Madden & Finucane Bloody Sunday Closing Submissions

15.1.1 Having failed comprehensively to minimise the risk of the use of lethal force by the security forces in the planning stage, the arrest operation on 30^th January 1972 was carried out with inadequate control systems and unclear objectives. The usurpation of planning by General Ford, encompassing the deliberate selection of 1 Para to conduct the arrest operation, diluted Brigadier MacLellan’s authority and rendered him impotent to prevent, let alone control the manner of the launch of the operation.

15.1.2 Although 8^th Brigade set out the likely axes of movement for the arrest operation in the Op Order G95.570, Colonel Wilford failed to brief Brigadier MacLellan about his proposed operation in any detail.

15.1.3 Conversely neither Brigadier MacLellan nor Lieutenant Colonel Steele made sufficient inquiries of Colonel Wilford to apprise themselves of the potential strength, direction or tactics planned for an arrest operation under their command. In normal circumstances it would be astonishing for Brigadier MacLellan not to seek to approve a plan or agree a framework for 1 Para to work within given that up to 249 soldiers could be involved in close proximity to up to 10,000 civil rights marchers.

15.1.4 However, Brigadier MacLellan knew that these were not normal circumstances. As outlined above in Section 12 the Brigadier understood the import of General Ford’s interference in the plan and did not want to risk censure for attempting to put 1 Para on a tight leash prior to the march. The Brigadier knew that the plan was not his own and that on paper he was to leave 1 Para with “carte blanche”. However, Brigadier MacLellan had retained unto himself the authority to launch the operation in whole or in part and it is clear that he intended to control or limit the operation through his direct authority via Brigade Net. The end product was a dangerously vague plan with mechanics of control which were deficient and deliberately muddled.

15.1.5 Almost from the moment 1 Para arrived in Derry those with responsibility for command and control began to lose operational control of events incrementally and at differing levels. From Brigadier MacLellan down to the lowest section commander in Support Company failures of command and control in the execution of the arrest operation, brought about by inadequate planning and obfuscation of authority, resulted in the deaths of 13 people and injury of 14 more.

15.1.6 These operational failures are attributable on a personal basis to Brigadier MacLellan, Lieutenant Colonel Steele, Colonel Wilford, Major Loden and the individual platoon and section commanders under his control.

15.2.1.1 One of the central components of the case made by the soldiers both at the Widgery Inquiry and at this Inquiry was that 1 Para was given a direct order by 8 Brigade to launch the arrest operation.

15.2.1.2 It is submitted that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the assertion that the order to go in was given via a secure link. It is alleged that 1 Para entered the Bogside without authorisation from 8 Brigade.

15.2.1.3 In the alternative, it is submitted that if 8 Brigade HQ did give an order authorising the arrest operation,

15.2.2 There was no order given at all

15.2.2.1 There is a considerable body of evidence which casts doubt on whether 1 Para received authorisation at all prior to going into the Bogside. It is correct to say that the military account that a BID 150[1] was used to communicate the order to go in fits neatly with the incontrovertible fact that no such order was recorded by Mr Porter on the Brigade net.

15.2.2.2 Therefore the question of whether 1 Para received an order at all rests entirely on the existence and use of a secure net. It is submitted that there was no secure net, and that even if there was, it was not used to convey any order to go in.

15.2.2.3 Prior to the alleged order given over the BID 150, transmissions made over the Brigade net comprehensively defeated the supposed purpose of using a secure net. Ostensibly the secure net was to be used on 30^th January 1972 to give 1 Para the element of surprise so that when the order to go in was given, eavesdroppers on the Brigade net could not hear it and thereby avert rioters of the impending operation.

15.2.2.4 It was widely known in army circles and among some sections of the general population that army communications including the Brigade Net could be picked up by an ordinary radio or television set with a small amount of retuning of the set in question. (James McCafferty AM60.1, Jimmy Porter, AP9) Consequently the army developed the practice of not discussing intentions or plans over these insecure nets. In fact a directive was issued by 8 Brigade on 10^th November 1971 stating:

“We must accept the fact that our Pye communications, which can be picked up on transistor radios and TV sets, are completely insecure. No mention of future intentions is to be made over the Pye network unless the new fixed cursor SLIDEX code is used. All units are to ensure that normal voice procedure security is used by all ranks over our communication networks. Ordinary telephones may be used for restricted matters only in a guarded manner; privacy telephones can only be used for confidential administrative matters, and are not to be used for future operational intentions.” (G27.207)

15.2.2.5 The success of the planned arrest operation was of great significance to the army, with General Ford hoping that anywhere up to 400 hooligans would be arrested. 1 Para had attempted to keep a low profile in making their way to Derry. Surprise and impact was one of the key factors in the execution of the arrest operation. Using a secure net to organise and authorise the launch of the operation would have excluded the risk of the element of surprise being lost. The BID 150 would have been ideal for this purpose.

15.2.2.6 However, if the officers manning the Gin Palace had access to a BID 150 and were aware of its purpose, it is inexplicable why they proceeded to make transmissions over the Brigade net which had the effect of openly advertising 1 Para’s intentions well in advance of the alleged order to go in. The officers in the Gin Palace INQ 2033 and INQ 1853 were Captains in Battalion HQ who would both have attended Colonel Wilford’s O Group in their respective capacities as Regimental Signals Officer and Motor Transport Officer. Indeed the Regimental Signals Officer INQ 2033 had previously commanded Anti-Tank and Machine Gun Platoons and presumably had wide field experience. (Day 352/111/3 to Day 352/111/10)

15.2.2.7 As can be seen from the table below, as early as around 15.39 it would have been obvious to anyone listening to the Brigade net that army units were seeking to come through barriers to disperse the crowd. Moreover, the request for permission timed at 15.55 was made by an officer in the Gin Palace in uncoded and clear language naming both the object of the operation and the desired target area (William St/Little James St).

15.2.2.8 Anyone listening to the Brigade Net could have easily worked out exactly what operation was planned over 10 minutes before it actually happened. Any prospect of secrecy or surprise was utterly defeated. The suggestion that a tactical advantage was still available to 1 Para by the giving of the order over a secure net is a chimera in which the military have invested a good deal of their credibility in relation to the BID 150.

15.2.2.9 Indeed even Lieutenant Colonel Steele, the witness who has the greatest vested interest in the concept of the secure net providing secrecy, had to admit his surprise when confronted by the facts in making his witness statement in 2000:

“I am today rather surprised that 1 PARA used the Brigade net for this request, since the BID 150 secure net was specifically set up for such communications”. B1315.008 paragraph 42

15.2.2.10 It should be noted that on their evidence, soldiers at the Gin Palace had access all day to a fully functional secure net as well as a telephone line, both of which they knew would have been more secure than the Brigade net. The officers in the Gin Palace could easily have made all of their sensitive communications surrounding the arrest operation with 8 Brigade on the secure net. Furthermore, it was not ventured by the officers in the Gin Palace that they simply forgot about the BID 150. In fact INQ 1853 alleged that there was a signaller at the Gin Palace devoted to the BID 150 all day.

15.2.2.11 Given their experience and detailed knowledge of the utility of the BID 150 it is apparent that INQ 2033 and INQ 1853 never had in mind any overriding necessity for surprise or secrecy, the stated purpose for using a BID 150. It necessarily follows that there was no plan or directive to use a secure net for the order to go in to give 1 Para a tactical advantage.

Lack of documentary evidence surrounding BID 150

15.2.2.12 There is very little documentary evidence to support the assertion that 1 Para had and/or used BID 150 equipment for operational purposes in Derry on 30^th January 1972. Although the BID 150 was classified as TOP SECRET, no convincing evidence was proffered to show that the normal practices of army procedure (signals instructions, requisition forms, provision for a secure log) were obviated on the grounds of its classification. If anything, common sense would dictate that more bureaucracy should follow such a highly valued piece of technology, not less, both to secure its safety and to ensure proper usage.

15.2.2.13 Although 4 sets of BID 150 equipment were requested by 8 Brigade on 20^th December 1971 (G43.279) not one corresponding document has been produced acknowledging receipt of the equipment or subsequent documents dealing with distribution and usage within the 8 Brigade area. In fact all of the documents disclosed to this Inquiry which deal with the use of the BID 150 within the 8 Brigade area post date 30^th January 1972.

15.2.2.14 The 1 Para Signals Instruction for the day (W287), including net diagrams, does not make mention of the secure net or BID 150 at all. It was suggested by INQ 2033 that this document would not have included reference to the BID 150 since it was classified (C2033.4 paragraph 17). However, the BID 150 was only the encryption unit attached to a C42 (No. 3) radio unit. The C42 required tuning to a pre-determined frequency to allow it to communicate with other radios on the secure net in the same fashion as any other radio. No mention is made of a secure frequency (which could have been included without revealing the name or even nature of the equipment), nor are there any provisions specifying whether they are to collect the encryption card from 8 Brigade HQ or from 39 Brigade HQ, or a reminder of to whom they are to speak in order to get the card.

15.2.2.15 The Royal Anglian Signals Instruction for the day (W363) also makes no reference to secure net or BID 150 capability, even to say that it is not to be used on the day.

15.2.2.16 In contrast, the 8 Brigade Signal Instruction prepared later that year and dated 22^nd August 1972 (W305) devotes almost a full page at W307 to the purpose, operation, and security of the BID 150 Brigade Secure Net. It is instructive to note that less than seven months after 30^th January 1972 the BID 150 was openly acknowledged and documented in this instruction which was marked “CONFIDENTIAL”. The suggestion that the BID 150 could not be acknowledged on paper is not only illogical in operational terms but it is also undermined by later documentary evidence.

15.2.2.17 Other than the word of the soldiers involved there has been no evidence produced to show that the BID 150 was in service either in 39 Brigade or 8 Brigade prior to 30^th January 1972. The MoD has not produced a single signals instruction, signals briefing paper or other documentary record pre-dating 30^th January 1972 verifying its operational use. Therefore there is no evidence to show that 1 Para possessed a BID 150 to bring to Derry, or that 8 Brigade had one to use in concert with them.

Infrequent use of the secure net

15.2.2.18 Lieutenant Colonel Steele said he only used it for two transmissions to 1 Para all day (note that he said one to Widgery), one of which was the order to go in. INQ 2033 on the other hand claimed that he may have used the secure net three or four times[2] on the day to speak to Brigade. INQ 2033’s recollection of events was somewhat hazy and in particular his description of the BID 150 as a one-to-one net was entirely erroneous[3]. Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel Steele gave evidence in 1972, whereas INQ 2033’s first statement was made in 2000. It is suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Steele’s evidence, if any, is to be preferred over INQ 2033’s evidence on this matter.

15.2.2.19 It can be seen in the Porter transcript that at some time around 6.30pm, 1 Para were attempting to contact 8 Brigade using their telephone line.

15.2.2.20 Item 687 shows that Lieutenant Colonel Steele (Seagull) was anxious to speak to 1 Para. The telephone lines were understandably busy at the time at Brigade HQ. The officers at the Gin Palace responded saying they would keep trying to get through on the telephone. If there existed a direct hotline to Lieutenant Colonel Steele’s office in the secure net it would obviously have been the easiest and most secure way for either party to get in touch. The fact that it was not used or even suggested in the above transmissions lends further weight to the premise that the secure net did not exist.

15.2.2.21 On Lieutenant Colonel Steele’s own evidence the secure net was used twice on the day. At a time when it would have been the ideal means of communication it was left idle. There is no logical explanation for the virtual redundancy of such a highly valued and high-tech piece of equipment. If the BID 150 had been in service that day it would have been used more often and to greater effect than alleged by the soldiers in their evidence.

The absence of the resident battalions from the secure net

15.2.2.22 If the 4 BID 150 sets requested on 20^th December 1971 had arrived at 8 Brigade prior to 30^th January 1972, and one of them was functional at Brigade Headquarters one would expect that at least 3 of the resident battalions would also be operational on the secure net. It is submitted that the equipment would have required testing and configuration in the 8 Brigade area prior to its use in major operation.

15.2.2.23 However very few of the officers manning the Operations Rooms of the resident battalions recalls having a BID 150 on the day. Colonel Roy Jackson told this Tribunal that in his time in Derry he never had access to a secure radio Day 285/64, and again at Day 287/31.

15.2.2.24 INQ 406 of the 22^nd Light Air Defence Regiment says that there was a BID 150 in the battalion headquarters on the day Day 274/37 and that INQ 1041 was manning it. INQ 1041 however has no memory of this and was in fact one of the watchkeepers and was one of those responsible for maintaining the battalion log (C1041.2 paragraph 10). David Ramsbotham told the Inquiry that the request made on 20^th December 1971 (G43.279) was in fact a request for additional sets and that 8 Brigade already had a small number Day 254/115. However INQ 1903 says that prior to the delivery of BID 150s he recalls occurring in early 1972 there were no BID 150s in 8 Brigade (Day 253/92).

15.2.2.25 Lieutenant Colonel Steele was careful to insist in his evidence to Widgery that only 8 Brigade and 1 Para were able to communicate on the secure net. He knew that the smaller the circle surrounding the order to go in the smaller the chances were of the story unravelling.

15.2.2.26 Contrary to what INQ 2033 claimed in his evidence at Day 352/132/3, the secure net was not a special one to one type of net. It was introduced as a secure Command Net supplemental to the Brigade Command Net. It too was an analog signal transmitted on an agreed frequency.[4] The difference was provided by the BID 150 which encrypted and decrypted the signal at either end. Any battalion HQ with a BID 150 and the appropriate encryption card would be able to access the secure net in the same fashion as they would the Brigade net. There was no restriction on how many call signs could operate on it. The limiting factors were the number of BID 150 sets and the possession of the correct card by each unit.

15.2.2.27 It would have been possible for 8 Brigade and 1 Para to use an exclusive encryption card not available to the resident battalions, however no evidence has been produced to show that that is what happened and there are no convincing reasons as to why such a course would have been desirable.

15.2.2.28 A secure net including the resident battalions would potentially have been of great operational value on 30^th January 1972. Sitreps from positions on the Embassy Building or the City Walls about the state of the crowd and timescales in relation to separation of marchers and rioters could have been provided in great detail over the secure net. It would have been tactically advantageous to keep transmissions about the position of the rioters and the proposed arrest operation off the Brigade net entirely. In addition, 1 Para were reliant on the resident battalions to open barriers and could have requested such action without eavesdroppers overhearing.

15.2.2.29 The convoluted story that only 8 Brigade and 1 Para had access to the secure net was no more than a convenient ex post facto damage limitation exercise on the part of Lieutenant Colonel Steele and 1 Para. The lack of merit of its premise from an operational tends to show that even if it existed no one used a BID 150 on the day.

Not informing HQNI

15.2.2.30 HQNI in Lisburn was monitoring events in 8 Brigade through sitreps sent via secure telex from 8 Brigade HQ Operations Room (C2090.10 paragraph 21 and C2090.14). 8 Brigade were under a duty to inform HQNI of sitreps received and operational decisions made. Ultimately HQNI would report to the MoD, and the MoD would report to the Prime Minister therefore accurate and up to date information was of the essence.

15.2.2.31 Often the matters passed to HQNI were of minor significance, such as serial 57, W28, “Creggan Rd crowd going N approx 50-60. CS drifting up behind”. At the time it was allegedly sent the order to send 1 Para on a scoop-up operation would have been the most significant transmission of the day. It would have been self-evident to even the most junior watchkeeper that HQNI would want to know of this immediately. However there is no entry in the HQNI log corresponding to the alleged order to go in given by Lieutenant Colonel Steele.

15.2.2.32 Furthermore, staff officers in HQNI had the capacity to listen to 8 Brigade net if they chose since it was being relayed via Slieve Galleon to Lisburn (C2090.14). Therefore they could hear everything transmitted over the Brigade net but could not hear messages sent over the secure net or telephone lines. This made it even more important for 8 Brigade to relay key transmissions which had been sent via the secure link. It is submitted that HQNI would have expected to be notified of the exact time of launch of the arrest operation along with its targets and strength as soon as it was launched. It is submitted that lack of any entry in the HQNI log corresponding to the order to go in is indicative that no such order was given by 8 Brigade.

Incredible nature of Gin Palace account

15.2.2.33 INQ 2006 told the Inquiry that he was manning the secure net all day. He said that at the crucial time he took the initial message from 8 Brigade which was “Yes, go, go” (C2006.12 paragraph 48). Having received this message he said he then threw the headset he had been listening to through the hatch back to the watchkeepers to take the full order. When questioned, initially INQ 2006 was fairly sure about throwing the headset:

15.2.2.34 However, when it was suggested to him that the watchkeepers in fact had their own handset for the secure link INQ 2006 conceded that the throwing of the headset may not have happened at all:

15.2.2.35 INQ 2006 says that he handed over the handset to the watchkeepers as soon as he heard the words “Yes, go, go” (Day 386/185/9). There is no explanation as to how Lieutenant Colonel Steele was supposed to know that he was to wait to speak to a second person to deliver the complete order. Furthermore it has never been suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Steele that he had to go through two separate soldiers at 1 Para HQ to deliver the order over the secure link. Transmissions are not delivered to thin air, particularly those over a net being used for the first time. The person transmitting will normally seek an acknowledgement that the other person is receiving before proceeding into the body of the message. If this normal procedure was followed on this occasion INQ 2006 would have had ample opportunity to acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel Steele and then pass on to his watchkeepers.

15.2.2.36 To add to the bizarre nature of the story INQ 2006 told this Inquiry that after passing on the handset to the watchkeepers he left his post and smoked a cigarette (Day 386/176/6). The C42 attached to the BID 150 required tuning to the correct frequency like any other radio, and signals officers were posted to ensure that radios (which had a tendency to drift) were kept in tune. INQ 2006’s recollection that at the crucial time of the day he was able to walk away from the Gin Palace for a smoke is clearly at odds with his job.

15.2.2.37 Neither INQ 1853 or INQ 2033 can recall receiving the order to go in. Certainly, neither of them recalls having a handset thrown at them by a signaller who then got up and went for a smoke. This account provided by INQ 2006 is false and misleading.

Chief Superintendent Lagans evidence re: “I am sorry, the Paras have gone in”

15.2.2.38 Chief Superintendent Lagan gave evidence about Brigadier MacLellan’s reaction upon hearing that 1 Para had gone in. He first described the Brigadier’s reaction in his statement signed on 10^th March 1972:

“I heard the reports of confrontations at the various barricades and that the main body of the marchers had gone down to Free Derry Corner. The Brigadier who had presumably gone to his Operations Room, came into the office and said 'The Paratroops want to go in'. I said 'For heaven's sake hold them until we are absolutely certain the marchers and the rioters are well separated'. He left me again. After an interval he returned and said 'I am sorry, the Paras have gone in'. I did not hear the order to the Paras to move, over the radio”. (JL1.2 paragraph 6)

15.2.2.39 When questioned about his understanding of what Brigadier MacLellan meant Chief Superintendent Lagan was clear that the Brigadier had not sent 1 Para in himself:

Mr Stocker: You have said you made the comment 'For heaven's sake, hold them'; did the Brigadier make any reply?

Answer: He did not make any reply, but he left his office, and I assumed that he was going into the OPs room to pursue my suggestion.

Answer: I cannot be specific about it, but after a short interval he returned to me and he said 'I am sorry, the Paras have gone in’.

Question: We have been told that there were a number of radio networks, one of which, the Ulsternet, is capable of being overheard and another network, which is a secure network, which is not capable of being overheard, so far as is known; did you know where the secure link was?

Question: Are you sure about the 'sorry'? You appreciate the importance of it. The Brigadier, according to you, came back and said 'I am sorry, the Paras have gone in'. You are satisfied about him saying 'sorry'?

Answer: I am completely satisfied. The two things, the words he used and the tone of voice in which he expressed them, impressed themselves on my

Mr Stocker: That is capable of two meanings. By the phrase 'I am sorry', did you take him to be, as it were, apologising, or did you take him to be expressing his own view that he was personally sorry about it?

Answer: I assumed, my Lord, that in view of what I had said earlier he expressed his sorrow to me. I also interpreted the meaning from the tone he used that he was not personally responsible for them going in.

15.2.2.40 Under cross-examination by Mr McSparran Chief Superintendent Lagan was even clearer in expressing his opinion.

Question: Your view was that the entry of Paratroopers, or the launching of the Paratroopers, was not as a result of his order at that time?

Question: Did he say, or indicate anything to you, which would have led you to the belief that he had given such an order?

15.2.2.41 When directly questioned by Lord Widgery Chief Superintendent Lagan stood firmly by his opinion:

Lord Widgery: I am very anxious not to leave this with any doubt about what you are telling me, Mr Lagan. I think what you are telling me is that the order, when given, as far as you could see, was the Brigadier's order, rather than that a mistake had occurred and somebody else had let the Paratroopers' Regiment off the leash without the Brigadier's instructions. I think what you are telling me is the first of those two.

Answer: When the Brigadier said to me 'Sorry, the Paras have gone in', my immediate reaction to it was that they had gone in on somebody else's instructions and not on his. I would have thought, in view of an earlier comment to me, that he would have consulted with me again before he would have sent them in. JL1.54 F

15.2.2.42 In his statement to this Inquiry Chief Superintendent Lagan deals with his contemporaneous interpretation of the words “I am sorry, the Paras have gone in”[5]. He is unambiguous that the interpretation he gave to Widgery was entirely consistent with the words spoken and the manner in which they were delivered JL1.17 paragraph 97. Consequently Chief Superintendent Lagan’s 1972 evidence stands uncontradicted. He firmly believed that Brigadier MacLellan had not been involved in the decision to send 1 Para in.

15.2.2.43 Brigadier MacLellan denied the inference made by Chief Superintendent Lagan in a letter to General Ford of 15^th March 1972 (B1279.001). Brigadier MacLellan admitted that he did have a conversation with Chief Superintendent Lagan after he had given the order, but that it was not in the terms alleged:

“I then returned to my office and told Lagan that the arrest operation had started. I cannot remember the exact words which were used but as far as I can recall Lagan then said ‘Well I hope they are separated enough’. I replied ‘I am assured that they are, but anyway it is too late to stop them now’. I suppose I may have said ‘……anyway I’m sorry but it is too late to stop them now’ but I do not remember using the word ‘sorry’ and if I did it was in this context and certainly not because I regretted having just given the orders for the arrest operation to start”. (B1279.002)

15.2.2.43 Brigadier MacLellan even goes as far as categorising Chief Superintendent Lagan’s evidence as “a deliberate distortion of the truth”.

15.2.2.44 He told this Inquiry that he did not recall saying the words but that if he did he meant, “I am sorry, I know you wanted it otherwise”. Day 262/75/7

15.2.2.45 However insistent the protests by Brigadier MacLellan, as the person with the most to lose he is open to the allegation that he would deny it in any event. Chief Superintendent Lagan’s evidence is unambiguous in his understanding of Brigadier MacLellan’s words. Although it is a subjective interpretation it supports the case that 1 Para entered the Bogside without the authorisation of 8 Brigade.

The lifting of the barriers

15.2.2.47 The order to 22^nd Lt AD to lift barrier 14 did not come from 8 Brigade, rather it came from 1 Para W128, item 370. A battalion to battalion command is not the normal method of issuing orders in the army. Whilst the battalion on the receiving end may assume that the battalion requesting has authority for its actions it cannot be sure unless it receives a direct order from a superior command. This uncertainty would be exacerbated if the receiving battalion was not party to a related order broadcast on a net to which they had no access.

15.2.2.48 In the event it would appear that the 22^nd Lt AD did comply and passed the order from their headquarters to A Company of the Royal Green Jackets who were manning barrier 14, but they barely had time to react. So rushed was the whole operation that 1 Para had to go through a small gap in the wire on the east side of William Street. Commander C Company said he would have preferred if the barriers had been opened in the middle of the road allowing them to go through in tactical formation rather than single file. Day 294/151/16

15.2.2.49 Furthermore, barrier 12 was not mentioned at all by 1 Para in their request/order to the 22^nd Lt AD, nor does it feature in the Brigade log. The soldiers manning barriers 14 and 12 were not ready to open them. INQ 1326 who was commanding the troops at barrier 12 said that there was a delay of 10 seconds while his men undid the wire (Day 301/113/3). Soldier S, who was driving the lead Pig through barrier 12 told Lord Widgery that he was halted at the barrier for “about a minute” (B711 E). 8 Brigade had not indicated that the soldiers at the barriers ought to be ready. The procedure lacked organisation and coherence suggesting that 8 Brigade had been circumvented and 1 Para went in of their own volition.

There was no order

15.2.2.50 All the foregoing factors demonstrate clearly that even if 1 Para had a functional BID 150 unit in Derry it was not used to receive the order to go in. The account provided by the soldiers is false and there was no order to go in at all. 1 Para therefore entered the Bogside without authorisation from 8 Brigade.

15.2.2.51 After he realised that 1 Para had commenced the operation without permission it is alleged that Lieutenant Colonel Steele instructed the log keepers in the Operations Room at Ebrington to retrospectively insert an entry in the log reflecting authorisation from 8 Brigade. It is noteworthy that the order recorded in the Brigade log at serial 159 is commensurate with the level of permission sought by 1 Para in their last request. Lieutenant Colonel Steele could only assume that the operation prematurely launched by Colonel Wilford was the one he had requested.

15.2.2.52 Since the watchkeeper manning the Brigade net would not have heard any such transmission, Lieutenant Colonel Steele knew that he had to take personal responsibility for the alleged order from an early stage. He knew that if he took ownership of this serial that he would be the only person at 8 Brigade HQ who could speak to its veracity. Furthermore, by claiming that only 1 Para had secure means he excluded the resident battalions from the equation, leaving the officers in the Gin Palace as the only remaining people who could answer questions about the order to go in. Neither INQ 1853 or INQ 2033 made a statement in 1972, nor were they called to give evidence to Lord Widgery despite the allegations made by Mr McSparran or the controversy surrounding the order to go in.

15.2.3 If the order was given, in what terms was it given?

15.2.3.1 In the alternative, if it is accepted that there was an order to go in given by 8 Brigade it is submitted that the order was a direct order in precise terms. There was no ambiguity or difficulty in language requiring interpretation. The order is recorded in the 8 Brigade log at serial 159, W47.

15.2.3.2 Lieutenant Colonel Steele insisted at Widgery that the order recorded at serial 159 was only the gist of the order he gave to 1 Para. He explained to Widgery (after some prompting from his counsel[6]) and has maintained since that the order he gave was in the following terms:

1 Para to launch the arrest operation, with one of the sub units going through barrier 14 and a prohibition from conducting running battles down Rossville Street.

15.2.3.3 Brigadier MacLellan says the Brigade Major gave the order in his presence over the secure net. His recollection did not include reference to barrier 14. In his statement to Widgery at B1235 Brigadier MacLellan says that the orders were that:

“(a) The operation was to be launched forthwith to arrest as many rioters as possible in the area of the junction William Street/Rossville Street.

(b) 1 Para were not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the Northern Ireland civil rights association marchers”.

15.2.3.4 In his statement for the Widgery Inquiry Colonel Wilford says that he was “ordered to make arrests” (B950 paragraph 15). The only qualification which he says he received was that there were to be “no running battles” (B988 E). Colonel Wilford maintains that he did not receive any restriction as to the number of companies in the order (B1110.032 paragraph 87).

15.2.3.5 The officers manning the Gin Palace have no direct recollection of the terms of the order which they say came over the secure net. INQ 2033 states that they would have passed on the order word for word Day 352/159/5 to 352/160/13.

15.2.3.6 It is worth noting that the 1 Para log bears some resemblance to the order recorded in the Brigade log. It is recorded at serial 31, W90.

15.3.1. The order to commence the arrest operation is timed in the Brigade log as having been given at 1607. At that time 8 Brigade knew or ought to have known that it was unnecessary, inappropriate and reckless in all the circumstances to launch an arrest operation at all.

15.3.2 As comprehensively exposed earlier in section 16.3, separation of the rioters from the marchers was never a key plank of the planning for the arrest operation. If it featured in the thinking of any of the soldiers at all on 30^th January 1972 it was no more than an afterthought.

15.3.3 Whether or not separation was in fact a pre-condition enshrined in the planning of the arrest operation, it is submitted that separation never in fact occurred on the day.

15.3.4 Furthermore it is submitted that the rioting at barriers 12 and 14 had subsided to a level where there was no longer a need to disperse the crowd. As a result of the reduction in the numbers involved in the respective riots combined with the distance they were from the barriers, at the point the order was given there was no realistic prospect of arresting more than a few rioters.

15.3.5 Brigadier MacLellan and Lieutenant Colonel Steele either knew or ought to have known that the above circumstances prevailed at 1607.

15.3.7 Brigadier MacLellan had made the decision to control the operation on 30^th January 1972 from his Brigade Headquarters at Ebrington. Having no view of proceedings or live CCTV link 8 Brigade were entirely reliant on information relayed by units on the ground, both through the Brigade net and telephone land lines. As is demonstrated by Appendix I below all of the relevant pieces of information were in fact broadcast over the Brigade net and are recorded on the Porter tape.

15.3.8 No additional information was received by 8 Brigade to assist in their decision whether or not to launch the operation. Therefore the key source to consider when examining the propriety of 8 Brigade’s decision to launch is the Porter transcript. It must be borne in mind however that the decision to launch any arrest operation was in the context of policing a large peaceful march with some civil disorder on the fringes. The table below contains all of the information available to Brigadier MacLellan in the run up to 1 Para entering the Bogside.

15.3.9 The best anyone in possession of the above information could have said about the situation just before 1607 hours was that 500 or so people had gathered to hear speeches at Free Derry Corner and 150 or so rioters were present at the junctions of William Street/Rossville Street. In our submission, given the general drift of people away from the march and the rioting, it would also have been valid to surmise that there were people strung in unknown numbers between these two groups. On the basis of the above transmissions there was no way of knowing whether separation of the rioters and the marchers had occurred.

15.3.10 The photographs taken by Mr Tucker from Block 2 of the Rosville Flats (EP28.1 et seq) demonstrate the disposition of the crowd on Rossville Street and the wasteground immediately prior to and after the entry of 1 Para into Rossville Street. They show a large number of people spread around the wasteground at Rossville Street giving lie to notion that any kind of separation had occurred at all. Brigadier MacLellan told this Inquiry that he did not realise that this was the scene on Rossville Street (Day 263/6/6 to 263/6/14). It is our submission that although he couldnot be sure of the exact scene on Rossville Street Brigadier MacLellan suspected that there were many innocent bystanders along the length of the street.

15.3.11 It is submitted that the reason that Brigadier MacLellan placed the “no running battles” restriction on 1 Para was to prevent them becoming embroiled with the marchers.

15.3.12 Brigadier MacLellan and Lieutenant Colonel Steele between them knew that “spectators” were a regular feature at the fringes of riots. These persons, who did not assist those rioting, but who were curious to watch the confrontation with the army were present at every riot.

15.3.13 The staff at 8 Brigade HQ were aware that the topography of the entire area surrounding the Rossville Street/William Street junction made the likelihood of conducting a successful arrest operation targeted at rioters based at that junction minimal. From the junction of Rossville Street/William Street there are myriad routes available to escape snatch operations conducted either on foot or in vehicles. In fact soldiers conducting an operation in vehicles would be hampered in pursuit of fleeing rioters through the numerous side alleys and walkways in the vicinity of Columbcille Court, Glenfada Park and Abbey Park.

15.3.14 It is submitted that the riot was no more severe than usual and Brigadier MacLellan was not given any indication by the units on the ground that the situation was getting out of hand. In fact 22^nd Lt AD told 8 Brigade at 1551:

“15 is clear, but serial 14 is suffering from a certain amount of stoning from the same hard core of hooligans on the Rossville Street/William Street corner” (W126, item 332).

15.3.15 Brigadier MacLellan conceded in his evidence that soldiers coming from barrier 12 would have faced considerable difficulty in making legal arrests, a matter which was of some concern to him prior to the march Day 262/98/14 262/102/3. In the event 8 Brigade did not make any attempt to ensure that 1 Para had been watching the stone throwing at barriers 12 and 14. As a result Brigadier MacLellan knew that any arrests made were in danger of being illegal arrests.

15.3.16 In the minutes leading up to 1607 Brigadier MacLellan, on the basis of the information he received, could not have believed:

(ii) that an arrest operation against the remaining rioters was necessary or safe

15.3.17 For all of the above reasons at the time of launch 8 Brigade knew or ought to have known that there was no real prospect of arresting any more than a handful of stone throwers at the risk of putting Parachute Regiment soldiers into close proximity with large numbers of civil rights marchers.

15.4 Nature of the order given

15.4.1 Brigadier MacLellan, Lieutenant Colonel Steele, Colonel Wilford and other former soldiers have asked the Tribunal to accept that when Brigadier MacLellan gave 1 Para the order to commence the arrest operation he implicitly left Colonel Wilford carte blanche in the conduct of the operation.

15.4.2 The Tribunal in our submission ought to reject this argument completely. The former soldiers propounding this construct wish this Tribunal, over 30 years later, to retrospectively authorise actions which were expressly forbidden in plain English in the order actually given.

15.4.3 In our submission, if an order was given at all which is disputed, it is accurately recorded in the Brigade log at serial 159. This order is broadly reflected in the 1 Para log, except that the 1 Para log has A Company (C/S 1) moving in addition.

15.4.4 In effect 8 Brigade gave authorisation for 1 Para to conduct the operation requested at 1555: “He [Wilford] would like to deploy one of his sub units through barrier 14 around the back into the area William Street/Little James Street. He reckons if he does this he will be able to pick up quite a number of yobbos”.

15.4.5 Brigadier MacLellan authorised a snatch operation to be conducted by C Company from barrier 14 up to the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. The Brigadier knew that rioters would flee down Rossville Street but did not want 1 Para soldiers to chase after them into the general crowd and so placed the “no running battles” limitation on the operation. His expectation was that, in line with the Operation Order, that it would be conducted on foot.

15.4.6 In our submission there is no mystery to the order given by Brigadier MacLellan. Reading more into the words than are present or disregarding portions of it are merely attempts to obfuscate simple English with illogical jargon.

15.5 Lack of liaison between units & no semblance of pincer movement

Colonel Wilford’s O-Group

15.5.1 Colonel Wilford briefed his company commanders and battalion staff on 28^th January 1972. Notes prepared for this purpose are at G94.562, with the hand-written version at B968.1. Wilford states at G94.562

"If the march takes place and confrontation becomes hostile, the battalion will deploy forward to break up the rioters and make the maximum number of arrests. At this stage I cannot give a detailed tactical plan. I will give the company deployment in our forming-up position and then give my concept of how I think the battle can go".

The notes are extremely sparse as acknowledged in Colonel Wilford’s accompanying note B968.5

15.5.2 In his statement to this Inquiry Colonel Wilford says that whatever option he took it would be a pincer involving all three companies in order to conduct the operation B1110.027 paragraph 54.

A Company’s planning and movement

15.5.3 Commander of A Company INQ 10 made a statement on 31^st January 1972 including a Diary of Operations at C10.8. He states that he was given orders at 1612 to “advance into Lower Road and turn East into William Street to assist Sp Coy in their task of arresting rioters at the William St/Rossville St junction”[7]. He goes on to describe the outcome:

“My movement caused the rioters to my front to run in the direction of Sp Coy, where some of them were arrested”.

It is implied in the above entry that A Company’s movement was co-ordinated with that of Support Company in the overall scheme of the arrest operation.

15.5.4 However this alleged co-ordination is not reflected in any planning as understood by INQ 10. He says in his statement to this Inquiry at C10.3 paragraph 17 that he knew that A Company was on the right flank of the operation, and that his task was a simple one:

“‘A’ Company’s task was simple – if there was rioting in front of us then we were to make arrests”.

In oral evidence INQ 10 gave more detailed evidence about his understanding of his mission that day:

15.5.5 Furthermore the assertion that A Company’s movement caused rioters to run and be arrested by Support Company does not stand up to scrutiny. It is accepted that Support Company did not arrest any rioters at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. In fact they never stopped at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. If A Company turned left down William Street, the most they could have seen of Support Company would have been a convoy of Pigs sweeping across the junction from left to right and out of sight. It is most improbable that anyone fleeing snatch squads moving west down William Street would have run in a straight line into the waiting arms of soldiers at the east end given the myriad escape routes offered by Little Diamond, Abbey Street and the various burnt out buildings leading into Columbcille Court. Taken at its highest, on 31^st January 1972 INQ 10 could only have guessed in hindsight that some of the people that his company chased from the area of William Street/Lower Road in fact ended up being arrested by Support Company on Rossville Street.

15.5.6 Rather than joining up with Support Company at junction of William Street/Rossville Street (sic) INQ 10’s current recollection was that his company ended up among some buildings but not on open ground (Day 289/27/14 to Day 289/28/1). His 1972 Diary of Operations puts the distance covered by A Company as 100m, which is only as far as the junction of Abbey Street.

15.5.7 INQ 10 at all times expected to go in on foot. This would have been in accordance with the Operation order G95.570 In his 1972 Diary of Operations, under “Crowd control” at C10.8 INQ 10 ordered as follows:

15.5.8 He confirmed in unequivocal terms at Day 289/18/6 to Day 289/19/2 that he anticipated that the operation would be conducted on foot:

15.5.9 The junction of Lower Road with William Street is some 300 metres away from the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. Given that INQ 10 had instructed his men to move in “tactical bounds of no more than 20m” it would have involved around 15 bounds with soldiers leapfrogging and providing cover the whole way down William Street to get to the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. The length of time required to undertake such a manoeuvre for all practical purposes excluded A Company from involvement in any arrest operation targeted at the William Street/Rossville Street junction. Rioters would have had adequate time to escape within the time that A Company had made their first few bounds. The simple geography of A Company’s position put them out on a limb, incapable of linking with the other companies of 1 Para.

15.5.10 In the event Support Company entered the Bogside mounted in vehicles. They passed the William Street Rossville Street junction and stopped on the waste ground and on Rossville Street. As a result, A Company’s advance on foot down William Street was rendered even more detached from Support Company’s line of assault. A Company had not been instructed to enter in vehicles to link up with Support Company, and in fact it is submitted that they were not aware that Support Company had mounted their vehicles.

15.5.11 A Company were briefed to use snatch squads to arrest rioters in front of their barrier. They were never intended to be part of any larger manoeuvre.

C Company’s planning and movement

15.5.12 Soldier 221A, the Company Commander of C Company does not have a current recollection of any briefings he received prior to 30^th January 1972 (B2168.001 paragraph 4). He expected that he would have been given limitations and boundaries prior to the operation otherwise it would have just been “a general scrum” (Day294/185/2).

15.5.13 However Soldier 221A told this Inquiry that the operation planned was no different from normal snatch operations:

There was no co-ordinated plan

15.5.14 From all the foregoing, it is clear that there was no prior planning involving a specific shape to the operation, whether designated stop lines or two pronged pincer movement. Wilford’s claims in this regard are best case scenario hindsight planning.

15.5.15 Neither of the company commanders who would have constituted the snapping arms of the pincer or the hammer or anvil had any knowledge of prior planning of a pincer. Nor do they recollect such manoeuvres being co-ordinated over the Company net radio on the day. Their tasks as far as they were concerned were to arrest any rioters directly in front of their barriers.

15.6 Lack of control over operations

15.6.1 MacLellan failed to restrain 1 Para and impose his will on soldiers directly under his command. This was due in part to the pressure he was put under by 1 Para and the presence of Ford and his stated wish to see an arrest operation.

15.6.2 Lieutenant Colonel Steele failed to recognise the full scale of the incursion undertaken by 1 Para and failed to ensure that his order to withdraw was complied with.

15.6.3 Colonel Wilford lost control of his companies and failed to regain control.

15.7 Level of control retained by 8 Brigade over arrest operation

15.7.1 The Operation Order for Operation Forecast is unambiguous as to where the authority for the deployment of 1 Para lay on the day. Under “Tasks” it is stated:

“(1) (a) This operation will only be launched, either in whole or in part, on the orders of the Bde Comd.” G95.570

15.7.2 It is obvious that in giving his order the Brigadier could not direct every single soldier, nor would he attempt to dictate the deployment and disposition of the individual platoons involved. However the key decision which was required of Brigadier MacLellan was whether he felt the rioting merited a full 3 company launch or a more limited approach.

15.7.3 Furthermore, whatever latitude is given to a subordinate in the implementation of his orders, it is submitted that military practice dictates that a commander never cedes certain portions of his authority. In the ordinary course of army business a commander retains the right to give any of the following orders at any time in the execution of an operation:

(i) to commence the operation (unless a criteria based order has been clearly drafted, specifying exact criteria, which once fulfilled automatically grant authority to commence to the subordinate)

15.7.4 In wartime, the retention of instantaneous tactical and strategic control is essential to the hierarchical functioning of an army. It allows a commander to continuously re-evaluate the overall situation, which a subordinate on the ground cannot do, while also minimising the scope for maverick actions by individuals in the chain of command. It is submitted that in a policing context such as that of 30^th January 1972 it was or ought to have been evident to those responsible for planning, that the retention of tactical and strategic control was of even greater importance than in a battlefield situation.

15.7.5 Brigadier MacLellan has not suggested that he was given orders by General Ford or General Tuzo to grant 1 Para any more autonomy than normal and therefore, in theory, he retained full control and responsibility for the arrest operation.

15.7.6 The argument advanced by various military witnesses (MacLellan, Wilford, Steele, Mike Jackson) was that Colonel Wilford was granted extremely wide discretion in the planning and execution of the arrest operation. General Sir Michael Jackson spoke at length on the concept of “mission command”. He asserted that the mission to arrest as many hooligans as possible was delegated to 1 Para as a battalion to execute as it saw fit once the order to go had been given.

15.7.7 Whilst it is accepted that Colonel Wilford was the appropriate officer to formulate the details of the plan [albeit, as submitted previously, after consulting local officers from resident battalions] at the point that he submitted his proposed plan to the Brigadier in the form of a request for permission his latitude ended and Brigadier MacLellan’s discretion began.

15.7.8 It is submitted that the conduct of the soldiers on the ground does not accord with an understanding congruent with the level of delegation now claimed. The detailed requests by 1 Para outlining the scope and intended target for their operation indicate a level of subordination on the part of Colonel Wilford incompatible with a claim of complete autonomy. Furthermore the restrictions contained within the alleged order from 8 Brigade when given their ordinary meaning strongly contradict any claim to carte blanche.

15.7.9 If Brigadier MacLellan did indeed concede authority to Colonel Wilford in the manner suggested by General Jackson, his actions constituted a dereliction of duty, and an act of negligence and/or recklessness in all the circumstances.

15.8.1 8^th. Brigade had achieved its professed purpose of containing the march by 4.05 pm. There were still some rioters active in the William Street/Rossville Street area but these could have been dispersed without difficulty. Had the arrest operation not been launched or had it been launched in accordance with the terms of either Operation Forecast, or the Order as reportedly given by 8^th Brigade at W47 serial 159, which authorised “1 sub unit of 1 Para to do scoop up op through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville St.”, then it is probable that the rest of the day would have passed off without further serious incident.

Wilford and Loden were the 2 most senior officers responsible for the command and control of 1 Para on the day.

ii. To co-ordinate the activities of each of the 3 companies directly under him;

iii. To direct their officers to ensure compliance with his precise instructions;

v. To ensure that communications with each company was sufficient to enable him to have the information necessary to a detailed understanding of the current deployment and engagements of each company and its sub units;

vii. To determine whether the situation on the ground required any alteration to the original concept of the plan;

ix. To keep Brigade informed as to any developments, whether in the execution of the plan as devised or adapted;

xi. To establish a headquarters that would provide a base for achieving the above objectives;

xii. To avoid becoming personally embroiled in a particular aspect of the operation;

xiii To avoid personal action that would jeopardise his capacity to discharge his overall responsibilities.

xiv To provide leadership through the commissioned officers to ensure that the soldiers on the ground remained disciplined and under control.

vi. To inform 1 Para H.Q. of any developments in the deployment or engagements of his men;

vii. To inform 1 Para H.Q. of anything which might have had significance for the overall execution of the plan for the day;

viii. To maintain proper lines of command and control through his commissioned and non-commissioned officers;

x. To ensure that any alterations to the original plan were fully understood and complied with;

xi. To ensure that he understood the precise nature and extent of any order he was given;

xii. To ensure that he gave orders in precise and clearly understood terms to those under his command;

xiii. To set clearly defined parameters to the area of discretion to be exercised by each category of men under his command;

xv. To maintain a command post and position that would best assist in the discharge of his command functions;

xvii. To ensure that his men and their officers understood and respected the rules of engagement under the Yellow Card;

xviii. To ensure that he was aware of the deployment of his men and the reasons for such deployment;

xix. To ensure that his men were at all times under the effective control of their officers;

xx. To prevent a situation developing, which would result in, each soldier being left to make individual judgments as to a proper response to events.

The theoretical role of Colonel Wilford and Major Loden bears little, if any, resemblance to what occurred on the day.

Support Company entered the Bogside at approximately 4.10pm on Sunday the 30^th January 1972. It entered contrary to all orders and expectations.

ii. It entered in vehicles and not on foot, contrary to Operation Forecast, G95.570 paragraph 9 (f);

iii. No arrest operation was carried out at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street

iv. A running battle was conducted down Rossville Street contrary to 8^th Brigade Order, W47 serial 159

v. No order was given as to where any vehicle under the command of Major Loden was to stop

vi. It was left to the discretion of the commander of each vehicle where they might chose to stop and debus, Day 346/40/1 to Day 346/40/22;

vii. As the vehicles stopped, even temporarily, soldiers discharged rubber bullets without the identifying a particular target V48/12.26

viii. No officer expressed any disapproval at the firing of rubber bullets at random, and indeed such action must have been condoned

ix. Shots were fired over the heads of demonstrators, contrary to the Yellow Card, by Lieutenant N and Soldier P

x. Soldiers T and V fired in circumstances which were unauthorised by the Yellow Card

xi. 108 shots were fired by Support Company based upon the individual judgment of the firer rather than under the control or order of a superior officer

xii. Soldiers S and H laid down fire in a particular area contrary to the Yellow Card

xiv. As no officer ordered any individual soldier to fire, no officer can account for any those killed or injured on Bloody Sunday

xv. No contemporaneous explanation supplied by those who fired accounts for 13 deaths and 14 wounded

xvi. To this day there is no explanation as to where the members of Anti-tank Platoon went after they left the low wall at Kells Walk V48/11.38

xvii. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why Colonel Wilford should have left his command post and gone to observe events on the ground as opposed to controlling them from a distance

xviii. There is no explanation as to what the officers were doing which prevented them from exercising command and control of their men and the fire in which they were engaged

xix. There is no satisfactory explanation as to the poverty of the communication between Loden and his Platoons, between Loden and 1 Para H.Q., and between 1 Para and 8^th Brigade

xx. There is no explanation as to how one soldier could fire 19 shots at 1 target in 1 location and not one other soldier witness or 1 officer comment on this

15.8.5. None of the radio logs records any authorisation for Support Company to enter the Bogside or instruction to any of the resident battalions to carry out any collateral act to assist the entry of Support Company. See 8^th Brigade log W47 serial 159, 1 Para log W90 serial 31, or the Porter log W128 serial 370 .The Porter log records that 8^th Brigade is informed at 16.13 that Support Company have moved south through the church to the area of William Street, directly south of the church, W129 serial 387.

Major Loden insisted, Day 345/28/1 to Day 345/28/6, that he was ordered to take Support Company through barrier 12 in vehicles. Thus it must be that the order for Support Company to go into the Bogside came from, either directly or indirectly, Colonel Wilford. Colonel Wilford had told the Widgery Tribunal, at B1110.93 paragraph D, that Brigade were perfectly aware that he had 2 companies to go through and that he intended to put them through. This may have been his settled intention but it was contrary to the express provisions of Operation Forecast at G955.570 paragraph 9f which specifically reserved the right to launch the arrest operation “in whole or in part” to 8^th Brigade.

15.8.5.2 The primary responsibility of Colonel Wilford for what occurred after Support Company entered the Bogside lies in that he launched an arrest operation that had not been authorised in the terms in which a Company, which had not been authorised to take part, executed it, and in an area that had not been anticipated.

The misinformation furnished to 8^th Brigade as to how Support Company had entered William Street through the church contributed to confusion and adversely affected the ability of Brigade to exercise proper control over the whole operation. W129 serial 387.

15.8.5.3 The last minute alteration to his proposed method of entry for Support Company, if Major Loden’s evidence is corrected at Day 345/25/1 to Day 345/25/25, meant that Support Company were ill prepared, ill informed as to the situation on the ground and with little opportunity to apprise itself of what, if any, tactics would be appropriate.

Colonel Wilford gave no additional information or orders to the Commanding Officer of Support Company as to:

(iii) How to co-ordinate his part in the operation with the other companies involved;

(vii) The nature and the disposition of the crowd, which Support Company had not observed.

(i) pass on the limitation that no running battles were to be conducted down Rossville Street;

(ii) provide any assistance how in all the circumstances Support Company soldiers could distinguish between those who had been rioting and other members of the crowd.

15.8.5.4 Colonel Wilford’s behaviour in abandoning his command post at a crucial moment is inexplicable as he was thereby denying himself the critical input necessary to demonstrate leadership when it was most required. In abandoning his post he effectively abandoned command and control of the operation. His response to questioning on V3/7.10 demonstrates how hopelessly out of touch he was with events on the ground and, if he was not dissembling, how he was struggling for information that it was his duty to be apprised of as a prerequisite to the discharge of his command.

15.8.5.5 His assertion to the Widgery Tribunal that he checked with the men at Kells Walk wall and that they were in “perfect control”, see B1110.70 paragraph E, rings rather hollow.

Colonel Wilford’s anxiety to carry out an operation was achieved at the absolute failure to calculate the risk to innocent civilians, see B1110.98 paragraphs B to C. This failure infected every decision made in relation to the specifics of the execution of Operation Forecast and contributed with singular significance to the subsequent outcome.

15.8.5.6 Indeed the first omission of the day, the failure to inform Brigade that he had moved troops forward of the central blocking points, contrary to the Brigade Operations Order G95.578 paragraph 7 (e), to the Abbey Taxis building where they would attract the attention of the marchers as they would require to be protected by clearly visible soldiers on the post office flat roof, reflects a failure of understanding of the complexities of the situation that he was dealing with.

15.8.5.7 His failure to inform Brigade that a shot had been fired at his men at a time when he was seeking to put pressure on Brigade to launch an arrest operation into the Bogside cannot be explained away on the basis of lack of appreciation of its potential significance. The knowledge of the presence of armed men, in itself, would have to be weighed by Brigade in making its determination as to whether the arrest operation should proceed.

15.8.5.8 The fact that a shot had been fired at members of Machinegun Platoon would inevitably have lead to Brigade seeking further information as to all the circumstances which surrounded the firing including whether fire had been returned and whether any one had been hit or wounded. Such inquiries would have lead to the revelation of all that occurred in the vicinity of Abbey Taxis. Had such information been made available to 8^th Brigade it must surely be problematic as to whether any arrest operation would have been authorised. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Colonel Wilford would have been unaware of the implications of the provision of accurate information to Brigade in respect of the “drainpipe shot”.

15.8.6.2 Colonel Loden, the officer commanding Support Company, emphasised 2 important features of his role on the day, namely to maintain firm control over his men and ensure that he was in apposition to provide meaningful leadership by communication with the officers under his command and with Battalion H.Q.

15.8.6.2 The decision to locate Machine-Gun Company in the derelict building formerly occupied by Abbey Taxis was apparently taken in conjunction with Colonel Wilford, whose primary duty it was to inform Brigade of this change to the Brigade Operations Plan. The decision to locate Machine-Gun Platoon in this building had the collateral consequence of the deployment of some members of Mortar Platoon on the flat roof of the Post Office building to the east, P201. This immediately resulted in troops becoming visible and vulnerable to attack given that this disposition was both intrusive into the Bogside and isolated from the protection offered by the resident battalions.

15.8.6.3 At 1550hrs. Colonel Loden claimed that he heard one high velocity shot, fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats, at the Motor Platoon and this shot stuck the drainpipe on the Church, approximately four foot above their heads. A few moments later he heard several shots from the Machine-Gun Platoon and he turned and saw a man fall at the corner of a building on the south of William Street. This man was taken away. He spoke to the Platoon Commander on his forward link and was told that a nail bomber had been shot. See Day 345/40/9 to Day 345/42/12.

15.8.6.4 This account of events was never communicated to either 1 Para H.Q. on the battalion net, nor to Brigade on the Brigade net. There is no record of any such communication on the Porter tape.

i. There was at least 1 gunman armed with a high velocity weapon operating from the Rossville Flats;

iii. There was a possibility that there could be other gunmen in other locations;

iv. That a gunman was prepared to shoot military personnel in spite of the presence of a large crowd of innocent civilians;

v. That there was at least one nail bomber in William Street aided and abetted by others;

vi. That nail bomber was prepared to throw an anti personnel explosive device in spite of the presence of large numbers of innocent civilians;

viii. That there was a reasonable possibility that at least one person had been shot dead by a soldier or soldiers from Machine-Gun Platoon;

ix. That if one person had been shot dead there was a possibility this would in turn provoke a more violent reaction from paramilitary organisations;

x. That 1 Para would be expecting to become engaged in a gun battle if they entered the Bogside;

xi. That innocent civilian lives would be placed at risk if an arrest operation was launched;

xii. That any proposed arrest operation would have to take account of all of the above matters.

Had Brigade been informed of the information in relation to the incidents on William Street then there must have been the real possibility that the arrest operation would have been launched and certainly not without the closest supervision and direct control of Brigade.

15.8.6.5 That such critical information was with held is inexplicable, except on the basis that I Para was so committed to the launch of the arrest operation that it regarded the risk to life as incidental and, therefore, did not wish any information which might jeopardise that launch to be made available. See Day 345/5320 to Day 345/54/23. Loden could provide no answer as to why he had not informed his own battalion of what he witnessed.

15.8.6.6 After entering the Bogside

The order in which Support Company vehicles entered the Bogside was such as to isolate Mortar Platoon from Composite and Anti-Tank Platoons. This effectively eliminated two thirds of the available troops from having anything other than a peripheral impact on an arrest operation. This order was probably due the hurried alterations to the plan brought about by the unfeasibility of putting large numbers of soldiers over the Church wall, rather than any considered strategic advantage. See Day 345/61/6 to Day345/63/25.

15.8.6.7 It did have the direct consequence that Mortar and Anti-Tank Platoons were attacking down Rossville Street when Lieutenant N had already fired over the heads of persons in the area of Eden Place. The sound of such fire would have led them to believe that if firing was in accordance with the Yellow Card that there were hostile elements engaging the soldiers who had deployed ahead of them. This in turn would have led them to interpret the situation as one in which the use of lethal force was necessary.

Indeed their arrival was so delayed that the arrest operation, in the terms envisaged at their briefings, was effectively lost. The only method available to them to detain those who had by this stage gone beyond the range of capture was to shot them.

15.8.6.8 There were a few stragglers left behind by the dispersal of the main body of the crowd and these are shown on V48/12.40.

15.8.6.9 However the behaviour of Colonel Loden is extraordinary in that he and his radio operators, if their evidence is to be believed, began to carry out arrests once they had debussed. See Day 346/9/7 to Day 346/10/22

This conduct meant that he was out of communication with his units at a time when there was or had been shooting going on and persons had already been killed or wounded, of which he seems to have been totally unaware until much later in the evening. Colonel Loden claims to have regained control quickly, see Day 346/7/1 to Day 346/7/11, however the real question is whether or not he was ever in command and control of his company on that day.

15.8.6.10 At Day 346/43/1 to Day/346/43/15 he stated that his authority was delegated through the platoon commanders, that he communicated with them on the radio and they told him what was going on.

15.8.611 However, in essence this meant that during the 6 to 10 minutes in which 13 people were killed and 14 wounded, in the confined area around Rossville Street, Colonel Loden was not personally aware of the events unfolding before his eyes, but was dependant upon reports from the Platoon Commanders. This in spite of the fact that his command vehicle was positioned in the centre of the area of the alleged engagement, that he can be seen on V48/12.26 occupying the perspex turret, and that directly in front and to the left of him at least 7 persons were killed and 4 wounded.

Thus for whole period of the shooting “ well, short moments, 10 or 15 minutes, the platoon commanders are there, that is their job and they are exercising control”.

15.8.6.12 There is no evidence from any source, other than Colonel Loden himself, as to what he was actually doing during the shooting. The radio logs and the Porter tape reveal not merely a dearth of reliable information as to what was happening, but an absence of any information. See Day 346/21/15 to Day 346/24/15.

15.8.6.13 His failure to account adequately for his own actions is also extended into an inability to account for the actions of his men. Video 48 at 11.28 shows approximately 18 men from the Anti-Tank Platoon rounding the wall at Kells Walk. These men disappear in the direction of the entrance of Glenfada Park North. Additional footage and photographs show that they do not reappear, their position is taken up by members of Composite Platoon and that Loden’s vehicle moves into the gable of block 1.The movement of this body of men occurs directly in front of the command vehicle. Colonel Loden can offer no explanation as to what these men are doing or where they went. See Day 346/37/8 to Day 346/37/16.

15.8.6.14 This movement is totally at odds with the evidence advanced as to the numbers of soldiers who were in Glenfada Park North. It is, therefore, at odds with the accounts furnished by the soldiers as to what happened there. The concept of command and control must surely be predicated upon at least a basic understanding of the deployment of soldiers and the reasons for that deployment. See Day 346/37/17 to day 346/38/4.

15.8.6.15 The only record of action being taken that day by Loden to exercise his authority is recorded on V3/5.30. This shows an interview to camera by Gerald Seymour and in the background Loden can be clearly heard to shout, “Cease fire”. See Day 346/55/25/ to Day 346/56/23.

15.8.6.16 His men ignored this order and further shots can be heard. He subsequently repeated the order in fuller terms for the benefit of the camera. The shooting that can be heard on tape was shooting along the eastern pavement of Rossville Street. There does not appear to be any satisfactory explanation in terms of the other evidence for this shooting.

15.8.6.17 Statements taken from the members of Support Company who had fired and the Shot Plot prepared by Colonel Loden later in the day where accepted by him as being as accurate a picture as the honesty of his men and the events of the day would allow. See Day 346/75/23 to Day 346/80/20. The loyalty displayed by Colonel Loden in accepting the versions of events as related by his men far from being commendable was precisely the type of loyalty, which could be exploited to mask the truth of not only what happened but also what Colonel Loden must have known to have happened. The specific reference in the Battalion Log to 2 dead bodies in Chamberlain Street must have come from Loden as he was the only officer in a position to communicate with the Gin Palace. It, therefore, still remains to be explained how such misleading information could have been passed to Battalion and forwarded to Brigade yet neither was informed as to the presence of 3 bodies in a pig beside the command vehicle. See Day 347/20/2 to Day 347/20/17.

15.8.6.18 The aspect of command and control that depended upon the provision and receipt of accurate information was undermined to the point at which it was not merely rendered ineffective but impossible. This failure provided a ready excuse for the excesses that took place. Colonel Loden’s claim, like that of Colonel Wiford, that he was firmly in command and control of his men as directed through his Platoon Commanders during the crucial period, is little more than casuistry.

15.8.7 Conclusion

Bloody Sunday was the result of a combination of many complex factors. The personal responsibility of Colonel Wiford and Colonel Loden is direct and significant. Their determination to achieve the launch of an arrest operation was at the expense of:

This comprehensive disregard for their general and specific responsibilities was the immediate cause of the tragedy of the day. It provided the means. It and many other factors provided the reasons.

The Adequacy of Porter Transcript

The key items of documentary evidence in the matters of orders and operational control are the Porter Tape and the 8 Brigade log.

It is submitted that the Porter tape recorded all transmissions broadcast over the Brigade net during the material time of the day.

Between 1531 and 1619 (serials 116 to 171) there are 10 entries in the 8 Brigade log which have no corresponding transmission on the porter transcript. They are serials:

118, 121, 138, 140, 142, 144, 151, 159,163, 167, some of which appear in the table below.

From the remaining entries serials 121, 138, 140, 142, and 144 are all sitreps sent to HQNI. They were rear communications which would have been sent via TELEX and would not feature on 8 Brigade Net.

With regard the other non-corresponding entries, press enquiries were normally made over the telephone (151), while helicopter pilots had their own radio frequency (163) [EVIDENCE]. It is likely that the RRF and RGJ communications were given over the telephone from their respective Battalion HQs (118 & 167).

The only outstanding operational communication during this time which is recorded on the Brigade log but does not appear on the Porter tape is serial 159, the alleged order to go in, which was sent over the secure link.

The absence of other entries in the Brigade log from battalion HQs to 8 Brigade demonstrate that (aside from the RUC) MacLellan and Steele had no other source of information for sitreps on crowd movement and rioting. Moreover it reflects the fact that all the units on the ground found it desirable to channel information over the Brigade Net so that any unit involved in the operation on the ground could be apprised of the situation to be ready to deal with unforeseen eventualities.

Consequently, when considered in conjunction with the 8 Brigade log, the Porter transcript provides for all purposes a word for word account of army communications between 1531 (when barriers 12 and 13 were being closed) and 1619 hours (at which time people were running up Westland Street away from 1 Para).

[1] For the purposes of these submissions references to “BID 150” encompass the full working apparatus, ie BID 150 encryption device coupled with a C42 No. 3 radio

[2] Day 352/143

[3] Day 352/133 However secure net was simply an analog signal voice net with encryption.

[4] Generally W348 outlines introduction of Secure Command Net in 8 Brigade

[5] JL1.16 paragraphs 91to 99

[6] B1299 at D where Lt Col Steele’s recollection was initially that he instructed 1 Para to use all three companies.

[7] INQ 10 no longer has a recollection of the actual order which came through to him. (Day 289/16/9 to Day 289/16/12)

SECTOR 1

16.1 General Introduction and Summary of Submissions

16.1.1 Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were both shot and wounded in what has been commonly referred to as the ‘Laundry waste ground’ on William Street. They were the first persons to be shot by the Parachute Regiment on Bloody Sunday, approximately fifteen minutes before Support Company’s entry into Rossville Street. It is apparent from the evidence that Damien Donaghy was shot first, followed by Mr Johnston. No other person suffered a gunshot wound in Sector 1.

16.1.2 Two soldiers, Corporal A and Private B admit to opening fire at an alleged nail bomber in the vicinity of the waste ground between the Nook Bar and the Castle Laundry on the southern side of William Street. Corporal A and Private B were part of a group of soldiers of the Machine Gun Platoon who had taken up position in the derelict Abbey Taxis building on the northern side of William Street. This building, with nine windows which face in an easterly direction, can be seen in P201.

16.1.3 Corporal A was positioned behind a first floor window and the trajectories of both his shots can be seen in P1. Private B was positioned on the ground floor. The trajectories of his three shots can be seen in P2 and P3.

16.1.4 The descriptions provided by Corporal A and Private B of their intended targets do not correspond with the physical descriptions of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, or the clothing which they were wearing on that day.

16.1.5 Soldier A claimed that the alleged nail bomber on whom he opened fire was approximately 5’6” tall, had fair hair and wore a blue cardigan or windcheater[1]. Soldier B told the RMP that the target at which he fired wore a dark coloured windcheater and was of average height. B12.

16.1.6 Damien Donaghy confirmed to the Tribunal when he gave oral evidence that his hair was black, and curly, and that he wore Wrangler jeans and jerkin, and a shirt and round neck jumper Day 070/22/11 to Day 070/23/9. John Johnston was dressed in an overcoat, a tweed jacket, grey trousers, white shirt and tie and a thick woolly cardigan Day 048/154/9 to Day 048/154/11. It would appear therefore, that according to the evidence of the soldiers, neither Damien Donaghy nor John Johnston was shot by a soldier.

16.1.7 Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were then helped from the waste ground to the home of Mrs Brigid “Ma” Shiels at Columbcille Court, where they were treated by Doctors Raymond McClean and Kevin Swords, and Sergeant John Lafferty of the Order of Malta. Father Joe Carolan then transported both to Altnagelvin Hospital separately.

16.1.8 An Official IRA volunteer fired one round from a 303 rifle from the Columbcille Court area in response to the wounding of Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston at soldiers on the flat roof annexed to the Presbyterian Church. It is submitted that this is in all likelihood the ‘drainpipe shot’.

(i) Both Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot by members of the Machine Gun Platoon.

(iii) They were shot deliberately – not accidentally – and without any justification.

(iv) Damien Donaghy and John Johnston had not handled a nail bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday. In addition, they had not acted in support of any person handling a nail bomb or any other lethal weapon on Bloody Sunday.

(v) Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were not in the vicinity of any civilian bomber when they were shot. Nothing was taking place in the vicinity of the laundry waste ground at the time they were shot which would have led the soldiers in Abbey Taxis to believe that their lives or those of their colleagues were at risk.

(vi) There are no “missing casualties” – Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were the only two persons shot and wounded in Sector 1.

16.2 Personal details and background

Damien “Bubbles” Donaghy was fifteen years old on Bloody Sunday. He was the first, and also the youngest person to be shot on Bloody Sunday. His parents were both deceased, and Damien and his brother lived with their grandparents in the Creggan. He was an apprentice engineer, attending the local Government Training Centre. He was also a promising footballer with local club Derry Athletic and had the potential to play at a professional level. Damien had no criminal record or political affiliations. He is now married with four children.

16.2.2 John Johnston

John Johnston was 59 years old. He was married to Margaret. They did not have any children. John had worked in the drapery trade for most of his adult life and in January 1972 was manager of a local drapery store, a position he held until his death in June 1972. He had no criminal record and no political affiliations.

16.2.2.2 Father Carolan has given a statement to this Tribunal at H3.1. He also gave a statement to the Widgery Tribunal[2] (but did not give oral evidence) and to the Sunday Times[3]

16.2.2.3 His statement to Eversheds was signed on 30 July, 1999, a very short time before he died after having suffered from a long illness. In our submission, the accounts that he provided in 1972 are much more reliable than that offered to this Inquiry. He told the Treasury Solicitor that he had gone to the Creggan to get his car at the request of Dr McClean, who had advised that Mr Johnston be taken to hospital first:

“…I proceeded to Columbcille Court down William Street, put Mr Johnston into the car and set off for hospital. Castle Gate was sealed off so I went to the top of Waterloo Street to find Butcher Gate was sealed off.

I was ordered by a soldier to try the lower gate – Castle Gate. I did so and was forbidden exit even though I told the Army and R.U.C. members there that I was sent down from the upper gate. I told them that I had a man in the car who was dying…I continued protesting vehemently and it was only when I proceeded to remove the barricade myself that they relented and let me through.

After taking Johnston to the hospital I returned and took Donaghy to the hospital[4]…” H3.9

16.3.1 Damien Donaghy was wounded on the right thigh. This is apparent from the heavy strapping that is visible around it in P750. The Tribunal will be aware, however, of inaccurate reports from Doctor Fenton (D0740[5] and D0762[6]) which state that Damien Donaghy was wounded on the left thigh. It would appear that the most reliable note of the injury Damien Donaghy sustained is at D0767[7] which notes that he suffered a wound to the right thigh with comminuted fractures. The entrance wound was to the front of the thigh, and a large exit wound measuring three inches was on the postero-lateral aspect of the thigh. No metal fragments were recovered from his wound.

16.3.2 Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan commented that the track of the wound through the thigh was more likely to be from front to back than reverse, and that no comment could be made in respect of the nature of the projectile. E10.004

John Johnston

16.3.3 John Johnston was wounded on the left shoulder and right hand. He also received a minor wound to his right hand[8] D0808

Mr Bennett noted that John Johnston suffered gun shot wounds of the right shoulder and lateral aspect of the right thigh. Both wounds were “through and through”, although a small piece of metal was taken from the wound in the leg. (D0801)[9] Mr Bennett’s remark regarding the wound to John Johnston’s right shoulder is inaccurate. This is apparent from P755 and P756.

16.3.4 Two fragments of metal recovered from John Johnston’s leg wound were submitted to DIFS for examination by Dr Martin, who concluded that the “copper jacket” was consistent with the base of a 7.62 calibre rifle bullet. (D0804) Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan comment that Dr Martin does not provide any details as to why he arrived at that conclusion. (E10.005), and their own views are that the multiple injuries sustained by John Johnston indicate that the bullet (or bullets) were “fragmented prior” to striking Mr Johnston. (ibid).

I16.3.5 In May 1972, he was readmitted to hospital, and he died on 16 June, 1972.

16.4 Sequence of Photograph/Video

16.4.1 There are no photographs of Damien Donaghy on the march. The only photographs in which he appears are those taken by Larry Doherty of the Derry Journal as he was treated for his wounds at the home of Brigid Shiels, at 8a Columbcille Court:

i) P751: Damien Donaghy being treated for a gunshot wound to the right leg in Mrs Shiels’ flat in Columbcille Court.

ii) P750: shows Damien Donaghy having had his right leg heavily strapped. This would appear to have been taken after P751

16.4.2 As with the case of Damien Donaghy, there are no photographs of John Johnston, with the exception of those taken by Larry Doherty as he received treatment in Mrs Shiels’ flat:

i)P755 and P756: Dr Raymond McClean can be seen examining the wound to Mr Johnston’s shoulder;

ii) P757: Mr Johnston receiving attention on the floor of the house by Sergeant Johnny Lafferty of the Order of Malta:

16.4.3 John Johnston can also be seen in Video 3 being assisted by Father Joe Carolan to his car as he prepared to take him to Altnagelvin Hospital.[10]

16.5.1 It is clear that Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot in the waste ground between the Nook Bar[11] and the Castle Laundry. P199 clearly shows the position of the waste ground. Some witnesses place Damien Donaghy and John Johnston on the waste ground to the east of Abbey Street, sometimes referred to as the ‘Grandstand Bar waste ground’. We would adopt Christopher Clarke QC’s suggestion that that may be the result of witnesses confusing one waste ground for another Day 011/15/14 to Day 011/15/15.

It is also clear that this confusion has been greatly informed by the presence of a square on the map Q12 at grid reference K09. This building, it has been suggested was an‘ice house’ [12] used by public houses to store ice in the days prior to refrigeration. Other witnesses have suggested it may have been a previous site of a bookmaker’s office.[13]

16.5.2 Whatever it was, it had been demolished by January 1972 but for some reason had been depicted on the map. It is submitted that this confused a significant number of witnesses when they came to be interviewed by the Inquiry. At least six witnesses have placed the shooting of Damien Donaghy and/or John Johnston on the Abbey Street waste ground.[14] It should also be noted that Counsel for a majority of the soldiers has also indicated that the area in which Damien Donaghy is not “seriously contradicted”.[15]

16.5.3 The fact that some witnesses have almost certainly identified the wrong waste ground is explicable by the mapping confusion. However, this isolated error does not detract from their evidence, which in many other respects, greatly assist the Tribunal.

DAMIEN DONAGHY

16.5.4 Damien Donaghy provided a short interview to Detective Sergeant Cudmore AD120.17. He also provided a statement to John Doherty, Solicitor’s Apprentice AD120.1 in 1972 and interviews to the Sunday Times Insight Team AD120.2 and also Fulvio Grimaldi AD120.26 have been attributed to him, which he does not recollect giving, Day 070/50/4 to Day 070/50/24. He provided a statement to the Inquiry at AD120.9. He did not give evidence to the Widgery Inquiry as he was still in hospital. He gave oral evidence to this Tribunal on Day 70.

“I did not throw any nail bombs or petrol bombs. Shortly after I went into hospital, my clothes were taken away for forensic examination. Nothing came of this and I was never prosecuted. The clothes were never returned. I view what happened to me as attempted murder. I never saw any gunmen or nail bombers. It was a peaceful march.” AD120.8 paragraph 19

16.5.5 He confirmed he attended the march with Alex McGuiness, Sean O’Neill, Liam Doherty, James Shiels and possibly John McGee Day 70/2/6 to Day 70/3/12.

16.5.6 He was standing at the Nook Bar when he first noticed soldiers the Abbey Taxis Building AD120.9 paragraph 5, AD120.16.

16.5.7 He previously provided conflicting evidence in relation to whether or not he threw stones on Bloody Sunday. Upon taking the oath he immediately clarified the position. He confirmed that he was one of a group of boys who threw stones and bottles at soldiers that he could see on the ground floor in the Abbey Taxis building Day 70/1/20 to Day 70/2/1. He was asked during his evidence why he had previously stated on occasion that he had not thrown stones. His reply was as follows:

“At that time I was a bit afraid in a way in case I would be charged with rioting, but another way I was afraid – I thought it might give the soldiers credibility for shooting me, because I threw stones. Day 070/20/10 to Day 070/20/13.

16.5.8 There were not many marchers left at this stage and he was approximately 20 to 30 feet from the soldiers Day 70/7/11 to Day 70/8/18.

16.5.9 Mutual insults were traded between the soldiers in the Abbey Taxis building and the youths. He was certain that “no petrol bombs or nail bombs were thrown during this period” and that he saw no one with any sort of weapon. As he was about to make his way towards his cousin Catherine Roddy’s house at Garvan Place in the Rossville Flats, two rubber bullets[16] were fired and one ricocheted off a wall not far from where he was (See AD120.27).

16.5.10 Intending to pick it up as a souvenir, he took about three steps towards the rubber bullet. He had not got to within 20 or 30 feet of where it ended up when he felt a jab in his right leg. In oral evidence he said that he was just into the waste ground Day 070/14/12 to Day 070/14/16. He fell immediately onto his back. He was unable to hear any shot being fired beforehand. It is Damien Donaghy’s recollection when he gave oral evidence that he was in the vicinity of the gable end of the eastern side of the waste ground near the Castle Laundry when he was shot, Day 070/24/20 to Day 070/24/12, Day 070/30/16 to Day 070/32/2.

16.5.11 Whilst on the floor he heard two gunshots AD120.23, AD120.6 paragraph 11, AD120.2. These occurred possibly ten or twenty seconds later Day 070/17/11 to Day 070/17/13. He did not see John Johnston shot Day 070/17/24.

16.5.12 He was then carried to 8A Columbcille Court to Mrs Shiels house. He knows that two of the people who carried him were John McGee and Michael Deakin.

16.5.13 He was placed on the sofa. Within a short period of time, Sergeant John Lafferty of the Knights of Malta arrived and placed a tourniquet on his leg (P751, P750). Dr McClean arrived later and bandaged him up. Eibhlin Laffery, Jim McDaid, Dr Kevin Swords, Father Carolan and Father George McLaughlin all attended the house as well.

16.5.14 During his oral evidence to the Tribunal Damien Donaghy rejected entirely the allegation of Soldier A:

“Q. "Two nail bombs were then thrown and they exploded very close to us." Did anything like that happen?

A. The only bangs was the sound of rubber bullets.” Day 070/21/18 to Day 070/22/3

16.5.15 Counsel for the Soldiers made clear to Damien Donaghy that he was not suggesting to him that he threw a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday. He explained to him that he would not have been shot unless he, or someone very close to him did something which led two soldiers “almost simultaneously, independently and honestly to believe that you, or whoever it was, was in the process of being about to throw a nail bomb” Day 070/3029/25 to Day 070/30/15.

16.5.16 The witness replied to Mr Glasgow, “You have made your position clear, but you are wrong.” Day 070/30/12 to Day 070/3013.

