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Committee on the
Administration of Justice & Anor, Re An Application for
Judicial Review [2005] NIQB 25 (18 March 2005)
Ref: KERF5235
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND ________ QUEEN'S
BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ________
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE
COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND MARTIN
O'BRIEN FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ________
KERR LCJ
Introduction
[1]
The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) is an
independent non-governmental organisation. Its purpose is
to secure the highest standards in the administration of
justice in Northern Ireland and, to that end, it works
with domestic and international human rights groups. At
the time that these proceedings were launched, Martin
O'Brien was its director.
[2]
On 15 March 1999, Rosemary Nelson, a well-known solicitor
and a member of the executive committee of CAJ, was
murdered when a bomb that had been attached to her car
exploded. A loyalist paramilitary group, the Red Hand
Commandos, claimed that they had carried out this
atrocity. Following her murder Mr O'Brien lodged a
complaint with the Police Ombudsman's office concerning
the failure of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the RUC) to
properly investigate threats made against Mrs Nelson
before she was murdered.
[3]
Mrs Nuala O'Loan is the Police Ombudsman for Northern
Ireland. In the course of her investigation into the
complaint she provided certain information to CAJ about
the progress of her inquiries. This prompted a request
from CAJ that she disclose to them certain material
relevant to the investigation into Ms Nelson's murder. CAJ
also asked the Chief Constable to provide certain
material. Both the Ombudsman and the Chief Constable
refused to provide the material sought. By these judicial
review proceedings the applicants challenge that refusal.
Background
[4]
On 10 August 1998 Paul Mageean, legal officer with CAJ,
wrote to Adam Ingram, MP, a minister of state in the
Northern Ireland Office, enclosing two documents, in one
of which explicit threats to the life of Ms Nelson were
made. The other document referred to her in a sinister
fashion. Mr Mageean suggested that these documents
constituted very definite threats to the personal safety
of Ms Nelson. He called on Mr Ingram to investigate these
threats and to provide the necessary protection for Ms
Nelson. A letter from the minister's private secretary,
dated 24 September 1998, in response to Mr Mageean's
letter stated that the documents had been passed
immediately to the Chief Constable's office for
investigation. It also mentioned a scheme run by the
Northern Ireland Office by which security measures could
be installed in homes at public expense and gave
information as to how Ms Nelson might apply for inclusion
in the scheme.
[5] The
documents enclosed with Mr Mageean's letter were not the
first threats that Ms Nelson had received. These had begun
after she started to represent clients detained in police
holding centres in Northern Ireland. Her case was
investigated by the United Nations special rapporteur on
the independence of judges and lawyers when he visited
Northern Ireland in 1997. In a draft of his report, the
special rapporteur referred specifically to Rosemary
Nelson as one of a number of lawyers who had complained of
police harassment and threats. It is suggested that her
name was removed at the suggestion of the Chief Constable
on the basis that her safety could not be guaranteed if
she was named in the report. On 29 September 1998 Ms
Nelson gave evidence to a subcommittee of the United
States Congress about threats to her and her family.
[6]
On 22 March 1999 two detective officers of the RUC called
at the offices of CAJ asking for the originals of the
documents that had been enclosed with Mr Mageean's letter
of 10 August 1998. They explained that they wished to have
the documents tested for fingerprint and DNA traces. On 29
March 1999, Colin Port, the deputy Chief Constable of
Norfolk was appointed by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, the Chief
Constable of the RUC to take charge of the investigation
into Ms Nelson's death.
[7]
At a meeting in April 1999 of the Police Authority for
Northern Ireland, Sir Ronnie Flanagan was asked whether Ms
Nelson had requested or whether she had been offered
security protection. According to the minutes of the
meeting, Sir Ronnie replied that Ms Nelson had not sought
security advice and that, prior to her death, the RUC did
not have information to suggest that she was the subject
of a specific terrorist threat. When CAJ became aware of
this statement they challenged the Chief Constable
publicly as to its accuracy. This led to a newspaper
article in the Irish Times on 27 May 1999 in which CAJ was
quoted as having expressed disbelief at the Chief
Constable's statement. Subsequently a press statement was
issued by the RUC which stated: -
"There is no discrepancy between what the Chief
Constable told the Police Authority in 1999 and the
correspondence between the CAJ, the Minister's office
and the Chief Constable's office in August/September
1998. As a result of the said correspondence, the CAJ
was advised by the Minister's office a to how Mrs Nelson
might apply to have protective measures installed at her
home; how she could contact local police crime
prevention officers for advice; and even how she might
apply for a personal protection firearm. None of these
possibilities was followed through.
