real query about the accuracy of the ammunitions checks conducted by Company Sergeant Major Lewis.

18.7.2.82 Thirdly, as demonstrated by Mr. Hill’s questioning of Soldier P in 1972, if this was a genuine arrest operation, then the incident raises questions about the failure of the soldiers to carry out arrests of unarmed civilians, as opposed to resorting to the use of lethal force to control the crowd.

18.7.2.83 It should also be noted in relation to Soldier P’s account of shooting over the heads of the crowd that as with the rest of his evidence (with the exception of Soldier 017 and the nail bomber) Soldier P’s account is uncorroborated by any other soldier.

18.7.2.84 The final issue in respect of which Soldier P’s evidence is relevant is in terms of how his evidence completely undermines the accounts of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon and also Soldier U of Mortar Platoon about civilian gunmen or bombers, at either the Rubble Barricade or the Rossville Flats.

18.7.2.85 Soldier P arrived at the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street before Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the Kells Walk Wall and was positioned in front of that wall. It would appear that he remained at this location for some considerable time, at least until his vehicle moved position.

18.7.2.86 On the account given to the Widgery Tribunal by Liam Mailey, soldier P just after photograph EP23.7 was taken Soldier P signalled to the group of soldiers who were behind him, but were not visible in that photograph. Then:

“Q. As a result of that did a number of soldiers come round the wall towards him, and have you shown them in photograph No. 8 (EP23.8) A. Yes.

Q. Did some of the second group of soldiers appear already to have taken up a firing position at the back of the wall? A. That is right.” WT7.36C-G

18.7.2.87 Soldier P fails in any account given by him to explain his contact with Anti-Tank Platoon or to deal with their actions in any way.

18.7.2.88 On his own account he was observing the Rubble Barricade located directly in front of him. Soldier P accepted that if a shot was fired at a target behind the Rubble Barricade that target would have been in his view and that he would have been completely exposed to anyone with a weapon behind the barricade. WT13.63A-B As it was pointed out to Soldier P, the people who were in the greatest danger from any threat posed by persons behind the Rubble Barricade were Soldiers 017 and P. WT13.63B Yet Soldier P never saw any of the targets identified by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon at the Rubble Barricade, nor did he experience any threat from those targets. He never saw the nail bombers identified by Soldiers F or J, nor did he witness any of the exploding nail bombs described by Soldiers J and E.

18.7.2.89 Despite the fact that Soldier P appears to have been observing the Rubble Barricade, as opposed to the Rossville Flats, Soldier P’s evidence also completely undermines the suggestions that there was civilian fire directed at soldiers from the Rossville Flats at the time he was located at the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street.

18.7.2.90 Soldier P accepted in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that in EP23.9 he is not looking at either the Rubble Barricade or the Rossville Flats. Although he asserted that the Rossville Flats were “always a source of danger” he accepted that that they were not sufficiently dangerous to warrant either himself or his colleagues either looking up at the Flats or taking cover. WT13.61D-F

18.7.2.91 Soldier P was then questioned further about the Rossville Flats as a source of danger:

“Q. From this part of Rossville Flats that is the part which looks west – you were in an extremely exposed area as you stood there at that time? A. Yes.

Q. So nothing was happening in that block of flats at that time which presented any danger to you? A. I am not saying nothing was happening, but I could not be certain.

LORD WIDGERY: Was there cover available? A. Not from that side of the wall, no, sir.

Mr. HILL: Would there not have been cover if you were to go about two or three yards back to [the Kells Walk Wall] . . . A. Yes.

Q. Would that not have presented cover to you, that small wall? A. Yes.” WT13.61F to WT13.62C

18.7.2.92 For the entire period when he was positioned at the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street Soldier P was completely exposed to any hostile fire from the Rossville Flats. In our submission this demonstrates, without more, that the accounts given by soldiers of civilian fire directed from the Rossville Flats towards soldiers on Rossville Street are completely untrue. Not only did Soldier P and Soldier 017, not take cover, nor feel the need to take cover, they neither of them, give any account of any fire or threat coming from that location.

18.7.2.93 Soldier P also fails to give any account of having heard firing from soldiers located right behind him, at the Kells Walk Wall, despite the fact that we know soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon fired from that location.

18.7.2.94 While Soldier P sought refuge in the device of memory loss in 2003 when he gave evidence to this Tribunal, even in 1972, Soldier P never gave:

“evidence as to any other deaths at that barricade or any other soldier firing at that barricade. . ” Day 353/68/12 to Day 353/68/16

18.7.2.95 In 1972, Soldier P had no choice but to account for his firing of live rounds, the option of memory loss was not available to him in such close proximity to the incident. However, even in 1972, Soldier P recognised, that in respect of the actions of soldiers other than himself, whose actions he could not have failed to witness, silence was preferable to telling the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday.

18.7.2.96 In 1972, Soldier P lied about his actions on Bloody Sunday in order to justify his use of lethal force in circumstances which were unjustified and unlawful. He was also part of a conspiracy of silence designed to prevent the Widgery Inquiry from establishing the truth about the deaths of 6 young men murdered by soldiers from his Platoon, Anti-Tank Platoon and Composite Platoon behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.2.97 In 2003 Soldier P, went one step further, in refusing to give this Tribunal any assistance in establishing the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday. Nonetheless it is submitted the evidence available to this Tribunal is more than sufficient to justify a finding of murder in respect of one or more of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash.

18.7.2.98 Soldier 017 is one of the members of Mortar Platoon armed with a rubber bullet gun on Bloody Sunday. Although Soldier 017 did fire his rubber bullet gun on Bloody Sunday, his primary importance is as a witness to the actions of Soldier P who appears to have accompanied him throughout his deployment on Rossville Street.

18.7.2.99 In relation to Soldier 017 it is our submission that when reading the written statements made by Soldier 017 one witnesses a process of evolution. As he progresses through the statements, new incidents are added and earlier ones embellished. The ultimate outcome of this evolution is a statement and testimony which bear only a passing resemblance to the truth. Soldier 017’s testimony is dishonest both by reference to what is included and what is omitted.

18.7.2.100 Soldier 017’s willingness to lie is in our submission motivated by a desire to lend credibility to the soldiers’ case that their use of lethal force was justified, coupled with an unwillingness to testify to the killings he must have witnessed from his vantage point on Rossville Street. This willingness is particularly evident in relation to his attempts to bolster the evidence of Soldier P as to his use of lethal force against an alleged nail bomber. An issue which is dealt with in more detail below.

18.7.2.101 It is alleged that Soldier 017 was involved in collusion with Soldier P and/or members of the RMP and/or members of the Treasury Solicitors to provide an account of events consistent with that of Soldier P, particularly with regard to his evidence about Soldier P’s having shot a nail bomber. It is noteworthy that while the first accounts given by these two witnesses bear little, if any resemblance to one another, as further statements and accounts are taken from them, the parallels in their evidence increase, demonstrating a continuing attempt on the part of Soldier 017 to lend support to the actions of his colleague. It is submitted that the ever-increasing correlation between their two accounts could not have been achieved without the active assistance of members of the RMP and personnel within the Treasury Solicitors.

18.7.2.102 Leaving that issue aside it is our contention that it can be demonstrated that Soldier 017’s evidence progressed from his first statement to the RMP through to his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and then to the account given to Eversheds. Each statement witnessed a further embellishment of his evidence and further lies, all aimed at supporting the military case. When Soldier 017 came to give oral evidence to this Tribunal, there was some retraction of what were demonstrable inaccuracies, albeit, not very many.

18.7.2.103 Soldier 017 made three statements in 1972, two statements to the RMP and a statement to the Treasury Solicitor. He was not called to give evidence at the Widgery Inquiry.

18.7.2.104 Soldier 017 made his first RMP statement in the early hours of the 31 January 1972 in which he stated as follows:

i) Soldier 017 armed only with a rubber bullet gun, debussed from his vehicle near the Rossville Flats and took up a position to the North-West of a block of flats near a low wall. B1472

ii) He could see the Rubble Barricade some 60 yards in front of him and there were rioters behind the Rubble Barricade who were stoning troops “deployed around the flats.” B1472

iii) Soldier 017 fired a number of rubber bullet rounds at the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade who stoned him in response. B1472

iv) A group of 4/5 rioters came close to Soldier 017 from around the corner of a wall to his right and stoned him. Soldier 017 decided he could make an arrest from this group and prepared to advance. As he did so he saw a man walking around the corner, who had “a black object I recognised as a hand weapon; either a pistol or a revolver.” B1472

v) Soldier 017 fired a baton round at the man but did not hit him and he then turned and ran away. He heard 2 small calibre weapon shots behind him as if the man had fired his weapon twice. B1472, B1473

18.7.2.105 Soldier 017 made a further statement on the 4 February 1972. This statement refers to an entirely new incident not dealt with in his first RMP statement. Specifically Soldier 017 states:

i) He was positioned behind a brick wall about 10 metres from 2 Columbcille Court. There was a crowd of about 50 people milling around in front of the Rubble Barricade and they rushed towards Soldier 017 so he fired 1 round which split them up. B1479

ii) A man appeared from behind the crowd and was “carrying in his hand what I took to be a nail bomb. It was lit as I could see the smoke coming from the fuse. As he raised his arm to throw the bomb towards us ‘P’ who was located” behind Soldier 017 fired 1 round. The man fell and was surrounded by the crowd, the nail bomb did not go off and “the crowd carried away the injured man.” B1479

18.7.2.106 Soldier 017 then made a statement to the Treasury Solicitor in which he deals with both incidents, Soldier 017 stated:

i) His Platoon debussed at the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. B1482 paragraph 2

ii) While they were in the vehicles “we could hear stones continuously hitting our armoured vehicle and on leaving the vehicle we were surrounded by a large crowd who were milling about the area of the front of the flats and in Rossville Street.” B1482 paragraph 2

iii) On debussing Soldier 017, along with Soldier P, crossed Rossville Street and took up position by the side of a wall in front of Columbcille Court. Shortly after taking up position he heard 2 high velocity shots which he believed came from around the area of Rossville Flats, he could not tell the direction of fire. B1482 paragraph 3

iv) There was a crowd of about 50 people in front of the Rubble Barricade, they rushed towards Soldier 017 so he fired 1 round which split them up. B1482 paragraph 3

v) Soldier P then warned Soldier 017 to look out as he had seen a man come from behind the crowd, Soldier 017 saw a man “carrying in his hand an object which I could see had a smoking fuse which I took to be a nail bomb.” He was raising his arm to throw the object, Soldier P fired at the man and he fell. The crowd then surrounded the man and Soldier 017 was unsure as to whether or not the man had been hit. The object did not explode and he did not see the man again. B1482 paragraph 3

vi) The crowd then went behind the Rubble Barricade and continued to throw bottles and stones in the direction of the soldiers. B1482 paragraph 4

vii) People were also running in and out of an alleyway which led to Columbcille Court, throwing bricks, bottles and stones at the soldiers. Soldier 017 decided that he could arrest one of these rioters and went to move towards the alleyway. A man walked around the corner towards Soldier 017 and was holding either a pistol or a revolver. Soldier 017 fired one round and then ran back to where he had come from. He heard 2 small calibre shots behind him as if the man had fired. B1482 paragraph 4

18.7.2.107 Soldier 017 gave a statement to this Inquiry in which he states as follows:

i) He heard the drain-pipe shot while at the Presbyterian Church. B1484.002 paragraph 9

ii) He heard the sound of bricks and bottles hitting the sides of his Pig as they entered the Bogside. B1484.002 paragraph 12

iii) He was in Lieutenant N’s Pig, although he identifies Soldier 013 and Soldier P as being in that Pig. B1484.002 paragraph 14

iv) He was positioned by the back door of the Pig facing Soldier P. B1484.003 paragraph 15

v) There were thousands of people in the waste ground and when they debussed they saw rioters all over the place. B1484.003 paragraph 18

vi) Soldier 017 fired a rubber bullet and chased the crowd. B1484.003 paragraph 20

vii) He made his way across Rossville Street towards the Rubble Barricade, initially he found himself isolated and then he moved to a position near Columbcille Court. B1484.003, B1484.004 paragraph 21

viii) There were thousands behind the Rubble Barricade and he was showered with bricks and stones from there. B1484.004 paragraph 22

ix) A group broke away from the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade and made approaches towards Soldier 017, he stated that the “would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me. Crowds had killed soldiers before. I felt very vulnerable there on my own.” B1484.004 paragraph 23

x) Soldier 017 fired 2/3 rubber bullets at the crowd and was then joined by Soldier P. B1484.004 paragraph 24

xi) 40 – 50 people came out from an alleyway leading to Columbcille Court, they ran south to join the main group of rioters and Soldier 017 fired rubber bullets at them.

xii) Soldier P then shouted a warning about a nail bomber, who was in the midst of a crowd just north of the Rubble Barricade. He was crouched down “with a dark object in his hand, which I took to be a nail bomb, He had his arm back as if he was ready to throw.” Soldier 017 heard a shot and saw the man fall, “he was engulfed by the crowd and that was the last I saw of him. When the crowd went back he had gone. The device did not go off.” B1484.004 paragraph 27

xiii) Shortly after that Soldier 017 looked down an alleyway immediately to his right, he could see rubble, 4/5 youths were throwing bottles or bricks towards Soldier 017 and he went forward to arrest someone, when he saw a man with a pistol. Soldier 017 fired a rubber bullet at the man and he “shied away. Soldier 017 was not sure whether the man actually fired at him. He states that he told Soldier P about the incident. B1484.005 paragraph 29 and B1484.005 paragraph 31

xiv) Soldier 017 did not see Soldier P fire any shots other than the shot at the nail bomber. B1484.004 paragraph 32

xv) Soldier 017 returned to his Pig to get his rifle and then stayed in that area. B1484.005 paragraph 33-34

18.7.2.108 Soldier 017 also gave an interview to Max Arthur in the mid/late 1980’s the results of which can be found in the second paragraph of an extract from a book published by Max Arthur at B1484.027. While Soldier 017, accepts that he was interviewed, he does not accept that the account is entirely accurate and stated in oral testimony that Max Arthur had made various aspects of the account up. Day 358/108/8

18.7.2.109 Soldier 017 gave a Supplementary Statement dealing with this interview, which can be found at B1484.023 and gave a further Supplementary Statement dealing with photographs which he took on Bloody Sunday at B1484.029

18.7.2.110 At this juncture it is only proposed to refer to one aspect of his interview with Max Arthur in which he describes “odd little riots in the side streets”. B1484.027 In his Supplementary Statement he stated that “whilst I do not recall the words I used, I do not believe this can be accurate. I had been facing a very violent riot on the rubble barricade . . . it was life threatening, if the rioters had caught me they would have killed me. As I watched the surge of the crowd back and forward towards me from the rubble barricade and they surged six or so times, I was genuinely in fear for my life.” B1484.0124 paragraph 4.2

18.7.2.111 Soldier 017’s statement to the Treasury Solicitor can to some extent be regarded as an amalgam of his 2 earlier statements to the RMP, combining as it does his account of witnessing a civilian gunman with his account of witnessing a nail bomber. Soldier 017’s account to this Inquiry is more detailed again.

18.7.2.112 Nonetheless Soldier 017’s Treasury Solicitor statement departs significantly from the earlier statements made by Soldier 017 to the RMP. The same can be said of his Eversheds statement.

18.7.2.113 It is proposed to deal below with some of the discrepancies as between his various accounts, which it is submitted, demonstrate Soldier 017’s tendency to exaggerate aspects of his evidence in a manner which grossly exaggerates the level of threat posed by civilians and encountered by soldiers.

18.7.2.114 The first time Soldier 017 ever gave an account of the drain-pipe shot was in the statement he prepared for this Inquiry. B1484.002 paragraph 9 While the fact of the drain-pipe shot is not in dispute, the manner in which it makes its appearance in the statement of so many soldiers from 1 Para is. Very few of the original RMP statements contain references to the drain-pipe shot, as further RMP statements were taken and statements were prepared for the Treasury Solicitors the incident appeared in the statements of more and more soldiers. It is our contention that this occurred, not because soldiers had witnessed this incident, but rather because either: having learnt of the shot subsequently, soldiers decided dishonestly to insert it into their evidence; or, it was suggested to soldiers by the RMP that they should insert this into their statements. Evidence about the shot had the advantage of being incontrovertible, because unlike virtually all of the other allegations of coming under live fire made by soldiers, it was in fact true. It is also not without significance that few of the soldiers who refer to it refer to the 5 shots fired by members of Machine-Gun Platoon in Sector 1.

18.7.2.115 Soldier 017 gives an account, for the first time, in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor, of stones continuously hitting the vehicle as it entered the Bogside. B1482 paragraph 2 This account is not contained in either of his 2 RMP statements. Moreover, no other soldier in Sergeant O’s Pig gives any account consistent with Soldier 017’s evidence on that issue, with the exception of Soldier P. In our submission this account is a gross exaggeration, as was suggested to Soldier 017 in the course of his oral evidence, Day 358/137/1 to Day 358/138/25 and is demonstrative of a willingness to embellish his evidence in order to create the impression of soldiers being under fierce attack from the moment they entered the Bogside.

18.7.2.116 The insertion of this detail into his Treasury Solicitor account is not without significance in terms of the allegation which is being made that Soldier 017 colluded with Soldier P to justify at least some of his live rounds. We say this because Soldier P, also for the first time in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor states that as the vehicles deployed into the Bogside “we could hear stones bouncing off our vehicles.” B591

18.7.2.117 In our submission this is just one of a number of parallels which can be found between the development of Soldier 017’s testimony and that of Soldier P, from Soldier 017’s second RMP statement through to his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

18.7.2.118 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Soldier 017 also refers to being surrounded by a large crowd as they debussed, again this is not referred to in either of his statements to the RMP. B1482 paragraph 2 This account is also contained in his statement to Eversheds wherein he states that there were thousands of people in the waste ground and when they debussed they saw rioters all over the place. B1484.003 paragraph 18 This account is contradicted by the Video evidence which shows Soldier 017 debussing from the second Mortar Platoon Pig. V48/12.14 to 13.01 The video clip shows that rather than surrounding the soldiers, the people near the Pig ran away from the soldiers, as they debussed. While Soldier 017 in oral testimony reduced his thousands to a 100 or so people, Day 358/46/15 the video evidence would tend to suggest that there were only a handful of people near the Pigs Day 358/135/16 to Day 358/135/17 and that they were running away. Day 358/136/6 to Day 358/136/10

18.7.2.119 The video clip also shows a soldier firing his rubber bullet gun as he de-busses. Only two soldiers in Soldier O’s Pig, Soldier 017 and Soldier 013 carried rubber bullet guns. Soldier 017 accepted that he was the soldier who fired the rubber bullet gun immediately on debussing. Day 358/135/20 to Day 358/136/1 This was a fact he neglected to mention in any of the statements made by him in 1972. Although it is mentioned in his Eversheds statement it is mentioned in the context of the thousands of people in the waste ground. In fact, as the Video demonstrates Soldier 017 fired his baton round at people who posed no discernible threat to soldiers and who were rapidly dispersing. Day 358/136/6 to Day 358/136/10

18.7.2.120 Soldier 017’s depiction, in his statements to Eversheds, of the riot encountered behind the Rubble Barricade is blood-curdling stuff. According to his Eversheds statement there were also “thousands” behind the Rubble Barricade, B1484.004 paragraph 22 this was reduced to a 100 or so in oral testimony. Day 358/53/13 to Day 358/53/20 He maintained that on arrival he was “showered” with bricks and stones thrown by the rioters at the Rubble Barricade. B1484.004 paragraph 22 While he accepted he had not been hit by any of the bricks and stones thrown at him from the Rubble Barricade he nonetheless maintained that they came within 2-3 feet of him. Day 358/59/15 to Day 358/59/24 He also described groups of youths from this crowd who were repeatedly advancing on his position, and according to Soldier 017 who “would have ripped me to pieces if they had got to me”. B1484.004 paragraph 23 To like effect in his Supplementary Statement the riot behind the Rubble Barricade was described as “life threatening, if the rioters had caught me they would have killed me.” B1484.014 paragraph 4.2

18.7.2.121 Soldier 017’s description of the rioting, depicts a scene of mayhem, in which soldiers lives were threatened, even by unarmed rioters. In our submission Soldier 017’s description is grossly hyperbolic and is contradicted by the photographic evidence depicting people at the Rubble Barricade, at the time soldiers arrived, EP27.6, EP27.7, EP27.8, EP27.9. In relation to his suggestion that bricks and stones were falling within 2-3 feet of his location it is submitted that unless Soldier 017 was far in advance of the locations in which he is seen in photographs, for example EP23.7, persons throwing bricks and stones from the Rubble Barricade could not come within 2-3 feet. These descriptions are in our submission further examples of Soldier 017’s propensity to exaggerate matters out of all proportion.

18.7.2.122 Probably most significantly, in terms of providing a justification for the use of lethal force by soldiers, Soldier 017 refers, for the first time in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement, to hearing high velocity fire from the area of the Rossville Flats, after he had crossed Rossville Street. B1482 paragraph 3 If Soldier 017 is telling the truth then this was the first significant incident to occur, yet he completely neglected to mention it in either of his RMP statements.

18.7.2.123 This incident does however have clear parallels with the statement of Soldier P to the Treasury Solicitor where he for the first time gives an account of 2 high velocity shots being fired. In Soldier P’s statement however the shots were fired from the Rubble Barricade and went over his head. B592

18.7.2.124 It is our submission that the discrepancies identified above, some of which are demonstrably false, demonstrate a tendency to gross hyperbole on the part of Soldier 017. An incident which involves isolated youths throwing stones from behind a Rubble Barricade, in circumstances where those stones posed no threat to soldiers, becomes, in Soldier 017’s testimony a life-threatening situation. Soldier 017’s flights of fantasy are not however the results of a hyperactive imagination, Soldier 017’s evidence is given with a clear agenda, that of exculpating the actions of his colleagues on Bloody Sunday who used lethal force. In our submission little, if any weight can be attached to evidence given by Soldier 017 of attacks on soldiers by civilians, given his demonstrable willingness to lie.

18.7.2.125 There are also some parallels between the lies told by Soldier 017 and those told by Soldier P, and the changes made by the soldiers when they come to give their Treasury Solicitor statements. These parallels are significant in view of the allegation made about the circumstances which gave rise to Soldier 017’s second RMP statement.

18.7.2.126 In relation to this statement it is our allegation that Soldier 017 was guilty of collusion, whether directly with Soldier P or with the assistance of the RMP, in order to provide some corroboration for Soldier P of the circumstances in which he fired live rounds.

18.7.2.127 The most manifest discrepancy as between the various accounts given by Soldier 017, and the most crucial, in that it seeks to justify the use of lethal force on Bloody Sunday, is the inclusion by Soldier 017 in his second RMP statement, of an incident which involved witnessing Soldier P firing a live round at a nail bomber.

18.7.2.128 If Soldier 017’s second RMP statement is to be believed then in the early hours of the 31 January 1972 he neglected to mention an incident in which:

ii) This resulted in Soldier 017 firing his rubber bullet gun for the first time.

iii) His action in firing his rubber bullet gun resulted in the crowd splitting up and a man emerged with a nail bomb.

iv) This man who was about to throw a nail bomb at Soldier 017 and Soldier P was shot by Soldier P as he raised his arm to throw the nail bomb.

18.7.2.129 The explanation advanced by Soldier 017 for failing to mention this in this first RMP statement is because “I thought seeing the gunman was more important so that is what I mentioned seeing. I think that was what I was specifically asked about.” B1484.008 paragraph 47.5

“Q. Was that [the incident with the nail-bomber] not something sufficiently important to be included in your first statement to the Military Police?

Q. How could you tell whether [the RMP were] interested in the nail bomber if you had not told them that there was a nail bomber?

18.7.2.131 Soldier 017 does not seek to suggest that he had forgotten the incident with the nail bomber when he spoke to the RMP on the first occasion, simply that he decided, not to mention it. Day 358/67/7 to Day 358/67/9 Thus Soldier 017 now advances two contradictory explanations for his failure to tell the RMP. Firstly, that he determined that the incident with the gunman was insufficiently important to tell the RMP and secondly that the RMP were not interested in hearing about the nail bomb. As was pointed out to him the RMP could not show disinterest unless he actually told them, and he accepted that he never told them.

18.7.2.132 It is our submission that neither explanation stands up to scrutiny. There can be no reason for regarding a gunman as more important than a nail bomber where both apparently threatened Soldier 017’s life, particularly when the first incident involved the use of lethal force by one of Soldier 017’s colleagues. In relation to the explanation advanced for the first time to Mr. Roxburgh in oral testimony, Day 358/65/12 to Day 358/65/16 for the reasons set out above, the RMP could not express disinterest about that of which they were unaware.

18.7.2.133 On Soldier 017’s own account the purpose of his second statement “was to back up what Soldier P had said”. Day 358/68/11 to Day 358/68/13 It is our submission that Soldier 017’s second RMP statement was a complete fabrication, designed exclusively to lend support to the justification advanced by Soldier P for his use of lethal force.

18.7.2.134 It is noteworthy in this respect that there are discrepancies as between Soldier 017’s first account of this incident and his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

i) In the account given by Soldier 017 to the RMP he claims to have seen the object in the man’s hand as he appeared behind the crowd. B1479 However in his account to the Treasury Solicitor he states that he saw the nail bomber after Soldier P shouted a warning. B1482 This change is significant in that it means that Soldier 017’s statement to the Treasury Solicitor is now more consistent with the accounts given by Soldier P about the incident. B577, B592, WT13.47E-F In our submission producing a statement consistent with Soldier P’s statement was the whole purpose of the exercise.

ii) In his RMP statement he was unable to state that the man was hit, merely that he fell, while in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he refers to the man being hit. B1479 and B1482 paragraph 3 There are also differences in Soldier P’s accounts as to whether or not the man was hit. In his RMP statement he stated that the man was hit B577. While his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he simply stated that the man fell. B592

iii) Also in his RMP statement Soldier 017 claims that “the crowd carried away the injured man.” B1479 This is the same account as that given by Soldier P in his RMP statement. B577 However in Soldier 017’s statement to the Treasury Solicitor he states that “the crowd surrounded the man and I am not sure where he was hit . . . I did not see the man who had been hit again or what happened in him.” B1482 paragraph 3 Again this is paralleled in Soldier P’s statements, in that he changes from a position in which the man was removed by the crowd to a position in which his attention was diverted as a result of which he did not see what happened the man. B592, WT13.48D

18.7.2.135 It is our submission that the discrepancies between Soldier 017’s second RMP statement and his Treasury Solicitor statement are part of the process of trying to produce an account consistent with that of Soldier P.

18.7.2.136 However, the major difficulty with Soldier 017’s account as corroboration is the fact that in terms of location, his account on the 4 February 1972 and subsequently, consistently describes a crowd advancing upon him from the Rubble Barricade and a nail bomber positioned just north of the Rubble Barricade on Rossville Street. B1479, B1482 paragraph 3, B1484.004 paragraph 27, Day 358/123/1 to Day 358/123/2 As Soldier 017 himself acknowledges that is totally at variance with the account given by Soldier P in his Treasury Solicitor statement and evidence to Lord Widgery. Day 358/122/24 to Day 358/123/2, P22

18.7.2.137 Significantly however it is not at variance with Soldier P’s original account to the RMP, as B579 attached to his first RMP statement demonstrates. In Soldier P’s original account to the RMP, as with Soldier 017’s account to the RMP, the nail bomber came from the direction of the Rubble Barricade in front of Soldier P on Rossville Street. Soldier P changed the location of the nail-bomber in all of his subsequent statements, Soldier 017, however failed to do so.

18.7.2.138 The fact that Soldier 017’s second RMP statement was taken on the 4 February 1972 is not without significance. We have previously submitted that a significant number of soldiers, of whom Soldier 017 is one, made statements on the 4 February 1972 for the express purpose of corroborating and justifying the use of lethal force by other soldiers. Those statements, whether manufactured by the RMP, the individual soldiers, or a combination of both, were untrue. We would refer the Tribunal to Section 5 of these submissions wherein we make that case.

“was not made recording a proper or genuine recollection, but it was made to corroborate the evidence that Soldier P had already given to the Royal Military Police.” Day 358/128/20 to Day 358/128/23

18.7.2.140 It is our submission that this was precisely the purpose of Soldier 017’s second statement and that the statement was a fabrication is the only logical explanation for:

ii) The discrepancies between his RMP statement and the Treasury Solicitor statement and the nature of those discrepancies.

iii) The discrepancies between Soldier 017’s account and the accounts given by Soldier P.