16.5.17 He also made clear to Mr Glasgow that the only person he saw shot in this area was himself Day 070/31/17 to Day 070/32/2.

16.5.18 John Johnston provided a statement to the Treasury Solicitor AJ5.3. He gave oral evidence to Lord Widgery and provided an interview to the Sunday Time Insight Team AJ5.1-2. There is a map attached to the interview that purports to mark the position where he was shot and where he saw Damien Donaghy propped against the eastern gable wall adjoining the Castle Laundry waste ground AJ5.9.

“I can tell you with all truth, I never heard a shot nor any bomb before I was hit, not a solitary thing did I hear except thr (sic) rubber bullets and the stones. How could anyone pick me as a gunman, there I am walking away with my back to the troops. They were just shooting at anything, like herrings in a barrel.” AJ5.2

“I did not have a weapon of any kind nor did anyone else including the wounded boy, as far as I could see. I cannot see any reason for the troops to assume that any offensive action was being taken against them by a civilian.

I heard no other shooting and I heard no nail bombs or anything similar.” AJ5.3, WT7.77 G

16.5.20 In his interview with the Sunday Times Insight Team given on 22^nd February 1972, John Johnston pointed out that he had never been on a march before and because he was worried about the gas and because of his bad chest, he made sure he was towards the end. Possibly, out of fear of prosecution he denied that he had been on the march when asked at the Widgery Tribunal WT7.78 B.

16.5.21 He could see that there was CS gas in the area of lower William Street and therefore decided to cut across to his right to the area of Glenfada Park to see an old man “about 90… He can’t get about much and I often go round to make sure his windows are shut tight if there’s a lot of CS gas around.” AJ5.1, WT7.76 D On instructions, we can confirm that the man’s name was Tommy Duddy.

“I saw soldiers in a firing position, in a burnt out house almost opposite to this waste ground and north of William Street. As I was crossing this waste ground I turned and looked at the soldiers I heard a crack of a shot. I was hit in the right leg near the hip and then another shot hit me in the left shoulder. At first I thought I was hit by rubber bullets. Another shot that I believe was a ricochet grazed my hand but I have no idea when this happened. Just before I was hit I saw a boy fall near the corner of the waste ground and William Street.” AJ5.3

16.5.23 He told the Sunday Times that he went into the open ground (meaning the Castle Laundry waste ground) approximately two thirds of the way across:

“about level with that old lorry, when there was a big thump on the back of my right leg. I thought, my God I’ve been whacked by a rubber bullet and went to hobble on, though I couldn’t move well. Then a man shouted to me “Christ Mr Johnson (sic), you’re shot, you’re trousers are soaking in blood.” I looked down and so they were, they were light grey and they soaked right through. Some men came to give me a hand and as I was helped away I could see a young lad lying propped up against the wall to my left (this was dogerty, (sic) he had been moved I think). When they got me into Columbcille Court, the shields flats I think, dr mcclean, (sic) discovered I had been hit at least three times; once in the shoulder, another in the left and a graze on my left hand from a ricochet. I’m now told that my big overcoat saved me: what with that, a good jacket and woolly cardigan, the bullet must have been slowed down. It was a grand sunny day, but it was still a bit chilly and I have to look after my dodgy chest.” AJ5.1

16.5.24 Mr Johnston in his oral evidence to Lord Widgery said that no one had a weapon of any kind WT7.77 G. He also confirmed that Damien Donaghy was at most about 10 feet from him when he saw him in the waste ground WT7.79 D.

“Mr GIBBENS: I ought to have put to this witness, and I forgot, that before this shooting incident two nail bombs had been thrown.

LORD WIDGERY: I will put it to him. Did you hear any nail bombs just before you were wounded? A. Absolutely no, your Lordship. There was no nail bombs, nothing.

Q. You heard no sound? A. I am positive there was not. There was not a sound. There was not a nail bomb, certainly not.”(Emphasis added) WT7.80 C-D

16.5.25 Betty Curran was on the march with her husband William. She saw two soldiers inside the Abbey Taxis building on the ground floor. She could see that a rifle was pointed at the people in William Street AC130.1 paragraph 7.

“… I saw two or three wee lads opposite to where I was standing (i.e. on the north side of William Street). They were throwing a few stones across at the soldiers on the flat roof…

After they had thrown a couple of stones, the lads turned and walked towards us. As they were coming towards us, I heard a shot. Damien “Bubbles” Donaghy was shot. I did not know him at the time, but learned his name later. He was only about 14 or 15 years old. I remember he had a lovely head of curly hair. He was wearing jeans. He had only been dandering across the road. He was facing me when he was shot, walking on my right hand side as I was facing him. He had just about reached the footpath on the side where I was standing. I just saw his body falling. He was only a few feet away from me when he fell. I think he fell face down. I remember that he fell onto a piece of ground which had originally been part of a small porch leading into a derelict house because I remember the black and white tiles on which he fell. It had clearly been someone’s hallway. I didn’t see where the bullet hit him at the time. I saw it bounce of the tiles though, and I realised that it was not big enough to be a rubber bullet. I heard two shots, one straight after the other, and they were the first two I heard that day. I recognised them as live because I saw one bullet bounce off the black and white tiles and I saw Damien Donaghy fall. I would not have known about the particular type of ammunition otherwise. I heard no further shots after that for 10 or 15 minutes… I did not see Damien Donaghy throw any stones towards the soldiers and, as he came towards me with his fellows, there was nothing in his hands. I remember this quite clearly because he had his hands down by his sides and not in his pockets.” AC130.2 paragraphs 10 to 12.

16.5.26 The witness’s husband, William Curran, then helped carry Damien towards the Shiels’ house. She did not see John Johnston being shot. AC130.2 paragraphs 12 to 13, AC132.3 paragraphs 15 to 18. William Curran, a pacifist, came from a family with strong links to the British Army Day 055/65/3 to Day 055/65/14.

16.5.27 William Curran noticed the soldiers in the area of the GPO office and saw a group of about four or five boys throw stones at them AC132.2 paragraph 8. Damien Donaghy was one of the boys who then crossed William Street towards the witness. Bubbles Donaghy lagged behind. The witness then heard shots. Although he did not see him get shot he then noticed Damien Donaghy on the ground lying on his back AC132.2 paragraphs 11 to 14. In his oral evidence he placed in red the position he believed where Damien Donaghy was shot AC132.17

16.5.28 The witness thought there were two or three high velocity shots. He stood at Damien Donaghy’s feet. He glanced around and saw an older man who he now knows to be John Johnston

“… coming to help Donaghy as well. When John Johnston was about five or six feet away from me, I saw him clutch his shoulder. I cannot remember precisely where I was in the waste ground when he was shot. I believe that he put his left hand to his right shoulder. I did not hear the shot. I think that he was also hit in the leg afterwards and he hopped away down the waste ground. I did not see where he went and I did not see him again.” AC132.3 parargaph 15.

16.5.29 In his oral evidence the witness acknowledged that it was assumption on his part that John Johnston was going to help Damien Donaghy Day 055/60/6.

16.5.30 When Mr and Mrs Curran appeared on the Secret History documentary they were equally emphatic the shooting in his area was completely unjustified:

There was no nail bombs in that vicinity, none in that vicinity where Damion (sic) Donaghy was shot there was no nail bombs. None at all.

16.5.31 On Bloody Sunday Patrick O’Carolan AO6.8 was a forty-year-old Executive Officer in HM Customs and Excise AM390.1. In his NICRA statement he said that he was standing the waste ground where Duffy’s shop used to be with a former RUC officer, Charles Meehan.

“Just then a shot rang out from the direction of the rear of Abbey Taxis. A young boy who had been standing at the corner of Sweeny’s bar on William St. fell to the ground crying out. I thought he had been hit by a rubber bullet in the leg. A crowd ran to him and shouted that he had been shot by a lead bullet… As I reached Columcille (sic) Court I looked behind and saw an elderly man who was limping and I saw blood coming from his leg. Two men rushed to help him. The Stewards then told everyone to move back towards Glenfada Park… I would emphasise that I did not hear any shots coming from the direction of the Bogside before the first lad fell at William Street.” AO6.8

16.5.32 This account is consistent with what he told Eversheds AO6.2 paragraphs 8 to 9 and AO6.3 paragraphs 16 to 18.

16.5.33 He confirmed that Damien Donaghy would have been no more than about ten feet away from him when he fell. He was doing nothing that warranted him being shot Day 060/8/6 to Day 060/8/25. The witness marked the position where he saw him fall at position “C” on AO6.6. He also saw John Johnston come from around the northeast corner of the building that adjoins the waste ground Day 060/13/5 to Day 060/13/13.

16.5.34 Again the witness in his account to this Tribunal emphasised that this was the first shot that he heard fired. In fact he said, “If I had heard shooting before I certainly would not have been waiting around in the area.” AO6.2 paragraph 11 In the same vein he continued, “I did not hear or see nail bombs or hear or see any gunmen. I did not see anyone throwing stones.” AO6.3 paragraph 18

16.5.35 Charles Meehan, the former RUC officer who is deceased and did not give oral evidence to the Inquiry but he did make a statement in 1972 that significantly corroborates Patrick O’Carolan:

“I saw two windows on the gable side of the disused building, previously occupied by Abbey Taxis Ltd., which had formerly been blocked up by the Derry Commission, were now lying open. I saw movements inside the shadows of the building and was amazed to see two paratroopers crouching in a sniping position pointing their rifles in the direction of myself and my friends. Their headgear showed them to be paratroopers.

I said to Pat O’Carolan: “We are in a very exposed and dangerous position if anything like shooting does start.” I had hardly finished this sentence when one of the paratroopers in the building lifted his rifle to the shooting position. I pulled Pat O’Carolan into the waste ground on my left and as I did so still looking at the soldier, he fired one shot and hit a youth who had moved into our position. The youth fell and was dragged across the waste ground towards Colmcille (sic) Court. As we ran in that direction a second man was shot in the shoulder as he ran alongside me. He also fell and was assisted out of the line of fire. I must make it absolutely clear that no one, where I was standing, was involved in riotous or disorderly behaviour.” AM390.1

16.5.36 The Tribunal is also referred to Charles Meehan’s map that he provided to the Sunday Times Insight Team in which the positions where Damien Donaghy and John Johnston fell are marked AM390.3.

16.5.37 John Quigg AQ1 and Day 053 was on the march with Charles Meehan. Whilst he is confused in his Eversheds statement in relation to some matters (such as the age of the man he saw shot in the leg and his position etc AQ1.1 paragraphs 6 to 7) his 1972 account marries well with the general body of evidence. He said that he had been taking shelter from tear gas that was being fired from the Rossville Street – William Street area. AQ1.4

“I was along with twenty to thirty other fellows. A shot came from the ruins of Richardsons factory in William Street. A chap alongside me fell to the ground. He had been shot just above the knee in the right leg. He was taken into a house in Colmcille Court (sic) by other people. He had been throwing stones towards the ruins of Richard’s Factory but he definitely had no weapon”

16.5.38 Eugene Lafferty AL1 did not make a statement in 1972. He gave oral evidence on Day 064

16.5.39 When he was in William Street he heard two shots overhead from the direction of the Presbyterian Church. These were the first shots he heard that day. Two people to his right were hit and fell to the ground. He incorrectly positioned the men actually on the southern side of William Street itself AL1.13, AL1.8 paragraph 9 however he confirmed in his oral evidence that they could in fact have been shot on the waste ground Day 064/81/11 to Day 064/81/22.

“Bubbles and Mr Johnston were just walking along at the time when they were shot. They did not do anything at all to warrant being shot. I know this for certain because they were so close to me. Bubbles and Mr Johnston were taken away by the Knights of Malta but I did not see where they were taken.” AL1.8 paragraph 10

16.5.41 In fact one of the Knights of Malta who was to treat the injured men was Eugene Lafferty’s father, Johnny.

16.5.42 Sergeant John Lafferty in his handwritten 1972 statement recorded that some youths in William Street were even trying to catch the rubber bullets being fired. He attended with some women and girls who were overcome with gas and returned to the area he had previously been. He was called to a boy who

“had been hit with lead bullets (sic), Lieut McDaid rushed to attend him when another call came, this time it was a man between 50 and 60 who had got shot. Mrs Shiels who lives near hand called to bring them to her house. Capt Day, Lieut McKinney and Lieut McDaid treated the boy young Donaghy, and Eibhlin Lafferty and myself attended to Mr Johnston.” AL2.3

16.5.43 Sergeant Lafferty accompanied both John Johnston and Damien Donaghy to Altnagelvin Hospital in Father Carolan’s VW beetle that had been made into makeshift ambulance. On both occasions the Army and RUC stopped them on the way to and from the hospital AL2.3, AL2.4.

16.5.44 Gerry Duddy (brother of Jackie Duddy) was a friend of Damien Donaghy. He did not provide a statement in 1972. He gave evidence on Day 59. He saw approximately six boys on the waste ground to the north of William Street throwing stones and bottles at the soldiers on the roof of the old bakery. He then heard a single shot and saw “Bubbles” yell out that he was shot. The witness assumed, because he saw no blood or obvious injuries, that Damien Donaghy had been hit by a rubber bullet. He saw a number of men help carry him away. As he did so there was a second shot, which hit John Johnston. AD146.1 paragraph 3

16.5.45 The witness positioned Damien Donaghy as being on the southern pavement of William Street as it joins the waste ground of the Castle Laundry AD146.6.

“Bubbles was doing nothing wrong, nothing to justify him getting shot… I didn’t hear any nail bombs in the area before or after Bubbles was shot. If any nail bombs had gone off everyone would have known about it; they would have injured the crowd as well as any soldiers they might have been aimed at. Nail bombs are made with the intention of causing as much damage as possible to the immediate area in which they explode.” AD146.2 paragraph 6

16.5.47 Philip Columba Donaghy AD116 said in his 1972 statement that he retreated up William Street due to the gas. A shot rang out and he saw a youth who was standing near him fell to the ground crying that he had been hit in the leg. He then heard another shot but did not see if that hit anyone. He recalled that the youth was shot in the front of the thigh and the Army were the only ones who could have shot him AD116.9. When the witness came to mark the position of Damien Donaghy on the map attached to his Eversheds statement, he mistakenly marked the waste ground that was further west towards Abbey Street. In any event, the witness was clear that if he was carrying a weapon at the time he, he was sure he would have seen it, as he was so close to him. The witness further confirmed, “I am sure I did not see a weapon” AD116.2 paragraph 7

16.5.48 Patrick McCallion AM74 said that he was on the waste ground to the south side of William Street facing the GPO. He heard about three shots from the north. He heard a cry and someone told him that a young boy had been shot. The witness looked to his left (west) and saw his neighbour Damien Donaghy had been shot. According to Mr McCallion, he was approximately five feet away from him at the time he was shot and was lying on the edge of the waste ground. The witness could not say if Damien Donaghy was throwing stones but he had been himself. He then heard another live shot and heard someone shout that John Johnston had been shot, although he does not remember anything further about this, AM74 paragraphs 11 to 15. The witness confirmed in his oral evidence that he heard no explosions, saw no one with a nail bomb and saw no one with “a pretended nail bomb” Day 071/151/13 to Day 071/151/18.

16.5.49 Billy McCartney AM 87 gave oral evidence on Day 54. He recalled that there were youths throwing stones at the soldiers in the derelict building on William Street. Mr McCartney joined in himself. He said that it was not heavy stone throwing and lasted for about five minutes. The soldiers fired the odd rubber bullet in return. AM87.3 paragraph 9.

16.5.50 There was then a “sudden salvo of rubber bullet fire – perhaps about six shots in total” from the soldiers in the derelict building. This caused the crowd to run back off William Street and into the waste ground areas. The witness reached a point about half way back onto the waste ground, “near the site of the old laundry” AM87.3 paragraph 10, AM87.6. Within a few seconds of that salvo, a live shot rang out. Damien Donaghy fell 10-20 feet in front of him, slightly to his left. In 1972 he described this area as where Duffy’s bookmakers shop used to stand AM87.6. This is near the gable wall at the western side of the Castle Laundry waste ground. In the course of his oral evidence, the witness marked this position with a red arrow Day 054/172/8 to Day 054/175/1, AM87.10.

16.5.50 Damien Donaghy had his back to him and was facing the derelict house, possibly at a slight angle. There were other people close to him. The witness surged forward to grab him and pull him backwards into cover.

“within a few seconds of the first shot, another live shot rang out. That was the shot that hit the elderly man, John Johnston. He was behind me, to his right, when he was shot and I do not think he fell to the floor. He was shot about 15 yards from where Damien Donaghy fell and he was a good way from the soldiers and from the action at the time. He was still upright when I turned to look at him but his arms were around his chest and there was blood on the upper part of his body. Almost immediately, some people closed in on him to help him.” AM87.3 paragraphs 10 to 11.

16.5.53 Mr McCartney in the course of his oral evidence marked the position where John Johnston was with a blue arrow on Day 054/174/8 to Day 054/175/10 (AM87.11).

16.5.54 The witness did not see either Damien Donaghy or Mr Johnston throw any stones. He was clear that Damien Donaghy would not have had time to collect a stone after the salvo of rubber bullets which caused everyone to retreat. “He had nothing in his hands, which were by his sides.” AM87.4 paragraph 13

19.5.55 In 1972 Padraig O’Mianain was a teacher who attended the march along with Michael Fox AF26 / Day 59 and Patrick O’Carolan Day 059/40/1. When he gave evidence to this Inquiry on Day 59 he was a precise and impressive witness. He was standing in the area of the Castle Laundry watching three or four teenagers throw stones at soldiers positioned on the roof of the GPO. Rubber bullets were fired and others in William Street were picking them up as souvenirs AO56.14 paragraphs 9 to 12. The witness bent down to pick up a rubber bullet and a bullet hit the wall to the west of where he stood AO56.15 paragraph 13.

16.5.56 He then heard a young man who he believed was at the gable wall on the northwest side of the Castle Laundry waste ground. The youth called out that he was hit twice. People moved towards him. When the witness reached him he was still standing up and there was blood, possibly on his right thigh. The witness helped turn him around and others then assisted in taking him away AO56.15 paragraphs 14 to 16. See map at AO56.19.

16.5.57 Padraig O’Mianain looked over his right shoulder and noticed an older man who looked as if he was on the point of stumbling. The witness placed him in a position somewhat further south into the Castle Laundry waste ground than the youth AO56.19. He accompanied the group carrying him further south towards the houses in Columbcille Court AO56.15 paragraph 17.

16.5.58 The witness was asked whether he saw a nail bomb or a canister of some sort being thrown in the area. He said that he did not and if he had he would have left “double quick.” Day 059/46/11 to Day 059/46/13.

16.5.59 Seamus Bradley AB69 gave oral evidence on Day 064. This witness was along with his wife Teresa AB70. After being overcome by gas they took a position at the Castle Laundry waste ground. Like some other witnesses Seamus Bradley describes it in his 1972 statement as “near the gap where Duffy’s bookmakers hut used to be.” AB69.1

16.5.60 He said that he saw about three soldiers levelling their guns at the crowd beside Ritchie’s factory. His wife could not see with the effects of the gas. He grabbed her by the hand and heard bangs. He pushed her into “the opening” at Duffy’s and a rubber bullet and a live round went in between the two of them. He looked around and saw a young lad was shot and blood was dripping from his thigh. AB69.1

16.5.61 For Teresa Bradley’s accounts see AB70.2 paragraphs 7 to 12 and Day 064/29/14 to Day 064/32/6, AB70.9. Her marked up photograph is at AB70.13.

16.5.62 In his oral evidence the witness marked with a red arrow the position where Damien Donaghy was on a photograph. This is at the northwestern side of the Castle Laundry waste ground AB69.7 Day 064/7/9 to Day 064/7/17.

16.5.63 Mr Bradley put his hanky to the boy’s leg and helped Sergeant John Lafferty of the Knights of Malta bring him to Columbcille Court AB69.1. The witness said that he was unaware of any stone throwing in the area at the time the boy was shot although he was concentrating on getting his wife away from the gas and bullets AB69.2 paragraphs 6 to 9. The witness was also unaware of the presence of a gunman in the area of Kells Walk or that his wife claimed to have observed one Day 064/13/14/5 to Day 064/15/14.

16.5.64 Dermot Carlin AC32 and Day 060 saw a youth, who is obviously Damien Donaghy, just south of the middle of the Castle Laundry waste ground “sitting with his legs splayed out in front of him, at approximately the point D” on map at AC32.7. There was another youth on one knee beside him holding him under his shoulders shouting obscenities and for someone to help AC32.2 paragraphs 10 to 13.

16.5.65 Thomas McDaid (AM177 and Day 066) was on the march with his wife Monica (AM170 and Day 065). Thomas McDaid recalls that he and his wife went into the waste ground at the Nook Bar. He was very familiar with the geography of the area, having previously worked at Brewsters Bakery in Little James Street. He recalls that John Johnston was one of the other dozen or so people standing in the waste ground, all of whom were facing north towards the Presbyterian Church. AM177.1 paragraphs 4 to 5. He had heard one rubber bullet fired before hearing a live round Day 066/33/14 to Day 066/33/15. His recollection is that there was nobody milling around the William Street area as the first shot was fired Day 066/34/18 to Day 066/34/25.

16.5.66 Mr McDaid believes that they were standing there for up to 10 or 15 minutes when he heard a live shot which struck a young boy who was standing against the wall at the corner of the Nook Bar. The witness did not actually see the youth being shot, but did see him standing leaning with his shoulder against the corner of the wall when his legs suddenly buckled, causing him to fall to the ground, immediately after the gunshot rang out. The youth was then carried away by four other youths towards Columbcille Court. Two more shots then rang out and Mr Johnston, who was standing facing north, was shot in the leg and arm. At the time Mr Johnston was smoking his pipe, and he was shot “within seconds” of the boy having been shot. AM 177.1 paragraph 6. Mr McDaid had also seen soldiers in the Abbey Taxis building, at the windows close to William Street Day 066/32/17 to Day 066/32/25, but they were facing onto William Street, rather than viewing the waste ground area, Day 066/33/4. His impression was that both were shot either by soldiers on the roof of the GPO, or by soldiers near the Presbyterian Church AM177.2 paragraph 8. It would appear from Mr McDaid’s contemporaneous statement at AM177.6 that he did not witness Damien Donaghy being shot, but he confirmed that he did see his leg buckle under him Day 066/38/4 to Day 066/38/6. Mr McDaid’s best estimate of the interval between the wounding of Damien Donaghy and the wounding of John Johnston is that it was “seconds rather than minutes” Day 066/41/15 to Day 066/41/16

16.5.67 Monica McDaid is equally clear about the position that she and her husband stopped at in the waste ground. She recalls that there were 14 to 18 people in that area. She witnessed the shooting of Damien Donaghy in the following terms, which are broadly consistent with the account Mr Donaghy himself has given to the Tribunal:

“To my left and in front was a young boy…He was leaning against the gable of the derelict building next to him. He kept looking out on to William Street by putting his head around the corner of the derelict building[17]. I cannot recall seeing anything in his hand or seeing him throw anything.” AM170.2 paragraph 7.

“We had been standing in the waste ground talking for about 5 minutes when I heard the first shot. I think that this was the sound of a rubber bullet. I assumed it came from the derelict houses…because I had seen the soldiers there earlier [the ‘derelict houses’ marked by Mrs McDaid on her plan at AM170.6 include the Abbey Taxis building] AM170.2 paragraph 9

“After the shot was fired, the young fellow who had been on the waste ground, turned to retrieve the rubber bullet which had been fired, and then ran away from William Street along the gable of the building on the waste ground. A few seconds later I heard a second shot. I mentioned to my husband that it was another rubber bullet but he said “no it was a lead shot”. I saw the young lad stumble as his legs buckled underneath him. I cannot remember if he fell to the ground…It felt unreal that he had been shot with a real bullet. I found out the day after that the young lad was Damien Donaghy…” AM170.2 paragraph 10

Mrs McDaid did not see any stones thrown from the waste ground, and did not see any stones thrown by Damien Donaghy Day 065/117/10 to Day 065/117/12. She then heard a further two shots and Mr Johnston, whom she also believes may have been smoking a pipe and was approximately ten feet away, started to sway and then slumped. AM170.2 paragraph 13. ‘A very short interval’ had elapsed between the wounding of Damien Donaghy and the wounding of Mr Johnston Day 065/127/25 to Day 065/128/1. Mrs McDaid did not see any nail bombs in that area. AM170.2 paragraph 13.

16.5.68 Michael McGuinness was on the march with his brother-in-law, Doctor McClean. He gave a statement to the Tribunal at AM283 and gave oral evidence on Day 64. Mr McGuinness has given evidence which is broadly corroborative of the evidence given by Mr Donaghy:

“…I heard a rubber bullet being fired. It hit the gable wall marked E on the map[18] on the east side of the waste ground marked D. the sound of the rubber bullet was softer than the gunfire I heard later. I believe the rubber bullet came from a northerly direction. It seemed to hit the wall fairly high up but wasn’t aimed downwards. It came from somewhere on the other side of William Street, from the northern side, but I do not know from how far away…People collected rubber bullets at that time and when I saw it I thought it would make a souvenir…” AM283.2 paragraph 8

16.5.69 Mr McGuinness then heard at least two sharp cracks as he bent down to pick up the rubber bullets. He did not see who had fired them. As he heard the shots he looked across the gap and saw a boy, who he now knows to be Damien Donaghy, on the western edge of the waste ground. McGuinness’ immediately knew that Mr Donaghy had been shot as he saw him lying back holding his right leg. He told Peter Pringle that he “…may be was nearest to him” but other people had passed him on the way to attend to Mr Donaghy AM283.11. The witness told Mr Lawson QC that he was not aware of anyone else near Damien Donaghy:

“…my eye was taken by the boy lying there who was Damien Donaghy. I was not in a mood to concentrate on anything else that was going on…all that took my eye was Damien Donaghy and when I went to collect him I was aware that other people came along and picked him up.” Day 064/174/6 to Day 064/174/15

16.5.71 There was not a large crowd in the area of the waste ground and he cannot recall if there was stone throwing in the area, but points out that if there had been, he himself would not have been in the area AM283.2 paragraph 11. Mr McGuinness also gave a statement in 1972 to Peter Pringle. He told Pringle that he thought Damien Donaghy had been ‘acting the fool’ when he had heard him shout that he had been shot, and suspected that he had been throwing stones at the soldiers after they had discharged their baton rounds, but stated that ‘there was nothing about him as he fell’. AM 283.11.

16.5.72 Mr McGuinness then recalls John Johnston coming into the waste ground. He believes that Mr Johnston would have been moving in a westerly direction along William Street (although this was merely an assumption, Day 064/148/20 to Day 064/149/4) and entered the waste ground at its north eastern corner. He was holding his shoulder and was very unsteady, leaning against the wall and appearing to be dazed. Mr McGuinness and his friend Charles McGill[19] then carried Mr Johnston in a “chair lift” to Mrs Shiels’ house. AM283.3 paragraphs 12 to 13.

16.5.73 Mr McGuinness sums up the mood in Mrs Shiels’ house in the following terms:

“John Johnston was very quiet and I do not remember him saying anything. I don’t remember any conversation about how or why the two men had been shot. It had happened in broad daylight, neither was carrying anything and John Johnston was a middle-aged man. It was therefore obvious that both were innocent and there was no need to comment on it…” AM283.3 paragraph 15

16.5.74 Derek McFeely was a 17 years old youth in January 1972. It is possible that he is one of the youths referred to by Michael McGuinness and Charles McGill who quickly lifted Damien Donaghy and took him to the safety of Columbcille Court.

16.5.75 He gave a statement at AM217 and gave oral evidence on Day 61. He has agreed that he was at the Laundry waste ground (Day 061/70/5 to Day 061/75/18). He recalls that Damien Donaghy was standing to his right, about four or five feet away Day 061/72/8 to Day 061/72/9. He knew him as “Bubbles”. At the time when the witness saw Damien Donaghy, he was unaware of any stone throwing in the area. AM217.1 paragraph 5, but there were a number of youths, possibly on the road in the middle of William Street, and on the footpath, who were jeering and verbally abusing the soldiers Day 061/72/11 to Day 061/73/4. He heard a single shot from the north side of William Street and then saw Damien Donaghy lying on the ground Day 061/75/6 to Day 061/75/9. He had not seen him engaged in any stone throwing at the time when he was shot, nor was he cat calling at the army Day 061/75/23 to Day 061/76/3. The witness did not hear any explosions or other bangs, save for rubber bullets being fired. Day 061/76/18 to Day 061/76/22. Instinctively, the witness ran in a southerly direction towards Columbcille Court and then returned with four of five others and carried him away. He did not see John Johnston[20] get shot, but was, however, aware of one or two more shots in the area where he had been standing with “Bubbles” Donaghy AM217.1 paragraph 5 to AM217.2 paragraph 7.

16.5.76 Peter Mullan was a 31 years old school teacher. He was a very impressive witness who gave his evidence with candour. He gave a statement to John Barry of the Sunday Times Insight Team at AM450.1 to AM450.4. He has also given written and oral evidence to this Tribunal. It is apparent from Mr Mullan’s evidence that he witnessed three important events:

16.5.77 His present recollection is that he was approximately 10 to 12 feet from Damien Donaghy when he was shot. He witnessed Damien Donaghy’s right leg give way and states that at the time that he fell, Damien Donaghy clearly had nothing in his hands. Although Mr Mullan did not see Damien Donaghy throwing any stones, his evidence is that there was plenty of rubble and small stones in the immediate area. He is sure however that “there were no petrol bombs, nail bombs or anything of that type on the ground. I was so close to him and had such a clear view that I am certain I would have noticed…” AM450.6 paragraph 8

16.5.78 Mr Mullan also witnessed the immediate aftermath of the shooting of John Johnston. His current recollection is that he had heard a second rifle shot, (AM450.7 paragraph 11, but he accepts that his evidence to John Barry that he did not hear the shot is more accurate Day 152/193/4 to Day 152/193/5) swung around and saw the elderly man (whom he now knows as Mr Johnston) on the ground. He was on the opposite side of the road from where Mr Donaghy had fallen and was about 10 feet or so from the witness. He recollects that he briefly assisted with the carrying of Mr Johnston to Columbcille Court AM450.7 paragraphs 11 to 12; Day 152/194/1 to Day 152/194/5

16.5.79 There is no evidence to suggest that Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, or indeed anyone who was in their immediate vicinity, were engaged in any hostile activity at the time they were shot.

16.5.80 Even Lord Widgery found that John Johnston was a truthful witness and essentially an innocent abroad:

“Evidence from civilians in the neighbourhood, including Mr Johnson himself, is to the effect that although stones were being thrown no firearms or bombs were being used against the soldiers in the derelict building. Having seen and heard Mr Johnson I have no doubt that he was telling the truth as he saw it. He was obviously an innocent passer-by going about his own business in Londonderry that afternoon and was almost certainly shot by accident. I have not thought it necessary to take a statement from Mr Donaghy, who was injured more seriously and was still in hospital when I finished hearing evidence. I am quite satisfied that had he given evidence it would have been in the same sense as that given by Mr Johnson. “ Widgery Report p13 paragraph 36

16.5.81 Specifically in relation to whether or not Damien Donaghy or Johnston were in involved in any activity which would could have caused or contributed to them being shot, Lord Widgery said the following:

“Whether or not the circumstances were really such as to warrant firing there is no reason whatever to suppose that either Mr Johnson or Mr Donaghy was in fact trying to light or throw a bomb.” (Emphasis Added) Widgery Report paragraph 39

16.5.82 It is clear from the evidence before the Inquiry that there is an element of confusion in respect of the precise position in the laundry waste ground where Damien Donaghy was shot and fell. Damien Donaghy has given evidence that he was shot at the northeastern side of the waste ground. The preponderance of evidence, however, would suggest that he was closer to the Nook Bar (i.e. the north western) side of the waste ground. There is no doubt however that neither he, John Johnston, nor anyone else in the vicinity was acting in a manner which would have properly warranted the soldiers to open fire.

16.5.82 In our submission, there is no objective or sustainable reason to provide justification for the shots fired by Soldiers A and B.

16.6 Civilian Gunmen and Gunfire

16.6.1 Introduction

16.6.1.1 The Lawton Team have produced a document entitled “Civilian Gunmen Table,” attached to the Memorandum from Counsel to the Tribunal dated 22^nd July 2002. Section 4 of this table relates to Columbcille Court and Section 16 to William Street. In accordance with the memorandum, both these sections should be considered together as “evidence under both headings relates to the shot(s) at the soldiers at the Presbyterian Church which, according to that evidence, followed the shooting of Damien Donaghy.” It is indisputable that there was a high velocity rifle shot fired by OIRA 1 across William Street at the Presbyterian Church. That being so, the only area that remains for consideration is the timing of this shot and whether or not it followed the wounding of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. This matter is considered below under the section entitled, “The Columbcille Court/ “Drainpipe Shot.”

16.6.1.2 However, other evidence suggests that in addition to the undisputed .303 shot, a pistol shot was fired in William Street. Whilst it is for the Tribunal to consider the veracity and / or reliability of such evidence, it is clear that there is no evidence from any soldier on the north side of William Street to the effect that they heard, saw or reacted to a shot fired by a pistol man in William Street. It is our submission, therefore, that were the Tribunal to decide that such a shot was fired, it must also conclude that this shot in no way contributed to or impacted upon the shooting of Donaghy and Johnston or what followed in the Bogside.

16.6.1.3 A further, distinct possibility is that those witnesses who refer to a pistol shot have either mistaken (a) a rubber bullet for a pistol shot (b) one of A and B's shots for a pistol shot or (c) OIRA 1's shot for a pistol shot because of:

iii) The number of rubber bullets, gas grenades and gas canisters being fired at the relevant time

iv) Confusion resulting from the surrounding commotion and the resultant divided attention

For similar reasons, it is clear that a number of witnesses are referring to the sequence of Soldier A and B firing five shots, injuring Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, and OIRA 1 returning one rifle shot but have failed to hear, refer to or remember all five shots fired by Soldiers A and B.

“ . . . I heard a story – I have no independent recollection of the source – that some in the Provisional IRA had made preparations to ambush the Army at the William Street barricade after the march had dispersed but we were never able to get corroboration of that story and in any event no shooting occurred there.”

Mr Barry, having reconsidered the notes of his interview with him, now states that source of this information was Mr Ivan Cooper. Day 193/104/25 to Day 193/105/9. The Tribunal is aware, however, that Mr Cooper denies ever having been interviewed by John Barry and rejects the Sunday Times document in its entirety. Day 419/76/17 to Day 419/76/15. Further detail is provided below. Considering this fact and Mr Barry’s acknowledgement in his statement that there is no corroboration of the story and that there was no such shooting, it is our submission that the Inquiry disregard this evidence.

16.6.1.5 Vincent Browne

“After the second burst of army gunfire the Officials took up positions and one shot was fired by one of the men with the short arms at a soldier in William Street but it missed. No other shot was fired then by anybody until the actual murderous assault on the Bogside by the Paratroopers.”

Whilst Mr Browne can no longer remember the interviews that took place with the relevant member/s of the Official IRA, this quote appears in the article subsequent to the description of how Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot in William Street and, as such, this would appear to be an obvious reference to the shot fired by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court.

16.6.1.6 Joe Carlin

This witness is purported to have told John Barry from the Sunday Times, during an interview, that he “heard a single high velocity shot just as it went in off William Street . . . It didn’t come from the Bog, in front of me. So we proceeded through to the back and hid behind the wall . . . but nothing seemed to be happening. . . . on the corner the Aggro was still going on . . While we were standing there, a small boy by our side was hit.”AC150.2 to AC150.3.

16.6.1.7 The witness did not give oral evidence to the Inquiry. The account was put to a Mr John Joseph Carlin who, giving oral evidence on Day 91/192/25 to Day 91/193/18, denied that the notes of the interview were anything to do with him.

i) The witness describes how the single shot he heard was high velocity and that it came from the direction of Little James Street, not the Bog [Emphasis added], an obvious reference to one of the shots fired by Soldiers A and B from Abbey Taxis. AC150.2

ii) He sees a small boy fall beside him with a wound in his leg, an obvious reference to Damien Donaghy. The young boy was taken to Columbcille Court AC150.3

iii) There was then a shot from the upstairs window of a house, in Columbcille Court, facing the flat roof of the sorting office immediately afterwards. AC150.3

16.6.1.9 Albeit that the witness is confused in referring to one high velocity bullet rather than the five fired by Soldiers A and B, it should be noted that:

i) This witness describes rubber bullets whistling all over the place and the firing of, what could have been, gas canisters in the area at the relevant time. The noise produced disguised the sound of five high velocity bullets being fired so that the witness heard only one. The witness actually states that “people said afterwards that they had been trying to synchronise rubber bangs and rifle shots.” AC150.3

ii) The witness acknowledges that “the strange part was that I didn’t hear the shot which hit him. I heard rubber bullet noises but no the shot, though it must have been close.” AC150.3

iii) The witness himself describes the sequence of events as “The news of the little boy shot and the news of the shot in return.” AC150.4

iv) Whilst the assertion by the soldiers’ representatives is that this high velocity shot was from a civilian source other than OIRA 1, it is apparent, in our submission, that this witness is describing the shots fired by Soldiers A and B and the return fire by OIRA 1. It should also be noted that it was, of course, impossible to test this information further by examination in oral evidence.

16.6.1.10 Ivan Cooper

“I have read some typewritten notes which I am informed were prepared by the Sunday Times Insight team. I have never seen them before making this statement. I find this account poisonous and disturbing and I reject it in its entirety. The manner in which it is written smacks of British security intelligence operating; it is for the most part, factually incorrect. There are many examples of factual inaccuracies in the articles. I therefore wish to reject this document in its entirety and will not even begin to give it credibility by addressing it in more detail.” KC12.30 paragraph 97

16.6.1.11 Even if the Tribunal was to find that Cooper have an interview with John Barry and in all likelihood made these remarks, we respectfully refer the Tribunal to the following. AM208.10 paragraph 17:

“Ivan Cooper is a fantastic liar he is the sort of person that I have always wanted to and have tried to avoid. I would take anything he says with a “pinch of salt”. The statement that he made to the Sunday Times is a fabrication. I suspect he made the statement to make himself sound like an important politician for the journalists.”

In these circumstances it is submitted that this extract from the statement cannot be relied on.

In his 1972 statement, Mr Donnelly merely describes how a pistol man fired one shot from the crowd and that no fire was returned, the obvious inference being that he saw the man fire the shot in question, M22.1. It becomes clear at Widgery and during his testimony to this Inquiry that Mr Donnelly did not in fact see a man armed with a pistol nor a man fire a pistol as illustrated by the extract below. Mr Donnelly clarified his initial statement at Widgery affirming that he “heard a loud bang which appeared to be a revolver shot.” [Emphasis added] M22.5 D-E Yet in his Eversheds statement, Mr Donnelly describes a man firing a shot at a derelict house as follows: “The firearm he was holding was a small handgun or possibly a starting pistol. I remember thinking that this man appeared to be drunk. . . .I can’t remember where he was standing when he fired the shot but I do remember that he was aiming toward a bricked up derelict house. This was the only shot I saw fired by a civilian all day.” MC22.20 paragraph 4. [ Emphasis added]. It would seem from reading this passage that, contrary to what he said at Widgery, Mr Donnelly did in fact see a man aim a pistol and fire a shot at a derelict house. Mr Donnelly accepts, however, at Day 071/16/10 to Day 071/17/11, that he did not actually see the man holding or firing a pistol:

16.6.1.13 Mr Donnelly’s evidence is based upon a great deal of his own supposition, and that of others, as illustrated by the italicised words above. Considering the number of rubber bullets and gas canisters being fired in the vicinity, along with fact that there was no immediate reaction of any sort, Day 071/16/6 to Day 071/16/7, it appears that Mr Donnelly has wrongly associated the sound of a rubber bullets or a gas canister being fired with the noise of a pistol. This incorrect correlation coupled with the unfounded belief that the man was holding a weapon in his pocket cannot be relied upon as proof of a civilian gunman. In all likelihood this man was, rather than being hustled away by the crowd as suggested at Day 071/17/9 to Day 071/17/11, was part of a group of people who, overcome by the effects of gas, were leaving the area.

Mr Hegarty describes in his statement how, having reached the junction of Abbey Street and William Street as seen at AH62.7, he heard a high velocity shot which he recognized as being from an army weapon and which the people around him believed to have come from the direction of the soldiers positioned in the old factory on the north side of William Street. AH62.2 paragraphs 8 to 9. It is possible that, not having heard the five shots fired by Soldiers A and B, Mr Hegarty then heard the shot fired by OIRA 1. However, considering the direction from which he heard the shot and that he recognized it as an army weapon, the Tribunal should, in our submission, as he concludes himself, find that what Mr Hegarty heard was the shot which hit the first man, i.e. what he heard was one of the five shots fired by Soldiers A and B which hit Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. The reason that he cannot account for the other four shots is simply because:

i) He cannot remember having heard all five shots particularly without the assistance of a contemporaneous statement

ii) Mr Hegarty concedes in later questioning that he could possibly have confused rubber bullets for high velocity bullets: “Um, no, because I mean -- well, it could have been, it could have been rubber bullets certainly.” Day 288/ 51/7 to Day 288/51/8. It is, therefore, plausible to suggest that, vice versa, whilst in William Street, he did not hear the remaining four shots over the copious rubber bullets being fired as well as the 15 CS gas grenades and 65 CS canisters that had been discharged by the army.

Mr Derek Humphry, a journalist in Derry, spoke to an Official IRA man who claimed to have, in breach of his orders for the day, Day 217/176/24 to Day 217/176/25, fired one pistol shot at soldiers stationed in a derelict building on the north side of William Street near the GPO building in response to the shooting of Damien Donaghy. M43.2 paragraph 10. It is Mr Humphry’s suggestion that it was after this pistol shot was fired that Mr John Johnston was shot, however, we know that, in accordance with the majority of the available evidence, Mr Johnston and Damien Donaghy were shot almost simultaneously. Mr Humphry’s evidence is not only inconsistent with the majority of other available civilian evidence, it is internally inconsistent as pointed out by Mr Clarke QC, to the extent that Mr Humphry’s is no longer certain whether the information in the article can be relied upon:

It is apparent that what Mr Humphry’s is describing is the shot fired by OIRA 1, in response to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, that he is mistaken when he states that this was a pistol shot and that this evidence should be juxtaposed with that outlined in the section on Columbcille Court/ Drainpipe Shot, below.

Ms Ingram, in her Eversheds statement, at AI1.2 paragraph 7, states that when she reached a point on William Street opposite the GPO Sorting Office a high velocity shot rang out from the direction of the GPO, as marked by an arrow on the map attached to her statement at AI1.6. Whilst Ms Ingram did not “address her mind at the time to whether the shot was an army shot or a civilian shot,” we know that the army did fire 5 high velocity rounds from the direction in which she indicates and at the relevant time. It is clear, therefore, considering that Ms Ingram was not aware of the fact that rubber bullets were being fired at the time or of the noise of a riot, Day 417/71/25 to Day 417/72/4 and admits that her memory is “not great,” Day 417/73/19, in regard to some matters, that either:

i) The shot to which Ms Ingram is referring is that fired by OIRA 1 after the five shots fired by Soldiers A and B, which she must not have heard.

ii) Ms Ingram did not hear, because of the noise of riot and rubber bullets, the further four high velocity shots fired by Soldiers A and B from Abbey Taxis resulting in the wounding of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.

iii) Ms Ingram simply did not recognise the sound of the other four shots as rifle shots

iv) Ms Ingram, without the benefit of having made a statement in 1972 cannot now remember that she heard five rounds coming from the general direction of Abbey Taxis.

A memorandum written by this witness, dated 3^rd February 1972, ED20.30-31, states that a source informed them that the Official IRA fired a single shot from a .45 pistol at an army sniper on the roof of the post office sorting building on William Street after Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot. This sequence of events is correct, however, the reference to a pistol rather than a rifle shot is incorrect as accepted by Mr Peter Pringle who states that they were informed of various accounts ranging from pistol shots from a burnt-out building on the corner of William Street and Rossville Street to shots from a second floor in Columbcille Court from behind some wooden slats and an account of a shot fired actually from the premises in Columbcille Court to which the injured men had been taken. Day 191/9/25 to Day 191/10/21. Mr Pringle clarifies further:

This note is, in effect, a clear reference to the shot fired by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court after the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston and cannot be considered a separate incident in any way. It is submitted the Tribunal should hesitate to base a finding of fact on uncorroborated material that was not of sufficient quality to print or publish in 1972.

Mr Mullarkey is not definitive even in his 1972 statement when he describes hearing about four or five shots followed by “a single shot, loud, a revolver I thought, but I could not place where it came from.” AM452.2. This is an obvious reference, in terms of location and timing, to the rifle shot fired by OIRA 1 after Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot. Mr Mullarkey, who no longer remembers this shot AM452.6 paragraph 31.5, was obviously mistaken in his belief that it was from a revolver because of:

iii) Confusion resulting from the commotion surrounding him and the resultant divided attention

iv) The number of rubber bullets being fired around this time which Mr Mullarkey claims not to have heard Day 69/12/14 to Day 69/12/22

Mr Myant has a memory of a very young girl approaching him to say that she had seen a man fire a pistol in William Street. M91.4 paragraph 13. He has no evidence to corroborate this, he does not know the girl’s name, the girl did not make a statement, Mr Myant considered her to be “hysterical,” “in a state,” that her memory was playing tricks on her, Day 122/177/6 and he felt that the incident she described did not occur on Bloody Sunday, Day 122/177/15 to Day 122/177/16. Mr Myant’s view of this incident is as follows:

Considering this analysis of the situation and that the evidence is otherwise completely untested, we submit that the Tribunal should attach no weight to this evidence.

Ms Anna O’Donnell, now deceased, referred, at AO20.1, to a man firing an old rifle from behind the taxi office in William Street hitting nothing. He was advised to put the gun away by bystanders which he did immediately. She did not see him after this. Ms Grainne O’Donnell elaborates on this evidence based on what her Mother told her of the incident, namely “after the person was wounded she saw a gunman come out of the house somewhere in the region of GRJ8/K8/7 carrying an old style gun. He fired a shot into the air. The people around him told him to put the gun away as he would draw army fire.” AO30. paragraph 25

16.6.1.21 This is an obvious reference to the shot fired, following the shots fired by Soldiers A and B, by OIRA 1 and its aftermath. Ms A O’Donnell is obviously mistaken when she suggests that the shot was fired from the ground into the air and her account is at odds with the majority of available evidence in this regard. It should also be noted that when she witnesses Damien Donaghy fall, having been shot by either Soldier A or B, she refers, mistakenly, to having heard only one shot rather than five. This evidence is completely untested, except by Ms Grainne O’Donnell to whom her Mother repeated the same mistaken account, and should, in our submission, be disregarded as such albeit significant that Ms Grainne O’Donnell does suggest that her Mother told her that she had seen the gunman in a derelict building. Day 105/140/1to Day 105/140/2.

It is clear, from his accounts at M77.1 paragraph 5, M77.3F-G, M77.7E-F and M77.12 paragraphs 7 to 9, that what Mr Tereshchuck is referring to the shot fired by OIRA 1 and that he has not remembered, or heard, the previous five shots fired by Soldiers A and B because of the confusion emanating from the commotion around him, including being overcome with gas and the resultant divided attention. Day 71/109/1 to Day 71/109/10.

16.6.1.23 Teresa Bradley

According to the witness there was a gunman on the first floor walkway of the western side of the Kells Walk maisonettes towards the northern end.

“The man was standing completely alone and was pointing a handgun straight in front of him with arm outstretched, and was firing it in the direction he was facing.” AB70.2 paragraphs 12 to 13

16.6.1.24 Mrs Bradley said that the man fired several times and the crowd shouted for him to stop. He then disappeared. According to Mrs Bradley, he had been shooting in a northerly direction after the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.

16.6.1.25 The witness claimed that she had told the statement taker about the gunman on 4^th February 1972. This was a schoolteacher called William Smyth. The witness accepted at Day 064/73/1 to Day 064/73/4 that she possibly did read the 1972 statement through before signing it. Neither did she tell anyone about her unhappiness about that statement except her husband Day 064/73/8 to Day 064/73/11. The witness’s husband however said that they had not discussed it. Day 064/14/7. William Smyth gave evidence on Day 083/181/14 to Day 083/182/12. He strongly refuted the suggestion that he had deliberately left out a reference to the gunman in Kells Walk in Teresa Bradley’s 1972 statement[21].

16.6.1.26 It the Tribunal accept that this incident occurred, it is clear that it took place prior to the deployment of Support Company Day 064/61/3 to Day 064/61/12. It is unclear at what the gunman was firing at but the army did not observe him.

16.6.2 The Columbcille Court/ “Drainpipe Shot”

16.6.2.1 OIRA1 fired a shot from Columbcille Court from a .303 rifle. It is likely to have been the shot that struck the drainpipe at the Presbyterian Church.

16.6.2.2 OIRA1 maintains that this shot was a retaliatory action taken after it became apparent that the Army had shot two civilians, namely Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. OIRA1 was on a balcony in the Columbcille Court flats when he heard three shots AOIRA1.27 paragraph 18. He also heard shouting to the effect that two civilians were had been shot and he formed the impression that soldiers positioned at the Presbyterian Church were responsible. He fired one shot at the Army. AOIRA1.6 paragraphs 16 to 21. He maintained this in the course of oral evidence on Days 395 and Day 396.

16.6.2.3 OIRA2 accompanied OIRA1. His evidence is to similar effect. He said that whilst on the Columbcille Court balcony he heard two or three shots and then heard shouts that two people had been shot by the Army. OIRA1 then fired one shot at “Army sniper in the Presbyterian Church area” AOIRA2.3 paragraphs 8 to 12, AOIRA2.15 paragraphs 9 to 14. He maintained this in the course of oral evidence on Day 392.

16.6.2.4 There was then a heated argument with Sean Keenan - Provisional IRA Explosives Officer, PIRA1 and RM1.

16.6.2.5 There is a large body of evidence to suggest that OIRA1’s shot did follow the shootings of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, but is a selection:

(i) Peter Mullan in our submission was the most compelling, persuasive and clear witness in relation to the sequencing of the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston and the incident with OIRA1. The witness knew and recognised OIRA1. The events, including the heated argument with others present is set out in considerable and convincing detail in his Sunday Times interview at AM450.1 to AM450.3. His Sunday Times interview is completely consistent with his Eversheds statement AM450.6 paragraphs 8 to 24. .

(ii) Eamon Gallagher gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 66. He also provided a detailed account to the Sunday Times Insight Team. In that account he heard that two men had been shot and saw a crowd carrying two bodies to Colmbcille Court. This must be a reference to Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. He also saw the BBC camera crew that were in the area. A man appeared with a rifle and said “I’m going to get on this roof and shoot,…” because these other people had been shot”. There was then a tug of war with the gun AG8.7. This account has clear echoes of the OIRA1 incident and the argument with Sean Keenan, PIRA1 and RM1.

(iii) Anthony Martin gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 176. He was formerly a L/Cpl in the UDR and spent 12 years in the Navy. In his Sunday Times interview to Peter Pringle dated 29^th March 1972 he said he was along with Peter Lancaster AL4. When they came out of a friend’s flat at Kells Walk he heard two high velocity shots “from the direction of the Richardson’s factory or the Presbyterian Church. A few seconds later I distinctly heard the thump of a .303 right beside us on the corner of Columbcille Court was fired – one round. I know the thump of the .303 very well… I want to make the point that it is a racing cert. that the .303 replied to the first two shots… after the shot had been fired I saw an argument going on between the gunman, who I later learnt was an Official and some Provisionals. The Provos were trying to get the gun from the Official and stop him firing because of the crowd.” AM24.3, AM24.11 paragraphs 19 to 20

(iv) None of the civilians who were throwing stones in the area of the waste ground north of William Street at the soldiers in the Abbey Taxis building or on the roof of the GPO refer to a shot passing northwards over or past their position towards the Presbyterian Church

(v) Damien Donaghy was in the area for some time before he was shot. He was involved in stone throwing in the waste ground to the north of William Street. He said that the first shot he heard fired in this area was when he was picking up a rubber bullet and was himself shot in the leg AD120.1. He heard no shooting prior to this.

(vi) Billy McCartney gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 84. He also had been in the area for some time and was involved in some of the stone throwing. The first shot he was aware of was that which struck Damien Donaghy. The second shot he heard struck John Johnston AM87.3 paragraphs 10 to 13.

(vii) When Eugene Lafferty was in William Street the first shots he heard were two SLR rounds that came from the direction of the Presbyterian Church. These shots struck Damien Donaghy and John Johnston AL1.2 paragraphs 7 to 8.

(viii) Father Carolan in his 1972 account was in William Street “a short distance from Rossville Corner”. He saw a few young men throwing stones at the army on the roof of the GPO. He then made his way into what must be the Castle laundry waste ground. A crowd was moving through this space and “shots rang out from the direction of the sorting office roof. I ducked at the sound of gunfire then I lifted my head to see about ten yards from me two men being helped, one old, one young.” The witness then assisted in helping them to the Shiels’ house. H3.8. These appear to be the first shots that he heard in the area.

(ix) Charles Meehan in his 1972 account provides further evidence. He said that along with Pat Carolan he stood in the area for “a while trying to clear our heads and eyes from the effects of gas”. He observed the soldiers in the Abbey Taxis building and saw the soldier who shot the youth AM390.1. It is submitted that this is clear evidence in relation to who opened fire first. Pat Carolan’s evidence corroborates Mr Meehan. He commented after setting out his recollection of seeing Damien Donaghy shot in his statement to Eversheds “That single shot was the first I heard. If I had heard shooting before I certainly would not have been waiting around in that area” AO6.2 paragraphs 8 to 11. Day 060/9/1 to Day 060/9/4.

(x) Frank Hone made a statement to NICRA but did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry. He said in 1972 that he heard shooting and heard two civilians were shot. He then heard a heavier shot three minutes later, which was close to him in Kells Walk. There is no reference to this in his Eversheds statement AH80.1, AH80.2 paragraphs 23 to 34.

16.7.1.2 This section deals, in the main, with the evidence of the soldiers in Machinegun Platoon whose evidence is appraised on an individual basis and collectively. The evidence of those in Wilford’s OP in William Street, Harrison’s Garage and the Embassy Ballroom is also evaluated in broad terms.

16.7.2.1 The exact whereabouts of the observation post in William Street where Colonel Wilford took up position prior to Support Company’s deployment through Barrier 12 is not known. Following an exchange between Colonel Wilford and Mr Clarke QC it seems probable that the observation post was in a three-storey building situated to the north east of the Presbyterian Church from where it was possible to see the march and the vehicles moving into the Bogside. Day 313/1/3 to Day 313/3/25. This building can be seen in P493. What is certain is that it is no distance at all from Abbey Taxis.

16.7.2.2 The occupants of this observation post, at the relevant time, were Colonel Wilford, Captain Mike Jackson, INQ 1152, INQ 1940 and INQ 1171. According to INQ 1940 there was an excellent view of the riot. He describes a scene of screaming, shouting and stone-throwing. C1940.2 paragraphs 8 to 9 and Day 315/104/1 to Day 315/104/24. Captain Jackson was observing for a longer period, yet he made no mention of any nail bombs.

16.7.2.3 Not one of these witnesses claim, in their statements or on Day 313, Day 318, Day 334, Day 315 respectively, to have heard nail bombs explode in William Street as alleged by Soldiers A and B. (INQ 1171 did not give oral evidence). Major Loden, also in the observation post could not offer any plausible explanation for his failure to hear these supposed nail bombs. Day 345/49/2 to Day 345/51/3.

16.7.3.1 The clear view from the Embassy Ballroom can be seen in P233.69A, P233.69, P279, P402, P403, P404, P406, P407, P408 and P409. Not one of those positioned on ECHO OP, except for INQ 877 dealt with below, namely Lieutenant 009, who was in charge of the ECHO OP, INQ 877, INQ 883, WO INQ 1164, INQ 1252, Soldier 108, Captain 021, Lance Bombadier 118, Soldier 123 and Soldier 157, refers to having heard explosions and/or nail bombs or of having seen any nail bombers at the time relevant to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. This is despite the fact that there was a clear view of all of the Bogside from the top of the Embassy Ballroom, C1025.5 paragraph 17. General Ford, Captain INQ 2 and Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson who claim not to have been on the Embassy Ball Room at the relevant time, were within the vicinity of Barrier 14 in William and do not refer to having heard nail bombs at this time.

16.7.3.2 INQ 877, who was not called to give evidence, believes that he heard the sound of explosions coming from the Rossville Flats, C877.2 paragraph 13. INQ 877 is clearly confused in this regard as he remembers radio traffic relating to this issue, none of which appears on the available logs. It is obvious that he has mistaken the sound of rubber bullet guns, CS canisters and/or CS gas grenades, none of which he realised had been fired on the day, for the sound of nail bombs.

16.7.3.3 Soldiers in Harrison’s Garage tasked to protect Stevenson’s Bakery/Abbey Taxis

INQ 117, INQ 146, INQ 312 and INQ 480 were given the specific task to cover Stevenson’s bakery. Yet they did not hear two nail bombs that supposedly exploded on the waste ground nor do they see the consequences of their having done so. They also fail to hear five high velocity shots from the Abbey taxis building. Importantly, and in common with all the other soldiers, they fail to see a man behaving in the manner described by A and B and they fail to see a young boy and an elderly man shot.

16.7.4.1 The only sergeant in the Machine Gun Platoon who was present at Bloody Sunday was Sergeant INQ 441. He was acting Platoon Commander in charge of Machine Gun Platoon because the resident Commander, INQ 1851, was on a course in America Day 303/68/5 to Day 303/68/10. His acting platoon sergeant was Corporal INQ 1686. Day 303/91/9. The platoon consisted, thereafter, of two Corporals, one of whom, Soldier A, fired live rounds on the day, three Lance-Corporals and fourteen Privates one of whom, Soldier B, fired three live rounds on the day. The platoon seems, on the evidence available, to have been divided into two sections. One section was commanded by Corporal A, the other by Corporal INQ 1686 whose second in command was Lance Corporal INQ 275. Soldier 005 and INQ 439 drove the two Machinegun Platoon Pigs. C439.1 paragraph 4.

16.7.4.2 Of the twenty-one members of the platoon who were present on Bloody Sunday only three made statements to the RMP, Soldiers A, B and 005, and only two to the Treasury Solicitor, Soldiers A and B. INQ 441 was the only platoon commander in Support Company not to have made a statement in 1972. Soldiers A and B were the only two members of the Machinegun Platoon to give evidence to Lord Widgery, on Day 12, and only nine members of the platoon gave oral evidence to this Inquiry. We have received no statement from INQ 1523, who could not be traced within the Inquiry’s jurisdiction, or INQ 1686 who is deceased.

16.7.4.3 According to the order of the day “an arrest force [was] to be held centrally behind the check-points and launched in a scoop-up operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible.” The Machinegun Platoon was to play an instrumental role in the purported arrest operation by acting as one of the arms in the pincer movement that was to close off the rioters around the junction of Rossville, William and Little James Streets. Day 046/18/1.

16.7.4.4 The reality of what happened on Bloody Sunday bears little resemblance to this order and the debacle that was the Machinegun Platoon’s involvement in the day supports the contention that the operation was not planned or controlled in order to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk of the use of lethal force. The role of the Machinegun Platoon in the day’s events highlights:

i) The danger of using troops whose lack of knowledge of the geography of an area contributed to an atmosphere of disorientation and chaos leading to an increased risk of gunfire.

ii) The fact that, once a decision had been made to use 1 Para, they should have been appropriately briefed by 8 Brigade in relation to: the geography of the area; locations from where 1 Para could launch an effective arrest operation; how Derry rioters operated and how the general body of marchers would be likely to behave.

iii) The fact that no arrest operation should have been launched in the circumstances which existed on the day. This is subject to our primary contention that 1 Para in fact went into the Bogside without an Order from 8 Brigade.

16.7.4.5 It was Colonel Wilford’s intention that troops would deploy from the area of the Presbyterian Church across the waste-ground and in, a pincer movement, close off any rioters somewhere in the junction of Rossville Street/William Street/Little James' Street. The original plan was for the troops to go through the yard of the Presbyterian Church and over a wall. According to some accounts soldiers were to use a Pig to drive through the wall next to the little building, with a flat roof to the east of the church, in order to get into the waste ground to the south leading onto William Street. A subsequent plan was devised, when, after a ‘recce’ on arrival in Derry, it became apparent that it was not feasible to get through the churchyard.

The actual deployment of Machinegun Platoon was achieved by putting some soldiers through a number of buildings on to the first floor of a derelict building commonly known as Abbey Taxis. According to Major Loden’s diary of operations, at B2212, at 1540 approximately:

"In view of the difficulty in approaching the disused building by a concealed route, which involved climbing two by twelve foot walls, I ordered the Machine Gun Platoon to move forward to this building, in anticipation of trouble at William Street on which a NICRA march was now moving. At the same time the Mortar Platoon cuts the wire on top of the wall and the Composite Platoon under my command was given a warning order to deploy 5 or to the open ground south of the Presbyterian Church to arrest rioters."

16.7.4.6 From the evidence of the members of Machinegun Platoon it seems that, in order to gain access to the building, they had to overcome very substantial physical obstructions including, at least, two high walls, one of which was topped with barbed wire. It was from this wall that the radio operator, INQ 455, is claimed to have fallen sustaining injuries that disengaged him from the operation and, as a result, continuing his role as signaller.

16.7.4.7 Soldiers A and B fired two and three rounds, respectively, from Abbey Taxis, however, they fired these live rounds, not at a nail bomber but at two innocent people, Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. As outlined in greater detail below, no member of Machinegun platoon, with the exception of four soldiers whose evidence cannot be relied upon, either saw or heard nail bombs. Only one member of the platoon, other than Soldier A, makes reference to a single shot having been fired towards their position, INQ 153, before shots were fired from within the derelict building. In effect, not one member of Machinegun Platoon corroborates Soldier A’s or Soldier B’s version of events. See Table 1 at Appendix 1.

16.7.4.8 We will, therefore, ask the Tribunal to conclude that Soldiers A and B lied both at Widgery and to this Inquiry when they maintained that they had seen and fired at a nail bomber. Neither the supposed sighting of a nail bomber nor the fact that live rounds had been fired were reported over the radio despite the fact that it could have had a dramatic influence upon any decision that the company commander had to make in relation to the deployment of other platoons and/or companies, a fact conceded by INQ 441. Day 303/87/4 to Day 303/87/9 and Day 303/100/25 to Day 303/103/2. The reason for this is that there were no nail bombs.

16.7.4.9 It was whilst the Machinegun Platoon was in Abbey Taxis, at approximately 1555 according to Major Loden’s diary, B2212, that a single shot is purported to have been fired at a wire cutting party, consisting of members of Mortar Platoon, hitting a drainpipe. Again according to Major Loden’s diary:

"A few moments after this a member of the Machine Gun Platoon observed a man preparing to ignite a nail bomb at the corner of the building on the south side of William Street. The Platoon Commander then gave orders to a corporal and a soldier to open fire as the bomber prepared to throw".

This shot, from Columbcille Court, actually occurred after the shots fired by Soldiers A and B. The timing of this shot is not relevant in any way to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston but is, within the context of Sector 1, dealt with further below.

16.7.4.10 There is conflicting evidence as to whether the entire platoon went into Abbey Taxis although it does seem likely that the whole platoon entered the building except for Soldier 005, and presumably INQ 439 although he has no real memory of the day, who remained guarding his Pig and drove it through Barrier 12 into Rossville Street in the convoy of Support Company, the deployment of which is as follows:

"The Mortar Platoon first; followed by my company headquarters and my ACV, escorted by Ferret scout cars, Armoured Command Vehicle; then the two empty vehicles of the Machine Gun Platoon, two 4-tonners of the Composite Platoon, and the two Pigs containing the Anti-Tank Platoon." B2251

"A warning order was received to be prepared to assault the rioters in William Street through the barrier in Little James Street. Accordingly I ordered the company to return to their vehicles. The Machinegun Platoon were unable to extricate themselves due to the final drop of 25 feet from the first floor of a disused building which had been used to gain covered access to their present position. I ordered the Platoon Commander to remain where he was and informed him that I would bring his vehicles to his position via Little James Street and William Street when the company assaulted through barrier number 12." ED49.11

There is, however, no evidence of this order on the radio which suggests that Major Loden did not in fact make this contact and that this is an attempt to give the impression that he was in control.

16.7.4.12 Major Loden’s false assertion is further exposed by Soldier 017 who says in his statement to Eversheds:

" I have seen a statement from Major Loden which suggests that he ordered me to take two empty Pigs back towards William Street to extricate the Machine Gun Platoon from a derelict house and that I did this. I did not take Pigs to pick up the Machine Gun Platoon. I think it more likely that Major Loden indicated to me that he wanted to get the Machine Gun Platoon extricated using two empty Pigs and that I then found soldiers to carry out this order." B2111.017 paragraph 113

16.7.4.13 The reality of the situation seems to have been that, without informing INQ 441, the vehicles were sent back to collect Machinegun Platoon so that only those who happened upon them by chance were transported down Rossville Street to the area of the Rossville Flats in a vehicle whilst the remainder went on foot. It is not clear whether all members of Machinegun Platoon reached the area of the Rossville Flats but it is clear that those who did arrived there towards the end of Support Company’s deployment into Rossville Street.

Soldier A

16.7.5.1 Soldier A says in his first RMP statement; "About 1530 hours on 30th January 1972 I was with other soldiers who moved from St James Street towards William Street, Londonderry. We moved across rooftops at the west side of the Presbyterian Church" B40.14. The only explanation he can provide for having used the term “rooftops,” knowing that he had gone over walls, is that he was perhaps tired or perhaps believed the walls he had gone over in gaining access to the derelict building to have been roofed. Day 297/60/22 to Day 297/60/5 .

16.7.5.2 Soldier B’s RMP statement is made ten minutes after Soldier A’s, uses exactly the same terminology and also places Soldier B outside the derelict building. Soldier B’s RMP statement says:

When this is put to him, Soldier A, again, fails to provide a plausible explanation. Despite Soldier A’s denial, it is obvious that Soldiers A and B’s RMP statements, and subsequent statements, were made as a result of a co-ordinated effort between them. Day 297/66/3 to Day 297/66/6.[22] For people to get accounts identically right may mean that they are accurate but when they get them identically wrong it gives rise to enquiries.

16.7.5.3 B3, the trajectory map that Soldier A marked as the area from which he fired completely correlates and matches the information in his first RMP statement. Soldier A has indicated that he was on waste ground outside the derelict building. Whilst he rectified this mistake by the time he made his statement to the Treasury Solicitor, at B20.025, he is unable to provide an explanation, other than that he was tired, as to how it came about. Day 297/61/8 to Day 297/62/10. The account provided to Major Loden for inclusion in his list is also patently incorrect although Soldier A can provide no explanation. Day 297/88/1 to Day 297/90/7.

16.7.5.4 Further evidence that Soldier A sought to suggest that he was on the waste ground rather than in the derelict building is that, rather than describing his position behind the window, he used the term “low walls:”

“Two nail bombs were then thrown and they exploded very close to us. We did not sustain any casualties as the majority of the troops were behind low walls.” B20.14.

16.7.5.5 Soldier A agrees that there was nothing to prevent him from saying that he actually saw two nail bombs in flight rather than using the above terminology and can provide no explanation as to why he did. Day 297/68/9 to Day 297/68/20.

16.7.5.7 When asked by Counsel for some of the Families whether to confirm that this is not a description of John Johnston or Damien Donaghy, Soldier A provides no comment other than that this was a description of the man he shot. Day 297/69/5 to Day 297/70/12. He maintains that he shot only one man, that he saw only one man fall and that he saw only one man being taken away. Yet it is clear from the following concessions that Soldier A could not have made a mistake:

ii) That he should not have missed his target at a distance of 50 yards Day 297/70/22 to Day 297/71/6

iii) He had 10 years’ experience in the Parachute Regiment and had previously been involved in hostile action Day 297/77/18 to Day 297/77/24

16.7.5.8 A soldier with 10 years’ experience in the Parachute Regiment would obviously realise the importance of reporting the presence of nail bombs in the area, let alone his having shot a nail bomber, prior to the launching of an operation. To suggest, therefore, that he did not communicate the fact that he had shot dead a “nail bomber” because he assumed that his supposed warning shout would have been sufficient caution to the platoon commander, is completely implausible.[23] Day 297/77/18 to Day 297/77/24. He accepts that he was at fault for this failure at Day 297/79/11 to Day 297/79/12.

16.7.5.9 It is clear that, having immediately embarked upon a course designed to obscure the truth, Soldier A has had real difficulty in recollecting with precision the actual inaccurate account that he had originally supplied. In our submission, the following aspects of Soldier A’s evidence undermine his account and only serve to support the suggestion that Soldier A did not shoot a nail bomber but shot, without justification, John Johnston, Damien Donaghy or both:

i) That the map on which he marked his alleged target is incorrect in exactly the same way that Soldier B’s is incorrect Day 297/72/1 to Day 297/73/12

ii) Whilst in 1972 he states that the object he saw in his target’s hand caught fire like a match, he evidence is now to the effect that it was clearly a very distinctive type of match. Day 297/73/13 to Day 297/73/24

iii) The inconsistencies contained in his various statements and evidence to Widgery, outlined in Counsel’s Reports Numbers 2 and 3

iv) Soldier A mentioned for the first time in his evidence to this Inquiry, with no plausible explanation, that he heard gunfire before they moved into the derelict building Day 297/112/19 to Day 297/115/14. He accepts, however, that he is possibly wrong about the timing of this incident, Day 297/118/9 in which case it would have provided no reason for him to be in any way ‘hyped up.’

v) He cannot account for having missed a target with his first shot Day 297/80/17 to Day 297/80/21.

vi) He cannot account for not having seen John Johnston and Damien Donaghy being removed from the area.

Soldier B

16.7.5.10 Soldier B fired three rounds from the ground floor of the Abbey Taxis building in William Street. He made a statement to the RMP, one to the Treasury Solicitor and gave evidence to Widgery in 1972. He now claims to have no memory of firing on Bloody Sunday. He underwent brain surgery in 1986 after which he suffered some short-term memory loss. However, he states that he is fully recovered so this cannot be relied upon as the reason for his having forgotten such a significant moment. Day 311/1/19 to Day 311/1/4.

16.7.5.11 Soldier B exhibits very defined views on civil rights marches and no go areas. He describes how civil rights marches were used by terrorists as screens for throwing petrol or nail bombs and for sniping at soldiers or police. B43.001. The Inquiry will be aware that no such example has ever been found and Soldier B admits that he had never actually been present at civil rights march before and cannot provide any such example. Day 311/3/12 to Day 311/3/14 and Day 311/3/20 to Day 311/4/10.

16.7.5.12 It “sticks in [his] mind,” more so than firing three live rounds incidentally, that Derry was a “no-go area run by terrorists,” B43.002 paragraph 5, and that he and his colleagues wished that they could go up to Creggan, recover a lot of IRA ammunition and weapons and effectively stop the no-go area and restore law and order to that part of Derry. Day 311/9/16 to Day 311/10/9. By the end of his oral evidence this desire has changed from being just “back room talk,” Day 311/9/16, to talk before moving into the Bogside and a belief, when positioned at the Rossville Flats, that this was what the operation involved. Day 311/92/4 to Day 311/92/14. Indeed, the fact that he did believe the operation to be one to clear the no go areas is confirmed when he states that he imagines that he was disappointed that the Bogside remained, after the operation, a ‘no go’ area. B43.004 paragraph 19.

16.7.5.13 Soldier B’s interpretation of the yellow card is questionable to say the least:

16.7.5.14 He also describes, in his 1972 statement, how he cocked his rifle when taking up his position because, since stones were already being thrown, he suspected that explosive missiles may also be thrown shortly. Day 311/32/1 to Day 311/32/6. He does not know why he did this but hazards the guess that he “probably” felt under threat. He also believed that it was permissible even if a group were just throwing stones. Day 311/70/24 to Day 311/71/18.

16.7.5.15 Soldier B now remembers how he, with seven or eight of his colleagues, moved over ruined buildings into a derelict building where, having climbed down a wall to the ground floor, he positioned himself near a wall that had been partly demolished and was more open and exposed than the wall with the windows which appear in the photos. It was during this process that INQ 455 fell and injured himself. B43.002 paragraphs 7 to 9. Soldier B accepts that he may have confused the exposure of the large windows in the Abbey Taxis buildings for a partly demolished wall, Day 311/26/7 to Day 311/26/10.What he is able to remember clearly, however, is that he felt that this was an area in which they could easily get slaughtered by someone planting a bomb by the solid wall. B43.002 paragraph 10.

“At about 3.30 I moved with other soldiers across roof tops between St James St and William St. to the West of the Presbyterian Church. We took up position close to William St. on ground where derelict houses have been broken down.” B43.009

This implies, in much the same way that Soldier A had suggested in his RMP statement and trajectory photograph, that he was outside the building at the time that he fired. Both Soldiers, coincidentally, amended their evidence when making a statement to the Treasury Solicitor to reflect that they had actually been inside the building when they fired. Day 311/16/21 to Day 311/17/7

Soldier B makes a significant, internally conflicting comment in his Eversheds statement:

There were people in the area throwing things at us. Stones, petrol bombs and the odd nail bomb, but I have no specific recollection now of nail bombs going off and cannot describe this further.” B43.003 paragrah 11.

When asked to account for this he suggests, in our submission absurdly, that he probably thought that the dust he saw rise was a nail bomb. He concedes that he has no specific recollection of other missiles being thrown. Day 311/30/15 to Day 311/31/3.

16.7.5.17 In his 1972 statements, Soldier B was a lot more precise. He described a man to whom he had paid “particular attention”[Emphasis added]:

I observed a person to whom I paid particular attention. This man was of medium height and wearing a dark coloured windcheater…[24]in the alleyway of William St looking towards our position as if trying to locate the nearest soldier. I then saw him bring his hand his right from behind his back .He had a dark object in his hand ..appeared to fill his hand..other hand he brushed downwards against a wall. He had a lighted flame in his left hand .He was looking down at his hands and started to bring them together. B143.009.