The Chief Constable's answers to the Police Authority in
April 1999 refer to the fact that the RUC itself did not
have information to substantiate a threat to Mrs
Nelson's life before her murder. Further in response to
a specific question he said he was unaware of any
request made to the Prime Minister's office for
protection to her."
[8]
On 3 June 1999 Mr O'Brien wrote to the Chief Constable. He
referred to the correspondence with Mr Ingram and the two
documents enclosed with the letter from Mr Mageean. He
asked a number of questions about whether an investigation
had been carried out on foot of the information that Mr
Ingram's secretary had said had been passed to the RUC
and, if so, about the nature of the inquiries conducted.
This letter received an acknowledgment from the Chief
Constable's office but no substantive reply. Ultimately,
it was suggested that a meeting might be a better way to
deal with the queries raised and this took place at the
Chief Constable's office on 4 October 1999.
[9]
Mr O'Brien wrote again to the Chief Constable on 9 March
2000, reminding him that at the meeting on 4 October 1999,
he had undertaken to send a "written composite
response" to the letters about the Rosemary Nelson
case and other matters raised at the meeting. This had not
been forthcoming and Mr O'Brien pointed out that Mr
Mageean would be giving evidence to a US Congressional
hearing on 14 March and that it would be helpful if a
written response, particularly in relation to the Nelson
case, could be received before that date.
[10]
On 14 March 2000 the Chief Constable wrote to Mr O'Brien.
On the matter of Ms Nelson, he said: -
"I explained at our meeting, having called in Colin
Port and John Stevens respectively in connection with
the investigation of the murders of Rosemary Nelson and
Pat Finucane, and having given them such an independent
remit, it is much more appropriate for them rather than
me to discuss aspects of their ongoing investigations
which at this stage are appropriate for discussion. The
remit given to them places no obstacle whatever for
ongoing interaction between them and your organisation
and others. This is something I very much encourage.
In connection with your letter of 3 June 1999
specifically relating to the murder of Mrs Nelson, I
explained to you at our meeting that the RUC itself had
no intelligence prior to Mrs Nelson's death to indicate
a threat of the dreadful atrocity that was to be carried
out. In relation to the documents to which you refer, as
these remain a matter of ongoing investigation, neither
I nor Mr Port believe that it is appropriate to discuss
the details you raise while the investigation is
current. You should be aware, however, that in relation
to the threatening note received by Mrs Nelson, nothing
of potential forensic value was lost in the period
between the sending of the note and its subsequent
forensic examination. At this stage, nothing has been
disclosed in the examination which has assisted Mr
Port's inquiry."
[11]
On 19 October 2000 Mr Mageean wrote to the Chief
Constable. Part of that letter is as follows: -
"… we understand that the investigation in
relation to the documents is now complete and that this
issue is once again under consideration by your office.
In these circumstances, we would be grateful if you
could indicate to us the outcome of the police inquiries
in relation to the documents. You will understand that
we remain concerned to discover what steps, if any, were
taken by the police when they received the threatening
documents from Minister Ingram's office."
[12]
An acknowledgement of that letter was sent from the Chief
Constable's office but no substantive reply was received.
Mr O'Brien then wrote to the Chief Constable on 20
November 2000 stating that his failure to reply to CAJ's
queries about the police investigations had reinforced
their suspicions that the threats had not been properly
investigated by the Chief Constable's office. He informed
the Chief Constable that, in consequence, a complaint had
been made to the Police Ombudsman.
[13]
The complaint to the Ombudsman outlined the matters set
out in summary above. It also dealt in somewhat greater
detail with the matters discussed at the meeting on 4
October 1999. According to the complaint document, Sir
Ronnie had told the CAJ delegation that the RUC had
carried out an assessment of the security risk to Ms
Nelson and had concluded that there was nothing to suggest
a threat from loyalist paramilitaries at the time
(presumably when they received the documents from Mr
Ingram's office).