18.7.2.141 In the first statement made by Soldier 017 he gives an account of having seen a civilian gunman, who fired 2 rounds at Soldier 017. From the first description given of this incident it appears that this incident occurred on Rossville Street with the man emerging from “round the corner towards me.” B1472, Day 358/81/22 to Day 358/81/25

18.7.2.142 That also appears to be the case with his statement to the Treasury Solicitor. He describes a situation in which rioters are emerging from an alleyway to throw stones at the soldiers, Soldier 017 decided to go forward to make arrests. “As I did so I saw a man walk around the corner towards me.” B1483

18.7.2.143 Of relevance to this issue is the fact that in the mid/late 1980’s, Soldier 017 was interviewed by Max Arthur. Soldier 017 accepts that the second paragraph entitled ‘Private, 1 Para’ on B1484.027 relates to this interview. He does not accept that the account is entirely accurate and stated in oral testimony that Max Arthur had made various aspects of the account up. Day 358/108/8

18.7.2.144 The interview is difficult to decipher because there are no references to street names, and it is not proposed to deal with every aspect of the interview. The interview is however relevant to the incident in which Soldier 017 claims to have seen a gunman. Reading the interview, in conjunction with the Supplementary Statement made by Soldier 017 to address this interview, B1484.023, B1484.024 it appears to state as follows:

i) Contrary to what appears in his earlier statements, he suggests that he actually went into the alleyway, in order to arrest rioters, when the gunman appeared. B1484.027, B1484.0123 paragraph 4.2

ii) He also suggests that the gunman fired a shot which hit the wall above him and that then, both himself and Corporal P, chased the gunman. B1484.027 He now disputes this stating that “I ran out of the alleyway having I believe been fired at and told Corporal P who then went back to the alleyway buy when the man with the pistol had gone.” B1484.0124 paragraph 4.2

18.7.2.145 Thus in both his interview with Max Arthur and his evidence to this Tribunal, and contrary to what is contained in his 1972 accounts, Soldier 017 is adamant that the gunman was down the alleyway which led to Columbcille Court, rather than as appears from his earlier accounts on Rossville Street. B1484.027, B1484.005 paragraph 29

18.7.2.146 Also of significance is the fact that in both his interview with Max Arthur and his testimony to this Tribunal Soldier 017 makes it clear that that he told Soldier P about the incident at the time, to the extent that Soldier P went to look down the alleyway to investigate whether the gunman was still there. B1484.005 paragraph 31. Yet in all the statements Soldier P has made about Bloody Sunday, he has never referred to this incident, nor corroborated Soldier 017’s account in anyway.

18.7.2.147 In our submission the lack of corroboration by Soldier P, or any other soldier, of this incident, completely undermines the credibility of Soldier 017 in this regard. It is submitted that the moving of the gunman from Rossville Street to the alleyway was because Soldier 017 recognised that the incident he described could not have occurred on Rossville Street without other soldiers having witnessed the incident, given the proximity of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.7.2.148 The account is also undermined by Soldier 017’s lack of credibility as a witness, his propensity for exaggeration and his willingness to fabricate accounts. In those circumstances no weight can be attached to Soldier 017’s testimony on this issue.

18.7.2.149 It should also be noted at this juncture that on Soldier 017’s own account no other soldier witnessed this gunman. Day 358/79/22 to Day 358/79/24 Moreover no soldier corroborates this incident. Thus even if the Tribunal were to conclude that in relation to this aspect of his evidence Soldier 017 were telling the truth, the actions of this gunman played no part in the use of lethal force by the soldiers of Mortar Platoon or Anti-Tank Platoon on Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday.

18.7.2.150 In our submission photographs EP23.7, EP23.8, P1119, EP23.9, EP33.6 and EP33.7 all show Soldiers P and 017 in various positions alongside against the east facing wall of the Kells Walk pram ramp. Soldier 017 accepted that he could identify himself in EP23.7 and EP23.8. In relation to P1119 and EP23.9 he did not confirm his identity but accepted that it was possible that he was the man with the riot gun. Day 358/150/12 to Day 358/152/17 It is our contention that each of the photographs identified above shows the same two soldiers, (in some cases alongside other soldiers) one armed with a rifle and one with a rubber bullet gun and that the soldier with the riot gun can be none other than Soldier 017.

18.7.2.151 It is thus evident from the photographic evidence that, within a short time of the arrival of Soldier P and 017 at the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street:

“there is a very substantial group of soldiers who appear to have joined you very quickly” Day 358/150/24 to Day 358/150/25

18.7.2.152 Yet Soldier 017 now claims to have no recollection at all of Anti-Tank Platoon on the day. Day 358/59/9 to Day 358/59/14

18.7.2.153 It is our submission that the assertion that he was unaware of the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon on Bloody Sunday is undermined, in the first instance by his first statement to the RMP. B1472 His RMP statement refers to the rioting crowd at the Rubble Barricade “stoning troops who deployed around the flats.” In our submission this is a direct reference to the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon who were located at the Kells Walk Wall behind Soldier 017 virtually from the outset of his positioning himself on the west side of Rossville Street. His assertion that he was unaware of Anti-Tank Platoon is also contradicted by P1120 and P1121 which show the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon speaking directly with Soldiers P and 017 and demonstrate conclusively that Soldiers P and 017 were aware of their presence.

18.7.2.154 Despite this Soldier 017 gives no evidence about the actions or conduct of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon on Bloody Sunday. We know that soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday, yet we are invited to believe that these live rounds went unnoticed by Soldier 017, as with Soldier P. To like effect, none of the targets identified by soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon were seen by Soldier 017 despite his proximity to the Rubble Barricade. Soldier 017 claims to have seen nothing of the movement of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon into Glenfada Park North, despite the fact that this would inevitably have occurred before he returned to his Pig.

18.7.2.155 Ever more extraordinary than his failure to witness the actions of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon was his failure to witness the actions of Soldier P. Taken at its height Soldier 017 witnessed Soldier P fire 1 shot, when we know Soldier P fired at least 9 and that he claims to have done so while accompanying Soldier 017.

18.7.2.156 Finally, and of most significance, Soldier 017 failed to witness the shooting and killing of Michael Kelly, Michael McDaid, John Young, William Nash and Hugh Gilmore who were undoubtedly shot and killed while he was on Rossville Street looking over the Rubble Barricade. As has been alleged, one or more of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were shot and killed by Soldier P with whom Soldier 017 was paired during the time he killed one or more of those young men. Moreover if any of them were not killed by Soldier P, they were killed by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, while Soldier 017 was positioned on Rossville Street.

“basically what you suffer from is wilful blindness; you have made a determined effort to see nothing in relation to the deaths that you must have witnessed of at least five people at that barricade and the movements of Anti-Tank Platoon into Glenfada Park where they carried out further murders” Day 358/169/9 to Day 358/169/16

18.7.2.158 Soldier 017 as with the other soldiers positioned on Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday, claims to have seen nothing of the shooting from the Kells Walk Wall, missed virtually all of Soldier P’s shots over the Rubble Barricade and failed to see even one of those shot and killed behind the Rubble Barricade as they fell. More than any other aspect of his evidence, this shows Soldier 017 to be a liar, unwilling to give true testimony to the murder of innocent civilians by his colleagues. In those circumstances no credibility can be attached to any aspect of Soldier 017’s evidence.

18.7.2.159 Whilst Private U was a member of Mortar Platoon, his actions relate mainly to the events in Sector 3 and in the area of the Rubble Barricade. He provided statements to the RMP, one to the Treasury Solicitor, gave evidence to Lord Widgery and gave oral evidence to this Tribunal on Day 369.

18.7.2.160 When asked by Eversheds how he felt about Bloody Sunday when it was over he said the following:

“Frankly I felt elated. Everyone was on a high. We had been in, had engaged gunmen and had shot them. That is how we honestly felt and I still believe, hand on heart, that we did a good job. When we got back to barracks, people all around were saying “well done”. It was like a mutual appreciation society… I believe one of the main reasons why I am having to give a statement today for this new Inquiry is that no paras were shot and killed that day. I have described how we came under fire. After the day, we were puffing out chests out and congratulating each other on our terrific fire and movement but, really, it was pure luck that none of us were shot. I now feel that we are being punished for not remembering all the details.” B787.009 paragraphs 47 to 48

18.7.2.161 The witness confirmed that he has always been clear in his mind that he killed someone on Bloody Sunday Day 369/121/16, B787.006 paragraphs 31 to 33. When examined by Counsel for the Families, the following exchange ensued:

“Q. Perhaps you are prepared to assist me in trying to establish at least who it is likely that you shot dead on that day?

Q. Are you prepared to assist in trying to establish who the person was you shot dead that day?

In our submission it is against this background that this witness’ evidence should be viewed.

Briefing

18.7.2.162 Private U’s recollection of the briefing he received from Lieutenant N before going to Derry was that although the Mortar Platoon were to conduct an arrest operation, this time there would be no “safety valve” i.e. where persons who were innocently caught up in the riot would be able to escape. No such tactic was to be employed in Derry so that everyone could be arrested. B787.001 paragraph 2. It is difficult to reconcile this soldier’s understanding of the plan with the emphasis Senior officers have made on the need for “separation” between innocent bystanders, marchers and rioters.

Like many of his colleagues, his understanding and knowledge about the No-Go area in Derry and reports of gunmen being able to walk freely appears to have come mainly from news reports that he saw on television B787.001 paragraph 5.

Presbyterian Church

18.7.2.163 In relation to the events which took place at the Presbyterian Church, Soldier U maintains a consistent pattern of recollection in keeping with all military witnesses, namely, that he has no recollection of hearing any SLR weapons being fired in that vicinity.

18.7.2.164 The witness however, provides a detailed recollection of hearing a single high velocity shot ring out and strike the building, which he occupied at the time. In fact at B787.003 paragraph 13 of his Eversheds statement:

“I was not aware of any of the boys having shot at anyone in that area. I heard no SLR fire whilst I was around in this area.”

By way of comment, Soldier U makes no reference to hearing any nail bombs explode in this area. The witness points out that the single high velocity shot enabled all the soldiers to make a decision that they would go in with SLRs. The significance of this event at the time however was not regarded by Soldier U or any of his colleagues in the Mortar Platoon as important enough to include in their statements made to the RMP on the evening of 30^th January or early hours of 31^st January 1972.

Going in / Level of Fire

18.7.2.165 The witness records that the original plan of entry i.e. driving a pig through a brick wall had to be significantly altered because of difficulties on the ground B787.003 paragraph 15. He entered the Bogside under the command of Sergeant O.

The inconsistent nature of U’s recollection of event is particularly highlighted through the provision of various accounts concerning the level of fire which he experienced and was subjected to as he made his way into Rossville Street. It is worthwhile summarising his recollections in the following way:

i) In his first RMP statement he describes hearing automatic gunfire as the vehicles advanced down Rossville Street.

ii) When he reached the vicinity of Eden Place and Rossville Street he cocked his SLR and put a round into the breech. He then arrested a man who was throwing stones, ascertained his identity and handed him over to the RMP.

iii) When he returned to the corner of the Rossville Flats he came under fire from the waste ground at the far end of Rossville Street. He estimated that he heard approximately thirty gunshots at this point. He identified a man with a pistol firing two shots and he returns one shot, which he claimed, struck the target B748.

i) As the pigs drove down Rossville Street he heard a long burst of automatic fire. U debussed from the vehicle and ran forward towards the Rossville Flats being struck several times by stones.

ii)As he faced the flats he heard the sound of four or five low velocity automatic shots. At this point he was struck by a bottle by a man whom he later arrested. During the arrest, three or four low velocity automatic shots struck the ground in his vicinity.

iii) The witness then said that having handed his arrestee over to other soldiers, he returned back along Rossville Street where he observed a number of soldiers at the entrance to the Rossville Flats Courtyard firing at a gunman. It was only at this point that U cocked his rifle.

iv) The witness requested cover from a colleague and made his way in the direction of the flats. As he ran he saw four or five automatic shots land near the Company Commander’s vehicle which was directly ahead of him in the direction of the flats.

v) Private U eventually took up a position at the northwest end of the north end of the Rossville Flats and it was from here that he shot the man who was firing a pistol. The witness then related the event that he omitted completely from his initial RMP statement, viz, the circumstances in which Alex Nash was shot B767.

18.7.2.168 Private U’s oral evidence to Lord Widgery can be summarised as follows:

i) During his sworn evidence before Lord Widgery the witness confirmed that he heard a long burst of automatic fire as the pig drove along Rossville Street WT13.94 F.

ii)According to him as he debussed from the vehicle he was struck by two bottles and several stones WT13.95 B.

iii) He described how he arrested one man and when asked by Counsel whether he heard any firing at this point he replied that he could not remember although he did recall hearing and seeing the fall of shots WT13.96 C.

iv) When asked directly if he cocked his rifle at this stage the witness replied that he did not WT13.96 E.

v) He went on to describe a second fall of shots on the waste ground in the vicinity of Eden Place WT13.96 F.

vi) He was asked directly if he could see other soldiers firing at this point and he replied that he could not WT13.97 A.

vii) He made his way forward and saw three or four shots fall in the vicinity of the Command Vehicle. The witness then went on to relate the circumstances in which he discharged his single round. When asked by Mr Hill BL whether the man who discharged the two shots with the pistol was his first experience of pistol shots that day the witness replied “No”. He went on to allege that he saw a man firing a pistol in the Rossville Flats Courtyard although he never mentioned this before. He did claim to have mentioned this however in an earlier statement WT14.2 F-G. If this is so, then Counsel for the Families have not been provided with it, unless of course this intended to be a reference to the incident related in his Treasury Solicitor statement at B767.

18.7.2.169 It is difficult to conceive of a situation that arises and is then later described in such inconsistent and contradictory terms:

i) We ask rhetorically how a witness who has apparently experienced direct gunfire forget to mention that experience when providing his account before Lord Widgery.

ii)Secondly how could someone who on one account, claims to have heard thirty gunshots never mention this again.

iii) Thirdly how could a truthful witness allegedly see his colleagues engage a pistol-waving gunman in the Courtyard of Rossville Flats with sustained fire and yet fail to mention this at the first opportunity of telling.

The most likely explanation is that this individual has woven a variety of accounts and experiences picked up by him in the aftermath of events around a central but heroic role, which he has identified for himself. His evidence in respect of these matters amounts to an unreliable tissue of misinformation, fiction and falsehood. Rarely on the face of this evidence does this witness provide an account that is consistent in respect of any particular event he describes.

Arrests

18.7.2.170 One matter of which the witness does provide some measure of consistency concerns the fact that he appears to have arrested someone who slipped on ice. In his RMP statement he alleges that this individual was called “Charles Collins” B749. In his Treasury statement the name of the arrestee has been deliberately deleted however it is clear that U mistook the surname “Collins” for “Canning”. Unsurprisingly, Mr Canning’s account of his arrest is somewhat different. He claimed to have been arrested by a Paratrooper who he had observed firing his SLR toward the Barricade. He was ordered to the ground where he was kicked repeatedly. He was then taken to an APC and further assaulted. He was struck in the face with a rifle and at least one Paratrooper kept threatening to shoot him AC25.5. It is submitted however that Private U did not arrest Mr Canning but is more likely to have arrested Mr James Charles Doherty Day 369/134/1 to Day 369/136/15. It will be recalled that this witness gave evidence to the effect that he slipped and fell on ice Day 104/110/5 to Day 104/110/7 and that whilst on the ground he was struck by what he assumed was a rifle butt, lost consciousness briefly, and was subjected to a stream of anti-Irish racist abuse. At one point he was told “You’re dealing with the fucking Paras now” AD69.2 paragraphs 13 to 19.

Did Private U shoot Hugh Gilmore?

18.7.2.171 One of the principal difficulties confronted by the Tribunal, is attempting to determine whether a direct relationship between soldiers who have allegedly fired and the deceased and wounded can be established.

Private U provides two different accounts in respect of the circumstances in which he allegedly, fatally shoots one person and potentially wounds another.

He described the incident in the following terms to the RMP at 0:00hours on 31^st January 1972:

i) “As the rioters thinned out I saw a man on the waste ground behind the Barricade, he was about 150 metres from my position. He was standing in the middle of about five other men at GR43321678 and he was wearing a light coloured anorak.” B749

ii) “In his right hand he had a pistol and I saw him fire two shots at other members of my unit who were on the opposite side of the road from me. From the standing aiming position I fired one aimed shot at this man. I saw that the shot struck him in the stomach and he jerked and fell. I also saw a man behind the one I fired at clutch his head with his hands and also fall to the ground.” B750

18.7.2.172 Yet when describing the same incident to the Treasury Solicitor the witness stated the following:

i) “I was in this position about two minutes when I saw five or six men walking across from Glenfada Park towards Rossville Flats behind the Barricade. I saw one of these men had a pistol. He had a light blue jacket on.” B768

ii)“The other men moved away from him as though they were surprised he had a pistol. He fired two shots in quick succession in the direction of the opposite side of Rossville Street from where I was standing where there were soldiers. Then I was in a standing aiming position, I took off my safety catch and aimed for the centre of his body. I fired one round. He fell backwards and the man behind him clutched his own head.” B768

18.7.2.173 During his evidence on oath to Lord Widgery the witness repeated an account largely consistent with his Treasury Solicitor statement. Interestingly, no other member of the Parachute Regiment (including those positioned at Kells Walk) corroborates either of these versions as an event that actually occurred.

The trajectory line as identified on the trajectory map B754 and trajectory photograph B787 provides a line of fire along which Hugh Gilmore had travelled in an attempt to gain the safety of the southern end of Block1. None of the other soldiers who admit to firing provide a similar trajectory line.

However at least one other military witness describes a soldier firing from this location although in somewhat different circumstances.

The Soldiers in the Peter England Shirt Factory

Soldier 015

18.7.2.174 Soldier 015 was a Bombardier in the 22Light Air Defence Regiment and was positioned in the Peter England shirt factory on Little James Street. See photographs P415, P417, P427. He had an SLR, binoculars and a radio. In providing an initial statement to the RMP, he described a soldier at the same location as U discharging his weapon in the following circumstances:

i) “Suddenly all the troops in the area seemed to dive for cover and take up firing positions. One soldier I noticed was observing two men behind a Rubble Barricade that stretched from Block No1 Rossville Flats across Rossville Street to Glenfada Park.” B1434.011

ii) “The soldier was positioned at the corner of Block No1 Rossville Flats. The men were continually throwing missiles in his direction. The two men suddenly jumped up and started running towards an open door half way down Block No1. The rear man stopped suddenly and turned to look at the soldier, as the soldier brought his SLR into the aim position. The man turned and started running faster towards the open door. I then saw the soldier fire one round in the direction of the fleeing man. The man dropped to the ground. He fell in the doorway, I then saw hands come from the doorway and drag the body in.” B1434.011, B1434.012

18.7.2.175 It could be suggested that what is described in this account relates to the death of Kevin McElhinney, in that he potentially left the Barricade with one other person and that he eventually ended up inside Block1. The point however that this account does serve to highlight is that U fired on someone on the east side of Rossville Street who was both unarmed and presented no risk to himself or any of his colleagues. Certain aspects of the description however support the assertion that the most likely focus of U’s attention was Hugh Gilmore as opposed to Kevin McElhinney. This conclusion is to be preferred for the following reasons:

i) The target was clearly seen to be throwing stones. It is accepted that Hugh Gilmore threw stones shortly before he was killed.

ii) No such allegation could be made against Kevin McElhinney at the time he was shot.

iii) It is clear from this description that the target is running as opposed to crawling and is shot at an early stage.

iv) A body of civilian and paramilitary evidence suggests that Hugh Gilmore had not only been throwing a stone (s) but was also taunting the soldiers and encouraging others to participate in his defiant behaviour.

v) A further consideration is linked to the fact that sequentially, Kevin McElhinney left the safety of the Barricade as at least three others lay dying or dead on its southern side.

vi) In conclusion, the most compelling reason for concluding that this incident almost certainly described the final moments of Hugh Gilmore is to be found in the concession by Soldier 015 to the effect that the individual be saw shot could have been dragged around the southern gable end of Block1 as opposed to the entrance doors to Block1 Day 360/202/25 to Day 360/203/18.

18.7.2.176 However when interviewed by Lt Colonel Overbury at Lisburn barracks on 16^th February 1972 the witness was shown a photograph of the area. He changed his account in the following material respects:

i) The man he saw shot was running towards an open door as opposed to half way down the Block itself. B1422

ii) The man stopped, turned and faced the soldier. He raised his right arm to shoulder height and pointed towards the soldier. B1422

18.7.2.176 This is by the standards of any Inquiry a truly remarkable document. It is respectfully submitted that its content highlights the priority of necessity over the moral imperative of truth. It strains the thread of credibility, that a witness in providing an account of how a human being is gunned down on the street chooses to deliberately ignore, the very features of the account itself which might possibly justify it. The disturbing nature of this document and what it is clearly intended to achieve is further highlighted by the fact that the witness described the same event to the Treasury Solicitor in precisely the same terms as he had related it to the RMP B1425. It should be noted however that someone has seen fit to amend the typed copy in manuscript for the purposes of including the justification, which was set out the statement dated 16^th February and recorded by Colonel Overbury. When Mr Heritage recorded 015’s statement on 9^th March 1972, 015 repeated, what in our submission was his truthful recollection of what he saw. Colonel Overbury does not appear to have attended with him on this occasion. However when 015 gave evidence on oath to Lord Widgery, he provided the version set out in his statement to Colonel Overbury, namely that the man in Rossville Street turned, faced the soldier and brought up his right hand WT16.37 A.

18.7.2.177 It is respectfully submitted that this witness, more than any other, highlights the collective disregard for the truth, which many of the military witnesses have demonstrated. Notwithstanding the nature of the earlier accounts as provided by him, 015 for the purposes of this Inquiry goes so far as to express the assumption that the unarmed civilian that he initially described to the RMP must have had a pistol B1434.004 paragraph 29. When asked about this assumption by Counsel to the Tribunal, it was suggested that it arose from a belief that a soldier in the British Army would not fire without a reason, the witness agreed with this explanation Day 360/181/2 to Day 360/181/5.

To suggest that these differences are best explained by someone who was feeling “tired and confused” is tantamount to treating both the role and purpose of this Tribunal with an astonishing level of indifference and at worst, contempt Day 360/185/8 to Day 360/191/11.

Soldier 023

18.7.2.178 The description of events surrounding this incident take on an even more perplexing dimension, through the provision of a seemingly corroborative statement by Soldier 023 who was a trained sniper in the same unit. He was with 015 on the top floor of the Peter England shirt factory. He also had a pair of binoculars and an SLR with a telescopic sight. He describes the following scene in his Treasury Solicitor statement:

i) “I then saw a man appear from the southern end of Block1 of Rossville Flats. This man had a rifle which he aimed up towards the soldiers deployed in Rossville Street. I heard the sound of shots as he fired. The man then went back behind the wall and reappeared a couple of minutes later.” B1522

ii) “I then took aim with my rifle. I heard the sound of a shot from his rifle. Before I could shoot I heard the sound of a high velocity shot and the man jumped back in the air and fell. A crowd gathered around this man and carried him away.” B1522

Significantly, no other soldier claims to have shot anyone this far south in Rossville Street. Moreover the engagement has not been recorded on the “Shot Plot” as prepared by Captain Jackson.

It will be recalled that the first and only occasion during which 015 allegedly pointed out his observations to Soldier 023 was in the statement taken by Lt Colonel Overbury on 16^th February 1972. 023 had no recollection of this exchange Day 360/40/5 to Day 360/40/22.

It would seem therefore that 015 and 023 although conducting observations along the same axis of activity see different things and experience different events. By way of example, after describing the man with the rifle being shot above, 023 went on to describe a man at a window at 57 William Street take aim with a rifle and discharge at least one round. He then described how the man reappeared a few minutes later and how a high velocity shot rang out from a position directly below his and the man fell backwards. He then described bodies being removed from Glenfada Park and Block1 to waiting ambulances B1519, B1520. 015 on the other hand, relates how he heard a bullet strike the building somewhere beneath his position and how he heard a high velocity round being fired from the same location. He recalls nothing of the drama outlined by 023 although both witnesses generally share in their description of the dead and the dying being removed in ambulances.

18.7.2.179 The variations provided by these accounts appear to derive from the following:

i) They are the result of a poorly contrived attempt to justify the circumstances in which Private U cut down an unarmed individual.

ii) That the accounts provide a number of accurate descriptions of not one but several shooting incidents in which both victims and soldiers have failed to come forward.

It could of course be suggested that any evidence linking Private U to the death of Hugh Gilmore has been undermined by the evidence of PIRA14 and PIRA 26 who testified that the soldier they believed to have shot Hugh Gilmore was on the west side of Rossville Street. However, such a suggestion fails to make proper account of the expert conclusions drawn by Messrs Shepherd and O’Callaghan, namely that Hugh Gilmore was likely to have been shot twice.

Further Observations by Private U

18.7.2.180 In concluding his initial account to the RMP, Private U outlined how he reported his “hit” to the CSM who was standing nearby. As they were about to move forward “to recover the body and weapon” a priest accompanied by approximately ten other people came upon the scene and appeared to remove the body B750.

Having provided a detailed statement on 31^st January 1972 concerning Bloody Sunday, Private U provided a further statement on 4^th February detailing a highly dramatic and moving event which he alleges occurred after he had shot the individual in the vicinity of Block1. That statement records how he saw two bodies lying behind the Barricade and how observed a man aged approximately 45 emerge from the Rossville Flats. (It will be recalled that the unchallenged testimony before Lord Widgery was that Mr Nash (senior) emerged from Glenfada Park North.)

18.7.2.181 Private U alleged that this man propped up the body of a youth who appeared to have a stomach wound. At or about this point an arm extended from the entrance of Block1 holding a pistol he observed the weapon jerk and a ricochet bullet strike five metres short on the southern side of the Barricade and then hit the middle-aged man in the right arm. Another shot was then discharged which appeared to strike the youth. The middle-aged man wandered off in a daze. A short time after this event an APC moved forward and removed three bodies from the Barricade. U believed that one of the deceased was the youth whom he had seen being shot earlier B759, B760.

18.7.2.182 The horrific nature of these events and the fearless actions of a father who in the face of overwhelming risk to his own life ran to the assistance of his dying son and whilst under sustained fire continued to provide what comfort he could during his final moments. It is beyond belief that Private U could witness such an incident and then neglect to include it in his initial description of the events witnessed by him that day. It is beyond all understanding that the event could be misrepresented in the manner described by U for no other apparent purpose other than to suggest that at least one of the deceased on the Barricade was killed by a civilian gunman.

Events not observed by Private U

18.7.2.183 Private U claimed not to have observed Kevin McElhinney shot as he crawled to towards the doorway of Block1. He was unable to explain how he could have failed to witness this despite the fact he must have been present when this happen Day 369/163/11 to Day 369/164/1. Similarly he claimed not to witness the shooting by Soldiers C and D from the pram ramp. He was unable to explain how he failed to see or hear this Day 369/164/2 to Day 369/164/11. He also was unable to explain how he failed to see the heated argument with Father Mulvey and Lieutenant N concerning the inhuman treatment of the denial of access to the bodies in the Mortar Platoon pig Day 369/166/18 to Day 369/167/12.

Missing Casualties

18.7.2.184 It is submitted that Private U never believed for one moment that the person he killed was not one of the thirteen bodies that were recovered. It is further contended that at no time did he inform any of his officers that “the person that I shot does not fit any of the known circumstances as to how people died that day”, or that “the body that I killed was spirited away and, therefore, we will never know the truth of what happened”. The witness confirmed that this was never a notion that struck him Day 369/175/18 to Day 369/176/6.

Loden Shot List

18.7.2.185 The witness said in evidence that he did not remember sitting in Major Loden’s pig at Clarence Avenue telling him about the “gunman” he shot. He was asked whether he had seen the shot list before (B2283.020) and the witness said that he had only seen it recently when consulting with the Treasury Solicitors. Counsel pointed out to him that his allegations of shooting the pistol man do not appear on the list and the witness said that he accepted that he had not told Major Loden about the circumstances in which he opened fire Day 369/179/25 to Day 369/183/10.