16.7.5.18 Giving evidence to Lord Widgery, Soldier B stated that the man seemed to be communicating with those behind him. B26. Soldier B aimed at the man’s chest, and fired three shots. He saw the man fall to the ground and two people came and took him away. The object in his hand presumably rolled away. Soldier B remembers none of this now but accepts that his 1972 statement makes it clear that he did not make a mistake on the day maintaining that he actually shot and hit a man whom he had identified as a nail bomber: Day 311/80/8 to Day 311/80/16:

i) He was familiar with the sound of nail bombs and does not believe that he could have mistaken the sound of a rubber bullet, or the explosion of a gas canister for a nail bomb Day 311/34/1 to Day 311/34/25.

ii) The man chose to light a nail bomb in full view of the soldiers. Day 311/72/8 to Day 311/72/12

iii) There was no impediment that could have led him to make a mistake. That wearing a respirator should not make any difference to his aim as they are taught to fire wearing a respirator. Day 311/73/8 to Day 311/74/4

iv) That he had a good clear unobstructed view of the man he shot so much so that he saw him in the process of lighting a nail bomb, saw that his first shot missed but that the second one hit the man at whom he aimed, that the man fell and that people took him away. Day 311/75/6 to Day 311/75/14

v) That this took place over a period of time during which this individual was drawing attention to himself through his actions Day 311/79/10 to Day 311/79/15

vi) States that he did not shoot Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston Day 311/76/17 to Day 311/76/20.

vii) That Soldier B was considered to be a “hot shot” and represented his battalion in Bisley. Day 311/89/5 to Day 311/89/11

16.7.5.19 Considering the above, it is clear that Soldier B cannot possibly be considered to have made an error. Nor can he account for the fact that Mr Johnston and Mr Donaghy were shot and removed for the area without his seeing it. All he can rely upon, therefore, is the theory that people who were justifiably shot that day were spirited away so that the bodies were never found. He claims that the nail bomber he shot must be one such ‘missing casualty.’ Day 311/86/16 to Day 311/86/10. This is a completely implausible suggestion and, in our submission, completely undermines Soldier B version of events in 1972 and his current claim that he cannot remember the events of that day. This, in turn undermines the evidence of Soldier A particularly in view of the fact that Soldier B makes it clear that he and Soldier A discussed the shooting incident after the event, Day 311/36/12 to Day 311/36/15. Soldier B describes how he considered the Widgery Inquiry to be “just a big game” to him. B43.006 paragraph 25. The Tribunal could not be faulted for finding that he has viewed this Inquiry in much the same way.

16.7.5.21 INQ 441 was called to give evidence, limited to “briefings and events in/around Abbey Taxis,” on Day 303.

16.7.5.22 INQ 441 had been acting platoon commander of Machinegun platoon for the period of just a few weeks before 30th January. Day 303/68/10 to 303/68/12. Prior to this, INQ 441 had been the platoon sergeant of the Anti-tank Platoon, also Support Company. With all the platoon commanders, INQ 441 attended a briefing given by Major Loden on the 29^th January 1972. The briefing sticks in INQ 441’s mind by reason of the fact that it “ was one of the most full and thorough briefings” he had ever been given during which he was shown maps and plans of the area. C441.1 paragraph 5. Despite this vigorous assertion INQ 441 is unable to remember:

As a result of this he claims that he is also unable to remember what information he passed on to his men during his own briefing. Day 303/70/1 to 303/70/14.

16.7.5.23 INQ 441’s memory of his position on the day not only varies between that given to Eversheds and that to the Tribunal during oral evidence but is not held by any other member of his platoon. According to his Eversheds statement, at C441.4 paragraph 18, INQ 441 “entered the derelict house” at the middle floor, and, because there were no stairs, it was necessary to scale or jump down the remaining brickwork, one man at a time, by leaning out of the window and dropping to the ground floor, Day 303/80/12 to Day 303/80/19. It is his memory that, with the possible exception of the driver or drivers of the Pigs and possibly a sentry for the Pigs, the rest of Machinegun Platoon also made their way to Abbey Taxis. Day 303/87/9 to Day 303/87/13.

16.7.5.24 When in the house INQ 441 describes how he sent at least one of his men over to a large window on the middle floor which looked south over William Street to provide cover “for the rest of my men as we made out way down onto the ground floor. The first soldiers to climb down onto the ground floor also took up positions at the windows of the derelict house in order to provide further cover. I believe that it was Corporal A who took up the position at the second floor window and Private B who took up a position on the ground floor.” [Emphasis added]. C441.4 paragraph 18. He goes on, at C441.4 paragraph 19, to describe how he tended to INQ 455, the radio operator, who had fallen “backwards from the edge of the floor.”

16.7.5.25 Having considered this statement, one would deem it safe to conclude that, whilst in the derelict building, INQ 441 personally witnessed members of his platoon take up positions at the windows and, indeed, directed at least one soldier to a particular position.[25] Not so, according to INQ 441’s oral evidence for, when he fell, INQ 455 landed outside the building, which is where INQ 441 went to his aid, Day 303/82/10. At a later stage of INQ 441’s evidence, further probing by Counsel to the Inquiry revealed that not only he but also the entire platoon, except for Soldier A and B, were outside the building. [Emphasis added]. Day 303/92/24 to Day 303/93/4.

16.7.5.26 It is not plausible to suggest that the platoon commander would take it upon himself to tend to an injured party rather than order a subordinate to do so freeing him to concentrate on controlling the operation at hand. When Counsel for some of the Families highlighted the resultant discrepancies between his written and oral evidence on this point the witness’s attempted clarification was, at best, completely confused as illustrated below, Day 303/98/24 to Day 303/99/22:

16.7.5.27 This supposed confusion digressed to concession when, having been shown Soldier A’s marked up photograph, B20.009, by Counsel for some of the Families, INQ 441stated that he could not recall exactly where his men were and that at the time he made his statement he “was to believe they were in a building . . . having gone along the wall.” Day 303/108/7 to Day 303/108/17

16.7.5.28 Finally, the plausibility of INQ 441’s suggestions that he was outside the building when Soldiers A and B fired is completely undermined by the fact that he claim “heard the hard extractions whilst we were in the derelict building when Corporal A and Private B fired at nail bombers.” [Emphasis added] C441.6 paragraph 29.

" . . . when a weapon is cocked and the trigger is pulled, but it does not fire properly because two bullets have gone into the breech. One of the bullets is simply expelled from the breech of the rifle rather than being fired from it." C441.6 paragraph 29.

16.7.5.29 Whilst INQ 441 was unable to assist any further as to what this would entail, Counsel for the Inquiry’s understanding of the term “hard extraction” was that when two bullets go into the breech, one bullet is fired but the other is not, so that the forward bullet is simply expelled without any firing while the latter is fired and discharged in the normal manner. Day 303/92/2 to Day 303/92/8.

16.7.5.30 It seems that INQ 441, in concocting this version of events, may have been trying to suggest that Soldiers A and B did not fire all the rounds that they claimed, but mistakenly ejected them onto the floor and, having been negligent in not collecting them, were forced to say that they had fired more rounds than they actually did. Day 303/93/25 to Day 303/94/6. The evidence of the more credible witnesses who heard Soldiers A and B fire, summarised below, does not support this scenario.

16.7.5.31 Also, despite having no memory of hearing Soldiers A’s and B’s shots, INQ 441 claims that he can “distinctly remember hearing that some of my platoon had hard extractions on their rifles earlier in the day.” [Emphasis added] C441.6 paragraph 29. What INQ 441 is sure of is that there was nothing to indicate that there had been a hard extraction other than the sound of a round pinging off the floor. Day 303/92/9 to Day 303/92/19.

16.7.5.32 This evidence cannot stand because if he were outside the building as he claims to have been, INQ 441 could not possibly have heard the ping of a round off the floor. Having been challenged on this point, both by counsel to the Inquiry and Counsel for some of the Families, INQ 441’s only response was “I cannot recall but that is what I felt when I made my statement.” Day 303/93/10. This attempt was frustrated in any event by Counsel for some of the Families in response to whom INQ 441 conceded that, although he could not remember having done so, had this occurred he would have ordered his men to pick up the extracted bullets.

16.7.5.33 It is our submission that this entire, weak concoction was an attempt by INQ 441 to conveniently distance himself from his responsibility in relation to the shots fired by Soldiers A and B which, although he assumes that he did hear them on the day, he claims to be no longer able to remember. Nor can he remember telling them to shoot if they identified a target nor having ordered them to ceasefire. Day 303/83/5 to Day 303/83/15. Yet, although he was not in a position to instruct them and had no knowledge of what they were firing at, being outside the building whilst they were inside, INQ 441 claims, nonsensically in our submission, that he would have told Soldiers A and B to ceasefire even if they had already done so by the time he saw them again. Day 303/85/20 to Day 303/86/7.

16.7.5.34 INQ 441 accepts that it would be highly irregular for one of his soldiers not to have immediately informed him that he had discharged live rounds in the belief that they had seriously injured or killed someone. Day 303/101/19 to Day 303/102/4. Whilst he can no longer remember it, INQ 441 concedes that, because of the dramatic influence upon decisions which the company commander had to make in relation to the deployment of other platoons and/or companies, it was his duty to have reported to Major Loden if members of his platoon had come into contact with persons who were either firing or throwing nail bombs at them particularly if the contact had resulted in a person actually being shot. Day 303/87/4 to Day 303/87/9 and Day 303/100/25 to Day 303/103/2. Indeed, he claims to have radioed the company commander to inform him that he had an injured man, INQ 455, a situation that one would have imagined would have been subsidiary to live rounds being fired and nail bombs thrown. Day 303/82/11 to Day 303/82/14. Major Loden’s evidence, on Day 345 is that he was informed by the machine gun

platoon commander that the machine-gun platoon had shot and killed a nail-bomber. If

this is correct and the evidence of A, B and 441 is incorrect, then the failure to tell

16.7.5.35 INQ 441 claims that his assertion on the “World in Action” film in 1972, X117.15, that his platoon had nail bombs thrown at them and that one of his men shot a man in the process of throwing a nail bomb is evidence enough of the veracity of Soldier A and B’s claims. This is a ludicrous suggestion put forward by someone who is clutching at straws and who himself admits that he believed the program to have been sanctioned by the Commanding Officer “in order to get the propaganda machine going in our favour before there was too much propaganda against us.” C441.7 paragraph 35.

16.7.5.36 Under questioning by Counsel for some of the Families, INQ 441 accepted that Soldiers A and B would have been aware that the Royal Military Police would be interested in whether they had been justified in firing shots and whether they had a specific target. He acknowledges that it would be a natural instinct for anyone, in those circumstances, to compare notes among themselves in order to determine whether:

(b) The target at which they had fired was wearing the same of different clothing

In spite of this concurrence, INQ 441 knowingly stops short of accepting that it would be natural to ensure that their stories married. He himself remembers having made a statement about the events of Bloody Sunday to what could have been the Royal Military Police but the statement has not been found. Day 303/95/6 to Day 303/95/20.

16.7.5.37 Although, due to the limitations, it was not open to the parties to question him about it, INQ 441 claims to have broken cover onto the open ground in front of the derelict house with a view to “following up the rear of the march and pick up stragglers” in accordance with his memory of what was the plan for the day. Day 303/81/18. He claims to have chased one such straggler into “a very dark and dingy bookmakers,” arrested him and handed him over to a member of Guinness Force. INQ 588 has “no recollection of this at all” and states that his memory is of leaving the derelict building when the crowd had already dispersed. C588.5 paragraph 23.

16.7.5.38 As bookmakers shops do not, open on a Sunday it is possible that the building to which he refers is City Taxis where Patrick O’Donnell was arrested. Alternatively, INQ 441 has invented this incident in order to explain away the fact that he had no idea where the remainder of his platoon was. It does not fit easily with the fact that INQ 441 was an experienced platoon commander, having previously commanded the Anti-tank Platoon. Rather, it seems convenient that, as with the story about INQ 455, the platoon commander undertook tasks better placed with a subordinate. However, as explained, we were unable to clarify this point any further.

16.7.5.39 INQ 441 claims that he went to Rossville Street on foot, Day 303/90/1 to Day 303/90/14 though he cannot recall whether some of the platoon may have gone down Rossville Street in Pigs. Day 303/87/14 to Day 303/87/22. Again, we are unable to test the veracity of INQ 441’s claims that he lent Soldier R, from Mortar Platoon, a pair of long johns that he had in his pig so that he could wear them under his trousers which had been splashed with “with a corrosive or acid” so much so that there were holes and burn marks all around the bottom of his trousers. It is open to us to question, however, the plausibility of a soldier changing his trousers on open ground in a hostile area. Also, INQ 1919, despite having spoken to Soldiers R and T, has no recollection of their being in pain or mentioning that they had acid thrown at them, Day 296/22/10 to Day 296/22/15 and neither does Soldier 005, another member of INQ 441’s platoon. For the reasons outlined above we would also suggest that the evidence of INQ 441 is completely unreliable.

16.7.5.40 Finally, it is noteworthy that INQ 441 accepts that, whilst it was possible to obtain private supplies of ammunition, the practice would be “frowned upon by the Platoon Commander.” [My emphasis] C441.7 paragraph 39. Where is the reference to how serious an offence this was, how the commanding officers would not stand for it and, that at the mere mention of such a practice, a full investigation would be commenced and suitable punishment meted out in order to ensure that this habit was stamped out? In our submission, this apparent tolerance, laissez-faire attitude from a platoon commander about such a serious matter.

16.7.5.41 INQ 455 has severe memory problems as the result of temporary oxygen starvation to the brain suffered during surgery and as such is of little or no help in relation to the events of the day. He can remember falling from the top of a wall, falling through some barbed wire and falling on his back. C455.1 paragraph 8. Because he has no memory of anything after that until he was in hospital, INQ 455 believes that he was knocked unconscious by the fall. C455.1 paragraph 8 . He is uncertain of the source of the shooting that he can remember having heard, C455.1 paragraph 5, and cannot remember having carried a back pack radio on the day, C455.2 paragraph 11, What is certain is that he is unable to clarify whether, as asserted by INQ441, he fell outside the building.

16.7.5.42 INQ 1805, who was not called to give evidence, believes that INQ 1851 was in command on Bloody Sunday and can no longer recall the details of a briefing or what their mission was to be on that day. C1805.1 paragraphs 4 to 6. He can, however, remember his section of four or five men moving through some derelict buildings and taking up a position in what was possibly a house for some time. C1805.3 paragraph 16. He has no memory of having seen any other soldiers but states that it is possible that INQ 624 or Corporal A was with him. C1805.3 paragraph 20.

16.7.5.43 As INQ 1805’s field of vision was very restricted, because of the walls surrounding, the thrust of his evidence is based mainly on what he could hear. He can remember that, at some stage whilst in the derelict building, he heard some shots. He could not, and cannot, distinguish whether the shots were enemy or friendly fire because of the echoes which resonate in a built up location, but he did not have any sense that his section was under fire and there were no rounds striking close by. He also cannot remember hearing any explosions nor a single shot. C1805.3 paragraphs 17 to 18. Although we have not had the opportunity to ask him, it is our submission that this witness, who was able to hear the sound of a crowd at some point, like that at a football match, C1805.3 paragraph 19, would have been able to hear the sound of nail bombs exploding and, as with the gunfire, would have remembered them had they done so.

16.7.5.44 INQ 275 was a Lance Corporal, second-in-command to INQ 1686, deceased, who was the section commander on Bloody Sunday. Day 340/169/20 to Day 340/170/4. He can remember nothing of a briefing, but surmises that approximately six to twelve men were ordered to take up position in the derelict building, Day 340/171/24 to Day 340/172/2, to keep an eye on the crowd and to stand by. Day 340/179/24 to Day 340/180/5.

16.7.5.45 It is INQ 275’s recollection that he gained access to the derelict building by going over one wall, moved forward to the right and went in through a door at the ground level. Day 340/171/7 to Day 340/172/6. This runs contrary to the evidence of his colleagues and, for what it is worth, Major Loden’s diary at ED39.11:

The Machinegun Platoon were unable to extricate themselves due to the final drop of 25 feet from the first floor of a disused building which had been used to gain covered access to their present position.

16.7.5.46 As INQ 275’s memory relating to his entry to the building and going up stairs to a room on the first floor, C275.3 paragraph 15, is clearly flawed, his evidence in relation to whether INQ 445 fell within the building or outside the building is of little assistance. When he says that INQ 455 fell to the other side of the wall to where he had started to climb, it does seems reasonable, therefore, to presume when his evidence is considered with that of the majority of the platoon that, contrary to the evidence of INQ 441, INQ 455 fell to the floor inside the derelict building. Day 340/173/9 to Day 340/174/3.

16.7.5.47 Similarly, his evidence to the effect that, whilst he was astride the wall he heard two or three rifle shots, should be treated with caution. C275.2 paragraph 11. When questioned by counsel for the Inquiry, INQ 275, unaware at the time that rubber bullets were being fired in the area, admits that he quite possibly mistook these rubber bullets for live gunfire. Day 340/173/1 to Day 340/173/8.

16.7.5.48 Across the road on a patch of waste ground INQ 275 could see a crowd of youths hurling abuse and clearly throwing stones in the direction of his platoon. INQ 275 stresses this point by adding that he did not see the youths throw anything that was obviously not a stone and that he cannot recall hearing the sound of nail bombs or explosions. [Emphasis added] C275.3 paragraphs 16 to 17. INQ 275, it seems in support of his colleagues, is reticent about drawing the definitive conclusion that he would have heard a nail bomb had it exploded outside the derelict building, as illustrated by the flowing exchange:

16.7.5.49 Whilst he earlier stated that he had not known that they had been fired, Day 340/173/1 to Day 340/173/8, INQ 275 is now using the noise of the rubber bullets as a potential reason for his not having heard nail bombs explode. Predictably, accepting that he would have expected a soldier who saw a nail bomber to shout a warning to the platoon, having stated that he cannot remember hearing a warning being shouted, he allows his colleagues an escape route with the qualification “it is possible that I would have forgotten.” Day 340/182/7 to Day 340/182/22.

16.7.5.50 INQ 275 cannot remember hearing army fire from the derelict building despite the fact that he was within feet of either Soldier A or B and claims to have learnt that Soldier A had fired only on his return to camp. It is possible, however, as put by counsel to the Inquiry but not accepted by INQ 275, that the gunfire he claims to have heard when astride the wall was actually heard at some other time on the 30^th January 1972. Day 340/172/16 to Day 340/172/18.

16.7.5.51 Our submission that it is not plausible and is less than honest for INQ 275 to suggest that he did not hear the shots fired from within the derelict building is exemplified by his incoherent agitated response to Counsel to the Tribunal and Lord Saville, the only explanation for which could be that he saw a soldier fire in circumstances where it was not justified:

16.7.5.52 It is the recollection of this witness that, having reached the yard of the Presbyterian Church, he heard shots fired in the distance. These were the first shots he heard that day and he is clear that none of the fire was directed at him or his colleagues nor were the shots being fired in his vicinity. C588.2 paragraph 8. It was, in his mind, after this incident that his whole platoon, C558.3 paragraph 11, made their way through what seemed like an assault course of walls and barbed wire into a derelict building. C588.2 paragraph 9. It was as they jumped to ground level, having entered the building at the first floor level, that INQ 455 fell, landing on his back. He seemingly injured himself to such a serious extent that he was lapsing in and out of consciousness.C588.3 paragraph 12. INQ 588 took up a position on the ground floor with Soldier B to his right although he cannot remember having been ordered to do so by INQ 441. C588.4 to C588.5 paragraph 15. He has no recollection of Soldier A being near him during this period nor of witnessing his actions. C588.5 paragraph 20.

16.7.5.53 INQ 588 remembers having seen a mass of people in front of the building at some stage and, just after INQ 455 fell, he believes that they came under stoning from youths in William Street. His memory is of being exposed to the stone-throwing youths who were approximately 40-50 metres away opposite the front of their location. It is his memory that, as “the room we were in was very small (approximately 10” x 10”) and with nothing to take cover behind,” the platoon had no choice but to face the youths. C588.3 paragraph 13. As no other member of his platoon remembers having been exposed in this way, it is probable that INQ 588 is mistaken in this regard, perhaps confused by the windows which were large and contained no glass.

16.7.5.54 It was during this time that INQ 588 could hear firing in the background that was near to, though not aimed at, his position. He is clear that it sounded like high velocity, 7.62, single rifle shots with no machinegun or small calibre fire. Significantly, it is as he was firing 20-30 baton rounds at the rioters that INQ 588 saw Soldier B also firing with his baton gun. When Soldier B’s statement was pointed out to him, INQ 588 presumes that he must be wrong even though his recollection seems clear. C588.4 paragraph 16. We submit that this soldier thinks that he was wrong in the sense that Soldier B must not have fired anything or that Soldier B must have been firing not a baton gun but a rifle.

16.7.5.55 INQ 588 emphatically states that he did not see any nail bombs, any missile being thrown that could be construed as a nail bomb nor a smoking or fizzing missile. He did not see the nail bomber as described by Soldiers A and B and does not recollect having heard any explosions. C588.4 paragraphs 17 to 18. He does not recall anyone shouting, “Nail bombers” or “bombers” nor INQ 441 saying “If you see a target, shoot” or issuing a cease-fire order. He saw no civilian gunman at any time during the day. C588.5 paragraph 24.

16.7.5.56 Whilst INQ 588 is obviously not willing to lie about what he saw from his position in the derelict house he is showing an unwillingness to place his colleagues in a critical light. This is illustrated by his readiness to put forward possible scenarios to explain why his evidence does not corroborate theirs, for example:

i) “It is possible that nail bombs were thrown past me and exploded but, because of the general confusion, background shooting noise, the noise from the baton guns and the noise from the crowd, I did not hear them.” C588.4 paragraph 17

ii) In relation to his not having seen Soldier A and B’s nail bomber]: “This may be because I was further west along William Street than where Soldiers A and B say they were and my field of view did not extend as far east along William Street as the location of the nail bomber described by them.” C588.4 paragraph 18.

iii) In relation to not hearing orders or warning shouts]: “Because of the reasons stated above about the level of noise in our location at that time it is possible that orders were shouted and a soldier from my unit fired in our defence without me hearing it.”C588.4 paragraph 19

iv) “My hearing may have been impaired because of a stone hitting me.” C588.5 paragraph 21. This is undermined by the fact that INQ 588 has already explained that this incident left him only momentarily stunned and that he resumed his duties after 2-3 seconds when he regained his senses. C588.3 paragraph 13.

v) “I personally did not witness [Soldier A’s] actions, nor afterwards hear of anybody talking about it.” C588.5 paragraph 20

vi) “I did not mix with the other Platoons and I have no recollection of hearing what had happened from other soldiers.” C588.6 paragraph 27.

This attitude is another example of the army’s cultural ethos, as described in Section 5.2, prompting a soldier to close ranks against criticism. Whether it is a case of hopefully presuming that his colleagues were honourably justified in firing live rounds, as per Soldier 160’s comment at B1956.5 paragraph 31, or whether this soldier actually saw and heard Soldier B fire live rounds but has chosen not to state as much will have to be determined by the Inquiry.

16.7.5.57 INQ 896 expresses a view prevalent amongst members of the Parachute Regiment i.e. ”The Royal Artillery were unable to cope with the amount of people expected to attend the march” C896.1 paragraph 5, and, having joined 1 Para as a boy soldier, INQ 896 had more reason than most to be proud of his regiment. This would perhaps explain why he displays a tendency to surmise when he has no actual memory or experience of a particular incident provided it would support the army’s actions on the day, for example:

(a) “I do not believe it was possible to obtain private supplies of ammunition. Of course, anything is possible but I do not think it happened.” C896.2 paragraph 13

(b) He was not aware of anyone tampering with or altering ammunition and yet can comment that he does not think it was possible to do this without anyone finding out. C896.2 paragraph 14

16.7.5.58 His understanding of the plan for the day was that Machinegun Platoon would move on the right flank with Anti-tank Platoon and Mortar Platoon forming one part of a pincer movement to cut off the rioters and C and D Companies moving along the left arm of the pincer. C896.3 paragraph 20. He remembers having to undergo what seemed like an obstacle course in order to gain entry to a derelict building. He states that “it was as we were going through the building I suddenly heard some shots fired.” C896.3 paragraph 22. Although his memory that it was Soldier E who fired these shots is clearly incorrect it is significant that, contrary to the evidence of INQ 441, INQ 896’s memory is of actually being in the building on the ground level, Day 341/7/21, and that he first heard “two or three shots” [emphasis added] not one. C896.4 paragraph 24 He did concede that he was not absolutely sure that the individual he saw in a firing position was Soldier E, Day 341/9/1,

16.7.5.59 INQ 896 is eager to state that his impression was that Soldier E could see a target because he had his rifle in a position which suggested as much. Day 341/10/4 His version of what he could see when he looked in the direction in which Soldier E was aiming does not correspond with the bulk of the civilian evidence or indeed soldiers’ evidence. Contrary to his claim that he “did not stop to see what [Soldier E] was looking at,” C896.4 paragraph 24 INQ 896 claims, in oral evidence, that, 200 metres away, there was a large, congested crowd standing around. Day 341/10/9 to Day 341/11/5. Significantly, he does not refer to having seen anyone with a nail bomb but is reluctant to rule out this possibility altogether responding, when asked whether he had heard a nail bomb or anything like it exploding, “there were a lot of noises and such like, yes, but, um, whether I would have said it was a nail bomb, I do not know.” Day 341/11/9

16.7.5.60 By the time INQ 896 left the derelict building and made his way into Rossville Street it is apparent that he was arriving as the events of the day were reaching a conclusion. He is, again, eager to emphasise that he believed some of the shots that he heard to have been fired from the Rossville Flats in his direction, even going as far as to say that he could hear the crack and thump. C896.4 paragraph 28 A final example of INQ 896’s loyalty to his regiment is to be found at Day 341/13/20 to Day 341/16/22. INQ 896 maintains that his recollection is that shots were fired from the direction of the Rossville flats at which point fire was returned. Day 341/15/8 to Day 341/15/12. This view cannot be sustained considering the following concessions on his part:

(a) He had very little idea of what was actually happening in the sense of why shots were being fired or who was firing at whom.

(c) It can be very difficult to tell, in an urban environment, where gunfire is coming from or in what direction a weapon is being fired

(d) That he probably could not really distinguish between enemy fire and return fire

(f) That he cannot remember where he was or what he was doing in the ten minutes during which the “return fire” was going on.

(g) That his conclusion that “the return fire sounded as though it was being aimed at dedicated targets” is based solely on the fact that they were single shots,

16.7.5.61 It is because of this unshakeable belief in his regiment that INQ 896 feels able to say “I remember that our reaction to the news was jubilant. We were in a theatre of war and there to do a job. No one had briefed us to kill people, but if our lives were put under threat, then we returned fired. I believe all the soldiers who fired that day had identified targets and returned controlled and disciplined fire.” C896.6 paragraph 44.

“The thought that the Paras must have been shot at developed like osmosis. The virtues of loyalty and honouring the Code were drilled into us in training and we did not question whether the Paras had been fired upon – that’s where the loyalty comes in, we all simply assumed that they had been fired at. We knew that the Yellow Card did not permit us to fire at anybody unless we positively identified a gunman. To us, it had to be the case that if the Paras fired they had been fired upon.”

16.7.5.62 The thrust of INQ 153’s evidence, which was read, is that he heard a shot whilst climbing over a wall, presumably into the derelict building. He believes that the shot came from south of his position but is uncertain as to whether it was high or low velocity, guessing at the latter. C153.1 paragraph 7 to C153.2 paragraph 7. Significantly, INQ 153 does not refer to anything that could be construed as being the shots fired by Soldiers A and B. Indeed the next gunfire to which he refers was “particularly heavy [exchange of] gunfire” whilst he was in the back of a pig presumably around the Rossville Flats although his evidence is not very clear as to the location. C153.2 paragraph 11. He states that he is unable to remember whether he heard any other gunfire between this and the single shot heard earlier.

16.7.5.63 This witness refers to having seen a rioter break away from the crowd to shout abuse at them from the middle of the waste ground beside the derelict building, C153.2 paragraph 8. It is possible that INQ 153’s memory is of Damien Donaghy attempting to retrieve the rubber bullet and is, therefore, significant that he makes absolutely no reference to having seen or heard nail bombs being thrown or exploding on Bloody Sunday.

16.7.5.64 INQ 1354’s evidence is rather confused but, in light of the fact that he was a “read” witness, we make the following observations.

16.7.5.65 INQ 1354’s memory of the briefing was that Mortar Platoon was to proceed down a road in vehicles, Anti-tank were to come, in vehicles, from the left and Machinegun Platoon from the right on foot. C1354.1 paragraph 5. He can remember scaling a wall although has no idea of whether it was part of a house or a building. C1354.2 paragraph 9. He has no memory of either INQ 455 falling off a wall nor of Soldier A and B firing live rounds but believes that, having deployed onto some open ground, he heard the sound of gunfire lasting for one or two minutes. C1354.2 paragraphs 9 to 10. Whilst he is unable to say whether the fire was incoming or outgoing, he is clear that the weapons he hear were “mainly semi-automatic, that is one shot weapons . . . I am certain that there was no automatic fire as automatic weapons produce a long burst of shots and I did not hear anything like that.” C1354.2 paragraph 11. Another feature that he is certain of is that he did not hear any explosions amongst the gunfire. INQ 1354 believes that he may have ended up in the area of the Rossville Flats and remembers seeing Colonel Wilford and Soldier 202 walking down the road together at a stage at which “it was all very calm.” C1354.3 paragraph 17.

It is significant that, in reference to the Widgery Tribunal, INQ 1354, instead of saying that he was not required to give evidence, sceptically states that he “did not play any part in it” almost as though he were glad not to have been called.

167.5.66 According to the nominal roll, although he makes no reference to it, INQ 1574, who was not called to give evidence, was the platoon’s intelligence officer. INQ 1544 repeats the predictable Para rhetoric such as that, despite not having been in Derry before, he knew that there were no go areas in the city where the soldiers and the police tended to leave the civilians alone to get on with it rather than anyone doing anything about the situation and that the Rossville Flats were considered troublesome. C1544.1 to C1544.2 paragraph 7.

16.7.5.67 He is of no assistance in relation to what happened in Sector One, as his memory comes in flashes of specific incidents, the first of which is being in the area of the Rossville Flats guarding the vehicle. C1544.2 paragraph 11. Although he later found out that INQ 455 had been badly hurt having fallen over a wall in attempt to get into a building, C1544.5 paragraph 36, INQ 1544’s memory is of INQ 455, carrying his manpack, leaving his location with the other men from his platoon. C1544.3 paragraph 16. Despite a clear memory of watching the Rossville Flats for gun flashes or snipers, C1544.3 paragraph 19, INQ 1544 cannot remember having seen any activity coming from the flats. C1544.3 paragraph 20.

16.7.5.68 INQ 1544 has a recollection of hearing sporadic gunfire, although none in his immediate vicinity. Whilst he cannot place it in sequence, INQ 1544, no stranger to gunfire, did not feel the need to cock his weapon, is clear that it was not automatic fire but single shots, that it did not sound like a gun battle and that he heard no explosions. C1544.3 paragraphs 22 to 23. It seems that INQ 1544 was not alone in feeling that he was not in danger as illustrated by his description of a couple of ‘squaddies’ standing in the road guarding civilians:

“They were standing at ease. One was holding his rifle up, pointing towards the sky and the other had the barrel of his gun resting on the toe of his boot and was leaning on the other end.” C1544.4 paragraph 29

16.7.5.69 INQ 1544 observes that, “it is strange but almost all of my recollections of that day are of being on my own, but I know I could not have been and I think that might just be my memory playing tricks.” C1544.4 paragraph 27. It could also be suggested that the fact that he cannot recollect discussing the day’s events or of knowing that two members of his platoon had fired shots is equally strange. It is apparent that INQ 1544 is extremely loyal to the army, asserting that the Paras were the “cream of the British Army as far as the infantry was concerned” C1544.1 paragraph 3 and that all of the guys he was with were excellent, professional soldiers, most of whom went on to join the SAS. C1544.1 paragraph 4. A plausible alternative, therefore, to a genuinely bad memory is that this witness is being deliberately unhelpful in attempt not to betray his friends who acted illegally.

16.7.5.70 This witness commences his statement with typical Parachute Regiment bravado stating that they were being sent to retake the Bogside in order to remedy an unacceptable situation in which the forces of law and order were unable to enter certain places. C624.1 paragraph 4. Although his memory in relation to INQ 1851 being in charge of the platoon and of going up the stairs is defective, considering the bulk of the evidence of Machinegun Platoon, he is clear that the whole platoon, presumably minus Soldier 005 and INQ 439, had to overcome a number of obstacles in order to take up their position. C624.2 paragraph 12.

16.7.5.71 It was as he was tackling one of these obstacles that he says he gave his rifle to a soldier whom he refuses to name but who is clearly, through a process of elimination, Soldier A. Soldier A then, shouting out that there was a gunman and a nail bomber and from a “squatting position on the roof of the outhouse, brought his rifle to his shoulder, looked down the sight and fired . . . one or two shots.” C624.3 paragraph 15. INQ 624 presumed that Soldier A, a friend of his C624.1 paragraph 8, believed there to be imminent danger from a target but makes no mention of having seen a gunman or bomber nor of hearing an incoming shot/s or explosions at this.

16.7.5.72 They were then ordered to go further into the Bogside to the area of the Rossville Flats, he can only assume on foot because he cannot remember getting into a vehicle, during which time he could hear a mixture of low and high velocity shots but no explosions. Considering that he volunteers the fact that he cannot recall any shots passing over his head and that the direction of the shooting was unclear because of the reverberation of the sound around the buildings it is more than likely that INQ 624 would have accepted that he may have been mistaken about anything other than army SLR fire. C624.4 paragraphs 22 to 24.

16.7.5.73 INQ 624 presumes that his rifle was sent off to forensics but, as he cannot remember having made a report to anyone to say that his rifle was fired, he believes that it is possible that he accounted for the ammunition that had been fired from his rifle by replacing them with extra rounds given to him by other soldiers, C624.5 paragraph 31 , which were available from the firing ranges. C624.6 paragraph 33.

16.7.5.74 The use of private supplies of ammunition ought to be unusual, rare and significant let alone the use of a rifle by another soldier. It is therefore inconceivable that such an incident as that referred to at C624.3 at paragraphs 14 to 16 and C624.5 paragraph 31 could be due to an erroneous recollection of the events of the day. The general accuracy of INQ 624’s other recollections would also tend to confirm that his memory of events is reliable. The most significant part of his evidence is further strengthened and corroborated by the responses of Soldier A when cross-examined on Day 297/135/11 to Day 297/137/4.

16.7.5.75 It is truly significant that Soldier A’s immediate response, when asked about the accuracy of this suggestion by INQ 624, is, not that such a thing could not have happened, but “I have no recollection of that.” Day 297/135/19. Then, when the matter had been pursued at length, Soldier A further asserted that if a soldier was to lend his rifle to another who discharged it, that there was no necessary duty to report the incident to his Platoon Commander or even the Company Commander. Day 297/136/19 to Day 297/137/4. The correspondence between INQ 624 and the Inquiry may cause the Tribunal to treat this evidence with caution. C624.9 to C624.21. However, whether this is in fact what happened it or not, it does confirm the general attitude amongst the members of Support Company that rules and regulations designed to ensure compliance with proper procedures may in fact be used to mask breaches rather than reveal them and further illustrates the lack of candour from the other members of Machinegun Platoon. It serves to demonstrate the lack of enforcement of adherence to such rules and orders that may have existed to ground personal responsibility on individual soldiers for their actual actions.

16.7.5.76 INQ 439 drove a pig with the registration number 15BK54, C439.1 paragraph 4. His memory of the day is so poor that all he can say for certain is that he heard shooting at some point as he waited in his pig. However, he is not able to be more specific other than to say that:

i) He knew nothing of a shot hitting a drainpipe or of any civilians being hit by fire C439.2 paragraph 10

iii) He cannot say how many were fired or whether they were fired close by C439.2 paragraph 8

v) It sounded like a high power weapon, not a Kalashnikov C439.2 paragraph 8

16.7.5.77 This is a very confused account upon which, in light of the fact that he was not called to give evidence, we make the following observations.

16.7.5.78 Although Corporal INQ 513 commanded a section of Machinegun Platoon he is not able to recall of whom it was comprised nor can he recollect any briefing in relation to the march. In fact, it is INQ 513’s memory that his section were tasked to concentrate on the Rossville Flats from where, they were told, snipers were firing. C513.2 paragraph 6. He then, with his section, debussed through Barrier 14 on foot, past Chamberlain Street, through McCarry’s Lane onto the waste ground on Rossville Street whereupon, because some of the crowd were still at the William Street end of Rossville Street, he decided that they should return to the pig. He stayed there until he saw Fr Daly come from Chamberlain Street carrying an injured person. C513.3 to C513.4 paragraphs 11 to 14. This is inconsistent with all of the available evidence in relation to the movements of Machinegun Platoon and it seems that this witness has, over time and having watched television footage of the day, a completely flawed version of his movements and that of his section that day. Whether this is genuine or convenient, in that he is not placed in the position of being asked questions the answers to which would be potentially critical of the actions of this colleagues on the day, is impossible to say without having questioned him. What he is clear about, importantly, is that it was very difficult to tell from where the shots that he heard were coming because the area was very built up producing an echo, C513.2, C513.3 paragraph 7, and that he did not hear or see any nail bombs or blast bombs explode during the day. C513.4 paragraph 13.

16.7.5.79 Like INQ 624, INQ 1553 states that they were told to ignore the fact that the Bogside was a “No-Go Area” and that they should follow the crowd into the Bogside. Other than that, although he has given it some thought and cannot understand why, his orders were very vague. C1553.2 paragraph 5.

16.7.5.80 He remembers that INQ 1851 was in America at a Rangers course, C1553.2 paragraph 7 , that they had to climb over what seemed to be a roof to get into a derelict building and that INQ 455 fell whilst attempting the climb. C155.3 paragraphs 9 to 10. Soldier A was supposed to help INQ 1553, who was in clear view of the rioters below, into the building but, instead, he cocked his rifle and, without shouting a warning, fired one or two shots, the first shots of the day. It was INQ 1553’s belief that Soldier A had fired at a nail bomber and can vaguely remember someone saying as much C1553.3 paragraph 11.

16.7.5.81 Shortly after, having reached the inside of the building, INQ 1553 heard someone fire a single shot from the ground floor. C1553.4 paragraph 13. INQ 1553 saw no one with a nail bomb but surmises that one may have hit the outside of the building. It is possible, if not probable, that this witness has mistaken the sound of stones hitting the side of the building and of rubber bullets being fired in the area, including from within the derelict building itself, with the sound of a nail bomb.

16.7.5.82 When in the area of the Rossville Flats guarding the pig containing the bodies, which were just piled on top of each other, see Section 18, INQ 1553 did not see any civilians with weapons, did not particularly feel that he was in danger, heard no explosions and believed that all the gunfire he heard could have been friendly fire. C1553.4 paragraphs 17 to 18. Before their return to Belfast Colonel Wilford congratulated them. C1553.5 paragraph 22.

16.7.5.83 The evidence of this witness reveals the propensity for a soldier’s colleagues to immediately assume that when he fired he was justified in so doing irrespective of the fact that they have seen nor heard anything which would have warranted such action. Indeed, the firing by their colleagues immediately increases their own sense of vulnerability and their own necessity to make a similar response.

16.7.5.84 INQ 1917’s memory of his platoon having been briefed to act as snatch squads varied during his oral testimony. In response to Counsel to the Tribunal he could remember only a short briefing, involving no examination of maps or photographs or reconnaissance, given on their arrival in Derry on the day of the march, Day 288/50/2 to Day 288/50/12 and Day 288/86/1 to Day 288/86/4, By the end of his testimony, however, in response to Mr Bradley BL, INQ 1917 answered as follows:

16.7.5.85 INQ 1917’s next memory is of the entire platoon, C1917.2 paragraph 8, having been ordered into a derelict building which he entered from ground level, Day 288/56/18, climbing to the first floor, Day 288/56/14, from where he could hear the people marching past, quite close to the building. Day 288/58/17 to Day 288/59/2. This former point contradicts a substantial body of evidence to the effect that the platoon entered via the first floor and descended to the ground floor.

16.7.5.84 It was as he was still making his way to the interior of the building, although he was on the first floor having been in the building for only a few seconds, that INQ 1917 claims to have heard shots. Day 288/61/3 to Day 288/61/20. INQ 1917 accepts the possibility, put to him by Counsel to the Tribunal, that this may have been the noise of baton guns being fired, Day 288/62/2 to Day 288/62/5 and that, unable now to say whether it was a gun or a baton gun, that he presumed they were under fire, Day 288/62/10 to Day 288/62/13, although he did not feel that his life was in danger. Day 288/63/1 to Day 288/63/2.

16.7.5.85 Counsel for some of the Families informed him that prior to and in the minutes that followed Machinegun Platoon’s entry into the derelict building, between 200 and 250 baton rounds had been discharged from Barrier 14, a total which rose to 324 by the end of the afternoon. Day 288/92/8 to Day 299/92/12, Notwithstanding his earlier concession to Counsel to the Tribunal INQ 1917 refused to acknowledge the possibility that these figures could account for his having misidentified the sound of baton rounds as that of live rounds. This despite the fact that;

(i) The entire situation had made his adrenaline levels go up. Day 288/91/15

(ii) It was his first ever experience, at the age of twenty, of coming under fire. Day 288/93/8

(iv) He has no memory of baton rounds having been discharged from he derelict building. Day 288/90/16 to Day 288/90/19

(v) His memory of the order in which events occurred is hazy now due to the passage of time and also due to the fact that things seemed to happen so fast. C1917.2 paragraph 12

(vi) That it was impossible to recollect detail and sequences of events due to the passage of time. [My emphasis] Day 288/85/1 to Day 288/85/4

(vii) He was in a situation with which he was totally unfamiliar and events were happening quite quickly.

In addition, it is significant that INQ 1917 states that he did not hear one high velocity round fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats at 1555 as referred to in Major Loden’s diary of operations. Day 288/101/6 to Day 288/101/11.

16.7.5.86 From his position he could see out of the window and said that he saw a group of people, mostly males in their twenties and thirties, running in various directions and throwing objects, some in his direction. He states that he cannot remember specifically what they were throwing but certainly makes no reference to a fizzing object, a match or anything that resembled a nail bomb. He then heard the sound of two explosions, similar to the sound of grenades, which, he claims, he can now identify, from later experience, as being nail bombs.C1917.2 paragraph 12.

16.7.5.87 He conceded to Counsel to the Tribunal that, at the time, he had no idea at all about what had caused these bangs or explosions, Day 288/64/23 to Day 288/65/1 and, in his statement, says, “they were loud bangs which I did not recognise as having been caused by a particular weapon. The noise was similar to the sound of grenades, a low thud. From later experience, I do not think they were grenade but possibly nail bombs." [Emphasis added] C1917.2 paragraph 12.

16.7.5.88 Again, however, although he was unaware that 15 CS gas grenades and 65 CS canisters had been discharged by the Army, Day 288/94/6 to Day 288/94/20, and although he was unfamiliar with the sound of nail bombs at the time, INQ 1917 dismisses the suggestion by Counsel for some of the Families that he may have mistaken the sounds of these weapons for that of nail bombs. He rejects outright the suggestion that he may have attributed what he heard to Soldier A and B’s story about having shot a nail bomber. Day 288/95/9 to Day 288/95/19.

16.7.5.89 INQ 1917’s next memory is of between two and five shots fired from within the building and of seeing two of the soldiers in his platoon in a firing position pointing their weapons towards the open space where he had previously seen the group of people throwing objects. C1917.2 paragraph 13. He does not recall INQ 441 giving an order to Soldier A and B to fire. Day 288/101/19 to Day 288/101/21. Corporal A subsequently informed him that he and Soldier B had fired at a nail bomber. Day 288/70/4 to Day 288/70/7. However, the two soldiers he saw were at ground level, Day 288/69/5, whereas it is Corporal A’s evidence that he fired from the first floor. INQ 1917 conceded that it is possible that Corporal A was in close proximity to him on the first floor Day 288/73/2. Given that INQ1917 was adamant that he had never seen or heard Corporal A firing, it was suggested by Counsel for some of the Families, but not accepted by INQ 1917, that this demonstrated the extreme difficulties in identifying firing on the day. Day 288/97/21 to Day 288/98/3. INQ 1917 then saw a group of people on the waste ground approximately 100 yards from the derelict building, tending to somebody on the ground.C1917.3 paragraph 14.

16.7.5.90 It is INQ1917’s memory that he returned on foot with his platoon to their Army vehicles before being driven to a position approximately 100 yards from the Rossville Flats.C1917.3 paragraph 17. On debussing and taking cover behind the vehicle he was conscious of high-velocity sniper fire from the direction of the flats, but did not see any muzzle flashes, anyone firing or any bullets striking their target. C1917.3 paragraph 21. It was his evidence that four or five such shots were fired from the flats over the space of a minute. INQ 1917 was not aware that members of other platoons in the area had opened fire and was therefore willing to acknowledge that he could not be 100% sure that the firing that he heard was not army fire. Day 288/80/2 to Day 288/80/17. With concession and the fact that he remembers having heard an order to ceasefire, C1917.4 paragraph 22, it is our submission that this soldier in actual fact heard was the other members of Support Company firing live rounds. This was at a stage after the three bodies had been moved, in the pig, to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, C1917.3 paragraph 21, and is therefore likely to have been the shots fired by Soldiers F and G at the Rossville Flats.

16.7.5.91 Having joined the regiment when he was twenty, C1874.7 paragraph 2, INQ 1874 was 23 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday. C1874.1 paragraph 2. From the outset of his oral testimony, INQ 1874 demonstrated a clear reluctance to give oral evidence or to adopt his Eversheds statement, which he claims not to have recognised, as evidence. Day 298/21/8. It seemed that this witness did not realise the consequence of the statement-taking process, i.e. that the statement would be relied upon evidence by the Tribunal and that he would actually have to give oral evidence. It appears, in our submission, that based on the belief that it was more of a dialogue with two people Day 298/22/3, the witness was prone to exaggeration, presumption in favour of the army or even untruths. Examples of this are illustrated below and include his claim that he saw someone with a rifle, that shots were directed at the derelict building in which he was positioned, some of which went over his head and that there were explosions.

16.7.5.92 INQ 1874 postulates that, although he us unable to remember having attended a briefing or being specifically told about an arrest operation, C1874.1. paragraph 3, the Parachute Regiment would have been sent in to quell trouble when other soldiers there couldn’t and that “they wanted us to show a strong presence since they knew the Paras would not take any crap. They sent us in expecting trouble,” C1874.1 paragraphs 4 to 5. This attitude, which is common amongst the Parachute Regiment, illustrates the pride they felt in being a part of it and bolsters our argument that this witness makes presumptions in favour of the army.

16.7.5.93 Although he cannot identify specifically which one, it is clear from his description of the building, having to climb over walls to get there, of having been there with the rest of his platoon and of INQ 455 injuring himself falling over a wall that INQ 1874 was in Abbey Taxis on Bloody Sunday and we proceed on that basis. C1874.2 paragraph 11.

16.7.5.94 From his position on the ground floor of the building INQ 1874 saw civilians run out now and again from behind walls and, having seen things thrown and then hearing explosions, assumes, again in favour of the army line, that the people were throwing nail bombs (saying later that he could hear nails hit the walls, C1874.3 paragraph 17) despite the fact that:

(i) He is unable to recall that there was a road between these people and his position or anything else about their location. Day 298/28/12 to Day 298/28/23

(ii) He did not see anyone with what could be described as a fizzing object in their hand Day 298/28/8 to Day 298/28/11

(iii) He only thinks that he is familiar with the sound that nail bombs made Day 298/29/15 to Day 298/29/20

(iv) In his view a nail bomb is not necessarily very loud although he could not give an exact description “after all these years.”Day 298/30/ 3 to Day 298/30/8

(v) He did not know that baton rounds were being fired from inside or anywhere near the derelict building although he denies that, had that occurred, there would have been a very loud noise. Day 298/33/12 to Day 298/33/21

(vi) Despite conceding that if a baton round went off at the same time as a rifle shot, it may be hard to distinguish between them he will not accept that may be difficult to distinguish between a baton round and an explosions. Day 298/34/2 to Day 298/34/9

16.7.5.95 INQ 1874’s evidence varies throughout his written and oral testimony as to the number of explosions that he heard. Firstly, in response to Counsel to the Tribunal, INQ 1874 states as follows:

16.7.5.96 It may be, as he later suggests, that INQ 1874 mistakenly thought that he was being asked about the number of shots which he does put at twelve. Day 298/42/3 to Day 298/42/12. If this is the case, the question arises as to why this witness did not answer the question actually put to him. Then, after having told Counsel for some of the Families that he does not recall twelve explosions, he states that he cannot say how many explosions there were and then that it could have been two, Day 298/42/15 to Day 298/42/25. In his statement INQ 1874 refers to “the first few explosions,” [emphasis added]. C1874.3 paragraph 17.

16.7.5.97 INQ 1874 claimed that, at the same time as the explosions, gunfire was directed toward the derelict building consisting of at least twelve, high velocity, single shots that mainly passed overhead, those that were level with them hitting the outside wall of the building. C1874.2 paragraphs 15 to 16 and Day 298/37/22 to Day 298/37/25.

16.7.5.98 Similar to that in relation to the explosions, INQ 1874’s evidence regarding these shots reveals a strong degree of uncertainty:

He conceded that it can be difficult to tell from where bullets are coming when in a built – up area but suggests that the Bogside is not a built-up area Day 298/38/2 to Day 298/38/15

(i) He is no longer certain if twelve shots were fired saying it could have been more or less Day 298/38/16 to Day 298/38/21

(ii) He was not aware that substantial amounts of baton rounds and gas cartridges were discharged by the army a very short distance away. Day 298/48/20 to Day 298/48/22

(iii) Despite his suggestion to Eversheds that he was confused as to whether some of the people were holding guns or broomsticks, C1874.3 paragraph 18, INQ 1874 accepts, in response to Counsel to the Tribunal, that he did not see them holding either.

Day 298/40/17 to Day 298/40/22. It was presumably as a result of this response that Lord Saville refused to entertain Mr Eilias’s request that the restrictions upon this witness be expanded to include questioning on INQ 1874’s assertion, at C1874.3 paragraph 25, that he saw someone carrying what looked like a rifle in the Rossville Flats area although “if someone walked through a door with a broom under their arm then it looked something like that.” Day 298/40/24 to Day 298/41/10 Incidentally, the witness also claimed to have heard explosions, seen bullets hitting the road as though from the Rossville Flats and of having seen a pig containing what could have been thirteen bodies around this time. C1874.3 paragraphs 22 to C1874.4 paragraph 29.

16.7.5.99 After this the witness heard shots fired from within the building but cannot say how many nor did he see who fired. He did not hear anything being shouted by any other member of his platoon, Day 298/39/24 to Day 298/40/2, nor see anyone fall. What is significant is that INQ 1874 accepts that it was a general attitude amongst the Parachute Regiment that if you saw someone with something that looks like a gun, you would have no alternative but to shoot. C1874.3 paragraph 18, C1874.4 paragraph 25 to 26.

16.7.5.100 INQ 1874’s evidence in relation to the degree of danger in which he felt himself to be varies considerably throughout his evidence. What follows is his response to Counsel to the Tribunal in relation to this matter:

16.7.5.101 The Tribunal may believe that the time spent on INQ 1874’s evidence is of little value considering the contradictions and unsupportable, uncorroborated assertions. Whilst we would also be of the view that this evidence cannot be relied upon, it does, in our submission, serve to illustrate that, despite what they saw on the day or remember of the day, an inherent characteristic of the military evidence is the interpretation or construction of the days events in such a way as to shore up the version of events put out by the army in 1972. In this specific case it is our suggestion that INQ 1874 perhaps feels justified in doing this because he feels that the army is being used as a scapegoat, C1874.6 paragraph 45.

16.7.5.102 INQ 1919 is eager to explain, devoting three paragraphs to the subject, what a thorough brief he and his colleagues would have received in relation to Bloody Sunday. He explains that they received a general briefing on the 29^th January 1972 when they were given a broad outline of the area into which they were to be deployed and of what other army units and the police would be doing although they were not informed, at this stage, as to their specific roles. C1919.1 paragraph 9. It was at the briefing, at Company level, on the morning of 30^th January 1972 that they informed of the intention to stop a march and at a platoon briefing that they were told they were to act as snatch squads. C1919.2 paragraphs 10 to 11. INQ 1919 accepts, in response to Counsel to the Tribunal, that he cannot remember actually remember any briefing at all and was saying what normal practice would have been. Day 296/1/19 to Day 296/2/24. Here is a witness who is doggedly determined, from the outset, to present the army, or at least his regiment, in a positive light. Contrary to his statement where he asserts, at C1919.1 paragraph 5, that he had no view as to how Derry was being handled before 30^th January 1972 by the units stationed there he agreed, during his testimony, that the Paras felt that they controlled Belfast but that in Derry local troops took ‘a lot of stick’ and could not do much about it. Day 296/47/16 to Day 296/47/20.

16.7.5.103 INQ 1919 definitively states in his statement to Eversheds that, even before gaining access, from above, to the derelict house, he could hear explosions some distance away, C1919.3 paragraph 17, interspersed, he says for the first time in oral evidence, with quite a bit of rifle fire. Day 296/8/20 to Day 296/8/21. He goes on to say that, although it was not obviously part of the plan, they had to enter the derelict building by crossing a flat roof, in all likelihood an upper floor of the derelict building as per the majority of the evidence from this platoon rather than a roof, which drew them to the attention of the crowd. C1919.3 paragraphs 16 to 18.

16.7.5.104 It was as the crowd started pointing and jeering that the platoon radio operator, INQ 455, became entangled in the barbed wire at the top of the wall and fell off taking the wire with him. What is significant about this evidence is that, contrary to that of INQ 441, INQ 1919 states that INQ 455 fell to the ground inside the building and that it was he and INQ 1686, who is deceased and is also known as UNK 194, not INQ 441, spent some time trying to untangle and help INQ 455 who was not seriously injured. Day 296/11/23 to Day 296/12/3.

16.7.5.105 After a few minutes, throughout which the younger elements in the crowd moved towards the derelict building throwing stones and missiles some of which were reaching them, he heard more gunfire. He claims that he also heard a number of bangs and explosions including nail bombs and petrol bombs, although he did not see anyone actually throwing them. There was then a verbal exchange between INQ 441, Corporal A and Private B, during which a nail bomb was mentioned. One shot rang out, and then a further two which he believed to have been fired by Soldiers A, who claimed a hit, and B, both of whom appeared to were aiming towards the same target area. He then saw a youth lying on the ground on William Street around whom a number of people had gathered. He could hear explosions as the shots were fired but at no stage did he see anybody with a nail bomb nor hear any order being given. (It could be suggested that the verbal exchange was a dispute over the fact that there was no justification to fire and that this is why INQ 441 wants to distance himself from the situation by now placing himself outside the building). C1919.3 to C1919.4 paragraphs 21 to 23 and Day 296/17/3 to Day 296/17/5.

16.7.5.106 However, on being questioned by Counsel for some of the Families who pointed out that this series of shots and explosions are not mentioned in Major Loden’s diary, INQ 1919 concurs that, after thirty years, it is possible that he may be confusing this episode for shooting that happened at a later stage in the day, that he would cannot now explain how he could distinguish whether an explosion was a nail bomb and that he may have been confused by the media coverage of the event. He accepts that, as he did not see Soldiers A or B, their target or an explosion he may have been influenced by what they told him of the event afterwards and by his belief that soldiers would not discharge live rounds unless there was a good justification for doing so. Day 296/33/23 to Day 296/36/22.

16.7.5.107 Whilst he cannot remember having heard rubber bullets being fired by members of his platoon INQ 1919 recognises, based on previous experience, that had a rubber bullet been fired from within a derelict building it would have made a bigger bang than one that had just been fired out in the open. In fact, he acknowledges that the sort of bang produced in such circumstances might be confused or mistaken for a nail bomb by a soldier who is unaware of what is happening. Day 296/43/6 to Day 296/43/20. Incidentally, INQ 1919 was aware some people picked up rubber bullets as souvenirs and occasionally sought to entice soldiers into firing them in acts of bravado just as Damien Donaghy had been doing. Day 296/42/22 to Day 296/43/5.

16.7.5.108 Although INQ 1919 believes that, due to INQ 455’s fall, the radio suffered some damage, the fact that an ambulance arrived for INQ 455 would suggest that the radio was, in fact, in working order and had been taken over by someone else when INQ 455 had become incapacitated in accordance with standard procedure. Day 296/19/6 to Day 296/19/19. The rest of the platoon got into the Machinegun Platoon Pigs and made their way to the Rossville Flats.

16.7.5.109 The story that particularly sticks in his mind in relation to this time is that Mortar Platoon had been fired upon from the Rossville Flats, Day 296/25/10 to Day 296/25/12. INQ 1919 did not hear any explosions or gunfire nor see any civilians with guns or explosives whilst at the Rossville Flats. C1919.6 paragraph 35. He can remember having spoken to Soldiers R and T but has no recollection of their being in pain or mentioning that they had acid thrown at them, Day 296/22/10 to Day 296/22/15. He claims that they mentioned only that there were bodies in the back of the pig that they were guarding. He claims that an ammunition check was carried out on more than one occasion after they left the derelict building. The first of them took place before they pulled out of the Bogside and before he spoke to Soldiers R and T. Day 296/23/4 to Day 296/23/17. This assertion should be reflected upon with caution considering INQ 1919’s apparent inability to distinguish between what actually happened on the day and what should have happened according to procedure as illustrated by his concessions, above, in relation to the briefing.

16.7.5.110 This is a perfect example of a soldier whose main purpose in giving evidence, like so many others and not only in 1972 but also in 2000, was to support the version of events put forth by his colleagues or what he presumed would be the army case. Not having deployed with the rest of Machinegun Platoon to the derelict building, Soldier 005 had remained guarding his pig until he got a message that his platoon had been cut off and he needed to go and extract them. He was then ordered to drive the second Machinegun Platoon Pig, i.e. the sixth vehicle in the convoy, into the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. B1374.001 paragraph 15. Before this order he had heard no shots or explosions but, thereafter, claims, in his Eversheds statement, to have:

(i) Heard low velocity incoming fire as he went through the barrier B1374 paragraph 9

(ii) Heard several high velocity shots as his vehicle stopped in Rossville Street

(iii) Heard a bomb go off as he took cover behind his Pig in Rossville Street. B1374.001 paragraph 12

(iv) Seen a man in the act of throwing something, possibly a nail or petrol bomb, from either the ground or first floor of the Rossville Flats. Having seen puffs of smoke and Soldier R firing at him, Soldier 005 believed that acid bombs or something similar was being thrown. B1374.002 paragraph 15

(v) Seen, according to his RMP although he cannot now remember the incident, a man located on the first floor veranda running between blocks one and two of the Rossville Flats fire two shots from a pistol. Soldier R, Soldier 005’s friend since they were in junior Para together as kids of fifteen, Day 338/194/13 to Day 338/194/19, returned 2 rounds at the man. B1374.004 paragraphs 31 to 34.

(vi) Heard pistol shots, which he calls “pepperpot shots” and some low velocity fire around the time that Major Loden was shouting to his men, in no uncertain terms, to stop firing. B1374.002 paragraph 16

(vii) Heard low velocity fire coming from the direction of the Rubble Barricade and from the Rossville Flats area into the car park which, judging by the “tap, tap, tap” sound, he presumed to be a pistol B1374.002 paragraphs 16 to 1 7

16.7.5.111 Soldier 005’s oral testimony was consisted of looking at various photographs, documents and maps and, allowing for the confusion arising through memory loss, appearing to help Counsel to the Tribunal to best of his ability. What transpired by the end of his evidence, however, was that Soldier 005 took responsibility for lying to the RMP in 1972 about seeing a man with a pistol. Day 338/165/8. When he made his statement to Eversheds he was maintaining a lie:

16.7.5.112 It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that the Tribunal should accept with caution Soldier 005’s internally contradictory evidence to the effect that he was concentrating on driving and not paying attention to what they were saying and that there was a partition between them and he so that he could not hear their conversation. B1374.003 paragraph 22. Also, according to Bernard Feeney, the Knight of Malta, there was no partition between the front and back of Soldier N’s pig which, presumably would have been the same as those issued to the Machinegun Platoon:

“I remember that there was a soldier sitting in the passenger seat of the Saracen (there was no division between the front and back of the vehicle). He was sitting sideways across the seat with his back to the passenger door and his legs stretched out very casually into the back of the Saracen. His legs would have been very close to the head of the middle body.” AF 8.5 paragraph 29.

16.8 Conclusions

16.8.1 At, or around, 3.30pm on 30January 1972, soldiers from the Machinegun Platoon of Support Company, under the command of INQ 441, moved into position in the former Abbey Taxis building on Willliam Street. A number of these soldiers were visible to the marchers and there followed an exchange of insults. This progressed into some minor stone-throwing involving a group of youths. Many of these stones did not reach their intended target.

16.8.1.2 At all material times, the crowd was under the constant observation of soldiers on the Embassy building, the roof of the GPO Sorting Office, soldiers positioned in Harrison’s Garage and on the flat roof annexed to the Presbyterian Church. At least one soldier from the Abbey Taxis responded with up to thirty baton rounds.

16.8.1.3 According to their evidence, Soldier B was in a position behind a window on the ground floor of the Abbey Taxis building whilst Soldier A was positioned behind the first floor window. Both Soldiers A and B claim to have fired two and three shots respectively at an alleged nail bomber on the waste ground. Their descriptions of the alleged nail bomber do not match that of Damien Donaghy or John Johnston.

16.8.1.4 Damien Donaghy was shot in the right leg, John Johnston in the left shoulder and right leg. He also received a minor hand injury. There is no objective evidence to support the version of events offered by Soldiers A and B.

(i) Damien Donaghy was shot and wounded by Soldier A or Soldier B who were located in the Abbey Taxis building.

(ii) John Johnston was shot and wounded by Soldier A or Soldier B, or both, who were located in the Abbey Taxis building.

(iii) Neither John Johnston or Damien Donaghy was armed and no action was taken by them which could have justified the use of lethal force by Soldiers A and B.

(iv) No action taken by Damien Donaghy or John Johnston posed a threat, or could have been perceived as posing a threat, to the soldiers in the Abbey Taxis building.

(v) The members of Machinegun Platoon were not attacked by nail bombs or gunfire on taking up their positions in the Abbey Taxis building.

(ix) There was no action by any member of the crowd on the laundry waste ground which either posed a threat, or could have been perceived as posing a threat such as to cause A or B to believe that they were justified in firing shots.

(x) Neither A nor B believed that either Damien Donaghy or John Johnston posed any threat to them to justify their firing.

(xi) Neither A nor B believed that any person in close proximity to Damien Donaghy or John Johnston was acting in such a way as to pose a threat to their lives or that of another.

(xii) OIRA 1 fired a shot at soldiers near the Presbyterian Church after Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot.

Nobody other than Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot in William Street. Rather, these are two injured persons for whom Soldiers A and B have failed to account.

Role & Responsibility of Soldiers of 1 Para

Based on the evidence, the role and responsibility of the individual soldiers involve in Sector 1 can be summarised as follows:

i) Corporal A fabricated accounts of seeing a man with a nail bomb, hearing nail bomb explosions and civilian gunfire in order to justify his own use and his colleague’s use of lethal force.

ii) Corporal A fired at least 2 live rounds, in circumstances which were wholly unjustified, in the direction of the Castle Laundry waste ground where significant numbers of unarmed civilians were gathered.

iii) Corporal A may well have shot Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or both. He did so without any justification.

iv) In order to cover up the attempted murders of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, Corporal A fabricated accounts of seeing a nail bomber, hearing nail bomb explosions and hearing incoming fire.

v) Corporal A failed to explain how he did not see Damien Donaghy and John Johnston being shot or removed from the area of the Castle Laundry waste ground.

i) Private B fabricated accounts of seeing a man with a nail bomb, hearing nail bomb explosions and civilian gunfire in order to justify his own use and his colleague’s use of lethal force.

ii) Private B fired at least 3 live rounds, in circumstances which were wholly unjustified, in the direction of the Castle Laundry waste ground, where significant numbers of unarmed civilians were gathered.

iii) Private B may well have shot Damien Donaghy, John Johnston or both. He did so without any justification.

iv) In order to cover up the attempted murders of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, Private B fabricated accounts of seeing a nail bomber, hearing incoming fire and hearing nail bomb explosions.

v) Private B failed to explain how he did not see Damien Donaghy and John Johnston being shot or removed from the area of the Castle Laundry waste ground.

16.8.1.9 INQ 441

i) INQ 441 failed to take any necessary steps to acquire sufficient understanding of the conditions in Derry and in the Bogside in particular, before the launch of the arrest operation.

ii) He failed to take any necessary steps to obtain clear guidance and instructions about: the purpose of the operation to be undertaken by his battalion; his own role and that of his platoon; any restrictions and constraints imposed on the operation, and the geographical limits of their deployment particularly in view of the fact inter alia that they were ordered to a position ahead of the remainder of Support Company.

iii) He failed to give any appropriate briefing to the members of his platoon concerning these matters and did nothing to temper their aggression.

iv) In briefing his platoon INQ 441 failed to disabuse members of his Platoon of the notion that: they were being sent to Derry to break the No-Go areas or that they were being sent to Derry to teach 8 Brigade a lesson.

v) He failed to ensure proper discipline and conduct amongst members of his platoon; ensuring that they did not cock their rifles before it was justifiable to do so and, emphasising that they were not free to respond to any real or perceived threat by firing at civilians rather than disengaging in an orderly fashion.

vi) The consequences of the failures detailed above were that mostly young, relatively inexperienced, overly-aggressive members of his platoon deployed in an unfamiliar, unfriendly environment in a heightened state of tension and under a misapprehension about the nature of the threat facing them.

vii) INQ 441, as Platoon Commander, failed to exercise any supervision, command or control over Machinegun Platoon even when it became apparent that they were shooting unarmed civilians.

viii) While positioned in the Abbey Taxis building, INQ 441 watched as members of his platoon fired live rounds at unarmed civilians in William Street and failed to take any steps to stop them.

ix) Following the shootings, he covered up, and is still attempting to cover up, his and his men’s criminal behaviour.

x) As leader of the platoon whose members wounded Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, INQ 441 bears a personal responsibility for their attempted murder or, at least, grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.

ii) INQ 275 was less than forthright and honest with the Inquiry in an attempt to conceal the unjustified shooting of others.

i) INQ 876 has invented a false account that shots were fired from the Rossville Flats.

16.8.1.12 INQ 624

i) There is question as to whether or not the medical reasons advanced for this witness’s failure to give evidence are genuine given the earlier correspondence with which reveals a reluctance to give oral evidence.

ii) This witness had a complacent attitude towards the rules and procedures put in place to regulate and account for the firing of live ammunition. He had, at some time, access to ammunition above the amount issued to him.

16.8.1.13 INQ 1544

i) This witness’ statement is remarkable more for what he failed to see rather than what he actually saw.

16.8.1.14 INQ 1917

i) INQ 1917 has invented a false account of having heard nail bombs explode in William Street in an attempt to justify the shooting of others.

ii) INQ 1917 has falsely denied witnessing Soldiers A and B shooting unarmed civilians.

16.8.1.15 INQ 1874

i) INQ 1874 has fabricated an account of seeing gunmen in William Street and Rossville Street, of incoming shots and of nail bomb explosions in an attempt to justify the shooting of others.

16.8.1.16 INQ 1919

i) Has invented a false account of having heard explosions, including nail bombs and petrol bombs, in an attempt to justify the shooting of others.

16.8.1.17 Soldier 005

i) Soldier 005 invented false accounts of hearing incoming fire and explosions in order to justify the shooting of others.

ii) He was involved in collusion with Soldier R and/or the RMP and invented an account of a man throwing what looked like a nail/ petrol or acid bomb in order to justify Soldier R’s use of lethal force.

iii) Soldier 005 was involved in collusion with Soldier R and/ or the RMP and invented an account of a man armed with a pistol in order to justify Soldier R’s use of lethal force.

iv) Soldier 005 provided false evidence to Eversheds in the knowledge that it would be considered by the Inquiry and the Tribunal.

16.8.7.18 Concluding Section

Finally, all of the soldiers of 1 Para identified in this Sector perverted the course of justice, individually and collectively, in relation to the events of Bloody Sunday by concealing the criminal behaviour of their colleagues in Support Company and ensuring that they would evade prosecution for their crimes. Those who gave dishonest evidence on oath also committed perjury.

[1] RMP Statement dated 31^st January, 1972 B1;

[2] H3.8 to H3.9

[3] H3.12 to H3.18

[4] Damien Donaghy’s account of his removal to hospital can be found at AD120.11 paragraphs 14 to 15 and at Day 070/19/21 to Day 070/20/2

[5] Entry on ‘Record of Admissions’, 10 May, 1972

[6] Letter from Doctor Fenton to Dr Cosgrove, 10 May, 1972

[7] Report prepared for DS D Cudmore, 7 February, 1972

[8] Report of DS Cudmore

[9] Letter from Mr Bennett to the RUC, dated 7 February,1972

[10] See V3/6.30 to 7.00

[11] Also known as Sweeney’s Bar

[12] Day 059/13/20 to Day 059/13/23

[13] Day 059/90/3 to Day 059/90/5

[14] See evidence of Paul Coyle AC105.1 paragraphs 5 to 6 (and map at AC105.9) and oral evidence on Day 152/54/22 to Day 152/55/19; Columba Donaghy AD116.6 paragraph 7 (map at AD116.10); Jim McDaid AM166.2 paragraph 17 (map at AM166.9) and oral evidence Day 061/4/17 to Day 061/4/23; Liam Doherty AD80.3 paragraph 15 (map at AD80.6) and oral evidence Day 060/97/7 to Day 060/97/20; Derek McFeeley AM217.1 paragraphs 4 to 5 (map at AM217.5)and oral evidence Day 061/70/5 to Day 061/70/18; and Tony William Quigley AQ7.1 paragraph 6 (map at AQ7.5)

[15] Mr Glasgow QC Day 061/118/3 to Day 061/118/6 (questioning of Mr Derek McFeely).

[16] One soldier in the Machine Gun Platoon, INQ 588, admits to firing between 20 to 30 baton rounds from the Abbey Taxis building C588.4 paragraph 16

[17] Mrs McDaid amended this in oral evidence to say that Damien Donaghy was looking out on to William Street and that he did not put his head around the corner Day 065/141/16 to Day 065/141/21

[18] AM283.9

[19] Charles McGill’s evidence regarding this sector can be found at AM230.2 paragraph 14 to AM230.3 paragraph 16

[20] His NICRA statement at AM217.7 would indicate that in 1972 he was aware that the second shot that he heard did in fact strike a second man. He no longer recall this Day 061/79/11 to Day 061/79/17

[21] We refer the Tribunal to the remarks by Chief Superintendent McCullough in relation to the standards of honesty of the schoolteachers in Derry. Day 231/164/15 to Day 231/164/23

[22] Soldier B concedes that he and Soldier A discussed the shooting incident after the event, Day 311/36/12 to Day 311/36/15 and Soldier A states that they discussed it in the Pig. Day 297/76/4 to Day 297/76/8

[23] No other member of the platoon refers to having heard a warning shout about nail bombers from Soldier A

[24] His evidence changed to a man wearing a light coloured windcheater at the Widgery Tribunal – See Counsel Report No. 3 and B43.018C

[25] Soldier B states that INQ 445 fell inside the building at Day 311/20/12 to Day 311/20/15 He also confirms that INQ 441 was tending to INQ 455 to his right on the ground floor in the building. Day 311/24/1 to Day 311/24/10 and Day 311/37/11 to Day 311/37/16. He did not hear him saying “ If you identify a target, shoot it.”

[26] This draft statement was released by Eversheds on 10^th October 2003 and received by us on 21^st October 2003, ten days after Soldier A’s oral evidence.

17 SECTOR 2

17.1 Introduction and summary of submissions

17.1.1 The first paratroopers to enter the Bogside on Bloody Sunday were the soldiers of Mortar Platoon. Commanded by Lieutenant N, they occupied the first two Armoured Personnel Carriers (Pigs) in the Support Company column that passed through Barrier 12, across William Street and into Rossville Street. Lt. N was in the first pig, which pulled off Rossville Street into Pilot Row before stopping close to Eden Place at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses. The other half of the platoon was in the second pig, commanded by Sergeant O. It stopped momentarily on Rossville Street at the end of Pilot Row to let 5 members of the platoon off there before pulling up into the mouth of the Rossville Flats courtyard between the back of 36 Chamberlain Street and the north gable wall of Block 1.

17.1.2 Their arrival in Rossville Street caused panic among the hundreds of marchers and other civilian bystanders who were still milling around as the march came to an end and the meeting at Free Derry Corner was just getting under way. Including residents, marchers, journalists, photographers, first aid workers, priests and children, they fled in all directions to escape from the soldiers. A handful threw stones but they also dispersed rapidly. The scene was described by Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail as follows:

“The Saracens stopped in Rossville Street. The paratroops were fanning out and running in pairs across the open ground. It was just like watching an old war film, a sort of bayonet charge without bayonets. As the Paratroops caught anyone, they knocked him down with their rifle butts and kicked him. Then, leaving him lying, they ran on.” (M57.2 paragraph 5)

17.1.3 As they debussed, soldiers of Mortar Platoon fired rubber bullets indiscriminately into the crowd and within moments of debussing Lt. N had fired the first live shots. In the next 5 minutes or so, 7 members of his platoon, including himself, fired at least 29 live rounds into the Rossville Flats courtyard area, killing Jackie Duddy and seriously wounding Peggy Deery, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley. Patsy McDaid suffered a wound to his back so severe that it was believed not only by civilians but also by the medical staff at Altnagelvin Hospital to have been caused by a lead bullet. It now appears that he may have been hit by a rubber bullet modified so as to cause maximum injury.

17.1.4 Alana Burke was knocked down by Sergeant O’s Pig as it made its way to the mouth of the courtyard. Based on the photographs and oral testimony, it seems likely that the order in which the victims were shot was:

17.1.5 Mortar Platoon as a whole claimed to have fired 42 shots. In Sector 2, 7 soldiers claimed to have fired 29 shots into the car park area (the difference being accounted for by the fact that Corporal P and Private U fired 10 shots in Sector 3 and N fired 3 in Eden Place). The soldiers claim to have hit 7 people but there were only 5 known casualties. No soldier claims to have fired at or claims to have seen any other soldier firing at a teenage boy (Jackie Duddy), a middle-aged woman (Peggy Deery), a man walking towards him with his empty hands outstretched (Michael Bridge) or at a man walking from the low wall in front of Block 2 in a similar fashion (Michael Bradley). Soldier 13 fired rubber bullets at the windows but no soldier claims to have fired live rounds at the windows or to have hit anyone inside the flats. None of the descriptions of the circumstances in which shots were fired by soldiers in Sector 2 matches the circumstances in which any of the civilians were actually hit. In other words, on the soldiers’ accounts, not one of the casualties was shot by a soldier. For this reason alone, the soldiers’ evidence cannot be right. The soldiers have effectively conceded that those in respect of whom we appear were innocent victims. However, they have made the case that there were others who launched shooting and bombing attacks on the soldiers and that when the soldiers fired back in self-defence innocent people must have been killed accidentally. There is no foundation for this case in truth or in fact. Not one soldier was hit or wounded either by gunfire (except one who shot himself in the foot) or nail bombs or petrol bombs. The soldiers’ case depends almost entirely on the evidence of the soldiers and that evidence is, in all material respects, false.