[14]
The complaint also detailed a meeting that the CAJ and
other groups had with Mr Port on 21 March 2000. It stated
that Mr Port had indicated a definite line of inquiry in
relation to one suspect who, it was believed, had been the
author of one of the documents that had been sent to Mr
Ingram's office by CAJ. This prompted the suggestion that
had a proper investigation of these documents and the
originals been undertaken sooner, this person might have
been identified and Rosemary Nelson's death might have
been avoided. The complaint also referred to the
publication in a local newspaper on 7 May 2000 of a
section of the diary of Billy Wright, a loyalist
paramilitary murdered in HM Prison the Maze in December
1997. This extract should have raised serious concerns
about possible attack on Ms Nelson, CAJ claimed. It was
suggested that the RUC must have had access to the diary
after Mr Wright's murder and that Ms Nelson ought to have
been warned about these risks. Moreover, the existence of
the diary cast further doubt, CAJ claimed, on the Chief
Constable's statement to the Police Authority that he was
unaware of any terrorist threat.
[15]
The complaint document outlined a number of steps which,
it suggested, the Ombudsman's office should take. Among
these was the submission that several documents should be
obtained and that CAJ should also be given sight of these.
The documents were: -
1. The RUC report documenting the actions that the RUC
took or failed to take in connection with the threats
against Rosemary Nelson that Minister Ingram forwarded
to the Chief Constable's office;
2. Mr Port's review of the RUC report;
3. The original letter from the Minister to the Chief
Constable and all subsequent related correspondence;
4. A copy of the RUC's security assessment on Rosemary
Nelson;
5. A copy of any guidance which exists for carrying
out security assessments;
6. A copy of any relevant pages in Mr Wright's diary;
7. A copy of any reports documenting the RUC's
investigation of the threats made against Rosemary
Nelson in Mr Wright'
[16]
On 24 April 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to the Police Ombudsman
asking for a "general update" on the progress of
the investigation and posing a number of specific queries.
The letter also asked that the Police Ombudsman provide
CAJ with a number of documents associated with the
investigation. David Wood, director of investigations in
the Police Ombudsman's office replied on 30 April 2001,
answering the queries raised but making it clear that
documents obtained in the course of the investigation
could not be provided to CAJ. The letter ended with this
passage: -
"I hope this information is of assistance to you;
the investigation is now well under way after the
initial difficulties. I would hope that all
documentation will have been inspected within the next
two weeks but I am obviously in the hands of the RUC. I
will be as open as I can with you in respect of the
conclusions reached but you must understand that
confidential documents secured by us during the course
of an investigation must remain confidential. You are,
of course, free to request the documentation to which
you refer from the RUC but it must be a matter for the
Chief Constable as whether he discloses it to you. We
are given extremely strong powers to require such
documentation in order that the public can be satisfied
that in the investigation of complaints we can achieve
such access to ensure all aspects are properly
investigated. You can thus be assured that all apparent
avenues of investigation will be pursued."
[17]
Further correspondence was exchanged between Mr O'Brien
and Mr Wood on 17 May and 4 June 2001 with Mr O'Brien
renewing his claim to see material obtained by the Police
Ombudsman in the course of the investigation and Mr Wood
resisting that claim and pointing out that documents were
received by his office on a confidential basis and it was
for the owners or makers of the documents to decide
whether to release the material to CAJ.
[18]
A meeting between representatives of CAJ and Mr Wood and
Mrs O'Loan took place on 22 June. After that meeting, on
10 July 2001, Mr O'Brien wrote a long letter to Mr Wood
raising a number of points that emerged during the meeting
and returning to the theme of the production of documents.
The following documents were specified: -
1. The correspondence between the Northern Ireland
Office and the RUC following the dispatch of the material
by CAJ to Mr Ingram;
2. The internal review of the RUC investigation and the
report of Mr Port on that review;
3. Documents relating to the assessment by the RUC of
the risk to Rosemary Nelson's life;
4. The criteria for the risk assessment.
[19]
Mr O'Brien's letter claimed that recent jurisprudence in
the European Court of Human Rights supported his claim
that CAJ was entitled to see this material. On 20 July
2001 Mr Wood replied. He rejected the request for
disclosure of the materials sought. He referred to recent
judicial authority in Northern Ireland which, he said,
supported the stance that the Police Ombudsman's office
had taken on the matter of disclosure but stated that the
office did not operate a blanket policy of refusal to
disclose. Each case was treated on its merits but
documents supplied on a confidential basis would generally
not be disclosed.