18.7.2.186 A final example of the inconsistent character of the evidence provided by U concerns the experiences described by him after these events. In both his statements to the RMP, U makes no reference to the fact that shooting allegedly continued for some time after the events described by him were over however in his statements to the Treasury Solicitor, U provides the following account:

“All this time I could hear sporadic firing from behind me in the direction of the forecourt of Rossville Flats. The firing was low velocity and high velocity. I heard no explosions.” B769

In his oral evidence in 1972, U stated that the shots heard by him were between twenty and thirty in number WT13.100 E.

18.7.2.187 It is submitted that this serves to demonstrate this witness’ willingness to adapt and expand upon evidence that he believes will serve to provide an impression of consistency among the soldiers. The willingness to lie in order to secure this objective is not only confined to U but represents a disregard for the truth which is shared by every soldier materially involved in the events of this day.

18.7.3.1 Anti-tank platoon were an 17 man platoon. They were deployed into Rossville Street in the last 2 Pigs to enter the Bogside, positioned behind the soft-skinned lorries occupied by Composite Platoon. The soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon were under the command of Lieutenant 119, who was in the first of the Anti–Tank Platoon Pigs, the Platoon Sergeant INQ 1694 was in the second of these Pigs.

18.7.3.2 It has proved virtually impossible to identify which Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers were present in which pig. If the evidence of each soldier on this issue was to be accepted, virtually every soldier was in the second pig with only a tiny minority identifying themselves as having been in the first Pig.

18.7.3.3 We do know that the first Anti-Tank Platoon Pig to enter the Bogside was commanded by Lieutenant 119 and driven by INQ 1581. The second Pig was commanded by Platoon Sergeant 1694 and appears to have been driven by L/Cpl 036.

18.7.3.4 Table 1 at Appendix 1 shows the occupants of each pig with their designated roles and their movements after debussing, as far as we can tell from their own evidence.

18.7.3.5 None of the evidence given by soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon sheds any light on the question of whether a proper order was given to go through Barrier 12. However, the evidence from a number of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon does shed light on the approach of Support Company to the arrest operation which was to be conducted.

18.7.3.6 Lieutenant 119 when asked about the operation “to control” rioters B1435 acknowledged that in reality by the time the Pigs entered Rossville Street there was little prospect of arresting anybody:

18.7.3.7 As appears from the Video and Photographic evidence by the time Anti-Tank Platoon debussed, rioters had dispersed from Barriers 12 and 14 and civil rights marchers were also running away from the Pigs down Rossville Street. If the objective was to prevent the march reaching the Guildhall and put a stop to rioting at the Barriers, the objective had been achieved before a single member of Support Company debussed.

18.7.3.8 Despite this the approach of Anti-Tank Platoon was to advance – advance – advance. As appears from Soldier J’s RMP statement Anti-Tank Platoon’s objective were in a continuous state of advance up Rossville Street. Day 370/111/23

B265 “We were tasked to advance along Rossville Street towards the Lecky Road. . . . As we advanced along Rossville Street . . . I was positioned on the right hand side of Rossville Street advancing near to Columbcille Court . . .” B266 “. . . my rifle which was cocked at the start of the advance . . . I then, accompanied by other members of my unit, advanced further along Rossville Street towards the barricade. . . . The advance was continued and the crowds from the barricade were dispersed.”

18.7.3.9 Or as Soldier J articulated in his statement to this Inquiry “The only way to clear an area is to move forward. You can’t stand still; you have to move on.” B289.004 paragraph 24

18.7.3.10 It is submitted that Anti-Tank Platoon’s approach to the arrest operation, demonstrates that by the time the Pigs halted in Rossville Street, if not before, the operation was not a genuine ‘arrest’ operation but was rather an organised attack or assault on the crowd of unarmed marchers. Which, in the case of Anti-Tank Platoon, involved shooting at fleeing civilians.

18.7.3.11 Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers have suffered an unusually high degree of collective amnesia about the events of Bloody Sunday, and most of these soldiers are unable now to state when and where their vehicles stopped. However the available evidence suggests that Anti-Tank Platoon “leapfrogged” Composite Platoon and were the first soldiers to take up position at the low wall at Kells Walk.

18.7.3.12 That this is the case is demonstrated by EP2.8 a photograph which shows Col. Wilford at Kells Walk. The evidence before the Tribunal is that the soldiers in that photograph are soldiers from Composite Platoon and that the photograph is taken at a point in time at which soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon have gone through to Glenfada Park. (See for example, B1752.016 paragraph 27 Lt. 119)

18.7.3.13 Given that Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the Kells Walk Wall first the group of soldiers at the lee of derelict buildings at the top of Rossville Street in P1116 would appear to be the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon. P1120 and P1121 show the arrival of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon at Kells Walk. As appears from these photographs soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon passed in front of Kells Walk and appeared to speak with Soldiers P and 017 before returning behind Kells Walk. Neither Soldiers P, nor 017, nor any of the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon has advanced an explanation for what occurred at that point.

18.7.3.14 Another major issue which arises in relation to the deployment of Anti-Tank Platoon is the segment of Video 48 V48/11.35 to 11.55 which shows what appears to be a full platoon of soldiers passing around the front of the Kells Walk Wall and deploying down Rossville Street in front of Kells Walk Wall.

18.7.3.15 The majority of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon claim not to have entered Glenfada Park North. By the time EP2.8 has been taken there would appear to be no Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers on Rossville Street, in line with the evidence from the photograph and the evidence of the soldiers who identify themselves in that photograph. There is moreover no evidence from photographs, actuality footage or evidence from witnesses before the Inquiry of any retreat by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon back up Rossville Street prior to the arrival of Composite Platoon at the Kells Walk Wall.

18.7.3.16 No soldier from Anti-Tank Platoon has ever provided an explanation for the actions portrayed in this video whether in 1972 or subsequently.

i) More soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon than have ever acknowledged the fact, left the low wall at Kells Walk and advanced down Rossville Street.

ii) They did so as a full Platoon, and not with a small group comprising 4 or slightly more soldiers leading the way.

iii) In advancing down Rossville Street they were totally exposed to the Rubble Barricade and clearly did not regard themselves as under any threat from persons behind the Rubble Barricade.

iv) Soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon as a body failed to give an account of their actions in this respect in 1972. It is submitted that this collective failure demonstrates that soldiers were involved in collusion designed to mask the truth of the actions of Anti-Tank Platoon on Bloody Sunday, particularly with regard to their deployment into Glenfada Park North. Of course Video 48 was not available to the Widgery Inquiry and soldiers did not envisage that video evidence would subsequently demonstrate the dishonesty of their accounts.

v)Soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, without exception, have failed to give this Inquiry an explanation as to what was happening, demonstrating that soldiers are continuing to try to prevent the Inquiry from establishing the truth of the actions of Anti-Tank Platoon in either Sector 3 or Sector 4.

18.7.3.18 The accounts given by the soldiers as to how, where and when they fired their shots, when they gave evidence to Lord Widgery, are summarised in a table appended to Inquiry Counsel Report No. 1. As we have previously noted it is unwise to place any reliance on these accounts. Firstly, because soldiers gave different accounts when they were first asked to account for their shooting to Major Loden and subsequently the Royal Military Police, and also because some of their accounts have changed further in their evidence to this Inquiry. For what they are worth, they are summarised below. This summary is confined to the shots claimed to have been fired by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon within Sector 3 and does not deal with shots fired by these soldiers in other Sectors.

18.7.3.19 Anti-Tank Platoon admit to having fired 44 shots[9] in total in sectors 3, 4, and 5. Of those shots it is claimed that a total of 13 were fired in Sector 3, 15 if Soldier G’s shots fired down the alleyway towards Glenfada Park North are included. However, if the account of soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon was to be accepted the majority of these shots were fired at a point in time after all of the civilian casualties in Sector 3 had been killed or injured.

18.7.3.20 Of the shots he claims to have fired in Sector 3 L/Corporal F claims to have fired only 1 of those shots over the Rubble Barricade, which shot accounted for the death of Michael Kelly. He claims to have fired a further 8 shots at 3 separate windows in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats at a point in time after Anti-Tank Platoon had returned to Rossville Street from Glenfada Park North and by which time all of the casualties in Sector 3 had been killed. Soldier G also claims to have fired 1 shot at window in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats at this time. In consequence 9 of the shots which soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon claim to have fired in Sector 3 were not, on their evidence fired over the Rubble Barricade and were, in any event, fired at a stage in the day when they could not account for the deaths or injuries sustained by civilian casualties at the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.21 Thus the shots claimed by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon which are capable of accounting for the deaths behind the Rubble Barricade total 6.[10] L/Corporal F eventually admitted to having fired a shot from behind the low wall at Kells Walk at a man behind the Rubble Barricade, who he claims was attempting to throw what he believed to be a nail bomb. We know that L/Corporal F killed Michael Kelly. Corporal G fired 2 shots at a gunman in the alleyway between Glenfada Park and Columbcille Court. Corporal E fired 1 shot from the low wall at Kells Walk at an alleged sniper in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. L/Corporal J fired 1 shot from the low wall at Kells Walk at someone he claimed to have believed to be throwing a nail bomb, however he claims to have missed his target. L/Corporal J fired a further shot from the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court at someone throwing a fizzing object from the s-w corner of Block 1.

18.7.3.22 Table 2 at Appendix 1 shows the soldiers who fired and their claims as to where they fired from, what and where they fired at, the number of shots they fired, by whom they were seen to fire, whether they struck their targets and the most likely victims. It will be submitted that it is evident from the inability of soldiers to account for the number of persons killed behind the Rubble Barricade that their accounts of the circumstances in which they fired cannot be accepted. What is noteworthy with regard to this Table is the fact that no soldier apparently is capable of identifying any soldier from Anti-Tank Platoon shooting over the Rubble Barricade at the time when civilians were shot and killed, with the sole exception of Soldier 027 whose account provides no justification for the shooting by Soldier F of Michael Kelly.

18.7.3.23 Table 3 Appendix 1 shows the accounts of the soldiers as to when they first heard shots.

18.7.3.24 Table 4 Appendix 1 suggests a possible order in which shots were fired by soldiers. Relying, as it does, on admittedly unreliable soldiers’ evidence, the contents of this table are highly speculative.

18.7.3.25 Table 5 Appendix 1 represents an attempt to provide a quick-reference tool which allows ready comparison of the accounts given by all the soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon about certain material matters, such as whether they saw any civilians with weapons or heard any nail bombs. It will be remembered that, in Counsel Report No.2, Jacob Grierson prepared a comprehensive table identifying the apparent discrepancies and inconsistencies between the different statements made by each soldier and in Counsel Report No.3 there is an attempt to compare the accounts offered by the different soldiers.

18.7.3.26 Finally, while it is proposed to deal with the individual soldiers considered most relevant, this section will be confined to dealing with Sector 3. The conduct of the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park will be addressed in Sector 4.

18.7.3.27 Lt 119 was the commanding officer of Anti-Tank Platoon. As such he is the commanding officer of the Platoon which on any account is responsible for the majority of the deaths and injuries which occurred on Bloody Sunday. Anti-Tank Platoon account for all of the deaths and injuries in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park, as well as for the deaths of Mickey Kelly, Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty[11]. In addition, although they deny responsibility it is evident that, along with Soldier P, soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon were responsible for the deaths of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash.

18.7.3.28 Even Lord Widgery found the conduct of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon to have “bordered on the reckless” and that their shooting in Glenfada Park was “without justification”.

18.7.3.29 In these circumstances serious questions arise for the commanding officer whose responsibility it was to exercise command and control over the conduct of the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon in the course of the operation.

18.7.3.30 In 1972 Lieutenant 119 made 3 statements about the events of Bloody Sunday, as well as giving evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. In his statement to this Inquiry he has stated that he wishes to:

“reiterate the difficulty that I now have between determining what I now remember and what I have subsequently learnt about Bloody Sunday, particularly given the period that has passed. Having said which I am confident that what I said in my various witness statements at the time and what I said to the Widgery Tribunal was accurate.” B1752.020 paragraph 47

18.7.3.31 The difficulty is that there are significant discrepancies between the various accounts given by Lt. 119 about the events of Bloody Sunday in the statements made by him in 1972.

18.7.3.32 Lt. 119’s first RMP statement was made on the 31^st January 1972. As Lt. 119 acknowledged in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry, it was made at a time when he had received reports about the actions of his troops and had made a report to Major Loden. Day 364/17/12 to Day 364/17/25 Inasmuch as it refers to Sector 3 he states that:

i) “We had been travelling down Rossville Street in the direction of Lecky Rd when the vehicles came under fire from the Rossville Flats and Glenfadda Flats. It was decided to debus and continue the advance on foot.” B1435

ii) “As we were advancing along the right hand side of Rossville Street my Pl came under fire from snipers concealed in the Glenfadda Flats.” B1435 The grid reference supplied GR 43201683 represents a position inside and to the south of the Glenfada Park North courtyard.

iii) “Under the command of ‘E’ and ‘F’ a number of my platoon entered a square, Columbcille Court .” B1435

18.7.3.33 Lt. 119 acknowledged in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry that, when making his first RMP statement, he would have understood the importance of providing any information to the RMP which would have justified the decisions made by his soldiers in opening fire. Day 374/19/9 to Day 374/19/22

18.7.3.34 Yet by the time he goes to make his second RMP statement on the 4^th February 1972 he adds some significant matters not mentioned at all in the first account he gave to the RMP, specifically:

i) Anti-Tank Platoon were advancing towards “the mob of rioters with the object of arresting as many as possible.” B1752.036

ii) As they advanced they “came under fire from at least two different directions”. B1752.036

iii) On reaching the Kells Walk Wall he “heard a number of shots, from what sounded like a pistol, and also from an M1 rifle.” He estimated that 7-10 rounds were fired in total and that they had “passed very close over our heads.” B1752.036

iv) He stated that the pistol was “located at ground level at the corner of Glenfada Park Flats” about 30 metres ahead and to his right and that he saw “muzzle flashes” although not the weapon. He speculated that the gunman was “aiming quickly around the corner of this building without exposing himself.” B1752.036

v) The M1 rifle was “located at one of the windows of Rossville Flats towards the Southern end and, probably on the top floor, and almost at the end of the building.” Again he was unable to see either the weapon or the person holding it but based his conclusion on his “experience and the noise of the report and rounds passing overhead.” B1752.037

vi) He then states that he “sent ‘E’ and ‘F’, together with a party of men around the right of Glenfada Park and sending for my vehicles at the same time for cover. When I had satisfied myself that the men in the open were now in cover I myself moved into Glenfada Park.” B1752.037

18.7.3.35 Thus as between Lt. 119’s RMP statement, inasmuch as they relate to Sector 3, there are the following discrepancies:

i) His first RMP statement describes coming under fire from a location within Glenfada Park North from which he could not have come under fire.

ii) In his first RMP statement he describes snipers (plural) firing from Glenfada Park North.

iii) He fails to describe a pistol man behind the Rubble Barricade and makes no reference to anyone firing from the Rossville Flats, in particular there is no reference to the use of an M1 carbine.

18.7.3.36 Lt. 119 then goes on to give a statement to the Treasury Solicitors in which he provides further information, which differs in material respects from his earlier accounts:

i) “I saw that the leading Platoon had come under fire. . . I was carrying an SLR and cocked it. I assume my men did the same. The sound of cocking is clearly audible and when the Commander cocks his weapon, his men will do the same.” B1752.043 paragraph 5

ii) The reason for sending men to Glenfada Park North was with the objective of cutting “off the gunmen by the Barricade.” B1752.044 paragraph 7

iii) “As soon as my vehicles were in a position to give us satisfactory cover from the fire from Block 1 I moved forward myself into Glenfada Park courtyard.” B1752.044 paragraph 7

18.7.3.37 Finally Lt. 119 gave evidence at the Widgery Tribunal in the course of which he stated as follows:

i) That he saw 3/4 strikes land close to the right-hand side of the Mortar Platoon’s vehicles. WT14.10E-F

ii) That 3/4 rounds passed overhead from the pistol located at the south east corner of Glenfada Park. WT14.12D-E

iv) That one soldier returned fire and that he was unable to identify that soldier. WT14.13C

v) That after they returned from Glenfada Park Soldiers F and G both left the vehicle with F at the front and G at the left hand side in response to the radio operator pointing out fire from Block 1 and that he saw F fire 2 shots. WT14.15D-E

18.7.3.38 There are significant and material discrepancies as between the various accounts given by Lt 119 in 1972. Specifically:

i) In his first statement he states in clear terms that the Pigs from his Platoon came under fire. When he deals with this subsequently he states that it was the lead Pig from Mortar Platoon which came under fire and that he saw 3/4 shots hit the ground on the right hand side of this Pig.

ii) In his first statement he states that once his Platoon began to advance up Rossville Street on foot they came under fire from snipers inside Glenfada Park. Aside from the fact that he could not have come under fire in Rossville Street from anyone located at the Grid reference which he provided, in his subsequent statement these snipers become, a pistol man at the mouth of Glenfada Park North and someone with an M1 carbine shooting from the top floor of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. There is no explanation for the fact that in his first statement the snipers can be found at the same location, while in his second they are coming under fire from “two different directions”. Moreover there is no explanation for the omission of the detail about the types of weapon being used in the first statement.

iii) The first occasion in which he describes a soldier as having fired a shot from the Kells Walk Wall is during the course of his oral testimony to Lord Widgery, he does not refer to this in any of his written statements.

18.7.3.39 Given that Lt 119 now contends that he has no real memory of what occurred and relies upon his 1972 account as accurate the question is which of the varying accounts he has given, if any, should be accepted by the Tribunal.

18.7.3.40 The second difficulty which arises from Lt. 119’s reliance on his 1972 accounts is that some of the accounts are patently and demonstrably untrue as was clearly established in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry.

18.7.3.41 The first example of Lt. 119’s evidence being untrue relates to his contention that the Mortar Platoon Pigs came under fire. As dealt with previously, in Lt. 119’s original account it was the Pigs from his own Platoon which came under fire, significantly, no other member of Anti-Tank Platoon, apart from Soldier H has ever contended that their Pigs came under fire as they entered Rossville Street.

18.7.3.42 Since making his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Lt. 119 has consistently made the case that it was the lead Pig in Mortar Platoon which came under fire and that he saw 3/4 shots hit the ground on the right hand side of the lead Pig. In his evidence to this Inquiry he has stated that “I still have a snapshot of one of those rounds”. Day 363/121/19 to Day 353/121/20

18.7.3.43 The difficulty for Lt. 119 is that EP29.3 which is a still from the heli-tele shows clearly that while the second pig of Mortar Platoon was quite close to the first pig “there was a sizeable gap between the second Pig and the next following vehicle which would have been Major Loden’s command vehicle.” Day 363/122/8 to Day 363/122/12

18.7.3.44 Video 48 also demonstrates that “the command vehicle is some way behind the second Mortar Platoon Pig and the Ferret is some way behind the command vehicle, apparently at a time when the fist Pig of Mortar Platoon has turned off and then behind the Ferret car are the two Pigs of the Machine-Gun Platoon and then there is the two lorries and then there is the two Pigs of your own Platoon.” Day 363/122/24 to Day 363/123/6

18.7.3.45 It was thus clearly demonstrated, through the photographic evidence, and the actuality footage, that Lt. 119 could not have seen the Mortar Platoon Pig come under fire from his location in the first of the Anti-Tank Platoon Pigs. The only conclusion can be that he lied about this in order to provide some justification for the subsequent actions of soldiers in his Platoon involved in the use of lethal force. It is not without significance that he made the case that the fire came from the Rossville Flats in circumstances where soldiers from his Platoon apparently fired a large number of rounds at persons in the Rossville Flats whom they alleged were using weapons against military personnel.

18.7.3.46 The issue is significant not merely because it demonstrates that Lt. 119 was lying about what occurred on Bloody Sunday from the very outset of the engagement, but also because it provided the justification for Lt. 119 and the other soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon to cock their rifles.

18.7.3.47 It is submitted that even had his evidence been truthful in relation to witnessing Mortar Platoon come under fire, the decision to cock rifles was in breach of the Yellow Card.

“As we passed through . . . I saw that the leading Platoon had come under fire. When hostile fire is observed it is the practice to cock weapons without further order. I was carrying an SLR and cocked it. I assume my men did the same. The sound of cocking is clearly audible and when the commander cocks his weapon his men will do the same.” B1752.043 Paragraph 5

“A. Having observed that they were under fire I cocked my weapon as I de-bussed. I had an SLR, sir.”

“Q. Of course, when the Platoon Commander cocks his weapon, is it right that the others do as well? A. Yes sir, that is right.

18.7.3.51 The action taken by Lt 119 and the soldiers in his Pig in cocking their weapons was therefore contrary to the yellow card, even had Lt. 119 seen the Mortar Platoon Pigs come under fire. He was not of sufficient rank to authorise his men to cock their rifles and his men were not entitled to cock their rifles simply because their Platoon Commander did so. In reality of course Lt. 119 could not see any gunmen and was not “about to open fire”.

18.7.3.52 It is unclear whether Lieutenant 119 failed to understand the limitations placed by the Yellow Card or simply disregarded it. The fact that he defended his actions by reference to the Yellow Card suggests the former rather than the latter. However, given the reliance placed by more senior officers on the Yellow Card as controlling the circumstances in which lethal force would be used by soldiers on the ground, Lt 119’s apparent confusion as to what was permitted raises major issues. If a Platoon commander and the men of his Platoon were interpreting the Yellow Card as authorising them to cock their rifles in circumstances where they were not so authorised it undermines the effectiveness of the Yellow Card as a method of preventing unlawful use of force. It also raises the question of the extent to which more senior officers, at least within 1 Para, and apparently throughout Northern Ireland, failed to take steps to ensure that soldiers did not use lethal force except as permitted by law.

18.7.3.53 The decision of Lt 119 and the men of his Platoon to cock their rifles, even prior to debussing is also significant in that it illustrates the mindset of Anti-Tank Platoon on Bloody Sunday. A mindset in which there was a total disregard for the limitations placed on the use of lethal force by the Yellow Card and a willingness and eagerness to engage in the use of lethal force should the opportunity arise. An eagerness which went far beyond the use of lethal force in circumstances where soldiers believed themselves to be justified and which ended with the killing and wounding of unarmed civilians fleeing from the soldiers.

18.7.3.54 Lt. 119’s evidence is that after they debussed and as they advanced up the right hand side of Rossville Street they came under fire. We have already addressed the discrepancies between Lt. 119’s various accounts as to where they came under fire and from and by what weapons.

18.7.3.55 According to Lt. 119 it was the fact of being under fire which resulted in the decision to seek cover at the Kells Walk Wall. However Lt. 119 is unable to provide any explanation for the scene shown in photograph EP27.6 which shows “an obvious and substantial gap with nothing going on, between the convoy of vehicles at the north of Rossville Street and a group of 40 or 50 people standing up behind the rubble barricade”. Day 363/126/1 to Day 363/126/6

18.7.3.56 Lt. 119 states that he was one of the first to debus and one of the first to arrive at the low wall at Kells Walk. B1752.015 paragraph 27 Thus on his own evidence Lt. 119 would have been among the first, if not the first, soldier from his Platoon to arrive at this location. He was also the officer in charge, and thus responsible for decisions with regard to deployment. At the time he arrived Soldiers P and 017 were already positioned in front of the Kells Walk Wall on Rossville Street. Despite this Lt. 119 has never given an account, either in 1972 or subsequently, to explain what was happening in photographs P1119 and P1120 where members of his Platoon advanced forward of the Kells Walk Wall and were involved in communication with Soldiers P and 017.

i) They demonstrate that there was communication between Anti-Tank Platoon and Soldiers P and 017, in circumstances where a reading of their statements would suggest that they were not even aware of each other.[13]

ii) The photographs contradict the evidence of Lt. 119 to the effect that Anti-Tank Platoon were coming under fire as they advanced down Rossville Street in that soldiers were able to move forward of the low wall without cover.

iii) At no stage does it appear that Soldiers P and 017 required cover from the Kells Walk Wall, moreover their location provided no cover from any fire directed from the Rossville Flats, undermining entirely Lt. 119’s suggestion of a gunman with an M1 carbine.

18.7.3.58 Lt. 119 has moreover never provided an account of the actions of P and 017 in circumstances where we know that Soldier P fired at least 9 shots down Rossville Street and 017 discharged a number of baton rounds.

18.7.3.59 Lt. 119 also failed to see any of the targets whom his soldiers claim to have fired at, nor any of the nail bombs apparently thrown down Rossville Street and seen by Soldier J.[14]

18.7.3.60 According to Lt. 119 he was aware of only one soldier from his platoon firing a shot from the Kells Walk Wall and that shot was fired in the direction of the pistol man behind the Rubble Barricade. He has never identified the soldier in question.

18.7.3.61 His explanation for having been aware of only one shot, in circumstances where even on the account of Anti-Tank Platoon there were 3 shots, was that there were “A lot of other things going on at the same time.” When asked what other things he replied “just the general situation”. Day 363/137/6 to Day 363/137/14 That general situation was one in which Soldier P fired 9 shots, Soldier 017 was firing baton rounds, and at least 3, and probably more live rounds were fired by Anti-Tank Platoon and 4 young men were shot and killed behind the Rubble Barricade. Yet Lt. 119 missed all of those events, and cannot state beyond a reference to the “general situation”, what it was that would have prevented him from seeing or hearing what was occurring around him, in circumstances where his platoon were in his immediate vicinity and he was ostensibly in control of their actions.

18.7.3.62 Of the 3 soldiers from his platoon who admit an involvement in shooting from behind the Kells Walk Wall, none of them claims to have fired at a man with a pistol. Soldiers F and J who admit shooting over the Rubble Barricade claim that their targets were nail-bombers, while Soldier E who shot in the direction of the Rossville Flats claims to have shot a gunman with a Luger machine pistol.

18.7.3.63 While Soldier P does claim to have fired at a man with a pistol behind the Rubble Barricade, there are a number of discrepancies between his account and that of Lt 119:

i) Soldier P fired 4 shots and was positioned in front of the Kells Walk Wall when he fired his shots, whereas Lt 119 claims that it was a soldier from his Platoon who fired 1 shot and was positioned behind the Kells Walk Wall.

ii) Soldier P’s pistol man was crouching behind the Rubble Barricade while Lt. 119’s target was apparently firing from the south-east corner of Glenfada Park North and “aiming quickly around the corner of this building without exposing himself.” B1752.036

iii) Most significantly however Soldier P claims to have hit his target while the pistol man identified by Lt. 119 could not have been killed because it is the existence of that pistol man which provides the justification for the movement of Anti-Tank Platoon into Glenfada Park North.

18.7.3.64 According to Lieutenant 119 the decision to advance into Glenfada Park North was in order to cut off the pistol man behind the Rubble Barricade. B1252.044 paragraph 7

18.7.3.65 His evidence is that he initially sent ‘some’ of his men, including Soldiers E and F into Glenfada Park North, while at the same time sending a runner back to the Anti-Tank Platoon vehicles to bring them forward to provide cover to allow the remainder of his platoon to advance.

“To cover us from fire from Block 1 I sent a runner to order up our vehicles to give us cover on the road. I then ordered some men forward into the courtyard of Glenfadda Park, hoping to cut off the gunmen by the barricade. As soon as my vehicles were in a position to give us satisfactory cover from the fire from Block 1 I moved forward myself into Glenfada Park courtyard.” B1752.044 paragraph 7 See also B1752.037

18.7.3.66 However photographs and actuality footage demonstrate that this account is patently untrue.

18.7.3.67 In the first instance V48/11.35 to 11.55 demonstrates that virtually every member of Anti-Tank Platoon advances forward of the Kells Walk Wall as a unit, the numbers advancing are approximately 17, the number of men in Anti-Tank Platoon, and it is clear that there is not at that time, nor has there been, any advance party. Whether or not they all eventually entered Glenfada Park North, all of Anti-Tank Platoon moved forward down Rossville Street together.

18.7.3.68 It is also clear that members of Anti-Tank Platoon did not wait to be provided with cover from vehicles prior to advancing up Rossville Street. V48/11.35 to 11.55 not only demonstrates that Anti-Tank Platoon moved as a unit, but they did so in the absence of cover and no vehicles had been brought forward when they moved. EP2.8 moreover demonstrates that, at a point in time after Anti-Tank Platoon had left the Kells Walk Wall their vehicles had still not been brought forward.