17.1.6 On the most controversial issues, there are major inconsistencies and discrepancies between different soldiers who purported to witness the same events and, of course, between the soldiers and the other witnesses, including civilians, priests and journalists. Like the civilians, many of the soldiers either may have been genuinely confused about what was going on at material times or have been simply unable to recall events accurately when they were making contemporaneous statements for the Widgery Inquiry or more recently to Eversheds. This is certainly the most obvious explanation for the conflicting evidence on basic, uncontroversial matters, such as how many soldiers were in each pig and who they were.

17.1.7 However, it does not account for the glaring inaccuracies and inconsistencies that characterised the soldiers’ evidence on the central issues, namely who shot whom where and why. The most striking feature of the soldiers’ evidence on these issues is the scale of dishonesty, deceit and falsehood exhibited by them both in the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday and during the course of the present Inquiry. This applies equally to the soldiers in Sector 2. Some of them have tried to brazen it out by making no concessions and adhering doggedly to their 1972 statements; some have told half-truths and made minor concessions while denying the central allegations; all of them have taken refuge to a greater or lesser degree in a feigned loss of memory. Not one soldier involved in the main events has told the whole truth about what he did or what he witnessed on Bloody Sunday.

17.1.8 In our submission, the material events that occurred in Sector 2 can be summarised as follow:

(i) Alana Burke was knocked down by Sergeant O’s pig as it made its way into the Rossville Flats courtyard area.

(ii) When the paratroopers debussed, they immediately set about firing rubber bullets indiscriminately as well as beating and arresting civilians without justification.

(iii) The soldiers were not attacked with nail bombs, petrol bombs, acid bombs or other bombs and, except for 2 pistol shots fired later by a civilian gunman of whom they were unaware, they did not come under gunfire by civilians.

(iv) Lt. N fired the first shots at or above the heads of civilians at the junction of Eden Place and Chamberlain Street.

(v) Whether or not they believed that Lt.N’s shots were fired by civilians at them, other members of Mortar Platoon then opened fire on civilians in the courtyard area.

(vi) Peggy Deery was the first to be shot. She could have been shot by one of a number of soldiers including in particular S,V, N or Q.

(vii)Jackie Duddy was then shot as he ran toward the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. He was probably shot by Soldier V although he could have been shot by one of a number of soldiers, including in particular R, S, Q and O.

(viii) Michael Bridge was probably shot by Lt. N but could have been shot by one of a number of soldiers. After he saw Jackie Duddy shot, he walked towards the soldier with his arms outstretched and he was shot as he shouted in their direction in protest at the shooting.

(ix) Michael Bradley could have been shot by any one of a number of soldiers. He was shot in similar circumstances to Michael Bridge when he left the cover of the low wall after seeing Jackie Duddy shot.

(x) Patsy McDaid was probably shot with a rubber bullet by Soldier 013 but could have been shot by one of the other soldiers with a baton gun, including in particular Soldiers 112, 019 and 017.

(xi) Some time after the soldiers opened fire and after Jackie Duddy had been shot, OIRA 4 fired two pistol shots from behind the cover of the gable wall at 36 Chamberlain Street at soldiers but the shots went unnoticed, at least by soldiers.

(xiii) After Jackie Duddy’s body had been carried along Chamberlain Street and up Harvey Street, soldiers from C Company made their way into 33 Chamberlain Street and arrested all the male occupants without justification.

(xiv) Soldiers failed to offer or arrange the provision of medical attention for any of those shot.

(i) All of the deceased and injured in Sector 2 were shot by members of the Mortar Platoon.

(iii) They were shot deliberately - not accidentally - and without any justification.

(iii) None of the deceased or injured had handled a gun or bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday. None of the deceased or injured had acted in support of any person handling or using a gun or bomb at any time on Bloody Sunday.

(iv) None of the deceased or injured was doing anything at the time they were shot which would have led the soldiers responsible for shooting them to believe that they posed a threat of any kind.

(v) None of the deceased or injured was in the vicinity of civilian gunmen or bombers when shot. Nothing was taking place in the vicinity of the deceased or injured at the time they were shot which would have led the soldiers to believe that their lives or those of their colleagues were at risk.

(vi) None of the deceased or injured was shot in crossfire or in the course of a ‘gun-battle’ with civilian gunmen.

(vii) When the vehicles and soldiers of Support Company appeared in Rossville Street they did not come under fire. Soldiers opened fire without justification and not as a result of being fired upon first.

(viii) There was no ‘gun battle’ and no ‘exchange of fire’ as alleged by the soldiers. At some stage after Jackie Duddy was shot, one gunman fired 2 rounds from a .32 automatic pistol from behind the gable wall at 36 Chamberlain Street towards the waste ground but he was not seen by any soldiers, his shots did not elicit any response from soldiers and he did not hit anyone.

(ix) There are no “missing casualties” - all of the persons killed and injured in Sector 2 have been accounted for.

(x) All of the civilians arrested in Sector 2 were arrested unlawfully and without justification.

. 17.1.10 The evidence concerning the arrests in this sector is dealt with in Section 16. In this section, firstly, we provide an overview of the civilian evidence concerning the events of Sector 2. Secondly, dealing with each of our clients individually, we examine the civilian evidence concerning the circumstances of their shooting as well as the medical and forensic evidence relating thereto. Thirdly, we examine the evidence of the soldiers involved in this sector, i.e. those of Mortar Platoon and C Company as well as those soldiers in Observation Posts overlooking the area. Then, we examine the evidence of Para brutality in Sector 2. Finally, on the basis of the evidence, we shall specifically address the Soldiers’ case that civilian gunmen and bombers were present in Sector 2 and that those who were hit were spirited away from the scene.

17.2.1 The sequence in which the dead and wounded were shot in this sector was Peggy Deery followed by Jackie Duddy. Then Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley and lastly, Patrick McDaid. Peggy Derry was brought into 33 Chamberlain Street before Michael Bridge who was brought into the same house. She was shot before Michael Bridge. Jackie Duddy was certainly shot before Michael Bridge who can be seen remonstrating with the soldiers in P740 after Jackie Duddy has been shot. Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley were shot in consequence of their reaction to Jackie Duddy's death. Patrick McDaid was wounded as he got to the southeast corner of the car park just before the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 . Alana Burke was also struck by a Pig on the wasteground whilst running towards the Rossville Flats car park.

17.2.2 The evidence of civilians confirms that a large number of people ran down both Chamberlain Street and Rossville Street and moved through the Rossville Street Car Park to the alleyways between blocks 1 and 2 and blocks 2 and 3 of the flats. The series of photographs taken by Derrick Tucker in the sequence EP28.1 to EP28.6[1] illustrate the flight of the crowd and the arrival of the Pigs of Mortar Platoon in Rossville Street. Robert White took a series of photographs which run from EP35.19 to EP35.20. These photographs show the movement of the two Pigs of Mortar Platoon along Rossville Street, Lieutenant N's Pig having come to rest on the waste ground. The clock on the Guildhall is clearly visible in these photographs, showing a time of 4.10pm. V48/12.46 and V2/147 shows that Sergeant O's Pig had come to a halt momentarily on Rossville Street and a number of soldiers debus. Lieutenant N's Pig turns left on to the waste ground. Sergeant O’s Pig then turns left on to the waste ground, coming to a halt at the mouth of the car park, as seen in P188. During this deployment Alana Burke was struck by a Pig of Mortar Platoon on the waste ground.

17.2.3 Most Reverend Bishop Edward Daly or Father Daly as he then was, described at H5.16 how he heard the sound of the armoured cars revving up, as he stood in the Rossville Street area. It was mainly a peaceful crowd. He saw Pigs coming down Rossville Street, followed by soldiers on foot. The revving of the engines alarmed him and most people who were there. Most people started moving away slowly at first. As the Pigs gathered speed, most people expected them to stop at the junction of Eden Place. Father Daly recalled that when they did not, everyone sensed something different was happening. At that stage panic set in and people starting running in all directions, including himself. Day 075/13/10 to Day 075/14/20. He confirmed that he ran with the crowd, he thought towards the rear. He then headed towards the car park of Rossville Flats. He confirmed that the scenes depicted at EP28.4A and EP28.5 were the sorts of scenes he remembered. He recalled the crowd beginning to thin out as people made their way towards the alleyways out of the flats. Day 075/13/23 to Day 075/15/5.[2]

17.2.4 William Harley was positioned on the balcony and then at a flat on the top floor of block 2 of Rossville Flats. He saw one army vehicle stopped between block 1 of Rossville Flats and the gable end of Chamberlain Street and another bouncing over the waste ground. AH36.2 paragraph 9. He saw a Pig deliberately knock over a young man AH36.2 paragraph 10.[3]

17.2.5 David Capper was a news reporter for BBC Radio on the 30 January 1972 and was present at the march. He had arrived at the point where he can be seen in EP2.4. His evidence was that he saw a crowd of several hundred beginning to run across the waste ground from the William Street direction. He had already estimated that on the open ground in front of the flats in total there were several thousand people. Behind the crowd he saw a number of APC'S drive up Rossville Street. One vehicle pulled left into where Pilot Row is located and another one stopped not in line with it but further up. As soon as they came to a halt soldiers got out and started firing.

17.2.6 Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail described the paratroopers fanning out in pairs across the open ground. It was like watching an old war film, a sort of bayonet charge without bayonets. As the paratroopers caught anyone, they knocked them down with their rifle butts and kicked them. They left them lying they ran on. M57.2 at paragraph 5.

17.2.7 P595 shows Lieutenant N’s Pig with the passenger door open and Lieutenant N has presumably debussed. P853 again shows Lieutenant N’s Pig with INQ 1918 debussing. P272 shows a crowd of people in the car park at the top of the photograph. P273 shows a crowd, Sergeant O’s Pig and Lieutenant N’s Pig. It also shows Lieutenant N, INQ 1918 and the helmet of a soldier, likely to be Soldier 019. Lieutenant N’s shots were likely to have been fired just after P273 was taken. P275 shows Duncan Clarke being led away after being arrested in all ikelihood by Lieutenant N and INQ 1918. P488 shows Soldier 019 holding a baton gun on the edge of the alleyway. P489 shows Lieutenant N’s Pig and INQ 1918 wearing the backpack. It seems likely that this is Lieutenant N’s Pig since it does not have the ladder that can be seen in other photographs of Sergeant O’s Pig. P595 shows where Lieutenant N’s Pig ended up.

17.2.8 Coleman Doyle took a series of photographs from EP24.1 to EP24.7, showing soldiers, having debussed from Lieutenant N's Pig, engaging with civilians on the waste ground. It would appear that the Pig on the right of the photographs is Sergeant O's Pig and at the time of these photographs seemed still to be moving towards the mouth of the courtyard, by reference to the position of the vehicle in relation to the fence posts. At M23.19 paragraphs 7 to 8, Coleman Doyle described the soldiers jumping out of the Saracens and starting to run across the waste ground to the car park of the flats and towards Kells Walk. At Day 072/74/11 to Day 072/74/22, he described how the soldiers fired quite a number of volleys of rubber bullets. It was "the biggest crescendo of baton guns" he had ever heard. They were firing across the waste ground at people. The activity of the paratroopers at this stage of events is considered in further detail at 19.9 of these submissions.[4]

Lieutenant N’s shots at Eden Place

17.2.9 At about the time of the events depicted in Coleman Doyle's photographs, EP24.1 to EP24.7, Lieutenant N had debussed from his Pig on the waste ground. He had, on his evidence, immediately become involved with a civilian and "certainly within a minute he had moved towards the alley way which leads off what used to be Eden Place into Chamberlain Street". There he claimed to have seen the crowds surging from the junction with Chamberlain Street and felt he had no alternative to fire warning shots at them.

17.2.10 The photographer Gilles Peress was fired on by a paratrooper who was kneeling at the corner of the buildings at Eden Place. M65.1.1. Given the location it is submitted this could only have been Lieutenant N.

17.2.11 At M65.20 paragraph 9 he said that he advanced further up Chamberlain Street to the place marked C at M65.55. He then peeked around the corner of Chamberlain Street and Eden Place and saw a paratrooper at approximately point D at M65.55. The paratrooper was in a crouched position in full battle dress wearing a helmet with the visor up. He was holding his rifle at his side parallel to his hip. He was looking in the direction of Harvey Street. The soldier made eye contact with Mr. Peress. He stepped out from the cover of the corner and held his cameras up above his head and shouted 'press'. The soldier then fired a shot at him. Day 212/193/22 to Day 212/195/13. The witness then quickly headed for cover further up Chamberlain Street in the direction of the Rossville Flats. He saw where the bullet had impacted. It had hit the ground floor windowsill of the house marked E on M65.55. About four days after Bloody Sunday he went to check out the bullet hole with Peter Pringle of The Sunday Times and it was still there. Day 212/195/14 to Day 212//196/13.

17.2.12 John Mitchel McLaughlin recalled at AM340.3 paragraph 13 fifty or so people who had been at Barrier 14 that had then ran into Chamberlain Street and south down into the courtyard of the Rossville Flats, where they all thought that it would be safer. When they left the Army had not yet come through Barrier 14. As the witness was running south down Chamberlain Street he heard the a live shot. He heard this shot just as he was running past the opening of Eden Place. It was unmistakably a high velocity rifle shot, but he did not see who fired it or in what direction. Day 080/66/24 to Day 080/67/22. He ran past the opening of Eden Place and took cover behind a house at the point which is marked with an A on AM340.11. Day 080/12/23 to Day 080/13/4.

17.2.13 The witness turned round at this point to see who had fired the shot, and he saw a photographer standing about 10 feet from him, immediately to his north at the point marked with a B on AM340.11. This photographer was frozen to the spot and seemed unable to move. Day 080/13/20 to Day 080/14/12. He had his hands high above his head and was looking to the west through the opening at Eden Place. He saw a soldier there. He had only a vague memory of that soldier, but thought he was bare headed. He had no memory of him wearing a gas mask. Day 080/14/13 to Day 080/15/9. The soldier lifted his rifle up to his shoulder and it seemed to the witness that he was aiming at the photographer. He shouted at the photographer to run towards him and just at that moment a shot rang out. Day 080/67/23 to Day 080/68/11. The witness immediately thought the soldier had shot the photographer as he could hardly miss from that range. However, he was not actually looking at the soldier when the shot was fired but it seemed to him that it must have been the same soldier who fired the shot. The soldier shouted no warning. Day 080/15/10 to Day 080/16/1. There were no civilians attacking soldiers in this area. The witness saw a puff of dust and a lump of brickwork fly out of the wall of the house immediately behind him. Half a brick came out of the wall where the bullet struck it. The position where this wall was is marked on the attached map with a C. The brick was one of a row of bricks immediately above a window. The witness was really panicking at this point and started running again south down Chamberlain Street. Day 080/16/2 to Day 080/16/20.

17.2.14 AM 340.11 shows point C to which he referred and is number 13 on the eastern-most side of the street. B is where the witness said that he saw Mr. Peress. A is where he said he was positioned. At AM340.8 paragraph 47 of his statement, Mr. McLaughlin said that after Bloody Sunday he was interviewed by The Sunday Times Insight team and they revisited the spot in Chamberlain Street. He told The Sunday Times Insight team about the shot that had been fired and when they looked where the soldier must have been when he fired and where the bullet struck the wall, they worked out that actually the soldier must have been firing at him. He could only have missed the witness by a matter of inches. With hindsight, the witness thought that the first shot the soldier fired may have been a warning shot. However, he believed that the second shot was a serious effort at blowing his head off. Day 080/70/5 to Day 080/71/7.

17.2.15 Patrick Anthony Clarke[5] described seeing an old man being beaten by soldiers in Eden Place, but says nothing about people advancing to rescue him. AC64.4 paragraph 10. The witness saw a man come out of the shop door that opened on to Eden Place. He was in his late forties or fifties. A soldier then came into Eden Place and grabbed the man, hitting him on the head with a baton and pulling him around the corner. Day 074/82/18 to Day 074/83/1. Almost immediately after the old man had disappeared, a second soldier put his head around the same corner and looked into Chamberlain Street in Patrick Clarke's direction. The soldier fired and obviously could not see what he was firing at. The shots hit no. 13 Chamberlain Street. Day 074/86/3 to Day 074/86/23. At AC64.10 to AC64.14 are a series of photographs taken in 1998, which purport to show the firing experienced by this witness.

17.2.16 Patrick Walsh stated at AW5.2 paragraph 8 that he was positioned at the junction of Eden Place and Chamberlain Street, from where he saw two Pigs arrive at the waste ground. The Pigs came to a stop and he saw two soldiers jump out. They took up positions facing Chamberlain Street.

17.2.17 The witness then recalled a lady opening the front door to her house in Chamberlain Street. As the door was still open, he heard a live shot fired. He witnessed the shot striking the brickwork of the house, just above a window, although he did not realise at the time that this was a live bullet until he saw the damaged brick. He immediately shouted to the lady to go back inside. The witness did not see who fired the shot, but was under the impression that it was fired by one of the two soldiers he had seen in Eden Place. He believed that the shot was aimed at him, one of the men who were lined across the street or a photographer whom the witness had previously seen in Harvey Street. AW5.2 paragraph 9.

Arrests and incidents of brutality on the waste ground

17.2.18 The incidents of brutality and arrest considered in this sector are examined in detail at section 17.9 of these submissions. The events considered therein occurred within a short space of time after the Paratrooper's debussing from Lieutenant N and Sergeant O's Pig. The photographs taken by Jeffrey Morris at P273 and P274 show clearly in the background that the car park is continuing to empty. People are continuing to run to move towards the back of the car park. Soldier S and Soldier V are in all likelihood the soldiers seen in EP24.7, making their way along the wire fence toward the car park of Rossville Flats having assaulted Charles McMonagle, the Knight of Malta. It was within a very short space of time from this point that Jackie Duddy was shot in the car park.

Events in the car park

17.2.19 Gilles Peress went down Chamberlain Street and took a series of photographs beginning at P627 showing Jackie Duddy on the ground in the car park, being tended to by Father Daly and others. The time between the taking of Giles Peres’ photograph down Eden Place P274 and the photograph of Father Daly tending to Jackie Duddy was between ninety seconds and three minutes. Day 213/54/5 to Day 213/54/19. The witness was standing near the children’s playground and witnessed continuous shooting from two soldiers at the far corner of the high flats and one at the back of 36 Chamberlain Street. M65.2.

17.2.20 The ambulance that picked up the body of Jackie Duddy was called at 4.15pm. It would appear therefore that Jackie Duddy was shot at a very early stage and the events must have occurred within a very few minutes of the arrival of the Paratroopers on the waste ground and at the car park. The ambulance that took both Peggy Derry and Michael Bridge to hospital was called at 4.20pm and arrived on Chamberlain Street at 4.27pm. Patrick McDaid had assisted Peggy Deery into 33 Chamberlain Street and was wounded after Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley.

17.2.21 In addition to the photographic evidence, a large body of civilian evidence indicates that people ran through the car park aiming to exit via the alleyway between blocks 1 and 2 or the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. People ran from the waste ground into the car park and also down Chamberlain Street into the car park. When the shooting began some people sought shelter at the gable end of Chamberlain Street and behind the low wall in front of block 2 of Rossville Flats. Others continued to try and exit via the gaps between the blocks.

17.2.22 It is clear from Video 48 that the Paratroopers in both Lieutenant N and Sergeant O's Pig began firing baton rounds either just before or as the vehicles came to a halt. Derrick Tucker Senior estimated that it was between thirty seconds to a couple of minutes between the arrival of the Saracens and the soldiers opening fire with live rounds. WT7.14 C. Father Daly had seen one Saracen on the mouth of the car park and perhaps another on the waste ground. Initially the soldiers had clustered around the Saracen at the mouth of the car park or near to the gable end of Chamberlain, but they had subsequently come out into the open. He was of the view that they could not have felt threatened in any way. Day 075/25/5 to Day 075/25/14 and Day 075/91/25 to 075/92/14.

17.2.23 Dolores McFarland watched the march from her mother's flat which was located in Block 3 marked with an X attached to her statement AM8.6. She noticed people run into the Rossville Street car park. She noticed an army vehicle drive into the entrance of the flats car park and also other army vehicles stopping before the entrance to the car park and also on Rossville Street. AM8.1 paragraph 8 to 9. She confirmed that P188 showed the position of the first Saracen. Day 083/83/10 to Day 083/83/15. She saw a soldier run from the Saracen at the end of Chamberlain Street, another at the corner of block 1 of Rossville Flats and another at or about the Saracen. Then she heard the shooting. Day 083/85/22 to Day 083/87/19. None of the soldiers appeared to take cover and they were not being evasive. The shots fired as the soldiers entered the Rossville Flats car park were the first shots she heard fired that day. At the same time as hearing these shots she saw a young lad she now knows to be Jackie Duddy fall.

17.2.24 David Capper described large reports (of firing) going on all around. He would look round from one area to another and hear a bang and a soldier would be putting down a rifle. At WT2.70 D he told the Widgery Inquiry that he had no indication of any firing from any other direction than the places where he saw the Paratroopers. He was very close to the soldiers and believed that he was possibly the person in the photograph EP2.4. He was certainly in the general area where the photograph was taken. At WT 2.70 G he confirmed he was in the area close to the soldiers and there were no indications to him of any shots coming in their direction and there was no ground being kicked up around them. M9.2 paragraph 3. At Day 073/74/8 to Day 073/74/11 he was asked the following:

Q: "You saw nothing and heard nothing which would have justified the Army firing live rounds at the crowd which was dispersing?"

17.2.25 He confirmed that his impression was that when the Army debussed there were a lot of rubber bullets fired. Quite soon after that he heard the sound of rifle cracks. The soldiers near to him did not appear to be taking any cover. Day 073/74/17 to Day 073/75/12. The witness was asked did it appear to him that the soldiers were trying to catch up with persons whom they were pursuing and that the persons whom the soldiers were pursuing were in flight. He answered:

"Oh they were in panic, they were running as fast as they could do to get away." Day 073/75/13 to Day 073/75/20.

The witness was shown EP28.5, showing a crowd apparently making its way towards block 2 of Rossville Flats. He confirmed that it was similar to the sight that he saw and said “yes” they were "running away from the soldiers." Day 073/75/13 to Day 073/75/20.

17.2.26 A substantial body of photographic and civilian evidence indicates that large numbers of civilians had fled through the car park, through the alleyways between the blocks of the Rossville Flats. As Mortar Platoon opened fire, people were continuing to flee towards the exits. Father Daly for example was originally aiming to exit between blocks 1 and 2 but changed his mind because it seemed to be jammed with people. He described people running in all directions just to escape from the square at the time Jackie Duddy was hit. Day 073/23/6 to Day 073/23/11. Other witnesses described people exiting the car park via the gap between blocks 2 and 3.

17.2.27 A large body of civilian evidence indicates that soldiers fired into the car park and across the car park at unarmed civilians fleeing towards the exits between the blocks of the flats. In addition there is clear evidence that soldiers fired up in the direction of the flats with no justification for doing so.[6]

17.2.28 William Harley gave evidence that a pig had stopped between block 1 of Rossville Street and the gable end of Chamberlain Street. One of the soldiers who got out of the pig fired the first shots he saw towards two men one of whom the soldier had attempted to attack on the ground. The men were running towards blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. The soldier had cocked his rifle and aimed at the two men. AH36.2 paragraph 12 and Day 077/7/15 to Day 077/8/2. This witness also saw a soldier on the eastern side of the pig, leaning on the bonnet aim his rifle and shot Mickey Bridge. AH36.2 at paragraph 18. There was no threat to the soldiers at the time Michael Bridge was shot Day 077/38/7 to Day 077/38/10.

17.2.29 Michael Bridge saw an army vehicle stopped between block 1 of Rossville Flats and the Chamberlain Street houses with the doors facing towards the car park. He saw a further soldier in the firing position aiming into the car park between the western side of the pig and the NE corner of block 1 of Rossville Flats.

17.2.30 Father Daly's evidence was that the first shot he heard at the car park was the shot that hit Jackie Duddy. Father Daly himself continued running and took shelter behind the low wall in front of block 2 as did a number of other civilians. Following hearing the shot that hit Jackie Duddy, Father Daly described a fusillade of gunfire and he dived behind the wall that runs parallel to block 2 of Rossville Flats. The burst of gunfire which caused terror and panic came from the area of the waste ground. Whether it came from the Pig in the courtyard or further away, he did not know. WT4.7 G, WT4.8 A, Day 075/26/18 to Day 075/26/23. Father Daly described a lull in the firing when he went out to tend to the boy. The gunfire resumed as he tended the boy and the direction of the gunfire was all from the area where the soldiers were. Day 075/30/6 to Day 075/30/10. In 1972 he had described the gunfire as something like thirty to forty feet away. WT4.10 B. There was no gunfire directed towards the Army in the Square and there was no threat posed to the Army at the time they opened fire. Day 075/30/22 to Day 075/31/5.

17.2.31 After the shooting of Jackie Duddy, Father Daly witnessed a soldier at the gable end of block 1 of Rossville Flats going down on one knee, taking deliberate aim and shooting Mickey Bridge. The soldier was a short distance from Mickey Bridge when he shot him. H5.5 at paragraph 21.

17.2.32 Of those who tended to Jackie Duddy, Liam Bradley became aware of the sound of shooting and soldiers taking up positions on the waste ground at Pilot Row and Eden Place. AB61.2 paragraph 10. William McChrystal was aware of Army fire over their heads, and bullets hitting the back wall of the courtyard as they tended to Jackie Duddy. AM460.2. Hugh McMonagle, had run by the body of Jackie Duddy in the car park and like Father Daly, he had ended up behind the low wall in front of block 2. As he lay there he could hear shots which seemed to be hitting block 2, although they may have been ricocheting around the car park. His impression at the time was that they must have been fired by the soldiers at Eden Place. AM369.3 paragraphs 15 to 16. Charles Glenn, the Knight of Malta, was aware of shooting from the nearest Army vehicle as he tended to Jackie Duddy. Day 080/191/20.

17.2.33 Michael Bridge was shot shortly after the photograph in which he appears at P740. The shooting was witnessed by, among others, Father Daly as he tended to Jackie Duddy. Father Daly saw a soldier stepping out from the gable end of block 1 of Rossville Flats, go down on one knee and fire at the boy who he believes was Michael Bridge. Michael Bradley, who is likely to have been shot shortly after Michael Bridge, had run towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. When he reached the gap he was told that a young boy was dead in the car park. He crouched behind the low wall in front of block 2. When he emerged he was shot. He had seen soldiers jumping out of a Pig and firing. AB66.4 paragraph 15 to AB66.6 paragraph 22.

17.2.34 Patricia Tucker Jarvis was in a flat in block 2 of the Rossville Flats and saw a soldier firing randomly from the passenger side of a Saracen in the car park. Day 122/116/17 to Day 122/117/17. She could not understand why the soldier was shooting.

17.2.35 Brian Ward recalled that he heard the first live shots of the day at the time he was running across the waste ground, towards the entrance of the Rossville Flats car park. The Pigs had pulled up one in front of the other in Rossville Street. Whilst on the waste ground he saw eight to ten soldiers jump out of the back of a Saracen and begin to fan out. Day 085/144 and P188. At this time he heard between six or seven shots. He knew that these shots were live rounds as they had a distinctive crack. He saw the soldiers point their rifles at the crowd but did not see in which direction the soldiers were firing. As he was running across the waste ground he noticed that one of the vehicles did not stop on Rossville Street. The vehicle stopped at the northern entrance to the car park at a point marked “G”, marked on the map attached to his statement. AW6.4 paragraph 12 and P188. He had been running in the direction of the wall in front of block 2 of Rossville Flats, when he saw Jackie Duddy hit.

17.2.36 Brian Magee saw Fr. Daly with a Knight of Malta tending to Jackie Duddy’s body. The witness was still aware of gunfire coming into the car park as this was happening. AM220.5 paragraphs 23 to 24.

17.2.37 John McIntyre who had ran down Chamberlain Street heard high velocity shots as he ran. AM286.2 paragraphs 12 to 15. His description of the scene as he reached the car park was that it was full of hundreds of people all seeking shelter from the shooting. The shooting was continuous and he thought it was coming from behind him although he was not sure from where or in what direction. There was much screaming and shouting and everyone seemed to be fearful of their lives. AM286.3 paragraph 17. The witness assisted Michael Bradley and described at that time many people trying to get out of the Rossville Flats car park as the intense shooting continued in the car park. AM286.3 paragraph 21.

17.2.38 Lieutenant N claimed to have fired a shot from the rear of Chamberlain Street at a nail bomber in the car park of Rossville Flats. Soldier V claimed to have shot a petrol bomber in the car park of Rossville Flats. There is no civilian evidence to substantiate or justify the shots that these soldiers fired. The killing of Jackie Duddy and the individual woundings of each of the civilians in this sector will be considered in separate submissions on behalf of each.

17.2.39 Joseph Eugene McGrory ran across the car park of the courtyard between blocks 1 and 2 of the flats. There was a bottle-neck as so many people were trying to get through there. The shots which had been coming, he believed, from behind him as he ran across the car park continued as he tried to get through the ally way. The witness stated that during the whole of the march he had not seen anyone in the crowd with guns or bombs, nor had he heard guns being fired from the crowd or any explosions. AM268.3 paragraphs 16 to 17.

17.2.40 Hugh O'Donnell Senior described as he ran towards the car park of Rossville Flats, noticing two soldiers who he believed were shooting from the Saracens in the waste ground, towards the alleyway between blocks 1 and 2 of Rossville Flats. AO31.3 paragraph 15.

17.2.41 James Brendan O'Connor described trying to get out of the Rossville Flats car park via the alleyway that runs between blocks 1 and 2, but being forced to keep diving to the ground as shots were being fired towards him. AO10.7 paragraphs 47 to 48.

17.2.42 Soldier R claimed to have fired at a nail bomber in the car park close to block 1 of Rossville Flats. Soldier S discharged twelve shots in the direction of blocks 1 and 2, claiming to be firing at a man with a rifle. These two soldiers are, on their admitted shots, the likely candidates for indiscriminate and unjustified firing in this area of the car park, experienced by civilians.

17.2.43 There is no civilian evidence whatsoever which substantiates the firing of Soldier R towards a nail bomber. There is no civilian evidence whatsoever to substantiate Soldier S's firing in this direction at a man with a rifle.

17.2.44 A number of civilians took shelter at the gable end wall of Chamberlain Street. Patrick McDaid described twenty to thirty people around him in that area.[7] Following the shooting of Jackie Duddy, a number of people ran across towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. Shooting was still going on at this stage. The series of photographs taken by Giles Peress at P796, P797, P798, P800 and P801 show events in this corner of the car park around the time Patrick McDaid was hit.

17.2.45 Patrick Walsh who appears in P796 and P797 recalled shooting going on at the time when P797 was taken. Day 171/29/4 to Day 171/29/9. He described running into Rossville Flats car park as fast as he could. There was a foreign photographer somewhere taking photographs. There were crowds of people running through the car park at the same time as him. He could hear shooting. He remembered thinking that he must aim for an exit, either the alleyway between blocks 1 and 2 or between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. He also described the panic in the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3. AW5.2 paragraphs 10 to 12.

17.2.46 Gilles Peress saw no justification for the shots fired by the soldiers in the car park towards the gaps between blocks two and three of the flats.M65.11.

17.2.47 Noel Doherty was running towards the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville flats. He looked around and saw a soldier standing at the north eastern corner of block 1 of Rossville Flats. The soldier was firing shots in the direction of the alleyway running between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. The soldier continued to fire on a number of occasions according to this witness. AD91.4 paragraphs 20, 27, 31.

17.2.48 Soldier Q claimed to fire a shot at a nail bomber at the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats, from the northern end of block 1. Sergeant O claimed to have fired three shots at a man with a pistol behind a Cortina car[8], towards the south end of block 3 of Rossville Flats. He also claimed to have fired two shots towards the alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats. Soldier R claimed to have fired three shots at a man with a pistol between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats.

17.2.49 There is no civilian evidence to substantiate Soldier Q's claim of a nail-bomber in the location at which he fired. There is no civilian evidence to substantiate either Soldier R's or Sergeant O's claims of activity of a man with a pistol between blocks 2 and 3 of Rossville Flats.

17.2.50 The overwhelming evidence of civilians suggests that there was no justification for soldiers opening fire in the Rossville Flats car park and that there was no threat to them, which could have or did justify such action. No petrol bomb or nail bomb was thrown at the army at any time. Almost all of the civilian evidence indicates that the Army were not fired upon, save to the extent acknowledged by OIRA 4. The following examples are illustrations of the civilian evidence from a wide variety of locations around the Rossville Flats and car park.

17.2.51 Father Daly was categorical that there was no justification for soldiers opening fire and that no threat was posed to them.

17.2.52 Gilles Peress heard or saw no nail bombs or petrol bombs or any civilian with a weapon. M65.3 and M65.10.

17.2.53 Fulvio Grimaldi did not hear any nail bombs that day. He claimed to know the sound of nail bombs well at that time. M34.3 paragraph 12.

17.2.54 Patricia Tucker Jarvis, who was in a flat in block 2 of Rossville Flats and had seen a soldier firing randomly, also stated that no one had any guns as far as she could see and she didn’t hear any firing from the flats. AJ2.4 paragraph 6. She didn’t hear any explosions or see any civilian gunmen nor anything thrown from the windows of the flats. AJ 2.4 paragraph 14.

17.2.55 Martin Tucker did not hear any nail bombs or big explosions that day. He did not hear machine gun fire. He did not see petrol bombs thrown. AT 17.5 paragraph 34, AT17.6 paragraph 39.

17.2.56 Derrick Tucker Junior did not see any missiles or petrol bombs thrown into the courtyard Neither did he see any shots fired from the flats AT15.10 paragraph 25.

17.2.57 Robert Gallagher, from a position on the balcony which ran along the front of block 3 of the Rossville flats, saw no civilians with guns or saw any bombs being thrown or heard any either in the Rossville flats car park. AG26.4 paragraph 20. The witness, in describing the shooting of Jackie Duddy, stated that throughout his observation the shooting had been continuous. There were further bursts of fire as Father Daly tended to the young man and again as he witnessed the shooting Michael Bridge. AG26.4 paragraphs 24 to 26.

17.2.58 Brian Ward witnessed the shooting of Jackie Duddy and Michael Bridge. During the time he was in the car park he did not see any objects being thrown at soldiers and he did not hear any shots, other than those being fired by the soldiers themselves.AW6.6 paragraph 16.

17.2.59 Peter Gallagher did not see any civilians with weapons of any description, during the whole afternoon’s events. Neither was he aware of any shots being fired from the Rossville flats or of any acid being thrown from the flats or of any nail bombs or petrol bombs exploding. AG23.5 paragraph 30.

17.2.60 Dolores McFarland did not see any nail bombs or petrol bombs during the day. The only fire she heard was coming from the soldiers at the entrance to the Rossville flats car park. Throughout the time she was looking down into the Rossville flats car park, she did not see anything being thrown out any of the flats or from the roof of the flats. AM8.5 paragraph 22.

17.2.61 Brian Magee stated that apart from the one civilian gunman described at AM220.6 paragraph 27, the only shooting he heard that day was the distinctive sound of army rifles. He saw no other civilians with weapons, either guns or nail bombs, nor did he hear any other explosions that he could associate with nail or blast bombs. AM220.8 paragraph 40.

17.2.62 Hugh Breslin who saw the shooting of Jackie Duddy and who ran across the car park through the gap between Block 1 and 2 of the Flats, did not see any civilian with any weapon nor did he hear any nail bombs exploding. AB77.3 paragraph 13.

17.2.63 Mary Bonner who witnessed the shooting of Jackie Duddy from a flat on the second floor of Block 2 of Rossville Flats, at no time heard or saw petrol or nail bombs or civilians with weapons AB38.5 paragraph 49. She had given evidence to the Widgery Inquiry and at WT.41 D rejected the suggestion that there was firing from the flats at soldiers when they arrived.

17.2.64 Bernard Doherty had ran into the car park and stopped at a low wall which ran parallel to the northern side of Block 2 of the flats. From there he witnessed the shooting of Michael Bridge. He then ran towards and through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the flats. He described the shooting a more or less continuous during this time and although he could not be certain about the specific direction from which the shots were being fired he felt that at all times they were being fired from behind him i.e. somewhere to the north.AD54.3 paragraphs 13 to 15. He did not see any civilian with a weapon and he did not see or hear any petrol or nail bombs being thrown in the courtyard of the flats. AD54.5 paragraph 21.

17.2.65 Francis Dunne had witnessed the shooting of Michael Bridge and exited the car park through the gap between block 1 and 2. He noticed a civilian with a weapon at the gable end of Chamberlain Street. This was the only civilian he saw with a weapon that day. Nor did he see or hear any nail bombs or petrol bombs. He was definite that he did not see any acid bombs or missiles thrown when he was in Rossville flats car park. He was there for about three to four minutes and at no stage did he feel threatened by anything being thrown from the flats. Apart from the shooting he experienced as coming from the soldiers there was no shooting coming over his head from behind him.AD173.30 paragraph 37.

17.2.66 Kevin McDaid, at AM167.6 paragraph 30 stated that he saw no-one with guns or nail bombs in the crowd that day.

17.2.67 Brian Johnston did not hear nail bombs at any time. AJ9.3 paragraph 28.

17.2.68 Cathleen O'Donnell did not hear any shots being fired at the soldiers. A023.2 paragraph 12.

17.2.69 Paul McDaid ran across Rossville Flats car park from the end of Chamberlain Street and saw Jackie Duddy on the ground. He saw no armed civilians or anyone throwing anything at soldiers in the car park. Nor did he see anyone throwing bottles from the flats. Day 090/142/11 to Day 090/142/20.

17.2.70 It is submitted that the civilian evidence including that of priests and journalists provides overwhelming support for the following propositions:

i) The soldiers in Sector two opened without justification on civilians most of whom were fleeing away from those soldiers.

17.3.1 The movement of Pigs 1 & 2 into the Bogside and the deployment of Mortar Platoon can be traced in the photographs:

P509 et seq. are stills from the heli-tele film showing the pigs moving across William Street before Pig 1 turned off into Pilots Row and then stopped in Eden Place. .

P592 (taken by Robert White) shows Pig 1 just after it has passed Eden Place.

P593 (also taken by Robert White but apparently from a more southerly position at the alleyway leading from Rossville Street to the North East corner of Glenfada Park North) shows Pig 2 just after five of its occupants (P, R, U, 006 and 017) have apparently debussed.

P517 (taken by Derek Tucker from Block 2) shows Pig 1 turning off Pilots Row towards Eden Place. (The Tribunal’s pagination suggests that they consider this photograph to show Pig 2 but this is not correct.)

P514 shows the scene on the waste ground moments after Pig 1 has arrived, with a small group making its way through the gap leading from Eden Place to Chamberlain Street.

P516 (another photograph taken by Derek Tucker) shows Pig 2 just emerging from the North end of Block 1 into the car park.

P793 (taken by Gilles Peress from Chamberlain Street) shows only two people in the roadway leading to Eden Place, not a crowd that had to be dispersed by a warning shot.

P278 shows two soldiers making their way along the back walls of Chamberlain Street after encountering Charles McMonagle (Knight of Malta). Both soldiers are behind what appears to be No. 26 Chamberlain Street. The soldier in front is left-handed and we know that Soldier V was left-handed. it is probably Private S behind him as they make their way to the corner behind 36 Chamberlain Street.

P1015 appears to show INQ1918 (the radio operator) at the Northern corner of Eden Place with Lt N behind him and Soldier 019 approaching them from the opposite direction. Pig 2 is just about visible towards the right hand side of the photograph. It is not clear whether it has yet stopped.

P1016: The crowd is noticeably thinner. Pig 2 may still be in motion because the doors do not appear to be open and there is no sign of any soldiers beside or behind it. The two soldiers seen making their way towards the flats would not appear to be V and S since the soldier in front appears to be right-handed and they do not appear to have reached the wall behind 26 Chamberlain Street, where Charles McMonagle was assaulted. The photograph shows INQ1918 with Duncan Clarke. Lt. N is now standing at the Northern corner with Soldier 019 occupying the opposite corner.

EP24.1 to EP24.4 show soldiers attacking the stragglers on the waste ground as they run towards the flats. In EP24.2 the front passenger door of Pig 2 is clearly open but there still seems to be no one standing beside or behind the vehicle. Nor has any soldier yet arrived at the North East corner of block 1.

P627 and P628 show Jackie Duddy fatally wounded on the ground and attended by Fr Daly, Liam Bradley and Charles Glenn among others.

P590 shows the gunman seen by Fr Daly at the side wall of 36 Chamberlain Street while two soldiers (possibly V and S) appear to be crouching at the back wall around the corner.

P630 and P285 show Michael Bridge gesticulating toward the soldiers who are seen beside Pig 2 in P285.

P285 shows a virtually empty car park and no sign of Peggy Deery, who is believed to have been shot somewhere between Eden Place and Pilots Row before she was carried around the corner into 33 Chamberlain St. From this photograph and from other evidence it would appear that Peggy Deery was shot before Jackie Duddy. By the time P285 was taken she must already have been carried into 33 Chamberlain Street by Patsy McDaid and others before he (Patsy McDaid) made his way to the Eastern side of the carpark and then towards the alley between Blocks 2 and 3 where he was shot in the back, apparently with a rubber bullet,

P796 - P801 show civilians including Patsy McDaid, Paddy Walsh and Paddy Doherty making their way in a southerly direction to the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3. Patsy McDaid was shot about this time in this area.

P524: By the time this photograph was taken, the Pigs had been pulled back to the North end of Block 1 and Lt Col Wilford is apparently making his way across open ground from William Street towards them. About this time, Lt. N was ordered by Major Loden to pick up the bodies from the Rubble Barricade. These bodies were loaded into his pig and driven to Altnagelvin Hospital under the command of Sergeant O.

17.4 Alana Burke

17.4.1 Personal Details and Background

17.4.1.1 Alana Burke was 18 when she was knocked down by Sergeant O’s Humber pig which was driven by INQ1579 on Bloody Sunday. She was single and lived with her widowed mother in the Bishop Street area of Derry. She was the eldest of 10 children and worked as an accounts clerk for Desmond Motors. She had no criminal record or political affiliations.

17.4.1.2 Relevant Photographs

17.4.1.3 Summary

Alana joined the march at the Granstand bar in William Street. She positioned herself around the front of the march and was present during the early confrontation between the soldiers and the marchers when they reached Barrier 14. Like many others her clothing was heavily soaked by the water cannon which had been brought forward to disperse the crowd. Overcome by the effects of CS gas she was attended to by the Knights of Malta and then made her way into Chamberlain Street eventually ending up on the waste ground at Eden Place. After a short conversation she decided to make her way home southwards along Rossville Street. Alana made her way through an opening in the wire fence which traverses where the Rossville Street waste ground meets the Rossville Flats car park. Alana briefly engaged spoke to Frankie Campbell, a local youth club leader who alerted her to the fact that “Saracens” were heading towards her position. Alana began to run but was hindered somewhat by the saturated condition of her clothing. At some point she was assisted by an acquaintance Lorney McMonagle who attempted to pull her to safety. In the panic he somehow released his grip and Alana was struck by an APC in or about the vicinity of grid reference M14 AB101.5.

17.4.1.4 Alana recalled in her 1972 statement dated 23^rd February 1972 made to Mr Leonard of the Treasury Solicitors Department witnessed by Father Patrick Grant of St Columb’s College:

“A Saracen came up behind me and struck me with a thud, which I can still remember vividly on the right side of my back and legs. What exactly happened next is somewhat confused in my mind, but I remember moments later lying against a low wall behind the shops at the far end of the car park.” (emphasis added) AB101.6

17.4.1.5 The experience outlined in this account is repeated at AB101.2 paragraphs 6 to 7 of her Eversheds statement. The Tribunal will be aware from the heli-tele footage that a number of military vehicles accelerated in a southerly direction along Rossville Street.

17.4.1.6 Some impression of the actual impact of these vehicles on the ground at the material time is to be gained from the description contained in The Sunday Times Working Papers at S227:

“The noise was appalling as the pigs revving flat out, produced a siren scream that the inhabitants of the Bogside have come to know. People watching the convoy were struck by its speed. The lead pig turned hard left off Rossville Street and bumped over the waste ground to halt in a wide puddle where Eden Place and Pilot Row used to be. Sergeant O’s pig drove deeper down Rossville Street then also swung left to halt mid-way across the entrance to the flats car park.”

17.4.1.7 The account then goes on to offer the following insight into the real consequences of embarking upon this manoeuvre:

“There is a dispute about how many people were standing in waste ground as the pigs halted – from fewer than 500 to more than 1,000. The best estimate from pictures is about 300-400. What is quite clear from the witnesses we have talked to is that the bulk of these were innocent bystanders – marchers, sightseers, locals, and Press and TV men. And they were joined by rioters who had fled up Chamberlain Street and through Eden Place.” S228

“People frantically dodged out of the pigs’ way. At least one man was knocked flying, though he does not seem to have been badly hurt. But Alana Burke, an 18-year old clerk was not so lucky: as she began to run up from the waste ground to the car park the second pig hit her hard from behind. She ended up in hospital.” S229

17.4.1.8 Evidence at hearing clearly demonstrated that driving in a manner which exposed innocent pedestrians to the risk of serious injury was an inherent feature of a well-establish military tactic in dealing with crowd control. The Tribunal is referred to the following exchanged between Counsel and Soldier 006:

“Q. You stated at paragraph 18 of your statement to Eversheds that your policy was to drive through rioters as often gunmen were behind them?

Q. What you have told Eversheds is that you would drive straight into a group of people where you knew there were gunmen?

Q. Why would you take a risk such as that if you genuinely believed that you were driving straight into where gunmen were?

A. Well, hopefully doing that, it would actually unnerve the gunmen rather than being stood in front of rioters.

Q. Presumably, if there were gunmen there, they would see your vehicles coming and they would be ready to shoot you the minute you got out of your vehicle; would that not be the logic of what you are telling us?

A. It could do, although otherwise it could, if you were too close, they might get out of the area.

Q. Is it not a fact and is it not the correct position that you did not expect gunmen there, you simply drove through the rioters to disperse the crowd?

A. Well, that is not up to me sat in the back, is it, that is up to the commander in the front.

Q. You do not make these decisions, but you have given evidence in your statement as to what your platoon did, so that is why I am asking you these questions.

Q. Again, I have to suggest to you that you did not differentiate, at that stage, between rioters and a crowd of people fleeing from the advance of the Army?

Q. Sorry, I did not say "women", I said "people." You did not distinguish at all between rioters and this crowd, is that not the correct position?

17.4.1.9 This description of events is confirmed by the recollection of Antoinette Coyle AC85 who at the time was a seventeen year old member of the Knights of Malta. She described the incident in the following way:

“We began walking south along the waste ground of Eden Place and Pilot Row towards the Rossville Flats. The next thing I remember was seeing a large crowd of people running south down Rossville Street. The crowd seemed to be spreading all over from behind us. There were also two Saracens which seemed to be travelling at great speed. People were jumping out of the way to avoid being knocked over. I told the young man to stay clam and stay with us, but as soon as he saw the commotion he ran away. Sophie (Marley) and I began to run with the crowd and I remember the Saracens overtaking us on our right. I was very scared. I was amazed that nobody was knocked down by the Saracens. I thought that the Saracens were heading towards Free Derry Corner and would continue south down Rossville Street. However, suddenly the Saracens veered left off Rossville Street and moved onto the waste ground of Pilot Row and Eden Place. I have no idea how many people were running into Rossville Flats car park but there seemed to be hundreds…” AC85.13 paragraph 18

17.4.1.10 In addition, Fulvio Grimaldi who was on the Rossville Street waste ground said:

“I heard engines roaring and saw two or three Saracens move south down Rossville Street at a speed I had never seen before (and I must have seen hundred of Saracens elsewhere before that day). It was an incredible speed.” M34.55 paragraph 17

It is accepted, even by Counsel for the Soldiers, that Alana was struck by the APC, which at the material time was driven by INQ 1579.

17.4.1.11 The impression created by the above descriptions is not surprisingly differently represented by the driver of the pig which struck Alana Burke:

“When we drove through the people we were trundling along; we could not go overly fast as although the vehicle was not quite as slow as a tank; it was an old army vehicle.” C1579.3 paragraph 18

INQ 1579 went on to record that as he drove into the car park of the Rossville Flats a man stood spread-eagled in front of him baiting him to strike him with the vehicle. As soon as he saw him he immediately “banged” on his brakes but the momentum carried the vehicle forward and the front of the vehicle “tapped him causing him to fall down. We hit him at a very low speed. He simply rolled over, got up and ran off. There were no visible wounds or signs of a limp. I cannot recall what he looked like or what he was wearing” C1579.3 paragraph 20

17.4.1.12 The witness said that this incident happened at the very edge of the car park. INQ 1579 went on to deny having struck Alana Burke and offered the following explanation for this confident assertion:

“I have been asked whether or not I recall knocking down a young lady on the way across the waste ground. I have no recollection of this incident and am certain that if I had have hit someone I would have felt the impact. For example, if you went over a curb you would bounce.” C1579.3 paragraph 20

17.4.1.13 This explanation highlights the policy of denial which all military witnesses adopt when coping with allegations relating directly to them. It will be recalled that notwithstanding that he had already struck both a soldier at Barrier 12 and a male, Thomas Harkin, in the vicinity of the car park, the witness was at all time aware of these events even though he had not felt the impact. As with the “unknown” soldier who shot Peggy Deery, an admission does not sit easily with a shared perception of military masculinity and professional restraint.

It has to be recalled however that during the course of his evidence INQ 1579 made it clear that exclusive responsibility for the management and conduct of his driving was not entirely his. He conceded that the manner of his driving was at all time dictated by the instructions he received Day 336/182/9 to Day 336/183/3.

17.4.1.14 Although this witness had no experience in crowd control manoeuvres which involved driving directly at, or through people, who were rioting Day 336/181/18 to Day 336/182/8, other evidence clearly showed that this was a well used and widely acknowledged method of crowd control by at least one other member of the Mortar Platoon:

"Our policy was to drive straight through rioters, as often gunmen were behind them. We would therefore drive into the area where the gunmen were." Eversheds statement of Soldier 006 (emphasis added) B1377.005

17.4.2.1 A number of people provide evidence to the effect that they recall someone being knocked down during the arrival of the Mortar Platoon APCs.

Roisin Stewart records in her Eversheds statement a girl in a dark crombie knee length overcoat with light brown hair who may have been hit by a “Saracen” in the vicinity of Eden Place. Her friend who was with her, Willie Meenan prevented the witness from attending to the girl and urged her to keep running in a southerly direction as he believed her to be dead AS34.3 paragraph 15.

17.4.2.2 Joseph Ernest Moore recalled seeing a person being hit by a moving “Saracen” somewhere between Eden Place and Pilot Row. He was unable to provide specific details about location, description or gender AM 413.3 paragraph 14. However in a statement supplied by him on 1^st February 1972 seems to suggest that he saw two people being struck by a “Saracen”:

“As I ran with the crowd I observed a person going up in the air where the Saracen struck him. I saw a second person being hit with the Saracen. As I got to the tunnel it was jammed with people. People were shouting and squealing to get through. I couldn’t get through.” AM413.14

“The other Saracen drove further south up Rossville Street and cut across the waste ground south of Pilot Row, heading towards the car park of the Rossville Flats. This Saracen stopped at approximately the point marked G on the attached map (Grid Reference L13) (AO7.12) and, as it screeched to a halt, it hit a civilian who sort of “bounced” off the front of the vehicle and was thrown to the far (north eastern side) of the Saracen. I cant describe the person I saw hit by the Saracen at the time. However, the Saracen seemed to hit this person “straight on”. I didn’t know whether it was a man or a woman, nor did I see what happened to them after they had been hit. I have found out later that it was Alana Burke”. AO7.3 paragraph 17

17.4.2.4 Anthony Harkin AH11.3 paragraph 13 described a group of girls running south from Quinn’s Lane, one of them was wearing a bright red coat. He watched one of the “Saracens” hit this particular girl at a point midway between Eden Place and Pilot Row, (Grid Reference N13) (AH11.20). The witness’ impression was that the vehicle bowled her over AH11.3 paragraph 13. The witness said in oral evidence that he thought the girl was Alana Burke Day 177/14/25. He also agreed that he might have been mistaken about the precise location where she was knocked down but that he thought it was in a position further north that where Alana had indicated. The position marked by the witness in his oral evidence can be found at AH11.21; Day 177/15/2 to Day 177/18/12.

“I then saw a Saracen deliberately run into Alana Burke. She was standing near to me in the Rossville Flats car park at the position where I have marked “F” (Grid Reference K/L15). The front side of the Saracen hit her and knocked her to the side. I don’t remember any other details of how she was hit, only being aware that she had been and being horrified. I grabbed her and put my arms around her and pulled her over to a wall where I have marked “G” (Grid Reference L17) on the map.” AC137.7 paragraph 10

A number of witnesses recall seeing Alana in Joseph Place. Most of them confirm that the injuries complained of by her had been caused when she was struck by an APC.

17.4.2.6 Sean Canney gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 093. He had entered one of the flats at the north east end of Joseph Place. He recalled that there were six or seven people in the flat, one of whom was Alana Burke, whom he knew. She appeared to have a serious back injury and he was advised by one of the others that she had been knocked over by an APC AC24.9 paragraph 51

17.4.2.7 Antoinette Coyle referred to above of the Knights of Malta gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 095. She recorded at AC85.1; AC85.25; AC85.8 paragraph 33 that she attended upon Alana who at the time was lying on the living room floor in a maisonette in Joseph Place. She was told that she had been crushed by a “Saracen” against a wall and that she could not feel anything from the waist down. The witness then left to get an ambulance.

17.4.2.8 Paul James McLaughlin AM350.7 paragraphs 39 to 40 a fellow Knights of Malta Volunteer gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on Day 176. This witness provided evidence to the effect that he had been advised that a young girl was being detained in the first house in Joseph Place as a result of being struck by a Saracen. He went to that location for the purposes of providing First Aid and discovered the patient to be Alana whom he knew through the activities of Irish dancing.

The witness confirmed that Alana complained that she had no feeling below her waist and was unable to move her legs. He rendered some precautionary treatment and then made arrangements for her to be removed by way of ambulance to Altnagelvin hospital.

17.4.2.9 Alana Burke herself gave evidence on Day 076 in a manner consistent with the details of her Eversheds statement. The experience produced a series of high emotional moments as she recalled the events of that day. The Chairman intervened to offer a degree of respite Day 076/89/6. Everyone including Counsel for the Soldiers accepted that Alana was struck by an APC, which was driven by Soldier INQ 1579. It acknowledged that whilst some confusion may exist in respect of the precise location at which the incident occurred, this confusion is undoubtedly linked to the pandemonium of hundreds of people fleeing for safety. In support of this proposition we rely on photographs P516, P517, and EP 24.1, EP 24.2, EP 24.3, EP 24.4, EP 24.5, EP 28.5, P485, which in our respectful submission speak for themselves.

17.4.2.10 Support for this proposition may be inferred from the following exchange from between the witness and Counsel for the Soldiers in the course of her oral evidence:

“Q. I am not challenging, you understand, Miss Burke, that you were run down or that it was in that area which is very much an open area, is it not?

17.4.2.11 As with many of the witnesses who gave evidence the trauma of this event undoubtedly had an adverse effect upon her ability to recall with total accuracy all aspects of her experience on Bloody Sunday. While the precise details of the impact remain hazy, the allegation itself was not only immediate but remains constant.

17.4.2.12 It is common case that Alana was struck by an APC and this proposition has never been challenged by representatives acting for or on behalf of INQ 1579 and indeed has remained the position which has been adopted by Counsel to the Inquiry Day 017/86/10.

17.4.3 Injuries Sustained

17.4.3.1 Alana Burke was admitted to hospital suffering from shock and temporary paralysis from the waist down. She subsequently suffered severe pain on the right side of her back radiating down towards the right S.I. joint. In addition, she continued to suffer a lack of sensation below the right knee D0950. She was X-rayed at Altnagelvin and there was a suggested injury to the lumbar spine. E10.006 She had injuries to her pelvis and right leg. AB101.2 paragraph 11. She was discharged within several days and attended Altnagelvin as an outpatient for several months thereafter D0950, D0951, D0952. The consequences of these injuries in later life were traumatic and are set out in his statement to the Inquiry AB101.2 paragraph 11.

17.4.4 Removal to Hospital

17.4.4.1 She was brought through by other civilians the Rossville Flats car park and taken to the McConnell house (Number 12 Joseph Place) the second maisonette of the northern block of Joseph Place AB101.16. The evidence of Eamon Melaugh who believed that she was taken to the second maisonette AM397.6 to AM397.7 corroborates this. Alana disputed the evidence of Michael Bradley that she was taken to the same house as him (i.e. Number 13 Joseph Place) Day 076/87/16 to Day 076/88/1.

17.4.4.2 Paul McLaughlin AM350.14 paragraphs 25 to 27 and Antoinette Coyle AC85.1, AC85.8 paragraph 33 of the Knights of Malta, there treated her.

1 Some time after 4.51pm Alana Burke was placed in an ambulance VRM 7689 EZ which was parked in Rossville Street near the entrance to the Rossville Flats. Also placed in the same ambulance were Barney McGuigan and Kevin McElhinney. The ambulance was manned by John Rafferty (driver) and Samuel Hughes (attendant). It arrived in Altnagelvin Hospital at 5.15pm. ED39.6; D500.26, D500.27; D94

17.4.5 Conclusions

i) The hostility of the driver responsible for colliding with and injuring Alana Burke demonstrates a total disregard for human life and her safety;

ii) Alana Burke was injured because INQ 1579 drove at a speed which was inappropriate for the prevailing conditions and circumstances at the time;

iii) If, as suggested by INQ1579, that he had driven the vehicle in the manner outlined whilst acting under the instructions of Sergeant O, then the responsibility for the injuries sustained by Alana Burke must be shared between these individuals (Day 336/182/9 to Day 336/183/3);

iv) The aggressive nature of the arrest tactics which were employed by 1Para, namely the use of armoured vehicles, indicates a strategy which contained a clearly defined risk to all persons lawfully congregating within the perceived catchment area;

v) The policy of driving heavy armoured vehicles at or through large numbers of unarmed civilians demonstrates a reckless disregard for their safety and welfare (Day 336/163/15 to Day 336/163/21);

vi) That INQ 1579 knows perfectly well he knocked down a female when he drove the Mortar Platoon pig on Bloody Sunday;

vii) That INQ 1579 has covered up this fact in his evidence to the Tribunal;

viii) That INQ 1579 deliberately lied on oath to the Tribunal about the circumstances in which he injured Alana Burke.

17.5 Margaret “Peggy” Deery

17.5.1 Personal Details and Background

17.5.1.1 Margaret “Peggy” Deery (nee McIntyre) was 38 when she was shot on Bloody Sunday. She was a widow whose husband died three months previously of cancer of the spine. She had 14 children aged between 16 and 10 months old. The family lived in the Swilly Gardens area of Creggan but by the time she was released from hospital on 29^th May 1972 the family had moved to Creggan Heights. She was to wear a calliper on her left leg until she died in 1988. She had no criminal record or political affiliations.

17.5.1.2 Relevant Photographs

17.5.1.3 Summary

An event such as a Civil Rights March on a Sunday afternoon would have been an opportunity for her to escape from the full time demands which rearing a family of fourteen children would have entailed. The opportunity to exchange family gossip and neighbourly news would have been shared between her and her sisters who accompanied her on the march:

“I remember a friend of my mother’s called Peggy McLaughin and two of our cousins, May and Rita Nichol, came round to call for my mother. She had not really been out of the house since my father died and Peggy, May and Rita were insistent that she come out and participate in the march. She had certainly never been on any previous marches.” AD32.1 paragraph 4

Despite this she would not have been exempt if it were alleged that at some point during the course of the afternoon that she participated or was present in a riot then proof of such an allegation would have attracted a mandatory period of imprisonment.

17.5.1.4 Anthony McCallion recalled seeing Peggy in or about the junction of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street. He remembered saying to her “Don’t head up there, they’re rioting.” She just smiled and walked on north up Chamberlain Street. A short time later he could hear the sound of shooting coming from the direction of the junction between William Street and Rossville Street. AM65.2 paragraphs 8 to 10

No less that fourteen witnesses including Peggy and her son Tony refer to the location at which she was allegedly present when she was shot. Five of the witnesses identify the location at grid reference M16 on map Q8 i.e. at the west of Numbers 34 to 36 Chamberlain Street at the waste ground. Of these five, three gave evidence before the current Tribunal. They are Patrick Doherty AD96.2 paragraph 10, Neil McLaughlin AM346.3 paragraph 16 and Patrick Moore AM17.4 paragraph 20.

Three witnesses place Peggy at a location slightly south of the gable of 36 Chamberlain Street / Rossville Street car park. They are Pascal Keys AK36.1, George Nelis AN9.3 paragraphs 16 to 20,Gerry McBride AM46.4 paragraphs 11 to 12.

A fourth witness, Peter Gallagher AG23.11 paragraphs 15 to 18 placed Peggy in grid reference L15.

17.5.1.6 Peggy herself believed that she was shot in the vicinity of Pilot Row AD33. James McDermott AM184, Brian Magee AM220.4 paragraphs 7 to 20 and Leo Deehan AD178.5 to AD178.7, support this opinion. The final witness, Mr Tony Deery confirms the same location in a statement provided by him to the Tribunal albeit upon the basis of what he was told by his mother while she was alive AD35.2 paragraph 12.

17.5.1.7 Location Table

The apparent diversity of opinion and recollection in respect of the location at which Peggy Deery was shot, is understandably if not partially explained by the widespread panic and confusion, which existed at the time. It will be observed, that the various locations at which Peggy was allegedly shot generally comply with the route, which would have been taken by those who carried her to Mrs Nelis’ home at 33 Chamberlain Street. It is clear from the various descriptions provided by a number of witnesses that Peggy was carried in a disorganised, almost haphazard manner by a variety of people stopping to assist at various points along the route. Again, this development probably has more to do with the widespread panic, which existed among the crowd who for the most part were generally preoccupied with their own safety. It is to be regretted that no attempt was made by the RUC to investigate the shooting of Peggy Deery or to record with any accuracy the precise location where she was shot. It would appear from all documents supplied, that at the material time the RUC were only concerned with whether Peggy had participated in an illegal march. Indeed the investigating officer smugly commented on her explanation for her movements that day as being inconsistent with an innocent bystander ED62.1.

17.5.1.8 It is useful to recall how the RUC officer records the incident in which she is shot:

”There were hundreds of people in this area running to get away from the Army who had driven into the back of the flats in Saracens. A man had fallen on top of me and he got up and ran around the corner. Whilst I was on the ground I was able to see the Army men in front of me and I saw and heard them shooting. I attempted to get up but I slipped and cut my head and nose. I then saw a soldier in front of me and he appeared to be taking aim at me and I then felt a blow to my left thigh. I called to a man to help me which he did and he took me to a house in Chamberlain Street.” ED62.2 to ED63.3

17.5.1.9 The account is remarkable more for what it does not contain rather than for what it does. No attempt has been made to record the identity or description of the soldier concerned, the spatial relationship of the victim to the firer, the absence or presence of any obstruction, the length of time that she continued to observe his presence, whether it was he who fired the shot, what he did afterwards and whether any words were exchanged. The routine questions which would be made in the course of a proper investigation into what on the available evidence, was a clear case of attempted murder.

17.5.1.10 This is all the more so given that the victim was a 38 year old widowed mother of fourteen children, who on instructions had never been arrested or interviewed by the RUC before.

Detective Sergeant Cudmore appears to record in the second paragraph of his report that Peggy indicated on a map the approximate position where she was shot ED62.1. Unfortunately this document has never been provided. This seems hardly surprising given the manner in which the investigation in this shooting was conducted.

17.5.1.11 Approximately twelve witnesses have provided evidence to the Tribunal in respect of having assisted in her transportation to 33 Chamberlain Street or observing it as it took place. These included Frank Carlin AC32.2 paragraph 9, Francis Duddy AD144.3 paragraph 14, Elizabeth Gallagher AG11, Pascal Keys AK36, Patrick “Patsy” McDaid AM172.3 paragraph 10, James McDermott AM184, Brian Magee AM220.4 paragraphs 7 to 20, Mary Moore AM414.3 paragraph 16, Margaret Neils AM 11.3 paragraph 15, Hugh Sheerin AS10, Anna Nelis of whom it will be recalled also gave evidence to the effect that when soldiers entered 33 Chamberlain Street one of them appeared to look at her injuries and then stated “Let the whore bleed to death” AN8.2 paragraphs 8 to 12, AN8. paragraph 21.

It will be recalled that Matt Campbell when providing his statement corroborates the above remark with by attributing the following to one of the soldiers, namely “Let the bastards or whores bleed to death”, AC140.1.

It also appears that she was seen by Martin McGuinness as he ran through the Rossville Flats car park KM3.2 paragraph 7, KM3.124 and Day 390/78/24 to Day 290/81/6.

17.5.1.13 Timing

As indicated at the outset, Peggy Deery was almost certainly the first person to be shot after troops entered Rossville Street. There is a certain amount of evidence which enables the Tribunal to confidently arrive at this conclusion. Patrick McDaid in his contemporaneous statement to the RUC provided with the following account

"I was walking up Chamberlain Street whenever crowds started to run past me going towards the Rossville high flats because somebody had shouted 'the Army's coming'. I ran along with this crowd to the top of Chamberlain Street where I slowed down. Two or three youths then appeared from the direction of the Rossville flats and to my right. They were carrying a woman who I now know to be a Mrs Deery and I saw that she had been shot in the leg. I went over and helped them to carry Mrs Deery into a house in Chamberlain Street where I tied a piece of scarf around her leg to stop it bleeding. I went outside and started to shout for first aid or an ambulance. I then heard shooting going on in the area and I saw a young fellow fall and I believe his name was Duddy. He fell in the square of the flats but I did not see who had shot him." AM172.21

17.5.1.14 It should be pointed out that Mr McDaid’s Treasury Solicitor statement, the Sunday Times interview, his oral evidence to Lord Widgery and his evidence to this Tribunal in this regard has remained constant.

In addition to the above there is also the contemporaneous account as provided by Billy Gillespe, though some of its contents were disputed, in which he appeared to confirm (to the Sunday Times) that Peggy had been carried to 33 Chamberlain Street before Jackie Duddy or Michael Bridge were shot AG34.17.

17.5.1.15 At least one witness, Peter Gallagher, appears to suggest a different sequence of events. He recorded in his Eversheds statement at AG23.10 paragraph 13 that he had a distinct recollection of seeing Father Daly giving Jackie Duddy the last rites. He appears to have observed this scene from the shelter of the south gable end wall of Chamberlain Street. He could hear continuous shooting although none of it was automatic fire. He was conscious that an attractive dark haired woman approximately 25 years of age had been pushed out into the clearing beyond the gable end. The woman then suddenly fell to the ground and he realised that she had been shot. He went on to describe how he assisted in dragging her back towards the cover of the wall. She had an extensive gunshot wound to the back of her thigh. He also recalled that she was unarmed and wearing fish net stockings AG23.10 paragraphs 13 to 18.

17.5.1.16 In both his 1972 and Eversheds statements he has Michael Bridge being shot and taken to 33 Chamberlain Street after assisting with Peggy Deery. In relation to the sequence of events this account is largely corroborated by the contemporaneous account supplied by Mr Gallagher at the time. While the details may be different, the witness’ broad recollection of event is consistent AG23.7.

17.5.1.17 One of the few recorded descriptions from Peggy Deery of the soldier who actually fired the shot is contained in the interview notes of Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team:

“I looked over towards Rossville Street and there were the big Pigs coming in and one headed over towards where we were. Then I saw a soldier with the red Para hat come up from the Pig that was near us and he took aim, I thought at me or the man standing next to me (she does not know who he was). I shouted to this chap 'for God's sake watch out, that one's going to shoot' and as I moved towards the man for protection like I felt this big thump in my leg, in the thigh really. It is funny, I never heard the bang. The soldier was not more than 25 yards. I could recognise him clearly if I saw him again. He was about your height, five-foot ten, fatter than you, with a round fat face and a little dark of complexion, although he also had that black stuff streaked over his face." AD33.1

17.5.1.18 The victim’s daughter, Helen Mahon, records the following in her Eversheds statement:

“My mother talked about Bloody Sunday a lot afterwards. She said she would never forget the face of the soldier. After he had shot her he had cocked his gun and she had said she was a widow with fourteen wee ones. He had then put his head down and walked away. She said that he had red hair. She said that he had shot her at close range.” AD32.3 paragraph 20

“My mother always said that she would be able to immediately recognise the soldier who fired the shot by his red hair.” AD34.2 paragraph 17

17.5.1.20 Tony Deery related what he mother told him in his Eversheds statement:

“My mother talked quite often about the soldier who had shot her. He was tall, with red hair. She did not bear a grudge against him although she could not understand why he had shot her as she had been dong nothing wrong.” AD35.1 paragraph 8

17.5.1.21 Leo Deehan AD78.5 did not give oral evidence to the Tribunal. Beyond expressing the belief that the soldier who fired the shot was an officer he unfortunately omitted to provide any further details.

Peggy Deery could have been shot by any one of a number of members of the Mortar Platoon including soldiers S, V, N or Q. However Lieutenant N and Private S to a greater extent must be regarded as real contenders for having shot her.

17.5.1.22 As has been pointed out in Section 15.2.8 of our submissions Lieutenant N claimed that he fired 1 round at a nail bomber in the car park striking him in the right thigh. As the Tribunal is aware, Peggy was shot in the left thigh but more likely in a position to the west of the houses of Chamberlain Street on the Rossville Street waste ground at a very early stage in the events, probably when Lieutenant N was still at Eden Place or at his APC with a prisoner. The Tribunal knows that Michael Bridge was shot in the car park and like Peggy was shot in the left thigh, which corresponds with Lieutenant N’s account except for the fact that Michael Bridge was unarmed and not a nail bomber.

17.5.1.23 Private S on the other hand worked his way southwards along the wall at the back of Chamberlain Street. He admitted firing 12 rounds in the Sector 2 area from the rear of 34 Chamberlain Street, which is not far at all from where a number of witnesses set out in this section have positioned Peggy Deery as falling. Indeed Peggy herself said she was shot in the area of Pilot Row. Private S’ justification for firing those rounds however was wholly unbelievable and all of those rounds, in our respectful submission remain unaccounted for. Our submissions in respect of Private S are set out in detail at Section 15.2.8.3.

17.5.1.24 It is a matter of regret that none of the Mortar Platoon soldiers has had the moral courage to either admit to or identify any colleague firing at or hitting any target resembling Peggy Deery. In fact none of the official bibliographies of the Parachute Regiment when detailing or outlining any of the events of this day make any reference to the fact that they shot a woman on Bloody Sunday. It therefore appears that whoever shot Peggy Deery is enjoying the benefit of a Regimental cover-up or that the fact that she was wounded has yet to be brought to their attention.

17.5.2 Key witnesses

Rossville Street waste ground / Car park

17.5.2.1 Neil McLaughlin AM347 provided an interview to the Sunday Times Insight Team in 1972. He gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 91. Whilst he had no memory of providing that interview he accepted in oral evidence that he might well have done as a large amount of detail corresponded with his recollection when he made his Eversheds statement and that the detail in the Sunday Times account could have come from him Day 91/41/21 to Day 91/42/10. For example, the witness agreed that he could have seen Peggy Deery shot but did not now recall it as he marked in his Eversheds map that he first saw Peggy at AM347.6. Similarly, he accepted that he could have helped Peggy Deery to 33 Chamberlain Street even though his current recollection was that he only witnessed this happen Day 91/44/5 to Day 91/46/4:

“The first person to fall was a Knights of Malta (sic) man. Neil does not know who is he was shot (sic). He merely fell. He was a few paces to Neil’s right, and he fell by the back wall of the C St row --- in other words the crowd running forward had just cleared the gable end. Almost immediately, a girl two paces to his right fell. Neil couldn’t remember much about her appearance except she was wearing black stockings. Neil was sure she had been shot.” AM347.13

17.5.2.2 The witness went on to relate how he saw a crowd around a body in the car park. He did not actually see this person being shot. He then saw Michael Bridges (sic) shot AM347.13. The account continues:

“But at some stage he and four others went to Mrs Deery – the woman in black tights – and lifted her. Her whole leg was “sagging” in her tights, he said, and when they lifted the leg, the knee bent the wrong way. The five of them carried her to the end of C St. at which point other people took over.” AM347.13

If it is accepted that this is an accurate account of what the witness was telling the Sunday Times Insight Team in 1972 then it is strong evidence that Peggy Deery was in fact shot at the west side of the houses at Chamberlain Street near the Knight of Malta, Charles McMonagle, who is shown in photograph EP33/5. It provides further weight for the proposition that she was shot by a member of the Mortar Platoon before Jackie Duddy and Michael Bridge.

17.5.2.3 Brian McGee AM220 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 89. Counsel to the Tribunal commended him on his statement saying that it was “admirably clear” Day 89/165/22. He was 16 on Bloody Sunday. He was standing at the south gable end of the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street. There were about 20 to 30 people present. He saw an APC parked near the flats and then he remembers hearing the first shots. In his Eversheds statement he recorded that he saw a youngish woman aged 18-20 carried by two men. A Paratrooper at position “E” to the east and possibly to the front of the APC moved to position “H” and tried to interfere with the men carrying the woman. The soldier, who was wearing a gas mask, then had his attention diverted and went elsewhere AM20.4 paragraph 19. If one goes to the witness’ map at AM220.17 it is apparent that this Paratrooper moved from the area of the pig in photograph P518 towards the rear of the houses in Chamberlain Street from where Peggy Deery was being carried.

17.5.2.4 She was then carried around the gable end. She had a three-quarter length coat and wore either a short skirt or a skirt that had ridden up her legs. She wore knee length boots with dark tights. The witness thought that her right leg was bleeding heavily AM220.4 paragraph 17.

17.5.2.5 The witness now knows this woman was Peggy Deery and he said that he might have assisted the men for a few steps AM220.4 paragraph 20. It is submitted that this witness’ evidence is also useful in terms of sequencing as after seeing this incident he then saw Jackie Duddy’s body in the car park, then seeing Michael Bridge and then OIRA 4 AM220.5 paragraphs 22 to 27. It is further submitted that Mr McGee’s evidence assists in demonstrating that Peggy Deery was shot somewhere at the rear of the houses in Chamberlain Street on the waste ground and was carried from this area along the back of those houses. It is also clear that this also attracted the attention of one of the Mortar Platoon soldiers at Sergeant O’s pig yet none of these soldiers admit to seeing a woman suffering from a gunshot wound at all.

17.5.2.6 Brian McGee in our submission was a particularly clear and truthful witness whose honesty nor reliability was challenged by Counsel for the Soldiers. In particular they did not challenge his assertion that the soldier who was present at Sergeant O’s pig moved towards as if to interfere with Peggy Deery and the two men who were carrying her.

17.5.2.7 Pascal Keys AK36 provided a one-page statement in 1972. He said that the Army had shot indiscriminately into the garage space at the back of the flats. He saw Peggy fall as he ran towards the garages. He helped carry her along with two other men into 33 Chamberlain Street. He then left to try and get an ambulance AK36.1.