[20]
On 25 September 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to the Chief
Constable informing him of the request that CAJ had made
of the Police Ombudsman for disclosure of the documents
enumerated in the letter of 10 July and of her refusal to
disclose them He then asked that the Chief Constable agree
to produce the documents for CAJ. Superintendent Hamill
replied on behalf of the Chief Constable on 18 October
2001. He stated that the Chief Constable considered that
these documents were confidential and he refused to
disclose them.
[21] On
12 December 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to Mr Wood after they
had met some short time before in order that CAJ
representatives be shown the draft report of the Police
Ombudsman into the CAJ complaint. A number of matters are
dealt with in the letter that are not directly relevant to
the issues that arise in this application. Two specific
items are germane. Mr O'Brien complained that the report
failed to set out what changes had been made to procedures
as a result of the internal RUC review. He suggested that
CAJ could not determine what these changes were because
they had not been supplied with the relevant documents. He
also protested that CAJ was placed at a disadvantage
because they were unaware of the changes suggested by
either the internal review or the review conducted by Mr
Port. Apart from these specific complaints, however, the
letter contained a long commentary on, and, at places,
critique of the draft report. It also made a large number
of suggestions as to the amendment of the report and lines
of inquiry that might be pursued.
[22] On
21 December 2001 Mr Mageean wrote to Mrs O'Loan and the
Chief Constable asking them to reconsider their refusal to
disclose the documents sought in the letter of 10 July
2001, advising them that CAJ had received counsel's
opinion that there were grounds to challenge the decision
not to disclose these documents by way of judicial review.
On 17 January 2002 Superintendent Hamill replied
maintaining the Chief Constable's position as outlined in
the letter of 18 October 2001. Mrs O'Loan replied on 13
February 2002 confirming her refusal to disclose the
documents.
The judicial review application
[23]
The Order 53 statement seeks an order of certiorari
quashing the decisions of the Police Ombudsman and the
Chief Constable refusing to disclose the requested
material to the applicants, together with a declaration
that the applicants are entitled to the documents sought
and an order of mandamus compelling their disclosure. A
declaration is also sought against both respondents that
they are acting incompatibly with the applicants' rights
under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and that they are therefore in
breach of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
[24]
The grounds on which the relief against the Ombudsman is
sought are that the decision is contrary to article 2 of
ECHR and section 6 of the Human Rights Act and to various
sections of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998; that
she fettered her discretion in adopting a policy of
non-disclosure; that she failed to give sufficient weight
to the request made in respect of each document sought;
that she erred in law in considering that the consent of
the original source of the documents was required before
it could be disclosed; that by her refusal to provide the
documents the Ombudsman was failing to promote the policy
and objects of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act; and that
she failed to give sufficient weight to the statutory
provisions outlined above, the effect that non-disclosure
would have on the applicants' ability to contribute to the
investigation, to the identity of the complainant, to the
subject matter of the complaint and to the benefit that
would flow from their having sight of the documents
sought.
[25]
In relation to the Chief Constable, the applicants claim
that he too acted incompatibly with their article 2
rights; that he fettered his discretion; that he erred in
deciding that confidentiality was a sufficient reason for
non-disclosure and in believing that his supplying the
Ombudsman with the requested material absolved him of the
duty to consider the applicants' request for disclosure;
that in reaching his decision not to disclose the
documents requested the Chief Constable failed to have
sufficient regard to the applicants' rights under article
2 of the convention and to the merits of the request for
disclosure; that the decision was "unfair,
unreasonable and unlawful"; and that adequate reasons
for it had not been given.