18.7.3.69 The evidence is also inconsistent with the evidence of Soldier 147. According to Soldier 147 the reason he remained with the vehicle was in order to take messages or to move the armoured vehicle to another position if ordered to do so. B1889 If Soldier 147 is correct, Lieutenant 119 had no need to send a runner back to the vehicles, he could simply have radioed Soldier 147 who was waiting in the vehicle for that very order.

18.7.3.70 It is contended that the evidence given by Lt. 119 that he had to wait for cover before advancing into Glenfada Park North is patently untrue and was advanced for the following reasons:

i) To perpetuate the suggestion that his soldiers were under fire from the Rubble Barricade and Rossville Flats and thus in need of cover. In this way Lt 119 sought to provide some justification for the decisions made by soldiers in his platoon to open fire.

ii) At the same time Lt 119 sought to distance himself from the movement by Soldiers E, F, G and H into Glenfada Park North and thus to distance himself from the murders carried out by his Platoon in that courtyard. Or as it was put by Counsel acting on behalf of the families what he was “looking for was an explanation as to how you as the commander of a platoon had failed to see the actions of that platoon and their conduct in Glenfada Park” Day 364/38/1 to Day 364/38/5

18.7.3.71 Soldier 027, Anti-Tank Platoon’s radio operator, has made a number of serious allegations against Lt. 119 and other members of Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.7.3.72 He contends that at a briefing held the night before they went to Derry Lt. 119 said to his platoon “lets teach those buggers a lesson – we want some kills tomorrow”. Lt. 119 denies that suggestion.

18.7.3.73 In relation to the events at the Kells Walk Wall he alleges that soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, and specifically F, G and INQ 635, opened fire in the direction of the Rubble Barricade and fired a substantial number of rounds, killing people behind the Rubble Barricade. He maintains that he could not see targets behind the Rubble Barricade. This allegation is also denied by Lt 119.

18.7.3.74 It is accepted that Soldier 027 was a witness prone to hyperbole and that he has since qualified the allegations contained in the document prepared by him in 1975. Nonetheless it is the case that the account given by Lt 119 is riddled with inconsistencies and lies. The same is true of the accounts given by other soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon and the Mortar Platoon soldiers on Rossville Street. These accounts fail entirely to explain how John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash met their deaths, in circumstances where they were killed by soldiers firing down Rossville Street at the time Anti-Tank Platoon and Soldiers P and U were positioned on Rossville Street.

18.7.3.75 Moreover the account of how Michael Kelly met his death was advanced at an extremely late stage in proceedings and at a time after it had been established that a bullet from Soldier F’s gun had killed Michael Kelly.

18.7.3.76 In neither the evidence presented to the Widgery Inquiry, nor the evidence presented to this Tribunal have soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon told the truth about the extent of the shooting from Kells Walk to the Rubble Barricade. In reality while the account given by Soldier 027 has undoubtedly been exaggerated it is probably as close to the truth as this Tribunal has heard.

18.7.3.77 Certainly soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon fired more rounds from the Rubble Barricade than they have admitted, they fired them at unarmed civilians and they fired them in circumstances in which they feel unable to justify their use of lethal force.

18.7.3.78 Lt 119 gave evidence to this Inquiry that in circumstances where Anti-Tank Platoon could have been responsible for the deaths of 11 people and seriously wounding 7 others, people who it is accepted were unarmed, his “command and control on [Bloody Sunday] was . . . as it should be”. Day 364/11/8 to Day 364/11/11

18.7.3.79 There is some evidence before the Tribunal that Lt 119 did not in fact command the respect of his troops and did not have sufficient authority to exercise command and control over soldiers in his Platoon and in particular some of the more senior NCOs such as Soldiers F.

18.7.3.80 INQ 1253 gave evidence to this Inquiry that he had spoken to Lt 119 shortly after Bloody Sunday and that as a result of that conversation he had got “the impression that it was troops whom he had commanded who were described as "out of control" and running ahead of him and being frightened?” Day 304/6/20 to Day 304/6/29 Or as he stated under questioning from Lt 119’s counsel

“I think he was concerned that he had been responsible for these soldiers and had found it difficult to control them and everything else because of the circumstances on the day. He felt that it -- I am not going to say that he felt it was unmanageable; he just felt that -- that there was something wrong on that day.” Day 304/13/4 to Day 304/13/9

18.7.3.81 There is some confusion in INQ 1253’s account as to whether the troops being referred to by Lt 119 were soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon or soldiers from Composite Platoon, in that INQ 1253’s impression was that the soldiers being referred to were soldiers from Headquarters but that they were under the command of Lt 119.

18.7.3.82 Another possible explanation for the confusion may be the fact that at least one of the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon and a soldier in respect of whom Lt 119 has been expressly critical, had only recently come from Headquarters, Soldier H.

18.7.3.83 Soldier 018, a member of Anti-Tank Platoon has also made a statement which would again suggest that Lt 119 was unable to exert the level of control required of a Platoon commander, or at least the Platoon commander of Anti-Tank Platoon of 1 Para which appears to have been somewhat dominated by figures such as F and G. Soldier 018 describes Lt. 119 as a

“young chap who had not long passed his officer training course. It may have been his first command of a platoon. He came with his own ideas and vision of what he wanted and, initially, he did not gel with the other men in the Platoon. However, he did mellow after a while, this may have been because the NCO’s in other platoons had a word with him.” B1489 paragraph 6

18.7.3.84 On the evidence before this Tribunal about the conduct of Anti-Tank Platoon on Bloody Sunday, it is clear that those soldiers were either: operating completely beyond the control of Lt 119, or that Lt 119 was in fact in control and that soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon were out to “get some kills” on Bloody Sunday.

18.7.3.85 What is clear is that the photographic and actuality footage demonstrates that:

i) Lt 119 must have witnessed the killings at the Rubble Barricade, whether they were carried out by Anti-Tank Platoon, or a combination of Anti-Tank Platoon and soldiers from Mortar Platoon.

ii) Lt 119 has been demonstrably dishonest in his account of what happened on Bloody Sunday and that dishonesty has had as its objective the provision of some justification for the actions of his soldiers in using lethal force, while distancing Lt 119 from the use of lethal force.

18.7.3.86 It is contended that Lt 119, was at the very minimum a witness to the use of unjustified lethal force against unarmed civilians behind the Rubble Barricade. That he witnessed the murder of Michael Kelly, John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash by soldiers of 1 Para, some of whom were members of his own Platoon, and that he has since that time participated in a criminal conspiracy to cover up the events of that day and the murder of innocent civilians by soldiers under his command.

18.7.3.87 Significantly, despite the fact that soldiers from his Platoon were expressly criticised by Lord Widgery for firing without justification, neither Lieutenant 119, nor any of the soldiers identified as being involved in that shooting, suffered any detriment to their career within the military.

18.7.3.88 Soldier F made a number of statements to the RMP which he confirmed that he had signed. His statements to the RMP appear at B121 to B133 and ARR46.5 and ARR46.6.

Soldier F’s first statement to the Royal Military police was recorded at 2.04 hours on 31 January 1972. In summary he stated as follows:

(i) They deployed in pairs with himself working with “G”. They advanced along Rossville Street towards the Rossville Flats where numerous rioters were located. He was armed with an SLR loaded with a magazine of 20 rounds. When they deployed he started to advance, he cocked his weapon with one round in the breech. The safety catch was on safe. B121.

(ii) They advanced about 30 yards and came under sniper fire which sounded like rifle fire. These shots came from the direction of Rossville flats. They were too far from the flats to pinpoint the gunmen at this stage. B121.

(iii) They continued to advance and got nearer the flats and he could see that there was a barricade across the street at the far end of the flats. He estimated that there were about 200 rioters in the area at that time. These rioters were throwing stones, bottles and other missiles at them and other troops as they advanced. He saw at least 2 nail bombs explode as they advanced. B121.

(iv) They took up position behind a wall on the right hand side of Rossville Street about 40 yards short of the Rossville Flats. They again came under sniper fire from the flats. He estimated that this gunfire was coming from the second floor of the flats and the third window along. He fired three aimed shots at this window and saw all three shots strike the windows. B121, B122.

(v) After these shots the sniper fire stopped and he saw about 30 – 40 rioters leave the barricade and go to the right behind the block of flats out of their sight. B122.

(vi) They then moved right to Glenfada Park where he saw a man light something. He saw it fizzle and spark and realised it was some form of bomb. The man raised his arm as if to throw the bomb. He fired two aimed shots at the man. The first shot struck him in the shoulder and the second struck him in the stomach. The bomb did not explode. By this time other members of his unit had joined them and they had advanced towards the rioters. The rioters dispersed. B122.

(vii) The remainder of his team gave him cover and he checked around the corner of the building. Around this corner he saw huddled against the wall about 20 people including 19 men and 1 woman. He called the remainder of his team and they arrested the 20 people. They then escorted these prisoners back towards Rossville Street covering each other as they moved back. By this time they were ordered to join their vehicles which were now near the Rossville Flats. They had handed the prisoners they had arrested over to the Military Police. B122.

(viii) They got into their vehicles and stayed in that position for a couple of minutes when the Radio Operator said, “There’s a sniper up on the flats ”. Soldier F jumped out of the vehicle and took up a firing position beside the vehicle. The Radio Operator told him where he had seen the gunman and he saw something move in the window. He fired approximately four aimed shots into the window and saw all four shots strike the area of the window. He changed position to near the vehicle parked in front of theirs. At this time a man appeared in a window in the second from the top floor of the flats. He had a rifle and fired two shots at them. Soldier F then fired four aimed shots at this man and saw the four shots strike the area of the window. He did not know if he hit the gunman or not. After about 10 minutes they withdrew from the area. B122, B123.

18.7.3.89 Soldier F’s second statement to the Royal Military Police appears at B126. This statement was made at 14.10 hours on 31^st January 1972.

(i) This statement described being shown a collection of photographs by Corporal Brobson of the SIB. He selected two photographs marked Donaghy showing two positions of a male dressed in a denim jacket and trousers with a wound to his left side. He stated that he was reasonably sure that he shot this man at a full-scale riot in the Glenfada Flats on 30^th January 1972 for being in possession of nail bombs. B126.

18.7.3.90 Soldier F’s third statement to the Royal Military Police appears at B129. This statement is undated but confirmed by Soldier F as having been made on 4 February 1972. In summary he stated that:

(i) At about 1610 hours he was positioned near the junction of Rossville Street and William Street where they had debussed. They deployed to the west of Rossville Street and moved southwards on some waste ground. They came under fire from a gunman who was south of his position but he was unable to locate him. He saw three men move from the barricade north-west into the area of Glenfada Park Flats. One of the men was carrying what looked like a rifle. B129.

(ii) Himself and Soldier G ran down an alleyway and came into a square formed by three blocks of flats and a block of garages. They were positioned at the end of the garages at about 50 metres west of the northwest corner of block 1 of Rossville Flats. He saw three men on the other side of the square about 30 metres away near to 24 Glenfada Park, south west of their position. He shot and hit one man as he attempted to throw an object which looked like a nail bomb. He saw Soldier G fire and hit another of the men who was carrying what appeared to be a rifle. The third man ran off but he believed he was engaged by another soldier. He did not see this engagement. B129.

(iii) They were ordered to remount their vehicles and withdrew. The vehicles were positioned level with the northeast wall of block 1 of Rossville Flats facing south down Rossville Street. As they entered the vehicles three shots were fired at them from a window on the second floor of block 1. The window was about the fifth from the southern end of the flats. The shots passed high over their vehicles. He returned two rounds at the gunman and he saw Soldier G return one shot. He saw all three bullets strike the windows. He could not say if the gunman was hit. B130.

(iv) He did not search the dead, wounded or arrested persons. The orders for firing were to fire when ordered or if the situation was covered by the yellow card issued to troops on IS duties in Northern Ireland. B130.

18.7.3.91 Soldier F’s fourth statement to the Royal Military Police appears at B132 and was taken on 15 February 1972 at 1600 hours. A version of this statement is to be found at B167.034. In summary he dealt with arrests and stated as follows:

(i) During the course of the afternoon of 30^th January 1972 he observed a group of rioters in Rossville Street in the vicinity of the barricade. He particularly observed four of this crowd and made a mental note of them. They were throwing stones and bottles at Soldier F and his colleagues. B132.

(ii) At about 1900 hours on 30^th January 1972 he went to Fort George to try and identify some of the rioters he had previously seen. On his arrival he saw a large group of about 20 persons sitting or standing in a wire enclosure. He observed them and picked out four men as the ones he had previously seen attacking them with missiles in Rossville Street. He was photographed with these men for identification and their names were Bradley, Norrice, O’Keefe and McAllion. B132.

(iii) When he spoke to O’Keefe at Fort George O’Keefe told him he was a priest or part time priest. He was not wearing a clerical collar, which Soldier F thought odd. He did not address any remarks to O’Keefe concerning the clothing and he emphatically denied asking him “where is your fucking collar” as had been alleged by certain newspapers. B132.

(iv) After he identified the four persons mentioned above he took them to one side and waited for his turn to be photographed and documented. He allowed them to stand at ease one behind the other and to keep their hands behind their backs. They were not placed against a wall at any stage. B132.

(v) At about 1910 hours approximately he was processed with his four prisoners. Other members of the regiment were also with their prisoners waiting to be processed. B132.

(vi) He then dealt with allegations in connection with his treatment of two prisoners, namely McLoughlin and Liddy which he stated appeared in an article he had been shown in the Sunday Independent dated 6^th February 1972. B167.034. He did not know either of these men, neither did he arrest them. He emphatically denied that he made these men expose themselves at the heat of a stove for half an hour. In fact he did not see any stoves at the detention centre. He did not strike any prisoner at any stage and he certainly did not use a rail and rubber hose pipe to assault any witnesses. The allegation that he spat into Mr McLaughlin’s mouth was completely unfounded and without a shred of truth. B133.

(vii) At no time did he ill-treat any of the prisoners. Neither did he see any ill- treatment of any prisoners at this time. The senior NCO of the Coldstream Guards was at the detention centre, as was a Warrant Officer II. He did not speak to him concerning ill treatment of prisoners, neither did anyone warn Soldier F that one of his prisoners could have a heart attack as a result of any such alleged treatment. This was a completely untrue allegation. B133.

(viii) He made two further statements concerning arrests which are at ARR46.5 and ARR46.6.

18.7.3.92 It is submitted that the actions of soldiers, including Soldier F, towards persons in their custody at Glenfada Park North and later Soldier F at Fort George, showed a propensity for physical and verbal abuse towards civilians. Soldier F also demonstrated himself to be capable of gratuitous violence and torture.[15] In addition he was prepared to sign statements and forms concerning arrests which were completely untrue and he continued to lie about his activities in his fourth RMP statement.

18.7.3.93 It is submitted that Soldier F participated in no less than four false identifications of alleged rioters at Fort George picking people out as rioters and falsifying the reasons for their arrest. These matters were put to him at Day 375/152/11 to Day 375/164/16. He relied on a stock answer of not recollecting events described in the documentation he had appended his signature to. However his activity at Fort George demonstrated his personal capacity for sustained lying both orally and in writing. Soldier F must have been told to attend Fort George to make identifications by his army superiors since it is clear that Soldier F not only lied about making a mental note of the four people rioting earlier on Rossville Street, but hadn't actually arrested anybody. Those in charge of Anti-Tank Platoon and Support Company must have been aware at a later stage that Soldier F did not make the arrests he claimed to have done given the nature of the deployment on the day. It was put to him at Day 376/42/7 to Day 376/42/13 that the four statements[16] he made regarding the relevant arrestees which he had signed and declared to be true were, in fact, completely false. He replied:

In examination at this Inquiry when he was not relying on failing to remember events described in arrest documents and statements he showed himself to be an unreliable and utterly untruthful witness. When Counsel for the families questioned him on an article from a newspaper[17] which included mention of him as a Paratrooper responsible for brutality towards prisoners he denied that any article in which his name appeared had been drawn to his attention at any stage. He declared himself “positive” about this. Day 376/36/6 to Day 376/36/11. It was then pointed out to him that in his fourth RMP statement in 1972 he had mentioned at 167.034 that he had been shown a newspaper article about his treatment of prisoners. It may also be illustrative to point out that at 167.033 he also mentioned allegations against him “by certain newspapers”. When Counsel pointed out to him that his previous answer was thus clearly untrue he replied:

“ If you put it in that context, it probably was, yes.” Day 376/37/16 to Day 376/37/19.

18.7.3.94 Following Soldier F’s four statements to the Royal Military Police he made a statement on 19^th February 1972 to Lieutenant Colonel H Overbury at Lisburn Barracks. This statement appears at B135 and can be summarised as follows:

(i) After they first left their vehicles in the Rossville Flats area they did not, as he said earlier, fire at a window in the Rossville Flats. He fired these shots later.

(ii) He did however fire. He aimed a round at a man he saw behind the barricade about 40 yards from him who was about to throw a bomb. This was a large object and he saw sparks coming from it. As he said earlier, two nail bombs had earlier exploded near them as they moved towards the Rossville flats. B135.

(iii) When he moved with Soldier G into Glenfada Park he fired two rounds as he said earlier at another man who was about to throw a bomb. The object in the man’s hand was definitely a bomb because it was fizzing. Immediately after this Soldier F ran along the eastern wall of Glenfada Park to the corner. As he did so he heard pistol shots coming from the area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville Flats. He shouted “there’s a gunman” and he dropped to one knee and took an aim position. He saw a man near the wall facing his direction who turned as if to run. He saw he had an object in his hand. This man was the only person in the area from which gunfire had come. The object in his hand was large and black like an automatic pistol. He fired two rounds at this man and he fell to the ground. B135.

(iv) He then saw 20 people, 19 men and 1 woman standing near him huddled together at the end of the flats at Glenfada Park. He arrested these people with others including Soldier G who came up. B135.

(v) After he had returned to his vehicle and come under fire again as he described earlier, he fired three shots at the second floor window of the Rossville Flats. He also fired a further five rounds at men firing in his direction from the windows of Rossville Flats. He said he could work out the number of rounds he fired on the last two occasions from the ammunition check he made very shortly afterwards when he counted seven rounds left in his magazine. He was certain that he fired one round at the nail bomber at the barricade, two rounds at the nail bomber in Glenfada Park, two rounds at the gunman at the end of Rossville Flats and three rounds at the window of the second floor of the Rossville Flats. The remaining five rounds he fired on two separate occasions at different windows at the Rossville Flats. On each occasion he saw a man with a rifle who had on each occasion fired in their direction. At no time did he fire except aimed shots at the person who was attacking them. B135.

18.7.3.95 Soldier F gave a statement to the Treasury Solicitors which appears at B137 and can be summarised as follows:

(i) He claimed to be armed with an SLR and 20 rounds. (This suggestion may be contrasted with what he later came to tell Lord Widgery at WT14.45 B-C.) As soon as they left the vehicles on the junction of William Street, Little James Street and Rossville Street he heard shots coming from the direction of Rossville Flats. He then cocked his rifle which is the normal procedure on hearing firing. They then took cover in front of a wall at the north west side of Rossville Street near the William Street junction to weigh up the position. He saw explosions in Rossville Street near the north end of Rossville Flats. B137.

(ii) Together with Soldier G they moved off in the direction of the barricade in Rossville Street in order to make arrests. They worked in pairs to cover each other. There was a big crowd of about 200 people running away from them, some towards the barricade. Firing was taking place from the Rossville Flats and he was reasonably sure this was small, automatic fire. This fire was directed to his left. They took cover behind the wall at the south end of the low rise flats on the west side of Rossville Street in front of Columbcille Court. B137. It is notable that it is only in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement that Soldier F mentioned “automatic” fire for the first time. He could not explain this when asked why it did not appear in his RMP statements. Day 375/169/15 to Day 375/169/19. It may be the case that it was suggested to Soldier F that Soldier G had talked of automatic fire in his statements and that Soldier F simply agreed with this proposition.

(iii) He then observed a number of people behind the barricade. One of them was attempting to throw what looked like a bomb which was in his hand. It was fizzing. Soldier F had seen nail bombs before and he was in no doubt that this was one. He fired one aimed shot and the person fell. The bomb did not explode. He did not see what happened to it. Then he saw three men leave the barricade. One was carrying a rifle and they moved to the right in the direction of Glenfada Park. B137.

(iv) Himself and Soldier G moved around the side wall to the right and into Glenfada Park in order to cut their retreat off. As they entered Glenfada Park the three men were directly in front of them on the far side. One of them turned and was about to throw what appeared to be a bomb (because it was fizzing) in their direction. Himself and Soldier G dropped down on one knee. He took an aimed shot. The first shot seemed to hit the man at the bottom of his shoulder, the second in the chest. The man fell to the ground. B137.

(v) He then asked Soldier G to cover him as he heard pistol shots in the direction of Rossville Flats. He approached the southeast corner of Glenfada Park. He got down on one knee. He observed a man with a pistol at the far end of Rossville Flats. He thought the man was wearing darkish clothes. The man had a black object which looked like a pistol in his hand. He then shouted to Soldier G “there’s a gunman down here” and took two aimed shots and the man fell to the ground. The man was in a half crouching position moving to the right as he shot him. B138.

(vi) He then observed, in the position where he was, about 20 people (19 men and 1 woman) huddled against the side of a wall at the south end of the western block of Glenfada Park. He shouted to Soldier G to assist him in arresting these people. They then ushered them back through the rear of Glenfada Park into Columbcille Court and he saw soldiers taking them off. B138.

(vii) They were then ordered to withdraw back to their vehicles and they went back to the vehicles, which had moved to Rossville Street level to the end of Rossville Flats on the west side of the street. They got into the vehicles. They were checking that nobody was missing and then awaited further orders. By this time the Radio Operator was observing the Rossville Flats out of one of the windows of the vehicle and observed a gunman in the flats. B138.

(viii) Soldier F jumped out of the vehicle and ran to the front of the vehicle and asked the Radio Operator where the gunman was. The Radio Operator indicated where the gunman was and Soldier F fired three rounds in the direction of the window where the Radio Operator pointed out and where Soldier F saw a movement. He saw all of his shots strike a window. It was a second floor window. B138.

(ix) He then moved forward to the front of the vehicle and observed the flats. He spotted a man with a rifle at the same window and he fired three rounds at this window. B138.

(x) He then saw a gunman appearing in the top floor of Rossville Flats. He had a rifle. He saw the rifle fire. Soldier F then fired two rounds at the window. He did not know whether he had hit him or not. B138.

(xi) After this time everything went quiet and they moved around the side of Rossville Flats. He then checked his magazine and found he had seven rounds left. His platoon waited for about ten minutes for further orders and they were then ordered to move back to the waste ground between William Street and Prince Arthur Street. They did so. They then left the area. B138.

(xii) Soldier F confirmed that he made two statements on 31^st January 1972 regarding the events of 30^th January 1972. He stated these were statements taken in the early hours of the morning and furthermore this was his first operation in the area. Having seen aerial photographs of the area, he now realised some of the positions he gave in these statements were not accurate. He was now satisfied he had a clear understanding of the positions he took up that afternoon. B138.001.

(xiii) He also said he was reasonably sure he had shot a person whose photographs were shown to him called Donaghy. He stated that he shot this person in Glenfada Park. Having seen further photographs of Donaghy he was still reasonably satisfied that he was the person he shot because he bore a close resemblance. B138.001.

18.7.3.96 In his first RMP statement Soldier F described their deployment and advance along Rossville Street towards Rossville Flats where numerous rioters were located. He stated that when he deployed and started to advance he cocked his weapon with one round in the breech. The safety catch was on safe. He then described advancing 30 yards where he came under sniper fire which sounded like rifle fire. It is clear that Soldier F had his weapon cocked with a live round in the breech at a time when there was no threat to himself or his colleagues from any civilian or activity by gunmen. This was a clear breach of the Yellow Card.[18] At Day 376/64/4 to Day 376/64/7 Soldier F accepted it was such a breach. It was further pointed out to Soldier F that in his Treasury Solicitor statement at B137 paragraph 2, he claimed in contrast to his first RMP statement, that as soon as they left the vehicles the first thing he heard was shots coming from the direction of the Rossville Flats and he then cocked his weapon. Soldier F agreed they were two completely different accounts but could not explain it. Day 376/65/6 to Day 376/66/2. He went on to give further answer to Counsel on this matter which it is submitted is typical of his testimony to this Inquiry. At Day 376/67/7 to Day 376/67/12:

A: "As far as I wrote down at the time, or it was made out at the time, they were both true to the best of my knowledge."

Soldier F agreed that his Treasury Solicitor statement made the incident "Yellow Card compliant", but again could not explain it. Day 376/66/3 to Day 376/66/16.

18.7.3.97 In his first RMP statement he described shots coming from the direction of Rossville Flats. They were too far from the flats to pin point the gunmen. They continued to advance and as they got nearer the flats he could see the barricade. He then described the missiles etc. and the two nail bombs exploding. They then "took up a position" behind a wall on the right hand side of Rossville Street about 40 yards short of the Rossville Flats. In his third RMP statement he described coming under fire from a gunman who was south of his position but he was unable to locate him. Even though on Soldier F’s evidence the soldiers were under sniper fire from the direction of either the flats or the south and could not pinpoint the gunmen or gunman, they continued on foot advancing towards the flats. He did not claim any attempt "to take cover" until his Treasury Solicitor statement. Advancing on foot under fire and towards incoming fire and without being able to locate the gunman, seems an inherently unlikely movement by military personnel. It is submitted the truth of the matter is that they were able to advance under no threat whatsoever to take up position behind the wall.

18.7.3.98 At WT14.66 E-G and WT14.67 A-C Soldier F was examined concerning the nail bombs he heard going off in front of the barricade. He described them as being about 40 metres in front of the barricade and exploded about 40 metres away from him. This placed him about 80 metres from the barricade. They went closer to the barricade after the explosion and confirmed that they kept on advancing, both himself and the other 16 soldiers who came with him. The concept of a group of 16 soldiers advancing into the face of exploding nail bombs towards the persons armed with such nail bombs and taking no action whatsoever is patently ludicrous. The only explanation for such a scenario is that no nail bombs exploded.

18.7.3.99 The above was not the only example from Widgery where Soldier F indicated that he and colleagues had proceeded onwards in the face of hostile fire. He confirmed that following his alleged sighting of the three men with the rifle he moved forward from the wall. He was asked the following at WT14.68 C-D:

Q: “As you came forward you were coming nearer and almost directly into commanding line of fire from Rossville flats.”

It is submitted that once again Soldier F was claiming to engage in a manoeuvre which was at best suicidal. In fact it is another example of a fabrication of a threat of hostile activity, in an attempt to justify army conduct on the day. It is submitted that Soldier F and other soldiers were able to reach the positions they did on Rossville Street precisely because they were not under fire.

18.7.3.100 In his first RMP statement Soldier F described continuing to advance towards the flats and seeing a barricade across the street at the far end where the 200 rioters were located. These 200 rioters were throwing stones, bottles and other missiles at themselves and the other troops as the troops advanced. He saw at least two nail bombs explode as they advanced. It is obvious from independent evidence such as the contents of Video 48/11/.35 to 11.41[19] that no such grouping of rioters or such number of rioters were engaged in that activity in the area described by Soldier F as the soldiers advanced down Rossville Street. The civilian evidence and the evidence of journalists and photographers behind the Rubble Barricade demonstrates that not only were there no nail bombs but the troops were not under attack. The evidence of Liam Mailey who took the series of photographs[20] from behind the Rubble Barricade gave evidence that during the time he was taking his series there were no nail bombs or petrol bombs. Day 163/131/25 to Day 163/132/7. Indeed as the soldiers advanced there were no crowds behind the Rubble Barricade and there was a clear gap between the soldiers and the group of people behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.101 By the time of his Treasury Solicitor statement the crowd of 200 were being described as running away from the soldiers as opposed to throwing stones, bottles and other missiles at the troops as they advanced. B137 paragraph 3. It is submitted that this alteration can only have come about as a result of Soldier F being advised that his original description was unsustainable on the basis of other evidence or information available. He therefore had to correct his false description in his first RMP statement.