17.5.2.8 Gerry McBride AM46 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 079. He provided a statement to NICRA in 1972,which we submit is a more accurate account certainly in terms of sequence than that given to Eversheds. In 1972 the witness said that he saw a soldier at the end of the flats hitting a civilian with something. He then saw a girl crawling. He grabbed and tried to lift her. The girl said that her leg was broken. When he was helped by “a couple of fellas” he was able to see that there was a hole right through her leg. Mr McBride helped carry her into the house in Chamberlain Street AM46.8. In his Eversheds statement the witness confirmed that where he saw Peggy Deery was at the rear of Chamberlain Street approximately three houses up from the bottom Day 079/76/1 to Day 079/76/3.

17.5.2.9 The sequence in his 1972 statement continues that he then saw a body in the car park who must be Jackie Duddy and then saw Michael Bridge shot. The sequence in his Eversheds statement is that he first saw Jackie Duddy along with Father Daly in the car park before seeing Peggy Deery. His sequence in that account continues with him witnessing Michael Bridge being shot before managing to get Peggy Deery to 33 Chamberlain Street.

17.5.2.10 Patrick McDaid AM172 who was also wounded on Bloody Sunday provided a large number of statements and interviews. These are dated 4^th February 1972; 7^th February 1972; 27^th February 1972; 7^th March 1972 and also one statement which is undated. He also gave oral evidence to Lord Widgery and this Tribunal on Day 092. What he says in respect of Peggy Deery has always remained constant. As Mr McDaid reached the southern end of Chamberlain Street (grid reference M16) with the car park in front of him he saw three or four men carrying a woman. Mr McDaid assisted in bring Peggy into 33 Chamberlain Street where he applied a tartan scarf to her leg in an effort to stop the bleeding. He then went out along with the woman of the house (Mrs Nelis) to try and get either First Aid or an ambulance and then saw someone shot in the car park Day 092/107/4 to Day 092/109/6, AM172.2 paragraph 10, AM172.12, AM172.14, AM172.17, AM172.21, AM172.27, WT7.83 A-B.

17.5.2.11 Elizabeth Gallagher AG 11.1 provided a one page handwritten statement in 1972. She was a 37 year old housewife who assisted in bringing Peggy Deery into 33 Chamberlain Street. She also secured the assistance of the chemist Otto Schlindwein who told her to try and get an ambulance otherwise Peggy would bleed to death. When she went outside and told a Corporal he told her “Let the fucking whore bleed to death. Its good enough for her.”

17.5.2.12 Frank Carlin AC33 was running south down Chamberlain Street where he saw three men carrying a woman away from the area of the Rossville Flats car park. He saw this group before he reached the car park. He could see that she had a very bad wound to her thigh and though there was a lot of blood she was still conscious AC33.2 paragraph 9. The witness Patrick Pearse Moore at AM417.4 paragraph 20 gave strikingly similar evidence.

17.5.2.13 Francis Duddy AD 144 was running south down Chamberlain Street and saw a woman who he later learned was Peggy Deery being carried into a house. He recalled that Peggy wore a headscarf and black tights. He also recalled the wound on her leg AD144.11 paragraph 14. After witnessing this he saw Jackie Duddy’s body in the car park and Michael Bridge actually being shot AD144.12 paragraph 16.

17.5.2.14 Fulvio Grimaldi M34 gave evidence to the Tribunal on Day 131. After taking photographs of Jackie Duddy’s body being attended to by Father Daly and others he returned to the relative safety of the Chamberlain Street southern gable wall:

“… a woman was carried past me into Chamberlain Street, in the same direction that Jack Duddy has been carried. The woman had blood dripping from her. She was taken into the first house on the east side of Chamberlain Street. I later learned that the woman was Mrs Deery.” M34.60 paragraph 46

17.5.2.15 Fulvio then witnessed Michael Bridge being shot in the car park. He followed Michael Bridge who was also carried into the same house as Peggy Deery:

“In the living room, I saw Mrs Deery again. She had a terrible wound in her leg. There was a huge lump of flesh hanging down, which people were trying to put back in place. Meanwhile, several other people were helping Mr Bridge who had been placed in the courtyard at the back of the house. Michael Bridge proved to be a very brave man.” M34.61 paragraph 50

17.5.2.16 The witness took photographs P748 and P749 of Mrs Deery on the sofa. These are the only photographs that we have of Peggy on Bloody Sunday.

Susan North M35 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 130. She provides essentially corroborative evidence of the above in respect of Peggy Deery at M35.5 paragraphs 25 to 29. The Tribunal has a copy of her sound recording made on Bloody Sunday. The witness confirmed that page 23 to 27 of the Grimaldi / North transcript tape relates to events taking place inside 33 Chamberlain Street A9/34.0 to 35.0, E3.0052 to E3.0056, M35.13 paragraphs 80 to 83.

17.5.2.17 33 Chamberlain Street

Anna Nelis AN8.1 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 103. She was at home with her mother and sister Margaret at 33 Chamberlain Street. She recalled that three or four men called out from Chamberlain Street asking if they could bring an injured woman into the house. Peggy Deery was laid down on the settee near the window. In her contemporary account the witness said that Peggy’s leg was badly mutilated AN8.9. She went outside and secured the help of Otto Schlindwein. She then went out and phoned an ambulance from the Donaghue house at 2 High Street AN8.9, AN8.3 paragraph 14. When she returned the Knights of Malta were present with Peggy who was still bleeding profusely AN8.9. Michael Bridge had also been brought into the house while the witness was out. When a “Saracen” arrived outside her door she went out to the soldiers and explained the situation to them. She asked for their assistance and told them Peggy needed “urgent medical aid”. The witness continued:

“ “Let her bleed to death”… The soldiers came in. There was two of them. They came into my kitchen. They looked at the injured woman and said “Let the whore bleed to death”. They then went into the yard to look at the injured man. I didn’t hear what they said. They left my house. I went out with them and remained in the street. A girl, a member of the Knights of Malta, Alice Long came running and screaming across the courtyard of the high flats. She shouted at the soldiers to get an ambulance for her. The soldiers started to shout back “Let them f… well die”. and used more abusive language”” AN8.9

17.5.2.18 After Peggy and Michael Bridge were taken away the men who were present in the house were arrested. Anna Nelis also complained about this incident to the RUC at Victoria AN8.13.

The witness confirmed in the course of her oral evidence to Counsel that none of the soldiers in Chamberlain Street offered medical assistance either in the form of the provision of a field medical pack or by way of offering to treat anyone in the house Day 103/25/7 to Day 103/25/13.

17.5.2.19 Margaret Nelis AN11 also gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 103. She ran towards her house and heard shots “from all directions” AN11.10. She was at the door of her house at 33 Chamberlain Street when men came over and carrying a woman and asked her whether they could come in. A lot of other people also came into the house. In her Eversheds statement, Mrs Nelis recalls that most of the people in the house were in their thirties and older AN11.3 paragraph 14. Michael Bridge was also brought into the house at a later stage. This witness did not see Peggy’s injury but recalls that people were saying that she was badly hurt and that she had been shot AN11.3 paragraph 15.

In her RUC statement of complaint the witness said that some of the soldiers assisted in moving the two wounded persons out of the house before all the male occupants were arrested AN11.10.

17.5.2.20 George Nelis AN9.1 also gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 103. This witness came out of Chamberlain Street and into the Rossville Flats Courtyard. He noticed a body on the ground of a young boy aged fourteen or fifteen who was lying on his front. The position of the boy is marked on the map at AN9.20. Someone present remarked that the boy was dead. The witness did not know who this man was, nor has he found out since who the boy was Day 103/87/16 to Day 103/88/16. It should be pointed out that this was not mentioned in any of Mr Nelis’ contemporary accounts at AN9.9 and AN9.21.

About fifteen to twenty feet southwards he came upon Peggy Deery. He thought that she was wounded in her right thigh:

“I can vividly remember the blood pumping out of the wound very quickly, almost like water from a hosepipe. It was when I saw that, that it really came home to me that the situation was very serious and very dangerous” AN9.3 paragraph 17

He went to his mother’s house at 33 Chamberlain Street and very soon thereafter two men arrived with Peggy Deery. This witness also refers to two soldiers being present in the house shortly after making comments about the two wounded persons in the house such as “let them bleed to death” and “they deserve it” AN9.3 paragraph 23, Day 103/92/16. The witness was later arrested and taken to Fort George with the other males in the house. He later made a complaint to the RUC, which can be found at AN9.21.

17.5.2.21 Otto Schlindwein AS.2 gave evidence to the Tribunal on Day 104. Mr Schlindwein was a chemist who ran a pharmacy in Creggan. He saw a body in the Rossville Flats car park. He said that he could “quite believe” it was Jackie Duddy AS2.6 paragraphs 11 to 12. Before the witness could run into the courtyard, a woman who he later learned was Anna Nelis outside 33 Chamberlain Street grabbed him and asked him to help Peggy Deery. When the witness entered her house he recognised Peggy Deery on the sofa and saw that she had:

“… a very bad bullet wound in her thigh and was bleeding profusely. I could see immediately that she had been shot, and from the way in which she was losing blood I feared for her life. I bound up her leg wound with a blanket and then told Mrs Nelis that Mrs Deery needed an ambulance as a matter of urgency.” AS2.6 paragraph 15

Once Peggy Deery was placed in the ambulance the witness was arrested and later rifle butted by a soldier with a Scottish accent AS2.7 paragraph 21, Day 104/167/6.

17.5.2.22 Charles McMonagle AM367 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 102. He was a Volunteer in the Knights of Malta and was assaulted in the Rossville Flats waste ground. He walked south down Chamberlain Street during a lull in the shooting. He was then called into 33 Chamberlain Street and was asked to treat Peggy Deery whom he did not know at the time. Someone had already placed a towel over her wound. He bandaged Peggy’s leg up as best he could but there was little he could do for her AM367.4 paragraph 25. The witness recollected that a number of persons were insistent in the house that there was a problem with Peggy’s blood type if she needed a transfusion and that was something that he alerted the ambulance men to when they arrived Day 102/126/12 to Day 102/126/22.

17.5.2.23 Majella Doherty AD 182 gave oral evidence to the Tribunal on Day 184. She was also a Volunteer in the Knights of Malta and was dragged into 33 Chamberlain Street. She recalled that there was another First Aider present, who must be Charles McMonagle, though she is unclear whether he was there before or after she arrived. The witness is incorrect in her recollection that the wound was on Peggy’s right leg but she recalls accurately the serious nature of her injury:

“To be truthful, the entire back of her leg was blown away. It was not a pretty sight and it might be because it was so shocking that I can’t remember much else about the scene. Peggy Deery was a widow woman with about 14 children. I remember when I was attending to her she was much more worried about her children than she was about herself.” AD182.5 paragraphs 13 to 15.

The witness goes on to relate how despite their best efforts, the Knights of Malta were unable to stop the bleeding and how she never thought she would “see such devastation to a human limb as the back of her leg” AD182.6 paragraph 17.

17.5.3 Injuries Sustained

17.5.3.1 Peggy Deery sustained two gunshot wounds to her left thigh. A bullet entered the front of her thigh and exited leaving “an extensive wound on the back of her left thigh” and a complex and compound fracture of the left femur. Due to the fact that the wound on the back of the lower left thigh was described as “extensive”, the track of the bullet is more likely to be from front to back than the reverse. The Inquiry’s experts were unable to comment on the nature of the projectile. E10.005

17.5.3.2 Mrs Deery underwent surgery on the evening of 30^th January 1972. A medical report dated 21^st February 1972 by Consultant Nephrologist Dr Mary McGeown of Belfast City Hospital recorded:

“I am informed there is no sign of healing of the shattered femur, and that the wound is grossly infected. As there is evidence of severe damage to the sciatic nerve it is thought that the leg may later have to be amputated.” D1079

17.5.4 Removal to Hospital

17.5.4.1 After being medically treated by a local pharmacist Otto Schlindwein and Knights of Malta Charles McMonagle and Majella Cassidy (nee Coyle) at 33 Chamberlain Street she was taken out of the Nelis house shortly after 4.27pm and placed in an ambulance VRM 4491WZ along with Michael Bridge. The ambulance was manned by John Holmes (driver) and William Grey (attendant). It arrived at Altnagelvin Hospital at 4.50pm. ED48.98; D500.26, D500.27; D1037

17.5.5 Conclusions

i. Given the evidence of the location, timing and firing of his SLR from the rear of the houses in Chamberlain Street, Private S, it is submitted is a prime contender for firing the bullet that struck Peggy Deery.

ii. Given the evidence of the location and firing of his SLR from the rear of the houses in Chamberlain Street, Lieutenant N, it is submitted is also a strong candidate for firing the bullet that struck Peggy Deery.

iii. Peggy Deery was not engaged in any unlawful activity when wounded apart from trying to move away from the Paratroopers who had debussed on the Rossville Street waste ground.

iv. There was no activity around her or in her vicinity which could provide any justification for her wounding.

v. She was wounded by a member of Mortar Platoon who has covered up his involvement in her attempted murder and provided a false account of his activities on Bloody Sunday in Sector 2 both in 1972 and to this Inquiry.

vi. The Mortar Platoon soldiers know that one of them wounded Peggy Deery and have engaged in a conspiracy of silence in respect of her wounding. That conspiracy of silence began in January 1972 and continues to the present day.

vii. The conduct of members of C Company 1 Para at 33 Chamberlain Street when presented with a seriously wounded woman was appallingly callous and should be condemned.

17.6.1.1 Jackie Duddy was 17 at the time of Bloody Sunday. At the time he was working as a weaver in a shirt factory. At the time of his death he had applied to join the Merchant Navy. His family believe he only sneaked out to go because so many others were going and he went for the fun of it. It was a big day out. He had no criminal record. He was a highly talented young boxer. He had won a number of titles and trophies at boxing and had fought in England. His family often wondered if he would have reached the Olympics or European Games, or what sort of career he would have had before he died. Like all the families the Duddy's were utterly devastated by his death.

17.6.2 Civilian evidence on the shooting of Jackie Duddy

Jackie Duddy was shot as he was running in the car park of the Rossville Flats car park. He was running away from the direction of the soldiers who had de-bussed on the waste ground from Lieutenant N’s Pig and Sergeant O’s Pig at the mouth of the car park. He was shot from behind in the right upper shoulder and fell face down on to the car park. It is likely that he was shot between 4.10 pm and 4.15 pm when an ambulance was called at Altnagalvin Hospital. Jackie Duddy was carried by the group who had attended him including Father Daly across the Flats car park and up Chamberlain Street. He was taken from Waterloo Street by ambulance after 4.21 pm to Altnagalvin Hospital.

P627 Jackie Duddy on the ground in the car park being tended to by Father Daly, Charles Glenn and Liam Bradley. Taken by Giles Peres.

P628 and EP26.12 Father Daly, Charlie Glenn, Liam Bradley tending to Jackie Duddy in the car park

P629 Jackie Duddy on the ground with Father Daly and Liam Bradley taken at the top of Harvey Street on Waterloo Street.

P631 and also at P862 and EP26.14 Jackie Duddy being carried from the car park by group including Father Daly, Liam Bradley, Charles Glenn, William McChrystal, William Barber. Taken by Fulvio Grimaldi.

P632, P633, P634. Jackie Duddy being carried up Chamberlain Street to Harvey Street and Waterloo Street.

P740. Group surrounding Jackie Duddy and Michael Bridge on the far right with hands outstretched. Taken by Giles Peres.

EP28.1 to EP28.6. Photographs of Derrick Tucker. It would appear the correct sequence of these photographs is outlined by Dr. Bell at E26.4 and that is 4,3a, 3,2,1,4a or 5,6. This would accord with the recollection of Martin Tucker at Day 098/77/14 to Day 098/84/5 except for photograph 6.

V1/0.5.13 to 0.5.24. Jackie Duddy being carried down Chamberlain Street towards Harvey Street. Video 49. footage: and 19.12

The shooting of Jackie Duddy

17.6.2.4 The Most Reverend Bishop Edward Daly, or Father Daly as he then was, having witnessed events at Barrier 14 moved down Rossville Street. At H5.16 in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal he stated that the first intimation he had that there would be any further trouble came when he heard two or three rifle shots that came from the direction of William Street. At this time he was in Rossville Street about midway along Kells Walk. Perhaps ten minutes after the first two or three shots rang out, he heard the sound of the engines of the Saracen armoured cars revving up. There was hardly any stoning or aggro at this time. The odd gas canister was being fired. The people in the Rossville Street area were mainly a peaceful crowd and standing around chatting like himself, prior to going home. He then headed, at the back of the crowd, down Rossville Street and towards the car park of the flats. At WT4.6 C he described running towards the courtyard of the flats. This took him more or less across the waste ground. He remembered looking back at one point. As they ran most of the crowd were looking back. The army came further than Eden Place which was unusual. Day 075/13/23 to Day 075/14/10. He thought he was towards the rear of the crowd. Day 075/14/18 to Day 075/14/23. He confirmed that EP28.4A was the sort of scene he remembered. Day 075/14/24 to Day 075/15/5. Also EP28.5. The crowd began to thin out as people made their way towards the alleyways leading out of the flats.

17.6.2.5 At WT4.6 D he described seeing a young boy running beside him. He gave very much the same description in his statement at H5.3 paragraph 15 and Day 075/18/10 to Day 075/18/20. He was about sixteen or seventeen. He believed he was running towards the rear of the crowd and he overtook him. The boy laughed at him, as he believed he was amused to see him running. Father Daly recognised him. He had seen him boxing once before in a youth club, but he could not have named him at that time. Father Daly overtook him at this point. The boy was running and looking back as he was himself and he thought everybody was. The young boy was about a few feet behind him and there was a shot, and simultaneously the boy gasped or grunted. He looked round and the boy just fell. This was the first shot he heard since the shots in Rossville Street. Day 075/22/6 to Day 075/22/10. At WT4.7 A Father Daly pointed out that the boy fell on the cross section of one of the car park space lines-he thought about the third or fourth one in. He was aware of a Saracen behind them and soldiers in the waste ground. Day 075/23/16 to Day 075/24/16. He not aware of rubber bullets being fired when Jack Duddy was shot. Day 075/24/20 to Day 075/25/4. At the time of the shooting people were interested in getting clear. At that time he did not see any form of hostile action against the army. Day 075/25/5 to 075/25/14

17.6.2.6 Father Daly had described in 1972 an incident where a man or a woman was struck by a Saracen. In his evidence to the current Inquiry, he was able to recall that it was somewhere round the back of the houses in Chamberlain Street but he could no longer recall if this was before or after Jackie Duddy was shot. Day 075/17/2 to Day 075/17/14.

17.6.2.7 At WT4.7 D, he confirmed that the boy was not carrying anything that he saw in his hand. He confirmed to Lord Widgery that he heard a shot at the time the boy was hit and he was convinced that shot came from behind somewhere from the area of the waste ground. The boy fell on his face. Father Daly ran on. He thought the shot was a bit sharp for that of a rubber bullet gun, but he could not take it in at all, that he had been hit by a live bullet. He ran on still looking back. He then heard a fusillade of gunfire and he dived. He tried to get cover behind a little wall.WT4.7 G and WT4.8 A.

17.6.2.8 He was referring to the wall that runs parallel to block 2 and confirmed it to have been the wall in P795. Day 075/27/7 to Day 075/27/9. He recalled a burst of gunfire which really caused terror and panic. The burst came from the area of the waste ground. Whether it came from the Saracen near the courtyard or further he did not know. Day 075/26/18 to Day 075/26/23. He remembered initially aiming for the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 but because of the number of people there ended up at the low wall marked on H5.74 At WT4.9 B and H5.4 paragraph 19 he described lying on the ground: "that is at the edge of Block 2 wall". This point was marked by the witness at H5.75. After a time he looked back over his shoulder and he saw the young boy that he had passed lying out in the car park. He was lying at this time on his back with his head towards the witness. He remembered distinctly that the boy fell on his face but when he saw him he appeared to have been turned over possibly by Mr.Barber who reached him first. He saw him on his back.

17.6.2.9 There was a lull in the firing at this time and he decided he should go out and attend the boy. He took a handkerchief from his pocket. He was not aware of any other bodies in the immediate area. He took a handkerchief from his pocket and waved it for a little time and then he got up to a crouched position and he went out to the boy and first of all knelt beside him. He had his handkerchief in his hand. There was blood oozing from his shirt, roughly he thought it was either just to the side inside the arm either on the right- or left-hand side. Then a young boy from the Knights of Malta who was Charles Glenn suddenly appeared on the other side of this boy. He tried to deal with this wound to staunch the flow of blood. He felt he should administer the last rites to the boy and he administered the last rites of his church to him. H5.4 paragraph 19.

17.6.2.10 There was gunfire which started at this point and both of them lay down flat beside the boy. His recollection of the direction of the gunfire was that it all came from the area in which the soldiers were. Day 075/30/6 to Day 075/30/10. In 1972 he had described the gunfire as something like 30-40 feet away and was very close to them. WT4.10 B. He was not conscious of any gunfire directed towards the army in the square of Rossville Flats and there was no gunfire. There was no threat posed to the army at the time they opened fire and he did not think there was any justification for it. Day 075/30/22 to Day 075/31/5.

17.6.2.11 It is not wholly clear from the accounts of civilian witnesses whether Jackie Duddy came into the car park from Rossville Street or from Chamberlain Street. At WT4.6 E, Father Daly stated that he himself overtook Jackie Duddy who was running and looking back: "As I was myself ... As we came in here", which is presumably into the mouth of the car park, "... he was running, he was a little bit behind me", Father Daly having come from the Kells Walk direction. However at this Inquiry he could not say where the boy had come from. Day 075/18/10 to Day 075/18/20. His brother Gerry Duddy AD146.3 paragraph 10 saw him crossing Rossville Street and walking in a south easterly direction then across the waste ground towards the Rossville flats a few minutes before he himself heard shooting and began to run south down Rossville street. Brian Johnston placed him running from the waste ground by Pilot Row into the Rossville Street Courtyard. Isobel Duffy at AD158.2 paragraph 12 stated that she saw him running in from "the entrance to the car park of Rossville Flats" and had stated in at WT57 B that it was from the direction of the Saracens. A number of witnesses placed him running from Chamberlain Street. Hugh Breslin believed that he must have come from Chamberlain Street. “From the direction he was lying it was the only direction he could have come from.” Day 082/124/14 to Day 082/124/19. Mary Bonner at Day 082/52/17 to Day 082/52/22 said that she did not actually see him come out of Chamberlain Street but assumed he came from that area. She was one of a number of witnesses who expressed a belief that he must have come from Rossville Street or Chamberlain Street.[11]

17.6.2.12 There can be no doubt that Jackie Duddy was running in roughly the same direction as Father Daly across the courtyard of the car park initially at least towards the gap between Block 1 and 2 or possibly towards the low wall in front of Block 2 where Father Daly ended up. The understandable difficulty for witnesses given the pace of events and the undoubted fact of people running to both exits was shown by Patrick McDaid who thought Jackie Duddy had come from the western gable end of Chamberlain Street but accepted he could have come from the waste ground east of Rossville Street and was "running out that direction from around that side." Day 093/110/12 to Day 093/110/23.

17.6.2.13 Liam Bradley whose statement appears at AB61.1 is the man in the cap in the photograph EP26/12. As described in AB61.2 paragraphs 6 to 7 he ran down Chamberlain Street into the car park of the Rossville Flats and the first thing he saw was a boy lying in the car park. He was pretty much in the middle of the car park. He thought he must have been hit by a rubber bullet. He was not aware of any shooting at the time. If there was any, he thought he would have assumed it was rubber bullets. At AB61.2 paragraph 8 he stated that his immediate thought was to try and get across the car park and out through the alleyway between Blocks 1 or 2 of the Rossville flats. He ran in that direction directly towards where the boy lay. He was lying face down on his own with his head pointing south towards Block 2. He went towards him and turned him over and that was when he recognised him as Jackie Duddy. He knew Jackie because they were both amateur boxers. They used to train together. He was a dedicated young man who never took a drink. He was wearing a normal coat and trousers. The only distinctive thing he was wearing was a Pioneer pin on his coat. The pin was from the Total Abstinence Association and means that the wearer does not drink alcohol.

17.6.2.14 At AB61.2 paragraph 9 he described turning over Jackie Duddy and realising that he had been shot through the chest and that he was dead. He knelt down beside him and said the act of contrition in his ear. He was with him for a minute or two on his own. Father Daly arrived and started praying with him. Then Charles Glenn of the Knights of Malta arrived. At AB61.2 paragraph 16 the witness identified himself as the person wearing the cap and carrying Jackie Duddy in the photographs starting at EP25.6. It was as he was bent over Jackie Duddy praying in his ear that he first became aware of the sound of shooting and of soldiers taking up positions on the waste ground at Pilot Row and Eden Place. He realised live ammunition was being fired. AB61.2 paragraph 10.

17.6.2.15 William McChrystal now deceased, made a statement in 1972 which can be found at AM460.2 He described coming into the courtyard of the flats and seeing Father Daly kneeling over the body of a fallen youth. He saw another man assisting and went to their aid. As he was kneeling the army fired over their heads and the bullets hit the back wall of the courtyard. When he arrived at the youth’s side there was no evidence of any weapon, gun, nail-bomb or stone. They carried the youth up either Harvey Street to Waterloo Street. They laid him on an eiderdown supplied by Mrs. McCloskey. He was dead at this time. His name was Jackie Duddy.

17.6.2.16 Charles Glenn was the Knight of Malta who tended to Jackie Duddy. He made a NICRA statement at AG43.10 and his more recent statement is at AG43.1. At AG43.3 paragraph 21, Charles Glenn described a paratrooper jumping out of a vehicle and assaulting an old man. At AG43.3 paragraph 23 he stated that immediately after this (assault on the old man) he heard a shot being fired from what he thought was an SLR. He thought it was fired from the vicinity of Eden Place but he was not in the best position to confirm this. He did not see shots striking the ground at Pilot Row aimed at the soldiers. He then heard people calling to him. He was not sure whether this was before or after he got up from the ground. Once they saw him looking around the area, a group of people beckoned him over and he gathered that someone was down. He probably ran across the waste ground in a southwesterly direction to reach the group. He recalled passing a soldier standing by the north stairwell of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, but he could not recall any other people in that area.

17.6.2.17 He thought that there were about three or four people kneeling or crouching beside the body of a young man. AG43.4 paragraph 26. He noticed that the casualty was lying on his back unconscious and had lost a lot of blood. He searched for the entry wound and saw that he had been shot in the left collarbone. He propped up the body on several occasions to try and find out if he could find the exit wound, which he found in the middle of his back. On examination he concluded that the wound was fatal and there was nothing he could do for him. He covered the wound with a bandage although by this stage the wound was not even bleeding. He thought that the youth had already died by the time he arrived at the scene, however he was not suitably qualified to make this assessment. He confirmed the body would have been turned more than once whilst he was there. Day 080/188/15 to Day 080/188/17. The people surrounding the man's body included Father Daly and people who he now knows as Liam Bradley, Hugh McMonagle and another person whom he did not know. He did not know but subsequently discovered that the boy was Jack Duddy. Day 080/192/2 to Day 080/192/9. He remembered the soldiers pointing their rifles and an impression of shots being fired at different elevations. Day 080/192/10 to Day 080/192/12. He remembered a number of army vehicles which had entered the area together .He recalled two volleys of shots from around the nearest armoured vehicle and that the weapons were pointed in the direction of the flat courtyard. Day 080/191/20 to Day 080/192/9.

17.6.2.18 Hugh McMonagle whose statement to the Inquiry appears at AM369.2 also gave oral evidence on day 100. The witness described running in the direction of Rossville Flats as the army came in. He saw Lieutenant N's Pig pull onto the waste ground and saw a number of army vehicles driving south down Rossville Street. He was running along a narrow path which was parallel to the back gardens of houses in Chamberlain Street. He did not look behind him. As he was running he heard live fire. There were no soldiers or vehicles in front of him. As he continued he went through a gap in the wire fence and ran into the car park. As he ran he saw a body in the car park which he later knew to be Jackie Duddy. The witness ran on and got behind the low wall in front of Block 2. As he lay there he could hear shots which seemed to be hitting Block 2 although it may have been that they were ricocheting round the car park. His impression at the time was that they must have been fired from the soldiers in the Pig at Eden Place. AM369.3 paragraphs 15 to 16. From his position he did not see any bottles or other items being thrown from the top of the flats. AM369.3 paragraph 18. He saw a priest around the body and he went over. He recognised the priest as Father Daly and saw Charlie Glenn, who was a Knight of Malta. He then witnessed events surrounding the shooting of Michael Bridge and accompanied him to 33 Chamberlain Street. When he emerged he turned left towards the car park and saw Father Daly with the group coming towards him. He joined the group at the end of Chamberlain Street and helped carry Jackie Duddy north up Chamberlain Street.

17.6.2.19 William Barber, now deceased, was interviewed by the Sunday Times in 1972 which can be found at AB9.1. At AB9.2 he recalled reaching the Chamberlain Street gable and was running. He described it as “confusing” but he was running and there was a young lad beside him running on his left. He just fell as in a “dead man’s fall”. He just toppled forward. He thought the lad must have been hit by a rubber bullet on the back of the head. He seemed to hit his face on the ground. When Mr. Barber looked down he saw a trickle of blood on the ground presumably from the front of his face. He thought it must be from where the lad had hit his nose. Mr. Barber and another boy picked him up to try to drag him along. He was awfully heavy so they turned him over. Blood gushed from his nose and mouth. They dropped him and his head hit the ground. Mr. Barber recalled thinking he must get the boy medical assistance. Father Daly came back from the flats towards them. The witness shouted up to two women in the flats and he also went towards the Chamberlain Street entrance. When he got back a bloke with a cloth cap was there tending to the boy and Father Daly was trying to clear everyone away to give the boy the last rites. Mr. Barber knew they were being fired at. He didn't think he heard a shot but heard people shout: “They’re firing at us”.

17.6.2.20 A clear body of evidence suggests that Jackie Duddy fell forward, after being shot, on to his face. The evidence of Father Daly, the witness Kevin McDaid at AM167.3 paragraph 13, William Terence McClements at AM108.2 paragraph 9, James McKinney at Day 081/99/18 to Day 081/100/4 and Martin Tucker at Day 098/89/12 to Day 098/89/15 confirm a picture consistent with the injuries found on the body of Jackie Duddy as having fallen forward on to his face. It is clear that the injuries visible in EP25.7 would be consistent with a forward fall.

(iii) There was no object near him when he fell and no weapon or missile of any kind around him.

(iv) He was running away from the soldiers at the waste ground and the mouth of the car park.

(vi) No-one around Jackie Duddy was engaged in any threatening activity towards the soldiers.

(vii)The soldiers continued to fire into the car park as Jackie Duddy was being tended to by Father Daly and others.

(viii) There was no gunfire, nail bombs or any threat directed towards the soldiers from the car park.

17.6.2.22 William Barber stated that Father Daly and he thought also himself had handkerchiefs out as they carried the body towards the Saracen and the nearest soldiers. The soldiers shot at them. Mr. Barber said a few choice words and they veered towards and down Chamberlain Street. Once they got round the corner of Harvey Street in what must have been Waterloo Street they laid the boy down there and Mr. Barber put his jacket under him. Other people put coats around him.

17.6.2.23 Father Daly described the discussion and decision to move Jackie Duddy to Harvey Street or Waterloo Street so as to have a better chance of getting an ambulance. H5.5 paragraph 23. After the interlude involving the gunman they got up on their knees and he waved a white handkerchief. There was a burst of gunfire and their group lay down again. Eventually the group got up and the body was carried up Chamberlain Street, right into Harvey Street and then into Waterloo Street where Mr Barber took off his coat and Jack Duddy's body was laid down on it. He appeared to be dead at that time. H5.6 paragraph 25.The position is marked as the letter J on H5.25.

17.6.2.24 The photographs P631 and P634 show Jackie Duddy being carried to Waterloo Street. At the corner of Chamberlain and Harvey Street the party met Mr Bierman and Mr Cave of the BBC and a patrol of soldiers and can be seen on the video footage at V1/0.5.13 to 0.5.24. A lady who lived in the vicinity, Mrs. McCloskey, called an ambulance. Father Daly waited for the ambulance.

17.6.2.25 Charles Glenn at AG43.4 paragraph 31 described moving cautiously with the young man's body in a northeast direction towards Chamberlain Street and then up to the junction of Harvey Street. He was concentrating on keeping the dressing in place. Liam Bradley recalled a being part of the group which carried Jackie Duddy out of the car park and north up Chamberlain Street. AB61.6 paragraph 12.

17.6.2.26 Hugh McMonagle identified himself in Video footage. V1/05.13 to 0.5.24. and AM369.5 paragraph 28. As they carried the body up Chamberlain Street he could hear shooting which he thought was coming from the North of Chamberlain Street and over their heads. He thought the shots were in front of him and definitely being fired in the street because of the echo on houses on either side of the street. The group carried Jackie Duddy up Harvey Street and laid him down on the ground. Mr. McMonagle went to find an ambulance and saw a policeman, an army officer and four soldiers on the wall at the side of Castle gate. He did not know which regiment they were from but he shouted to them to “get a fucking ambulance, as a wee boy has been shot.” As he shouted the Officer, wearing kid gloves, began to slow handclap. Mr. McMonagle went to another Barrier across Waterloo Street and shouted at the soldiers there to get an ambulance. The soldier spoke into a radio and appeared to him to be pretending he knew nothing about what had happened. He grabbed across the barbed wire at the soldier and was struck by other soldiers with the muzzles of their rifles. He did not recall how long he was there but when he turned round everybody and Jackie Duddy's body had gone. The witness went down Harvey Street and was chased by soldiers who ran up from the Chamberlain Street end. AM369.6 paragraphs 30 to 32.

17.6.2.27 Father Daly described the discussion and decision to move Jackie Duddy to Harvey Street or Waterloo Street so as to have a better chance of getting an ambulance. H5.5 paragraph 23. After having encountered the gunman he spotted at the gable end wall of Chamberlain Street himself and the group got up on their knees and he waved a white handkerchief. There was a burst of gunfire and their group lay down again. Eventually the group got up and the body was carried up Chamberlain Street, right into Harvey Street and then into Waterloo Street where Mr Barber took off his coat and Jack Duddy's body was laid down on it. He appeared to be dead at that time. H5.6 paragraph 25. The position is marked as the letter J on H5.25.

17.6.2.28 It is submitted that the civilian evidence establishes overwhelmingly that no person near Jackie Duddy was doing anything or carrying any item which could have justified shooting in his direction. Father Daly was clear that he saw no nail bombs explode at any time during the afternoon. H5.3 paragraph 12 and Day 075/57/19 to Day 075/58/3. Nor did he witness any hostile action either stone throwing or shooting against the army prior to them opening fire. He was clear that people were merely running for safety. Day 075/25/5 to Day 075/25/14. The first shot heard by Father Daly in this area was the shot which killed Jackie Duddy. H5.3 paragraph 12. As he was administering the last rites to Jackie Duddy the gunfire began again and heavy firing continued after the shooting of Michael Bridge and as they carried the body of Jackie Duddy across the car park. H5.6 paragraph 25. Father Daly was not aware of any gunfire directed towards the army from the car park or the flats. H5.4 paragraph 18. It is clear on our submission that not only was Jackie Duddy running away from the soldiers with his back towards them and was at all times a target moving away there is no civilian evidence whatsoever of anyone else around or near Jackie Duddy stopping to confront the soldiers or indeed of anyone stopped and confronting the army or having anything in their hand.

17.6.2.29 It should be noted that on Day 095/146/22 to Day 095/147/5 Mr. Glasgow QC when questioning the witness John McCrudden, who had acknowledged that he may have been mistaken in his suggestion that Jackie Duddy was a boy who may have had a bottle in his hand, stated the following: “…I think it is right you should know that neither I nor any of my colleagues has ever suggested that Jackie Duddy had a bottle”.

17.6.2.30 Christy Lavery, at AL5.2 paragraph 9 stated that he was running into the Rossville Flats car park and came abreast of a young man whom he now knows to have been Jackie Duddy, whom at the time he did not know. Jackie Duddy was a few yards west and to the right perhaps one pace in front of the witness. The witness did not hear a shot, but saw a gush of blood coming out of the left-hand side of Jackie Duddy's chest. Day 085/72/7 to Day 085/72/14. He saw him crumple and fall to the ground landing on his face, with his head pointing towards the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 and his feet towards the waste ground. His arms were spread out at right angles to his body and he could see that he had a stone in his right hand. AL5.2 paragraphs 10 to 12 The witness described at AL5 paragraphs 11 to 12 how he called a Knight of Malta to help tend to Duddy, but he described this man as being a different Knight of Malta than the one shown in photograph at AL5.6. He also did not remember Jackie Duddy being attended to by Father Daly. When questioned by Mr. Lawson at Day 085/85/7 to Day 085/85/10 as to whether he was having difficulty recalling what he saw that day he answered that his recollection of the facts might be different now than to what he recalled then. He gave evidence at Day 085/72/15 to Day 085/72/19 and he described the size of the stone at as "pretty small about tennis ball size." When questioned further about the matter by Mr Lawson at Day 085/85/11 to Day 085/85/25 he indicated that it might have been smaller maybe a golf ball size or a large marble size. Even if this evidence were correct it is clear that at the time Jackie Duddy was shot he presented no threat to the soldiers whatsoever.

17.6.2.31 The witness Brian Johnston described taking Jackie Duddy by the right shoulder and raised his shoulder about two feet off the ground. He saw a huge amount of blood coming from the chest area and there appeared to be an open wound. The witness saw Duddy's right hand opening and inside there was a pebble the size of a bead. Day 084/108/14 to Day 084/108/19. He had thought about this since and believed the pebble had been scooped up into Duddy’s hand as he fell. The witness did not believe he saw his left-hand which as it would have been under his body as he lifted him.

17.6.2.32 A large number of witnesses confirmed that Jackie Duddy had nothing in his hands when he was shot. Father Daly at H5.19 paragraph 14 lines 8-10, William McChrystal at AM460.2, Kathleen O’Donnell at AO.2 paragraph 14, Brian Ward at AW6 paragraph 13, Kevin Leonard at AL.1 paragraph 13, Patrick Doherty at AD96.1 paragraph 16 and Isabel Duffy at AD158 paragraph 15 all confirmed that Jackie Duddy had nothing in his hands when he was shot.[12] Neither was anything found around his body .The evidence of Christy Lavery and Brian Johnston has be placed alongside this evidence and it is submitted that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that Jackie Duddy had nothing in his hands when he was shot.

17.6.2.33 As well as Father Daly a large number of witnesses placed Jackie Duddy at the time of the shooting running southwards in the car park of the Rossville Flats and running away from soldiers in the direction of the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the flats. The witness Joseph Eugene McGrory at AM268.2 paragraph 10 placed Jackie Duddy as running in the same direction as himself towards the gap between Block 1 and 2, as did Peter Gallagher at AG23.2 paragraph 11, Bernard Joseph Gilmore at AG38.4 paragraph 20, Martin Tucker at AT17 paragraph 21, Kevin McDaid at AM167.3 paragraph 14.[13] The evidence of Alexander McLaughlin at AM317 paragraph 12 and James McGeehan AM227 paragraphs 10 to 11 would appear to support this proposition. Mary Bonner at AB38.2 paragraphs 12 to 14 and Brian Ward at AW6.1 paragraph 13 placed Jackie Duddy running near or along-side Father Daly as he ran towards the low wall in front of Block 2.

17.6.2.34 Patrick Doherty at AD96.3 paragraph 16 stated that Jackie Duddy at the time he was shot was standing shouting at soldiers and was not running away. It can be noted that at Day 085/12/2 to Day 085/12/6 Counsel to the Inquiry asked what was Jackie Duddy doing at that point. The witness answered: “They were just standing, they were standing sideways facing the soldiers, shouting at them getting ready to run”. In examination at Day 085/27/18 to Day 085/27/24 Mr Finnegan QC suggested to the witness that when he eventually got a clear sight of Jackie Duddy lying on his back it was that that led him to the conclusion that he must have been standing facing the soldiers when he was shot. The witness was asked could he have been mistaken about that, his answer was: “might have been it has been a long time ago”. It is suggested that in regard to the witness Patrick Doherty the overwhelming body of evidence suggests that Jackie Duddy was running away from the soldiers and was not facing them when he was shot.

17.6.2.35 Paul McDaid at AM173 paragraph 9 described running south down Chamberlain Street. He headed for the gaps between Blocks 1 and 2. As he did so he became aware of Jackie Duddy to his right running in the same direction as himself. There was nothing in his hands. Suddenly Jackie who was wearing a red polo neck jersey pitched forward and fell on his mouth and nose arms outstretched. He thought he had tripped and could not recall hearing shots.

17.6.2.36 Brian Ward at AW6 paragraphs 13 to 15 described running towards the wall in front of Block 2 of the Flats alongside him to his left. He noticed a lot of other young fellows running in the same direction at the same time. He heard a shot and noticed a young fellow to his left hit. He believed Jackie Duddy had been running to his left and Father Daly was between them although slightly behind them. He knew the boy was seriously injured because he fell and made no effort to break his fall. He had nothing in his hands.

17.6.2.37 Brian Johnston at AJ9.5 paragraphs 18 to 23 was running into the courtyard of Rossville Flats heading towards the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3. He heard gunfire from behind him. There was a short volley of shots. He thought he heard two or three shots before he saw, out of the corner of his eye, a lad fall face forward to the ground. The lad who he now knows was Jackie Duddy had been running at the tail end of a small group. He had become isolated and fallen a little behind. The witness remembered seeing the black gaberdine of the priest flapping as he was running a couple of yards ahead of the lad. He now knows the priest to be Father Daly. He knew the shots were high velocity rounds from their high pitched distinctive crack. They were the first shots he heard that day. He then went over to tend to him.

17.6.2.38 Peter Gallagher whose statement appeared at AG23.3, was one of the rioters at Barrier 14. He ran into Chamberlain Street and into the courtyard of the Rossville flats towards the exit between Blocks 1 and 2. He said that he heard a high velocity shot and saw Duddy about twenty feet away from him fall at a point D at AG23.8. He says that everyone had been running behind Duddy and then stopped and ran back to the gable end wall on the western side of Chamberlain Street, that is below number 36. He saw Father Daly give Jack Duddy the last rites. There was continuous firing from all around him.

17.6.2.39 James Donal Deeny ran south across the car park to the point marked, but did not remember aiming for anywhere in particular. Day 086/138/1 to Day 086/138/25.

17.6.2.40 A boy, who he now knows to be Jackie Duddy, was running slightly in front of him and to his right. Jackie Duddy wore dark lightly clad clothing and was in the same bunch of people as the witness. He was about a yard or two away from him and they were both facing south. He thought that they may have both ran past a soldier as they ran through the car park from the entranceway. The witness then saw Duddy shot almost in front of him. He fell over immediately on to his face and his head was pointing to Block 2 and his feet to the entrance of the car park. Day 086/87/1 to Day 086/87/20. He stopped up short; as if he had not he would have tripped over him. The witness does not recall hearing the shot that hit Duddy. He stopped and looked at him for 5 or 10 seconds. There was blood was coming out of his chest area. The witness cannot recall hearing any shots before Duddy was shot. There was what seemed to be a lull between Duddy being shot and the people in the car park starting to flee. The witness knew that Jackie Duddy was dead or about to die. Day 086/142/6 to Day 086/142/9. In AD26.4 paragraph 16 he stated that Bridge made a run for the soldier who he thought had probably shot Jackie Duddy at point G on the attached plan, AD26.9 Day 086/87/21 to Day 086/87/25. This was the northeastern corner of Block 1 of the Rossville flats.

17.6.2.41 Sean Eugene O'Neill whose statement appears at AO65.1 is not being called to give oral evidence to the Inquiry. It is submitted that the Inquiry ought to treat the evidence of this witness with the utmost caution. If his evidence of events in Sector 2 as a whole and later events at the Rubble Barricade is taken as a whole we would adopt the observation of Christopher Clarke QC on Day 24 of his opening statement concerning this witness’s "fleetness of foot". His ability to have witnessed almost all the major incidents in these areas is remarkable and highly improbable. His description of Jackie Duddy as a regular rioter is utterly false. It is not borne out by the personal background information, or the weight of the civilian evidence.

17.6.2.42 Noel Doherty at AD91.3 paragraph 18 described turning in the run to the direction of the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. However, he could see that this exit was congested. The witness estimated that about 150 people were trying to get into that alleyway and the entrance door into Block 1 of the Rossville flats. He decided to head for the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 of the flats as this did not seem to be as congested. At AD91.3 paragraph 20 he referred to beginning to run.

17.6.2.43 However, at this point he saw a soldier standing on the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville flats at the point marked 4 on the attached map at AD91.8. This soldier was leaning against Block 1 but did not seem to me to be taking shelter. He was holding up his rifle just under his armpit and aiming through his sights. The soldier was firing shots in a diagonal line in the direction of the alleyway running between Blocks 2 and 3. He saw his rifle jerk up but did not see any smoke or flashes coming from the rifle. He then heard about five or six shots go past him. He carried on running in the direction of the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville flats, glancing over his shoulder as he ran. He could just about see Army vehicles towards the Rossville Street end of the courtyard in the approximate positions marked 5 and 6 at AD91.8. He could not recall how many or what type of vehicles they were. As he was running to make his escape, he noticed a young man had fallen to the right of him. Although he did not know who he was at the time, he now believed that this young man was Jackie Duddy. At the time he thought he had tripped, as he had fallen in the middle of the courtyard. He did not realise that he had been shot. He did not stop but carried on running, trying to keep his body as low as possible. When he got to the low wall (about three feet or so high), which was a few feet north of Block 2 of the Rossville flats, he jumped over and got down behind it.

17.6.2.44 Mary Bonner gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry at WT5.38. She lived at 34 Garvan Place on the second floor of Block 2 of the Rossville flats and was viewing events from the veranda looking out onto the car park towards Chamberlain Street. At AB38.1 paragraph 7 she stated that her first recollection was seeing a crowd of screaming people running down Chamberlain Street towards the car park. She believed that there were also people running down Rossville Street but she was really concentrating on Chamberlain Street. She could hear a lot of banging which sounded like rubber bullets and also the helicopter overhead. Day 082/47/1 to Day 082/47/5. Almost at the same time as the crowd were running into the car park two Saracen armoured cars arrived in the car park. They had been travelling at speed and she could hear the sound of their engines. The noise of their engines made her focus on the Saracens. She was not exactly sure where they came from.

17.6.2.45 She first saw them as they arrived in the car park. One Saracen, which was possibly the first to arrive, pulled up at the side of the stairs at the northern gable end of Block 1. Its back door was open facing the car park. The other seemed to be more or less behind it, but she could not be specific other than it was on the waste ground. She could not describe the position of this one in detail and was unsure which way it was pointing. Day 082/49/22 to Day 082/50/8. The witness saw two soldiers jump out of the back of the first Saracen, the one parked just by Block 1. One soldier knelt on one knee holding his rifle in an aiming position, the other jumped out from behind him and seemed to fire his gun immediately. He didn't seem to aim it but fired it from waist height. They did not move from those positions and stayed close to the back door of the Saracen. Day 082/51/1 to Day 082/52/4. As she looked down the car park had virtually cleared but there were still some people running towards the low wall, which runs parallel to Block 2 and just in front of the rear entrances to the shops. Many people were lying or hiding behind that low wall, but the witness could not give precise numbers. There were still a few people running for cover.

17.6.2.46 She saw a young man, who she now knows to have been Jackie Duddy, running possibly from the direction of Chamberlain Street. The witness believed he was the last person running for cover and she assumed that he was running from the direction of Chamberlain Street. He was making towards the low wall. Day 082/52/5 to Day 082/53/14. She could see Father Daly run past him. She did not know where Father Daly came from. The witness saw Jackie Duddy turn his face slightly to the left as if he was looking behind or to the side of him. She heard a bang and he went down face first on to the car park. Day 082/53/21 to Day 082/54/1. He fell approximately at the end of the middle set of white car parking lines. AB38.6. Jackie Duddy was heading for the low wall and running more or less straight towards her. Father Daly and a couple of other people who had been with him ran behind the wall. She could not tell where the shot that hit Jackie Duddy came from but connected it in her mind with the soldier that she saw shoot his gun when he got out of the back of the Saracen. The two events were instantaneous. Day 082/54/9 to Day 082/54/14.

17.6.2.47 She shouted down to the people hiding behind the low wall “that young fella's been hit by a rubber bullet”, which was what she thought at the time. Father Daly crawled out towards Jackie Duddy who was lying face down. He knelt on Jackie Duddy's right (to the left as she looked) and turned him face up. Day 082/55/1 to Day 082/55/10. She could see that Jackie Duddy had blood on his shirt and could see that he tried to lift his head. As Father Daly was cradling Jackie Duddy's head she then heard two shots and Jackie Duddy seemed to jerk and then was still. The witness did not know where those shots came from or whether they hit. They sounded the same as the first shot that she had heard. She could not see any other civilians in the car park, her attention was focused on Jackie Duddy and Father Daly. She then witnessed the shooting of Michael Bridge.

17.6.2.48 She placed Jackie Duddy as falling approximately at the southern end of the middle set of white car parking lines the spot having been marked at AB38.6. It is a little further over to the east from the place at which the photographs show Jackie Duddy to have fallen.

17.6.2.49 Isabel Duffy gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry at WT5.53 D and to this Inquiry at AD158. At AD158.2 paragraph 12 she stated that whilst at her brothers flat, which was two to three doors into Block 2 from Block 1, she looked down into the car park and saw a young boy running in from the entrance. The boy seemed to be running towards the Bog entrance as it was known, which was the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. She recognised him as Jackie Duddy but did not know him personally. The witness was a member of the amateur boxing Board of Control at the time and knew him to be a young boxer. The witness focused in on him and he seemed to me to be at the tail end of the people who had run down William Street towards the Rossville flats. The witness could not recall seeing anyone else around. AD158.2 paragraphs 11 to 13.

17.6.2.50 At about the same time, she noticed two soldiers, both on one knee, by the northern gable end of block 1 of the Rossville flats. The position is marked as "3" on AD158.7. She could not recall whether or not they were wearing any masks or visors or of any sort. Both were kneeling fairly close to the wall. The soldiers were holding their rifles against their waists. She could not recall whether either of the soldiers had their right or left-hand on the trigger. The witness could recall that whichever hand was not on the trigger was being used to support the barrel of the rifle and that hand was steadied by the soldier leaning his elbow on the knee that was not in contact with the ground. As she looked back and forth from Jackie Duddy to the soldiers a shot rang out, she believed from the two soldiers she was looking at. At the time she thought it was a rubber bullet as it was too early in the troubles for her to distinguish between various types of bullet. AD158.3 paragraphs 14 to 15. Her account of 23 February 1972 at AD158.8, has her coming out of her brother's flat and seeing one of the soldiers get down on his knee and point a rifle, having jumped out of the Saracen, and fire two shots, the second of which she believed killed Jack Duddy. This account was consistent with her evidence to Widgery at WT5.53 C-D.

17.6.2.51 Jackie Duddy continued to run. He had reached as far as the about the third garage away from the southern end of Block 2 when a second shot rang out and he pitched forward, his arms outstretched and his hands open and he fell on his face. He fell in the position marked 5 on AD158.7 and his head was nearest to her with his feet towards the entrance to the car park. His legs were splayed out. He was not carrying anything in his hands or in his arms when he fell. After he fell the witness could see blood spreading down his back, from the top of his back towards his hips. At the time she did not see anybody else in the car park or around Jackie Duddy. To her the car park seemed to be empty. There could have been people sheltering close against the wall in front of Block 2 but she would not have been able to see them from where she was standing. AD158.3 paragraphs 15 to 16.

17.6.2.52 Cathleen O’Donnell was 16 or 17 at the time and lived with her family at 57 Donagh Place on the eighth floor of Block 3. At AO23 paragraph 8 she described attempting to get to her flat after going on the march. On the top walkway of Block 2 she was stopped by a man who was lying down on his tummy and overlooking the car park. She could still hear shooting but did not know where it was coming from. He shouted at her to lie down 'they are shooting they can see you'. She went straight down on to her hands and knees and began to crawl along the top balcony of Block 2 on her mouth and nose. Day 082/101/19 to Day 082/102/4. She was terrified because she could hear shooting and did not know where it was coming from or what the people shooting were aiming at.

17.6.2.53 Whilst the witness was crawling along she was looking out to her left across the Rossville flats car park. She had a clear view from the balcony. There were railings that went from the floor of the balcony to approximately chest height and she could put her feet through the gaps and she could see through them clearly. As she was looking through the railings and crawling along she saw some soldiers running across the waste ground behind the Chamberlain Street houses but did not pay much attention to these soldiers. She also saw one Saracen which had stopped near Pilot's Row on the waste ground. Day 082/102/7 to Day 082/102/25. She could see some people running into the car park from Chamberlain Street. She agreed that what she saw gave the appearance of people trying to get away through the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 and Blocks 2 and 3. Day 082/103/23 to Day 082/104/4.

17.6.2.54 Two soldiers caught her attention. She did not know where they came from, whether they ran across the waste ground or whether they came from the Saracen, but she did not see them come out of the Saracen. They were standing at points 1 and 2 marked on the map at AO23.11. Points 1 and 2 are on the northeast corner of Block 1 of the Rossville flats. A black soldier was holding a large gun from his waist and was shooting it around the car park at waist height and up in the air. We know there was no black soldier in Mortar Platoon but the witness believed that he appeared to be aiming his rifle at nothing in particular. He appeared to be aiming at nothing in particular. He was shouting - she could hear the echo of his voice. The soldier kneeling was shooting from his shoulder, again in no particular direction, just all around the car park. AD23.2 paragraph 11, Day 082/105/9 to Day 082/106/7.

17.6.2.55 At that time there were not many crowds in the car park. There were some people running, trying to hide. People were disappearing as the soldiers were shooting. Her attention was focused on the two soldiers, as she did not know what they were shooting for and did not hear anything being shot at them. AD23.2 paragraph 12.

17.6.2.56 The witness then noticed a young boy run across the car park from the point marked 3 on AD23.11 and at the points marked 3 on photographs AD23.9 and AD23.10. At AD23.3 paragraph 14 she described the boy running across the car park in front of the garages underneath Block 1, side along to her. He was the only person there at the time and she was unsure where he came from. She believed he was running towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the flats. He looked happy. He had long dark hair and was wearing a dark coat with big lapels. He had nothing in his hands. She remembered at one stage he looked around and then ran on. The witness did not believe that he saw the soldiers and people were shouting at him to lie down. Suddenly she saw his arms go up above his head in a "v" shape and he fell flat to the ground. She did not remember if he fell on to his back or his tummy. At that time it did not register with her that he had been shot. The witness then saw blood running out from underneath him and she knew then that he had been shot. He was shot at the point marked 4 on AB23.11. She connected the shooting to the two soldiers she had seen at the northeast corner of Block 1. Day 082/110/13 to Day 082/110/25. When her father threw her into the flat there was still shooting going on. AD23.3 paragraph 17. The last thing she remembered is seeing the young lad on the ground with lots of blood everywhere and a man with no hair near him with a white flag. This was Father Daly. She later learned the boy was Jackie Duddy. AD23.3 paragraphs 15 to 16.

17.6.2.57 The late Derrick Tucker, who lived at 31 Garvan Place in Block 2 of Rossville flats, had served three years in the Royal Navy and thirteen years in the Royal Air Force. On the day itself he saw from the veranda outside his flat people in Rossville Street and Chamberlain Street suddenly start to run and saw the approach of the convoy of armoured vehicles. WT7.9 A-B. The scene is as depicted in his photograph at EP28.5. Two Saracens turned into the car park of the Flats from Rossville Street. In doing so they drove through the crowd and the first Saracen knocked down one man, sending him spinning away. The Saracens stopped and soldiers deployed from the back of them. Immediately the Saracens stopped the soldiers got out. One soldier ran to the front nearside wheel and took up a firing position. Another ran to the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses and started pushing people with his rifle held in a port position. AT16.1. He described at WT7.14 B how another soldier from the leading Saracen took up a firing position on the offside of the vehicle. This soldier raised his rifle and started firing towards the landings of the flats. The witness estimated that there was thirty seconds to a couple of minutes between the soldiers getting out of the Saracens and their commencing fire. WT7.14 C. Up to that point the only firing he had heard was of gas canisters and rubber bullets at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. The soldier at the nearside front wheel of the Saracen started firing and he saw a man fall to the ground. That man turned out to be Jackie Duddy. WT7.9 C. He described himself as being 30 yards at least from Jackie Duddy. WT7.14. He saw Father Daly going to his assistance. WT7.14 D.

17.6.2.58 On the evidence of the soldiers, the person who would appear to have been in that position was Sergeant O. The witness described two further shootings in the car park. At no time did he see any of the above mentioned men with weapons of any sort in their hands. WT7.14 C.

17.6.2.59 Martin Tucker, the elder of the two sons of Derrick Tucker Senior who were present in 31 Garvan Place that day, stated at AT17.3 paragraph 17 that two Saracens stopped just in front of garages at the point marked D on the map attached to his statement at AT17.16. It was positioned about a third to a half of the way down Block 1 and to the east of block 1, slightly further down than the photograph of the Pig number 2 would appear to suggest. At AT17.3 paragraph 17 the witness stated that two soldiers got out of the back of one of the vehicles, which was very unusual. The two soldiers came round to the front of the vehicle fairly quickly. Other soldiers may have got out but he only saw those two clearly.

17.6.2.60 At that time, the rest of the crowd was generally scattering and getting out of the way. Some people were heading for the stairway at the north end of Block 1. Most were going for the alleyways between Blocks 1 and 2 and Blocks 2 and 3. The two soldiers were wearing khaki uniforms and helmets. The witness did not notice anything distincti ve about them as they moved to the front of the vehicle. One stood by the offside door (i.e. the passenger door Day 098/87/16 to Day 098/87/19) at the front of the vehicle. He was not sure if the other one went round to the other side of the vehicle, but his recollection was that they were both quite close together. He had an image of the one that moved closest to Block 1 leaning on the front of the Saracen and he did not see them taking cover in any way.

17.6.2.61 Within seconds, one or both opened fire. They were high velocity shots and were the first shots he had heard that day. The witness recalled that both soldiers were shooting but he could not be 100 per cent certain. He stated that one of them definitely was. People were still running away and the crowd were starting to thin. He saw the soldier who was by the offside door, aiming his rifle from the shoulder. Day 098/88/10 to Day 098/88/15.

17.6.2.62 He then heard a crack and saw a man, who he now knows to have been Jackie Duddy, fall at the point marked E on the map AT17.16 attached. At first he could not really believe he had been shot and was trying to make sense of it. However, from the reaction of the people around him, the witness then knew that he had been shot. He had been running side on to the soldier when he was shot. The witness confirmed that he was neither directly facing the soldier or had his back directly to the soldier. Day 098/89/21 to Day 098/90/8. He seemed to be running for the exit between Blocks 1 and 2. AT17.4 paragraph 21. At the time he was shot there would have been about half a dozen or so people closest to him who perhaps realised what had happened. Day 098/92/6 to Day 098/92/11. The next thing the witness saw was his parish priest, Father Daly, as he was then, by the side of Jackie Duddy. A small crowd of maybe half a dozen had gathered around them. And when they later started taking Jackie Duddy out of the car park, he recognised one of those people as Willie Barber. Day 098/92/21 to Day 098/92/24.

17.6.2.63 The witness then described the shooting of Michael Bridge In those first few minutes when Jackie Duddy and Mickey Bridge were shot, he recalls there were maybe half a dozen or ten shots. He thought all these shots were from the two soldiers he had seen. The witness described the interval between the shooting of Jackie Duddy and Mickey Bridge as "a few minutes at most." Day 098/135/20 to Day 098/136/15.

17.6.2.64 Derrik Tucker Junior was aged 12 at the time of Bloody Sunday. He recalled large numbers of people trying to out of the Courtyard from the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 but also recalled there were more people concentrated around the exit between Blocks 1 and 2. AT15.3 paragraph 16. At AT15.3 paragraph 18, he described about five or six Saracens, one of which turned eastwards off Rossville Street and came on to the waste ground. The witness recognised this as the scene in EP28.4A. Day 099/5/20 to Day 099/6/2 When the Saracens came in there were hundreds, possibly thousands of people in the area of waste ground around Eden Place and Pilot's Row. AT15.3 paragraph 19.

17.6.2.65 The Saracen which had come onto the waste ground looped behind an abandoned van and then disappeared out of view. He recalled another Saracen that stopped at the gable end of Block 1 of the flats. From where he sat he could just see the bonnet of the vehicle. He identified the front of this vehicle as visible in EP28. 5 at Day 099/7/13 to Day 099/7/25. He saw a Saracen parked at about the point B marked on AT15.21 which is clearly some distance further into the car park than any other witness civilian or military has placed a military vehicle. He accepted at Day 099/10/1 to Day 099/11/2 that this was possibly the same vehicle as had appeared at the gable end of Block 1. He further accepted it was the Saracen which appears in P188 which we know to be Sgt O's Pig. Day 099/13/3 to Day 099/13/7.

17.6.2.66 At AT15.3 paragraphs 21 to 22 he described how he also saw a soldier get out from the rear of the Saracen that he marked with the letter B. He took up a position some four to five feet from the Saracen. He did not take cover. He immediately started shooting in the direction of Blocks 1 and 2, where people at the alleyway were trying to get out of the courtyard. The witness was unable to remember how many shots were fired and did not know whether anyone was hit as a result. Large numbers of people were able to escape through the alleyways between Blocks 1 and 2 and Blocks 2 and 3. As the crowds cleared he saw a group of people by a body lying on the ground. He marked the approximate position of the body with the letter C on AT15.21. He could see that Father Daly, who was a parish priest, was one of the group around the body, but he did not recognise anyone else. The soldiers were still in the courtyard at the time. The witness was shown EP28.5 and it was his view that the person he saw fall must have been in that photograph rather than come into the car park later. Later he heard that the boy whom he had seen on the ground was Jackie Duddy. He then went on to describe the shooting of Mickey Bridge. He thought that it was something in the order of 20 minutes between the Saracens entering the courtyard and the shooting of Mickey Bridge. Day 099/15/17 to Day 099/15/23.

17.6.2.67 Betty Dunleavey at AD169.2 paragraph 8 described a soldier kneeling down on one knee at the point marked C on the attached map at AD169.4. She could not remember anything distinctive about his uniform although she could tell he was a soldier. He had a helmet on and was holding a rifle in his hands. She saw him shoot a boy, whose position was marked D on AD169.4. She did not know from where the boy appeared, although she believed he was running towards the entrance to the Rossville flats' car park. The witness now knows this boy to have been Jackie Duddy.

17.6.2.68 The soldier kneeling at point C was kneeling just to the west of No. 34 Chamberlain Street and the boy at point D was about a third of the way down Block 1 and about ten yards or so out to the east. At AD169.4 paragraph 9, she stated that the soldier must have had him right in his sights as he shot him. She could only see the top half of the boy's body from her position on the balcony. His body jumped when he was shot and he twirled around as he fell. She saw the body fall out of her line of sight, although she did not see it hit the ground. This was the first shot that she heard in the car park that day. She had heard earlier shots coming from the Rossville Street side of Block 1, although they did not seem to be of high velocity, unlike the shot fired at Jackie Duddy.

17.6.2.69 Dolores MacFarland watched events from her mother's flat on the second floor in Block 3 looking over the car park towards Block 1 and Rossville Street. She described at AM8.2 paragraph 8 the arrival of a Saracen at the entrance to the car park. She thought the two soldiers she saw first got out of this vehicle were the ones who opened fire from positions marked A and B on AM8.6 She accepted at Day 083/112/7 to Day 083/112/18 that she did not actually see these soldiers fire. One was positioned closer to the north east corner of Block 1 and the other closer to the rear of the houses in Chamberlain Street. These soldiers were not being evasive and none of the soldiers appeared to take cover. AM8.2 paragraph 9. At this time there were a couple of hundred people in the car park most of whom were fleeing and who were trying to get through the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2, into the doorway to the stairwell at the northern entrance of Block 1 or through the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. AM8.2 paragraph 10. The shots from these soldiers was the first live fire she heard that day. At the same time as she heard the shots she saw a young lad she now knows to be Jackie Duddy fall to the ground. She thought initially he might have tripped. She saw Father Daly tending to him and a number of others gathered round him. AM8.2 paragraphs 11 to 12. She then witnessed the shooting of Michael Bridge and saw Jackie Duddy being carried towards and up Chamberlain Street. AM8.3 paragraphs 14 to 15.

17.6.2.70 The witness Martin Tucker at AT17.4 paragraphs 24 to 27 suggested that the soldier or soldiers who shot Jackie Duddy and indeed Michael Bridge were on the western side of the pig parked at the mouth of the car park. The witness Mary Bonner in her statement at AB38.1 paragraph 15 and who gave evidence on Day 82 also believed that Jackie Duddy was shot by a soldier on the west side of a pig. Kevin McDaid believed it was a small soldier or a soldier crouched down on the passenger side of the Saracen parked with its front into the car park between the end wall of Chamberlain Street and Block 1 of the flats. AM167.3 paragraph 14 and Day 100/82/5 to Day 100/83/9. Cathleen O’Donnell whose statement appears at AO23.6 paragraph 11 and AO23.7 paragraph 14, who also gave evidence on Day 82 indicated that she saw a black soldier with long legs at Block 1 shooting at waist height whom she connected to the shooting. Isabel Duffy described at AD158.2 paragraph 14 evidence of a soldier firing from the north shooting Jackie Duddy in a position firing from north of Block 1. Noel Doherty also described at AD91.4 paragraphs 20 to 28 a soldier firing from the north of Block 1 shooting Jackie Duddy. The witness James Donal Deeney who gave evidence at Day 086/87/21 to Day 086/87/25 saw Michael Bridge make a run for the soldier who he thought had probably shot Duddy at a point north east corner of block 1. James McKinney whose statement appears at AM303 and who gave evidence at Day 081/99/2 to Day 081/100/18 indicated that he saw a soldier firing from the back of a pig at Eden Place. His impression was that the person fell forwards when he was shot as if about to hit the deck and he thought he was wearing a red jumper. The witness Betty Dunleavy whose statement appears at AD169.2 gave evidence on Day 83/130/4 to Day 083/131/3 that Jackie Duddy was shot by a soldier at the back of Chamberlain Street houses just to the west of 34 Chamberlain Street.

17.6.2.71 There is clearly a wide variety of civilian evidence as to the location of shooters and provenance of the shots into the car park of the flats. This is not altogether surprising given the circumstances of the day. The witnesses were watching events unfold at a very fast pace in an extremely short period of time. The variety of locations from which the shooting of Jackie Duddy was witnessed inevitably affected the quality of the identification of individual soldiers. A number of the witnesses were of course either fleeing themselves under fire or sheltering from shooting from the soldiers at the mouth of the car park and on the waste ground. What there is absolutely no doubt about is that the civilian evidence establishes clearly that the shot which killed Jackie Duddy came from a limited number of soldiers firing into the car park. The soldiers who admitted firing into the car park positioned themselves in the general area from which the civilian witnesses say the firing came.

Conclusion

17.6.2.72 The essential consensus of the civilian evidence is that Jackie Duddy was shot running away from the soldiers positioned at the mouth of the car park and on the waste ground. He was not armed or engaged in any offensive activity towards the soldiers. He was running for shelter along with others towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats when he was fired upon from the rear. It is clear that no activity around Jackie Duddy justified his shooting. It is further clear that no activity in the car park or the flats justified his shooting. The unjustified shooting continued as he was being tended to by a priest, a first-aider and civilians. Jackie Duddy was murdered by a soldier of Mortar Platoon.

[1] The suggested sequence of Derrick Tucker's photographs by Dr. Bell is to be found at E26.4. The sequence is 4, 3a, 3, 2, 1, 4a or 5, 6.This would accord with the recollection of Martin Tucker at Day 098/77/14 to Day 098/84/5, except for photograph 6.

[2] See also evidence of William Harley AH36.2 paragraph 8, James Lynch AL24.3 paragraph 13, Robert Gallagher AG26.4 paragraph 21, Mary Bonner, AB38.1 paragraph 7.

[3] Derrick Tucker Senior described a similar incident at WT7. 14B. This is possibly Thomas Harkin AH106.2 paragraph 6 to 7

[4] See the evidence of Jeffrey Morris and other civilians considered in detail at 19.9 below.

[5] The witness Joseph Nicholas at AN17.3 paragraph 8 connected an attempt to rescue an old man from Paratroopers at Eden Place with a shot towards no. 13 Chamberlain Street. Neither Lieutenant N or Soldier 019 claim to have had an arrestee in the their custody while Lieutenant N fired his shots towards Chamberlain Street.

[6] See for example the evidence of Antoinette Coyle at AC85.6 paragraphs 22 to 26. No soldier admits firing at this location.

[7] AM172.2 paragraph 12.

[8] Martin Tucker saw soldiers who he believed were responsible for shooting up a brown Ford Cortina parked in the car park of Rossville flats. He considered it bizarre, as there was no one in the car and nothing special about it. There were perhaps half a dozen shots, maybe more and he was certain he did not see a gunman behind it. The witness believed the soldier fired at this car from the side of the Chamberlain Street houses rather than the northern end of block 1 of Rossville Flats. AT17.5 paragraph 29 and Day 098/86/12 to Day 098/86/23. Gerard Colhoun also saw this incident AC70.4 paragraph 12.

[9] Further evidence of the lack of threat to the Army can be seen at the following: William Harley at AH36.6 paragraph 31, Kevin Leonard at AL7.5 paragraph 14, Charles McMonagle at AM367.6 paragraph 35, Monica Hegarty at AM63.5 paragraph 7, Brian Baker at AB1.9 paragraph 17, Alan Harkins at AH8.5 paragraph 24, Patrick Rowe at AR30.2 paragraph 8 and AR30.3 paragraph 15, Patricia Canning at AC26.5 paragraph 25,

[10] However Neil McLaughlin’s contemporary account indicates that Peggy Deery was shot at the rear of the houses at Chamberlain Street / Pilot Row AM347.13.

[11] For example Peter Gallagher Day 83/38/10 to Day 83/38/25 and Day 83/39/1 to Day 83/40/25, Kevin Leonard AL7.5 paragraph 10,

[12] See also Charles Glenn AG43.1 paragraph 33

[13] See also Patrick Harkin AH29.1 paragraph 13

[14] James McKinney at AM303 and Day 81/97/14 to Day 81/102/22 gave evidence which closely described the shooting of Jackie Duddy but his location of his fall was clearly wrong .The witness was not inflexible on this point at Day 81/102/14 to Day 81/102/21. The witness James Christopher McKnight also clearly described the shooting of Jackie Duddy but located the postion of his body wrongly. The scene in P630 brought back a recollection, Day 401/142/12 to Day 401/142/23. At AM312.17 he located two soldiers firing one at the south west gable end of Chamberlain Street below no. 36 and one south of Chamberlain Street in the car park.

17.6.3 Injuries sustained

17.6.3.1 The post mortem examination was carried out by Dr Carson at 4.00 pm. (E2.68) The report of Doctor Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan appears at E2.31.32 with the accompanying diagram at E2.74. Photographs taken in the mortuary are in Bundle P2 at Tab 1 (P29 to P40) inclusive.

17.6.3.2 In summary, Jackie Duddy was struck by a single bullet which entered the outer side of the right shoulder. It passed through the right side of the chest, damaged the right lung, spine, major blood vessels and the left lung and then exited through the upper left side of the chest. The diagram at E2.74 is slightly misleading in that it indicates the entry wound on the front view of the body whereas it would appear from photographs P34 and P36 that the bullet entered slightly behind the midline, i.e. closer to the back of the shoulder than the front. He also suffered other minor injuries consistent with falling to the ground.

17.6.3.3 Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position, the initial track passed from right to left and there was probably a slight angle backward. After deflection by the scapula, the track passed forwards into the chest where it was again deflected, this time by the spine, before exiting.

17.6.3.4 As Dr. Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan point out, great care must be exercised in interpreting the track angles in this injury since the mobility of the shoulder may allow for many different positions of the chest and body with the arm in the same position. However, the medical evidence is consistent with the civilian evidence that Jackie Duddy was shot by a soldier to his right as he ran towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2, perhaps turning to look over his right shoulder at the soldiers as he did so. His injuries do not correspond with any of the accounts of the soldiers who admit firing into the Rossville Flats courtyard or indeed of any other soldier who witnessed the events.

17.6.4 Forensic Evidence

17.6.4.1 Swabs were taken from Jackie Duddy’s hands and clothes for the purpose of forensic examination. Summarised in Table 2 of Dr Lloyd’s report at E1.30 are the totals of the numbers of particles recorded by Dr Martin from the hands and surfaces of the outer garments of all the deceased together with the conclusions of his reports. In Jackie Duddy’s case, the results were negative. There was, therefore, no forensic evidence supporting any suggestion that he was engaged in any unlawful activity about the time he was shot.

17.7.1 Patrick McDaid was 24 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday. He was a single man from the Creggan area of Derry and was employed as a Plumber by the Londonderry Development Commission. He attended civil rights marches regularly and joined the march on 30 January at Bishop’s Field.

P205 (Not taken on the day). Retaining wall in front of block 3, which Patsy McDaid ran along to the right before diving down the steps towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3.

P796, P797, P798, P800, P801. Series of photographs taken by Giles Peres including Patrick McDaid at P796 (EP25.7) and P797 (EP25.8) on the ground at the retaining wall in front of block 3.

P610 (P760), P611 (P761), 612 (P762). Taken by Eamon Melaugh both in a maisonette in Joseph Place and outside.

P762.1 (EP2.16) Taken by Jeffrey Morris showing Patrick McDaid being taken to the ambulance with Charles McMonagle on the left Noel McLoone on the right.

17.7.3 Civilian Evidence

17.7.3.1 Patrick McDaid was the fourth person known to have been wounded in the car park of the Rossville flats. In his statement at AM172.1 he described helping others carry Peggy Deery to the house at the corner of Chamberlain Street which was number 33. It would appear that he was the last person wounded in this sector. He also appears to have seen the shooting of Jackie Duddy. Day 092/109/7 to Day 092/109/17 and Day 092/110/8 to Day 092/110/11.

17.7.3.2 At AM172.2 paragraph 11 he described coming out of the house, and looking around. He could only see a few people standing around in Chamberlain Street and he could not see any help. He stood at the southern end of Chamberlain Street, where it led into the Rossville Flats car park. He was going to run across the car park, to the entrance between blocks 1 and 2. As he looked around he could see people standing about alongside the western gable end wall of Chamberlain Street. He then described the shooting of a young man who must have been Jackie Duddy.

17.7.3.3 At AM172.2 paragraph 12 he described standing at a point at the very south of Chamberlain Street. There were about 20 or 30 people around him although he did not specifically remember any of them. All he could recall is that everyone wanted to get out of that area. He and some other people moved to his left, that is eastwards to the far eastern corner of the car park. At this point there was a corner, formed by the junction of the eastern end of Chamberlain Street and a high wall to the car park side of block 3 of the Rossville Flats. There was nothing going on in that corner of the car park and he never really noticed anything else happening around him.