The arguments
[26]
For the applicants Mr Treacy QC submitted that the Chief
Constable's refusal to disclose the documents, based as it
was on a sweeping claim that confidentiality countermanded
this, could not be sustained. With the exception of the
correspondence passing between the RUC and the Northern
Ireland Office, confidentiality did not attach to any of
the material sought. In any event, no conceivable harm
could come even from the disclosure of that
correspondence. It was not suggested that public interest
immunity attached to the documents sought or that any
consideration had been given to their production in a
redacted form. Moreover, it was not claimed that the
disclosure of the correspondence between the Northern
Ireland Office and the police or the internal police
reviews would have any prejudicial effect. Absent any
detrimental effect to individuals or to the investigation
generally, the duty to disclose to the complainant was, Mr
Treacy said, clear.
[27]
In advancing the case against the Ombudsman, Mr Treacy
pointed out that Mrs O'Loan in her affidavit suggested
that each request for disclosure "was considered on
its own individual merits against the background of eh
restriction on disclosure contained in section 63 of the
1988 [Police (Northern Ireland) Act". In fact, Mr
Treacy argued CAJ was an agency to whom, by virtue of
section 63, disclosure should be made.
[28]
Mr Treacy suggested that the Ombudsman had misunderstood
the reason that CAJ wanted to have the material. She
appeared to believe that this was for the purpose of
monitoring her investigation. This was not the case. CAJ
wished to have the material in order to nullify any
disadvantage that would otherwise accrue to them in
contributing to the full and thorough investigation of
their complaint.
[29]
On the human rights issues Mr Treacy argued that CAJ was a
victim for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights
Act 1998. He pointed out that article 34 of the convention
provides that the ECtHR may receive applications form any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of any
of the rights set out in the Convention. To qualify as a
victim CAJ need only show that it is itself directly
affected by the decision that it challenges.
Alternatively, the applicants qualified as indirect
victims. Ms Nelson was a member of CAJ and it is affected
by her death; CAJ is the complainant in relation to the
Ombudsman's investigation; and its pursuit of the
documents is supported by Ms Nelson's mother. In the
further alternative Mr Treacy argued that CAJ was entitled
to bring these proceedings and to rely on article 2 in a
representative capacity.
[30]
Mr Treacy argued that the disclosure of the material was
necessary in order to fulfil the respondents' obligations
under article 2 of the Convention. The procedural
obligations arising under this article require that the
applicants should not be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
the Chief Constable. There needed to be a "sufficient
element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its
results to secure accountability in practice as well as in
theory".
[31]
For the Chief Constable Mr Morgan QC submitted that there
was a public interest in preserving a confidentiality
dimension to the type of investigation undertaken by the
Ombudsman. If documents such as were sought by CAJ were
disclosed this would have an inevitable impact on the
efficacy and success of inquiries such as she conducted
into the complaint in the present case. There was a public
interest in recognising this in order that others would
not be discouraged from making complaints or in
co-operating with investigations.
[32]
Mr Morgan also argued that the applicants were not
entitled to the victim status that was prerequisite under
section 7 of the Human Rights Act to enable them to rely
on Convention rights. He submitted that the applicants
were not entitled to advance a claim based on article 2
unless they could show that they were directly affected
and this clearly did not arise.
[33]
for the Ombudsman Mr Brian Fee QC claimed that so far from
seeking to obstruct the applicants' participation in the
investigation she and her staff had gone to considerable
lengths to facilitate it. She was bound, Mr Fee said, to
abide by the constraint contained in section 51 of the
Police (Northern Ireland) Act. She was obliged not to
release the information unless she was satisfied that by
doing so she would further the objectives therein
contained.
The relevant statutory provisions
[34]
So far as is relevant section 51 of the Police (Northern
Ireland) Act 1998 provides: -
"51. - (1) For the purposes of this Part
there shall be a Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.
(2) …
(3) …
(4) The Ombudsman shall exercise his powers under this
Part in such manner and to such extent as appears to him
to be best calculated to secure-
(a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of
the police complaints system; and
(b) the confidence of the public and of members of the
police force in that system."