18.7.3.102 In his first RMP statement Soldier F described being behind the wall on the right hand side of Rossville Street and again coming under sniper fire from the flats. He estimated the gun fire was coming from the second floor of the flats, the third window along. He then described firing three aimed shots at this window and saw all three shots strike the windows. It will be seen that these shots completely disappeared from Soldier F’s subsequent accounts of events and in fact he later acknowledged to Lt. Colonel Overbury at B135 that he did not witness or engage in any such incident. It is submitted that this incident at the flats was an invention designed to disguise the real use that Soldier F made of his ammunition on the day.

18.7.3.103 In his first RMP statement at B122 Soldier F described, after the sniper fire from the second floor of the flats had stopped, about 30-40 rioters leaving the barricade and going to the right behind a block of flats out of their sight. On seeing this they i.e. the soldiers moved position to their right to Glenfada Park where he saw one of the men light something. Soldier F saw it fizzle and spark and he realised it was some sort of bomb. The man raised his arm to thrown the bomb and Soldier F fired two aimed shots at him striking him in the shoulder and the stomach. The bomb did not explode. By this time other members of the unit had joined them. It is notable that in his third RMP statement at B129 Soldier F described three men moving from the barricade northwest into the area of Glenfada Park Flats. One of the men was carrying what looked like a rifle. At the stage of the third statement he thus claimed to have identified a group of three people as opposed to 30-40 rioters but has added that one of the group had a rifle. His explanation for the apparent differences in these accounts was given at Day 375/143/18 to Day 375/143/19.

“I do not know, maybe it was just the confusion at the time when the statements were made”.

This attempt by Soldier F to explain the confusion was repeated throughout his testimony to both the Widgery Inquiry and his evidence to the current Inquiry. It is submitted that it can be completely rejected as inadequate, self-serving and thoroughly dishonest in keeping with the general content of Soldier F’s evidence.

18.7.3.104 It is beyond comprehension why Soldier F left such a detail as a man with a rifle out of his first account of the movement from the barricade unless either he was inventing such a detail in his third RMP statement to emphasise the threat he and his colleagues faced or had become aware that Private H, for example, was claiming to have witnessed gunfire from behind the Rubble Barricade with what were possibly short rifles. The explanation may also lie in the fact that in his third RMP statement Soldier F also claims to have seen Soldier G fire and hit another of the same three men in Glenfada who: “was carrying what appeared to be a rifle”. This incident did not appear at all in Soldier F's first RMP statement. It may be noted that in his first statement to the RMP at B168 taken at 02.15 on 31 January 1972 Soldier G claimed to have shot one of two men with small rifles in Glenfada Park.[21] This may well explain why Soldier F's account of the incident then appeared in his next RMP statement. It is a reasonable inference that Soldier F was attempting to verify Soldier G's account. For further consideration of Soldier F and Soldier G in Glenfada Park see submission on Sector 4.

18.7.3.105 In his third RMP statement at B130 Soldier F introduced, for the first time, the suggestion that he saw Soldier G fire a shot at windows in Rossville Flats and this is of course following the return to the vehicles. No mention whatsoever was made in the Soldier F’s first statement of Soldier G firing any shots at any time of the day. This may it is submitted provide an example of Soldier F attempting to account for and justify the shooting by Soldier G as well as his own shots.[22] Soldier F of course denied, quite implausibly it is submitted, ever learning from Soldier G or other members of his platoon what shots they had fired after the events of the day were over. Day 375/106/9 to Day 375/106/21.

18.7.3.106 It was only in his statement to Lt. Col. Overbury on 19^th February 1972 that Soldier F acknowledged that he fired a round at a man which he saw behind a barricade about 40 yards from him when he was about to throw a bomb. It was a large object and he saw sparks coming from it. This of course is the shot which was claimed to have killed a nail bomber. It was the shot which killed Michael Kelly[23]. Soldier F made no reference whatsoever in his RMP statements to shooting a man about to throw a bomb behind the barricade. It is submitted that it is quite clear that by this stage Soldier F must have been made aware that he was a prime suspect for the shooting of a civilian behind the barricade from his position at the Kells Walk. This is the only rational explanation for the introduction of this information by Soldier F into his statement to Colonel Overbury on the 19^th February 1972. Hence the shooting of Michael Kelly had to be justified by the claim that Soldier F had in fact fired at a man about to throw a bomb behind the barricade.

18.7.3.107 At Day 375/165/13 to Day 375/166/18 Soldier F was asked what it was that caused him at the date of his statement to Colonel Overbury to state that he had fired a shot behind the barricade which was the first shot he had fired that day. His reply was, it is submitted, typical of Soldier F's stock response in evidence:

"Well, that statement was made in 1972 and I obviously made the statement but I cannot recollect anything about it."

He was asked could he explain why the same situation arose concerning mentioning the man with the pistol behind the flats. He replied: "No."

It is submitted that he was then asked a key question by Counsel to the Inquiry at Day 375/166/19 to Day 375/167/1:

" Q. Is the position that by this stage it was becoming apparent in the course of the investigation as to what had happened on the day, that the accounts given by the Anti-Tank Platoon did not fit with the number of victims?

He was then reminded that he had told Lord Widgery that he had not referred to shooting at the barricade because it had slipped his mind and that he had not mentioned the man with the pistol at the rear of the flats because his recollection had been prompted by seeing aerial photographs. He answered that he presumed it was seeing his statements not aerial photographs. Counsel suggested to him that it could not be seeing his previous statements that caused him to produce the statement including two new important shootings. He replied:

"I know, but obviously that is a statement I made but I have no recollection of it ". Day 375/167/2 to Day 375/167/15.

18.7.3.108 It is submitted that it is utterly inconceivable that Soldier F could have any honest reason to omit mention of such an incident in his first four statements to the Royal Military Police which were taken before the statement to Colonel Overbury on the 19^th February 1972. He could only have come to mention it after being forced to do so by further information or circumstances being brought to his attention. Thus, not only does Soldier F mention the shooting but of course attempts to provide a justification for it also. B135.

18.7.3.109 The following exchange occurred at Day 376/86/15 to Day 376/86/22:

Q: "We know you shot and killed Michael Kelly because the bullet that you fired was recovered from his body. You know that do you not?"

Q: "The overwhelming evidence in this case is that Michael Kelly was completely and utterly innocent at the time he was shot; do you follow me?"

18.7.3.110 Soldier F’s reason for the omission of any reference to the shooting at the barricade until the statement to Lt. Col Overbury was stated at Day 376/53/20 to Day 376/53/25.

Q ".does it follow from what you are saying that it did just slip your mind that you had killed a 17 year old boy when you made that statement?" [i.e. his first RMP statement]

A "During the events of the day there was a lot of confusion and it is possible, yes."

18.7.3.111 When the issue of why he had not mentioned his shooting of the man at the barricade or the man with the pistol behind the Rossville Flats was raised at Day 375/138/25 to Day 375/139/6 Soldier F’s reply was:

“All I can say was there is errors of in the judgement of making the statements and they got confused.”

18.7.3.112 At WT14.65 E-G Soldier F was asked about the numbers behind the barricade. He claimed there were about six to eight people behind it. When asked were the people behind the barricades throwing stones towards the troops, Soldier F gave the following answer:

The evidence of Soldier F to Widgery was therefore that at the time he shot the man at the barricade with the bomb, there was no other activity taking place around the man which could have justified firing. Although it is virtually impossible to rely on anything Soldier F said as constituting the truth, in the context of this answer, it is highly unlikely that if other persons had been throwing any objects around Michael Kelly, which constituted a threat to Soldier F or his colleagues that Soldier F would have failed to mention this. Any suggestion therefore that it was the conduct of other persons around Michael Kelly that caused him to be shot by accident or ricochet is untenable on the evidence of the person who fired the fatal shot.

18.7.3.113 At Day 375/83/17 to Day 375/83/19 Soldier F was asked the following:

Q "Were you aware of other people falling at or in the vicinity of the barricade, apparently shot?"

It is submitted that there is no doubt that throughout his statements Soldier F was sure he hit the person he aimed at. Any suggestion that the bullet which hit Michael Kelly was intended or struck someone else before him is unsustainable on the account of Soldier F.

As to his reasons for firing, the evidence of Soldier F is so discredited as to be unworthy of belief. He has been and remained in his evidence to this Inquiry a persistent and wholly transparent liar. One of the major reasons for his lies has been his knowledge that he murdered Michael Kelly at the Rubble Barricade. Even if it were not possible to conclude this on the evidence of Soldier F and the circumstances of the shooting itself, the civilian evidence that Michael Kelly was not engaged in any conduct justifying the application of lethal force confirms overwhelmingly that on 30 January 1972, Michael Kelly was murdered by Soldier F at the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.114 While there is disputed evidence about whether or not a ceasefire order was given at Kells Walk prior to Anti-Tank Platoon entering Glenfada Park North, there is no doubt a ceasefire order had been given when Soldiers F and G fired their rounds at the Rossville Flats. The need to justify the shooting after such an order no doubt contributed to the need to obtain a series of statements from soldiers who could report a gunman or gunmen shooting from the Rossville Flats at soldiers after their vehicles had moved up Rossville Street. The RMP clearly went to considerable lengths to obtain information designed to justify the actions of Soldiers F and G. See Table x attached showing the order in which soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon made their statements.

18.7.3.115 In his first RMP statement at B123 Soldier F described how having returned to their vehicles on Rossville Street and after being in position for a couple of minutes their Radio Operator said: “There’s a sniper up in the flats.” Soldier F jumped out and took up a firing position beside the vehicle. The Radio Operator told him where he had seen the gunman and he himself saw something move in the window. He fired approximately four aimed shots at this window and he saw all four shots strike in the area of the window. He changed position to near the vehicle parked in front of theirs. At this time a man appeared in a window in the second from the top floor of the flats. He had a rifle and fired two shots at the soldiers’ position. Soldier F then fired four aimed shots at the man and saw the four shots strike the area of the window. He did not know if he hit the gunman or not.

18.7.3.116 Soldier F’s third RMP statement was made on 4th February 1972 which is significant date in the statement taking exercise. The Tribunal is referred to Section 5 of these submissions where it is demonstrated that a significant number of soldiers made statements on that date which were expressly designed to corroborate and justify the use of lethal force by other soldiers.

18.7.3.117 As can be seen a number of soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon fall into that category and made statements on 4 February 1972 including, of course, Soldier F himself. Soldier J made a statement at 15.10 hours, (B269, B270), Soldier 018 at 19.15 hours, (B1487) Soldier 036 at 19.30 hours, (B1629, B1630) Soldier 147 at 20.00 hours (B1886, B1887) and Soldier F, time unknown. Soldiers 018, 036 and 147 had not made any statements prior to this date. The statements of each of soldiers 018, 036, 147 and Soldier J deal with the incident where they say they came under fire from the Rossville Flats and Soldiers F and G returned fire. In spite of the intention of this statement taking exercise by the RMP significant discrepancies arise in the 4^th February 1972 accounts which are examined in detail in the submission on Soldier 036.

18.7.3.118 In his third RMP statement at B130 which was his 4^th February 1972 statement Soldier F described what is clearly the same incident which occurred following the withdrawal from Glenfada and an order to remount into their vehicles. Their vehicles were positioned level with the northeast wall of block 1 of Rossville flats facing down Rossville Street. On his account in this statement three shots were fired at them from a window on the second floor of block 1 of the Rossville flats as they entered the vehicles. The window was described as about the fifth from the southern end of the flats. The shots passed high over the vehicles. Soldier F claimed to have returned two rounds at the gunman and saw Soldier G return one shot also. He saw all three bullets strike the windows. He could not say if the gunman was hit.

18.7.3.119 The incident described is at the same time and location as the two incidents of the four shots described in the first RMP statement and is clearly the same incident. It is not clear from this statement whether Soldier F was describing an additional two shots at the relevant location or was now claiming only two as opposed to previously claiming two sets of four in the first RMP statement. He did not mention the previous account in his third statement. It may be significant or it may be sheer coincidence that this is the only occasion that Soldier F ever claimed to have fired two shots at this location and that is precisely the number of shots attributed to Soldier F in the 4^th February statement of Soldier 036. Soldier 018 described a total of three shots fired by Soldier F and Soldier G which is again a precise combined total of the shots claimed by Soldier F and Soldier G at that stage. Of course this exercise in chicanery is rendered redundant when Soldier F by the time of his statement to Lt Colonel Overbury on 19 February 1972 has to change his shot number again back to eight because by now he has to introduce the single shot at the Rubble Barricade and the two shots at the pistol man behind Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.

18.7.3.120 The third RMP statement introduced Soldier G as firing for the first time at the same general location. In spite of Soldier F's assertion to the Inquiry that he hadn't been made aware of other people's shots it is inherently likely that by the time Soldier F had come to make this statement that he had been made aware that Soldier G had admitted firing a shot at this location in his first RMP statement.

18.7.3.121 In his statement to Lt. Colonel Overbury, Soldier F referred to three shots he fired at the second floor window of the Rossville Flats following his return to the vehicle on Rossville Street. As well as these three shots he also described firing five rounds at men firing in his direction from the windows of the Rossville Flats. He introduced the figure of five for the first time into this statement fired on two separate occasions having previously divided the shots as four and four in his first RMP statement. Significantly he did not divide the five rounds up. It is submitted that there is no reason why he could not have done so in this statement given his knowledge as the shooter and the fact that he was quite happy in previous statements to divide the number and location of these shots. It is submitted that he must have been either by his own decision or on the advice of others declining to pin down the division of these shots pending further information. This submission is supported by the fact that when he came to speak to the Treasury Solicitor he was able to divide these shots into three and then two. B138 paragraph 10.

18.7.3.122 At B138 in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor Soldier F described having returned to the vehicles and awaiting further orders. Soldier F described the Radio Operator having observed a gunman in the flats out of one of the windows of the vehicle. According to the Treasury Solicitor statement, the Radio Operator was asked by Soldier F where the gunman was. It was the Radio Operator who indicated where the gunman was located. Soldier F fired three rounds in the direction of the window the Radio Operator had pointed out and where Soldier F saw movement. He claimed to see all of his shots strike the window. It was the second floor window.

18.7.3.123 In his Treasury Solicitor statement Soldier F then described moving forward to the front vehicle and observing the flats. He spotted a man with a rifle at a third floor window. Soldier F fired three rounds at this window.

18.7.3.124 He then claimed to have seen a gunman appearing on the top floor of Rossville flats. The man had a rifle. Soldier F claimed to have seen the rifle fire and he fired two rounds at the window. He could not say whether he had hit him or not. Soldier F then gave a further description of everything going quiet but moving round to the side of Rossville flats and there checking his magazine where he found seven rounds left. Thus his statement to the Treasury solicitor has amplified the claim first made to Colonel Overbury on the 19^th February of a further five shots fired on two separate occasions at the Rossville Flats. It is quite clear once again in our submission that the pattern of Soldier F’s evidence is to provide justification for his firing of what he claims to have been thirteen shots.

18.7.3.125 At Day 375/171/1 to Day 375/171/25 it was put to Soldier F that he had in his first RMP statement divided the shots into groups of four and four but by the time of his statement to the Treasury Solicitor the division of the shots had become three, three and two. He replied as follows:

“ I cannot answer that. I do not know. I really do not know. Obviously it is in my statement and I have put it down, so it obviously happened but to answer your question I do not know.”

Soldier F’s evidence to the Widgery Tribunal and the shooting at the windows of Rossville Flats.

18.7.3.126 With regard to the firing at the windows after return to the vehicles at WT14.50 A-D Soldier F was being asked questions about the gunman at the window which the Radio Operator had pointed out to him. In this account Soldier F added substantial further detail to the account he gave in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor. When asked to describe the movements he actually saw, he claimed that it was the sort of movement “as though someone was pulling a rifle out of a window”. When asked if it looked like a rifle, he replied yes. This may be contrasted with his accounts in his first RMP statement and his statement to the Treasury Solicitor which included only a description of "movement". It is submitted that on any reasonable reading of the exchange between Soldier F and Mr. Gibbens at WT14.50, Soldier F was making the details of his account up as he went along. He then returned at WT14.50 C to describing seeing the movement of a person and, as Soldier F fired, the person moved back. When Soldier F was asked was he firing at the window, he replied yes. It may also be noted in this account that Soldier F described shooting at the third window along on the second floor. His first RMP statement at B125 contained no such description of the location of the window and his Treasury Solicitor statement contained only a description of a "second floor window". Soldier F was once again providing detail at Widgery he had not included in his previous accounts.

18.7.3.127 Soldier F was then examined on the second alleged gunman in the flats as described in his Treasury Solicitor statement. This was the alleged gunman seen when he had moved to the front vehicle. This gunman was described at WT14.51 A as on the same floor as the previous gunman only the next window along that is the fourth window. It was pointed out to Soldier F at WT14.74 A-D that he had told the Treasury Solicitor at B138 paragraph 10 of his statement that he had seen the man at a third floor window. Soldier F's response was that "with the number of windows" he was confused. He claimed it was the second floor window. It is submitted that Soldier F's confusion arose solely from an inherent lack of truth in the accounts of the various incidents.

18.7.3.128 Soldier F’s description of this gunman in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor at B138 is noticeably bare referring only to a man “with a rifle”. In his evidence at the Widgery Tribunal at WT14.51 A Soldier F described the rifle as being out of the window pointing it in Soldier F’s direction. He went on to describe a figure with a rifle sticking out of the window in his general direction. He claimed that this was not in an aimed position but he recognised it as a rifle. No such detail was given to the Treasury Solicitor. It is submitted that once again it is clear that Soldier F was embellishing his testimony at Widgery to bolster his account of events. He again claimed that his round struck the window but did not see whether they struck the man with the rifle. Again this information was not given to the Treasury Solicitor. The man then moved back from the window. After Soldier F had fired the man had just completely gone. At this stage Soldier F claimed that Soldier G was firing also but could not see what his target was. Soldier F claimed that Soldier G fired one round from the second vehicle. It is not quite clear how Soldier F would have known this or observed this since as Soldier F made so clear at WT14.52 A Soldier G fired from the second vehicle behind the vehicle that Soldier F was firing from.

18.7.3.129 In his statement to the Treasury Soldier F described the third gunman as appearing on the top floor of the Rossville Flats. He had a rifle and Soldier F claimed to see his rifle fire. Soldier F fired two rounds at the window. He could not see whether he had hit the man or not. In his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry at WT14.52 A-G Soldier F claimed to be able to identify the weapon as a single barrelled weapon and was able to say that whilst the gun man was not aiming at him, the gunman was aiming at troops at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. Again Soldier F was providing detail under questioning which was quite remarkable in contrast to the paucity of detail on very significant events through his first RMP statement to his Treasury Solicitor statement.

18.7.3.130 It does not appear to have been explored with Soldier F at Widgery why a gunman with Anti- Tank Platoon personnel, vehicles and possibly other soldiers directly beneath him at Rossville flats should chose to put his weapon out of a window and fire up Rossville Street towards the William Street and Rossville Street junction. Soldier F claimed to have seen the muzzle flash from the window and it was one shot. He again claimed that he had been ordered to withdraw to the side of Rossville flats where he checked his magazine and found seven rounds left in his magazine out of ten. It is submitted that on an examination of the combined content of Soldier F's various statements and his evidence to Lord Widgery the reader is presented with a concoction of lies and self-serving justifications for the discharge of his weapon on the day.

18.7.3.131 Some insight into the conundrum of Soldier F's numerous different accounts of shot fired at the windows of the Flats can be gained by reference to WT14.60 G and WT14.61 A-E. Under cross-examination by Mr. McSparran QC the following exchange occurred after Soldier F’s confirmation that he had told the SIB that he had fired a total of 13 shots:

“Q … but you did not tell them you had fired two rounds at a man with a pistol? [i.e. the man behind block 2 of Rossville Flats.]

Q. Will you tell the tribunal how you accounted for those two rounds at the time you made the statement to the SIB?

A. At the present time [meaning the time he was making the statement], sir, I mixed my rounds up. I was firing at the flats and later I then accounted for the rounds when I was firing at the gunmen…

Q. You told the SIB investigator that you had fired another two rounds at the flats?

Q. Was that two rounds fired as a separate shooting incident at the flats or was that two rounds fired in addition to the rounds you had already mentioned had already been fired at any one of the separate incidents?

Q. So you detailed another shooting incident at the flats to the SIB Investigator did you which did not take place?

Q. When, in fact that had not occurred at all. Those were two shots you had fired at a man with a pistol on the ground?

Q. So apart from not telling the SIB investigators about firing at the man with the pistol, that was one inaccuracy, you failed to tell him about that?

A. Sir those two shots were mentioned came into account in one of the previous statements. I mentioned four rounds at one of the windows.

Q. That meant in one of the previous statements you said you had fired four rounds at one of the windows when you had fired two?

A. At the time I made those statements it was in the early hours of the morning. There had been all riots during that day and I couldn't quite think about it…”

The exchange then continued regarding why Soldier F had made the statements he had. Counsel for the families in 1972 did not of course have access to the previous RMP statements or the two subsequent statements to Lt.Colonel Overbury or the Treasury Solicitor.

18.7.3.132 It is submitted that the following propositions arise out of the above exchange:

(i) Soldier F at Widgery admitted claiming shots he fired at the Rossville Flats in his RMP statements were in fact shots he fired at the man with a pistol behind block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He therefore admitted to Lord Widgery that he had concealed shots he had fired by claiming to have fired shots he had not in fact fired. He was concealing his shots behind block 2 and this could only have been because having fired those shots he could not justify them. The later allegation that the man had a pistol behind block 2 was either his own attempt or one which was suggested to him to justify his murderous and unlawful activity in firing behind block 2.

(ii) In the above exchange with Mr. McSparran Soldier F’s own lies were beginning to unravel. In the exchange with Mr McSparran he clearly accepted the account of these two shots being fired at the window in the Rossville Flats were a substitute for his real two shots behind block 2. As we now know he had indeed given an account of firing two shots at the Rossville flats in his third RMP statement at B130 and these may well have been the two shots he was thinking of at this point in the exchange. As can be seen from the above Widgery extract during the exchange with Mr. McSparran Soldier F began by claiming the two shots were "additional" to the previous shots he had accounted for to the RMP. If that was the case Soldier F by the time of his third RMP statement had admitted fifteen shots. In the course of the exchange with Mr. McSparran he attempted to bring the total back to thirteen by saying that those two shots had in fact been part of an account of firing four shots at the Rossville Flats he had given to the SIB. The only account of four shots he gave to the SIB were the two groups of four shots at the Rossville Flats windows in his first RMP statement at B123. Soldier F was clearly capable of not only telling lies but lies within lies.

(iii) It is submitted that the two shots at the pistol man behind block 2 represented two out of the three shots which Soldier F had said in his first RMP statement had been fired at the flats by him on de-bussing. The third shot was his shot at the barricade. He had told Lt. Colonel Overbury that the three early shots were in fact fired later as part of the eight shots at the windows of the flats thus keeping his total at thirteen. He was still attempting to maintain this, even at this Inquiry at Day 376/61/3 to Day 376/61/22. It is submitted that this was a clear and deliberate deception by Soldier F to cover three previously unacknowledged shots at Michael Kelly and behind block 2 of the Flats.

(iv) Whether the two shots at the pistol man were concealed as part of the account in the first RMP statement or the account in the third RMP statement he of course did not own up to the pistol man shots behind block 2 until the statement to Colonel Overbury on 19 February 1972. It is submitted that the only reason he would have done so was by that stage he was aware or had been made aware by that date that he was the main candidate for the shooting behind block 2 of the Rossville Flats and could not get away with not admitting to any shots in that area. He therefore was forced to admit shooting there and invented two shots at a man with a pistol to justify it.

(v) The question as to why Soldier F made the third RMP statement claiming two shots were fired at the window in Rossville Flats is not clear. It may be that these two shots were an additional two to the thirteen he admitted to in his first RMP statement and if so the only logical inference is they were required to cover two further unjustified shots he had not admitted to or thought might be discovered. It is important to emphasise that there is no independent verification of exactly how many shots Soldier F fired on Bloody Sunday or where he fired his total number of shots. Given the amount of ammunition he was carrying, even as admitted, to Lord Widgery, it is highly likely that he fired more shots than he admitted. This would have particular significance in every area in which Soldier F is known to have discharged shots.

18.7.3.133 It is submitted that there can be little doubt that Soldier F and Soldier G fired a number of shots at the Flats and were clearly responsible for firing at the window of 12 Garvan Place.[24] The shots were fired at Fulvio Grimaldi[25] who was attempting to take photographs of the soldiers from the window of the flats. The window was located on the second floor and was the third window along when moving north to south. The bullet holes are shown at P544.[26] In his evidence to this Inquiry at Day 375/173/24 Soldier F was asked did he fire at least six shots at the same window said:

18.7.3.134 It is further submitted that no gunman fired at Soldier F or Soldier G in the Rossville Flats. Soldier F did not see a gunman or a weapon at that location. He did not see any shots or hear any fire. Nor did he believe he saw a gunman or a weapon. Their shots were fired wholly without justification. These shots demonstrate the mindset of the soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon and in particular Soldiers F and G to the use of lethal force.

18.7.3.135 It would appear that the civilian and photographic evidence suggests there was possibly a total of seven shots. If this evidence is correct there is a question of what happened to the excess number of shots fired by Soldier F and Soldier G. Since neither soldier ever suggested that they had done anything but hit the window targets they were aiming for it cannot be the case that they simply missed. If the civilian evidence is accepted as correct, in all probability one or more of these shots accounts for some of the shooting by Anti-Tank platoon soldiers over the Rubble Barricade. The issue of shots over the Rubble Barricade is considered below.

18.7.3.136 As has been seen already in this submission Soldier F admitted for the first time to Lt. Colonel Overbury on 19 February 1972 that he fired one shot at the Rubble Barricade. He maintained that suggestion in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and to Lord Widgery. This was the bullet traced to the body of Michael Kelly. At Day 375/85/4 to Day 375/85/15 Counsel to the Inquiry asked Soldier F could he tell the Tribunal how the three, namely John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash died. Given his known location and the timing of these shootings following Michael Kelly this must be an obvious lie. He said he could not nor could he say who shot them. Further he said he did not see them fall. He could not offer any explanation why on the accounts given to Lord Widgery and this Tribunal by the Anti-Tank Platoon there was no explanation for how the three died. He denied there had been a conspiracy of silence.

18.7.3.137 However the following matters were put to Soldier F and his response to them suggests not only his presence at the barricade at the time of these shootings but a probability of further shots by Soldier F at the Rubble Barricade in addition to the shot which killed Michael Kelly.

“F of my section reached the pavement by the end of the small wall, he went down into a kneeling position beside it, raised his rifle to his shoulder, and without pause or hesitation commenced firing towards the centre of the crowd…” B1565.014.4.

Q: "How are you able to tell if you have no recollection of the circumstances of your firing?"

This passage was again put to Soldier F at Day 376/147/10 to Day 376/147/17.

Q: "He is likely to be right, is he not that when you fired towards the crowd at the barricade, you fired from a kneeling position?"

At Day 375/87/17 to Day 375/87/25 a further portion of Soldier 027's statement at B1565.039 at paragraph 84 was put to Soldier F:

"Within seconds, other soldiers came on the scene, some kneeling and some standing joining in the firing. I could see strikes on the barricade. Two people towards the centre of the barricade fell within a few seconds of each other in the opening burst of firing." Counsel to the Inquiry then put the following to him:

"Q: So the picture that he is giving is that you come to the wall and immediately begin firing and then other soldiers join firing at the barricade and two fall. Are you saying you have no recollection of that? A: That is correct." Day 375/87/23 to Day 375/88/2.

Soldier F's reply was not a denial but a confirmation that he had no recollection of that. Further quotations from Soldier 027's statement were put to Soldier F including the following from B1595.039 paragraph 90:

"I would estimate that we were at that position for a number of minutes which is a long time in this context. I cannot say how many each individual fired. It all merged into a general outburst of shooting. Initially when there just two or three soldiers firing I would say that there were steady shots being fired at intervals of a second or two".

It is submitted that the absence of a denial is critical in assessing the weight to be given to these descriptions of events. Soldier F did not challenge the veracity of these accounts given by Soldier 027. Whilst certain other areas of Solder 027's evidence may give some cause for concern as to reliability this area was not challenged by the witness who was being accused.

A further quotation from Soldier 027 was put to Soldier F at Day 375/89/10 to Day 375/89/19:

"The level of shooting grew as more soldiers arrived. I have been told that during the Widgery Inquiry, Lance Corporal F started, firing in a kneeling position, it would not have taken long to fire three or four rounds. My impression was that the firing continued during the following minutes."