17.7.3.4 The solid concrete wall on the car park side of block 3 was too high for them to get up. He realised that if they wanted to get out of the car park, they would have to run across it to the gap between blocks 2 and 3. Three or four other people around him ran across the car park and made it to the gap between blocks 2 and 3. He decided that he was not going to stay where he was because it would have been very easy for them to get caught by the Army although he had not seen any soldier at this stage. He therefore got down on his hands and knees ready to creep or crawl across the car park. However he then changed his mind as he thought that a running target would be more difficult to hit. Therefore, before he had moved from his position he stood up again and got ready to run.

17.7.3.5 He could still hear shots as this was going on, but he could not recall where they were coming from. He had just started to run out from the wall and had got about two yards when another man also decided to make a run for it and he ran past his left-hand side. The other man was carrying a camera by its strap in his right hand, which, as he ran, he dropped. Patrick McDaid could not believe that the man stopped and turned to pick it up before carrying on heading for the gap between blocks 2 and 3. Seeing the man do this made Patrick McDaid again stop and hesitate before running out. The man with the camera was likely to have been Giles Peres.

17.7.3.6 From his position Patrick McDaid could see the people who had run across to the gap between blocks 2 and 3. The people were yelling to come on and make a run for it. He did not recognise or know any of the people who had run across. He just wanted to get out. He therefore ran out from his position and headed for the gap between blocks 2 and 3. As he ran he had nothing in his hands. The approximate position of his run is marked by a dotted line on the map at AM172.26.

17.7.3.7 He saw a low wall in front of him which looked as if it might provide him with cover. As he was running he saw the wall and bent down to dive over the wall. He landed on the ground the other side of the wall. He did not realise then but later discovered that the wall had steps around it and the ground on which he had landed was lower than the level of the car park he had run along. As he hit the ground, someone else landed behind him, slightly to his left-hand side. This person said to Patrick McDaid "I think you are shot in the back." Patrick McDaid said no they have missed. He did not feel as though he had been shot. The man then put his hands on his back and showed him his blood on his hand. He panicked. Fear went through him. He did not know how badly he was hit, particularly because the wound was on his back and he could not see it. He believed he was hit at the exact time when he bent from upright position to dive over the wall.

17.7.3.8 He indicated that he believed he was able to identify himself in EP25.7 as the person lying prone on the ground on the right hand side in the group of people shown. He also believed from what he was told later that the man behind him was Patrick Walsh. Day 092/117/1 to Day 092/117/24. He wanted to change direction and run for the gap between blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. However, the man with him held him back and said 'no'. He did not even look at the man with him, as he was slightly behind him. The man then sort of pushed him from behind or half ran with him through the gap between blocks 2 and 3. He could not really remember how he got through the gap between blocks 2 and 3 because the only thing that was going through his mind at this stage was wondering how badly he had been hit.

17.7.3.9 The man pushed him into the first house of the northern block of Joseph Place. It can be noted that at AM172.5 paragraph 26, Patrick McDaid referred to his previous statement of 7^th February 1972, in which he indicated that he was carried to the second or third house in the northern block of Joseph Place. He stated that that could have been the position but he believed it was the first. Patrick McDaid confirmed that he appeared being treated in P760, P761 and P762.

17.7.3.10 John Joseph Tyre whose statement is at AT20.3 described running across the corner of the car park against the high wall after having seen Peggy Deery and Michael Bridge. He did not see any Saracens or soldiers. There were about six fellas huddled on their knees in the corner (at point Z attachment 2) at AT20.6 on the north-east corner of the car park. They were all down on their hunkers watching out over the car park. The wall behind them was about ten feet high. He crouched with his shoulder against the wall. He could hear shooting which he thought was coming towards the Rossville Flats. It was the same cracks he had heard before. He could not hear any other noise. He did not see any missiles being thrown from the flats.

17.7.3.11 One or two fellows decided they would crawl along the side of the wall towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3. He did not know their names. They crawled on their hands and knees and were sometimes down flat. After they were out of sight another fella and himself set off to crawl towards the gap. He thought he had been crouching at the wall for some minutes. He did not know the lad in front of him but he would now guess it was Patrick McDaid. Day 093/163/18 to Day 093/163/22.

17.7.3.12 The boy crawled along on his hands and knees and the witness did the same. They crawled very close to the wall about a foot apart. If they heard a succession of cracks then the boy in front would lie down flat. He was wearing dark clothes, a dark jacket like a suit jacket and trousers. He had black hair, around collar length. He was a bit older than the witness, about eighteen or nineteen. They sometimes would have crawled on their hands and knees and sometimes would have tried to run a bit on their hunkers. Day 093/163/23 to Day 093/164/5. They got to the top of the couple of steps near to the children's play area leading down to the gap. The boy in front came up a bit on his hunkers to get down the steps. Suddenly he fell straight down with his head forward. His body was on the steps. The front part of him may have been just passed the steps.

17.7.3.13 The witness agreed that Mr. McDaid’s own description to the Inquiry of taking a dive over either the steps or the wall near to the steps, in such a way that the bullet caught him as he was in the course of diving, could accord with his own recollection. Day 093/165/14 to Day 093/165/21. He saw a small hole in his mid-back slightly to the right of centre. It was a small clean hole about three quarters of a centimetre in diameter. There was no blood. He could now see two or three older men in a doorway in the Rossville flats shouting at them to come on. He wanted to get past the boy so he crawled around him and crawled quickly through the gap. When he got to the gap he stood up. It is submitted that the location of the wound and the sequence and position of events described by him suggests that what Mr Tyre was referring to is the incident in which Patrick McDaid was wounded.

17.7.3.14 Billy Gillespie at AG33.2 paragraphs 9 to 10 described being behind a low wall in front of block 3 of the Rossville Flats. He described a line of people waiting for the right opportunity to get away. Patsy McDaid was in front of him. Patsy McDaid got up and ran towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3. There was still shooting coming down from the Bog towards Free Derry Corner and in the waste ground to the east of Rossville Street. Patsy McDaid had not moved far from behind the wall when he was shot in the back. The witness marked the spot on AG33.13. The witness stated that he and people behind him lifted Patsy McDaid and ran with him towards the gap. They stuffed some pads down his back. They carried him down the steps, which were just before the gaps between blocks 2 and 3, that is the set of steps in front of block two bays in from the east. Day 084/157/17 to Day 084/157/22. At the gap some people took him out and helped him away.

17.7.3.15 Patrick Walsh recognised himself as the person in P796 and P797. Day 171/27/8 to Day 171/27/25. He recalled hearing shooting going on at the time when P797 would have been taken, where he is shown with his hand on Patrick McDaid’s shoulder. He could not say where the shooting was coming from. Day 171/29/4 to Day171/29/9. The witness had described, in an interview with the Sunday Times in 1972 which can be found at AW5.35, a youth cannoning into him as he ran. They both fell and the youth told him he had been shot. The witness saw the wound in his back. He decided the youth needed attention and he could see the back doors to Joseph Place were open and people were crouching there. He ran across the alleyway behind Joseph Place and another man helped him get the boy into the second house. The witness confirmed that he had forgotten this incident but was reminded of it by his wife and he did remember it Day 171/33/25 to Day 171/34/5. It seems that the evidence of Soldier 134 at B1831.004 paragraph 21, Day 363/54/20 to 363/57/12 and Day 363/89/1 to Day 363/89/24. confirms a man being assisted by another into a house in Joseph Place.

17.7.3.16 Joseph Nicholas identified himself as the figure in EP25.8 immediately behind the prone figure of Patrick McDaid with Patrick Walsh and possibly one of the figures in EP25.7. Day 078/18/8 to Day 078/18/8 and Day 078/19/9 to Day 078/18/20. He was able to recall an interview with the Sunday Times in 1972 at AN17.2 but not the contents of the interview. In that interview he named Patrick McDaid as a person who was hit as he made a run towards stairs and in the direction of the alleyway behind Joseph Place. Day 078/40/3 to Day 078/41/4.

17.7.3.17 Patrick McDaid was carried to a house in Joseph Place. This scene was witnessed by Thomas Dawe. Day 094/128/16 to Day 094/129/3. James Anthony Norris was a Knight of Malta who attended the march in that capacity. In a written statement in 1972 at AN20.21 he recalled treating, amongst others, a man with a back wound in a house in Joseph Place. The wound was likened to a bullet track along his back. He and Mr Mcloone another Knight of Malta applied a gun-shot pack to the man’s back and sent him to hospital. Noel Christopher McLoone recalled in his statement to this Inquiry treating a man for a back wound in what he now knew to have been 12 Joseph Place. AM359.22 paragraphs 23 to 24. Although he had thought it was an elderly man called Johnson the witness confirmed in oral evidence that he had recently found out the man’s name was Mr.McDaid. Day 175/152/4 to Day 175/152/22. He further confirmed looking at P761 that the wound he saw was similar to the wound seen in the photograph of Patrick McDaid and that it might be the person he treated but could not tell from the photograph. Day 175/153/14 to Day 175/153/23. The description of the wound, the location of treatment and the accompanying evidence of Mr.Norris would point clearly to the conclusion that both these men treated Patrick McDaid in Joseph Place.

17.7.3.18 Charles Downey whose statement appears at AD133 and who gave evidence at Day 91, recalled helping Patrick McDaid into the house in Joseph Place face down, because he had been shot in the back, but did not recognise him in any of the photographs shown to him namely P760 and P762. He did not recognise the type of wound shown in P760 but the witness did not think that it was possible he saw someone other than Patrick McDaid on the occasion in question with the sort of wound seen in P760. Day 091/110/13 to Day 091/112/9.

17.7.3.19 Eamon Melaugh described at AM397.6 paragraphs 53 to 58 going to the first maisonette at Joseph Place and seeing a boy with a wound between his shoulder blades. He took two photographs P610 and P611.

17.7.4.1 His wound was described in the relevant medical report of Mr.H.M Bennett FRCS which is at ED28.3 as a glancing wound which had been fired while the patient was ducking down and did not indicate a direct hit from behind. The same medical report said that the wound was noted to be full of carbon particles which could indicate a fairly close range discharge. Mr Bennett found the wound to be full of what he described as carbon particles which he considered would indicate a fairly close range discharge. Mr Bennett, of course, was dealing with what appeared then as a suggested glancing gun-shot wound. He was therefore explaining the particles in that context. This is considered further below in the findings of Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan. Patrick McDaid indicated to the Widgery Inquiry that he spent twelve days in hospital.

17.7.5.1 Patrick McDaid was taken to Altnagelvin hospital in ambulance no.2 registration no.5986 UZ manned by Mr.Harry Wray and John Gilchrist which had arrived near the entrance to Rossville Flats at 4.28 pm. It arrived at hospital at 4.45 pm.

17.7.6.1 The opinion of Dr. Shepherd and Mr.O’Callaghan is to be found at E10.7, E18.6.1 and E20.1. In EIO.7 they refer to the findings of Mr. Malhorta, Consultant Surgeon and Mr.Bennett. Mr McDaid sustained a ragged three-inch by two inch lacerated injury over the left scapula. Mr.Malhorta did not find a true entrance or exit wound. He recorded the finding of black edges on the wound and a lot of carbon particles. In a discharge report of 11 February 1972 it is suggested that it was possibly a glancing wound with the tearing of the skin and superficial tissues.

17.7.6.2 After examining photographs of the wound they concluded at E18.6.1 that even with the photographs:

“A fresh interpretation of the injury remains difficult mainly due to the overall lack of reliable information. However, the appearance of the injury suggests it may have been caused by a thin ‘disc’ or sliver of material moving rapidly, which has sliced through the skin of the back from a generally right to left direction leaving a flap of tissue at the upper margin. It does not have the appearance of a typical bullet wound.”

17.7.6.3 At E20.1 Mr O’Callaghan and Dr Shepherd conclude that Patrick McDaid was not struck by a bullet. Objects that could cause such a slicing wound as that suffered by Mr. McDaid would include an old penny, other metal discs, the top or bottom plates of a “U2” type battery. The black particles around the wound might be explained by the disc being contaminated by either the contents of the battery or by soiling of a penny if it were placed against the charge in the baton round gun. They accept other possibilities may exist. The essential matter is that in 1972 the doctors were proceeding on the basis that they were dealing with a gun-shot wound and Mr.Bennett sought to explain the back particles in that context. It was in that context that he was able to suggest a fairly close range discharge. It is submitted that the findings of Mr. O ' Callaghan and Dr. Shepherd now invalidate any such suggestion. It is submitted that there is no basis for suggesting a fairly close range discharge. In the context of the evidence regarding rubber bullet discharge on the day Patrick McDaid was not shot at close range but by a soldier towards or in the mouth of the car park. The shot was by means of a doctored rubber bullet.

17.7.6.4 At Day 229/61/3 to Day 229/61/9 Dr. Shepherd stated that they were confident the wound was not caused by a lead bullet. A doctored rubber bullet had to be the “highest possibility” given the documentation supplied to him. He referred to this documentation in E20.1 which indicated that doctored rubber bullets were used. Day 229/62/11 to Day 229/62/17. Dr Shepherd specifically rejected the suggestion from Peter Clarke QC on behalf of a number of the soldiers that nuts and bolts from nail bombs could be candidates for the injury because of the slicing action causing the wound. Day 229/74/3 to Day 229/74/11. Further in the context of the suggestion of nail bombs whilst accepting the possibility of a slicing action from the bottom of a tin can lid he could find nothing of the appearance of explosives injuries, including nail bombs, in the injury to the back of Patrick McDaid. Day 229/74/11 to Day 229/75/5.

17.7.6.5 A contemporary police report from Superintendent Finn indicated the following:

“He does not appear to have been guilty of any illegal conduct at the time he was shot. Fortunately he is still alive.” OS1.838

17.7.6.6 The identity of the soldier who fired a rubber bullet and struck Patrick McDaid is limited to a number of candidates. Of the four baton round gunners in the two Pigs on the waste ground and at the courtyard of the flats, Soldier 017 gave evidence that he debussed in Rossville Street and remained there during the engagement. Soldier 019 debussed and accompanied Lieutenant N. He would therefore have taken some time to reach the mouth of the car park. He was asked could he have fired rubber bullets across the car park when he debussed, towards the flats. He replied no, he did think he would have done. Day 343/174/8 to Day 343/174/19.

17.7.6.7 Soldier 112 placed himself at the northeast corner of block 1 of Rossville Flats and from there he could see a group of civilians in the alley way between blocks 1 and 2. He claimed to have fired some baton rounds in the direction of stone throwers and some further rounds in the direction of the alleyway as they retreated. He estimated about six baton rounds were fired in all. Day 320/106/14 to Day 320/107/5. Soldier 112 was asked had he fired his rubber bullet gun from the direction of the northeast corner of block1, to the gap between blocks 2 and 3. He did not recall, but doubted that he would have at that distance. Day 320/143/1 to Day 320/143/6. He denied that he had any knowledge of soldiers modifying baton rounds. Day 320/143/1 to Day 320/143/25. He had been using a baton gun for most of his time in the Army, which was a total of six years from 1970 onwards and had never heard of baton rounds being modified. Day 320/144/1 to Day 320/144/13. He further denied shooting Patrick McDaid with a modified rubber bullet, nor did he recollect seeing anyone firing baton rounds across the courtyard in that direction. Day 320/144/14 to Day 320/144/23.

17.7.6.8 It is most probable that the projectile was fired from the weapon carried and used by Soldier 013. Soldier 013 in his statement at B148.003 paragraph 15 described being positioned on Rossville Flats car park and concentrating on dealing with rioters, who were screaming and shouting.[1] He described himself as quite aggressive at that age, "…I gave a few of them a doing over….I think that is why I was given the job of firing the baton rounds, to keep the rioters away. I was probably over aggressive as a soldier. The Para's ethos is that if someone is going to be violent towards you, you attack them. I always used aggression and it worked. It is the best form of defence. I felt that the aggression was justified given what I faced as I got out of the Pig". B1408.003 paragraph 15.

17.7.6.9 Soldier 013 then described chasing a lad up the stairway, which he thought, was at the northern end of block 1. He chased him up the stairway and fired a baton round up the stairs. He also fired a number of baton rounds at the windows of Rossville Flats, as there were also "…good firing positions" there. He wanted to keep people away from the windows to prevent them shooting at soldiers. He could not now recall which windows he fired at. B1408.003 paragraph 16.

17.7.6.10 He described at this point, using the walls of the Rossville Flats and Sergeant O's Pig as cover. "…I kept firing my baton round to keep people away and all the time I was expecting to be shot". B1408.004 paragraph 17. He did not remember seeing anyone hit or anyone being shot in the car park, although he saw people falling over in the crowd. He was concentrating on looking for firing positions and gunmen. He did not use his rifle at all. "…my role was to use the baton gun". B1408.004 paragraph 18.

i. Given the evidence of the location, timing and firing of a baton gun in the car park, it is submitted that Soldier 013 is a prime contender for firing the baton round which struck Patrick McDaid.

ii. Patrick McDaid was not engaged in any activity when wounded apart from trying to move through the Courtyard of the Rossville Flats towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3.

iii. There was no activity around him or in his vicinity which could provide any justification for his wounding.

v. It is overwhelmingly likely that he was wounded by a projectile fired from a rubber bullet gun.

vi. Such a wounding was the result of a deliberate and malicious act in doctoring the projectile from a rubber bullet gun.

17.8. Soldiers’ Evidence

17.8.1 Introduction

This section deals with the evidence of the soldiers in (i) Mortar Platoon, (ii) C Company and (iii) the Observation Posts overlooking the sector. In each sub-section, we first provide an overview of the soldiers’ accounts and then examine the salient features of the most relevant soldiers in each category.

17.8.2 Mortar Platoon

17.8.2.1. The first 2 Pigs in the Support Company convoy that passed through Barrier 12 were occupied by soldiers from the Mortar Platoon under the command of Lt. N. Lt. N says that there were 18 in his platoon. He had briefed them on the Saturday evening that they were to engage in an arrest operation in the event that the march became violent. They drove in their pigs from Palace Barracks, Holywood to Derry on Sunday morning and went via their forming-up place to the Presbyterian Church. Apparently the original plan was for Mortar Platoon to gain access to William Street by driving through a brick wall beside the church but this plan was abandoned when it was realised there was a drop on the other side of the wall. The revised plan was to access William Street by driving through Barrier 12.

17.8.2.2. The Platoon was divided into two sections. The distribution is not entirely free from doubt but it would appear to have been as follows. Lt. N commanded the section in Pig 1 comprising himself, Private S (the driver), Lance Corporal V, Private Q, Private O19, Corporal 162, Private 112 and INQ1918 (the radio operator). This is 8 in total and there are Eversheds statements from each of these soldiers. The second section was commanded by Sergeant O and comprised himself, Corporal P, Lance Corporal 768, Private R, Private T (deceased), Private U, Private 006, Private O17, Private 13 and Private INQ1579. This makes 10 in total.

17.8.2.3 The doubt arises from the conflicting testimony of the soldiers in this platoon and the fact that the normal practice was to divide the Platoon evenly so that there were nine in each Pig. According to Sergeant O, the platoon was reasonably fluid in movement as between the two Pigs but there were certainly 9 men in each Pig (B575.111 paragraph 24). During his oral testimony he said that there would not be 10 in one Pig and 8 in the other (Day 335/21/16 to Day 335/21/19). He is probably wrong about this. The doubts relate mainly to Soldiers 112, 017 and 768.

17.8.2.4 Soldier 112 believes that he was in Sergeant O’s Pig (B1732.1 paragraph 4 and Day 320/96/9 to Day 320/96/18 and Day 320/123/7 to Day 320/123/24). He has a recollection of an altercation that took place between someone in the Pig ahead of him and someone at the Barrier which would mean that he was in the second (O’s) Pig (Day 320/96/19 to Day 320/96/23). Some of the soldiers he remembers being in his Pig were certainly in O’s Pig but others were in N’s Pig. One of those in N’s Pig, Soldier Q, remembers being paired with 112 but 112 says he was not paired with anybody (Day 320/87/3 to Day 320/87/9). He specifically remembers that when he got out of the vehicle he had his back to the flats and there were crowds of people running across the waste ground in his direction. But he also said that his vehicle swung round to the left to get on the waste ground, i.e. facing north on his attached map (B1732.4 paragraph 17). He marked a point on the attached map around Pilots Row where he believes he debussed and this point is between the points were the two Pigs stopped.

17.8.2.5 If he was in Sergeant O’s Pig there would have been more soldiers (perhaps 11) in Sergeants O’s Pig than in Lt. N’s Pig. However, the Pigs could hold 10 in the back, according to 112 (Day 320/124/10 to Day 320/124/14). There were four soldiers with baton guns in the Platoon and it would have been expected that there would have been two in each Pig and indeed the video shows two puffs of smoke appearing almost simultaneously at the back of Lt.N’s Pig when it comes to rest in the waste ground suggesting that there were two soldiers with baton guns in that Pig. The only other soldier with a baton gun who was definitely in Lt. N’s Pig was Soldier 019. Soldier 017, who had a baton gun, was adamant that he was in Pig 1 and that Corporal P was with him but Corporal P was equally adamant that they were both in Pig 2. Bearing in mind O17’s deployment after debussing, the likelihood is that they were both in O’s Pig. Soldier 013 was definitely in O’s Pig so, if 112 had also been in O’s Pig, that would have made three baton gunners in O’s Pig and only one in N’s Pig. Bearing in mind 112’s own uncertainty on this issue it seems likely, on balance, that he was in Lt. N’s Pig and deployed immediately with Soldier Q to the north gable wall of Block 1 close to Sergeant O’s Pig.

17.8.2.6 Sergeant O believed that INQ768 was in his Pig. (B575.111 paragraph 24) INQ 768 believed that he drove that Pig (C768.28 paragraph 15) but it is clear from other evidence that he did not, although he may have driven it to the Morgue. He was still certain that he was in Sergeant O’s Pig. (Day 323/128/14 to Day 323/128/20) He made the point that there would not have been an uneven distribution of manpower in each vehicle, which of course points to there being 9 in each, but he also said that normally there would be one Corporal and one Lance Corporal in each vehicle and he could not remember any other Lance Corporal in his vehicle. There were 2 Lance Corporals in Mortar Platoon, namely INQ768 and Lance Corporal V. V was clearly in Lt. N’s Pig so, if the normal practice was followed, INQ 768 would have been in Sergeant O’s vehicle.

17.8.2.7 On balance, therefore, it would appear that there were 10 soldiers in Sergeant O’s vehicle and 8 in Lt. N’s Pig, made up as suggested above.

17.8.2.8 Table 1 at Appendix 1 shows the occupants of each pig with their designated roles and their movements after debussing, as far as we can tell from their own evidence.

17.8.2.9 The Army logs and Mr Porter’s transcripts record that 1 Para were not to conduct “running battles” up Rossville Street, yet the convoy passed through the junction of William Street/Little James Street and up Rossville Street as far as the Rossville Flats. Lt N said that the hooligans had retreated before the arrival of the convoy and his Pig simply followed them onto the waste ground. The effect was that, once the lead Pig went into and along Rossville Street, the rest of the convoy followed. Both Major Loden and Lt N claimed to be responsible for this decision.

17.8.2.10 Major Loden stopped his armoured command vehicle in the middle of Rossville Street in a completely exposed position, exercising no apparent control over the operation. The rest of the convoy stopped behind him.

17.8.2.11 When he eventually debussed at the far side of the waste ground, Lt. N made his way to the buildings at the back of Chamberlain Street and the corner of Eden Place. Almost immediately, he fired what were the first shots in the area, which either triggered or gave the green light for the rest of the Army firing.

17.8.2.12 The accounts given by the soldiers as to how, where and when they fired their shots is summarised in a table appended to Inquiry Counsel Report No. 1. It is unwise to place reliance on any of these accounts but, for what they are worth, they are in brief as follows: Lt. N fired 3 warning shots, as he described them, at a crowd at or near the junction of Eden Place and Chamberlain Street, then he made his way behind the back of the houses at Chamberlain Street and fired 1 shot at a nail bomber in the car park, hitting him in the right thigh. This may have been Michael Bridge, but Peggy Deery was shot in the thigh behind Chamberlain St. Corporal V made his way from Pig 1 towards the flats and somewhere south of the wire fence fired 1 shot which probably hit Jackie Duddy. Private R was dropped off from Pig 2 on Rossville Street and as he ran past the north end of Block 1 he claims to have seen a nail bomber in the car park beside the east wall of Block 1 and shot him either from the north east corner of Block 1 or from the back of Pig 2 or from somewhere in between, depending on which of his three different versions is believed. Private R fired another 3 shots at a man with a pistol between Blocks 2 and 3. Sergeant O fired 3 shots from the passenger side of Pig 1 at a man behind a Cortina, 3 shots at a man at the southern end of the balcony in Block 3 and another 2 shots at a man with an M1 carbine on the ground between Blocks 2 and 3. Private S in the meantime was firing 12 rounds at a man or men with a rifle in front of the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. Private Q fired 1 shot at a gunman in the corner between Blocks 2 and 3. Private T fired 2 shots at an acid bomber on a balcony in Block 1.

17.8.2.13 This makes a total of 7 soldiers firing 29 shots into the courtyard and surrounding flats. In view of the availability of private supplies of ammunition and the shortcomings of the accounting process, it is impossible to say whether these were the only shots fired by these or other soldiers in this area.

17.8.2.14 The enigma of INQ 2003 seems to be resolved. In a statement to UTV, he claimed to have fired the first fatal shots and his account tallies with the shooting of Jackie Duddy. He claimed in the programme to have travelled in Pig 2 but he is not referred to by any of the other soldiers in Pig 2. His name does not appear in the nominal roll. He originally denied being in Derry on Bloody Sunday and he has now reverted to this position. He testified to the Tribunal that he has had a drink problem and was not there.

17.8.2.15 Table 2 at Appendix 2 shows the soldiers who fired and their claims as to where they fired from, what and where they fired at, the number of shots they fired, by whom they were seen to fire, whether they struck their targets and the most likely victims.

17.8.2.16 Table 3 Appendix 3 shows the accounts of the soldiers as to when they first heard shots.

17.8.2.17 Table 4 Appendix 4 suggests a possible order in which shots were fired by soldiers. Relying, as it does, on admittedly unreliable soldiers’ evidence, the contents of this table are highly speculative.

17.8.2.18 Table 5 Appendix 5 represents an attempt to provide a quick-reference tool which allows ready comparison of the accounts given by all the soldiers in Mortar Platoon about certain material matters, such as whether they saw any civilians with weapons or heard any nail bombs. It will be remembered that, in Counsel Report No.2, Jacob Grierson prepared a comprehensive table identifying the apparent discrepancies and inconsistencies between the different statements made by each soldier and in Counsel Report No.3 there is an attempt to compare the accounts offered by the different soldiers.

17.8.2.19 Map Q7 is the chart showing the trajectory of shots fired by all the soldiers in Mortar Platoon and indeed by the other platoons. It should be noted that the trajectories shown in this map are different from those shown in the marked-up photographs in the cases of V, R and S. The soldiers suggested that the marked-up photographs are more accurate. This is particularly significant in the case of V since his marked-up photograph would suggest that he fired at a target in line with the point where Jackie Duddy fell. It is possible that Jackie Duddy was hit by another soldier’s shots such as one of the 12 shots fired by Soldier S from behind 36 Chamberlain Street to the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 although this also is based on the assumption that this soldier did fire all his shots in that direction. The attached Sector 2 Plan 1 and Sector 2 Photograph 1 of the car park show the approximate location where each of the deceased and wounded fell as well as the trajectories of the shots fired into the car park area by the soldiers, as specified by them in their marked-up trajectory photographs.

Lieutenant N’s Pig

17.8.3.1 Lt N’s role in the events of Bloody Sunday is crucial. His conduct at two key stages in the operation, namely crossing William Street and firing the first shots, is sufficient in itself to suggest that, at the very least, his judgment and composure were suspect.

17.8.3.2 On top of this, Michael Starke has given evidence (M73.10) suggesting that Lt N may have been suffering from a psychiatric disorder (post traumatic stress disorder) at the time of Bloody Sunday. Mr Starke was a journalist with the Aldershot News in January 1972 and shortly after that with The Soldier. In the course of his work, he paid a visit to 1 Para on a weekend in December 1971 and was invited to go on patrol with Lt N. He refers to two incidents from that weekend that stick in his mind.

17.8.3.3 The first was when N, “in an apparent frenzy”, ordered the driver of his pig to follow a Mercedes car and ram it. Mr Starke says that even the driver questioned whether Lt N really wanted him to do this but there was “no reasoning with him”, he was “in a fury”. Mr Starke viewed this as a “manic action” on Lt N’s par (M73.11 paragraphs 8 to 9)). Later that evening, Mr Starke saw Lt N drinking alone and engaging in what he regarded as a “manic ritual” that involved setting fire to liqueurs before extinguishing the flame and then drinking them. In an article he wrote in the Irish News in 1997, Mr Starke described Lt N (without name) as “a troubled young officer” (M73.17) Mr Starke discussed the matter with a Consultant Psychiatrist and expresses the view that some of the Paras were suffering post traumatic stress disorder on Bloody Sunday (ibid).

17.8.3.4 RSM INQ 2037 (C2037.4paragraph 16) also says that he saw N sheltering in Soldier OO5’s Pig after the event because he was scared and apparently upset. During his oral testimony, RSM INQ2037 said he got the impression that Lt. N was in a state of shock (Day 321/220/4 to Day 321/220/6). He asked Lt. N what he was doing in Soldier 005’s Pig and he “just sat there looking forward” (Day 321/158/15 to Day 321/158/25). He didn’t find out why Lt. N was in the Pig but he “realised someone had ordered him to stay in there out of the way” (Day 321/157/14 to Day 321/157/24)

17.8.3.5. In these circumstances we applied to see Lt. N’s full service record and any psychiatric records that may exist. However, this application was refused despite the availability of material suggesting that he may have been unfit to be entrusted with the responsibility of leading the entire company into the Bogside. The Regimental Sergeant Major said at one point that he thought Lt. N was a reasonable young officer and he had never any occasion to think otherwise (Day 321/222/20 to Day 321/222/22). It was pointed out to him that he had said in his statement, in reference to disparaging remarks made about Lt. N in the Praxis programmes, that he agreed with the comment that Lt. N was not a good officer and that he agreed generally with the comments made about him in the Praxis programmes (C2037.7 paragraph 41) His reply to this was that after the incident in Londonderry, he could hardly say he was a good officer (Day 321/223/4 to Day 321/223/5)

17.8.3.6 Lt. N was just 23 years of age on Bloody Sunday, with just over two years in the Army (Day 323/41/5 to Day 323/41/12) but as commander of the first two Pigs through Barrier 12 he was effectively given the responsibility of leading the entire convoy. Yet, according to his evidence:

(i) He had not seen the written Operation Order (322/146/24 to Day 322/147/2).

(ii) He was not given any guidance or restrictions at any briefing by Major Loden or Col. Wilford of the Operation – specifically, he was not told that he was not to conduct any running battles down Rossville Street or even that he was not to go down Rossville Street, or that he should stop at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street (ibid). He was just told to go off and make the maximum number of arrests. (Day 322/147/3 to Day 322/150/1)

(iii) He did not know where the crowd was going to lead him; the entire convoy had to follow wherever he took them; it was really “the blind leading the blind” to wherever the crowd took him up Rossville Street; and he was going to have to end up in the middle of the crowd if he was going to carry out any number of arrests (Day 322/150/2 to Day 322/150/24)

(iv) Many of the people in that crowd were simply people who had been on the waste ground, rather than rioting at Barrier 12 (Day 322/41/8 to Day 322/41/18) and he had no way of knowing which were rioters and which were innocent stragglers (Day 322/151/15 to Day 322/152/7).

(v) He was not aware of any pincer movement or “cork in the bottle” strategy (Day 322/151/9 to Day 322/151/11). He had no recollection of it being explained that the IRA had never used a Civil Rights march to attack the Army or that the IRA had given an undertaking that they would not attack soldiers in or around the march (Day 323/41/15 to Day 323/41/21).

(vi) He regarded the operation as simply “a frontal assault on the crowd, a snatch, get in wherever you could and simply grab as many as you could.” (Day 322/124/2 to Day 322/124/5)

(vii)He was not aware that the flats were monitored from Observation Posts (Day 323/42/12 to Day 323/42/16)

(viii) No one told him that the risk of being shot at was so minimal that, according to the Brigade Major, the last thing on anybody’s mind at the Brigade Order Group conference was shooting. (Day 323/43/3 to Day 323/43/14)

(ix) It would be a fair inference that his men were not told that the IRA had never used a Civil Rights march as cover to attack the Army and that the IRA had given an undertaking to the Army that they would not attack soldiers in or around the march. (Day 323/43/15 to Day 323/43/17)

17.8.3.7 In other words, Col. Wilford and Major Loden put a junior, inexperienced officer at the head of the entire Support Company column in a position where he would effectively determine the eventual deployment of the Paratroopers; failed (either deliberately or inadvertently) to relay to him the restrictions imposed by the Brigade Commander not to conduct running battles down Rossville Street; failed (either deliberately or inadvertently) to give him any instructions, guidance or restrictions other than the order to make “the maximum number of arrests”; and failed (either deliberately or inadvertently) to give either him or his men accurate information about the likelihood of being shot at. Indeed, he was told that Rossville Flats was “a particularly dangerous spot” (B438.38 paragraph 14.2) even though, in the 3 months before Bloody Sunday, according to Brigadier MacLellan, there were only 3 occasions when the flats were used by snipers. (B1225)

17.8.3.8 Lt. N was at the Presbyterian Church before being deployed in the Bogside. In his Eversheds statement, he claimed to have heard the “drain pipe shot”. He formed the view that it had probably been fired from Rossville Flats because he heard the crack “coming from just above and behind my head” and the guttering that was struck was “behind me and below that level” so that the bullet must have been travelling in a downwards direction. The line of sight, he said, ended at the high-rise flats (B438.4 paragraph 22). When questioned by Counsel to the Tribunal, he accepted that the guttering must have been above him so that any deduction he made on that basis could not be right. (Day 322/22/22 to Day 322/23/4) He still adhered to the claim that he had heard the crack of the bullet. However, Soldier 112 gave a very different account of this incident, saying that Lt. N had come up onto the roof, inquiring about the noise and asking whether any of the soldiers there had fired. Lt N denied this (Day 322/139/3 to Day 322/139/11) but conceded that the shot probably did not come from Rossville Flats (Day 322/139/21 to Day 322/140/3). Whether or not Soldier 112 was correct, it is clear that, despite seeking to suggest to this Tribunal that the shot had come from Rossville Flats, he did not know where the shot came from since this is what he said in terms in 1972 (B397 paragraph 4).

17.8.3.9 Sergeant O said that, when they were in the APC but before moving through the Barrier, he was either ordered or permitted by Lt N to cock his weapon. (B575.110 paragraph 23) Lt. N denied giving that order or permission (Day 322/145/12 to Day 322/145/19). He said that there was no reason at that stage to consider that they would need to use their rifles, there was no reason to give any such instruction or permission and it would have been completely wrong to do that (Day 322/141/19 to Day 322/141/22). It would have amounted to “an escalation of the situation” (Day 322/143/18 to Day 322/143/25) and the possibility that would flow from that kind of order was that the soldiers were “one step nearer to firing their rifles” (Day 322/145/6 to Day 322/145/11)

17.8.3.10 As N moved through the barrier, the crowd turned and ran and he ordered his driver to follow them (B438.7 paragraph 34 and see also the statement of the driver Private S at B724.18 paragraph 3).

17.8.3.11 The vehicle was parked with the rear exposed to the Rossville Flats so that when the rear doors were opened they were more or less in full view of the flats. It was not in his mind that his men may have been fired on from the flats. (Day 322/154/25 to Day 322/155/2) He could not therefore have had any expectation of coming under any IRA attack, despite his suggestion that he believed the Rossville Flats to be a particularly dangerous spot.

17.8.3.12 When he debussed he “immediately” became involved with a civilian who, he claimed, attacked him (Day 322/49/8 to Day 322/49/19) but “certainly within a minute” he had moved towards the alleyway which leads off what used to be Eden Place into Chamberlain Street. (Day 322/43/24 to Day 322/44/3). There he claimed to have seen the crowds surging from the junction with Chamberlain Street and felt he had no alternative but to fire warning shots at them. He remembers being nervous but he claims that he did not panic or overreact to the situation (Day 322/61/11 to Day 322/61/17). Although he accepted that he fired 3 shots, he claimed in his Eversheds statement that he only remembered firing 1 shot at this stage. (B438.9 paragraph 39). Counsel to the Inquiry mentioned during a question that Lt. N’s present recollection was of firing only 1 shot. (Day 322/61/18 to Day 322/61/21) Lt N himself repeated during questioning by Mr Morgan that his “mental picture now is still 1 shot” (Day 323/46/12 to Day 323/46/18). However, in between these occasions, he said: “my recollection is my point of aim was roughly the same for all 3 shots (Day 322/63/6 to Day 322/63/7) and “I have a very clear memory of firing all 3 shots at the same point of aim” (Day 322/65/5 to Day 322/65/11).

17.8.3.13 Whether or not he was truthful in his recollection of the number of shots he fired, he has consistently stated that, apart from the drainpipe shot some time earlier at the Presbyterian Church, the shots he fired himself at this stage were the first shots he heard on Bloody Sunday. He said this at the Widgery Inquiry (B433) when events would have been fresh in his mind and he repeated it in response to questions from Counsel to this Inquiry (Day 322/88/2 to Day 322/88/10) and from Counsel for Madden & Finucane (Day 322/167/18 to Day 322/167/21).

17.8.3.14 It is of enormous significance that this is the information that was provided to General Ford. Following the opening meeting of the Army’s Widgery Tribunal Team on 2^nd February 1972, General Ford spoke to Major General INQ2144, the Director of Personal Services and told him:

“ The opening shots had quite definitely come from the IRA who had fired twice when 1 Para were crossing the barricade, but it would probably be established that an officer of 1 Para had subsequently fired a burst of warning shots into a brick wall immediately before the main battle began” (emphasis added, G114B.743.5 paragraph 12)”

17.8.3.15 It is unclear where General Ford got the notion the IRA fired twice while 1 Para were crossing the barricade. However, the point is that he must have been told by information coming up the chain of command that Lt N had fired the first shots in the Bogside. Lt N agreed that this was “very probably” a reference to him and that this report “would have gone up through the chain of command”, starting with him (Day 322/173/5 to Day 322/173/25). He accepted that Major Loden would have passed on that information and “presumably” did not say anything that caused General Ford to take a different view (Day 322/174/4 to Day 322/174/9). Quite clearly, the briefing given to General Ford represented the considered assessment of Col. Wilford and Major Loden, after taking into account all the evidence available to them from other soldiers and what they had witnessed themselves, of the order of events and, in particular, the order of shooting. They had introduced the suggestion that there had been a “battle” but not that the battle had been precipitated by civilian gunfire. Also of enormous significance is the fact that, no doubt because they realised its implications, this understanding of the overall picture did not appear in the statements of General Ford, Col Wilford, Major Loden, Lt. N or any other soldier. If Col Wilford or Major Loden had been anxious to prepare an accurate report of the sequence of events, they ought to have recorded that the first shots had been fired by a paratrooper. Instead, the press statements were to the effect that civilian gunmen had fired on the paratroopers first. The world was being told that the first shots in the Bogside were fired by the IRA while General Ford was privately telling Major General 2144 that the first shots were in fact fired by an officer of 1 Para.

17.8.3.16 It appears to have been general knowledge among soldiers, including those who were not even present, that it was Lt. N’s shots that set off a chain reaction among the other soldiers. (See, e.g., the Praxis interview of INQ1413. (O18/3))

17.8.3.17 The circumstances in which Lt. N fired his shots are in dispute. Gilles Peress, a French photographer, was one of the last people to run down Chamberlain Street. He paused at the corner of Eden Place and Chamberlain Street, on the north side, and took photograph P274. This shows two civilians in the street and what appears to be a puff of smoke from a rubber bullet gun at the point where Soldier O19, who had a rubber bullet gun, would have been standing. After he had taken this photograph, he crossed the street, raised his camera and shouted “Press”. However, a soldier at the corner where Lt. N was present fired at him from the hip in a kneeling position. (M65.1.1 paragraph 4 and M65.20 paragraph 9) Lt. N agreed that he fired from a kneeling position but denied that he fired from the hip at a lone individual or what appeared to be a photographer trying to cross the street. (Day 322/77/20 to Day 322/77/21)

17.2.3.18 However, he also denied firing “about head height” (Day 322/l64/10 to Day 322/164/13) although this was exactly what he had said twice to the Widgery Tribunal (B420 F and B421 A), He said he had no idea why he had said this. “All my shots were above head height there”, he said (Day 322/165/4 to Day 322/165/5) even though, as pointed out earlier, he had said that he did not even recollect firing the second and third shots.

17.8.3.19 He did not see the danger inherent in firing at a house in Chamberlain St and, specifically, it did not occur to him that anyone might have been living in the house (Day 322/163/2 to Day 322/163/10).

17.8.3.20 With regard to the question whether he should have been firing warning shots at all, he argued that to do so was simply “outside the scope of the Yellow Card”, not contrary to it. (Day 322/127/12 to Day 322/127/20). One of the general rules set out in the Yellow Card is: “Always first try to handle the situation by other means than by opening fire. If you have to fire: (a) fire only aimed shots, (b) do not fire more rounds than are absolutely necessary to achieve your aim”. (ED71.1 paragraph 3). Lt. N was in breach of the Yellow Card by not choosing means other than opening fire, such as instructing Soldier 019 to fire rubber bullets if necessary. He was also in breach in that he did not fire aimed shots and he fired more rounds than were necessary. Lt. N’s response to this was that he fired aimed shots at the wall above the crowd. (Day 322/159/20 to Day 322/159/21). Having initially said that he did not rely on anything in the Yellow Card to justify what he did (Day 322/157/21 to Day 322/157/23) he claimed he could rely on paragraph 12. This provides that “if there is no other way to protect yourself or those whom it is your duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured he could fire after due warning” (ED71.2) even though he accepted this was a reference to firing at people, not walls. (Day 322/162/17 to Day 322/162/21).

17.8.3.21 Lt. N. said that firing aimed shots was “not really acceptable conduct”. (B438.2 paragraph 10, and Day 322/127/21 to Day 322/127/23) He had been taught in basic training that warning shots were not to be used (Day 322/127/25 to Day 322/128/4) Lt. N had fired warning shots before but he could recall no “fuss” about it. (Day 322/3/22 to Day 322/4/11). He had reported the previous incident to his company commander but he had not been reprimanded or censured or warned about his future behaviour. (Day 322/129/7 to Day 322/129/14) Despite this, he rejected the suggestion that experience alone would have allowed him to believe that he could behave in a way that was unacceptable and contrary to his training but get away with it. (Day 322/129/22 to Day 322/130/1) When asked about the fatal shootings for which the Parachute Regiment had been responsible during the same period as the previous incident, i.e. August 1971, he claimed to have no recollection of them. He certainly had no recollection of paratroopers being disciplined or even reprimanded for those shootings.

17.8.3.22 Lt. N is no longer sure that the person he shot on the grounds that he was about to throw a nail bomb did in fact have a nail bomb. (B438.11 paragraph 43 and Day 322/92/18 to Day 322/92/22). He said that he first experienced this doubt several years after the event when learning that the forensic evidence was flawed (Day 323/6/15 to Day 323/6/21) Apart from the fact that the forensic evidence was known at the time to be flawed in many respects, there never was any forensic evidence in relation to the wounded, such as Michael Bridge.

17.8.3.23 When explaining why he believed that the youth in question was about to throw a nail bomb, he said that “there must have been something in the demeanour of the youth which made me think he was about to throw a nail bomb, to make me react in the way I did” (Day 323/7/18 to Day 323/7/20) If, as he claimed at the Widgery Tribunal, he had seen a smoking nail bomb in the hand of his target, this would have been a perfectly legitimate reason for believing that the man had a nail bomb. He expressed no doubt about seeing a smoking nail bomb in 1972 either to the RMP (B374) or to the Widgery Tribunal. (B422) However, in his Eversheds statement, he was at pains to point out that he only saw the person in question “for a split second” and that he “may” have seen smoke or it might have been something else”. (B438.11 paragraph 43).

17.8.3.24 When asked what happened to the “nail bomb” after the target was hit in the leg, Lt. N said that he was still holding it, “it went with him”. (Day 322/93/21 to Day 322/93/24) In other words, the target was clutching his injured leg with a nail bomb in his hand, according to Lt N. Nor did Lt N or any other soldier take any steps to arrest this man even though he was disabled and “there were no other visible threats after he had been shot.”(Day 322/94/10 to Day 322/94/20)

17.8.3.25 Lt. N now recognises the possibility that the person he shot did not in fact have a nail bomb in his hand. (Day 323/77/12 to Day 323/77/17) This, of course, is because he knows perfectly well that the person he shot did not have a nail bomb or any other object in his hand.

17.8.3.26 The likelihood is that Lt N shot Michael Bridge as Mr Bridge was gesticulating in a virtually deserted courtyard in such a way as to make it clear that he had nothing in his hands and presented no threat to the soldiers. He was shot in full view of a number of soldiers. It is because he was shot when he presented no threat that Lt N now denies shooting him. Not one of the other soldiers is prepared to admit seeing the event. Lt N could not explain why “no one in the Mortar Platoon, either in 1972 or subsequently, has said either that he shot [Michael Bridge] or that he saw anybody else [shoot] him, when he appears to have been shot in daylight in a square which was empty around him”, as Christopher Clarke QC put it. (Day 322/100/4 to Day 322/100/10) So anxious was Lt. N to distance himself from this shooting that he also distanced himself from the event about which Mr Bridge was protesting, namely the shooting of Jackie Duddy. (Day 323/17/4 to Day 323/17/22) Nor did he admit to seeing any of his Platoon shooting anyone, even though 6 of his soldiers fired 28 other shots into the courtyard area. (ibid). It is also possible that he shot Peggy Deery since she was also shot in the thigh roughly in the area of Lt N.’s target. However, she was probably the first person to be shot in this sector and this probably happened when Lt N was still engaged either at Eden Place or in the vicinity of his APC.

17.8.3.27 When asked whether he exercised any kind of restraint or discipline or control of any kind over the actions of his soldiers once he had debussed, his reply was that he was “extremely preoccupied” (Day 323/19/8 to Day 323/19/18)

17.8.3.28 In his Eversheds statement, Lt. N claimed that he first became aware that there had been shooting (other than his own shots) when he heard the cease- fire order given by Major Loden. (B438.12 paragraph 48) However, he also said he became aware that there had been shooting before that, specifically when he spoke to two of his soldiers who said that they had engaged two gunmen. (Day 323/30/4 to Day 323/30/8). Lt. N was then involved in removing the bodies from the Rubble Barricade. He did not suggest in either of his two RMP statements (B385 and B394) that either he or his men had been fired upon during this operation or at this time but in his statement to the Treasury Solicitors (B401 paragraph 21) he said that, during the 15 minutes or so from the time when he had collected the bodies until the Pig left with them, there were several shots which appeared to be fired at the Pigs standing outside the flats and to come from “somewhere further down Rossville Street South”. His account was further embellished by the time he got to the Widgery Tribunal, when he told the Tribunal that several shots were fired “in our direction” either “from the top of the flats” or from a direction that he indicated on the model. (B426 A-C)

17.8.3.29 He never searched the bodies or the barricade (Day 323/38/19 to Day 323/38/23), so he clearly did not expect to find any evidence of civilian firing from that point. Indeed he saw “absolutely no evidence of any civilian firing or nail bombing or petrol bombing or anything of that kind” apart from his own target in the courtyard. (Day 323/39/3 to Day 323/39/6).

17.8.3.30 That, however, did not prevent him from appearing on the “This Week” television programme telling what he admitted was a series of lies to the effect that he had himself seen a civilian with a gun firing at the soldiers (Day 323/24/9 to Day 323/26/4; the transcript of the broadcast is at B405). When asked why he told this lie several times in this interview, he said “this would be an example of what we call spin” (Day 323/26/5 to Day 323/26/11). Surprisingly, he did not mention in this interview that he had himself shot what he claimed to have been a nail bomber. During the same interview, another officer said in a cavalier way that it was “unfortunate that there are some 3000 other people milling around the area, some of whom may have got caught up in it, but the Army engaged gunmen and killed them”. It is suggested that this reflected Lt N’s own attitude. Having led his own platoon into the middle of a crowd, he proceeded to shoot recklessly at or above the heads of civilians in Chamberlain Street, he shot Michael Bridge simply because he was shouting at the troops, he did nothing to restrain the shooting by members of the Platoon and since then he has tried to cover up his criminal behaviour by inventing accounts of nail bombers and gunmen while pretending not to have been aware of anything else going on in front of his eyes.

17.8.3.31 Lt N said that over the years he developed doubts regarding his actions on Bloody Sunday although he says that the only doubt he had was whether his target was throwing a nail bomb. (Day 323/5/22 to Day 323/6/6) He denied that he was wracked with guilt for what he did. (Day 323/22/22 to Day 323/22/23) In our submission, the extent of his wrongdoing is such that he ought to be.

17.8.3.32 Private S was the driver of Pig 1. After he debussed he worked his way forward along the wall at the back of Chamberlain Street. From a position behind number 34 Chamberlain Street, he claimed that he fired 4 bursts of 3 shots each at a rifleman in front of the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. He said he hit the person or persons on 2 occasions. He said in his first RMP statement that nail bombs and acid bombs were thrown from the top of the flats on the men from his unit. He said in his second RMP statement that he saw 5 nail bombs thrown from the balcony but in his SA statement he said this was not true - he did not see any nail-bombers. He said in his second RMP statement that he saw a gunman in the ground floor window near the south-east corner of Block 1 and that O fired at him. O did not say that he fired in this direction and this suggestion did not feature in S’s SA statement.

17.8.3.33 In his Eversheds statement, Private S said that he had forgotten most of what happened on Bloody Sunday (B724.1 paragraph 7). He did not remember making any of the RMP or SA statements attributed to him but he invited the Tribunal to accept the accuracy of those statements by saying: “It is obvious that I recalled events in far greater detail in 1972 and where there is detail in my evidence from that point in time which I no longer recall now then I must defer to those statements” (B724.3 paragraph 21).

17.8.3.34 Shortly after he began giving oral testimony, Soldier S said that he wished to “make a little bit of a statement” about the statements he made in 1972. He pointed out that he was 18 years of age on Bloody Sunday and there were “definitely inaccuracies in those statements and I am not proud of that fact and I am conceding to the fact that those statements are inaccurate” (Day 331/61/6 to Day 331/61/11) He said the statements were made quite late at night to RMP’s, which can be “quite a frightening affair in itself”. He regretted the fact that he had signed “a statement in 1972 that is basically inaccurate; it is not wholly inaccurate, there are bits in there that have been added by the RMP’s that are not wholly accurate.” (emphasis added, Day 331/61/12 to Day 331/62/2) .

17.8.3.35 When questioned by our Counsel, S said that at the time he made the statements he believed them to be accurate and correct in every material respect. (Day 332/14/7 to Day 332/14/10) When pressed as to how he could now know that they were inaccurate, he said that he knew he could “not have been facing some of those directions or some of the other things that had been put in there”. (Day 332/14/18 to Day 332/14/20). He said that “obviously at the time you are going to subject yourself to the, shall we say, the commands of the imposing RMPs” (Day 332/14/23 to Day 332/14/25). When asked if the RMPs’ put things into his statement which were wrong he said: “I would agree with that”. (Day 332/15/19 to Day 332/15/21). In other words, within the space of a few sentences, Soldier S said the RMP’s put things into his statement which were wrong after he had said that at the time he believed the statements to be accurate in every respect.

17.8.3.36 It was a feature of his evidence that he repeatedly shifted his position on this issue. Having told the Tribunal that details were “added by the RMPs that are not wholly accurate” and the RMPs “put things into [his] statement which were wrong”, he also said that he did not remember them putting words into his statements or that anything that appears in those statements came from the RMP’s as opposed to himself (Day 332/19/2 to Day 332/19/3). In fact he said that he did not remember making the statements at all or anything about the way in which they were taken. (Day 332/16/12 to Day 332/16/18) This did not stop him saying that the statements were “inaccurate in the respect that they do not accurately reflect probably what I actually quoted to the RMPs on the day” (Day 332/19/18 to Day 332/19/20).

17.8.3.37 This is dealt with further in relation to specific “inaccuracies” in his 1972 statements. However, the general point is that it is impossible to know whether the reason for the “inaccuracies” is that Soldier S volunteered a false account or that he simply agreed to sign a false account provided for him by the RMP’s. In either case, Soldier S was dishonest in signing statements that he knew to be false. In the latter case, the consequences are that none of the RMP statements made by other soldiers can be regarded as reliable since, if the RMP statement-takers were prepared to encourage one soldier to sign a false account, it is likely that they did the same with the other soldiers.

17.8.3.38 In either event, he knew when he signed his Eversheds statement that his 1972 statements were false but, as appears above, he invited the Tribunal to accept that what he had said in the statements was the truth and should be relied upon since his present recollection of events was so poor. When it was put to him that he was thereby lying to the Tribunal, he replied: “by implication, I suppose I was”. (Day 332/87/15)

17.8.3.39 For these reasons alone, the Tribunal cannot attach any weight to his evidence, except insofar as it consists of admissions against interest, such as the admissions that his RMP statements were false, either at the instigation of the RMP or otherwise.

17.8.3.40 His claim to have very little recollection of events should be regarded as no more than a screen intended to protect his testimony from detailed scrutiny. If he genuinely had no recollection of the events, he would not have been able to say that particular parts of his 1972 accounts were wrong. Likewise, he would not have been able to say that his 1972 account of the circumstances surrounding his own shots was right. Yet this is exactly what he did. He was at pains to stress that, in respect of his own involvement, the 1972 statements were correct. He said:

“This is a truthful statement, definitely. Um, I have no doubt that this part of the statement has not been added to or enhanced in anyway, it is definitely what I saw; it is definitely what happened to me; my experience on the day; …. . that part that describes my engagement with a gunman is correct and truthful” (Day 331/70/7 to Day 331/70/15)

“Q. But you are able to recall, on this occasion, the number of rounds you fired and the rounds being fired at you and hitting the men you fired at?

“I was then engaged in exchanges of fire with a gunman or gunmen. My only recollection now is that the exchange was over quickly, I do not recall how many rounds I fired, or were fired at me or whether or not I hit any of the men who were firing at me.” (B724.3 paragraph 15)

17.8.3.43 When this contradiction was put to him, he said the Eversheds statement was true and that what he had meant when he said that it was clear in his mind’s eye was that he recalled it from his statement. (Day 332/85/13 to Day 332/85/24)

17.8.3.44 Soldier S is sure that his 1972 accounts are wrong for the simple reason that he remembers these events very well but he is not prepared to admit that he was personally at fault. Bloody Sunday, according to his recollection, was the only occasion when he fired a shot during his service in Northern Ireland. (Day 332/84/7 to Day 332/84/9) On that occasion, he fired 12 and in circumstances so discreditable that he was obliged to invent an account in order to conceal the truth of his actions. That account will now be examined.

17.8.3.45 Soldier S said in his first RMP statement that the rioters at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street numbered about 2000 (B724.12) but he was not making any distinction between rioters and marchers (Day 332/21/13 to Day 332/21/15). He said in his SA statement that “as soon as the vehicle stopped we debussed, we came under fire” (B724.19) but he had not suggested that in either of his RMP statements. He now accepts that this suggestion was “not to be taken too literally”. (Day 331/82/1 to Day 331/82/17) However, this was conceded only after it had been pointed out to him that his first reference to civilian firing in his RMP statement was the firing that he said occurred when he had been in his position at the back of 34 Chamberlain Street for about 5 minutes. (B724.13).

17.8.3.46 Indeed, according to that statement, he had cocked his rifle “from taking up [his] position”, i.e. behind 34 Chamberlain Street (B724.12) so that, according to the statement, he had his rifle cocked and ready to fire before he himself heard any firing. Lt. N, for one, did not claim that he came under fire either as soon as he debussed or at any time prior to the recovery of the bodies from the rubble barricade. The photographs, in particular P1015 and others in that sequence, make it clear that the soldiers in those photographs, viz. N, 019 and 1918, were not behaving as if they were under fire.

17.8.3.47 In his first statement he claimed that nail bombs and acid bombs were thrown from the top of the flats onto the men from his unit who were making arrests. (B724.12, B724.13) In his second RMP statement, he repeated this and said that about 5 nail bombs were thrown altogether. (B724.16) In his SA statement, he said that “this is not really correct” (B724.19) and he told this Tribunal that he did not see any nail bombs or acid bombs.

17.8.3.48 When he was asked how he knows he didn’t, he said “it was probably put to me” (Day 332/37/14 to Day 332/37/17). When asked if the RMP were actually putting in things that he knew to be wrong, he said “that may well have been the case” although he did not have a recollection of it, “that is the nature of the way they did things” (Day 332/39/3 to Day 332/39/18). When asked whether they said “look, Soldier S, you saw nail bombs and acid bombs did you not, just put it in your statement; it that what happened?”, he said “probably” (Day 332/40/5 to Day 332/40/8). When asked if it was because he was only 18 at the time that he allowed himself to sign the statement when he knew he had not actually seen nail bombs or acid bombs, he said “I would say that that is a fair assumption” (Day 322/40/9 to Day 332/40/12).

17.8.3.49 With regard to his own shooting, he suggested that on each of the 4 occasions that he fired, the gunman appeared from the midst of a crowd when a gap in the crowd opened up. Following each of the 4 episodes of firing, the crowd closed in front of the gunman. It was pointed out to him that in photographs P1015 and P1016 it is apparent that the crowd in the Rossville Flats courtyard thinned rapidly as soldiers approached. He accepted that the crowd were dispersing in all directions. (Day 332/43/11 to Day 332/43/16) However he was not prepared to accept that the crowd must have virtually disappeared by the time he reached the back of 34 Chamberlain Street.

17.8.3.50 As he was taken through his account, he took issue with a number of indisputable propositions such as that, on his account, he was pointing his rifle at the crowd (Day 332/47/14 to Day 332/47/16) and that the crowd must have heard the “gunman” in their midst firing towards him”. (Day 332/48/2 to Day 332/48/5)

17.8.3.51 When asked why, when the crowd had been running so quickly to get away from soldiers whenever they debussed, they would have hung around after he had started firing in their direction, he simply said: “I am sorry, I cannot help you there, I am sorry.” (Day 332/51/5 to Day 332/51/10).

“Q Instead of running away from the firing, they run between the two gunmen, or they move between the two gunmen, that is the civilian gunmen and yourself?

17.8.3.53 This ridiculous scenario occurred 4 times in all over a space of approximately 2 minutes, according to Solider S, during which time the gunman or gunmen fired 13 shots at him and he fired 12 shots in return.

17.8.3.54 Soldier S believes that generally speaking he would expect to hit a target with a single shot at 50 yards, the approximate distance between him and the target on this occasion. (Day 332/6/5 to Day 332/6/10) Yet he claims to have succeeded in hitting his target only twice, possibly even only once. (Day 332/6/20 to Day/332/7/3)

17.8.3.55 INQ 444 was a member of C Company who saw a paratrooper on the waste ground firing between 10 and 20 shots towards Blocks 2 and 3 at an angle of 30 to 40 degrees with the rifle “under his arm at a position between his shoulder and his waist”. INQ 444 thought that this soldier had “lost the plot.” (C444.5 paragraph 34). Soldier S was the only person in the waste ground area who fired more than 10 shots and it is submitted that he was probably the soldier seen by INQ444.

17.8.3.56 It is further submitted, for a number of reasons, that he may have been the soldier who shot Peggy Deery. Peggy Deery was probably the first to be shot after Support Company entered the Bogside. Although it is not entirely clear where she was shot, it appears to have been somewhere behind 34 or 36 Chamberlain Street. Soldier S arrived in the first Pig. When he debussed he headed straight for the wall behind Chamberlain Street and was almost certainly one of the two soldiers seen in photographs P1016 and P278 making their way along the back wall towards Rossville Flats. Charles McMonagle, the First Aid officer seen lying on the ground in P278, gave evidence that one of the 2 soldiers seen with him in this photograph had jumped out of what would have been S’s Pig and fired immediately from the hip towards the courtyard of the Rossville Flats.

17.8.3.57 Clearly, it is impossible to say whether S did shoot Peggy Deery or indeed anyone else but he fired 12 shots that are completely unaccounted for in the sense that his own account of how they were fired is as ludicrous as Soldier H’s and has to be rejected out of hand.

17.8.3.58 In his first Eversheds statement, Soldier 013 said that one of his colleagues, whom he was not then prepared to name, had said he had seen a civilian gunman and had “dropped him”. According to 013, “the colleague was tense and shaking when he was telling me. It was very hard to shoot a moving target”. (B1408.4 paragraph 19)

17.8.3.59 In a supplementary statement, he said that the soldier in question was Private S. (B1408.26 paragraph 3). Soldier S did not say that any of his targets were moving. Indeed, they appear to have been stationary when he fired. 013 did not give oral testimony. If his evidence was meant to suggest that S told him that he had shot someone who was moving (which is the apparent meaning of his statement) this confirms that at least one of his targets was someone other than the gunman or gunmen he claimed to see in the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2.

17.8.3.60 The evidence would suggest that Peggy Deery was stationary when she was shot and that neither Michael Bridge nor Michael Bradley was doing anything more than standing or walking towards the soldiers. The person who is most likely to have fitted the description of a “moving” target was Jackie Duddy.

17.8.3.61 Nor can Soldier S’s account be reconciled with the accounts of other soldiers. In particular, Lt N (P20), Soldier R (P24) and Soldier V (P28) marked the trajectories of their shots on photographs, marking the position of their target and their own position when they fired. If Soldier S was standing behind 34 Chamberlain Street, he could not have failed to see the targets of each of these soldiers but he has never claimed to have seen any of them. The accounts of these soldiers were explored with him but he was unable to explain this. (Day 332/58/24 to Day 332/64/25)

17.8.3.62 In his first RMP statement, S made no reference to seeing any other soldier firing but in his second statement he said he saw a gunman firing from a ground floor window about three windows in from the southern corner of Block 1. He said this gunman fired six shots at his platoon and he saw O fire back. (B74.16). (Incidentally, this was one of the supporting statements made on 4^th February 1972.) These shots were in addition to the 13 fired by the gunman or gunmen at whom S himself fired, which makes a total of 19 shots fired from this corner, none of which struck a soldier. When he made his SA statement, he said that he could not see O’s target and that this target was in the south-east corner of the car park. (B724.20 paragraph 10)

17.8.3.63 In other words, the gunman in the ground floor window near the gap between blocks 1 and 2 no longer existed; O had not fired in that direction; and he saw O fire in a different direction at a different target in a different corner of the carpark. He accepted that this was one of the “inaccuracies” in his 1972 statements.(Day 332/69/11 to Day 332/69/25) It is submitted that he invented the story in the second RMP statement about seeing the gunman in order to support Sergeant O but, unfortunately for him, the details he gave were inconsistent with the details that had already been given by Sergeant O.

17.8.3.64 When asked by the Chairman how he knew that his second RMP statement was inaccurate in this respect when he did not remember the incident, he replied: “Because it was probably inserted there for me, probably.” When asked if this was done by the RMP who took the statement he said “Probably, yes, Sir” and he “went along with it”. (Day 332/72/16 to Day 332/72/25)

17.8.3.65 With regard to other shooting, S said he was not conscious of anyone firing a pistol in his vicinity (Day 331/93/16 to Day 331/93/20) so none of his firing could have been in response to the 2 shots fired by OIRA 4 from behind the gable wall of 36 Chamberlain Street. Nor did S hear any automatic fire at any stage. (Day 332/82/2 to Day 332/82/6 and B724 D)

17.8.3.66 Soldier S said that he served with the Army in the Middle East after Bloody Sunday. He was involved in firing thousands of rounds and admitted that he had killed “lots of people” (Day 332/88/9 to Day 332/88/24). It is submitted that, notwithstanding his frequent expressions of sympathy, Soldier S had no compunction about shooting people and that, bearing in mind both his apparent location and the number of shots fired by him, he is one of the prime suspects for shooting Peggy Deery. He may very well have shot Jackie Duddy too.

17.8.3.67 In summary, Lance Corporal V accompanied Private S and, in his RMP statement, he said that he fired only one round, at a person in the Rossville Flats courtyard after that person had thrown a bottle with a fuse in it. When he was interviewed by Mr Heritage of the Treasury Solicitors he said that he could not see anything in the man’s hand when he fired at him. This led to the well-known exchange with Lt Col Overbury and the intervention of Messrs Stocker and Gibbens. The statement was clearly tantamount to an admission of murder but his evidence was altered in his SA statement in that he then said he fired instantaneously at a time when he believed the man still had the petrol bomb.

17.8.3.68 The clear inference is that Lt. Col Overbury, Major Bailey or someone else advised V to change his story. Although Counsel for the Widgery Inquiry was aware of the contents of V’s original RMP statement, V was not challenged about this at the Inquiry.

17.8.3.69 Lance Corporal V claimed that he no longer remembers the events in any detail. He also said that he has no recollection of any of the interviews with the RMP, Mr Heritage or anyone else prior to the Widgery Tribunal. There are numerous inconsistencies in his accounts, including whether and when he heard explosions or gunfire and what type; when he cocked his rifle; whether he saw petrol bombs; whether he saw the petrol bomb leave the hand of the person he shot before he fired and the reason for the discrepancy between the trajectory map and Loden Shot List on the one hand and the marked-up photograph on the other in respect of his own position when he fired and the position of his target. No other soldier admits to having seen V firing.

17.8.3.70 Lance Corporal V and Private S were probably the first to fire into the courtyard. According to the account apparently given by V to Major Loden and then given by him to the SIB investigator later that night, his target was hit at more or less the same spot where Jackie Duddy fell. V also said that the person he hit was attended by a group of civilians including a priest. Both these factors point to the conclusion that Jackie Duddy was shot by Lance Corporal V.

17.8.3.71 Soldier V claimed not to remember the events of Bloody Sunday in any detail. (B821.3 paragraph 2) He remembered the drainpipe shot although he never mentioned this in 1972. His next memory, he said, was of debussing from the back of the Pig and breaking the ice on top of a frozen puddle. He was annoyed at having stepped in a puddle (B821.3 paragraph 2.1). It says a lot that he remembered this but claimed to have only the most limited recollection of shooting a person dead. When asked during his oral testimony if he was seriously suggesting to the Tribunal that he remembered trivial details such as stepping into a puddle but did not remember major details such as seeing a person throwing a petrol bomb at S and S shooting him, perhaps dead, he replied: “That is correct” (Day 333/106/16 to Day 333/106/21)

17.8.3.72 He also remembers, as he got out of the Pig, noticing a person in uniform and wearing a respirator. He said:

“My immediate thought was that the guys here were extremely well organised. I had never before or since seen civilians with respirators and uniforms. Because of this I ran at the man and pinned him against the wall with my rifle”. (B821.3 paragraph 2.3)

17.8.3.73 This contention positively drips with dishonesty. The person to whom he was referring, Charles McMonagle, was carrying a First Aid bag and, as the photographs of him show, he was quite obviously a First Aider. However, Lance Corporal V was seeking to justify his assault on him by suggesting that he believed him to be a member of an organisation of rioters or possibly terrorists who dressed in uniforms like regular soldiers.

17.8.3.74 With some reluctance, Soldier V was prepared to “go along with” the suggestion that he was probably the soldier on the left in photograph P278 and that the soldier in front of him was possibly Private S. (Day 333/50/13 to Day 333/51/11). The soldier to the left in this photograph has a Lance Corporal’s stripe on his right sleeve and his position accords with the position suggested by V himself. In view of his own admission that he pinned a First Aider against the wall and the fact that Charles McMonagle can be seen slumped to the ground in such close proximity to him, V was clearly one of the two soldiers who assaulted him. He may also have been one of the two soldiers seen by Brian Johnston (Day 84/104/22 to Day 84/105/15) hitting civilians as they ran past the gap in the wire fence that can be seen in the photograph.

17.8.3.75 In his Eversheds statement, V said his next memory was of hearing a burst of machine gun fire and seeing bullets hit a wall between him and the soldier in front of him. He said it was definitely machinegun fire and because it hit the wall on his left he believed it came from the area of the Rossville Flats. He said it was enemy fire directed at him personally (B821.38 paragraph 2.4.). This was completely at odds with the account given by him in his SA statement where he said that as he was running forward behind S he heard the firing of single shots and saw the spurt of bullets hitting the ground. (B821.12). In other words, the single shots in 1972 became automatic fire in 2000 and bullet strikes to the ground on his right in 1972 became bullets strikes to the wall on his left in 2000.

17.8.3.76 There were also discrepancies about whether and when he heard explosions and when he cocked his rifle. In his RMP statement, the order in which events occurred was that he debussed, then heard the sound of shots, then cocked his weapon and then heard two explosions. (B821.8) In his SA statement he said that just before he debussed he heard the sounds of two explosions, he then cocked his rifle as soon as he debussed and as he was running forward he heard the shots. (B821.12) When asked to explain why he changed the order, he said he had no recollection of making the statement but he accepted that it read as if he had cocked his weapon before he had heard any shots. (Day 333/104/12 to Day 333/104/16). If this was right, he prepared to fire before he had heard anybody firing at him.

17.8.3.77 In his RMP statement, he said “rioters also threw petrol and acid bombs.” (B821.8) When he came to make his SA statement, he said that “no petrol bombs were being thrown.” (B821.13) When asked why he said this in his RMP statement when it wasn’t true, he replied: “I have no idea” (333/108).

17.8.3.78 He also claimed in his oral testimony to the Widgery Tribunal that as he was running along the back wall of Chamberlain Street there were approximately 100 people near the end of the Chamberlain Street wall throwing stones and bricks. (B821.19 to B821.20) However, it is quite apparent from P1015 and 1016, the photographs showing V and S making their way along the back wall towards Rossville Flats, that the crowd was running away, not throwing stones or even facing V.

17.8.3.79 In his RMP statement, he said that firing was taking place at him “from several positions with several different types of weapons.” (B821.8) However, he told Lord Widgery that what he heard was high velocity rifle fire coming from the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. (B821.19 D-F.) In other words, within the space of a few weeks, he had changed his story from “coming under fire from several positions, form several different types of weapons” to coming under fire from one kind of weapon from one position (Day 333/113/13 to Day 333/113/24).

17.8.3.80 Of course, in none of the photographs do any of the soldiers look as if they are under fire and, as suggested in the civilian evidence, they clearly were not.

17.8.3.81 In his RMP statement, V indicated 5 distinct stages in the incident in which he said he shot a petrol bomber. First, he saw him draw back his right arm. Secondly, he saw him throw a bottle with a fuse attached to it. Thirdly, after the bottle must have been in the air for several seconds, he saw the bottle hit the ground but not exploding. Fourthly, the petrol bomber moved from the crowd. Fifthly, V fired. (B821.8).

17.8.3.82 Even on his own account, therefore, V shot at this alleged petrol bomber after he had thrown his “petrol bomb” and after he had ceased to be a threat. This was pointed out by Counsel to the Inquiry during his oral testimony when V claimed that he shot the petrol bomber because he was “endangering S’s life” and it was necessary to shoot him. His only explanation was that it all happened in a flash, (Day 333/66/3 to Day 333/69/2) “in a fraction of a second” (Day 333/128/8 to Day 333/128/12).

17.8.3.83 That was not the account he gave to the RMP or to Mr Heritage when he was interviewed on 5^th March 1972. On that occasion, he described the episode in terms which indicated that it was even more protracted than appeared from his RMP statement. After he saw the fuse coming out in mid-air and the bottle landing without exploding, he “kept an eye on the man who had thrown it, as he moved back in the crowd. As soon as the movement of the crowd gave him a clear sight of the man he shot at him” (B821.2) That was the same sequence of events as set out in the RMP statement but in even more clearly separated stages. Mr Heritage asked him if he could see anything in the man’s hand. He replied “no, Sir, I can’t honestly say that I did”.

17.8.3.84 As appears from Mr Heritage’s note, Major Bailey intervened and said he wished to discuss the position with Col. Overbury before they proceeded. Although this must have been a unique experience for Lance Corporal V, he claimed to have no recollection whatsoever of this interview (Day 333/71/24 to Day 333/72/2). He also claimed to have no recollection whatsoever of the meeting that must then have followed between himself and either Col Overbury or Major Bailey or both. (Day 333/131/1 to Day 333/132/19) It will be remembered that Col Overbury claimed to have no recollection of this meeting either. (Day 243/145/14) No one admits having any recollection that this meeting even occurred (when it must have done) or what advice V was given (when he must have been given some).

17.8.3.85 Nor does anyone admit to remembering how V’s SA statement came to be made. Contrary to the practice evident from the other written SA statements, this statement did not bear the signature of either the statement-maker or the statement-taker and it was not dated. It is not even known whether it was prepared following a further interview with a member of the Treasury Solicitor’s staff or simply presented to the Treasury Solicitor. We do know that Mr Heritage had no further part in the process and did not re-interview this soldier.

17.8.3.86 The advice that V received had a dramatic impact on V’s memory of the circumstances in which he shot the “petrol bomber”, as appears from his SA statement. In that statement, V gave a completely different account in which he said that “all these events took place almost instantaneously” and he claimed that it was only after he shot the man that he “then realised that he had thrown the bomb before I had shot him.” (B821.13) This was the account that was repeated under oath to Lord Widgery. (B821.29).

17.8.3.87 The most striking feature of his Widgery testimony is that, although Senior Counsel to the Tribunal and Senior Counsel for the Army were both involved in the “negotiations” following the admission to Mr Heritage and both were therefore aware of the previous, strikingly inconsistent statements, neither they nor their Juniors (nor indeed Lord Widgery himself) raised this. This could not have been an oversight. The only possible explanation is that Counsel for the Widgery Tribunal and Counsel for the Army agreed in advance that no reference would be made to the account given by V to the RMP and to Mr Heritage.

17.8.3.88 When Soldier V gave his account at the Widgery Tribunal, Mr Underhill asked him: “Did all that happen in a very short space of time?” and V duly provided the necessary answer: “A fraction of a second, Sir”. (B821.21 B). He told Mr McSparran that he could not see that the petrol bomb had been thrown before he fired at the bomber. (B821.29 A) When tested about the sequence of events, he gave an account that was so contradictory as to be incoherent and it attracted the intervention of Lord Widgery. Within the space of a few seconds, he said that he saw the fuse burning but did not see it alight and that it was impracticable to shout a warning when he saw the fuse burning on the ground because the bomber still had the bomb in his hand. (ibid) He also told Lord Widgery that the fuse would have been in the bottle when it hit the ground (B821.30 A) although he had told Mr Heritage that it had come out when it was in the air.