[35] The relevant parts of section 63 of the Act
are: -
"63. - (1) No information
received by a person to whom this subsection applies in
connection with any of the functions of the Ombudsman
under this Part shall be disclosed by any person who is
or has been a person to whom this subsection applies
except-
(a) to a person to whom this subsection applies;
(b) to the Secretary of State;
(c) to other persons in or in connection with the
exercise of any function of the Ombudsman;
(d) for the purposes of any criminal, civil or
disciplinary proceedings; or
(e) in the form of a summary or other general
statement made by the Ombudsman which-
(i) does not identify the person from whom the
information was received; and
(ii) does not, except to such extent as the Ombudsman
thinks necessary in the public interest, identify any
person to whom the information relates.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to-
(a) the Ombudsman; and
(b) an officer of the Ombudsman."
[36]
Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, so far as is
relevant, provides: -
"7. - (1) A person who claims that a public
authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which
is made unlawful by section 6(1) may-
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this
Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned
in any legal proceedings,
but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful
act.
…
(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a
victim of an unlawful act only if he would be a victim
for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if
proceedings were brought in the European Court of Human
Rights in respect of that act."
Confidentiality
[37]
In Taylor and others v Serious Fraud Office [1999]
2 AC 177, documents generated by a Serious Fraud
Office inquiry were disclosed to the solicitors of
defendants in a criminal trial. The solicitors in turn
disclosed them to the first plaintiff who issued
proceedings for libel. The House of Lords held that an
implied undertaking applied to material disclosed by the
prosecution in criminal proceedings. Lord Hoffman said at
208: -
"The implied undertaking in civil proceedings is
designed to limit the invasion of privacy and
confidentiality caused by compulsory disclosure of
documents in litigation. It is generated by the
circumstances in which the documents have been
disclosed, irrespective of their contents. It excludes
all collateral use, whether in other litigation or by
way of publication to others."
and at page 211: -
"Many people give assistance to the police and
other investigatory agencies, either voluntarily or
under compulsion, without coming within the category of
informers whose identity can be concealed on grounds of
public interest. They will be moved or obliged to give
the information because they or the law consider that
the interests of justice so require. They must naturally
accept that the interests of justice may in the end
require the publication of the information, or at any
rate its disclosure to the accused for the purposes of
enabling him to conduct his defence. But there seems to
me no reason why the law should not encourage their
assistance by offering them the assurance that, subject
to these overriding requirements, their privacy and
confidentiality will be respected."
[38]
In Re A's application [2001] NI 335 I said of these
passages: -
"These passages identify the public interest in
maintaining confidentiality for police investigations
unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
Unless it can be demonstrated that there are compelling
reasons for disclosing the contents of a police
investigation file, its vital confidentiality should be
preserved."
[39]
I consider that these remarks hold true for the
investigation of a complaint by the Ombudsman. It is not
difficult to identify the public interest that is at stake
here. The nature of the investigations conducted by the
Ombudsman is such that great sensitivity may be required.
Confidentiality can promote rather than detract from the
effectiveness of an inquiry. If witnesses are aware that
their statements will be inspected by other agencies,
their incentive to candour may be diminished. Mr Treacy's
arguments focussed on the avowed lack of need for
confidentiality in relation to these particular documents
but that, as it seems to me, misses the point. The
effective investigation of complaints must depend to some
extent at least on the knowledge of participants in
inquiries such as this that their contributions can be
made confidentially.
[40]
Different considerations would of course apply if it could
be demonstrated that by keeping confidential documentation
generated by the investigation a less effective inquiry
was likely to ensue. But that is not the case here. On the
contrary, the Police Ombudsman's office has been
assiduous, not to say painstaking, in informing the
applicants at every stage of the inquiry of the state of
its progress and it has provided a draft report and
received extensive comment on it. There is no reason to
question the assertions of the office that it has
conscientiously pursued every legitimate line of inquiry.
[41]
In R (on the application of Green) v Police Complaints
Authority [2004]
UKHL 6 the claimant lodged a complaint alleging that
he had been deliberately knocked down by a police officer
driving an unmarked police car. The complaints authority
supervised the investigation of the complaint by another
police force. It sent a list of all the witness statements
and documents that it would be taking into account. The
claimant asked for disclosure of everything in the list.