When asked did he have a recollection of the firing continuing for a number of minutes, Soldier F replied "No I do not". It is submitted that during this entire exchange Soldier F did not deny any part of the incident referred to by Soldier 027.

18.7.3.138 Soldier F did not admit until 19 February that he fired at all at the Rubble Barricade. The account given by Soldier 027 set out above was not denied by Soldier F and he acknowledged he could not tell whether it was accurate or not. It is submitted that it is entirely probable that Soldier F fired further shots at the Rubble Barricade in addition to the shot that killed Michael Kelly along with Soldier G and the other Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers at the Kells Walk wall.[28]

18.7.3.139 As has already been demonstrated the statement made by Soldier F to Colonel Overbury on 19^th February 1972 contains very significant differences from the statements made to the Royal Military Police.

(i) In this statement Soldier F stated that he did not, contrary to what he said earlier in his first RMP statement, fire at a window in Rossville Flats after they first left their vehicles in the Rossville Flats area. He, in fact, fired these three shots later and formed part of his firing at the windows of the flats following his return to their vehicles. B135. The removal of these shots from the total of course allowed Soldier F to account for the shooting of Michael Kelly at the barricade and the two shots at the man with the pistol behind block 2 of the Flats. Soldier F confirmed this was what he had done at Day 376/59/15 to Day 376/60/6.

(ii) For the first time he introduced an acknowledgement that he fired a round at a man which he saw behind a barricade about 40 yards from him when he was about to throw a bomb. This was the shooting of Michael Kelly and is discussed at above.

(iii) Soldier F’s account in evidence at WT14.67 F-G was of a nail bomb fizzing in the man’s hand, but presumed it fell to the ground and confirmed there was no explosion. It is notable in our submission that the same fate befell the nail bomber allegedly seen by Soldier F in Glenfada Park North. It is submitted that this is not likely to have been co-incidental incompetence on the part of two nail bombers but in reality likely to have been because Soldier F invented both accounts. It also made it easier for Soldier F to stand over the two accounts if he said the nail bombs did not explode should anyone have asked why no one else saw or heard the nail bombs explode.

(iv) In this statement to Lt. Colonel Overbury Soldier F, also for the first time, introduced the account of hearing pistol shots coming from the area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville flats. He described shouting “there’s a gun man” and dropping to his knee into a kneeling position. He saw a man near the wall facing in his direction who turned as if to run. He saw the man had an object in his hand. He was the only person in the area from which the gunfire had come. The object in his hand was large and black like an automatic pistol. Soldier F fired two rounds at the man and he fell to the ground. Thus again Soldier F introduced a description of firing and shooting a man in an area he had not mentioned at all at any stage in his four previous statements to the Royal Military Police. The only rational explanation for this particular omission is that Soldier F wanted to conceal his unlawful shooting in that area. By the time that Soldier F came to make the statement to Colonel Overbury on the 19^th February 1972 the only rational explanation for mentioning was that he had been made aware that he was a likely candidate for shooting from the corner of Glenfada Park North behind block 2 of the flats. He therefore had to produce a justification. B135.

(v) As has been seen at paragraph 18.7.3.121 above Soldier F significantly reworked his distribution of shots at the windows in Rossville Flats in contrast to his previous RMP statements.

(vi) He claimed he could work out the number of rounds he fired on the last two occasions from the ammunition check he made shortly afterwards when he counted seven rounds left in his magazine. B135. He later told the Treasury Solicitor that this was done when they moved round the side of Rossville Flats. B138 paragraph 12. This was of course before he went to barracks and then waited four hours to make his first statement.[29] If Soldier F had been giving a remotely truthful account of his actions he could have provided this information in his first or even one of the subsequent RMP statements. He claimed to have been certain that he fired one round at the nail bomber at the barricade, two rounds at the nail bomber in Glenfada Park, two rounds at the gunman at the end of Rossville flats and three rounds at the window on the second floor of the Rossville Flats. The remaining five rounds he fired on two separate occasions at different windows of the Rossville Flats. B135.

(i) As has been demonstrated above at 18.7.3.96 Soldier F attempted to use his statement to the Treasury Solicitor to alter his account of the circumstances in which he came to have his weapon cocked on Rossville Street.

(ii) As has been demonstrated above Soldier F used his statement to the Treasury Solicitor to correct his obvious untruths in his first RMP statement concerning the conduct of the crowd running away towards the Rubble Barricade.

(iii) Solider F then described how he observed a number of people from his position behind the wall at what appears to have been Kells Walk. One of them was attempting to throw what looked like a nail bomb which was in his hand. It was fizzing. He had seen nail bombs before and he was in no doubt it was one. Soldier F fired one aimed shot and the man fell. The bomb did not explode. He did not see what happened to him. Then he saw three men leave the barricade. One was carrying a rifle and they moved to the right of Glenfada Park. B137 paragraph 4.

(v) He described the shooting of the man with the pistol behind block 2 of the flats.

(vi) As has been seen at above at 18.7.3.122 to 18.7.3.125 Soldier F then significantly reworked the breakdown and distribution of his shots at the windows of the Rossville Flats.

Soldier F’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry and his excuses for inconsistency.

18.7.3.140 At WT14.60 C-D Soldier F was asked why he did not tell the SIB that he had shot a man behind the Rossville Flats from his position at the southern end of Glenfada Park. His answer was: It slipped my mind what with the other offence that happened”. “What other offence?” Answer: “Shooting the other two bombers”. It is submitted that even for a witness of F’s doubtful credibility the suggestion that the shooting of a man with a pistol behind Rossville Flats had slipped his mind when he was discussing other matters with the SIB is remarkable. It may also be noted that Soldier F in this attempted explanation put his slip of the mind down to other events being the shooting of the other two bombers. This was in itself an obvious lie since he had also failed to mention one of the “bombers” at the barricade to the SIB.

18.7.3.141 At WT14.61 F at the end of the exchange with Mr. McSparran considered above, Soldier F was asked for an explanation as to why he had said he had fired four shots at a window when he had only fired two, his answer was as follows:

“At the time I made those statements it was in the early hours of the morning. There had been all riots during the day and I couldn’t quite think about it.”

On the contrary it is submitted that it is clear that Soldier F had every opportunity to think about it and in fact at WT14.61 F Soldier F acknowledged he had about four hours in their barracks in Derry before he made his first RMP statement. It is submitted that what Soldier F did not have ample time to think about was just how he was going to present a consistent and plausible account of the discharge of his shots and avoid detection for the actions he had carried out. He therefore minimised his early accounts to the SIB in the hope that the actual amount of shots and his targets would not be discovered. It may be noted that at WT14.62 A-C Soldier F confirmed that he was firing at the man with the pistol behind the flats to kill him. He also confirmed that that had “just slipped” his mind.

18.7.3.142 At WT14.64 A-C Soldier F was asked why he did not refer to the shooting of the man with the pistol behind the Flats and what brought it to his mind on the 19^th February. His answer was as follows:

“At that time I was shown aerial photographs of the immediate area and I realised that I had shot a man there. We had previously only had a map.”

In his statement to Colonel Overbury on 19 February Soldier F had said that having read his previous statements and looked at maps and photographs of the air: “ I realise that I have mistaken the sequence of events.” B135.

He then went on, as we have seen, to disavow his first three shots at the Rossville Flats on de-bussing, add the shootings at the man at the barricade and the man behind the Rossville Flats and change the breakdown of his shots at the windows of the flats. He therefore did considerably more than change his sequence of shots with the use of previous statements, maps and aerial photographs.

18.7.3.143 Even Soldier F began to sense the ludicrous nature of the proposition he had put forward in his statement to Colonel Overbury and to Lord Widgery that his recollection had been prompted by maps and aerial photographs at Day 375/167/4 to Day 375/167/9. When asked about the matter he replied:

He was then challenged by Counsel to the Inquiry on this statement on the basis that it could not have been his previous statements that caused him to produce the statement to Colonel Overbury which included two important new shootings. He replied:

“I know, but obviously that is a statement I made, but I have no recollection of it". Day 375/167/14 to Day 375/167/15.

It is submitted that in addition to being a different excuse from the one proffered earlier, as a statement in itself it beggars belief. It is submitted that he had failed to mention this incident before 19^th February 1972 because he considered until that point it would not necessarily emerge that he was the soldier who had fired from the position at the corner of Glenfada Park North. By the 19^th February 1972 the army were in possession of the evidence of Soldier 134 and others and it can only be rational to conclude that Soldier F had been made aware of that information. The Army had also to explain by that stage two civilian deaths and two woundings in that area, none of which had been accounted for by any soldier.

18.7.3.144 When the issue of why he had not mentioned his shooting of the man at the barricade or the man with the pistol behind the Rossville Flats was raised at Day 375/138/25 to Day 375/139/6 Soldier F’s reply was:

“All I can say was there is errors of in the judgement of making the statements and they got confused.”

18.7.3.145 It was pointed out to Soldier F that in his first RMP statement he was not confused about the number of bullets he fired. His reply was:

He further acknowledged that he gave a precise account of the number of shots, the sets of shots, the targets and the sequence. Day 375/139/11 to Day 375/139/12. It is submitted that the only possible conclusion that be drawn form these answers is that Soldier F had no truthful or logical answer to the questions asked.

18.7.3.146 It was further pointed out to him that the shots omitted were shots where he was trying to kill his targets.

A. There was a lot going on that day, there was a lot of activity going on and when I made these statements, the statements got confused and there were errors made.” Day 375/139/25 to Day 375/140/3.

It is submitted that these answers further demonstrate that the shooting was unjustifiable and that Soldier F was an utterly untruthful witness.

18.7.3.147 Soldier F had failed, even by the time of his third RMP statement, to mention either his firing at the barricade or his shooting behind the Rossville Flats. It is not known precisely when this statement was made but it must have been some days after his original statement. Soldier F was asked to explain this failure. He replied as follows:

“All I can say is that it must have been an error at the time and I must have forgot and then later on, when more statements was required, obviously it was to come to light. I have no explanation for it.” Day 375/144/19 to Day 375/144/22.

He went on to deny the suggestion from Counsel to the Inquiry that the reason there was no explanation was that in these statements he was telling lies in order to conceal the truth and therefore got in trouble with the details of what happened. Day 375/144/23 to Day 375/145/2.

18.7.3.148 Soldier F could not explain the appearance of either the shooting at the barricade or the shooting behind the Rossville Flats in the statement of 19 February 1972. It is submitted that Counsel to the Inquiry summarised the general truth about these omissions at Day 375/166/19 to Day 375/166/24 with this exchange:

“Q Is the position that by this stage it was becoming apparent in the course of the investigation as to what had happened on the day, that the accounts given by the Anti-Tank Platoon did not fit with the number of victims?

18.7.3.149 It is submitted that Soldier F’s testimony to this Inquiry as well as being untruthful and self –serving was designed to continue to conceal his activities on Bloody Sunday. It is simply beyond logic or belief that he could have forgotten the incidents he was involved in entirely. If that is the case his “amnesia” can only have been part of a deliberate and conscious strategy to avoid answering as to the events of Bloody Sunday. It is important to note that at Day 376/28/20 to Day 376/28/22 Soldier F confirmed that he had no medical condition which accounted for his total lack of recall.

18.7.3.150 At Day 375/59/8 to Day 375/59/17 having confirmed that before Bloody Sunday he had not killed anyone and after Bloody Sunday he had killed no one in Northern Ireland he agreed it was a pretty dramatic day.

Q "Are you being truthful when you say that you remember practically nothing whatever about it?"

It is submitted that this was not correct and that Soldier F's vague recollection of the day was simply a device conceived by him to avoid answering questions likely to be asked of him and to which he could not answer truthfully without admitting to a litany of lies, torture, unlawful activity, wounding and murder.

18.7.3.151 He acknowledged in his Evershed’s statement that he remembered some men leaving the Barricade and Soldier G. At Day 375/83/4 to Day 375/83/8 he stated he could not remember the scenes in P635, E14.012 and E14.016 and all he could remember was the barricade. It would probably be idle to speculate on why those items should stick in his mind but shooting to kill at least two men did not. However, it is of note that when certain propositions regarding his conduct were put to him he asserted they did not happen. Again it is not clear how he could have done this if his memory of the day was genuinely so vague.

18.7.3.152 It is submitted that the shooting by Soldier F behind the flats clearly accounted for the killing of Patrick Doherty and Barney McGuigan. It is also submitted that Soldier F in all probability fired more than the two shots he acknowledged into that area. These either shots which he claimed to have fired at the windows of the Rossville Flats or extra shots he never admitted to. Further submissions on this matter may be found at submissions on Sector 5. It is further submitted that the only evidence of the number of shots fired in this area by Soldier F and indeed his total of thirteen shots comes from himself. It is submitted that the number of Soldier F's inconsistent accounts make it difficult to conclude that he was being truthful as to the location of a number of even his declared shots. Soldier F denied in his statement to this Inquiry at 167.002 paragraph 15 and Day 375/116/7 to Day 375/116/8 that he had private supplies of ammunition.

18.7.3.153 It is notable that in his first RMP statement at B121 and in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor at B137 paragraph 1, he described himself as armed with an SLR with twenty rounds. He then describes deploying and debussing. In his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry at WT14.45 B-C, he was asked had he debussed near the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. He confirmed he had and was asked the following:

A: "20 rounds on the rifle itself, 20 rounds in my pouch and 10 rounds in a bandolier."

Soldier F would appear to have told Lord Widgery that he had left the vehicle with fifty rounds of ammunition as opposed to his earlier figure of twenty. This must raise yet another question as to the truthfulness or accuracy of any account given by Soldier F as to his ammunition supply and his use of that on the day.

18.7.3.154 At Day 375/59/8 to Day 375/59/17 having confirmed that before Bloody Sunday he had not killed anyone and after Bloody Sunday he had killed no one in Northern Ireland he agreed it was a pretty dramatic day.

Q: "Are you being truthful when you say that you remember practically nothing whatever about it?"

In summary it is submitted that Soldier F remembered very well the events he was involved in but chose not to assist this Inquiry. He chose not to do so with the intention of obstructing the search for the truth about Bloody Sunday and to attempt to continue with his policy of self-serving lies and evasions. The purpose of such a policy was to cover up murder and wounding of innocent civilians and to cover up the wrong doing of his colleagues. His “amnesia” at this Inquiry was to prevent himself having to answer questions to which he had no answer and to avoid answering questions concerning the conduct of his colleagues.

18.7.3.155 Soldier J admits to having fired 2 live rounds while on Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday. Both rounds were fired over the Rubble Barricade, one on the Glenfada Park side of the Rubble Barricade and one at the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. In relation to both shots he claims to have fired at persons who were about to throw nail bombs at him and in both cases he claims to have missed his target.

18.7.3.156 Soldier J is a crucial witness in a number of respects. He is one of the few soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon who admits to having fired live rounds over the Rubble Barricade in Rossville Street. While he claims to have missed those targets the location of his first target makes him a prime candidate for having killed one of John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash, his second shot makes him a candidate for the killing of Hugh Gilmore. In these circumstances Soldier J may account for 2 of the deaths behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.157 It is alleged that Soldier J probably murdered at least one of John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash at the Rubble Barricade on the 30^th January 1972. Since that date he has lied about his actions and lied about the actions of his fellow soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon, in order to prevent the truth about his role in the murder of innocent civilians from being told.

18.7.3.158 Soldier J was interviewed by Toby Harnden in 1999 and is the soldier referred to as Soldier X in articles written by Toby Harnden and published in the Daily Telegraph in May 1999. (L282.1, L282.2) Soldier J acknowledges that he has “previously, untruthfully” and repeatedly lied about his involvement in that interview, despite having been repeatedly asked by the Tribunal through his solicitor whether he was Soldier X. He eventually told the truth in September 2003, just prior to giving evidence. B289.028 paragraph 1 and B289.029 paragraph 7

18.7.3159 Soldier J explained that the purpose of having given the interview to Toby Harnden was to assist soldiers in their anonymity application and also because:

“I wanted to get over the point that we were fired upon first after a riot had got out of hand I was fed up with reading and hearing that the Paras went on an unprovoked attack.” B289.028 paragraph 4

18.7.3.160 During the course of the interview with Toby Harnden Soldier J stated that he had witnessed events on Bloody Sunday that he had not actually witnessed. In the course of this Inquiry he justified this by stating that

“A. Because, sir, he was our last-gasp chance to get our anonymity. I had to put it -- lay it on thick. In other words, in this modern idiom today, you would say I sexed it up a bit.” Day 370/9/4 to Day 370/9/9[30]

18.7.3.161 Soldier J was apparently incapable of acknowledging that he had told untruths to Toby Harnden preferring to hide behind phrases such as ‘sexed-up’ and ‘hamming it up’ rather than accept that he had told Mr. Harnden out and out lies.[31]

18.7.3.162 In Soldier J, the Tribunal is dealing with a witness who is demonstrably dishonest, who despite having had to accept that he had “previously, untruthfully” lied to this Inquiry, not once but “repeatedly”, was unable to characterise blatant lies as untruths. Crucially it has been shown that this witness has, over a period of years, been dishonest in his dealings with this Tribunal, and was, in his interview with Toby Harnden, dishonest in relation to his involvement in Bloody Sunday.[32]

18.7.3.163 It is our submission that his evidence cannot be accepted as being given in good faith, and as with his interview with Toby Harnden, his objective in giving evidence to this Inquiry has been to present a view of Bloody Sunday sympathetic to the Paras, rather than to tell the truth about his role in the events of that day.

18.7.3.164 Soldier J as with a number of soldiers from 1 Para claims to have a limited recollection of the events of Bloody Sunday. In relation to his current account, it is noteworthy that his recollection about the early part of the day is clear up until he was briefed about the operation in Derry, from that point on he states that:

“I do not remember much more about the events of that day.” B289.002 paragraph 12

18.7.3.165 In fact as became apparent in the course of questioning by Counsel for the Tribunal and Counsel for the Families, in relation to most of the issues on which he was questioned, Soldier J’s stock response was that he had “no recollection”. The only real exception to that reply relates to the shootings themselves in respect of which he maintains that he can clearly recollect that the persons he shot were nail-bombers and that he did not hit his targets. Thus he can assist this Inquiry to the extent necessary to provide himself with a defence to allegations of murder, but no more.

18.7.3.166 In the course of his interview with Toby Harnden Soldier J is quoted as saying:

“I was grilled for several hours this year by lawyers acting for the Saville Inquiry. I told them the bare minimum and said that I could not really enlarge on anything said to Widgery or contained in my original statement the day after Bloody Sunday.” B289.029 paragraph 4

[1] See for example, Soldier F who has admitted killing Michael Kelly, William McKinney, Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty, as well as having probably caused the injuries of Joseph Mahon, Patrick Campbell and Danny Magowan.

[2] B623.001 paragraph 1

[3] Other than on a range.

[4] The only exception to this is that corroboration is offered by Soldier 017 to Soldier P’s shooting of a nail-bomber, although, it is our submission, for reasons developed below, that this corroboration was the result of dishonest collusion.

[5] It seems clear from Soldier P’s RMP statement, his evidence to Lord Widgery and his clarification of matters to this Tribunal, as well as the photographic evidence that this was the location of the crowd he initially claims to have seen, as well as his location for most of the operation, until he decided to return to his vehicle. Day 353/55/14 to Day 353/55/22

[6] Yellow Card (November 1971 Revision) ED71.1. See general rules no. 4

[7] This is consistent with the evidence of the photographer Liam Mailey as will be seen below.

[8] In his RMP statement Soldier P constantly refers to having been accompanied by two soldiers. This is changed in his Treasury Solicitor statement and his evidence to Lord Widgery to one soldier, who has been identified as Soldier 017.

[9] This is based upon the premise that Soldier G’s shots down the alleyway are regarded as having taken place in Sector 3. The total number of shots include the shots claimed by David Longstaff, INQ 023 who was not one of the soldiers who gave evidence at the Widgery Inquiry and who now claims to have fired a shot in Glenfada Park.

[10] In addition we have the 2 shots fired by Soldier G which while included in this paragraph, cannot account for the deaths behind the Rubble Barricade.

[11] Admitted by Soldier F

[12] Yellow Card (November 1971 Revision) ED 71.1. See general rules no. 4

[13] Soldier P does in the course of his Widgery evidence acknowledge that there were soldiers behind him, although he states that he believed that they were members of Composite Platoon.

[14] Lt. 119 did not see the nail-bomber at whom Soldier F fired, nor the nail-bomber at whom Soldier J fired, nor the man with a Luger machine pistol at whom Soldier E fired.

[15] See the evidence of Father Terence O’Keefe H21.51 paragraphs 29 to 31.

[16] Thomas Bradley ARR 5.2 and ARR 5.3, Patrick Norris ARR 46.1 and ARR 46.2, also ARR 46.5,Terence O’Keefe ARR 50.2 and ARR 50.3,Michael McCallion ARR 32.2 and ARR 32.3.

[17] L193

[18] See ED71.1. Yellow Card revised.

[19] Also P1117, P1118 , EP27.6, P1121

[20] AM50.14 to AM50.19

[21] This was eleven minutes after Soldier F's first statement was taken by the RMP.

[22] Soldier F confirmed that himself and Soldier G worked as a pair. B121. Further, they were "great mates". Day 376/71/10 to Day 376/71/11.

[23] WT14. 73G Soldier F confirmed the number of his rifle. This was the number of the rifle identified in Dr. Martin’s evidence and Soldier F agreed there was no possibility of anybody else using that rifle that afternoon.

[24] See the transcript of the relevant excerpt from the Susan North tape at E3.0062-0065.

[25] M34.65 paragraphs 76 to 80

[26] The photographs show that six shots went through the window. However, a number of the persons present refer to a further shot hitting the window frame. Margaret Featherstone AF5.4 paragraphs 20 to 23 refers to one shot hitting the metal frame, then six more coming through the window. Susan North said the following: "I was under the distinct impression there were seven bullets and one had hit the window frame which can also be seen in the photograph". M35.8 paragraphs 48 to 49, M35.9 paragraphs 53 to 58.

[27] A number of soldiers refer to soldiers firing over the Rubble Barricade without identifying them. Soldier H at B229,INQ 1237 at C1237.6 (48) INQ 635, C635.4 (28)

[28] Soldier E, Soldier J and Soldier P of Mortar Platoon.

[29] WT14 61 G

[30] A reference to the more complete exchange on this issue is Day 370/90/21 to Day 370/92/21

[31] “LORD SAVILLE: Another way of describing it would be that you told Mr Harnden things that you knew not to be true; is that right?

A. I told Mr Harnden things that I had gleaned from my first statements, from other people what had told me, just to ham it up a bit so he would make a good case for it and write things in the paper which could persuade the Prime Minister to give us anonymity.” Day 370/91/10 to Day 370/91/17

[32] Soldier J’s involvement in the arrest of individuals and the dishonest accounts he gave about the persons whom he had arrested are also evidence of his willingness to lie about the events of the day. This topic is addressed in relation to Soldier J’s involvement in Sector 4.

18.7.3.167 Soldier J maintains that these are not his words but that Toby Harnden has “taken that out of context to make maximum headlines with it.” Day 370/94/4 to Day 370/94/9 Although it is noteworthy that when asked:

“Q. Was it the position that the game plan was to threaten that if you were to be named, you would not tell the whole story because of fears for your safety in the hope that that threat would influence the decision on anonymity?

A. Well, I do not know really for sure, but it seems a very good bargaining chip to make sure that we did not -- or we did get anonymity, but I cannot remember saying that to him. Again, I think it was a bit of journalistic licence.” Day 370/94/22 to Day 370/95/6

18.7.3.168 It is the case, as Soldier J has had to concede, that his Eversheds statement is the bare minimum and does not enlarge in any way on the statements previously made or the accounts given to Lord Widgery. Day 370/93/25 to Day 370/94/7

18.7.3.169 It is our submission that Soldier J has lied to this Inquiry about the extent of his recollection about Bloody Sunday and that

“the progression of your statements was a carefully constructed device to provide a smokescreen against those who would inquire as to the truth about what happened on Rossville Street and what happened in Glenfada Park”. Day 370/129/1 to Day 370/129/6

18.7.3.170 It will moreover be contended that it became apparent during the course of questioning by our Counsel that Soldier J does in fact have a greater recollection of events than he wishes to acknowledge.[1] Soldier J, just as he lied to Toby Harnden about his role on Bloody Sunday, and as he lied to his own lawyers and this Tribunal about his role as Soldier X, is lying about the extent of his recollection about Bloody Sunday and is doing so with the express objective of obstructing the search for the truth.

18.7.3.171 Soldier J made 3 statements in 1972, two to the RMP and one to the Treasury Solicitor. As with other soldiers in 1 Para who claim either a limited or no recollection about the events Soldier J invites this Tribunal to accept the accounts he gave in 1972 as accurate. As he stated on one occasion, when challenged about the accuracy of those accounts in light of objective evidence to the contrary:

“I think because I put that down in my statement and spoke to Lord Widgery on that, it must be true to say that I did see nail bombs being thrown that day, sir.” Day 370/84/12 to Day 370/84/14

18.7.3.172 However, as with Lt. 119 and other soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, the difficulty lies in establishing which of the various versions advanced by Soldier J in 1972, if any, should be accepted as accurate. Particularly given, not only the contradictions between the various accounts given by Soldier J, but the contradictions between his accounts and those given by other soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon.

18.7.3.173 Soldier J’s first statement was made on the 1^st February 1972, two days after Bloody Sunday, and as he has acknowledged he felt under no pressure at the time he made the statement. Day 370/113/17 to Day 370/113/23 Inasmuch as it relates to Sector 3 he states as follows:

i) That 1 Para had been tasked to advance down Rossville Street to disperse a crowd of 1,500 rioters who were congregated at the Rubble Barricade. B265

ii) As they advanced down the right hand side of Rossville Street he heard automatic fire coming from the Rossville Flats. B265

iii) As they continued to advance they came under fire and heavy stoning from persons located in the Glenfada Court area. B265

iv) When he was 100m from the Rubble Barricade he could clearly see the Barricade and he could see youths throwing missiles. B265

vi) He saw a youth whose hand was in the throwing position and who had an object in his hand from which he could see smoke B266

ix) Meanwhile “Other troops had opened fire on other snipers located around the Rossville and Glenfada Flats area.” B266

x) They then advanced further along Rossville Street towards the Rubble Barricade and several nail bombs were thrown at them. B266

xi) He saw a person at the junction of a block of flats holding a nail bomb, he was able to see smoke coming from the bomb. B266

xii) He fired one shot which hit the wall above the nail bomber’s head, the nail bomber dropped and disappeared and Soldier J did not believe he hit him. B266

xiii) As this was happening he was under fire from the Rossville Flats the fire was automatic. B266

xiv) “The advance was continued and the crowds from the barricade were dispersed.” B266

It should be noted that in his first RMP statement he gives no further information in relation to his involvement in the events of the day and no description of any kind in relation to what occurred in Glenfada Park North.

18.7.3.174 In relation to his first RMP statement it should be noted that, contrary to what he asserted, there never were 1,500 rioters behind the Rubble Barricade. Soldier J was unable in the course of his evidence to this Inquiry to explain how he had come up with that figure. Day 370/12/19 to Day 370/13/1

18.7.3.175 While not a major issue in relation to the evidence he gives, this is just one more example of Soldier J’s preparedness to lie in order to provide justification for the actions of soldiers.

18.7.3.176 Soldier J’s second RMP statement was made on the 4^th February 1972 and is in essence supplemental to his first in that, he does not rehearse those matters about which he had already given an account, but provides additional material, not contained in his first RMP statement. In essence the additional material is as follows:

i) In his first RMP statement he had stated that “Other troops had opened fire on other snipers located around the Rossville and Glenfada Flats area.” B266 In his second statement he states that “From [the Kells Walk Wall] I observed two male persons taking cover behind a barrier which was placed across the street at Rossville Flats. The distance between them and myself was about 100 metres. . . . From my position members of my Coy returned fire at the nail bombers but I cannot say who they were as at this point everyone was wearing gas masks.” B269

ii) Whereas in his first statement he simply refers to going into Glenfada Park North to effect arrests he now provides information in relation to the shooting carried out by F and G in Glenfada Park North.

iii) He gives a description of the incident in which F and G shot at windows in the Rossville Flats. Significantly, from inside the rear of the Pig he was able to say that he heard 2/3 low velocity shots “and more” fired from the “second storey of Rossville Flats at the northern end.” B270

18.7.3.177 The fact that his second statement was made on the 4^th February 1972, is not without significance. We would refer the Tribunal to Section 5 of these submissions wherein we make the case that a significant number of soldiers made statements on that date which were expressly designed to corroborate and justify the use of lethal force by other soldiers.