17.8.3.89 What is clear is that Lance Corporal V shot the person he intended to shoot (Day 333/146/17 to Day 333/146/22) and that when he shot he was intending to kill that person (Day 333/74/19 to Day 333/74/21). The person he shot was attended by a group of civilians, including a priest (Widgery Transcript at B821.30 G and Day 333/147/5 to Day 334/147/13). Apart from this group, who he said all had white handkerchiefs, V did not remember any other people still in the courtyard of the flats. (Widgery Transcript at B821.22 A) He believed there was no one else lying on the ground in the area (Day 333/148/6 to Day 333/148/11).

17.8.3.90 The scene depicted by Lance Corporal V is, therefore, exactly the same scene described by civilians and depicted in the photographs (starting at EP25.6) of Jackie Duddy being attended by a small group of civilians, including Father Daly, in a courtyard that is otherwise virtually deserted. Soldier V denied the person he shot was the person shown in these photographs, because he did not fit the description of the person he shot at. (Day 333/150/1 to Day 333/150/3) He insisted that the person he shot was wearing a white shirt and that he shot him in the stomach. No one in the courtyard area was shot in the stomach and it is submitted that Soldier V invented the suggestion that he shot his victim in the stomach and that he had a white shirt in order to distance himself from the shooting of Jackie Duddy.

17.8.3.91 In his list of engagements (B2283.20), Major Loden noted at No. 2: “one petrol bomber at GR 43281679 shot from GR 43291683 apparently killed (car park)” This is clearly a reference to Lance Corporal V’s single admitted shot. As appears from the map (OS1.807) on which we have drawn the shots listed by Major Loden, the position of No.2’s target matches the position of V’s target as depicted in the map attached to his own RMP statement. (B790) The position of the target in each case is close to the position where Jackie Duddy fell.

17.8.3.92 However, when V came to mark up the trajectory photograph (P28), the location of his target had shifted dramatically so that it was now behind the back wall of 36 Chamberlain Street. However, even this shows V firing towards the spot were Jackie Duddy fell, as can be demonstrated if the line representing the trajectory is simply extended to the point where he can be seen in the photographs to have been lying. (P28).

17.8.3.93 Incidentally, as he accepted himself, Soldier V also moved his own position from behind 36 Chamberlain Street to a position close to the fence (Day 333/164/1 to Day 333/164/20). He said he cannot remember why he did that. (Day 333/165/11 to Day 333/165/12).

17.8.3.94 For completion, it should be noted that no one admitted to seeing V firing and V did not admit to seeing the other soldiers firing, except S. Although he was apparently in more or less the same position as S, he did not claim to see the gunman or gunmen allegedly seen by S on four different occasions. He did not mention anything about seeing S firing or seeing S’s targets in his first statement. In his SA statement, he said he saw S returning fire in the direction of the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 but all he saw was “flashes coming from that direction”. He did not hear shots or see a gunman. (B821.13 and at Widgery, B821.21).

17.8.3.95 It is in these circumstances that we respectfully submit that the evidence supports the propositions that:

(i) Soldier V is a dishonest and unreliable witness who fabricated his description of the person he shot, the way in which he shot him and the reasons for which he shot him.

17.8.3.96 In summary, Private Q deployed to the east corner of the northern end of Block 1. He claimed to have seen a person throw a nail bomb from the junction of Blocks 2 and 3 to within 10 yards of Pig 2, i.e. a distance of 60 –70 yards, where it exploded. He fired one round and hit him in the chest.

17.8.3.97 In his Eversheds statement, he said he could hear the crack and thump of incoming fire over his head. (B657.3 paragraph 18) During his oral testimony to this Tribunal, he said that when he referred to the “crack and thump” of incoming fire he meant high velocity fire. (Day 339/18/13 to Day 339/18/16) However, at the Widgery Tribunal, he emphatically said on more than one occasion that the firing he heard was not high velocity but low velocity. (B636, B642E and B650)

17.8.3.98 He told this Tribunal that apart from that firing, he was not aware of any other fire during the course of the day. (Day 339/20/21 to Day 339/20/24) However, he had said in his Eversheds statement that before he shot the nail bomber he heard “a mixture of high and low velocity incoming fire.” (B657.5 paragraph 29) When it was put to him that that could not be right in the light of what he had told the Tribunal, he said he was “just confused.” (Day 339/21/2 to Day 339/21/9)

17.8.3.99 He told this Tribunal that when he talked about incoming fire he meant that fire was being directed towards him and towards the other soldiers that were there. However, he had told the Widgery Tribunal that he did not know from which direction the shots had come or where they landed, (B657.27 F) Nevertheless, he insisted that rounds were being fired at him and at the soldiers near him. (Day 339/72/7 to Day 339/72/9) He said he was sure about this and he was on oath. What he had said on oath to Lord Widgery was: “I never heard any shots fired at me at all”. He was then asked: “Throughout the whole of the period you were concerned with the operation, you were not conscious of being fired on at any time?” He answered: “No”. (B657.35 B).

17.8.3.100 When these passages were put to him he then said he was “talking in a personal context,” meaning that he was only talking in those passages about shots being fired at him personally and that what he had meant was that there were shots fired at “other soldiers near [him]”. (Day 339/74/3 to Day 339/74/8) He was then shown the next page of the Widgery Transcript, where he was asked the following:

“Q. During the whole of the period you were there, there were a number of other men who were in that vehicle also operating about that area?

Q. You were not conscious of any firing directed at you or them during that period?

17.8.3.101 He accepted that he was there talking not just about himself but the men with him and when asked for an explanation he said he could not give one. (Day 339/74/25 to Day 339/75/4) He accepted that the impression given in his testimony to Widgery was that he came under no incoming fire. When asked why he gave that impression if it was not true, he replied: “It was not an intentional lie”. Eventually, he accepted that the accounts given to Lord Widgery and this Tribunal are “completely opposite”. (Day 339/77/2 to Day 339/77/3)

17.8.3.102 In his RMP statement, he said: “As I got out of the vehicle there were stones and bottles being thrown towards our position from where Chamberlain Street runs into the forecourt of the flats”. (B657.20) When it was pointed out to him that the vehicle from which he debussed was N’s Pig, not O’s, and that it had stopped near Eden Place, he accepted that it would not have been possible for him to come under any kind of stone or bottle attack in the way that he described in his statement. (Day 339/67/8 to Day 339/67/17) His explanation was that it was a confusing time. He said he remembered being confused when he made his statement but in his next answer he did not remember being confused when he made that statement. (Day 339/68/3 to Day 339/68/11) He said that by the time he got to the north gable wall of Block 1 he was not being stoned at all (Day 339/69/11 to Day 339/69/14), which corresponded with his statement to Eversheds. (B657.38 paragraph 19) It was then put to him that if he was not being stoned when he got out of his vehicle and if he was not being stoned when he reached the north end of Block 1 it is likely that he was not being stoned at all but he still insisted that he was being stoned by people in the car park.

17.8.3.103 Before taking up position at the east corner of the north gable wall of Block 1 he had gone to the west corner. He did not see anyone fire from the rubble barricade or from anywhere else in Rossville Street towards the Army or throw anything (apart from “rocks”). He claimed not to have seen any soldier fire towards the barricade. (Day 339/29/4 to Day 339/29/8)

17.8.3.104 When questioned by Christopher Clarke QC about the account given by him to the RMP concerning the nail bombs, he accepted that the impression was given that several nail bombs were being thrown so as to land close to the soldiers and that the soldiers were in effect under a nail bomb attack. (Day 339/38/6 to Day 339/38/22) Despite the obvious impression given in that statement that there was more than one nail bomber, Soldier Q refused to accept this. (Day 339/39/4 to Day 339/39/25). However, he accepted that in his account to Lord Widgery he had talked about 4 or 5 nail bombs being thrown. (B636) When asked if he was exaggerating the number of bombs he saw thrown, he said “not intentionally”. (Day 339/41/13 to Day 339/41/15)

17.8.3.105 In his Eversheds statement he said that he saw a man throw a nail bomb and it landed in the car park “in among the people” and “it exploded” (B657.4 paragraph 20). In his testimony to this Tribunal he said the noise it made was a very audible crump which must have been heard by the civilians in the carpark and the soldiers who were in or around the Pig that was at the entrance to the carpark. (Day 339/32/1 to Day 339/32/13) He did not see any nails come out of the bomb. (Day 339/32/20 to Day 339/32/24) In other words, it was a nail bomb with no nails. Nor did he see any of the nail bombs smoking or fizzing. He accepted that, according to his RMP statement, the nail bomb must have been thrown about 60 or 70 yards, i.e. about twice the length of the chamber in the Methodist Central Hall. (Day 339/84/10 to Day 339/84/21)

17.8.3.106 There are a number of problems with Soldier Q’s account of the nail bombing. First, his own accounts of the number of nail bombs thrown and the number of nail bombers have been at variance with each other. Secondly, the distance which he says the nail bomb was thrown is unlikely, to say the least. Thirdly, although at least one of these nail bombs landed and exploded amongst a group of civilians, no one was injured. Fourthly, the nail bomb that did explode had no nails and none of the nail bombs he saw fizzed or smoked. Fifthly, not one member of his own Platoon and not one of those members of C Company who made their way to the end of Chamberlain Street (towards which Q said in his Widgery evidence one of the bombs had been thrown: B657.18) heard or saw a nail bomb explode in the courtyard. Q’s account is patently an invention.

17.8.3.107 Soldier Q did not accept that he was necessarily the person seen at P285 standing at the east corner of the north gable wall of Block 1. However, he agreed that that was certainly where he was standing at the material times (Day 339/82/11 to Day 339/82/19) and it is submitted that it is almost certainly Q seen in the photograph. In other words, he must have seen Jackie Duddy lying on the ground surrounded by a small group of civilians, including a priest, and he must have seen Michael Bridge being shot as he gesticulated towards the soldiers. He had no explanation as to how he could have missed seeing that event occur in an otherwise empty carpark. (Day 339/50/11 to Day 339/50/20)

17.8.3.108 At one stage, INQ 2003, who had a drink problem, tried to suggest that he was Soldier Q and that he had shot Jack Duddy. He told the Tribunal that he pretended to be Q because he understood from soldiers who were there that it was Soldier Q who had shot Jackie Duddy. He said that he did not know who told him that but when asked whether it was Q he said “maybe, yes.” (Day 339/53/7 to Day 339/53/23)

17.8.3.109 Without prejudice to our submission that Jackie Duddy was probably shot by Soldier V, it is also possible that he was shot by Soldier Q. We say this for five reasons. First, he was in a position (the east corner of the north gable wall of Block 1) where he could have shot him, although if he did go first to the west corner and stayed there for any length of time he may have arrived at the east corner after Jackie Duddy was shot. Secondly, the suggested trajectory of his shot (from the north-west corner of the courtyard to the south- east corner) is consistent with hitting Jackie Duddy at the point where he fell. Thirdly, his account of the circumstances in which he fired is clearly fabricated so that he must have fired in circumstances and with an effect to which he is not prepared to admit. Fourthly, INQ 2003 was certainly in a position to know from the talk among the men directly involved in Sector 2 who had done what and it does seem logical that if he was trying to pass himself off as the person who shot Jackie Duddy he would have used the cypher of the soldier he understood to have been responsible for that. It would, however, be unwise to place any reliance on 2003’s understanding. Fifthly, Q was very confident that he hit his target and he believed that he killed the person he was aiming at. (Day 339/59/22 to Day 339/60/6)

17.8.3.110 With regard to the question whether he saw acid bombs, he told Eversheds that he did not see acid bombs being thrown and he did not see them land. (B657.5 paragraph 30). He had told Lord Widgery that he saw bottles being thrown from the flats, he saw them landing and he saw liquid that he thought was acid coming out of the bottles. (B657.28 F) Nor had he suggested in his RMP statement that he had seen Soldier T with acid on his trousers, as he claimed, (Day 339/80/16 to Day 339/80/18) even though he was discussing acid bombs in that statement.

17.8.3.111 Finally, no other soldier admits to seeing Q fire his shot and Q does not admit to seeing anyone else fire.

17.8.3.112 Private INQ 1918 was Lt N’s radio operator in Pig 1. He fired no shots. He did not make an RMP statement but did sign an arrest form in which he claimed that he had arrested Duncan Clarke. He said in the RMP statement form supporting the arrest that he saw the person he now knows to be Duncan Clarke throwing stones at Security Forces. (C1918.9)

17.8.3.113 In his Eversheds statement, INQ 1918 said that he heard incoming fire from behind him and to his left, which would have been from the direction of the William Street/Rossville Street junction.(C1918.2 paragraph 8) He provided a diagram illustrating this. (C1918.5) No one else has suggested that civilians or indeed soldiers were firing from this location. He also claimed to recall hearing a Thompson sub-machine gun at some stage but cannot recall nail bombs and saw no one with weapons. (C1918.3 paragraph 14) In answer to Counsel to the Inquiry, it was “perfectly possible” that he may have imported into his recollection of Bloody Sunday a recollection from another day and that the recollection of a Thompson sub-machine gun could well come from another occasion. (Day 342/101/9 to Day 342/101/11)

17.8.3.114 INQ1918 said that the shots that he heard from behind him were high velocity rounds. He heard “a couple of shots”- it was not an SLR. (C1918.2 paragraph 8). Fire was returned, he said, but he did not know who returned the fire. He only heard SLR’s firing. He did not see anyone fire shots and he does not know if it was anyone near him who was returning fire. “SLR fire sends out shock waves and echoes and it is very difficult to tell where it is coming from”, he said. (C1918.2 paragraph 9) It should also be remembered that he was wearing headphones and a respirator. (Day 342/102/11 to Day 342/102/13)

17.8.3.115 INQ1918 claimed to have no recollection of seeing or hearing N fire 3 shots even though, as the Chairman pointed out, he was in very close proximity to him at the time. (Day 342/114/12 to Day 342/114/19) It is simply impossible to accept that INQ1918 would not have heard or been aware of his Platoon Commander firing 3 shots within a matter of feet from him. This is yet another witness who preferred to feign memory loss rather than deal with difficult questions about the shots fired by other soldiers.

17.8.3.116 He was supposed to stay close to his Platoon Commander so that he could transmit and receive messages on the radio on his behalf. He accepted that it was possible that he accompanied Lt N when he returned to the wall at the back of Chamberlain Street after depositing the prisoner in the back of the Pig (Day 342/118/2 to Day 342/118/8) but he claimed to have no recollection of what Lt. N did and specifically no recollection of him firing at a man he said was a nail bomber. (Day 342/118/9 to Day 342/118/12)

17.8.3.117 INQ1918 did not recall sending or receiving any transmissions over the radio. (C1918.3 paragraph 16 and Day 342/119/10 to Day 342/119/17)

17.8.3.118 His memory of the day was so poor, he said, that he had “no memory of the whole thing”, no memory of discussing it with anyone, no memory of being told that a young man called Jackie Duddy had been shot dead in the courtyard, no memory of being told that other persons had been wounded and not even any idea when he first learned that civilians had been killed and wounded on Bloody Sunday. (Day 342/120/17 to Day 342/120/25)

17.8.3.119 With regard to his own conduct, he said that he would not have snatched the prisoner himself because one cannot do snatch squad duties whilst carrying a radio, so that someone else must have snatched the prisoner and handed him to him. (C1918.4 paragraph 20) When asked to explain how he could have come to make a statement in which he said he was part of a snatch squad and arrested someone for throwing stones, he said he could not remember how “that gentleman turned up and was given to me or what happened to him afterwards”. (Day 342/96/4 to Day 342/96/11) Even on his own account, therefore, it is likely that INQ1918 had not seen Duncan Clarke throwing stones and had not arrested him but had simply received him from another soldier, so that his statement to the RMP was false.

17.8.3.120 Fortunately, we have the independent evidence of the photographs (especially P273) and of Jeffrey Morris, who was working for the Daily Mail. In the statement made by Mr Morris in1972, he said that the soldier with the respirator in P273 (i.e. 1918) was one of 2 paratroopers who forced him against a wall with a rifle across his neck and kicked him on the thigh. (M57.2 paragraph 5). He then saw INQ1918 hit Duncan Clarke on the head with his rifle butt.

17.8.3.121 Corporal 162 deployed in the Eden Place/Chamberlain St area, according to his RMP statement, but then ran along the wall at the back of Chamberlain Street where he met O, took a prisoner from him and returned to his Pig. He fired no shots.

17.8.3.122 In his Eversheds statement, he claimed to have heard automatic fire as he got out of his Pig. His explanation of this is tentative and confusing. He said he heard what he “believed” to be automatic fire. Reference to his belief was not meant to imply a degree of doubt, he said. (Day 323/212/7 to Day 323/212/25). In his Eversheds statement he explained that the fire came “from my right in front of the Pig” (B1962.3 paragraph 17) which would suggest a location towards Eden Place/Chamberlain Street but he said later in the same paragraph that it came from Rossville Flats or Rossville Street area (i.e. directly behind the Pig) and repeated this in his oral testimony. (Day 323/217/19 to Day 323/218/6)

17.8.3.123 In the same paragraph, he said “I do not know who fired, from where or who they were firing at”, which is also difficult to reconcile with the suggestion that it came from Rossville Flats or anywhere in particular. When it was suggested to him that he had really no idea where this alleged automatic fire was coming from, he said “No, absolutely, although it was on my right” (Day 323/221/8 to Day 323/221/9). He also said in his Eversheds statement (B1962.3 paragraph 17) that the firing was not an immediate threat to him, which suggests that it was not incoming fire, but that it made him “go to the left hand side of the vehicle, i.e. close to the wall at the back of the terraced houses”. The left hand side of the vehicle was facing towards Rossville Street, away from the walls at the back of the houses.

17.8.3.124 However, Corporal 162’s claim to have heard automatic fire is undermined principally by the fact that he made no reference in his RMP statement to hearing such fire or indeed any fire at all. If he had heard any civilian gunfire, this is exactly the kind of detail that would have been welcomed by the RMP. He could not explain why he made no reference in his 1972 statement to hearing any gunfire. (Day 323/213/1 to Day 323/213/21)

17.8.3.125 Corporal 162 deployed initially to Eden Place but he claimed not to have witnessed Lt. N’s shooting. Indeed, he even claimed that he did not even know that Lt N had fired at all until he was told by counsel during his oral Testimony. (Day 323/218/13 to Day 323/218/15 and Day 323/225/17 to Day 323/226/3)

17.8.3.126 The only offensive action on the part of civilians referred to in his RMP statement was that of a man throwing a metal stake at him (an incident he no longer remembers) and people throwing stones and bottles. Incidentally, he said that he ran towards the alleyway which runs between Eden Place and Chamberlain Street to “try to arrest these people who were throwing stones and bottles in Rossville Flats forecourt” (B1962.7), which is of course in a different direction. He now accepts that he did not in fact see people throwing stones and bottles and that by the time he had got out of his vehicle people were running away. (Day 323/186/6 to Day 323/186/11) When asked why, if he had not seen people throwing stones and bottles, he signed a statement to this effect, he said that came from Military Police, not him. (Day 323/187/3 to Day 323/187/7) In other words, he signed a statement that, in this respect at least, was false.

17.8.3.127 It is submitted that the rest of his evidence to this Tribunal is false insofar as he claims to have heard civilian gunfire or to have been unaware of the shooting by other soldiers. He said that, apart from the automatic fire, “there was certainly no other specific shots which made me look up or look in any particular direction. I never saw any particular individual shooting and neither did I see anyone shooting at me.” (B1962.3 paragraph 19) This is a soldier who made his way towards Sergeant O’s Pig at a sufficiently early stage, according to his account, to be able to take custody of the civilian (William Doherty) arrested by Sergeant O, who claims not to have started firing before this point.

17.8.3.128 Mr Doherty would appear to have been put into Lt. N’s Pig by Corporal 162. It is therefore probably Corporal 162 who struck him in the face with the butt of his rifle, as described by Mr Doherty (AD113.1 paragraph 5).

17.8.3.129 Corporal 162 admitted that he had spoken to Neil Davies of Praxis (B1962.6 paragraph 35 and Day 323/199/13 to Day 323/200/1). He recognised the transcripts at O23.1 et seq and O24.1 et seq as reflecting conversations he had on two occasions with Mr Davis (Day 323/203/3 to Day 323/211/17). The one thing he apparently did not want to talk about was Bloody Sunday because “that was something in my past and that is the end of it” (Day 323/232/16 to Day 323/232/24). He denied that Attachment 5 to his statement (B1962.12 to B1962.15) was a transcript of any discussion he had with Neil Davies. (B1962.6 paragraph 36) In this attachment, the soldier talked about having almost a free hand, laughing at the “Yellow Card System”, getting away with murder, using dirty tactics, ruling by fear and things getting out of hand. With regard to Bloody Sunday, the soldier suggested that Lt. N’s “warning shot” set everybody off and “the lads starting firing”, “some of those guys even fired from the hip”.

17.8.3.130 Whether or not the soldier giving that interview was Corporal 162, he was certainly a member of Mortar Platoon and, it is submitted, the real reason why 162 claims not to have seen anything is because what he saw and witnessed is reflected in the contents of Attachment 5.

17.8.3.131 Soldier 019 was one of the two soldiers in Pig 1 with a baton gun. He has identified himself in P1016 as the soldier at the corner opposite Lt. N. He said in his RMP statement that he heard 3-5 shots from Rossville Flats before N fired. He also saw someone cutting Private T’s denims off after he was hit with an acid bomb. He did not make any arrests or see any arrests. He said he fired no live rounds. Although he denied it, he is undoubtedly the subject of Praxis interviews transcribed at O.27, O.28 and O.29 in which, among other things, he discussed the “dirty tactics” and “set-up situations” in which they engaged and in which he said that on Bloody Sunday Lt. N fired first.

17.8.3.132 We say that Soldier 019 is the source of the comments recorded in these transcripts for the following reasons. First, one of the producers of the Praxis programme has already testified under oath that 019 was the source for one of the interviews and the other two are clearly interviews with the same person. Secondly, his own counsel had previously told the Tribunal that he was the source for some of the transcript and he admitted that he had given his counsel instructions to that effect. Thirdly, he, and only he, fits the profile of the interviewee. It could not be anyone else. Fourthly, the interview was conducted by a former paratrooper who actually served with 019 in Mortar Platoon so that he could hardly be fooled by an impostor pretending to be 019 in the sense of claiming the role, responsibilities and experiences of 019 on the day. We shall deal with each of these in turn.

17.8.3.133 The transcripts in question were prepared for the purposes of a documentary made by John Goddard, Tony Stark and Neil Davies for Praxis Films, who were commissioned by Channel 4 for the purpose. In his Eversheds statement (M86.11 paragraphs 35 to 36), Mr Goddard said that he recalled the name of the interviewee recorded in transcript O.27 but he was unable to identify him because he was given an undertaking of confidentiality. When Mr Goddard came to give his oral testimony, he was informed by Counsel to the Tribunal that 019 had released him from any obligation of confidentiality and he was asked to confirm whether he was the person to whom the transcript at O.27 related. After a short discussion about the fact that 019 shared the same Christian name as Corporal 162, he confirmed that it was 019. (Day 233/134/15 to Day 233/134/25)

17.8.3.134 During the testimony of Mr Goddard, his own senior counsel, when invited to confirm his instructions in this matter, said:

“.. .. Soldier 019 believes that [O27.1] must represent part of the conversation he had, but may I say he has considerable reservations about the way it is recorded and the language which he is supposed to have used”. (Day 233/119/9 to Day 233/119/13)

The interviewee in O.27 is clearly the same as the interviewee in O.28 and O.29. This is clear because the details given of the role and experience of the interviewee in the three transcripts correspond, not to mention the repetition of certain points and even terminology. We refer to the three transcripts for the full terms and effects thereof. By way of example, the interviewee in O.27 says that he was armed with a baton gun; he did not fire himself; he did not see a target; he was with the Platoon Commander; the Platoon Commander fired first; the empty cases passed over his (the interviewee’s) head; the world collapsed around them; and lots of careers were ruined that day. The interviewee in O.28 said that he did not fire a bullet; he did not see any targets; he was with the Platoon Commander; he was right by the Platoon Commander; the Platoon Commander fired first; the cartridges whistled past his head; and careers were ruined. The interviewee in O.29 said that he did not fire himself; he did not see any targets; he was right by N; N started firing first; the cases were flying right by his head; the world collapsed around them; and lots of careers were ruined that day.

17.8.3.135 Apart from the details of 019’s own experience on Bloody Sunday, details of the general conduct of paratroopers in Northern Ireland appear in O.28 and O.29. A number of them correspond, for example about the “set-up” situations and private supplies of ammunition.

17.8.3.136 The interviewee in these transcripts was a member of Mortar Platoon, he was in Lt. N’s Pig, he was armed only with a baton gun, he was beside Lt. N when Lt. N fired at the junction of Eden Place/Chamberlain Street and he had a recollection of seeing Soldier T having his denims cut off. These details are extensive, specific and unique to Soldier 019.

17.8.3.137 The interviews were conducted by Neil Davies, a former member of the Mortar Platoon who served with 019 in Aden. (Day 343/94/6 to Day 343/94/17) Mr Davies was the main contact with the paratroopers interviewed for the programme and he interviewed many of them himself. It can be assumed that he was familiar not only with 019’s role on Bloody Sunday but also with the role of others in the same Platoon. It is inconceivable that he could have been fooled by an impostor.

17.8.3.138 Despite having all these matters put to him, 019 persisted in denying that he was the source of any of the material in the transcripts.

17.8.3.139 We repeat the requests made at the conclusion of his oral testimony that the Tribunal should consider referring this matter to the DPP with a view to prosecuting this witness for perjury. He is clearly not the only soldier who committed perjury either at the Widgery Tribunal or at this Tribunal. However, he was perhaps the most blatant offender.

17.8.3.140 Among the most relevant facts and contentions advanced by Soldier 019 in the course of these interviews are the following:

(i) You have got to be a “psycho” to get into the Paras. They use maximum violence in minimum time. They are “like Tyson in the ring – dominate, sort out, people then behave themselves, unpredictable, kick shit out of ‘em.”

(ii) The Paratroopers engaged in dirty tactics and had contempt for the Yellow Card.

(iii) The Paratroopers engaged in “set-up situations”, including planting firearms or explosives to procure wrongful arrests and convictions, murdering civilians and fabricating evidence to cover up such unlawful activity.

(iv) They all carried extra, private supplies of ammunition and ignored the rules about ammunition.

(v) On Bloody Sunday, Lt. N fired first, “he had lost it”, the shooting then started.

17.8.3.141 By virtue of 019’s refusal to admit that he gave these interviews, the Tribunal was unable to explore them further and was therefore seriously impeded in its search for the truth about Bloody Sunday.

17.8.3.142 Bearing the contents of his Praxis interview in mind, the Tribunal can safely disregard the account given by 019 to the RMP in 1972 insofar as he suggested he heard civilian gunfire from Rossville Flats and that he heard these shots before Lt N fired.

17.8.3.143 With regard to his claim that the crowd started to advance on himself and Lt. N throwing perhaps dozens of bottles, photographs P272 and P273 reveal no evidence of the bottles that 019 says were landing near him and breaking. (Day 343/170/10 to Day 343/171/14)

17.8.3.144 The Tribunal can also reject his evidence that he does not remember firing any rubber bullets and was not even aware of the practice of modifying rubber bullets (Day 343/173/7 to Day 343/174/12). Soldier 019 might have been one of the two soldiers who attacked Jeffrey Morris. As one of only four members of Mortar Platoon with a baton gun and as the person who took William Doherty into custody, he may also have been the soldier who fired his baton gun at point blank range and hit Mr Doherty when Mr Doherty was sitting in the Pig. (AD.113.3) He may also have fired a rubber bullet into Duncan Clarke’s face when he was in the back of the same Pig. (AC6.1.1) One of these incidents was witnessed by Captain 200, the Composite Platoon Commander, who said that he saw a soldier fire a rubber bullet into the back of an APC at point blank range when the APC was parked at the northern end of Block 1. (B1980)

17.8.3.145 Finally, he may have been the soldier who fired the rubber bullet which apparently caused the wound suffered by Patsy McDaid, although we consider that Soldier 13 is the most likely candidate for that.

17.8.3.146 Soldier 112 was armed with a baton gun and fired a number of baton rounds. He said it was only after he had arrested a person and taken him to his Pig that he heard gunfire, including Thompson submachine gun fire. Eamon McAteer was the person said to have been arrested by him but Eamon McAteer was not arrested in Rossville Street. Soldier 112 was one of those who collected the bodies from the rubble barricade.

17.8.3.147 Soldier 112 claimed to have witnessed the drainpipe shot. He recollected that Lt. N climbed up the ladder to his position and asked if anyone had fired a shot. (B1732.3 paragraph 12) When his attention was drawn to Lt. N’s claim that his (Lt.N’s) immediate reaction was that the crack was an incoming high velocity shot, he said “what I do remember is him waving a rifle and asking did we fire one of these” (Day 320/125/18 to Day 320/125/25), which, if true, tends to undermine Lt N’s account.

17.8.3.148 He said that when he fired at those who were rioting in the waste ground after he debussed, he fired “at the group generally as opposed to individual rioters”. He was not aiming at anyone in particular. (Day 320/132/19 to Day 320/132/21) He initially accepted that that was not within the rules but when it was pointed out to him that he was then acting outside the rules he said it was within the rules. (Day 320/133/1 to Day 320/133/9)

17.8.3.149 At Fort George, 112 made a statement to the effect that he had seen Eamon McAteer throw stones in Rossville Street and that he had arrested him. (ARR30.3) When it was put to him that he had made that statement when, in fact, he had not seen Mr McAteer throwing stones there at all because he was not in Rossville Street, Soldier 112 replied “that is possible” (Day 320/133/19 to Day 320/133/24). It is submitted that Solider 112 knew perfectly well that he had not seen or arrested Eamon McAteer since Eamon McAteer was, as we know, arrested at the gable end of Glenfada Park North and 112 does not recall going “anywhere near the area of Glenfada Park North”. (Day 320/102/5 to Day 320/102/8) Mr McAteer’s account of the circumstances in which he was identified by 112 at Fort George should be preferred. (B1732.14) Soldier 112’s account of this matter is a complete fabrication, made in circumstances where he would have expected Eamon McAteer to be prosecuted for riotous behaviour and given the mandatory six months prison sentence.

17.8.3.150 Soldier 112 claimed to have heard a mixture of high and low velocity firing. When challenged about this he accepted that, because there were so many thumps and bangs and explosions going on of different kinds, including baton guns, it is possible that what he thought may have been low velocity firing may not have been. (Day 320/135/17 to Day 320/136/1) He could not say whether the high velocity firing was all SLR fire. (Day 320/134/22 to Day 320/134/24)

17.8.3.151 Despite his location at the east corner of the north gable wall of Block 1 and the fact that he was looking into the courtyard, he did not see any soldiers opening fire. (Day 320/136/2 to Day 320/136/19) He did see soldiers in firing positions but he said he could not recognise them, even though he was within a few yards of Sergeant O and must have been standing right beside Q when he fired from the same corner.

17.8.3.152 He claimed to be concentrating most of his attention on the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 (Day 320/137/12 to Day 320/137/25) but he did not see anyone firing a gun or carrying a gun in that alley (Day 320/141/15 to Day 320/141/19), which undermines S’s account of seeing as many as 4 different gunmen who fired about 13 shots at him from that location.

17.8.3.153 Soldier 112 did not see any gunmen anywhere in the courtyard, or in the block of flats or on the balconies. He denied seeing any civilians lying on the ground in the courtyard. (Day 320/142/13 to Day 320/142/19) Nor did he see any nail bombers or anybody of that kind (Day 320/138/9 to Day 320/138/16), which undermines the evidence of all those soldiers who claimed to have shot at gunmen and nail bombers there.

17.8.3.154 Although he was one of only 4 soldiers with baton guns in the courtyard area, he denied that he fired across the courtyard and did not see anyone else firing baton rounds across it to the location where Patsy McDaid was hit. (Day 320/144/14 to Day 320/144/23) Soldier 112 used a baton gun most of the time during his service in Northern Ireland from 1970 until Bloody Sunday but he said that he had never even heard tell of baton rounds being modified by the insertion of batteries or in any other way. (Day 320/143/7 to Day 320/144/13).

17.8.3.155 In his Eversheds statement, he described seeing the hand of a person holding a gun appear from a second floor window of Block 1 but he conceded during his oral testimony that it is possible he did not in fact see that. (Day 320/116/4 to Day 320/116/11) He said that maybe his memory was playing tricks with him but he denied inventing the account, which in our submission he clearly did. (Day 320/145/5 to Day 320/145/16).

17.8.3.156 He was challenged about gunfire that he claimed in his Eversheds statement to have heard which he had not claimed in his 1972 statement to have heard. It was suggested to him that as time has gone by he could have remembered hearing and seeing more than he actually did hear and see, to which he replied: “I could have imagined it”. (Day 320/145/17 to Day 320/146/7)

17.8.3.157 As far as the suggestion in his RMP statement (P1730) that he had heard a Thompson sub-machine gun is concerned, he said it was possible that this was put in at the suggestion or prompting of someone in the RMP. (Day 320/149/21 to Day 320/150/2)

17.8.3.158 Soldier 112 was involved in removing the bodies from the rubble barricade. He said that he had no recollection of feeling under threat as he did that and no concerns about being fired upon (Day 320/146/23 to Day 320/147/3), which tends to confirm that there was no firing going on at that stage. He said he did not search either the bodies or the barricade for weapons or nail bombs because he did not expect to see any. (Day 320/147/4 to Day 320/147/10)

17.8.3.159 He did not expect to see any, it is submitted, because he knew perfectly well that there were no civilians either in the courtyard or in Rossville Street throwing bombs or firing weapons at soldiers.

Sergeant O’s Pig

17.8.3.160 Sergeant O was in charge of Pig 2. He made three RMP statements. In the first, he said that there were 9 members of his section in the Pig, 7 with SLR’s and 2 with anti-riot guns. When he got out of the Pig he arrested William Doherty. He did not hear the sounds of any shots until after this arrest was made. He claims he came under fire from about 4 or 5 weapons of mixed calibre.

17.8.3.161 According to his account, he fired 3 shots at and hit a man with a pistol behind a Cortina close to the junction of Blocks 2 and 3; he fired 2 (sic) shots at a man with an M1 carbine on the first floor veranda between Blocks 2 and 3 and hit him in the head; and he fired 2 shots at a third gunman on the ground floor between Blocks 2 and 3 who was carrying an M1 carbine. He said that troops were stoned, bottled and petrol bombed.

17.8.3.162 In his second RMP statement made two days later, presumably when he realised he had fired 8 shots instead of 7, he said that he had fired an additional shot at the gunman on the first floor balcony in Block 3. In his third RMP statement on the 15th February, he added that he had ordered T to shoot an acid bomber if he threw another acid bomb from the second floor balcony of Block 1. He didn’t see T shoot but heard him fire 2 shots.

17.8.3.163 Sergeant O was a Scottish Protestant. He agreed that Scotland has the same sort of problems with religious bigotry and sectarian hatred as Northern Ireland, albeit on a smaller scale and that there would be Scottish Protestants who would have sympathies with Ulster loyalists (Day 335/140/3 to Day 335/140/12). However he said that he “would not know whether a lot of Scottish Protestants have a deep antagonism towards Irish Catholics or whether a lot of soldiers are drawn from areas, such as the housing estates of Glasgow, where that kind of problem exists” (Day 335/140/16 to Day 335/140/25). He said: “there is no reason to talk to the soldiers about what their attitude is about, what their bigotry is and so on”. (Day 335/141/12 to Day 335/141/15) When it was suggested to him that soldiers would not leave their attitudes at home when they joined the Army, he said: “I never seen any traces of bigotry within any Platoon I have commanded .. .. I have never come across it” (Day 335/141/16 to Day 335/141/24)

17.8.3.164 He denied that there was even a perception in 1972 that the Paras had a strong Scottish/Protestant element. (Day 335/142/3 to Day 335/142/8). However, that was the evidence of the Parachute Regiment’s own Regimental Sergeant Major, INQ2037, who said: “There have been lots of comments that the Army was anti-Catholic. This was not the case. The press made a big thing about the fact that there was a high percentage of Scots in the Paras and most of them were Protestants. We did not hate Catholics”. (C2037.6 paragraph 31).

17.8.3.165 When this was put to Sergeant O he said he was not aware of such a perception. He didn’t even know there was a high percentage of Scottish Protestants in the Parachute Regiment because he had no idea what religion people were. They never talked about politics. They did talk about football but he said he would not know who the Rangers supporters were or, if there were any, the Celtic supporters (Day 335/143/13 to Day 335/143/23). INQ 2003 said that Sergeant O was a “real true blue Loyalist” and used to sing the Sash on occasions. When Sergeant O was reminded that 5 of the 7 or 8 NCO’s in the Sergeants’ Mess during the Thames TV interview were Scottish, he said “maybe you just hit us on a bad night” (Day 335/145/8 to Day 335/145/11).

17.8.3.166 Sergeant O denied that he was a sectarian, anti-Irish racist. However, during an interview with the Praxis producers, he said: “I do not particularly like the Irish race because of what they have done to themselves” (B575.62). He said that was not an expression of racism, that was “because what the Irish race are doing to themselves. Not every member of the Irish drop into that category”. (Day 335/148/10 to Day 335/148/14).

17.8.3.167 Referring to the use of the term “Fenian” as a term of anti-Catholic abuse, he said that none of his soldiers would say that sort of thing. (Day 335/145/18 to Day 335/146/4) However, Dr McDermott gave evidence about how his children had been playing in Springham Street near the Paras’ forming-up point at Clarence Avenue and soldiers had chased them inside, calling them “Fenian fuckers” (AM5.1 paragraph 3). Sergeant O had himself dealt with at least one complaint made by a local resident about the presence of the Paras in that area so he may very well have been in charge of these soldiers in the absence of officers on a reconnaissance mission.

17.8.3.168 Sergeant O objected to the No Go area in Derry (Day 335/154/12 to Day 335/154/13) and he described how “generally, the men’s view seemed to be that this [going to Derry on Bloody Sunday] was a chance to sort out the Londonderry hooligans, who we had all seen on TV.” (B571.108 paragraph 12) It is submitted that Sergeant O and others in the Parachute Regiment were of the view that Catholic civilians could be shot with impunity. He claimed that he was not even aware that, in one incident alone in August 1971, 5 Catholic civilians, including a priest, had been shot dead by members of the Parachute Regiment. (Day 335/157/8 to Day 335/157/13).

17.8.3.169 Sergeant O claimed to have heard the drainpipe shot and told Lord Widgery that it came from inside the Bogside (B472 E) but he had no idea where the shot had come from. (Day 336/1/9 to Day 336/1/10). He even told the Praxis interviewers that it “could have been the British Army.” (B575.70)

17.8.3.170 He suggested in his RMP statement that there were about 2000 people rioting at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street (B575.137 and Day 336/5/2 to Day 336/5/9). That was clearly a gross exaggeration and during his oral testimony he said that the bulk of the crowd was between the rubble barricade and Free Derry Corner. (Day 335/25/12 to Day 335/25/14) The explanation was that Sergeant O did not see any distinction between rioters and marchers, as he admitted himself, although he suggested that this was only until he moved forward and realised where he was. (Day 336/5/14 to Day 336/5/17)

17.8.3.171 Sergeant O cocked his rifle in the Pig before going through Barrier 12 and believes the rest of the men followed suit. (B757.110 paragraph 23) This was in breach of the Yellow Card (ED.71.1), which provides at paragraph 4 that “unless you are about to open fire no live round is to be carried in the breech”. Company Commanders and above may order weapons to be cocked as appropriate. Even if Lt. N authorised this (and he denies this), he was not O’s Company Commander. There is no suggestion that Major Loden ordered or authorised soldiers to cock their weapons.

17.8.3.172 Sergeant O was unaware of the instruction not to conduct running battles down Rossville Street and claimed not to be aware of any danger in becoming involved in driving through a crowd and jumping out with cocked weapons in the midst of the crowd. (Day 336/9/15 to Day 336/9/24) Incidentally, he admitted that it was possible that Alana Burke was knocked over by his Pig and he may not have seen it. (Day 335/27/17 to Day 335/27/23)

17.8.3.173 He claimed that they managed to separate a section of about 200 people between the two Pigs (B575.137, B575.112 paragraph 31, and Day 335/31/17 to Day 335/31/24) but he later admitted that he had no idea of the size of the crowd between his own Pig and Lt. N’s Pig. (Day 336/13/22 to Day 336/14/5)

17.8.3.174 When he got out of the Pig he was carrying his SLR, not a baton, but he told the Praxis interviewers that all he had was a baton and was totally unarmed (B575.2). When it was suggested that he had told a deliberate lie, he said: “I do not know how it came up in the concept it did honestly .. … what I said was wrong, there is no doubt about it .. … It was not meant as a lie .. .. it was statements I made and it turned out they were wrong.” (Day 336/15/21 to Day 336/16/24) When it was suggested that he had been trying to give the interviewers a false impression, he said: “I do not know what I was trying to do quite honestly”.

17.8.3.175 He also told the Praxis interviewers that the Paras did not carry masks “because they did not believe in them”. (B575.3) However, as appears from a number of photographs, the Paras did carry gas masks and did wear them, including Sergeant O himself (B575.111 paragraph 26, and Day 336/17/22 to Day 336/117/24). His explanation for this lie was: “We did not carry gas masks on us, on our actual bodies, the gas masks were in the Pigs”. (Day 336/18/8 to Day 336/18/9) He denied that he was trying to give the interviewer the impression that he was not wearing a gas mask (Day 336/18/22 to Day 336/18/24).

17.8.3.176 Shortly after he got out of his Pig, Sergeant O set upon William Doherty, a 56 year old bystander who was trying to make his way to safety. By his own admission, Sergeant O hit Mr Doherty on the head with his rifle by using the rifle as if it were a baton with such severity that the plastic stock of the rifle shattered. (Day 335/34/1 to Day 335/34/13) He accepted that the wound on Mr Doherty’s head as seen in photograph ARR16.1 was the result of him hitting Mr Doherty. (Day 335/34/14 to Day 335/34/24) It is clear from the civilian evidence that, as soon as he debussed, Sergeant O “immediately turned his rifle upside down and started using it like a baseball bat, clubbing people who were running past” (AM152.2 paragraph 9 per John McCrudden) and that when he grabbed Mr Doherty he beat him repeatedly with the rifle. (per William Barber AB9.2, Charles Glenn AG43.3 paragraph 21 and Patrick McCrudden AM153.12)

17.8.3.177 With regard to the first shots that Sergeant O claimed to hear, he claimed to see bullet strikes on the wall at the back of 36 Chamberlain Street and also on the ground between the wall and the Pig. Unfortunately for him, he gave different accounts on different occasions of when and in what circumstances these occurred (Day 335/50/2 to Day 335/53, Day 336/21/24 to Day 336/23/21 and Day 336/138/4 to Day 336/138/22). If these bullet strikes had really occurred it would have been difficult to remember such details as the order in which they occurred. Sergeant O’s problem was that they did not occur at all but he was inventing detail to give a convincing account and then could not remember the details he had invented.

17.8.3.178 He told the Tribunal that he was next to the front left wheel of the Pig when the firing started (Day 336/23/23 to Day 336/24/5) but said in his RMP statement that when the firing started he was positioned at the rear of the vehicle (B575.138). When this was pointed out to him, he said: “The Humber is not exactly, you know, one hundred yards long, it is a very small vehicle, you have – 4 or 5 yards covers it, I was in that area. I could not give you the exact position obviously” (Day 336/24/6 to Day 336/24/14). However, he had tried to give the exact position and the reason he told the RMP that he was at the back of the vehicle was presumably to explain why he was not hit by the burst of firing from 4 or 5 different weapons. The third account was given in his oral testimony to Lord Widgery, when he said that he was “moving back to the vehicle” when he came under fire (B475 E)

17.8.3.179 It is submitted that he gave three different accounts of when he came under fire because he never came under fire at all and therefore had to invent a recollection of where he was when this happened. If he had really come under such heavy fire, one of the things he would have remembered would have been where he was at the time it started and, in particular, whether he was out in open wasteground without cover or at the front of his vehicle facing what he claims to have been was the source of the firing or under cover at the back of his vehicle.

17.8.3.180 With regard to the “4 or 5 weapons” and the “mixture of high velocity and low velocity fire”, (Day 335/47/2 to Day 335/47/14) this account was of course fictitious and he could not always remember the details he had invented. He told the Tribunal that he was not aware of any automatic fire (Day 335/48/2 to Day 335/48/10) but when asked by the Praxis interviewers whether he had any idea what sort of weapons might have been responsible for the 10 round burst that he claimed to have heard, he said “automatic, that is all I will say”. (B575.74). When this discrepancy was put to him, he said that “it was wrong” and he could not remember saying that to them (Day 335/49/17 to Day 335/49/24). This was a recurring problem for Sergeant O.

17.8.3.181 When the firing started, Sergeant O did not even take simple precautions such as taking cover behind the Pig. (Day 336/24/15 to Day 336/24/25) or putting his helmet on - he was bare-headed throughout the shooting which he characterised as “the heaviest I have heard in Northern Ireland”. (B575.74)

17.8.3.182 With regard to his first target, it was put to him that, contrary to the location suggested in his trajectory photographs (P21), the Cortina car behind which he claimed to have seen a pistol man was, according to the grid reference (43291678) given by him in his RMP statement (B575.138), in line with the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. That was also the location suggested by Mr Martin Tucker (AT17.5 paragraph 29), who saw soldiers shooting at a car there in a bizarre fashion.

17.8.3.183 Sergeant O accepted that he was firing in this direction and that he was therefore firing in the direction of people who were trying to exit the courtyard (Day 336/28/9 to Day 336/28/15). He said he was firing like that because someone was firing at him and he was trying to save his life even though he accepted that he could have saved his life by simply stepping behind the Pig. (Day 336/28/16 to Day 336/28/22) At one stage he suggested he was not conscious of civilians being in the area, then he accepted that he was perfectly well aware of them. (Day 336/29/1 to Day 336/29/10) When it was put to him that he was firing without regard for the welfare of civilians, he said: “that never entered my mind”. (Day 336/29/15 to Day 336/29/25) When asked if he made any judgement about whether or not civilians might be endangered by his firing, he said “I did not think about that at the time”. (Day 336/30/4 to Day 336/30/8) Put another way, he was shooting with impunity.

17.8.3.184 Nor did he see it as part of his responsibility to monitor the firing by other soldiers, especially more junior soldiers in his Platoon who were nearby. (Day 336/31/18 to Day 336/31/21)

17.8.3.185 Soldier T said he was about 3 feet behind O at this stage looking in the same direction in which Sergeant O was firing but he said he could not see what he was firing at. (B736 and B745 B-F)

17.8.3.186 Sergeant O’s account of the reactions of the alleged pistol man behind the car is also difficult to accept at face value. He says that the gunman did not take cover or duck behind a wall or do anything else to avoid being shot when Sergeant O “returned” fire. The “gunman” stood there exposed and firing his handgun until he was shot (Day 336/36/10 to Day 336/36/20).

17.8.3.187 Sergeant O had difficulty with the location of his second “target”. In his RMP statement, he had suggested the gunman was on the walkway between Blocks 1 and 2 (B441). He repeated this in his RMP statement (B575.141) and in his Treasury Solicitor’s statement (B575.147 paragraphs 12 to 13). Also, when he gave his evidence to Lord Widgery, he specified that the second gunman was on the lowest of the two adjoining catwalks in between Blocks 2 and 3 (B478 D). However, as appears in P292, this walkway was completely enclosed. When this was put to him, he said: “Looking at this I was obviously mistaken in where I thought the gunman was, I think the gunman was on the balcony, on the corner” (Day 336/43/20 to Day 336/43/22).

17.8.3.188 He clearly realised this problem before he made his Eversheds statement because there, for the first time, he suggested that the gunman was on the balcony at the southern end of Block 3 (P575.115 paragraph 49). He recognised the difference himself (Day 336/39/3 to Day 336/39/9). When it was first put to him that when he had made his first RMP statement he was clearly talking about the walkway between the two blocks, his reply had been: “I can see how that can be misinterpreted there, yes”. (Day 336/37/23 to Day 336/38/1)

17.8.3.189 It was clear that he altered his account for the purposes of the Eversheds statement after he had seen photographs of the walkway and balcony. In his statement, he referred to the description in the first RMP statement of the gunman on the veranda between Blocks 2 and 3 and went on: “Having now looked carefully at a photograph of the Rossville Flats, I have identified that the veranda or balcony was actually towards the south end of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats, not on the walkway between Blocks 2 and 3”. (B575.123 paragraph 93) However, that alteration was not enough to remedy the problem for O.

17.8.3.190 As appears from P280, below the “balustrade” there are individual railings between which are gaps, so that it is perfectly possible to see right down to the floor of the balcony. In other words, people moving along the balcony were visible down to their feet, so that the picture painted by Sergeant O of heads bobbing up and down above the balustrade level (with their bodies otherwise hidden behind some kind of solid screen) did not correspond with reality and must have been invented. When this was put to sergeant O, he adhered to his account and said : “All I could see of them was parts of their heads above the balcony rail; that is the impression I still have in my mind”. (Day 336/44/25 to Day 336/45/3)

17.8.3.191 During these incidents, Sergeant O claimed that his section was under “constant small arms fire from several positions in the Rossville Flats area”. (B441) During his testimony he said that between 60 and 120 rounds could have been fired at him. (Day 336/47/8 to Day 336/47/11) We know that no soldiers were hit by any gunfire but, in addition, Sergeant O and at least two other soldiers were beside the Pig during this period and even the Pig does not appear to have been hit. Certainly Sergeant O never suggested that it was and there does not appear to have been any damage to the Pig. The windscreen, headlamps, tyres and radiator were all exposed to any incoming gunfire but they remained intact.

17.8.3.192 During this period, O claims to have seen Private S’s gunman in the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 and said that there were civilians near the gunman. His attitude towards the safety of civilians is reflected in the exchange between himself and Counsel for the Inquiry, as follows:

“Q. You did not consider retreating to the safety of the pig so as to avoid the risk (a) of either of you being shot and (b) any civilians being shot?

A. We had targets and we went for the targets, that is all I can say.” (Day 335/76/6 to Day335/76/17)

17.8.3.193 Sergeant O told the RMP that there were petrol bombs thrown at them (B575.139) but he conceded that he had not seen any petrol bombs. Nor did he see any nail bombs. (Day 336/56/9 to Day 336/56/13) That means that he did not see any of the targets N, Q and R claimed to see. N placed his target in a location where, if he had existed, he would have been virtually within touching distance of Sergeant O. (P20). Soldier Q claimed to shoot at a nail bomber at the junction of Blocks 2 and 3 (P23), which is exactly where O said that, most of the time, he was looking and occasionally firing but during none of that time did he see Q’s target. (Day 336/61/6 to Day 336/61/8) Indeed, if Sergeant O is to be believed, neither Q nor N even said to him that they had shot nail bombers in those locations.

17.8.3.194 Sergeant O accepted that the soldier seen in photograph P285 standing against the passenger side of the Pig is probably him. (Day 336/65/18 to Day 336/65/23 and Day 336/68/18 to Day 336/68/20) That soldier looks as if his left hand is resting on the mudguard and it appears that he is looking down the barrel of his rifle in the direction of Michael Bridge. Whether or not he is at that moment looking in that direction, it is quite obvious that anyone in that position could not help but see Jackie Duddy on the ground in the middle of the courtyard surrounded by a group of civilians, including Father Daly, and also Michael Bridge as he gesticulated and shouted at the soldiers around the Pig. Yet he repeatedly denied seeing any of this. (Day 336/68/25 to Day 336/69/5).

17.8.3.195 Sergeant O, it is submitted, was obliged to maintain this in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary because he was not prepared to admit that he saw Jackie Duddy, Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and perhaps even Patsy McDaid shot in circumstances that were completely indefensible.

17.8.3.196 Indeed he was not prepared to admit to any malpractice on the part of soldiers. He even claimed that he had never heard of the practice of soldiers having their own private supply of ammunition. (Day 335/115/9 to Day 335/115/18)

17.8.3.197 It is submitted that what Sergeant O was doing in Sector 2 was engaging in the kind of firing to which he referred himself in his Praxis interview when he talked about “putting ammunition into an area where you know something is happening, just trying to keep people’s heads down”. (B575.20)

17.8.3.198 When it was put to him towards the end of his examination that he still believed that what the Paras did on Bloody Sunday was not wrong, he replied: “Some of it was wrong, obviously innocent civilians got hit; I’ve got no doubt about that, but I do not believe that they were hit deliberately”. It is submitted that he knew this because of what he had seen himself, not, as he suggested, from what he learned subsequently. (Day 336/73/13 to Day 336/74/1)

17.8.3.199 Having said that some of it was wrong, he was then shown part of his Praxis interview where he had said: “Derry was not wrong .. … from our point of view, Derry was not wrong. Derry was done by a disciplined force who were caught in a situation where they had to respond”. (B575.94). He then said he would “stand by that”.

17.8.3.200 Sergeant O knew from the beginning that what happened on Bloody Sunday was wrong, which is why he refused to talk to Praxis about those events (B575.74). Soldier 1413 said that soldiers were told by officers and senior NCO’s to “button their lip on this”. (O18.4) It is submitted that Sergeant O was probably one of the NCO’s who issued that instruction.

17.8.3.201 It was put to Sergeant O that errors of judgement were made by soldiers on Bloody Sunday. He said that he had heard that but he did not know it for a fact. (Day 336/79/1). When it was pointed out to him that this was exactly what he had said himself to the Praxis interviewers (B575.95), he said he could not remember what he was talking about. (Day 336/80/14 to Day 336/80/22)

17.8.3.202 Sergeant O was in charge of the soldiers who took the bodies to Altnagelvin Hospital. Ivan Cooper described how “the soldiers were joking with each other and laughing .. .. the soldiers were jubilant and gave you the impression they were thinking they had busted an IRA unit. One of these soldiers was a Scottish soldier”. (KC12.27 paragraph 81) Sergeant O denied that he was the Scottish soldier (Day 336/83/18 to Day 336/83/19) but he later told Counsel to the Tribunal that he was the only Scottish soldier in Mortar Platoon on Bloody Sunday. (Day 336/140/2 to Day 336/140/6) He also thought that this was “a job well done”. (Day 336/83/15 to Day 336/83/17) It is submitted that Sergeant O was one of the soldiers joking and laughing as the bodies of John Young, Michael McDaid and Willie Nash were carried to the mortuary.

17.8.3.203 All the evidence points to the conclusion that Sergeant O was a thoroughly dishonest witness who bears a heavy degree of responsibility for the shootings in the Rossville Flats courtyard. Not only did he allow other soldiers to fire unjustifiably at innocent civilians but he himself took the opportunity to spray bullets around the courtyard in much the same way as his hero, John Wayne, might have done in a war film. (Day 336/70/10 to Day 336/70/14)

17.8.3.204 Since his account of his own shooting cannot be accepted, it is impossible to know where and at whom he fired and whether he hit any of the deceased or wounded. However, in addition to the fact that, like all the other soldiers in his platoon, he was acting in concert with them in a joint enterprise, he was the leader of the soldiers in his Pig and actively encouraged the shooting by his own example. On this basis alone, he is criminally responsible for the murder of Jackie Duddy and the wounding of Michael Bridge, Michael Bradley and Patsy McDaid.

17.8.3.205 Private R was an 18 year old soldier designated as the vehicle guard for Pig 2. He was dropped off in Rossville Street and was taken by surprise when the Pig drove on into the carpark. He had to run after it and as he caught up with it he said that he heard a number of shots from about six different weapons. He said he also heard explosions but couldn’t say where they came from. According to his first RMP statement, he took up a position at the north-east corner of Block 1 and fired 1 round at a man with a fizzing object in his hand. He claimed a hit. He then fired 2 or 3 rounds at a man with a pistol at the junction of Block 2 and 3. He wasn’t sure if he hit him.

17.8.3.206 In his second RMP statement he said that he was actually positioned between the wall and the Pig whenever he fired his first shot. He also added the fact that he had seen O’s target behind the Cortina and saw O fire.

17.8.3.207 In his SA statement he said that he fired his shots from the right-hand back door of his Pig, i.e. the third location in as many statements. Acid bombs were thrown at him after he fired, not before as he had previously said in his second RMP statement. As the second acid bomb was thrown, T fired. He did not require medical attention for his acid burns.

17.8.3.208 He then said in his Eversheds statement that, in addition to the high velocity and low velocity incoming fire, he heard Thompson sub-machine gun fire.

In his first RMP statement Private R said that there were “in excess of 800” rioters at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. (B691.9) He conceded during his oral testimony that he may have made that figure up on the basis of what he heard. (Day 337/85/13 to Day 337/85/25)

17.8.3.209 Private R debussed in Rossville Street. He said in his RMP statement that he heard the sound of shots and cocked his weapon before the Pig drove off again. In his SA statement he said this happened as he ran across the waste ground. (B691.015 paragraph 4) In his Widgery testimony, he first of all said that this happened after going about 10 to 15 yds. (B677 A) but in cross-examination he said it happened after going about 50 yds. (B683 F). In his Eversheds statement, he reverted to suggesting that the incoming fire occurred when he got out of the vehicle and, apparently, before the vehicle moved off. (B691.2 paragraphs 10 to 11)

17.8.3.210 In his first RMP statement he said that the crowd was throwing stones and bottles at him. In his SA statement, he said he was hit twice (B691.15 paragraph 4). He told Lord Widgery he was hit 3 times (B677 D), in the thigh, calf and hip. In his Eversheds statement he said that he was hit in the thigh, calf and head (B691.2 paragraph 12). He told this Tribunal that he knew he had not been hit in the head. (Day 337/91/3 to Day 337/91/16) When asked why he had said that in his Eversheds statement when he knew that he had not been hit in the head, he said “that must have been misinterpreted.” (Day 337/91/17 to Day 337/91/21).

17.8.3.211 He said in his first RMP statement that he heard high and low velocity shots from about 6 different weapons. (B691.10). He did not suggest these weapons included or sounded like an M1 carbine, an Armalite, a Thompson submachine gun and a starting pistol. However, this is exactly what he did say in his Eversheds statement. (B61.2 paragraph 10) During his oral testimony, he admitted that he was not able to say what sort of weapons had been responsible for firing those shots because he did not distinguish them at the time and had not heard many such weapons. (Day 337/94/17 to Day 337/95/2)

17.8.3.212 In his first RMP statement he said that after he reached his vehicle in the courtyard he heard explosions (B691.10) and he repeated this in his SA statement. (B691.15 paragraph 5) However, when he got to the Widgery Tribunal, he said that he heard them after about 10 to 15 yds from the point where he debussed from the Pig in Rossville Street (B677). When this was pointed out during his oral testimony to this Tribunal, he accepted that these were completely different accounts of when he heard explosions. (Day 337/97/16 to Day 337/97/23) He said he “may have been mistaken”. (Day 337/96/22 to Day 337/96/25)

17.8.3.213 In his first RMP statement he had said he could not determine the locations of the explosions (B691.10). He agreed that he did not have any idea where the explosions had come from (Day 337/97/3 to Day 337/99/15) but he pointed out a location on the model during the Widgery Tribunal hearing (B677 A), which was somewhere at the “back of the flats”.

17.8.3.214 He also gave a variety of accounts about where he himself was when, as he claimed, he noticed the “nail bomber” and fired a shot. First of all, he was at the north east corner of Block 1 (as per the map attached to his 1^st RMP statement, B691.11). Then, when he made his second RMP statement (B691.12), he said he was between the wall of Block 1 Rossville Flats and one of the APC’s. By the time he made his SA statement, he had decided that he had fired a shot from “beside the right hand back door of the Pig” (B691.015 paragraph 5). He then told Lord Widgery that he noticed the nail bomber when he was “just coming round this corner”, i.e. the north east corner of Block 1. (B677 G)

17.8.3.215 In his first RMP statement, he said that the nail bomber was wearing dark slacks (B691.10) but he then told Lord Widgery he was wearing light slacks (B679 A-B).

17.8.3.216 In his first RMP statement he said the nail bomber was running with the crowd and then stopped and attempted to throw the fizzing object (B691.10). In his SA statement he said that the man was “not moving in the same direction as the others” (B691.15 paragraph 5). By the time he came to make his Eversheds statement, the nail bomber was “pressed against the wall” and took a few steps forward from the wall before attempting to throw the object (B691.3 paragraph 14), a version he repeated to the Tribunal (Day 337/32/3 to Day 337/32/5).

17.8.3.217 In his first RMP statement, he said that the nail bomber was thrown “to the right and backwards” by the shot. (B691.10) but he told Eversheds that the bullet hit the man high up on the right shoulder, “causing him to spin around” (B691.3 paragraph 14). Private R accepted that being spun around was not the same as being thrown backwards and to his right (Day 337/110/1 to Day 337/110/23).

17.8.3.219 He said that rioters threw acid bombs, 1 of which splattered across his legs. (B691.10). This had changed to 2 in his 2^nd RMP statement, both of which he said struck him on the legs. (B691.12) He explained to this Tribunal that when he made his first statement to the RMP, he thought he had been hit by 1 acid bomb (Day 337/112/7 to Day 337/112/9), but someone else told him that he had been hit by 2. (Day 337/112/12 to Day 337/112/18). He admitted to the Tribunal that he then gave the impression in all his subsequent evidence that it was his own personal recollection that he had been hit by 2, even though “it may not have been true at that time” (Day 337/113/4 to Day 337/113/25). He gave this impression to Lord Widgery under oath. Indeed he said that the first one “struck [him] across the leg” and that he was hit by the acid on the leg both times (B679 B-D). This became modified when he said in his Eversheds statements (B691.3 paragraph 16) that 2 bottles smashed “near” to him and the acid splashed onto his trousers. Incidentally, when he was speaking to Soldier 005 subsequently, he did not mention that he had been hit by any acid bombs. (B1374.1 paragraph 15) Nor did he seek any medical attention. (Day 337/116/17 to Day 337/116/21)

17.8.3.220 It is submitted that, if he was struck by the contents of a bottle, it was not an acid bomb, whatever he may have thought at the time.

17.8.3.221 With regard to the pistol man in the corner between Blocks 2 and 3, he said essentially that he fired at a hand containing a pistol from about 70 yds away but he could not really say whether he had any prospect of hitting the hand from that distance. (Day 337/119/6 to Day 337/119/14)

17.8.3.222 Interestingly, Soldier 005 made his statement (B1370) on 4^th February, 45 minutes after R made his 2^nd RMP statement, and 005’s statement was concerned almost entirely with an account of shots apparently fired by R. The details corresponded with R’s firing in that it referred to a man firing 2 shots with a pistol at R and R firing back 3 times. However, the man that 005 claimed to see was located on the first floor on a veranda running between Blocks 1 and 2 whereas R said the gunman was on the ground floor between Blocks 2 and 3. Soldier 005 admitted that he made this up and could not have seen anyone in the location he described. (Day 338/160/14 to Day 338/160/20) It is submitted that 005 must have made up his statement in furtherance of an agreement for him to provide a supporting account for R.

17.8.3.223 R was another soldier who did not suggest that the Pig was hit, even though there were dozens of shots fired by civilians by his account. (Day 337/123/8 to Day 337/124/6)

17.8.3.224 He did not make any reference in his first statement to seeing Sergeant O’s target behind the Cortina and admitted that he did not even mention this to the RMP at the time. (Day 337/124/9 to Day 337/124/12) It follows from this that he was, at the very least, wrong when he told Lord Widgery that he had mentioned this in his 1^st statement. (B687 D) Significantly, in his Eversheds statement (B691.4 paragraph 19), he marked on a map (B691.8) the location of O’s target behind the Cortina in the same spot marked by O in his photograph (P21), the location which O now accepts was wrong.

17.8.3.225 He initially suggested that the reason he didn’t mention O’s firing was that the RMP had only asked him if he had fired but he then had to accept that that was not the case because he had included in his statement evidence about other shots that he had heard and about high and low velocity weapons (Day 337/124/23 to Day 337/125/24).

17.8.3.226 Soldiers N, Q, S, and V all claim to have fired at targets which should have been readily visible to Private R but he denied seeing any of them. He also denied seeing Jackie Duddy or Michael Bridge even though he was “looking out for trouble”. (B691.3 paragraph 12) He also accepted that he must be one of the soldiers behind the Pig at the time photograph P285 was taken. (Day 337/133/1 to Day 337/133/5) He accepted that he was concerned to see what was going on in the courtyard and it was more than likely that at least every now and again he had a look to see what was happening there. (Day 337/133/13 to Day 337/133/20).

17.8.3.227 As far as he could recall, “nobody claimed to shoot any of the people who was actually shot that day.” (Day 337/135/16 to Day 337/135/20)

17.8.3.228 This, therefore, is yet another soldier whose evidence is riddled with inconsistencies and discrepancies. He has clearly told lies about material matters and his account cannot be regarded as truthful. He may also, therefore, have shot Jackie Duddy or one of the wounded in the courtyard. What is clear is that when he fired at the “nail bomber” he hit the man he intended to hit (Day 337/143/4 to Day 337/143/10) and did so intending to kill him. (Day 337/142/16 to Day 337/142/20)

17.8.3.229 INQ 1579 was the driver of Pig 2. He accepts that on the way into the Rossville Flats courtyard the front of the Pig “tapped” a man who was standing spreadeagled in front of him (C1579.3 paragraph 20). This was Thomas Harkin. He denied knocking down Alana Burke or any young girl (Day 336/159/14 to Day 336/159/15) even though he had apparently made contact with a soldier on his way through Barrier 12 without hearing any thud (Day 336/176/2 to Day 336/176/10) and he had not heard any impact when he knocked over Mr Harkin (Day 366/177/12 to Day 366/177/16). He also said his vision was restricted to the side of the vehicle, the engine was noisy and the occupants, in order to be heard, had to talk above the noise (Day 336/180/12 to Day 336/180/19). Sergeant O accepted that it would have been possible for the Pig to hit Alana Burke without him having seen it (Day 335/27/21 to Day 335/27/23).

17.8.3.230 It is submitted that Sergeant O’s Pig did hit Alana Burke. Moreover, when Alana Burke was giving her own evidence to the Inquiry, counsel on behalf of the soldiers told her that it was accepted that she had been struck by the Pig and at no time was she challenged on that issue. (Day 76/101/10 to Day 76/101/12)

17.8.3.231 INQ1579 could not recall hearing explosions. He remembered smelling petrol and acid but did not see any petrol bombs explode or any acid bombs splash or explode (C1579.4 paragraphs 29 to 30 and Day 336/168/8 to Day 336/168/13).

17.8.3.232 He claimed to hear incoming fire (C1579.4 paragraph 28) but he could not say how many shots he heard or where they were coming from. (C1579.4 paragraph 27) He was not able to separate in his recollection what might be called civilian gunfire and SLR fire. (Day 336/170/7 to Day 336/170/10)

17.8.3.233 In support of the suggestion that the fire was incoming, he claimed to have seen the strike on the ground around the Pig and to have heard metal (presumably the Pig) being struck. (Day 336/170/1 to Day 336/170/6) However, he had said in his Eversheds statement: “I heard a bullet strike the ground and I would have seen them at the time but I cannot remember seeing this for sure now”. (C1579.4 paragraph 28) When this was pointed out to him and he was asked why he could remember it in his oral testimony but not when he made his statement, he replied “It could be a possible flashback”. (Day 336/200/13 to Day 336/200/16)

17.8.3.234 INQ1579 did not inspect the vehicle for damage after the event. (Day 336/168/24 to Day 336/179/3)

17.8.3.235 When asked to explain why, in his prime position, he did not see one shot being fired by any of his colleagues he said:

17.8.3.236 “Sir, there is no doubt that I have seen and heard more than what I have in my statement, but with the passage of time being in excess of 31 years, the memories have faded and disappeared.” (Day 336/188/25 to Day 336/189/3) When asked in turn whether he had seen Peggy Deery, Jackie Duddy or Michael Bridge shot, he said he hadn’t. When asked by the Chairman whether he had any recollection at all he said: “No, Sir, it is all faded and gone, Sir”. (Day 336/189/25)

17.8.3.237 This is another witness who was “stone-walling” the Inquiry because he could not have given an honest account of the events he witnessed without implicating his former colleagues in shooting at civilians without justification.

17.8.3.238 Soldier 006 debussed in Rossville Street and, together with Soldier 037, arrested William Dillon. It was only then that he heard shooting break out and he took cover. After that, he “and a couple of lads from [his] Platoon” went to the stairwell of Block 1. He went up one flight of stairs and looked along the balcony but didn’t go any further. In his Eversheds statement, he says that the only firing he heard was that of SLR’s. (B1377.5 paragraph 24) He thought the firing was coming from soldiers behind the low wall. He was further forward than they were. He could not see anyone behind the rubble barricade at the time. (B1377.5 paragraph 25) He saw no civilians with guns and heard no explosions. Soldier 006 was one of the soldiers who picked up the bodies on the rubble barricade. He also says that at Fort George the officers wanted soldiers to say they had arrested men and the soldiers were saying they had not. (B1377.5 paragraph 28)

17.8.3.239 In his Eversheds statement, all that 006 could say about where he debussed was that the Pig was facing towards the high flats (B1377.5 paragraph 20). However, in his RMP statement, he said that the vehicle stopped at the junction of Eden Place and Rossville Street and he debussed. (B1375) Bearing in mind also that he was with Soldier 037 when he arrested William Dillon, it seems likely that he debussed when Sergeant O’s Pig came to a temporary halt on Rossville Street at the end of Pilots Row so that 5 soldiers in all debussed at this point, viz R, U, P, 017 and 006.

17.8.3.240 He was the first to grab hold of William Dillon and he said that he probably hit him with the butt of his rifle. (Day 334/22/10 to Day 334/22/23) He said that Mr Dillon did not have a weapon or missile in his hand, he had not seen him throwing any kind of missile and he could not remember him taunting the soldiers in any way. When asked whether he had threatened the soldier in any way, 006 said: “Well, he were coming straight at us, so ... ..” In answer to the question “what made him different from the other people who were running past you?”, he said: “everybody else had dispersed”. (Day 334/18/10 to Day 334/18/12)

17.8.3.241 Soldier 006 said that he had probably seen his colleagues using their rifle butts in the same manner as himself (Day 334/35/22 to Day 334/36/1); that Sergeant O and Lt. N may well have been aware of that (ibid); but he was never prevented from doing it. (Day 334/37/1 to Day 334/37/3) Indeed, in his Eversheds statement he said: “We thought that if we went in, we would give them all a good hiding .. … “ (B1377.2 paragraph 5).

17.8.3.242 Soldier 006 accepted that although the arrest form suggested that William Dillon was arrested for assault, that was not the reason in his mind why he was arrested (Day 334/55/18 to Day 334/55/21). He said that he must have said to the RMP that he had arrested a youth for assault “as you had to say something” (B1377.9 paragraph 43). He thought that the RMP just wrote in the statement that Mr Dillon was arrested for assault and he just agreed with it. He said that it was an experience of his that the RMP wrote things which may not even be true. (Day 334/56/19 to Day 334/56/22)

17.8.3.243 Soldier 006 was familiar with the sound of gunfire. He had come under Thompson submachine gun fire in the Falls Road in Belfast and he had been close to a nail bomb that exploded in Belfast. (Day 334/34/1 to Day 334/34/11 and Day 334/62/16 to Day 334/62/20) He did not hear any non-Army gunfire or explosions or nail bombs or petrol bombs at any time. (Day 334/60/17 to Day 334/63/25) The only fire he remembered hearing was the sound of SLR’s (B1377.6 paragraph 24).

17.8.3.244 In his RMP statement, he said he heard shooting break out and took cover. He was not able to locate where the shots came from. He saw that the vehicle had moved (another indication that he debussed in Rossville Street) to a position about 10yds from Block 1. It was from this position that he saw a member of his Regiment firing at the Barricade. (B1376) He said that he did not recall hearing shots from SLR’s in the courtyard (Day 334/63/21 to Day 334/63/25) but it is fair to remember that he went inside Block 1 and up a flight of stairs. He said he was not certain if this was before the shooting or not (B1377.6 paragraph 26).

17.8.3.245 Soldier 006 was involved in collecting the bodies from the rubble barricade. He did not search them because he did not expect to find anything of interest to the Army. (Day 334/66/3 to Day 334/66/11)

17.8.3.246 Solider 006 was an unusual witness. To his credit, he was the only member of Mortar Platoon prepared to say that he neither saw nor heard any civilians engaged in any attack on soldiers in the form of shooting or bombing of any kind. He was also the only member of Mortar Platoon to say that, although he had experience of civilian gunfire, the only gunfire he heard was that caused by Army SLR’s. It is surprising that he did not hear or see Army shooting in the courtyard but we do not consider that there is a sufficient basis for suggesting that his account of this aspect of the matter is dishonest. The first shooting he heard, perhaps behind him, was probably Lt. N’s shots, followed by those of V, S and the others in the courtyard area. He then entered Block 1 itself and may not therefore have been in a good position to see or hear further Army firing in that area.

17.8.3.247 Soldier 006 clearly had no reason to fabricate an account that was unfavourable to the Army. Given the robust attitude, to put it mildly, he exhibited towards the arrest of William Dillon and the handling of the bodies at the rubble barricade, he was obviously not unduly sympathetic to the families. Whilst we regard certain aspects of his evidence as unsatisfactory and we are not convinced that he disclosed the full extent of his recollection of events on the day, we recognise that he gave his evidence with a frankness and candour that was lacking in every other member of the Mortar Platoon. We respectfully invite the Tribunal to accept his evidence that there was no civilian gunfire or bombing attacks and that all the firing he heard was from soldiers.

17.8.3.248 INQ 768 appears to have been in Sergeant O’s Pig. He claimed to have heard a short burst of incoming automatic fire at the back of the Pig followed by Army SLR fire. He didn’t recall any other civilian gunfire or any bombs or explosions. He claimed that he did not remember hearing any baton rounds or seeing any soldier firing. He said he did not fire himself.

17.8.3.249 INQ 768 said he did not have a clear memory of the events but rather a number of vague recollections interspersed with a couple of clear recollections (C768.1 paragraph 2).

17.8.3.250 When he was in the Pig and before they went through Barrier 12, someone said: “If my men do not go in now, we are going back to Belfast” (C768.2 paragraph 14). INQ 768 definitely remembered these words but he could no longer remember whether they were spoken before he got into the Pig or when he was in the Pig. Nor could he remember whether it was an officer who said these words (Day 323/137/25 to Day 323/138/2) although it is unlikely that anyone other than an officer would have said this. The only person who would have been in a position to refer to “my men” and to have the authority to order them back to Belfast was Col. Wilford, so this is a further indication of the pressure Col Wilford was apparently putting on 8 Brigade HQ to move in.

17.8.3.251 The incoming fire that he claims to have heard soon after he got out of the Pig was “just a small burst of automatic fire or what I thought was automatic fire” (Day 323/143/22 to Day 323/143/23). He said he heard 5 or 6 rounds (C768.3 paragraph 18). It was “definitely high velocity” (Day 323/144/18 to Day 323/144/19) so it could not have been a Thompson. He said the rounds were fired “from either a machine gun or a rifle adapted to fire automatically, but I could not identify the exact weapon” (C768.3 paragraph 18). When asked if it could have been single but very rapid fire he said that it could not, “because there was not sufficient pauses” (Day 323/144/22).