The authority replied that it was unable to accede to that
request as section 80 (1) (a) of the Police Act 1996
prohibited the disclosure of any information received by
the authority in connection with its functions (but with
certain specified exceptions), and the relevant exception
in section 80 (1) (a), did not apply, as the disclosure
was not necessary "for the proper discharge of the
functions of the authority". The House of Lords held
that the main aim of the authority in carrying out its
functions in supervising the police investigation of
alleged misconduct on the part of police officers was to
satisfy the legitimate interests both of complainants and
of the wider public that the investigation of complaints,
and any decisions on taking disciplinary proceedings
should be, and should be seen to be, independent and
thorough. In the proper discharge of its functions, the
authority might judge that it was necessary to disclose
certain information derived from an investigation to
claimants if their legitimate interests and those of the
wider public were to be met.
[42]
At paragraph [73] of his opinion Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
dealt with the need for confidentiality in relation to
witness statements obtained in the course of an
investigation into a complaint against the police as
follows: -
"The other factor considered by the Court of Appeal
was the desirability of maintaining the confidentiality
of statements given by witnesses. They did not consider
that, in itself, this was a sufficient reason for never
disclosing witness statements. I agree: if disclosure
were indeed necessary for the proper discharge of the
authority's functions, then the statements would have to
be disclosed, whether or not they were regarded as
confidential. But it should be recognised that the
starting point of section 80 is that information
provided to the authority is to be kept confidential.
This mirrors the position with both the police and the
prosecuting authorities. As a general rule, this appears
to be entirely appropriate. Of course, witnesses who
give evidence to the police must expect that, whether
favourable or unfavourable to the potential accused, it
will be disclosed and become public in the event of a
trial. But, subject to that, they may have good reasons
for being anxious that it should not be revealed—for
example, if it tends to cast doubt on a complainer's
trumped-up allegation against a police officer. The
potential risks to such a witness are obvious.
Parliament recognises this legitimate concern in section
80 (1) (c) which allows information to be disclosed in
the form of a summary that does not identify the person
from whom the information was received. Similarly, in
complaints against the police, as in many other cases,
the statements will often show individuals, including
the witnesses themselves, in a bad light—behaving,
especially through drink, in ways or in circumstances
that they would be ashamed to see made public. So
witnesses will be understandably concerned that their
evidence about their own or others' misdemeanours should
be kept confidential unless there is a trial. The
concern will be shared by the other people involved. The
police and prosecutors are expected to respect that
concern."
[43]
It appears to me that the starting point in this case
should likewise be that information provided to the
Ombudsman should be kept confidential and that, generally,
it should only be revealed where necessary for the proper
discharge of her functions. The same considerations apply
to the need for the police to hold confidential materials
that they supply to the Ombudsman for the purpose of her
investigation. It could not be right that the need for
confidentiality of those inquiries could be disregarded in
the debate as to whether the Chief Constable should be
required to produce the material requested. The question
whether he should be compelled to hand over these
documents to CAJ cannot be isolated from the efficacy of
the Ombudsman's investigations. If it is right (as I
believe it to be) that she should be entitled to guard the
effectiveness of her investigation by withholding those
documents, it could not be right that it should be
imperilled by the release of the information from another
source. It is, of course, true that the Ombudsman's office
has pointed out that the Chief Constable could have waived
any claim to confidentiality and one may take it from this
that she would not have objected if he had chosen to do
so. But the effectiveness of her investigations must
depend on witnesses being able, if they choose, to refuse
to reveal documents that they have supplied for the
purpose of the inquiry.
The statutory incentive to confidentiality
[44]
The need for confidentiality is, in my view, frankly
recognised in the statutory provisions that deal with the
issue. This is underscored not only by section 63 of the
1998 Police Act but by section 51. The former of these
provisions forbids the disclosure of information received
in the course of the inquiry to others than those
specified. I do not accept Mr Treacy's argument that CAJ
is included within this group. His argument appeared to
rest on the proposition that CAJ came within the category
of "other persons in or in connection with the
exercise of any function of the Ombudsman". Their
claim to be included in this group depended on their
status as complainant but I do not consider that this is a
remotely viable argument. CAJ plays no part in the
performance of the Ombudsman's functions.