18.7.3.178 It will be seen from those submissions that a number of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon fall into that category. In particular we would refer the Tribunal to the fact that on the 4^th February 1972 statements were taken from the following members of the Anti Tank Platoon: Soldier J at 15.10 hours, (B269, B270) Soldier 018 at 19.15 hours, (B1487) Soldier 036 at 19.30 hours, (B1629, B1630) Soldier 147 at 20.00 hours (B1886, B1887) and L/Corporal F, time unknown. Soldiers 018, 036 and 147 had not made any statements prior to this date. The statements of each of soldiers 018, 036, 147 and Soldier J deal with the incident where they say they came under fire from the Rossville Flats and Soldiers F and G returned fire.

“. . . I was not in a position to see whether there was a gunman in the flats when the shots were fired, nor could I see that they went through the window. The RMP told me that he needed to include this to substantiate details that had been provided by my colleagues to show that when they fired, they did not hit anybody. As the time I made my statement, I was led to believe the details about the location of the gunman in the flats and the area to which fire was returned were true. I had also heard the shots being fired from my position inside the pig. I therefore agreed to include the details in my statement”. B1491.5 paragraph 42

18.7.3.180 Soldier J’s statement of the 4^th February is exclusively aimed at providing corroboration and justification for the actions of Soldiers F and G. In our submission it was made for that sole purpose and cannot be relied upon, except as further evidence of the willingness of Soldier J to perjure himself at the Widgery Tribunal and to lie in order to assist his colleagues.

18.7.3.181 Soldier J’s third statement was the statement prepared for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry and taken by the Treasury Solicitors. Again this statement differs in material respects from the combination of the first two statements made by Soldier J in the following ways:

i) “We then moved along in front of the wall behind which are low rise flats and while we were moving along to the end of this wall I could see stones and bottles and also nail bombs being thrown in our direction, from the direction of the barricade. I saw one nail bomb explode.” B272 A reading of this statement suggests that Soldier J initially went in front of the Kells Walk Wall and was forced to take cover behind it because of an exploding nail bomb. This is the first occasion upon which he suggests that a nail bomb exploded as they advanced down Rossville Street and prior to taking cover at the Kells Walk Wall.

ii) There was shooting from the Rubble Barricade, he saw three people and there was smoke coming from their rifles and two soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon engaged the 2 gunmen. B272 In his first RMP statement he referred to his colleagues engaging snipers in the Rossville Flats and Glenfada Flats area. In his second RMP statement he suggested that his colleagues engaged nail bombers behind the Rubble Barricade, these nail bombers have now become gunmen. B269

iii) The nail bomber at whom he fired had a fizzing as opposed to a smoking object. B273

iv) As they advanced forward of the Kells Walk Wall several nail bombs were thrown from behind the rubble barricade and 2 exploded. B273 Although he refers to nail bombs being thrown at soldiers as they advanced in his first RMP statement, B266 in neither of his RMP statements does he refer to 2 nail bombs exploding.

v) Again the second alleged nail bomber at whom he fired had a fizzing as opposed to a smoking object. B273

vi) His description of Soldiers F & G firing after the return from Glenfada Park North now involves two separate incidents of civilian fire and return fire. He no longer purports to be able to identify the precise location from whence civilian fire came. B273, B274

18.7.3.182 Finally Soldier J gave evidence at the Widgery Inquiry during which he gave an account broadly in line with his Treasury Solicitor statement except as follows:

i) The 2 men with rifles who were engaged by soldiers from his Platoon were crouched behind the Rubble Barricade and all that could be seen were their heads and shoulders and “puffs of smoke” as they were firing. It was as a result of the shooting from these gunmen that they took cover at Kells Walk Wall. B277.

ii) They were ordered by the Platoon commander, Lt 119 to go into Glenfada Park to make arrests. This is the first time he mentions being ordered into Glenfada Park North.

iii) When he returned from Glenfada Park North and was positioned in the rear of the vehicle, he heard shots from the Rossville Flats. He does not suggest that he was able to identify precisely where the shots came from but states that the wireless operator pointed out to the sentry where the shots were coming from. This sequence was repeated once. B282

18.7.3.183 As can be seen above there are significant variations in Soldier J’s account of events from statement to statement. The changes in the targets fired upon by his colleagues are significant in a number of respects, primarily because it is difficult to see how persons described as nail bombers can suddenly take on the appearance of men with rifles. The greater difficulty is of course that while two other soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon have admitted firing from the Kells Walk Wall, F claims to have fired at a nail-bomber, while E claims to have fired at sniper at Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. No soldier claims to have fired at riflemen at the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.184 Of perhaps even greater significance, given that Soldier J’s justification for the use of lethal force is his belief that the persons he identified were throwing nail bombs, both the sudden appearance of exploding nail bombs, and the change in description in the objects held by both of his own targets from ‘smoking’ objects to ‘fizzing’ objects.

18.7.3.185 In the course of his evidence to this Tribunal Soldier J failed to advance any explanation, coherent or otherwise, for the discrepancies between the various accounts given in 1972.

18.7.3.186 A more significant difficulty which arises however is that some of the other evidence before this Inquiry demonstrates that some of his accounts are patently untrue.

18.7.3.187 On Soldier J’s account he witnessed 3 nail bombs explode on Rossville Street. The first exploded at or about the time Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the Kells Walk Wall and a further 2 exploded as they moved forward of the Kells Walk Wall towards Glenfada Park North.

18.7.3.188 The movement of Anti-Tank Platoon up Rossville Street and their arrival at the Kells Walk Wall is caught on camera by Liam Mailey and the sequence can be found from P1116 to P1121.

18.7.3.189 Not only is it the case that the photographic evidence gives no indication that any nail bomb exploded in this area at or about that time, Liam Mailey who took the photographs, gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, and to this Tribunal. On his evidence no nail bomb exploded on Rossville Street at that time, or for that matter at any stage while he was on Rossville Street. Moreover while Liam Mailey was questioned by Counsel acting on behalf of Soldier J it was never suggested on Soldier J’s behalf, that a nail bomb had exploded at or about the time Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the Kells Walk Wall, or at any time. Finally, of course, Soldier J’s account in this respect, as well as being contradicted by the evidence of media witnesses behind the Rubble Barricade, and the vast body of civilian evidence, is uncorroborated by the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon and Mortar Platoon who were with him on Rossville Street. That a nail bomb could explode on Rossville Street at a time when large numbers of civilians were behind the Rubble Barricade, and large numbers of soldiers were in the vicinity of the Kells Walk Wall, and not a single witness can lend support to Soldier J’s account, renders it entirely implausible.

18.7.3.190 Soldier J contends that 2 further nail bombs exploded as soldiers advanced forward of the Kells Walk Wall. The image of soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon moving forward from the Kells Walk Wall was caught on video and V48/11.35 to 11.55 shows, not merely the soldiers advancing but also the absence of people behind the Rubble Barricade. Not only is it evident that nail bombs were neither thrown nor exploded, it is evident that “there were not any crowds there before the soldiers went in advance of the Kells Walk Wall”. Soldier J was specifically questioned about this issue and dealt with it as follows:

“Q. Could you explain the sentence: "The advance was continued and the crowds from the barricade were dispersed."

A. Well, as it says there, they must have dispersed and moved away from the barricade or from behind the barricade or whatever.

Q. But we have seen the video, there were not any crowds there before the soldiers went in advance of the Kells Walk wall; how do you explain that?

A. All I can say is, they must have moved before the photograph was taken or the video. Because, at one time -- according to that, at one time there was 1,500 people there, they did not just vanish into thin air, sir.

Q. This is after you have shot at a youth on the barricade, after you have gone ahead of the barricade; after, according to your subsequent statements, you have been nail bombed several times and you have seen one explode within 30 metres of where you were, and even after all of that, the advance continued and the crowds were dispersed?

Q. It just does not fit with the objective, independent evidence that exists from the media who were there; it does not fit, because you are lying and you know you are lying; is that not right?

18.7.3.191 Soldier J was given the opportunity in the course of this Inquiry to qualify his allegations with regard to nail bombs and stated as follows:

“Q. Your position, as I understand it, is that you now have, apart from your recollection of the man at whom you shot, no recollection of nail bombs being thrown or exploding; is that right?

Q. The Tribunal has heard a very great deal of civilian evidence that no nail bombs were heard to explode on the day. Is it right that the noise of a nail bomb is deafening?

A. Well, it all depends on the kind of built-up area where it would go off, sir.

Q. Assume that a nail bomb was thrown towards you and exploded, either as you advanced towards the Kells Walk wall or as you advanced from the Kells Walk wall to the barricade, would that make a deafening noise?

Q. Is it possible that whatever bangs and thumps that you heard did not in fact include an exploding nail bomb?

A. Well, I think because I put that down in my statement and spoke to Lord Widgery on that, it must be true to say that I did see nail bombs being thrown that day, sir.

Q. Is it possible that when you saw someone throw something or appear to throw something or with something in his hand, you chose to characterise it as a nail bomb whether you could see that it was or not?

A. If I saw the, the fizz or the smoke coming from it. I would have taken it for granted that it was a nail bomb, sir.” Day 370/83/11 to Day 370/84/20

18.7.3.192 Despite the large number of media witnesses present behind the Rubble Barricade on Bloody Sunday, including photographers and the actuality footage of Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday, there is no objective evidence which lends a shred of support to Soldier J’s evidence that 3 nail bombs exploded on Rossville Street. It is our submission that the evidence establishes beyond doubt that no nail bombs exploded on Rossville Street on Bloody Sunday and Soldier J’s insistence in continuing to assert that they did so, in reliance on what he said in 1972, demonstrates his continued willingness to lie about the events of Bloody Sunday.

18.7.3.193 Soldier J maintains that he does have a recollection of the circumstances in which he fired his two shots.[2] Day 370/28/16 to Day 370/29/13 He can identify his location at the time of the shooting, he can identify the location of his targets, he can describe their actions, he can state with certainty that they were about to throw a nail bomb and he can confirm that he did not hit his targets.

18.7.3.194 It is noteworthy that while he stated he could recollect the incident, he could not assist the Tribunal with any detail about the surrounding circumstances, in particular the two riflemen who were allegedly alongside the nail-bomber and who were being engaged by his colleagues at precisely the same time.[3]

18.7.3.195 In relation to his first target he told this Tribunal that his trajectory photograph P13 was inaccurate and that his target was at the Rubble Barricade but further west than the location identified in his trajectory photograph. Day 370/30/3 to Day 370/30/24

18.7.3.196 The location at which Soldier J places his first target is the location at which Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash were killed, shortly after the killing of Michael Kelly.[4]

18.7.3.197 Soldier J maintains that he was able to identify the object in the persons hand as a nail bomb because, “as I wrote in the statement, I distinctly saw smoke or fizzing coming from it.” Day 370/36/3 to Day 370/36/21 Whether it was smoking or fizzing depends of course on which of his 1972 accounts is to be accepted. He was not prepared to accept that he might have been mistaken in identifying his target as a nail bomber yet, he was wearing a gas mask when he fired his first shot, and was at a distance of approximately 75 yards from his intended target. Day 370/35/6 to Day 370/35/13[5]

18.7.3.198 Under precisely the same conditions Soldier J could not identify the soldiers of his own platoon, standing beside him, who also fired over the Rubble Barricade. Day 370/38/21 to Day 370/39/1 He never noticed Soldiers P or 017 standing in front of the Kells Walk Wall and never noticed Soldier P firing 9 rounds. He never saw any of the 4 persons who were killed behind the Rubble Barricade fall, Day 370/39/6 to Day 370/39/18 yet they were shot and killed while he was at the s Walk Wall and at about the time he was firing at a target at the precise location at which these young men fell.

18.7.3.199 When asked how he could fail to recognise his colleagues, he stated, “it is quite easy, really, I was observing that way, I was not really worried about what was going on at the sides of me. My whole vision was directed towards the barrier which there was people milling about on.” Of course this is precisely the reason why he could not have missed witnessing Michael Kelly, Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash as they were shot and killed.

18.7.3.200 It is moreover quite clear that, contrary to what he has said to this Tribunal, Soldier J does recollect precisely what happened at the time he fired his first round. When asked by Counsel for our clients:

“Q. How could you have failed to have missed the scene of boys walking through the barricade, soldiers firing and people dying when you are looking there?

A. I do not know the timescale of that, but I know there was not anybody really walking about at the time.

Q No, no, no. Surely what you have said is, “but I know there was not anybody really walking about at that time”; is that now a memory that you have, it has come to you suddenly like a bolt from the blue?

A. No, sir, I am just saying that what I saw from the other side of the barricade certainly was not the same as what you see from this side.” Day 370/115/25

18.7.3.201 While he backtracked once he realised his error, it is evident from the above excerpt that Soldier J has a much clearer recollection of his actions on Bloody Sunday than he has been prepared to admit to this Tribunal. The reason Soldier J chooses to hide behind a failing recollection is because he fired at least one live round over the Rubble Barricade, without justification, and he is guilty of the murder of, at least one of, John Young, Michael McDaid or William Nash.

18.7.3.202 Soldier J’s second target was again identified as a nail-bomber. According to Soldier J at the time he fired this shot: he was still wearing his gas-mask; approximately 4 nail bombs had been thrown at him from the Rossville Flats side of the Rubble Barricade; 2 had exploded; and, he was also under automatic fire from the Rossville Flats.

18.7.3.203 Again Soldier J states that he has a recollection of the actual shooting in his mind’s eye, albeit that he can no longer remember any of the surrounding circumstances, whether the exploding nail bombs, or coming under automatic fire. Day 370/49/19 to Day 370/49/23

18.7.3.204 Again Soldier J failed to witness events which were happening at the end of Block 1 at or about the time he was shot: he never saw Hugh Gilmore fleeing for his life along the side of Block 1; he never saw him shot; he never saw the people who came to his aid. Day 370/51/7 to Day 370/51/25 But he is sure that: despite the distance; despite wearing a gas mask; despite the fact that it was a fleeting glance he could not be wrong in his identification of his target as a nail-bomber. Day 370/49/ 25 to Day 370/51/6 and Day 370/51/24 to Day 370/52/4

18.7.3.205 The photographic evidence and the actuality footage, in particular V48/11.35 to 11.55 which shows Anti-Tank Platoon advancing down Rossville Street, demonstrate that when Anti-Tank Platoon advanced there was no one behind the Rubble Barricade, no nail-bombs were thrown and they were not under automatic fire.

18.7.3.206 If Soldier J did fire that round in the direction of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, then he is a strong suspect for having shot and killed Hugh Gilmore as he fled for his life. It is because, as with his first shot, his decision to fire live rounds at unarmed civilians was without justification that Soldier J lied in 1972 and has had to persist in his lies to this Inquiry.

18.7.3.207 Soldier J was returning from Cyprus the night before Bloody Sunday and was not therefore at any briefing given by Lieutenant 119. Nonetheless as with all of the soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon who have given evidence he rejects the suggestion that soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon regarded this as “an occasion upon which 1 Para might be able to engage with the IRA and get some kills”. Day 370/6/7 to Day 370/6/11

18.7.3.208 He claims that his current recollection was simply that they were there to police an illegal march at which trouble was expected. B289.002 paragraph 11 When questioned by Lord Gifford, Soldier J rejected the suggestion that his attitude in going to Derry was that he would like to get at the rioters and people in no-go areas, and deal with them as fully and strenuously as possible. Day 370/144/10 to Day 370/144/12

18.7.3.209 However, even in his statement to this Tribunal it is clear that when he went to Derry it was his view, and a view which was shared by his colleagues, that the situation in Derry was out of control:

“Bombings and shootings seemed to have become a nightly occurrence in Londonderry. Subsequently, just before Bloody Sunday, two police men had been killed there. We had never been to Londonderry but we all saw the news reels on the television about it and wondered why it was going so badly there.” B289.001 paragraph 6

18.7.3.210 His interview with Toby Harnden is more instructive about his approach and that of Anti-Tank Platoon both in terms of their attitude to the persons on the civil rights march and their expectations about to the operation in Derry.

“Q. "Soldier X, of the Support Company, said he had been told by officers that IRA activity was likely." Then there is the passage in quotes:

“We were briefed that it was an illegal march and that the civil rights movement had been completely infiltrated by Republican elements."

"Two policemen had been killed in Londonderry a few days earlier [we know that is true] and we were told that the IRA wanted to cause as much mayhem as possible; we were ready for the worst-case scenario."

18.7.3.211 Unusually, Soldier J accepted, both that this was what he had said to Toby Harnden and that it was true. In our submission this lends support to the view that at the very minimum the soldiers of 1 Para were dangerously hyped-up when they arrived in Derry, that they substantially over-estimated the risk posed to them by unarmed Civil Rights marchers, and that this attitude was encouraged, rather than suppressed by their officers.

18.7.3.212 Michael Kelly, Michael McDaid, John Young, William Nash and Hugh Gilmore were shot and killed at the Rubble Barricade by soldiers at a time when soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, including Soldier J were positioned behind the Kells Walk Wall. Soldier J, in common with the other soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon[6] has been unable to account for how these young men met their deaths. The reason for this complete inability, on the part of any of the soldiers to advance an explanation is because, consistently with the body of civilian evidence, there was indiscriminate and unjustified firing from the Kells Walk Wall which was covered up.

18.7.3.213 A feature of Soldier J’s limited recollection common to all soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon, is his inability to account for the actions of other soldiers. He has never identified the two soldiers standing by his side, apparently shooting at persons who posed a threat to his life and the lives of his colleagues. He claims that he can no longer recollect any of the events in Glenfada Park and thus does not have to deal with questions about what occurred there. He can no longer remember the shooting by Soldiers F and G at windows in the Rossville Flats when Anti-Tank Platoon left Glenfada Park North.

18.7.3.214 Soldier J accepted that he was aware of and understood the implications of the immunity which has been granted to soldiers in relation to their testimony on Bloody Sunday. Day 370/109/14 to Day 370/109/25 While charges cannot be brought against any individual soldier on the basis of admissions made about the events of Bloody Sunday, charges can be brought on the basis of the testimony of other soldiers. Thus if Soldier J was to identify his colleagues who fired lethal rounds over the Rubble Barricade, or was to describe the actions of his colleagues in Glenfada Park his testimony could incriminate them. Soldier J, and other soldiers in Anti-Tank Platoon have adopted a strategy of mutual protection. Each individual soldier is left to account as best he can for the shots he discharged, but no Soldier will account for the shots fired by his colleagues. By failing to recollect the actions of their colleagues, they prevent effective questioning of those actions and nothing they say can be used to incriminate the other. In this way the truth about their wilful murder of innocent civilians on Bloody Sunday is hidden. Day 364/23/10 to Day 364/23/15

18.7.3.215 Soldier J has given a false account about the circumstances in which he fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday both to Lord Widgery and to this Tribunal “false both as to what they did say and false by reason of what they omitted.” Day 370/149/2 to Day 370/149/8 He has moreover lied about the extent of his recollection of the events of the day. He has done so because on the 30^th January 1972 Soldier J participated in murder, and in the years since he has participated in criminal conspiracy to prevent the truth about Bloody Sunday from emerging, to protect himself from the consequences of his actions on Bloody Sunday.

18.7.3.216 Soldier H fired more live rounds on Bloody Sunday than any other soldier, firing a total of 22 shots. According to Soldier H, 19 of those rounds were fired into a frosted glass window in Glenfada Park North. It is alleged, that as Lord Widgery found in 1972:

“It is highly improbable that this cycle of events should repeat itself 19 times; and indeed it did not. . . . So 19 of the 22 shots fired by Soldier H were wholly unaccounted for.”

18.7.3.217 Soldier H’s conduct on Bloody Sunday is vital to understanding the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday. He was at the Kells Walk Wall when members of his Platoon and Mortar Platoon fired over the Rubble Barricade and 5 people were killed.[7] He was in Glenfada Park North when members of his Platoon shot and killed people in Glenfada Park North, Abbey Park and in Rossville Street. Most significantly, having fired 19 unaccounted for rounds, he must be a prime candidate for one or more of the civilian deaths which Anti-Tank Platoon have chosen not to account for, including the deaths of those murdered behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.218 Soldier H’s conduct in Glenfada Park will be dealt with separately in Sector 4. However given that:

ii) soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon have been unable to account for the casualties behind the Rubble Barricade;

it will be necessary to address the firing of those rounds, despite the fact that he has generally maintained that those rounds were fired in Glenfada Park North.[8]

18.7.3.219 Soldier H gave 3 separate statements to the RMP in 1972, he also made a statement to the Treasury Solicitor. His first 2 statements were apparently made within 20 minutes of each other, one of them is timed at 2.10am on the 31^st January, B218 while the second is timed at 2.30am on the 31^st January. B228B

18.7.3.220 As was noted by Counsel for the Tribunal the second statement appears not so much to be supplemental as “a complete re-write of [the first statement] and . . . appears to be markedly more intelligible.” Day 377/126/21 to Day 377/127/6 Soldier H has been unable to assist the Inquiry as to the circumstances surrounding the making of these two statements within such a short time-frame.

18.7.3.221 There are significant discrepancies as between the various accounts which have been given by Soldier H about Bloody Sunday, in 1972 and to this Tribunal. It is not proposed to address each discrepancy in detail. Rather it is our submission that reading Soldier H’s accounts of Bloody Sunday whether given in 1972 or 2003 a clear trend emerges, and that is a willingness to exaggerate, sometimes to fantastical levels, about alleged attacks on his Platoon and the level of threat faced by them as they entered the Bogside. In every account he has given about the events of Bloody Sunday, Soldier H has lied, and in suggesting that 1 Para faced an onslaught of hostile attacks from armed civilians he aims to distract attention from his actions and in some way to justify his involvement in murder.

18.7.3.222 In his first statement Soldier H makes no mention of hearing the drainpipe shot prior to receiving the order to move in. In his second RMP statement he describes hearing a shot which struck the east wall of the Presbyterian Church. B228 By the time he makes his Treasury Solicitor’s statement he has not only heard the shot but seen the drainpipe fall. B233

18.7.3.223 This evolving state of knowledge about the drainpipe shot is not unique to Soldier H. A large number of soldiers from 1 Para now claim to have either heard or seen that shot, despite not having made that claim in their original accounts. Significantly the same soldiers never give an account of having heard the 5 SLR shots fired by soldiers from Machine-Gun Platoon when at that location.

18.7.3.224 It is accepted that the drain-pipe shot occurred and was heard and/or witnessed by some soldiers. However in 1972 it became a relatively common feature of the evidence of many soldiers of 1 Para despite the fact that an examination of those accounts shows them to be inconsistent as to the detail. This occurred, not because soldiers had witnessed this incident but rather because: having learnt of this shot subsequently, soldiers decided of their own volition to dishonestly insert it into their evidence; or, it was suggested to soldiers by the RMP that they should insert this into their statements. Whichever is true large numbers of soldiers claim to have witnessed this shot and have gave evidence about it in order to bolster the soldiers’ case before Lord Widgery.

18.7.3.225 In the case of Soldier H, his claim to have heard the drainpipe shot is not without significance given what he said in his statement to this Tribunal:

“I felt this was confirmation of our expectation that the IRA were prepared for us and that they had deployed their snipers around the Bogside. We knew we were going into a hostile environment and when the shot was fired at us we realised that the IRA had got their weapons out as soon as we had arrived. They didn’t want us going in to the Bogside which had been their territory for two years. However, they were used to dealing with less well trained troops. Coming under fire like that would get you keyed up.” B262 paragraph 5

18.7.3.226 In our submission the drainpipe shot has become, for many soldiers a ex post facto justification for the aggressiveness with which they went into the Bogside and the eagerness they displayed in the use lethal force.

18.7.3.227 In his second statement to the RMP Soldier H describes hearing the sound of gunfire and bullets striking the left hand side of the vehicle before they debussed. B229 That account was not contained in his first statement and in subsequent statements he is more hesitant about the claim stating that he thought he had heard a shot strike the side of the Pig. B233 and B237.

18.7.3.228 When Soldier H made his statement for the purposes of this Tribunal he stated:

“I heard bullets strike the side of our Pig. It was more than two bullets and I would describe it as a hail of bullets. It was very frightening to be shot at while you were sitting in a Pig. It was like being in a tin can with someone banging a stick on the outside.” B263 paragraph 10

18.7.3.229 Soldier H has acknowledged in his evidence to this Tribunal that the sound he described may have been caused by stones hitting the side of the vehicle. No other soldier from Anti-Tank Platoon claims that their Platoon came under fire as they entered the Bogside in vehicles and is entirely dishonest. However Soldier H’s account of coming under fire, even prior to de-bussing, is consistent with his overall approach to giving evidence.

18.7.3.230 In his first statement Soldier H describes 4 gunmen behind the Rubble Barricade who were continually firing as Anti-Tank Platoon advanced from the Rossville Street/William Street junction up Rossville Street. B219 Moreover as Anti-Tank Platoon advanced up Rossville Street under this hail of gunfire Soldier H describes their being simultaneously stoned, nail bombed and acid bombed. B219

18.7.3.231 In his second RMP statement the number of gunmen has been reduced to two, while the nail bombs and acid bombs have disappeared. B229 In his Treasury Solicitor statement and the account given to the Widgery Inquiry he speaks of at least 2 gunmen. B233, B238

18.7.3.232 Soldier H maintains that 2 soldiers from his Platoon opened fire on the gunmen although he has never identified those soldiers and now claims that he cannot do so. As with Lieutenant 119 his explanation of the circumstances in which soldiers fired at the Rubble Barricade from the Kells Walk Wall is inconsistent with the accounts given by the soldiers who admit to having fired live rounds at that location.

18.7.3.233 He cannot now give an account of any firing from the Rubble Barricade and cannot explain how the nail bombs which he recollected at 2.10am had been forgotten by 2.30am. This account is moreover inconsistent with the photographic evidence showing the arrival of Anti-Tank Platoon at the Kells Walk Wall.

18.7.3.234 P1119 and P1120 contradict the suggestion that Anti-Tank Platoon were coming under fire as they advanced down Rossville Street in that soldiers were able to move forward of the low wall without cover. Moreover Soldiers P and 017 never took cover behind the Kells Walk Wall, undermining the suggestion of continual shooting, nail bombs and acid bombs even further

18.7.3.235 Soldier H’s inability to separate truth from fiction is evident even in his statement to this Inquiry. He describes the scene as Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the Kells Walk Wall in the following terms:

“There were thousands of people all around and there were only 10 of us. I was conscious that we had been shot as we entered and people were throwing stones at us.” B264 paragraph 13

18.7.3.236 It is evident from the photographs which show Anti-Tank Platoon as they arrived at the Kells Walk Wall P1117 to P1121, or the video evidence of the vehicles as they stopped, showing small groups fleeing from soldiers, that no description could be further from the truth. Once questioned about this Soldier H accepted that “It was not actually thousands of people surrounding us.” Day 377/27/22 to Day 377/27/23

18.7.3.237 However the fact that he was willing to continue to make a case, which was both discernibly untrue and designed to paint a picture of soldiers as victims, illustrates the lengths to which this witness is willing to go to hide the truth about Bloody Sunday.

187.3.238 Soldier H’s third statement is undated, B224 however, in common with a large number of statements taken from soldiers on the 4^th February 1972, it appears to be aimed solely at providing corroboration for the actions of other shooters, and in particular Soldiers F and G. Much of the detail of that statement deals with events which occurred in Glenfada Park North. However, in common with Soldier J (B269 to B270) Soldier 018 (B1487) Soldier 036 (B1629, B1630) and Soldier 147 (B1886, B1887) Soldier H’s third statement deals with the incident on Rossville Street when soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon maintain that they come under fire while in their pig and where Soldiers F and G fired at the Rossville Flats.

18.7.3.239 As with Soldier J, Soldier H’s third statement of the 4^th February has as its sole objective providing corroboration and justification for the actions of Soldiers F and G. It cannot be relied upon, except as further evidence of Soldier H’s inability to tell the truth.