17.8.3.252 Although he also denied that it could have been fire from more than one weapon fired at the same time (Day 323/144/23 to Day 323/145/1), this is exactly what it could have been in view of his Eversheds evidence that it could have come from a rifle adapted to fire automatically. There can be no difference in sound between the same rifle fired automatically and several identical rifles being fired within a short space of time of each other especially when only five or six rounds were heard.

17.8.3.253 At one point, in order to reinforce the suggestion that fire was incoming, INQ768 said that he thought the fire came from “the centre” of Rossville Flats (apparently Block 2) (Day 323/156/13 to Day 323/156/19) but in his examination-in-chief he had said that he did not know which block it was (Day 323/146/16)) and indeed, in his Eversheds statement he had said he “could not say who fired and from where” (C768.3 paragraph 20).

17.8.3.254 INQ 768 said that he heard between 3 and 10 rounds fired by the Army in reply to the “incoming” fire and, other than this, had no recollection of hearing any other firing. (C768.3 paragraphs 19 to 20) During his oral testimony, he confirmed that he had no recollection of hearing Lt. N’s 3 SLR shots from behind him (Day 323/148/21 to Day 323/148/23) or of hearing anything like 100 live rounds fired by the soldiers (Day 323/149/7 to Day 323/149/11) or any baton rounds at all (Day 323/149/12 to Day 323/149/15). Not only has he no recollection of seeing soldiers firing, he does not even have a recollection of seeing any soldiers in the firing position (C767.3 paragraph 20).

17.8.3.255 This simply cannot be accepted as truthful evidence. INQ768 was in a prime position behind the Pig to see a number of soldiers firing, not only in his own sector but in Sector 3. When pressed about these matters, he said: “I just cannot remember anything going on around me”. (Day 323/163/5 to Day 323/163/6) Among the soldiers firing from positions just a few yards (and in at least two cases just a few feet) from him were S, T, R and Q. It is submitted that the reasons for his refusal to admit a recollection of seeing these soldiers firing is that he knew they were firing at unarmed civilians. His evidence is summed up in his final answer to Counsel for the Madden & Finucane families: “I did not see anybody misbehaving”. (Day 323/170/1 to Day 323/170/2)

17.8.3.256 However, unlike most of the soldiers in Mortar Platoon, he did admit that he did not see any kind of missile thrown or any civilian with any kind of weapon. (Day 323/146/22 to Day 323/147/1) Indeed, apart from the 5 or 6 rounds that he said opened the firing, he did not hear or see anything that could have been interpreted as civilian gunfire or bombing. Like the other soldiers involved in taking the bodies to Altnagelvin, he could not explain the delay in getting there.

17.8.3.257 Soldier 013 said he expected to be going into a gun-battle situation but his job was to fire a baton gun. He said he was expecting to be shot and could hear bangs all around but he didn’t know where they were coming from. It could have been from soldiers, he said. He did not see any civilians carrying weapons and did not hear amongst the bangs anything he thought was a nail bomb. He said he did not fire a live round him.

17.8.3.258 Soldier 013 was required by the Tribunal to give oral evidence and he did attend on Day 339. However, he refused to give oral testimony. It was suggested that there was a medical reason but no details were given. It had not been suggested by his representatives that there were medical grounds justifying a failure to testify and we have seen no medical evidence in support of this suggestion. We took issue with the decision to excuse 013’s attendance but our complaint was rejected without explanation. We maintain our submission that this witness should have been required to give oral testimony.

17.8.3.259 In his Eversheds statement, 013 said that hearing the drain pipe shot was a contributory factor to what followed in that it meant there were snipers in the area so that “as far as we were concerned this was now a gun battle and not just a riot” (B1408.2 paragraph 10). In other words, if he is right, the paras went in anticipating that they would be shooting.

17.8.3.260 He also went expecting that they would be “giving the rioters concerned a good going over” (B1408.3 paragraph 12). He admits that he probably came out of his Pig firing his rubber baton gun. (B1408.3 paragraph 13)

17.8.3.261 After he debussed he said he could hear bangs going off all around him although he did not know where they were coming from – “it could have been from us” (B1408.3 paragraph 14). Significantly, he did not in his Eversheds statement repeat the suggestion made in his RMP statement (which was another one made on 4th February) that he heard the sound of gunfire and saw 2 or 3 bullets strike the ground behind him on his right. (B1406)

17.8.3.262 He clearly did not consider that he was under fire since he proceeded to deal with “rioters” in the sense that he “gave a few of them a doing over” (B1408.3 paragraph 15). He concedes that he was probably over-aggressive as a soldier (ibid). He claims to have chased someone into the stairway in the northern end of Block 1 and fired his baton round up the stairs. He claims he did not remember seeing people in the stairway at the time but the likelihood is that he was the soldier who fired his baton round at Barman Duffy at close range. No other soldier with a baton gun admits to going to this or any other block.

17.8.3.263 It is of considerable significance that this soldier, who said he was expecting to be shot (B1408.3 paragraph 14), “didn’t really think about snipers as [he] went in” to Block 1 (B1408.3 paragraph 16). This, of course, is completely at odds with the suggestion in his RMP statement that he had seen bullets strike the ground and that he believed the firing had come from the flats. He now says that he cannot remember saying this and cannot recall seeing bullets hit the ground (B1408.6 paragraph 34)

17.8.3.264 He also fired a number of baton rounds at windows in the Rossville Flats “as these were also good firing positions” even though he did not see anyone fire from there or anywhere else. (B1408.3 paragraph 16) He said that he “kept firing his [baton gun] to keep people away”. (B1408.4 paragraph 17)

17.8.3.265 He is therefore a prime contender for firing the baton round which struck Patsy McDaid. In this connection, it should be noted that the other soldier in Sergeant O’s Pig with a baton gun was 017, who had debussed in Rossville Street and remained in Sector 3. Of the two soldiers with baton guns in Lt. N’s Pig (019 and 112), 019 accompanied Lt. N. and would therefore have been delayed before even arriving at the courtyard of Rossville Flats. Soldier 112 is the only other soldier who had a baton gun but since he also debussed from the Pig at Eden Place he would presumably not have had as much opportunity as 013 to fire at civilians in the courtyard before they dispersed completely.

17.8.3.266 He was apparently not asked about modifying rubber bullets but he did admit that he carried “buckshee” live rounds later on in 1972 and that it was possible to get them (B1408.5 paragraph 31).

17.8.3.267 013 did not see any civilians carrying weapons. He said “I cannot say we were shot at” and he did not hear anything he thought was a nail bomb. (B1408.4 paragraph 17)

17.8.3.268 He said he did not remember seeing anyone hit in the car park “although I saw people falling over in the crowd” (B1408.4 paragraph 18).

17.8.3.269 As noted above, 013 was not initially prepared to identify Private S (B1408.4 paragraph 18) as the soldier who had told him he had “dropped” a civilian gunman, who was apparently moving rather than stationary. (B1408.4 paragraph 19). The fact that he was not prepared to name him initially suggests that he knew that Private S had no justification for shooting.

17.8.3.270 With regard to bottles and acid bombs being thrown in Block 1, he remembered being in the Pig with Private T and seeing liquid all over his boot. He said that he thought it might be acid but “it was actually probably a bottle of piss” (B1408.6 paragraph 35). This would help to explain why Private T and others might have been in a panic about the possibility of sustaining acid bomb burns when in fact he did not.

17.8.3.271 Soldier 013 does not make any reference to seeing any soldier firing or even adopting a firing position. He did not say that he saw anything that would indicate that the soldiers had fired unjustifiably. However, he remembers O “calming everyone down” and 013 thought to himself “Fucking hell, we have done it now, haven’t we?” (B1408.5 paragraph 27) In the barracks back in Belfast that night, he said: “I did think that we would be in deep shit” (B1408.5 paragraph 29). He also remembered thinking “that we were on our own now and we would pay for this” (B1408.5 paragraph 30).

17.8.3.272 It is difficult to understand why any of these thoughts would have occurred to him if he had not known perfectly well that the Paras had shot and killed unarmed, innocent civilians for no good reason.

17.8.3.273 With regard to talk in the barracks, he said: “No one said that they felt they should not have shot, but then again they would not say so, even if they did think that” (B1408.5 paragraph 30).

17.8.3.274 Soldier 013 claimed that he did not now know which Paras did the shooting. (B1408.6 paragraph 36) Quite apart from the fact that S told him that he had fired, it is quite clear from his recollection of talking to soldiers in the barracks who “felt they had shot at people who had either shot at them or were going to” (B1408.5 paragraph 30) that he had certainly known at one stage, in which case the likelihood is that he still knows but is not prepared to say.

17.8.3.275 This, in our submission, is one of the reasons why he was not prepared to give oral testimony. He knew who had done what and he also knew that it had been done without justification. He therefore is liable to have feigned a medical condition, which he did not apparently have before he arrived at the Central Hall, in order to avoid either committing perjury or implicating his former colleagues in murder.

17.8.3.276 Soldier 013 said he would “classify the day as an accident” (B1408.6 paragraph 37). The tone and contents of his statement suggest his belief that the Paras simply made understandable misjudgements and then covered it up when they realised the enormity of what they had done.

17.8.3.277 Private T is now dead. In summary, he claimed to have been splashed by liquid from an acid bomb and to have fired at an acid bomber on a balcony on Block 1. He did not see any civilian firing and did not see or hear any nail bombs. There are a number of significant discrepancies in his statements, in particular concerning his position when he fired (the trajectory map is different from his marked-up photographs), whether the acid bomber he fired at was on the 3rd floor veranda or the 6th floor veranda, whether the target was in the act of throwing when fired at and whether he saw where the bullets struck. There is no Eversheds statement.

17.8.3.278 In his RMP statement, Private T said that when he got out of his APC he assisted in making 2 arrests and when he moved back to the Pig the soldiers there were under a heavy stoning attack. He said that one of the bottles thrown from the balcony broke near him and he was splashed with the liquid. “It covered the front of my trousers from the waist to the knee” (B725). Sergeant O had told him to fire at anyone dropping acid bombs and he said he fired the next time a man appeared with a bottle in his hand. He fired two shots that missed.

17.8.3.279 Although this liquid covered the front of his trousers from the waist to the knee, he felt no more than a “tingling” on his leg (B726). If the liquid had indeed been acid he would clearly have felt more than a tingling sensation. He also passed the trousers to Warrant Officer Wood and they were then labelled, presumably for the purpose of being used as an exhibit (ibid). Whoever examined them must have realised that the liquid was not acid and they were not used as an exhibit at the Widgery Tribunal. At the Widgery Tribunal, Charles Hill, for the families, seemed to have instructions that the liquid may have been Windolene (B744), a suggestion echoed by Patrick Friel, who referred to his father throwing such a bottle from a balcony. (Day 118/139/12 to Day 118/139/15) Alternatively, Soldier 013’s suggestion that the liquid in the bottles was no more than urine may be correct.

17.8.3.280 Significantly, Soldier T did not make any reference to even hearing civilian gunfire at any time or seeing Sergeant O or any other soldier shoot.

17.8.3.281 However, when he made his SA statement, he talked about hearing a burst of low velocity fire which was either automatic or very rapid single shots coming from inside the courtyard (B735). The bottle of liquid was thrown, he says, from one of the verandas that were three stories up. It is also in this statement that he first introduced the suggestion that he saw Sergeant O firing. The trajectory photograph (B747) indicates a target on about the sixth floor.

17.8.3.282 By the time he came to give oral testimony before Lord Widgery, he was able to say that the first round that he fired at the “acid bomber” hit the roof of the building (B742 F) although he had said in his RMP statement that he did not see the result of this shot. (B726)

17.8.3.283 When asked what he felt when the “acid” splashed on his legs, he said that he had cut his leg just above the left knee and it began to seep in there. (B742 G – 743 A) Again, it may be observed that if acid had seeped in to an open wound he would have felt more than a tingling. Indeed he appears to have waited until after the shooting had died down before he went to the rear of the vehicle and had water thrown over his trousers (B743A). It is hardly surprising that Warrant Officer Wood disbelieved him.

17.8.3.284 As regards Sergeant O’s firing, he appears to have been a matter of 3 feet from Sergeant O but he did not see what the Sergeant was shooting at and he personally did not see anyone firing at the troops at all. (B745 D). Indeed, when he was asked whether he saw any persons firing, he said “no person actually fired at a target” (B745 D). This may not have been transcribed correctly but it tends to suggest that soldiers were not firing at targets. Nor did Private T see any nail bombs even though he accepted that in certain conditions he could hear a nail bomb as much as a mile away (B746 B).

17.8.3.285 The last 3 soldiers in Mortar Platoon can be dealt with compendiously. Corporal P, Private U and Private O17 were all in Sergeant O’s Pig and debussed in Rossville Street at the end of Pilot Row. Corporal P and O17 moved to Kells Walk and were involved in Sector 3. Private U followed the Pig towards Block 1 but took up a position at the north-west corner of Block 1 and became involved in Sector 3. The evidence of these soldiers is discussed in the Sector 3 submissions.

17.8.4. C Company

17.8.4.1 C Company went through Barrier 14 in William Street. The Officer Commanding was Acting Major 221a and the Company was comprised of 3 platoons: 7 Platoon under the command of Lt. 110, 9 Platoon and then 8 Platoon under the command of Lt. 26.

17.8.4.2 7 Platoon was first through the Barrier and went to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street only to find that Support Company had gone in ahead of them to take up positions in Rossville Street and on the waste ground behind Chamberlain Street. 8 Platoon went in next but turned left to deploy into Chamberlain Street. They paused at the end of Chamberlain Street and then again at the junction with Harvey Street, where they were in position when Jackie Duddy was carried along Chamberlain Street and up Harvey Street. Following this they moved to the end of the street and arrested all the men present in No. 33.

17.8.4.3 Photograph P253 shows Sergeant 2000, Corporal 579, INQ2045, INQ2051, INQ12 and INQ471 of 8 Platoon at the west corner of the William Street and Chamberlain Street junction. P948 et seq show members of the platoon at the junction of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street with Father Daly leading the group of civilians carrying Jackie Duddy from Rossville Flats courtyard.

17.8.4.4 None of the soldiers of C Company admits to firing a shot but most of them suggest that they heard “incoming” fire of some kind and many suggest they heard Thompson submachine gun fire. In our submission, their evidence of hearing or seeing civilian gunfire or bombing is either fabricated, imagined or mistaken. Although they do not appear to have engaged directly in shooting civilians, they were among those soldiers who engaged in the displays of triumphalism afterwards, as evidenced by the graffiti they daubed on the wall at the entrance to the chemist’s shop in William Stand photographed by Jimmy Porter (AP9.99): “the Paras were here and they fucking hammered fuck out of you”.

17.8.4.5 In Table 7 at Appendix 7, the evidence of the 33 members of C Company who have made Eversheds statements is summarised in tabular form insofar as it relates to the issues whether they saw civilians with guns, petrol bombs or nail bombs or heard nail bombs.

17.8.4.6 None of the claimed sightings match or, therefore, provide any corroboration for each other. Put another way, no soldier in this company saw the same sinister occurrence as any other soldier, so that a gunman who, according to a given soldier, appeared in full view of everyone was somehow not seen by anyone except himself.

17.8.4.7 Only 5 members of C Company even claim to have seen a civilian with a weapon and none saw any civilian firing a weapon. Only 2 claim to have seen civilians with petrol bombs and in both cases they claim to have seen them at Barrier 14. The overwhelming evidence is that no petrol bombs were thrown at Barriers 12 or 14. None of the soldiers saw nail bombs and only 1 suggests that he heard a nail bomb but even this soldier says he is not certain about that.

17.8.4.8 The claimed sightings of civilian gunmen do not correspond with each other or with any of the sightings claimed by members of Support Company. Lt 110 claims to have seen a youth with a long weapon like a rifle running between Blocks 1 and 2 from right to left. INQ 444 claims to have seen a civilian with a rifle move between the same Blocks but in the opposite direction and in different circumstances. INQ 1799 says he saw a man with an M1 carbine in the Rossville Flats courtyard between Blocks 2 and 3. These all appear to be at different times from, i.e. later than, the times when gunmen were allegedly seen in these areas by members of Support Company.

17.8.4.9. The other sightings do not correspond in any way with those claimed by Support Company. INQ1799 also claimed to have seen a man with a pistol in Chamberlain Street. INQ 2121 and INQ12 both claim to have seen a man with a rifle on the roof at Rossville Flats but the features of these claimed sightings do not match. In particular, one of these “gunmen” was “seen” on Block1 and the other on Block 2.

17.8.4.10. With regard to the order for the paratroopers to go in, a number of soldiers in C Company suggest that the officer commanding the troops in charge of Barrier 14 refused to lift the barrier for the paratroopers to go though into William Street:

17.8.4.11. Major 221a says in his Eversheds statement that he heard the orders given over the radio to both call signs 3 and 5 to move through the barriers. He says that the orders came from Battalion HQ (i.e. not Brigade HQ). The Royal Anglians did not lift the barrier so the first two platoons went through on foot.

17.8.4.12. INQ488 was a Platoon Sergeant. He says in his Eversheds statement that Major 221a asked an officer of the Royal Green Jackets to let a company through the barrier but he refused. Major 221a told INQ 488 to go over the barrier.

17.8.4.13. INQ876 was the driver of one of the C Company pigs. He says that the “crap hats” wouldn’t move the barrier and he had to ram it.

17.8.4.14. INQ1093 said the Officer Commanding the local unit at the barrier wouldn’t let them through and a Brigadier had to come and talk to him. He said they had to physically climb over the barrier.

17.8.4.15. INQ1334 said that General Ford was standing in a doorway near the barrier. General Ford could see that the barrier had not been lifted and “he just pointed towards the rioters beyond the barrier and looked to us as if to say “go on”. So we did.”

17.8.4.16. INQ2121 was listening to the Battalion net when he heard the order to move forward and then in.

17.8.4.17. INQ12 said “the crap hats” were saying that the Paras couldn’t go in. They had to push their way though the “crap hats” and climb over the barrier to go in.

17.8.4.18. This evidence would tend to suggest that the Officer Commanding the local soldiers at Barrier 14 had not heard or received, either on the Brigade net or otherwise, an order to lift the barrier to permit C Company to move through into the Bogside.

17.8.4.19. Very few of the soldiers in C Company admit to seeing members of Support Company in action. However, INQ 444 says he saw a soldier firing with his rifle under his arm into the Rossville Flats courtyard area. He fired between 10 and 20 rounds. This may have been Private S, who admitted firing 12 shots into the Rossville Flats courtyard. Whoever it was, this is clearly damning evidence against a soldier firing in Sector 2.

17.8.4.20. A number of the soldiers in C Company also refer to their role in arresting civilians in 33 Chamberlain Street. This is dealt with separately in the Arrests Section.

17.8.4.21. According to a statement dated the day after Bloody Sunday and therefore made with full knowledge of the gravity of the events of the previous day, Major 221a said that at 16.10 hrs he was ordered to “asslt. rioters in east end of William Street” (B2166) Note that the order related to rioters in William Street rather than Chamberlain Street or Rossville Street.

17.8.4.22. He claimed that he heard gunfire “from [his] right”; that he heard an M1 carbine across the open ground to the north (sic); and that he saw the strikes of several enemy rounds in the Rossville Street/William Street area. (ibid) He did not specify whether the gunfire from his right was civilian gunfire or Army gunfire or was indistinguishable. Significantly, he made no reference to hearing Thompson submachine gun fire or any other automatic fire or hearing nail bombs.

17.8.4.23. In his Eversheds statement, Major 221a said that his order to move came from Battalion Headquarters but the Officer Commanding the Royal Green Jackets at Barrier 14 clearly did not get any order to move the Barrier either from his own Battalion Headquarters or from Brigade Headquarters because he did not move it. C Company therefore went through and over the Barrier on foot rather than in their vehicles as planned. (B2168.3 paragraphs 16 to 17)

17.8.4.24. Major 221a did not seem to have a clear recollection of gunfire. After describing events without mentioning that he had heard any gunfire, he said:

“In addition to the low velocity (hand gun) shooting I heard in the waste ground, I believe I heard an M1 carbine shooting at some time during the day. It may have been the shooting I heard over the radio while C Company were based in the Foyle College car park. We may even have been shot upon while in the Foyle College car park. I cannot really recall”. (B2168.4 paragraph 30).

17.8.4.25. During his narrative he did not mention hearing any low velocity or other shooting on the waste ground. Indeed he said that he was “initially surprised to see C Company adopting a defensive stance” (B2186.3 paragraph 22), which suggests that he had not himself heard any civilian firing before he saw Support Company in the waste ground. Otherwise he would not have been surprised to see them adopting a defensive stance. While in the waste ground, he talked of having a “strong feeling of being exposed and vulnerable”, not that he was aware of any civilian gunfire. He says that members of Mortar Platoon “briefly explained to me that they were under fire” (B2168.3 paragraph 22) but he would hardly need that explained to him if he had heard civilian gunfire himself.

17.8.4.26. If Major 221a’s recollection is taken at face value, he had no idea what his own Company was up to in Chamberlain Street. He said that his Company had been very effective in the Chamberlain Street area and had made 22 arrests in the space of about 10 minutes. “That would have taken at least 44 members of the Company and probably more”.(B2168.4 paragraph 25). He said that most of the rioters ended up being cornered in alleyways or blocked off streets along Chamberlain Street or High Street or Harvey Street and most of them “came quietly once they realised they were going to be arrested”. (B2168.4 paragraph 26). Obviously, he had either forgotten or had no idea that all the arrests were carried out in one house by 2 or 3 soldiers who simply ordered the occupants out.

17.8.4.27 Major 221a’s dishonesty or, alternatively, startling lack of awareness of what was going on around him, is reflected in his suggestion that he was “not aware of allegations of brutality against members of the Battalion during the afternoon in the Bogside”. Brutality, he said, was never tolerated; it was simply not the way the Battalion operated. He said: “we were one of the very few units in Northern Ireland at the time who were able to restore and maintain law and order without resorting to the use of physical force.” (B2168.5 paragraph 33, emphasis added)

17.8.4.28 Warrant Officer Soldier 204 was not called to give oral testimony. He was the Company Sergeant Major of C Company. He says he would have accompanied the Company Commander but all that he can recall, he says, it that his Company went to Derry that day. He cannot remember where he went or what he did. He did not hear any firing personally (B2117.2 paragraph 8). He did make an RMP statement in 1972 but made no reference to seeing or hearing any civilian gunfire.

17.8.4.29 Lt. 110 was the commander of 7 Platoon, which consisted of Sergeant INQ 488, Corporal INQ444, Lance Corporals 1799, 003, 736, 939 and Privates INQ 131, 815 and Soldier 5. Lt 110 would appear to have made two statements to the RMP, one on 3^rd February (which we do not have) and one dated 4^th February, when the RMP were particularly busy taking supplementary statements from soldiers and in many of which, for the first time, soldiers claim to remember hearing civilian gunfire of various kinds, including in particular Thompson submachine gun fire.

17.8.4.30 Lt 110 did not remember the contents of his first statement but he starts off his second statement by saying “Further to my statement ..I would like to add….” (B1726.8) so the facts that appear in the second statement presumably did not appear in the first statement. The two facts that appear in the second statement are that, firstly, he heard a burst of 8 shots from a Thompson submachine gun being fired from a two-storey block of flats west of Kells Walk and, secondly, he saw a man with a weapon about 100 yds away in a location not specified but which appears to have been in the direction of Rossville flats.

17.8.4.31 It is submitted that if Lt. 110 had really heard a Thompson submachine gun and had really seen a gunman, he would have said so in his first statement. It is simply not credible that he would have left such matters out of his first statement, especially when he does not appear to have seen or heard anything else of any significance so it is difficult to understand what it was that he could have put in his first statement that was more important than the details in his second statement.

17.8.4.32 Significantly, he did not recall any of the Thompson submachine gun fire when he made his Eversheds statement (B1726.5 paragraph 29) and he could not remember it when he gave his oral testimony to this Tribunal (Day 350/83/17 to Day 350/83/22) although he was reluctant to admit that and he initially gave the impression that he did (Day 350/64/19 to Day 350/65/3 and Day 350/82/5 to Day 350/83/22).

17.8.4.33 With regard to the weapon, he said in his 1972 RMP statement that “all I saw was the butt of the weapon sticking out underneath his arm”. When he made his Eversheds statement, he said he could not describe the weapon “in any way save that it was a long weapon, like a rifle” (B1726.5 paragraph 22). However, by the time he gave his oral testimony, he claimed he could see “the butt and the barrel” (Day 350/73/22 to Day 350/73/25 and Day 350/103/19 to Day 350/105/15 emphasis added). He said this was a clear recollection in his mind’s eye (ibid) when it clearly was not in 1972. This was obviously a detail he added in 2003 in order to bolster his evidence about seeing a weapon.

17.8.4.34. In his RMP statement he had said that he was at the junction of William Street /Rossville Street at 15.45 hrs and at 1600 hrs he was at the rear of the Chamberlain Street houses when he saw the man with a weapon. These times were clearly wrong but, more importantly, he was suggesting that he saw the man with the weapon 15 minutes after he had arrived at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, which was itself some time after Support Company had already entered the Bogside. By the time Lt 110 claimed to see his gunman, Support Company were in the process of withdrawing from Rossville Street altogether. This was suggested by Mr Elias and established by reference to actuality footage in Video 1 at 5 minutes 10 seconds V1/5.10 to 6.30 (Day 350/75/15 to Day 350/78/14).

17.8.4.35. Lt. 110 identified his men in this clip crossing the waste ground at the time when Mortar Platoon’s Pigs had withdrawn and at least 1 Pig was making its way northwards towards William Street. This ties in with Lt. 110’s own recollection, which was that by the time his Platoon moved across the waste ground “people had been moved away from this area” and he had no memory of seeing any military vehicles on the waste ground (B1726.4 paragraph 21).

17.8.4.36. In other words, the gunman allegedly seen by Lt. 110 could not have been the gunman referred to by any member of Support Company. The alleged sighting occurred at a time when it was inherently improbable that any civilian would have been in the Rossville Flats courtyard, let alone with a weapon. Not surprisingly, Lt. 110 is the only soldier in the entire Battalion to claim to have seen this gunman. Likewise, his account of the Thompson does not tally with any account of any member of Support Company because he suggested in his 1972 statement that it was being fired from a 2 storey block of flats west of Kells Walk.

17.8.4.37. Initially Lt 110 said that the reason he didn’t shoot this gunman was because he didn’t have a rifle (Day 350/98/25) but, when it was pointed out to him that he had told Eversheds he could not remember whether he had a rifle or a baton (B1726.3 paragraph 12), he said he started off with a baton but could not recall whether that changed (Day 350/103/1 to Day 350/103/3).

17.8.4.38. As appears below, some of Lt 110’s men claim to have been fired on as they crossed the waste ground but Lt 110 did not recall any shots being fired at his platoon at any stage (Day 350/94/18 to Day 350/95/3); none were noted as having been fired at them (ibid); and no such firing was mentioned in his 1972 statement.

17.8.4.39. The truth, it would appear, is that Lt 110 and his entire platoon arrived at the waste ground after everything of significance had occurred but, possibly in response to a request from the RMP, he provided a statement on 4^th February saying that he had heard a Thompson submachine gun fire and seen a gunman in Rossville Flats when he had clearly witnessed neither event.

17.8.4.40 Sergeant INQ 488 gave oral testimony on Day 300. In his Eversheds statement, he said that he and Major 221a asked an officer of the Royal Green Jackets to let them through the barrier but he refused. Major 221a was not very happy at this and said to Sergeant 488 “over you go”. (C488.2 paragraph 14). This is a further indication that the Paras went through Barrier 14 without an order having been received from Brigade HQ.

17.8.4.41 He said that about 20 yards from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street he heard low velocity shots but he could not say what type of gun it was from. It could have been anything but he knew that it was low velocity fire because of the “booming sound that it made”. (C488.3 paragraph 17) However, he also said that he did not hear any rubber bullets being fired and since we know that between 51 and 64 rubber bullets were fired in the waste ground area it is likely that this was the booming sound he heard. When asked by Counsel to the Inquiry why he was so sure that the shots he had heard were low velocity shots rather than the sound of rubber bullets, he replied “because there was crack and then thump” (Day 300/37/10). As was pointed out by Counsel to the Inquiry, crack and thump is the classic description of high velocity fire but Sergeant 488 was not prepared to accept this and insisted that “all rounds had a crack and thump” (300/37/13), which is simply wrong and confirms Sergeant 488 as an unreliable historian.

17.8.4.42 He then says he heard high velocity sounds which he believed to be Support Company – “it was certainly not the IRA firing”. (C488.3 paragraph 18).

17.8.4.43 His platoon then deployed across William Street but did not go south around the corner and believes he was there for about 45 minutes. (C488.3 paragraphs 19 to 20). If, therefore, any member of his platoon did cross the waste ground he was not one of them. He does not suggest either that the platoon came under fire or that he heard Thompson submachine gun or any other automatic fire. Incidentally, another indication of the unreliability of this witness is his insistence that Support Company did not come from Little James Street but drove in their vehicles along William Street and took a right turn into Rossville Street (Day 300/63/23 to Day 300/64/13). It was only when the Chairman intervened that he was prepared to accept that it was possible that Support Company’s vehicles came from Barrier 12, although he still insisted that he saw them coming towards him even though he must have arrived at the junction after these vehicles had passed. (Day 300/65/6).

17.8.4.44 INQ 444’s evidence has to be treated with particular caution because his recollection of the whole affair was “very fuzzy” (C444.2 paragraph 14) and “very vague” (C444.3 paragraph 18). He also volunteered that he had made assumptions as well as including in his statement information that he had picked up from other soldiers after the event (Day 344/85/15 to Day 344/85/17 and Day 344/92/18 to Day 344/92/24).

17.8.4.45 He said that, almost as soon as he had moved through the barrier, he heard live gun fire “coming from the direction of the junction of William Street and Rossville Street” (C444.3 paragraph 20). Nobody else suggested that there was gunfire coming from that area and during his oral testimony he accepted that his recollection of where gunfire was coming from was wrong – it could have been coming from “anywhere”. (Day 344/119/13 to Day 344/119/17) He was not able to identify the rest of the “general gunfire” he claimed to have (Day 344/119/20 to Day 344/119/25)

17.8.4.46 He claimed to remember hearing 2 bursts of Thompson submachine gun fire, each burst being 6 to7 seconds at most (C444.3 paragraph 21) but he “cannot remember whether it was when I was going up William Street or back down it or what particular stage it was”. (Day 344/120/12 to Day 344/120/14). He said we should not pay much attention to the sequencing that he had suggested in his statement. (Day 344/120/18 to Day 344/120/20)

17.8.4.47 He was not prepared to accept that he could have mistaken the sound of other weapons for a Thompson. Although he recognised that there was a “huge difference” between the sounds of nail bombs and rifles and that at times one could get confused between the two (Day 344/123/24 to Day 344/124/2), he was not prepared to accept the logic that even if there is a huge difference between the Thompson and a rifle one could get confused between the sounds of the two depending on the surrounding conditions.

17.8.4.48 He said in his Eversheds statement that he was “fairly sure” that the bangs he heard in William Street were nail bombs (C444.4 paragraph 23) but conceded that these could have been the shots fired by Lt. N (Day 344/98/15 to Day 344/98/23). According to his recollection, each of these bangs “could have come from just about anywhere” (Day 344/126/12 to Day 344/126/24). It followed that the sound he identified as Thompson submachine gun fire could have been coming from just about anywhere because he said that the “sporadic rifle fire” that he heard about the same time sounded as though it was coming in the same direction as the Thompson submachine gun” (C444.4 paragraph 23 and Day 344/127/1 to Day 344/127/19). In other words, the so-called Thompson submachine gun fire was so indistinct that it could have been coming from anywhere. When pressed to accept the logic of this, he said: “all I know is the rifle and Thompson – all I know is I heard it” (Day 344/128/14 to Day 344/128/15).

17.8.4.49 He had suggested in his Eversheds statement that he had an “impression” that a gun battle was going on (C444.4 paragraph 25). But he accepted that, apart from what he said about the Thompson machine gun fire, all the firing he heard could have been SLR fire (Day 344/129/9 to Day 344/129/13).

17.8.4.50 With regard to the claimed sighting of a gunman, his recollection of where he was when this happened and how he got there is, by his own admission, completely unreliable. (Day 344/101/22 to Day 334/102/2)

17.8.4.51 In his statement, he said that after reaching the junction of Rossville Street and William Street his platoon turned around and went back along William Street, turned down Chamberlain Street, moved near the south end of Chamberlain Street, turned right into a small alleyway and ended up on wasteground. (C444.4 paragraphs 24 to 29). There is no such alleyway and no other member of his platoon describes this route.

17.8.4.52. INQ 444 had already said that the Tribunal should not rely on his sequencing of events but it appears that this claimed sighting occurred some time after the Mortar Platoon Pigs had withdrawn from the waste ground at a time when Major Loden’s Command Vehicle was parked at the north gable wall of Block 1. (Day 344/104/4 to Day 334/104/22) In other words, as with Lt. 110, this “sighting” must have occurred at least 15 minutes after Mortar Platoon went in and after all the material events in the courtyard area were over. Incidentally, this cannot be the same sighting as the sighting claimed by Lt 110. Lt 110’s gunman was running from right to left with his weapon partly concealed under his right arm (B1726.5 paragraph 22) whereas INQ 444’s gunman was running left to right making no attempt to conceal the weapon (Day 344/102/10 to Day 334/103/4), unless of course it was the same gunman running back and forth across this gap until he was spotted by soldiers. INQ 444 said that, at best, he had a “fleeting glimpse” of this individual but he was not prepared to concede that his recollection of this glimpse could be unreliable (Day 344/133/15 to Day 334/113/21).

17.8.4.53 The second incident that he said “sticks out in mind” is seeing a person on the roof of Block 1 throwing a bucket of liquid at a Pig which is marked on his map (C444.9) in a position not far from where Sergeant O’s Pig was parked. He saw a couple of soldiers jumping about, with other soldiers dousing them with water, which is how he knew it was acid (C444.5 paragraph 32).

17.8.4.54 The problem with all this is that, if such an incident happened at all, it happened when Sergeant O’s Pig was parked at the mouth of the courtyard. Neither INQ 444 nor any other member of his platoon arrived until some time after Sergeant O’s Pig had been withdrawn from that position so that INQ 444 could not possibly have seen this.

17.8.4.55 The third incident recalled by INQ 444 was seeing a soldier with his rifle under his arm firing between 10 and 20 shots at an angle of 30 to 40 degrees towards Blocks 2 and 3. (C444.5 paragraph 34) This, he agreed, was not a fleeting glimpse. (Day 344/136/23 to Day 344/136/25) The firing could only be described as reckless firing of a kind that was bound to endanger life. (Day 344/141/20 to Day 344/142/2)

17.8.4.56 It may be suggested that this account could be as unreliable as all of INQ 444’s other accounts but there is an obvious and important distinction. The other accounts were designed to suggest civilian gunfire and acid bomb attacks of such a kind as to have warranted “return” Army fire. The account of seeing a soldier firing recklessly into the flats is an admission against interest. It was also clearly one that he had been reluctant to make. He had not admitted to it in 1972. It was something he felt “pretty bad about” because he was “shirking [his] responsibilities”. (Day 344/112/21 to Day 334/113/4)

17.8.4.57 He also tried to resile from it to the extent that he suggested that this soldier had probably started firing “with his rifle properly in his shoulder” and that the rifle had “slipped out of the shoulder and was working its way down his body.” (Day 344/108/6 to Day 344108/11)

17.8.4.58 With regard to the timing, there is reason to believe that, contrary to his evidence, he did not in fact see this incident from the back of Chamberlain Street at a time when Sergeant O’s Pig had withdrawn to the north gable wall but from Rossville Street near the junction with William Street before he crossed the waste ground. Ironically, this possibility emerged when INQ 444 was trying to dilute the quality of his evidence on this issue. On the basis of his own map, it was put to him that he was very close to the soldier who was firing but he rejected this and said that, although his map suggested it was a distance of between 25 and 30 yds, it was more like 50 yds. (Day 344/137/3 to Day 334/137/20).

17.8.4.59 Unlike the rest of his recollection, this was an event that was clear in his mind. (Day 344/137/1 to Day 344/137/2). If he was not absolutely sure that he had seen this, he would not in our submission have admitted to it. He felt guilty about not reporting the matter (Day 344/143/1 to Day 334/143/3) and, although he denied it, he could not think of a more likely reason for not admitting it than a wish not to break ranks with his comrades. (Day 344/143/21 to Day/344/144/25) He did, however, tell at least one of his colleagues that he had seen a soldier fire in this manner. (C2597.2 paragraph 8)

17.8.4.60 Again, this was not a witness who was going out of his way to do any favours for the families. Indeed, when Eversheds showed him a photograph (probably E14.4) showing two crouching figures behind the gable wall at the back of 36 Chamberlain Street, he suggested that one of these figures was holding “what might possibly be a Thompson”. “It is not an SLR magazine on the weapon”, he added. (C444.8 paragraph 51) In other words, he was trying to suggest that these two figures were probably civilian gunmen with at least one Thompson submachine gun of the kind that he had claimed to have heard being fired that day. It was only when the whole photograph was shown to him that he realised that the figures were soldiers.

17.8.4.61 The Tribunal can be satisfied that this soldier did see a member of Mortar Platoon fire between 10 and 20 shots into the Rossville Flats. Whilst the availability of private supplies of ammunition means that it could have been any soldier, the only solider who admits firing that number of rounds is S.

17.8.4.62 Finally, it should be noted that INQ 444 did not see any civilian fire and he did not recollect anyone else from his own platoon (including Lt.110) saying that they had seen civilian gunmen that day. (C444.6 paragraph 41)

17.8.4.63 Lance Corporal INQ1799 gave oral testimony on Day 314. It quickly became apparent that he was an unreliable witness.

17.8.4.64 His impression of the briefing given by Major 221a was one of “serious business” and that they would be required to go into the No Go area, which was going to be challenging (C1799.2 paragraph 8).

17.8.4.65 He wanted to place himself beside Col Wilford and remembered Col Wilford asking on several occasions for permission to deploy his units but “he seemed to be being kept on hold” (C1799.4 paragraph 25). Counsel for the Inquiry demonstrated that Col Wilford was not where 1799 said this happened and he had to resile from that suggestion. He believes that his Platoon Commander was Lt. INQ1267 (C1799.4 paragraph 26) but he also said that he was in 7 Platoon and refers to Corporal 444 so he must be mistaken about this too.

17.8.4.66 Although other members of 7 Platoon recall going to the junction with Rossville Street, INQ1799 said that he turned into Chamberlain Street and just before he reached Harvey Street he saw a civilian gunman directly in front of him (C1799.5 paragraph 31). He said that he “closed on the crowd to within about 5 feet of them” and “the gunman I saw was about 2 or 3 people deep into the crowd” (ibid). No other soldier claims to have seen this gunman and indeed no other soldier claims that any of the soldiers came so close to the crowd. Indeed, it emerged during his testimony that 1799 didn’t actually remember being in Chamberlain St at all and then suggested this could have happened in William St.

17.8.4.67 Private INQ815 said that he was one of 1799’s “buddies” on the day and that they walked south down Chamberlain Street together. INQ815 said that there were “a few civilians about, but no one for us to chase and arrest .. .. there were some soldiers further ahead of me, that is, further south down Chamberlain Street.” He did not see any civilian gunmen or hear any shots and certainly does not appear to have seen INQ1799 dive into the doorway of a house. (C815.5 paragraphs 20 to 21).

17.8.4.68 Nor did any civilians, including journalists such as Gilles Peress, see the gunman or see any soldier so close to the crowd as it made its way down Chamberlain Street

17.8.4.69 Although this gunman was pointing an automatic pistol in 1799’s direction he apparently did not fire but allowed 1799 to dive “obliquely across the barrel of the gun” into the doorway of a house and take cover, where he exchanged his baton gun for an SLR that he had slung around his shoulder. (C1799.5 paragraph 34).

17.8.4.70 It is submitted that this account of seeing a gunman must be rejected as a fabrication, not only because it is inconsistent with all the other civilian and indeed soldiers’ evidence but it is inherently improbable, to say the least.

17.8.4.71 As he was in this house, he claims that he heard two distinct bursts of Thompson machine gunfire “close enough to be potentially threatening to me” (C1799.5 paragraph 36). It is submitted that this also was a pure invention.

17.8.4.72 Not content with seeing the pistol man in Chamberlain Street, 1799 claimed to see a gunman with an M1 carbine “lying in the prone position” at the east edge of a wall which, from his map (C1799.10), was directly in front of Block 2 (C1799.6 paragraph 46). It is important to note that when he claims to have seen this man he was, he said, standing at the end of Chamberlain Street with Major 221a and his radio operator. (C1799.6 paragraph 44). Although, according to INQ1799, the rifleman would have been just across the courtyard from the three of them, neither Major 221a nor his signaller appear to have seen him or indeed heard the “slow automatic fire … .. from a Bren gun or LMG, possibly the 303 version” which he claims to have heard while in the same position. (C1799.6 paragraph 45)

17.8.4.73 INQ 1799 says that he was going to fire his SLR through the wall because “the SLR is so powerful that a round would go through a wall and strike the man behind it” (C1799.7 paragraph 47) but as he released the safety catch and was taking aim another man stood up beside the gunman waving his hands in the air (C1799.6 paragraph 48). He decided that it was dangerous for him to fire so he decided not to do so. (C1799.7 paragraph 49) Just after he had been taking aim at the gunman, he claimed to remember hearing Major 221a say “don’t fire!” (C1799.7 paragraph 51). Major 221A did not suggest that he said or did anything of the kind. It is submitted that this account is either a figment of INQ 1799’s imagination or simple invention.

17.8.4.74 When he returned to barracks, he reported the gunmen that he had seen to either UNK221 or Lt INQ1267 (neither of whom was his Platoon Commander). He was never asked to give a formal statement or to file a report and he remembers being surprised that he was not called to give testimony at the Widgery Inquiry. (C1799.8 paragraph 61). If he had seen what he claims to have seen and had reported it, INQ 1799 would have been a star witness at the Widgery Tribunal. The only explanation for the absence of an RMP statement from him or an appearance at the Widgery Tribunal is either that he made up his account some time after the Widgery Tribunal or that even his superior officers at the time regarded him as a fantasist.

17.8.4.75 Soldier 003 was a Lance Corporal who went through Barrier 14 with Lt. 110 and Corporal 444. He said he was the first soldier through the barrier (Day 309/67/21 to Day 309/67/22) so that by the time his company went through the barrier there were no civilians between the barrier and the junction with Chamberlain Street. When he was in a position to see up Little James Street as far as the junction with Rossville Street, he saw that the crowd had moved right back to that junction. (Day 309/107/21 to Day 309/107/25). He accepted that at the time of his deployment there was no pressure on the barrier in the sense of crowds rioting there. By the time they moved in “there was no prospect of catching anyone”. (Day 309/109/6 to Day 309/109/17)

17.8.4.76 Contrary to the accounts of Lt. 110 and Corporal INQ 444, he was aware of no shooting as they made their way up William Street and the first time he heard shooting was when he crossed the waste ground. (Day 309/109/22 to Day 309/110/8).

17.8.4.77 In his 1972 RMP statement, he had not suggested that he had come under fire as he crossed the waste ground. He suggested that while he was at the back of 36 Chamberlain Street there was “quite a lot of firing coming from the flats at this time directed towards us”. (B1364). When he came to give his evidence to this Tribunal, he reversed this. He said that they came under fire as they crossed the waste ground (B1366.4 paragraph 19) and that they did not come under fire while they were at the back of Chamberlain Street (Day 309/112/16 to Day 309/112/17). The fire he came under as he crossed the waste ground, he said, was from a Thompson.

17.8.4.78 Two points occur in relation to this. First, as appears above, both Lt 110 and Corporal INQ 444 said that the platoon did not come under fire as they crossed the waste ground. Secondly, the sound of the Thompson submachine gun fire that Lance Corporal 003 claimed to hear did not occur at the same time as the sound of the Thompson that INQ 444 claimed to hear, so that they were not purporting to talk about the same sound.

17.8.4.79 Lance Corporal 003 said this sound was definitely from a Thompson but in his RMP statement and in his Eversheds statement (B1366.6 paragraph 32) he said it could “possibly” have been a Thompson. He claimed to have heard one burst of about six or seven rounds fired in two or three seconds. When it was suggested to him that the slowest Thompson fires at a rate of 600 rounds per minute, i.e. 10 a second, he said it could have been 20 or 30 or 40 rounds that he heard. (Day 309/117/22 to Day 309/117/23)

17.8.4.80 He had no sense of ever coming under fire from Rossville Flats (B1366.4 paragraph 21) and he conceded that, when he admitted that, he did not realise that in 1972 he had said the opposite. (Day 309/118/22 to Day 309/118/24)

17.8.4.81 In his Eversheds statement, this soldier said that he did not see anyone in the courtyard of the Rossville Flats and did not see any vehicles parked there. He also said that Support Company came into the Bogside after he had reached the back of the houses at Chamberlain Street. (B1366.4 paragraphs 21 to 22) Like other members of his platoon, Lance Corporal 003 obviously arrived in the waste ground sometime after the material events had all occurred. It is submitted that his accounts of hearing Thompson submachine gun fire or any other civilian fire are completely unreliable.

17.8.4.82 Lance Corporal INQ 736 claimed to have heard two small explosions as he ran along William Street and then some low velocity rounds when he got to the end of William Street. It sounded like a Thompson. (C736.2 paragraph 8) He did not go beyond this position because this was “the boundary of operations for C Company” (C736.2 paragraph 9). He said that he heard more incoming fire than Army fire. He tried to find out where the incoming fire was coming from by looking for smoke from gun muzzles, movement in buildings and so on but he did not see any smoke or anything else that warranted him opening fire (C736.3 paragraph 12). He did not make an RMP statement.

17.8.4.83 During his oral testimony, INQ736 rejected the suggestion that he could have mistaken the sound of baton round fire for the sound of a nail bomb explosion (Day 310/142/5) even though he did not remember hearing any baton rounds being fired once he had gone through Barrier 14. (Day 310/141/24) He explained that a nail bomb explosion is much louder than a baton being discharged. When asked by the chairman about the sound of two or more baton rounds being discharged at the same time, he insisted that the volume would be exactly the same. (Day 310/142/9). The explosions he claimed to have heard were to his left as he ran along William Street past the entrance to Chamberlain Street, in other words in or around the waste ground off Rossville Street (C736.2 paragraph 8). During his oral testimony, he confirmed that this meant he claimed hearing them at a time before the vehicles of Support Company went into the Bogside. (Day 310/171/24). In other words, according to this soldier, nail bombs were being thrown in the Bogside in or around the Rossville Street area before any soldiers entered that area, which is difficult to understand He was “as certain as anyone can be” (Day 310/149/12) that the low velocity fire he heard was a Thompson machine gun. However, he was also convinced that Support Company had entered the Bogside on foot, stopped advancing on foot when they were fired on and then returned to their vehicles to replace their batons with rifles. (Day 310/150/16 to Day151/3) He was “absolutely” sure of this and had a vivid recollection of that happening (Day 310/164/4 to Day/310/164/6) even though this was clearly all wrong. Since it was the Support Company soldiers who were advancing on foot who were the object of the hostile incoming fire which 736 claimed to have heard, the entirety of his evidence on this matter has to be regarded as unreliable. It is also significant in this respect that he did not report hearing these shots to anyone (Day 310/174/1). It is submitted that this soldier’s recollection of hearing nail bombs and low velocity fire must be either mistaken or fabricated.

17.8.4.84 Lance Corporal INQ939 did not give oral testimony. He also went to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. He heard shooting but could not say from which weapon they were fired. He thought they could have been fired on from perhaps two or three weapons at the same time but he would not say that the fire was automatic. (C939.3 paragraph 26).

17.8.4.85 Private INQ131 believed that the Paras were going to Derry to “break the No Go area so that the troops could go back on patrol” (C131.1 paragraph 5)

17.8.4.86 He also talks about coming under fire but his account of this is at variance with the accounts given by Lt. 110, Corporal INQ 444 and Lance Corporal 003. He has indicated on his map an area at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street as the point where he came under “incoming” fire. (C131.9 and C131.4 paragraph 19) The shots he claimed to have heard were single shots from a low calibre weapon. Enemy fire, he said, was almost continuous (C131.5 paragraph 27) but he did not recall hearing any automatic fire or explosions. (C131.5 paragraph 26) So, whatever he heard, it was not Thompson machine gun fire.

17.8.4.87 Despite his apparent recollection of continuous enemy fire, he claims that his platoon left the cover of the buildings at the junction with Rossville Street and made its way across the open waste ground in full view of Rossville Flats. He even embellished his account of the civilian firing by adding that he could see dirt jumping on the ground (C131.4 paragraph 19). He accepted that as he made his way across the waste ground and along the wall behind Chamberlain Street there was no cover at all (Day 333/29/9 to Day 333/29/12) despite the suggestion in his Eversheds statement that he took cover in this area. (C131.4 paragraph 21)

17.8.4.88 By the time he reached the back of Chamberlain Street, he said that most of the crowd had disappeared but he could see people “milling around on the waste ground, on Rossville Street and in the car park of the Rossville Flats”. He had no memory of what exactly they were doing but he had no impression of them fleeing (C131.5 paragraph 23). He said he could see a single Pig with its back towards him between him and the car park of the Rossville Flats but cannot remember any other vehicle in the area (C131.5 paragraph 24).

17.8.4.89 It is submitted that this soldier’s account is also unreliable insofar as he suggests hearing or seeing civilian gunfire. Like the other members of his platoon, it is likely that he arrived on the scene after the material events had all occurred but has difficulty accepting that he was present on Bloody Sunday and did not witness any civilian gunfire. Alternatively, if he was there when he heard gunfire, he must have been lying when he said that he “didn’t see any soldiers actually firing in the area all day” (C131.5 paragraph 26).

17.8.4.90 Not even this soldier said that there was any civilian gunfire after the soldiers ceased firing.

17.8.4.91 Private INQ5 was a signaller. He gave oral testimony on Day 379 and identified himself as the soldier with a radio running across the wasteground in Video 1/5.13 to 5.50 a still of which was saved as C5.61 (Day 379/15/12).

17.8.4.92 He claimed to have gone down an alley which would have been Macari’s Lane but he accepted during questioning that he was wrong about that and that he must have gone to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street (Day 379/13/25). He said that as soon as he reached the open waste ground “a whole lot of muck came down on us, by which I mean fire was opened up on us” (C5.2 paragraph 10) He was anxious to stress that he was definitely fired on by civilian gun fire. He said it was a mix of small arms fire and some heavy calibre weapons and machine gun fire. (C5.2 paragraph 11) He did not know where it was coming from or how much enemy fire there was but “there was a lot”. There was then “return gun fire from our lads” (ibid). Even when it must have been apparent to him that he was wrong, he insisted on adhering the story given to Lena Ferguson that he and other members of C Company were the first Paratroopers to the waste ground, that C Company were the first soldiers to be fired at and that, unknown to the gunmen who were firing at him, Support Company then came in and took the gunmen by surprise. (Day 379/64/5 to Day 379/64/13). It was then demonstrated to him by reference to P272, P273 and P274 that he was not behind the burnt-out van at all at the time when Support Company were in Rossville Street.

17.8.4.93 This soldier’s evidence is undermined by the fact that, first of all, he claims to have immediately hidden behind a burnt-out car as soon as he heard gunfire (C5.2 paragraph 10) and sheltered there for between 10 and 15 minutes (C5.2 paragraph 13) so that his view was limited on his own account. Secondly, again, by his own admission, he did not know if Support Company was in the area at the time. (C5.2 paragraph 12) In other words, he clearly didn’t hear Lt N firing shots just a few yards from him at Eden Place, or members of Support Company firing 29 shots into the courtyard of Rossville Flats and other members of Support Company firing shots in Rossville Street and Glenfada Park North. The explanation for all this is that he did not arrive at the waste ground until sometime after some or all of this occurred.

17.8.4.94 He claims to have kept in touch with events over the radio but, as we know from the logs and the Porter tape, there were no reports made over the radio at this time. Significantly, he had no recollection of being notified himself by any member of the platoon that contact had been made and that he should get on the radio (Day 379/37/17 to Day 379/37/20). The only time he recalled using the radio himself was before the Paratroopers went in (Day 379/38/8 to Day 379/38/15) even though he claimed to have personally witnessed incoming fire from the flats. In other words, although it was his job to report any contact, he did not do so, which gives rise to the inference that he was aware of no incoming fire.

17.8.4.95 INQ 5 denied talking to the Press about Bloody Sunday (C5.3 paragraph 19) but later made a supplementary statement in which he admitted talking to Praxis (C5.5 paragraph 2), Lena Ferguson (C5.6 paragraph 8) and Jimmy McGovern (C5.7 paragraph 13). His Praxis interview is at C5.15. His interviews with Lena Ferguson are at C5.28 et seq and notes of the McGovern interviews are at C5.39 et seq. These interviews are so extensive that he could not have forgotten them, which means that he deliberately lied to the Tribunal when he said in his original statement that he had not talked to the Press. His explanation for not disclosing them was that he did not regard the T.V. as the Press (Day 379/59/14to Day 379/59/17) but he had been confronted by Lena Ferguson and he refused to release her from her duty of confidentiality to him (Day 379/61/1 to Day 379/61/4). He maintained his claim that the army had come under fire but he never saw a gunman (Day 379/36/19) and has no recollection of any member of his platoon indicating that any “contact” had been made (Day 379/37/17 to Day 379/37/20). The account he gave to Lena Ferguson and others was based, at least in part, on information he received after Bloody Sunday, not on his own recollection. (Day 379/40/6 to Day 379/40/8) he himself has not recollection of hearing any army fire (Day 379/27/20 to Day 379/27/22). With regard to the “non army” fire he claimed to have heard, he told Praxis and Lena Ferguson that it definitely came from Rossville Flats but he accepted in his testimony that this was simply an assumption on his part (Day 379/28/22 to Day 379/29/28). In a built up area it is “virtually impossible to tell where the rounds come from” (Day 379/30/16 to Day 379/30/18). This is another soldier upon whose account no reliance can be placed.

17.8.4.96 Private INQ 815 went through Barrier 14 in a Pig after other members of his Platoon went in on foot. As mentioned above, he walked down Chamberlain Street with INQ1799 but there were very few civilians about and they were some distance behind other soldiers further down Chamberlain Street. (C815.5 paragraphs 20 to 21)

17.8.4.97 He did not recall hearing any shooting at all during the day (C815.4 paragraph 17). The thing that sticks out in his mind from the day is the way the dead bodies were handled. He says that the way they were thrown into the Pig was “totally disrespectful.” He was “disgusted” (C815.6 paragraph 27)

17.8.4.98 Lt. 26 was the Officer Commanding 8 Platoon, which crossed Barrier 14 after 7 Platoon and 9 Platoon. 8 Platoon went down Chamberlain Street.

17.8.4.99 Initially, during his oral testimony, he tried to justify the arrests carried out by his platoon on the basis that the people withdrawing down Chamberlain Street were throwing stones at them. (Day 315/126/19 to Day 315/126/21).

17.8.4.100 However, when it was pointed out that in his RMP statement he had said that the crowd remained 50 yds ahead of them and nothing was thrown at them (B1545.7), he said without blushing: “right, in that case I accept my version of 1972, nothing was thrown at us” (Day 315/127/2 to Day 315/127/5).

17.8.4.101 This made it clear at the outset that this witness was prepared to fabricate allegations of misconduct on the part of civilians in order to justify the misconduct of his own men, even in the relatively peripheral matter of arrests. Incidentally, it does not appear from his Eversheds statement that carrying out arrests was the main purpose of the operation but was no more than an “option”. (B1545.1 paragraph 14)

17.8.4.102 Lt. 26 had no idea that he was to take part in any kind of pincer movement (Day 315/153/17 to Day 315/153/19).

17.8.4.103 He heard no shooting when he was moving down Chamberlain Street (Day 315/157/7 to Day 315/157/8). He accepted that when his Pig parked at the very end of Chamberlain Street with his men around it they were “an absolutely perfect target there for any gunmen operating in Rossville Flats” but the Pig was not fired upon and none of his men were fired upon (Day 315/157/17 to Day 315/157/22). He also appears to have persuaded two frightened women to move from behind a car in the courtyard to Chamberlain Street (B1545.3 paragraph 23) which, as he agreed, he presumably would not have done if firing had been going on at the time (Day 315/159/3 to Day 315/159/6).

17.8.4.104 He claimed to have heard 2 or 3 gunshots from a high velocity weapon while at the end of Chamberlain Street (B1545.3 paragraph 24), not the 20 or 30 he said in his RMP statement (B1541). In 1972, he said that one weapon was “almost certainly” an M1 carbine and the other was “possibly” a .303. (ibid). By the time he came to give his oral testimony, he could distinguish accurately between the sounds of high velocity weapons “without any doubt” (Day 315/135/19 to Day 315/135/22) and was “absolutely certain” that one was an M1 carbine (Day 315/163/24 to Day 315/164/1). In addition, it should be noted that the M1 carbine is a medium velocity weapon.

17.8.4.105 He claimed to have formed the view that the firing was coming from the roof of Rossville Flats “in the immediate vicinity of a lift housing” (B1542) but he had to accept that from where he was he could not have seen any such structure (Day 315/166/23 to Day 315/167/2). He also claimed that these rounds passed right across his front in a “north westerly direction” (B1545.3 paragraph 24), i.e. effectively towards soldiers. When pressed to explain how he would have known the direction in which any such bullets were travelling, he initially claimed that he heard the bullets. When it was pointed out to him that he would only have heard the crack if it passed overhead and that it had not passed overhead, he said that he could not recall if he heard a crack or thump and agreed that he would only have heard a crack if it had passed directly overhead, which it did not. (Day 315/168/1 to Day 315/168/10)

17.8.4.106 The upshot of this was that, contrary to his RMP and Eversheds statements, he could not have formed the view that these shots were being fired in the direction he claimed and his evidence about the location of the alleged gunmen is undermined by the dishonesty in his account of what he could see on the roof.

17.8.4.107 He did not see any of the targets claimed by any of the soldiers in Mortar Platoon.

17.8.4.108 Based on his own evidence, it is likely that he was one of the group of soldiers who were laughing and joking when Antoinette Coyle of the Knights of Malta was seeking assistance for a number of civilian casualties. (AC85.17 paragraph 42)

17.8.4.109 Sergeant INQ2000 did not give oral testimony, presumably because he said in his Eversheds statement: “I have no recollection of going to Londonderry whatsoever and I have no recollection of the day at all” (C2000.1 paragraph 3).

17.8.4.110 He accepts that he signed formal statements alleging that William McCloskey, Charles McCarron and Paul Whoriskey (all arrested from 33 Chamberlain Street) were throwing stones at the military and that he also arrested James Ferguson for being in the house. .

17.8.4.111 This evidence was clearly fabricated. In his RMP statement made on 10^th May 1972 he said he was chasing about 50 rioters but “this group disappeared on reaching the top of Chamberlain Street and I had assumed that they had gone into the Rossville Flats area, because on our arrival at the top of Chamberlain Street they were nowhere to be seen”. (C2000.2). He said he went into the house at 33 Chamberlain Street, it was full of people and these people were the ones they had chased up Chamberlain Street after having seen them throwing stones. (C2000.2)

1.8.4.112 However, he did not suggest either in his RMP statement or in his Eversheds statement that he had seen any civilian gunmen or heard any kind of civilian gunfire, automatic or otherwise, or bombs of any kind.

17.8.4.113 By the time Corporal 007 went through the barrier, he could see that the crowd was already dispersed some distance away from him. (Day 310/63/12 to Day 310/63/17).

17.8.4.114 Although he initially denied it, he signed 3 statements alleging that he had seen his arrestees throw stones when in fact he did not. (Day 310/72/6 to Day 310/72/7) When asked to accept that when he made a statement alleging that William Duddy had thrown stones (ARR17.3) he knew it was not true, he said: “I know it now not to be true” but “I obviously believed it then”. When asked how he could have believed it then if he now knows it to be untrue, he said: “I’m not sure how I can answer that one”. (Day 310/72/17). The Chairman pointed out to him that in May of the same year he had told the RMP that he had not seen any of three arrestees throwing stones (B1384) and asked if the position was not the same when he signed his statement on 4^th February (note the date). He agreed that was correct. (Day 310/73/1) For this reason alone, his evidence cannot be relied upon.

17.8.4.115 His account in his RMP statement of hearing a gunman when he was at the end of Chamberlain Street bears a resemblance in several respects to Lt. 26’s account. He thought that the weapon he heard was an M1 carbine. He said: “from what I could see the gunman was in the vicinity of the lift housing on the roof of Rossville Flats”. (B1378) He admitted that as he stood in Chamberlain Street that day he did not form a view as to where the shots had come from or what kind of shots they were. It was not until he was asked to make his statement in 1972 to the RMP that he decided this. (Day 310/77/5 to Day 310/77/13) He claimed that he must have believed what he said in his statement in 1972 about the high velocity shots being from an M1 carbine but “standing here today [he] could not say that” (Day 310/76/24 to Day 310/76/25).

17.8.4.116 Corporal INQ 579 provided yet another version of events unlike that of any other soldier. He remembers his section advancing down Chamberlain Street side-by-side covering the whole width of the street. (C579.2 paragraph 13.) He could hear gunfire to his right but could not make out whether the shots were from an SLR or other types of weapon (C579.3 paragraph 13) but when they were half way down Chamberlain Street he heard the crack and thump of a bullet passing close to him. He thought it was a high velocity weapon fired from directly in front of him from Rossville Flats area. (C579.3 paragraph 15) “We all took cover when the shot was fired”, he said. (C579.4 paragraph 16) He said he asked if anyone had seen the gunman but nobody had (C579.4 paragraph 16). Lt. 26 does not remember this.

17.8.4.117 He went into 33 Chamberlain Street and saw a wounded woman who was lying on the settee but she “did not appear to be in any great pain” (C579.4 paragraph 18).

Bun W Ref	Item	To	From	Event	Time
W123	286	90A	65	Hello 90, this is 65. Can you be prepared to lift your barriers 12 and 14 should we require to push through them to disperse these crowds. Over.	(~1539)
	287	65	90A	90 Alpha. Roger. Out.

W124	294	90A	65	65, from our Sunray. Be prepared for movement through serials 12, 14 and 16. Over.	(~1540)
	295	65	90A	90A. Roger. Out.

W126	336	0	65	Hello, hello Zero, this is 65. My Sunray has deployed his units slightly forward from their original positions in preparation for any orders which you may have for him. Over.	1555
	337	65	0	Zero. Roger. Out.

W127	343	0	65	65, from my Sunray. He would like to deploy one of his sub units through barrier 14 around the back into the area William Street/Little James Street. He reckons if he does this he will be able to pick up quite a number of yobbos. Over.	1555
	344	65	0	Zero. Roger. Out.

	353	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area above barrier 14? Over.	1602
	354	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Over.
	355	65	90A	90 Alpha. Send. Over.
	356	90A	65	65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area William Street/Little James Street and around barrier 14? Over.
	357	65	90A	90 Alpha. Yes. Over.
	358	90A	65	65, roger. Would you mind informing Zero of this, as they don’t appear to believe us on this point. Over.
	359	65	90A	90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
W128	360	90A?	0	Zero, roger.

	367	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. People at the moment are advancing on the House Martin- wrong, on serial 14, using a corrugated iron shield. Have you any idea yet what time it was 65 was going in? Over.	1609
	368	90A	0	Zero. Roger to your first. As for your second, leave that for the moment. Out.

	370	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Can you lift barrier 14, where our call sign will be coming through? Over.	1609
	371	65	90A	90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
	372	90A	65	Hello, 65, this is 90A, serial 14 now being lifted. Over.

Bun W Ref	Item	To	From	Event
W146	685	65	0	Hello, 65, this is Zero. Grateful if you’d telephone me on the civil line when you are finished with it. Over.
	686	0	65	Zero, wilco. Out.
	687	65	0	Hello 65, this is Zero. Reference my last message, it is a matter of priority now that you contact Seagull as soon as possible. Over.
	688	0	65	65. Roger. We’re trying ring you, but the number’s engaged at the moment. We’ll keep trying. Out.

Serial	DTG	To	From	Event	Action
159	1609		BM	Orders given to 1 PARA at 1607 hrs for 1 sub unit of 1 PARA to do scoop up OP through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville St.

Serial	DTG	To	From	Event	Action
31	1610	9	+	Move 3 now through K14. Also C/S 1 No running battles

Bun W Ref	Item	To	From	Event	Time
W122	268	0	61Y	Zero, 61 Yankee. Head of the column approaching Aggro Corner. Over.	1534
	269	61Y	0	Zero, roger. Now this is important, um, for your to observe whether they now turn down Rossville Street or whether they form in Aggro Corner with a view to pushing on to their original published meeting place. Over.
	272	0	90A	Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Our call signs report the whole of William Street blocked. Head of the crowd at the William Street/Rossville Street junction. A number have turned away down Abbey Street. Over.
	273	90A	0	Zero, roger. Can you observe head of the … whether the head of the crowd are going to intend to push on down William Street or whether they will now be turning down Rossville Street towards Fox’s Corner. Over.
W123	274	0	90A	90 Alpha. Wilco. Out.
	275	0	61Y	Zero, 61 Yankee. There seem to be quite a few of the crowd breaking away, running down towards Waterloo Place. Over.
	276	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	277	0	61Y	Zero, 61 Yankee. The main body of the crowd now seems to be halted on Aggro Corner. Over.
	278	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	279	0	61Y	Zero, 61 Yankee. The crowd now definitely moving down William Street towards Waterloo Place. Over.
	280	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	281			Zero. Roger.
	282	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. The head of the crowd has now reached serial 14. The Sunray there is speaking to them at the moment. Currently all is peaceful. Over.	1536
	283	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	284	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Initial reports of crowd becoming hostile at serial 14 and a certain amount of stoning. Over.	1538
	285	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	288	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Currently Rucsack is talking to the crowd at serial 14. As far as the crowd is concerned, William Street and Creggan Street are completely blocked at the moment and we get reports of continued movement from Lone Moor Road into the area. Over.	1539
	289	90A	0	Zero, roger. And is there more reports of violence in the area of 14, and is it now in fact spreading towards 12 and 13? Over.
	290	0	90A	90 Alpha. No. We only had an initial indication of a limited amount of stoning. Latest reports show that Rucsack are talking to the crowd there. Over.
W124	291	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	296	0	76	Hello, Zero, this is 76. The tail of the crowd has just reached the junction Westland Street/Lone Moor Road. We believe the estimate of the size of this crowd to be considerably in excess of the 3,000 which was reported earlier. Over.	1540
	297	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	298	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. The crowd has spilt across to serial 15 and are being stoned by about 50 in that area at this time. Over.	1541
	299	90A	0	Zero, roger. Say again numbers. Over.
	300	0	90A	90 Alpha. I say again, five zero. Over.
	301	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	302	0	76	Zero, this is 76. Rucsack estimates the size of the crowd at about 10,000 now. Over.
	303	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	304	0	61Y	Zero, this is 61 Yankee. There’s a general drift of, I suppose, about 100 cro… people from Aggro Corner into the waste ground by the Flats in Chamberlain Street. Over.	1542
	305	61Y	0	Zero, roger. Would you care to comment on the latest report received from Rucsack, which is that the overall size of the crowd is now 10,000. Over.
	306	0	61Y	61 Yankee. We still maintain that it is more in the region of 2,000. The crowd is very spread out and this gives the appearance that there are very many more people taking part than are actually there. Over.	1542
	307	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	308	0	76	Zero, this is 76. The tail of the column is now Lone Moor Road/Creggan Terrace. Over.	1544
	309	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
W125	310			Zero Alpha. Roger. Out.
	311	0	61Y	Zero, this is 61 Yankee. Your large water pistol seems to have removed all the crowd now onto Aggro Corner. There seems to be a general move down, er, down Rossville street. Over.
	312	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	313	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. A certain amount of stoning at serials 14 and 15. Neptune has been used at serial 14 with considerable effect. Over.
	314	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	315	0	61Y	Zero, this is 61Y. Reference the state of the crowd, apart from the hooligan fringe, the vast majority of people now in the area of the waste ground by the Flats and on the … on Aggro Corner look as though they‘re not quite sure what they’re going to do next. Over.	1547
	316	61Y	0	Zero, roger. Can you estimate the numbers of this group now? Over.
	317	0	61Y	61 Yankee. We still reckon that it’s about … it’s in the region of 2,000 people. Over.
	318	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	319	61Y	90A	90 Alpha. Roger. Out to you.
	320	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Our call signs confirm that general movement of crowd, although there is a hooligan fringe at serials 14 and 15. Some CS has been used, but this was used by them. I repeat: used by them. Over.	1548
	321	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	322	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Serials 12 and 13 also under heavy bombardment from normal hooligans. Over.	1549
	323	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
W126	326	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Our sub units at call … serials 12 and 13 have had to disperse the hooligans with rubber bullets and gas. They have been dispersed now into the general area of waste ground Rossville Street/William Street. Little James Street is completely clear. They report that some of the hooligans were wearing respirators, though not of similar pattern to ours. Over.	1550
	327	90A	0	Zero. Roger to all that. What is the current situation at your 14 and 15? Over.
	328	0	90A	90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
	329	0	61Y	Zero, 61 Yankee. The general movement of the main body of the crowd seems to be down Rossville Street towards the area of the Flats. There is a flat-top lorry down behind the flats. Whether or not this is going to be used as a speakers’ platform I wouldn’t like to say just yet. Over.	1552
	330	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	331			Roger, Alpha. Roger. Out.
	332	0	90A	Zero, this is 90A. Reference your query regarding serials 14 and 15. 15 is clear, but serial 14 is suffering from a certain amount of stoning from the same hard core of hooligans on the Rossville Street/William Street corner. Over.	1551 1553
	333	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	334	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90A. Our call signs estimate numbers on Aggro Corner at the moment about 200. Over.	1554
	335	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	338	0	61Y	Zero, this is 61 Yankee. General state of the crowd. It now stretches between Aggro Corner, which has just had some more gas/cs? put on it, down to about 100 yards beyond the Flats. People are generally spreading out and the drift of people is definitely down to beyond the Flats and back the way they came, they came. Over.	1554
W127	339	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	346	0	76	Zero, this is 76. There’s a minor stoning now at serial 9. Over.	1558
	347	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	348	0	61Y	Zero, this is Kilo 61 Yankee. General crowd movement now is down into the Lecky Road from the area of the Flats. It seems as though a lot of people feel they’ve made their protest and are now returning back to their homes.	1559
	349	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	350	61Y	90A	90 Alpha. Roger. Out.
	351	0	76	Hello, Zero, this is 76. Approximately 200 people are being addressed by someone with a loudspeaker at Free Derry Corner. Over.	1601
	352	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	353	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area above barrier 14? Over.
	354	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Over.
	355	65	90A	90 Alpha. Send. Over.
	356	90A	65	65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area William Street/Little James Street and around barrier 14? Over.
	357	65	90A	90 Alpha. Yes. Over.	1602
	358	90A	65	65, roger. Would you mind informing Zero of this, as they don’t appear to believe us on this point. Over.
	359	65	90A	90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
W128	360	90A?	0	Zero, roger.
	361	0	76	People in the Creggan Road seem to be dispersing in a northerly direction suffering from the effects of CS gas, which was not thrown by us. Over.	1602
	362	76	0	Zero. I missed the first part of that transmission. Say it again. Over.
	363	0	76	76. Crowd in Creggan Road seem to be dispersing in a northerly direction. Over.
	364	76	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	365	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90A. There is now a crowd of about 500 on Fox’s Corner being addressed from a loudspeaker van. These appear to be normal civil rights people. There’s still a crowd of about 150 hooligans at junction Rossville Street/William Street. Over.	1603 1604 (3)
	366	90A	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	367	0	90A	Hello, Zero, this is 90 Alpha. People at the moment are advancing on the House Martin- wrong, on serial 14, using a corrugated iron shield. Have you any idea yet what time it was 65 was going in? Over.	1609
	368	90A	0	Zero. Roger to your first. As for your second, leave that for the moment. Out.
	369	0	76	Zero, this is 76. Most of the people in Creggan Road which are dispersing are children, women and old people. Out.	1609
	370	90A	65	Hello, 90, this is 65. Can you lift barrier 14, where our call sign will be coming through? Over.
	371	65	90A	90 Alpha. Wait. Out.
	372	90A	65	Hello, 65, this is 90A, serial 14 now being lifted. Over.	1609
	373	65	90A	64 [sic], roger. Out.
	374	65	0	Zero. Roger. Out.
	375	0	61Y	Zero, this is 61 Yankee. The crowd as I see it now is about 70 in Chamberlain Street. The people on Aggro Corner have been driven away by the last fusillade of gas cartridges, are moving down towards the meeting, which has now in strength to I think about 200 people on the corner behind the Flats. Over.	1610
W129	376	61Y	0	Zero. Roger. 90 Alpha, acknowledge. Over.
	377	90A	0	90 Alpha, acknowledge. Over. 90 Alpha, did you hear that last from 61 Yankee? Over.
	378	0	90A	90 Alpha. No. Over.
	379	90A	0	Zero. Roger. There are 70 hooligans in Chamberlain Street. Ah, most of those who have dispersed from Aggro Corner are moving down, ah, are moving down Rossville Street. Over.
	380	0	90A	90 Alpha. Roger. Out.
	381	0	61Y?	Ah, Zero, the appearance of the pigs and four tonners in Rossville Street has now effectively moved all the crowd out of Chamberlain Street and they are now forming behind the Flats. Over.	1612

Serial	DTG	To	From	Event	Action
118	1533		RRF	Fire Station. Report of 6 youths wanted in connection with shooting incident. Details later
151	1600		Press	Belfast Telegraph estimate crowd 3000
159	1609		BM	Orders given to 1 PARA at 1607 hrs for 1 sub unit of 1 PARA to do scoop up OP through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville St.
163	1612		FATOC	Prisoner hel went to MAIDSTONE as detailed should have been crumlin road	Check with G3 Int + Osborne booked as MAIDSTONE
167	1615		2RGJ	Paddy Devlin passed through road block towards Derry

Peggy Deery	Somewhere in the waste ground behind Chamberlain St, possibly between Eden Place and Pilots Row or behind no.36
Jackie Duddy	In the car park perhaps 20 yds. from the alleyway between Blocks 1 & 2.
Michael Bridge	In the carpark between Jackie Duddy and Pig 2
Michael Bradley	Between the low wall at block 2 and Jackie Duddy
Patsy McDaid	Close to the alleyway between Blocks 2 & 3. (Patrick McDaid helped to carry Peggy Deery to 33 Chamberlain Street and was making his way towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 when he was shot in the back.)
Pius McCarron	may have suffered his grazing wound in this area as well

Photo Ref. #	Description of Photograph	Relevant Witnesses Depicted in Photograph
P743	At William Street near Barrier 14	Margaret Coyle
P744	On stretcher at Joseph Place
P745	As above
P746	South of Block 2	Father Bradley, Noel McLoone