[45]
Section 51 requires the Ombudsman to exercise her powers
in a way that will secure the efficiency, effectiveness
and independence of the police complaints system; and the
confidence of the public and of members of the police
force in that system. Her judgment that this is best
achieved by keeping confidential material disclosed to her
in the course of her investigations is, in my judgment,
unimpeachable. In this connection it is to be noted that
section 80 of the 1996 Act is in strikingly similar terms
to those employed in the 1998 legislation.
The human rights arguments
[46]
The first argument to be addressed in this context is the
claim of the applicants to be entitled to rely on the
Convention. In my judgment, that argument can be disposed
of simply. Underpinning all the various formulations
advanced on behalf of the applicants must be the
proposition that they are directly affected (in the way
that phrase has been used in Convention terms) by the
asserted violation of article 2.
[47]
In Klass v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR ECtHR dealt with
the question of victim status in paragraph 33 as follows:
-
"33. While Article 24 allows each Contracting State
to refer to the Commission "any alleged
breach" of the Convention by another Contracting
State, a person, non-governmental organisation or group
of individuals must, in order to be able to lodge a
petition in pursuance of Article 25 [now article 34],
claim "to be the victim of a violation . . . of the
rights set forth in (the) Convention". Thus, in
contrast to the position under Article 24 – where,
subject to the other conditions laid down, the general
interest attaching to the observance of the Convention
renders admissible an inter-State application –
Article 25 requires that an individual applicant should
claim to have been actually affected by the violation he
alleges (see the judgment of 18 January 1978 in the case
of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Series A no. 25,
pp. 90-91, paras. 239 and 240). Article 25 does not
institute for individuals a kind of actio popularis
for the interpretation of the Convention; it does not
permit individuals to complain against a law in
abstracto simply because they feel that it
contravenes the Convention. In principle, it does not
suffice for an individual applicant to claim that the
mere existence of a law violates his rights under the
Convention; it is necessary that the law should have
been applied to his detriment. Nevertheless, as both the
Government and the Commission pointed out, a law may by
itself violate the rights of an individual if the
individual is directly affected by the law in the
absence of any specific measure of implementation."
[48]
An applicant may claim to be an indirect victim, for
example when he or she is a close relative (such as a
spouse or parent) of the affected person – see, for
instance, McCann v United Kingdom (1995)
21 EHRR 97, and Campbell and Cosans v UK (1980)
3 EHRR 531 at 545. But a colleague or friend does not come
within such a category and absent any direct effect on
such a colleague or friend, victim status is not
established. It is clear that no direct effect either on
CAJ or Mr O'Brien has been established. I must conclude,
therefore, that they are not entitled to rely on an
asserted violation of article 2 of ECHR for the purpose of
these proceedings.
[49]
Even if I had decided that it was open to the applicants
to rely on article 2, I would not have found that the
respondents' decision to withhold the material that was
sought constituted a violation of the provision. Much of
the Strasbourg jurisprudence relied on to promote that
claim has been usefully reviewed by Lord Bingham of
Cornhill in R (on the application of Amin)
v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2003]
3 WLR 1169. At paragraph [20] of his opinion, Lord
Bingham said: -
"While public scrutiny of police investigations
cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement under
article 2 [Jordan v UK (2001) 11 BHRC 1 (para
121)], there must 'be a sufficient element of public
scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure
accountability in practice as well as in theory. The
degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from
case to case.' …
The European Court has not required that any particular
procedure be adopted to examine the circumstances of a
killing by state agents, nor is it necessary that there
be a single unified procedure. But it is 'indispensable'
that there be proper procedures for ensuring the
accountability of agents of the state so as to maintain
public confidence and allay the legitimate concerns that
arise from the use of lethal force."
[50]
To rely on article 2 to advance their claim to be entitled
to see the requested documents the applicants would have
had to show that the investigation by the Ombudsman was
not sufficiently thorough to achieve these aims. I am
satisfied that they have not done so. As I have said the
Ombudsman's office was prepared to go to significant
lengths to involve the applicants at all material stages
of the investigation; they have been open to suggestion
and comment and have met representatives of CAJ on a
number of occasions. This approach betokens a willingness
to listen and to reassure. Judged objectively, I consider
that it constitutes "proper procedures for ensuring
the accountability of agents of the state".
Conclusions
[51]
None of the applicants' claims has been made out. The
application for judicial review must be dismissed.
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