18.7.3.240 Soldier H can no longer recollect the gunfire or nail bombs he gave evidence about in 1972, prior to entering Glenfada Park, with the exception that he maintains his recollection of the drain-pipe shot and of coming under fire whilst in the pig. Despite this he describes his feelings on entering Glenfada Park in the following terms:

“As I entered the courtyard I was terrified. I remember my knees trembling. The knocking of my knees is one of the clearest memories I have of the day. Coming under fire was absolutely terrifying.” B264 paragraph 16

18.7.3.241 He was unable to explain to this Tribunal the basis of that fear, given his limited recollection, stating “I can only now remember the nervousness of it there.” Day 377/52/2 to Day 377/52/21

18.7.3.242 What is clear is that while the details have changed, the picture painted by Soldier H in 2003 is the same as the picture painted in 1972. It is an image of soldiers facing a terrifying ordeal, coming under attack from armed civilians and forced to have recourse to lethal force and it is a gross distortion of the truth.

18.7.3.243 The reason Soldier H finds it necessary to distort the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday is because, as found by Lord Widgery, 19 of the 22 shots fired by Soldier H remain unaccounted for to this day.

18.7.3.244 Soldier H’s account of how he came to fire those 19 shots is so implausible it has been universally rejected. His Platoon Commander Lieutenant 119 stated that his initial reaction to hearing the description of Soldier H’s shots was “surprise and disbelief that he could have fired so many rounds of ammunition without me knowing about it.” B1752.018 paragraph 37 He subsequently went back to Glenfada Park and found that there was no damage to the area around the window and he gave evidence that he formed the belief that Soldier H may have lost a magazine full of ammunition because a “spare empty magazine was relatively easily obtainable.” B1752.018 paragraph 38

18.7.3.245 Sergeant 1694, Soldier H’s Platoon Sergeant apparently expressed concerns to CSM Lewis about some of the soldiers who had returned fire on Bloody Sunday, and in particular Soldier H, because of the explanation advanced by Soldier H for how he came to fire so many rounds. Day 373/226/1 to Day 373/226/9 and Day 373/227/8 to Day 373/227/25

18.7.3.246 CSM Lewis regarded Soldier H’s story as “incredible” Day 373/94/4 and stated that it was his belief that some soldiers, including Soldier H, may have responded, as he euphemistically put it, rather “enthusiastically, over enthusiastically, to a situation which could have been controlled easier by firing fewer rounds.” Day 373/99/12 to Day 373/99/22

18.7.3.247 A number of Soldier H’s fellow soldiers have also expressed their scepticism about his account. For example INQ 2003 stated:

“Soldier H’s story was that he shot magazines at a window but the story from the lads was that he lost it. Afterwards he could not be trusted and stayed in camp on Pig guard. “Rentokil” and “Two Mags” were two of his nicknames afterwards.” C2003.33 paragraph 19

18.7.3.248 Moreover, not a single soldier who was with Soldier H in Glenfada Park North has corroborated his account and as Soldier H acknowledged, so far as he is aware, “no-one has ever mentioned to you at any time that they saw you firing 19 shots.” Day 378/45/7 to Day 378/45/10

18.7.3.249 There are a number of difficulties with Soldier H’s account which demonstrate that it simply cannot be true:

i) In 1972 the area around the window at Glenfada Park North was examined and not only had the window not been broken but there was no damage to the area around the window.

“Sometime after Bloody Sunday but before the Widgery Tribunal I went back to Londonderry with a number of others in civilian clothes and accompanied by a number of RMP soldiers. My concern was to investigate the situation regarding H. The window at which he said he had fired 19 rounds was inspected and there were no signs of any damage around it which, if H was correct, there should have been and which could have been repaired in the time. The only explanation was that every round had gone through the window and only the glass needed replacing.” B1752.018 paragraph 37 Lt. 119

ii) Mrs. McCartney who lived in the house gave evidence that one shot was fired into their home, but not through a frosted window. The frosted window had not been damaged and there was no damage to their home consistent with Soldier H’s account. AM90 paragraphs 1 to 6[9]

iv) Moreover the account was so implausible that no soldier was willing to corroborate the incident despite the evidence which suggests that soldiers did provide corroboration for shooters in order to justify the circumstances in which they had fired live rounds. Section 5

18.7.3.250 Yet Soldier H, when giving evidence to this Inquiry, sought to resist the inescapable conclusion that his account of having fired through the window 19 times was untrue, and in doing so invited the Tribunal to believe the unbelievable:

i) When asked whether he was “seriously inviting the Tribunal to accept, as a realistic possibility, that 19 bullets fired at that window would not cause it to shatter?” He responded “I am stating what I know, sir.” Day 377/73/5 to Day 377/73/17

ii) The account given by Soldier H of the gunman disappearing and re-appearing, while leaving his rifle behind, defies credulity as the following exchange demonstrates:

“ if there was a gunman and if, as would seem likely in those circumstances, it was he who was supporting the rifle which he intended to use to fire at soldiers, then if you shot at him on 19 separate occasions and he moved away, you would expect the rifle inevitably to move as well; would you not?

Q. -- it is a necessary consequence of your evidence, if true, that something else was supporting the rifle so that it remained in a fixed position throughout; that must be the suggestion, must it not?

A. You are suggesting that. I, I cannot make a suggestion on something I do not know.

“Q. To fire 19 shots in your direction over a period of time, singly, waiting for the shadow to reappear and fire again, would take a little time; would it not, it is not just an odd shot that would get missed?

you would agree that it is remarkable that no-one saw you doing it; would you not?

Q. If that account is right, the upshot must be that the gunman, having been shot at once, must have intentionally moved into the same position of mortal danger, in line with a soldier with an SLR, who had just tried to kill him on 18 further occasions?

Q. Yes, the fact that he moved forward on 18 occasions -- 18 further occasions that you missed him on each occasion, is the explanation for those facts that in fact they are not true?

A. No, that is not right, sir. The statements I made at the time were true to the best of my knowledge and I would stick to those statements.” Day 377/76/10 to Day 377/77/10

18.7.3.251 In reality the last sentence encapsulates the evidence of Soldier H to this Inquiry. He was going to stick with the account he had given in 1972 despite all the evidence to the contrary, as he acknowledged himself

18.7.3.252 Soldier H fired 19 shots on Bloody Sunday for which he has never provided a truthful account. We know that Soldier H, along with other soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon, was at the Kells Walk Wall. We also know that soldiers fired from that position over the Rubble Barricade causing the deaths of Michael Kelly, John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash and also possibly Hugh Gilmore. Michael Kelly was killed by Soldier F, the other deaths remain unaccounted for. It is also of course the case that civilians were murdered in Glenfada Park North, Abbey Park and behind the Rossville Flats by soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon and Soldier H is a candidate for having killed those civilians.

18.7.3.253 Soldier H advanced a ludicrous account to explain his firing of 19 shots in January 1972 and he has been ‘sticking’ to that account ever since. The truth is not, as some of his colleagues have sought to advance on his behalf, that he lost a magazine. The truth is that on Bloody Sunday Soldier H fired 22 rounds in circumstances which were entirely without justification. Some of those rounds resulted in the deaths of unarmed civilians and he invented this account in order to try to account for the number of rounds expended, in a way which would not render him accountable for murder.

18.7.3.254 Soldier H is undoubtedly guilty of murder, the tragedy for the family of his victim/s is that he is not prepared, even now to explain his actions on Bloody Sunday. Soldier H is also, along with his colleagues in Anti-Tank Platoon guilty of having participated for 30 years in a criminal conspiracy to prevent the truth of their role in Bloody Sunday from emerging and has perjured himself in his evidence to Lord Widgery and in his evidence to this Tribunal.

18.7.3.255 Soldier H’s unaccounted for 19 shots do not merely raise the spectre of Soldier H’s guilt. They also demonstrate, without more, the complicity of his colleagues, his senior officers and the Ministry of Defence in murder and their tolerance of murderers within the ranks of the British army.

18.7.3.256 As has been seen: Soldier H’s colleagues did not believe his account; his Platoon Sergeant; his Platoon Commander; and the Company Sergeant Major did not believe his account. Lord Widgery expressly rejected his account in the conclusions he reached. Nonetheless when asked whether he was aware that Lord Widgery had rejected his evidence he stated:

A. No, sir, after the Tribunal, um we never heard no more.” Day 378/3/17 to Day 378/3/22

18.7.3.257 He was never disciplined for the firing of those rounds, nor indeed criticised. Day 378/4/16 to Day 378/4/20 Despite the fact that as INQ 1900 stated:

“it was clear to me that much of what occurred was outside the requirements of the Yellow Card. In one statement, a soldier said he fired 19 shots at a shadow in a window. In another case, a soldier said that he fired over the heads of the crowd. These two statements stick in my mind because they were totally outside the requirements of the Yellow Card and so blatantly wrong.” C1900.4 paragraph 23

18.7.3.258 Moreover, no action was taken by the RUC, upon receipt of the report and the conclusions of the Lord Chief Justice. The only conclusion possible from the universal rejection of Soldier H’s account, from his colleagues in 1 Para, through to the Lord Chief Justice was that he had used lethal force in circumstances which were unjustified. Yet Soldier H remained in the army for some considerable period after Bloody Sunday and left the army as a senior NCO. Day 378/2/8 to Day 378/2/14 There can be no clearer example of the willingness of the British military to condone “unadulterated murder”. GEN 02.07

18.7.3.259 Soldier E was one of the soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon who used lethal force on Bloody Sunday. In 1972 he admitted to having fired 2 shots on Bloody Sunday. The first in Sector 3 and the second in Sector 4.

18.7.3.260 The trajectory of Soldier E’s first shot is such that if his account is accurate in this respect he may be a candidate for the shooting of Hugh Gilmore. However, given that:

i) Soldier E is one of the few soldiers who admits having fired a shot from behind the Kells Walk Wall;

ii) John Young, Michael McDaid and William Nash were shot and killed by a soldier/s shooting down Rossville Street;

iii) None of the admitted firing by soldiers down Rossville Street accounts for their deaths,

iv) No witness, civilian or military, corroborates any aspect of Soldier E’s use of lethal force in Rossville Street;

Soldier E must also be a suspect for the murder of one of those three young men.

18.7.3.261 As with other soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon whose evidence is relevant to 2/more Sectors this section deals exclusively with his role in Sector 3 on Bloody Sunday.

18.7.3.262 It is alleged that Soldier E lied to the Widgery Inquiry, not merely about the circumstances in which he himself fired live rounds, but also in the evidence he gave about the general situation facing soldiers on Bloody Sunday and about the circumstances in which other soldiers fired live rounds. Specifically it is our case that:

i) Soldier E lied about the circumstances in which he himself fired a live round. Soldier E did not come under fire from a gunman with a Luger/machine-pistol located in the Rossville Flats, and he lied in order to justify his use of lethal force in circumstances which were unjustified and unlawful.

ii) Soldier E also lied about the general situation which faced soldiers when they de-bussed in Rossville Street. In particular he lied about: coming under fire as soldiers advanced down Rossville Street; hearing a nail bomb explode as he moved down Rossville Street; witnessing a petrol bomb explode in Rossville Street; and observing gunmen behind the Rubble Barricade, including one who was shot. He lied about these incidents in order to provide justification, in general terms for the actions and in particular the use of lethal force, by soldiers from his regiment on the streets of Derry on Bloody Sunday.

iii) Soldier E also lied about the circumstances in which he admits to having witnessed another soldier fire a live round. He gave evidence to the Treasury Solicitors and to Lord Widgery designed to provide some justification for the shooting by G at a window in the Rossville Flats in circumstances which were without justification.

18.7.3.263 Soldier E’s conduct in Glenfada Park North will be dealt with separately in Sector 4 however his conduct in Glenfada Park is relevant to his conduct while on Rossville Street in a number of respects. Soldier E is one of the soldiers who admits having entered Glenfada Park North and fired live rounds. According to Lord Widgery Soldier E was one of the soldiers involved in shooting civilians as they were fled from himself and his colleagues. The evidence given by soldiers to the Widgery Inquiry in relation to their involvement in events in Glenfada Park North was demonstrably dishonest and designed to cover up their involvement in murder. Soldier E thus demonstrated a willingness to use lethal force against unarmed civilians and to perjure himself in order to cover up his role and the role of his colleagues in wilful murder. In those circumstances little or no weight can be attached to Soldier E’s account of his use of lethal force in Rossville Street in the absence of corroboration.

18.7.3.264 Soldier E was also one of the soldiers involved in conducting arrests in Glenfada Park North. We would refer the Tribunal in particular to our allegation that paratroopers systematically lied about the identification of marchers as rioters as well as the location of, and reasons, for the “arrests”. Members of the Parachute Regiment, including Soldier E, made formal statements of (fabricated) evidence for the purpose of supporting criminal charges against the marchers, charges which, if proven, would have led to mandatory 6-month prison sentences. Soldier E’s willingness to participate in what was in effect a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice is further evidence of his willingness to participate in unlawful and dishonest conduct in 1972. His readiness to invent evidence for this purpose undermines his credibility generally and his evidence concerning his involvement in the use of lethal force.

18.7.3.265 Soldier E’s involvement in the unlawful use of lethal force in Glenfada Park North, the lies he told about the conduct of himself and other soldiers in Glenfada Park North and his preparedness to fabricate the circumstances of the arrests of innocent civilians all go to undermine his account of events on Rossville Street. Specifically that conduct provides support for the allegation that the circumstances in which he used lethal force on Rossville Street were unlawful, without justification and in all probability involved the murder of one of Hugh Gilmore, Michael McDaid, John Young or William Nash.

18.7.3.266 Soldier E made 3 separate statements to the RMP, all on the 31^st January 1972, he also made a statement to the Treasury Solicitor prior to giving evidence at the Widgery Inquiry.

18.7.3.267 Inasmuch as it referred to Sector 3, Soldier E stated as follows, in his first RMP statement:

i) As Anti-Tank Platoon advanced up Rossville Street he heard automatic gunfire and other shots coming from the vicinity of the Rossville Flats, he also saw a petrol bomb explode. B86

ii) Soldier E took up a position behind the Kells Walk Wall and saw a man in a window on the second storey from the top of the Rossville Flats who appeared to have a pistol of some sort in his hands. The gunman fired a shot and E fired 1 aimed shot at the gunman which he saw go through the window and strike the ceiling. B86, B87

iii) He then saw a man behind the Rubble Barricade with what appeared to be a machine gun. He saw him take up a firing position and then fall as if he had been shot. B87

iv) He saw a man next to the man with the machine gun with the butt of a gun. B87

v) The rioters behind the Rubble Barricade then moved towards Glenfada Park North and he moved forward in order to head them off. B87

vi) On returning from Glenfada Park North and while on Rossville Street troops came under fire from the Rossville Flats. Soldier E did not see any target and did not fire any further rounds. B87

18.7.3.268 In his second RMP statement he claimed that Michael Kelly was the person he had shot in Glenfada Park North and that he had shot him for throwing nail bombs. B91 It has of course now been established that Michael Kelly was killed by Soldier F and was shot and killed while positioned behind the Rubble Barricade.

18.7.3.269 In his third RMP statement, apparently made only 10 minutes later, he claimed that Gerard Donaghey was the person he had shot in Glenfada Park North and he had shot him for being in possession of nail bombs. B93.001, B93.002 It has now of course been established that Gerard Donaghy was killed by Soldier G and was shot and killed while in Abbey Park.

18.7.3.270 Soldier E subsequently gave an account of events to the Treasury Solicitor, as follows:

i) Shooting had broken out shortly after debussing and he cocked his rifle “which is the normal procedure.” B94

ii) As he reached the end of the Rossville Flats sniper fire broke out from the area of the Rossville Flats and he heard machine gunfire. B94

iv) He saw a sniper from the second storey from the top of the Rossville Flats who fired 1 shot with a machine pistol. Soldier E fired 1 shot which went through the window, he stated that he had no idea whether he hit the sniper. B94

v) He then saw a petrol bomb explode about 30 yards in front of the Rubble Barricade. B94

vi) At the same time he saw 2 gunmen behind the centre of the Rubble Barricade, one was kneeling and in firing position, he saw the gunman fall but could not say where the shot had come from. B94

vii) He saw the crowd escape towards Glenfada Park North so he got 4/5 men and moved forward. B94

viii) Upon returning from Glenfada Park North to Rossville Street they got into their vehicles. He maintained that they stayed in that position for 45 minutes during which time sniper fire of mixed velocity was directed at their position. B94

18.7.3.271 The account which Soldier E gave to the Treasury Solicitors is more detailed than that given to the RMP. There are also a number of discrepancies between the two accounts:

i) In his RMP statement he claimed that the petrol bomb exploded as Anti-Tank Platoon advanced up Rossville Street and prior to their having taken up position at the Kells Walk wall. B86 In his Treasury Solicitor statement he claimed that the petrol bomb exploded after he had taken up position at the Kells Walk Wall and after he had fired at his first target. B94

ii) In his RMP statement he claimed that he could see in through the window of the flat into which he had fired his shot and that he hit the ceiling. B86, B87 In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors he claimed that he could not say one way or the other whether he had hit the gunman. B94

iii) In both statements he described seeing two gunmen behind the Rubble Barricade, one of whom he saw fall as if shot. In his RMP statement he identified the gunman whom he saw fall by reference to his having what appeared to be a machinegun. He also described him as wearing glasses, with a cloth tied around the lower part of his face and wearing dark clothing. The second man is identified as having the “butt of a gun” Soldier E was unable to see any more of the supposed weapon. B87 In his Treasury Solicitor’s statement he simply states that he saw 2 gunmen behind the Rubble Barricade, one of whom was kneeling and in a firing position and whom he saw fall. B94

iv) In his RMP statement he makes no reference to having seen Soldier G fire at any target in Rossville Street upon their return to their vehicles. In his Treasury Solicitor statement he states that he saw Soldier G “who was a sentry for one of the other armoured vehicles take up position and fire.” B95

18.7.3.272 Soldier E gave evidence to Lord Widgery, there are a number of discrepancies between the account he gave to Lord Widgery and the accounts he gave earlier as follows:

i) He claimed to have heard an explosion in the area of the Rossville Flats which sounded like a nail bomb. WT14.29A He never previously made such a claim, either in his account to the RMP, or to the Treasury Solicitors.

ii) He claimed that he took cover behind the Kells Walk Wall because he came under fire 3 times from the Rossville Flats by machine pistol fire. WT14.29B-C In his previous statements he had claimed that the man with the Luger had fired only one shot. B86 and B94. This was the subject of questioning by Mr. Read Counsel to the Tribunal at B113D-E and will be dealt with in more detail at 20.9.3.210 – 20.9.3.218 below.

iii) His account in relation to what he saw of the shot he had fired is consistent with his Treasury Solicitor’s statement rather than his RMP statement in that he claimed that he could not say whether he had hit the gunman B94 but did not claim that he could see the shot he had fired hit the ceiling. B86, B87

iv) His account of having seen the petrol bomb is consistent with his Treasury Solicitor’s statement rather than his RMP statement in that he claims that it exploded after he had fired at his first target. B101D-E

v) In relation to the two alleged gunmen behind the Rubble Barricade. He now states that one had a Thompson sub-machine gun whilst the other had “what appeared to be a rifle”. B101G In his RMP statement he had stated that the first gunman, who was subsequently shot, “appeared” to have a machine-gun. B87

vi) He described this gunman as wearing goggles, as opposed to glasses. B102C

vii) He described the second purported gunman as crawling, a description he had not given before. B102A Under questioning from Mr. Hill he identified the weapon as a rifle.

viii) He continued to assert that he had acted of his own initiative in making the decision to move to Glenfada Park North, for the purpose of cutting off the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade. B102F

ix) In relation to Soldier G’s firing, he now claimed that when they came under fire whilst in their vehicles he could hear the crack “which indicated it came from the Rossville Flats” B105E and that Soldier G had fired one round towards the Rossville Flats. B106A Previously he had not been able to identify where the incoming rounds had come from or in what direct Soldier G had fired in.

18.7.3.273 It is our contention that Soldier E gave false accounts, both in the written accounts he gave of the events of Bloody Sunday and also in the oral testimony which he gave to Lord Widgery about the circumstances in which he fired a live round in Rossville Street, while positioned behind the low wall.

i) Because his first account of the shooting is on the face of it ludicrous and patently dishonest;

ii) Because of the discrepancies between the accounts originally given and the account given by Soldier E in oral evidence, during the course of which he demonstrated his willingness to lie about the incident;

iii) Large numbers of soldiers ought to have been in a position to provide some corroboration of both Soldier E’s firing a live round as alleged and of the circumstances which justified Soldier E firing a live round. Yet not a single member of Anti-Tank Platoon, nor Mortar Platoon provides a shred of evidence which corroborates either Soldier E’s suggestion that he fired a round at the Rossville Flats or which could justify E’s his use of lethal force.

18.7.3.275 In the first account given by Soldier E of the shooting he maintained that he saw the shot he fired go through the window and hit the ceiling. B86, B87 The idea that Soldier E positioned behind the Kells Walk Wall could have a sufficiently clear view of a ceiling on the inside of a flat on the second storey from the top of the Rossville Flats is a patently untrue. Inevitably that version of events disappears from subsequent accounts given by Soldier E and he was not questioned about this matter at the Widgery Inquiry.

18.7.3.276 The assertion is not without significance given that in the same statement Soldier E stated that the person at whom he fired “appeared” to have a gun. It is submitted that even on his own account there must be a question-mark as to whether the circumstances in which he fired justified the use of lethal force, given his limited observation of an alleged gunman.

18.7.3.277 In his written statements made in 1972 Soldier E stated that he had fired at the man with the weapon identified as a Luger-type pistol and located in the Rossville Flats after that man had fired one shot. B87, B94 When he gave oral evidence to Lord Widgery he claimed that the man had fired three shots. B100B-C

18.7.3.278 Soldier E was specifically questioned about this issue, during the course of the Widgery Tribunal, by Mr. Read, counsel for the Tribunal:

“Q. May I now turn to the small machine pistol which you say you saw fired from the window of Rossville Flats. Do you remember giving evidence today to my Lord that there were roughly three shots?

Q. One shot was fired at you but there were other shots which were not? Is that what you are saying?

18.7.3.279 In the first instance it should be pointed out that what Soldier E, in fact, said to Lord Widgery was:

18.7.3.280 This portion of the transcript demonstrates that Soldier E was clearly describing himself as having come under fire from the Rossville Flats, the fire having come from a small machine pistol and roughly three shots having been fired at him. B100B-C

Photo Ref. #	Description of Photograph	Relevant Witnesses Depicted in Photograph
P 661	Photograph of HG on the march	?
P 662/ EP23.9	HG running towards entrance to Block 1	Frank Mellon, Seán MacDermott, Don Carlin, James Greene, PIRA 26, Colm Keenan
P 663 / EP23.9A	Wider photograph of HG running towards Block 1	As above
P 664	Crowd round HG’s body at gable end	Hugh Kelly, Bernard Gallagher, Brian McCool, Danny McGowan, Frank Mellon
P 665	HG’s body at gable end	N/A
P 666	HG being tended to by Knight of Malta	?
P 667	HG and Barney McGuigan’s bodies by gable end	?
P 668	HG’s body covered by banner	Hugh Kelly and John Friel
P 669	HG’s body covered with blanket (shoes removed)	?
P 672	HG’s body on stretcher	?

Witness ¹	Location of HG when shot			Direction in which HG was facing		Reason for believing saw impact of bullet
	At / near rubble barricade	Running south	Other	North / towards soldiers	South / away from. soldiers
	At / near rubble barricade	Running south	Other	North / towards soldiers	South / away from. soldiers
Kathleen Brown	-	-	ü	ü	-	Claimed to have actually seen a soldier shoot him
Donal Deeney	ü	-	-	? ²	?	Heard HG say ‘I’m shot’ at barricade
James Greene	ü	-	-	ü	-	Heard HG say ‘I’m shot’ at barricade
Seán MacDermott	ü	-	-	? ³	?	Heard HG say ‘I’m shot’ at barricade (1972 account)
Geraldine McBride	-	ü	-	-	ü	Heard bullet whiz past her; HG gasped and said he was hit
Michael McCusker	-	ü	-	-	ü	HG put his hand to his back and staggered
Alexander McFadden	-	-	ü	-	ü	HG called out ‘I’m hit’
Eamon Melaugh	ü	ü	-	ü	ü	HG suddenly bent over and clutched his elbow (1972 account)
Frank Mellon	ü	-	-	-	ü	HG jerked and said ‘I’ve been hit’
Margaret Patterson	-	ü	-	-	ü	HG span round and fell
PIRA 14	P	-	-	P	-	Heard possibly 2 shots. Saw HG clutch stomach in a spasm. Saw him run and shout something like “I’m hit”
PIRA 26	P	-	-	P	-	Saw HG throw a stone. Saw soldier shooting. About same moment heard HG call out “I’m hit, I’m hit”

Photo Ref. #	Description of Photograph	Relevant Witnesses Depicted in Photograph ¹
P673	Kevin McElhinney on march at Rathlin Drive	N/A
P673.001	Kevin McElhinney in William Street (water canon being fired from Barrier 14)	N/A
P673.002	Kevin McElhinney in William Street	N/A
P673.003	Kevin McElhinney at rubble barricade	N/A
P674	Maybe him, crawling along Block 1	John McLaughlin and Barry Liddy
P674.001	Kevin McElhinney’s body in stairwell of Block 1, covered with a yellow blanket	John Dunleavy? and John McGrory?
P674.002	Kevin McElhinney’s body being carried from Block 1 to ambulance	Charlie Downey, Jim Norris, Seamus O’Donnell, Bernard Feeney
P674.003	Kevin McElhinney’s body being carried from Block 1 to ambulance	Charlie Downey, Jim Norris, Seamus O’Donnell, Bernard Feeney

18.3.1 Personal Details

18.3.2.50 Removal of Michael Kelly from Rubble Barricade

18.3.3 Injuries sustained

18.3.4 Removal to hospital

18.3.5 Forensic Evidence

18.4 Hugh Gilmore

18.4.1 Personal Details and Background

Description of Photograph

P 662/ EP23.9

P 663 / EP23.9A

P 664

P 665

P 666

P 667

P 668

P 669

P 672

18.4.2 Civilian Evidence in relation to Shootings

Summary

18.4.2.13 Timing of Events

18.4.2.15 Position of the Soldier who Shot Hugh Gilmore

18.4.2.16 Movements After Being Shot

18.4.2.17 Weapons

A. There was no weapons or any form of people

18.4.2.36 Position of Soldier Who Shot Hugh Gilmore

18.4.2.43 Position of Soldier Who Shot Hugh Gilmore

18.4.3 Removal to Hospital

18.4.4 Injuries Sustained

18.4.5 Forensic Evidence

Movements of John Young and Michael McDaid

Michael McDaid

“Arrest” of Michael McDaid

Civilian Evidence about Soldiers Firing at Rubble Barricade

Removal to Altnagelvin Hospital

‘The trousers were in fact examined [for surface particles] but much after the original report was prepared. The trouser levels are within the same range as the coat levels . . . Yes, they do not contradict or add to the coat evidence.’ WT9.36A

18.6 Kevin McElhinney

18.6.1. Personal Details and Background

18.6.1.4. Relevant Photographs

Description of Photograph

18.6.2. Civilian Evidence in relation to shooting

18.6.2.1. Summary

18.6.2.5. Location Where Kevin McElhinney was Shot

18.6.2.12. Who shot Kevin McElhinney?

18.6.2.13. Repeated Fire

18.6.2.14. Bullet Striking the Doorway Entrance of Block1

18.6.2.15. The Issue of Weapons

18.6.2.19. Key Witnesses

Civilians in the Area of Rossville Street / Block1 Rossville Flats

Civilians at Glenfada Park South

Civilians at the Glenfada Park North Gable

Issue of the “Leopard Crawl” and whether Two Males crawled towards the doorway

Inside the Stairwell of Block 1

18.6.3. Injuries Sustained

18.6.4. Removal to Hospital

18.6.5. Forensic Evidence

Briefing

Presbyterian Church

Going in / Level of Fire

Arrests

Did Private U shoot Hugh Gilmore?

The Soldiers in the Peter England Shirt Factory

Soldier 015

Soldier 023

Further Observations by Private U

Events not observed by Private U

Missing Casualties

Loden Shot List