FOURTH
SECTION
CASE
OF FINUCANE v. THE
UNITED KINGDOM
(Application
no. 29178/95)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
1
July 2003
FINAL
01/10/2003
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In
the case of Finucane v. the United Kingdom,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Mr M. Pellonpää,
President,
Sir
Nicolas Bratza,
Mrs
E. Palm,
Mr
M. Fischbach,
Mr
J. Casadevall,
Mr
S. Pavlovschi,
Mr
J. Borrego Borrego, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 10 June 2003,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The
case originated in an application (no. 29178/95)
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights
(“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Irish
national, Mrs Geraldine Finucane (“the applicant”),
on 5 July 1994.
2. The
applicant was represented by Mr Peter Madden, a lawyer
practising in Belfast. The United Kingdom Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C.
Whomersley of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
3. The
applicant alleges that there had been no proper, effective
investigation into the death of her husband, Patrick
Finucane.
4. The
application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998,
when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force
(Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5. The
application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court
(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article
27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in
Rule 26 § 1.
6. On
1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its
Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).
7. By
a decision of 2 July 2002, the Court declared the
application admissible.
8. The
applicant and the Government each filed observations on the
merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting
the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required
(Rule 59 § 3 in fine).
THE
FACTS
I. THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
9. The
applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Belfast, Northern
Ireland.
10. At
around 7.25 p.m. on 12 February 1989, the applicant’s
husband, solicitor Patrick Finucane, was killed in front of
her and their three children by two masked men who broke
into their home. She herself was injured, probably by a
ricochet bullet. Patrick Finucane was shot in the head, neck
and chest. Six bullets had struck the head and there was
evidence that one or more of these had been fired within a
range of 15 inches when he was lying on the floor. The day
after the murder, on 13 February 1989, a man telephoned the
press and stated that the illegal loyalist paramilitary
group, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (“UFF”) claimed
responsibility for killing Patrick Finucane, the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (“PIRA”) officer not the
solicitor.
11. Patrick
Finucane was a solicitor who represented clients from both
sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland and was involved
in a number of high profile cases arising from that
conflict. The applicant believed that it was because of his
work on these cases that prior to his murder he received
death threats delivered, via his clients, by officers of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”) and was targeted for
murder. Occasional threats had been made against Patrick
Finucane since the late 1970s. After acting for Brian Gillen
in a case concerning maltreatment in RUC custody, the
threats apparently escalated, and clients reported that
police officers often abused and threatened to kill him
during interrogations at holding centres such as Castlereagh.
On 5 January 1989, five weeks before his death, one of
Patrick Finucane’s clients reported that an RUC
officer had said that Patrick Finucane would meet his
end. On 7 January 1989, another client claimed that he was
told that Finucane was “getting took out” (murdered).
His death came less than four weeks after Douglas Hogg MP,
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home
Department, in a Committee Stage debate on the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill on 17 January
1989 said:
“I
have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there
are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are
unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.”
1. Investigation
into the killing
12. After
the shooting, the applicant’s house was cordoned off by
the RUC and a forensic examination of the scene conducted by
experts. Photographs were taken and maps prepared. A scene
of crimes officer examined the car believed to have been
used by those responsible for the shooting which had been
found abandoned.
13. On
13 February 1989, a consultant in pathology conducted a post
mortem examination.
14. A
major incident room was set up as the Antrim Road police
station. Many suspected members of the Ulster Freedom
Fighters (UFF) were detained and interviewed about the
murder.
15. On
4 July 1989, the RUC found one of the weapons believed to
have been used in the murder. On 5 April 1990, three members
of UFF were convicted of possessing this and another weapon
and of membership of the UFF. The weapon had been stolen
from the Ulster Defence Regiment’s barracks in August 1987
and in 1988 a member of the UDR was convicted of this theft.
16. In
or about September 1990, the police found firearms in the
roof space of William Stobie’s flat. Stobie was arrested.
He was, according to the applicant, questioned about the
Finucane murder from 13 to 20 September 1990. A
journalist had allegedly interviewed Stobie and had told
police about the interview but declined to make a statement.
The applicant alleged that Stobie denied to the police any
direct involvement in the shooting but admitted that he was
the quartermaster for the UDA, supplying the weapons and
recovering them after use. He also is reported as having
told the police that he had been acting as an informer for
Special Branch for the past three years. A decision was
taken on 16 January 1991 not to prosecute Stobie in relation
to the Finucane case, apparently on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence. On 23 January 1991, the decision was
taken not to proceed with two arms charges against Stobie.
The prosecution offered no evidence and Stobie was
acquitted.
2. Inquest
proceedings
17. The
inquest into Patrick Finucane’s death commenced on 6 September
1990 and ended the same day. Evidence was heard from RUC
officers involved in investigating the death, as well as
from the applicant, two neighbours and a taxi driver whose
car had been hijacked and used by those responsible for the
shooting. The applicant was represented at the inquest by
counsel who was able to question witnesses on her behalf.
After giving evidence, the applicant wished to make a
statement concerning the threats made against her husband by
the RUC but was refused permission to do so by the Coroner
on grounds that it was not relevant to the proceedings.
18. Forensic
evidence showed that the victim had been hit at least eleven
times by a 9 mm Browning automatic pistol and twice by
a .38 Special Revolver. Detective Superintendent (“D/S”)
Simpson of RUC, who was in charge of the murder
investigation, gave evidence that the Browning pistol was
one of thirteen weapons stolen from Palace army barracks in
August 1987 by a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR
– a locally recruited regiment of the British army) who
was subsequently jailed for theft. These weapons found their
way into the hands of three members of the UFF who were
convicted of possession of the weapons and of membership of
the UFF. However, the police were satisfied that those
individuals had not been in possession of the weapons at the
time of Patrick Finucane’s murder.
19. According
to the evidence given by D/S Simpson at the inquest, the
police had interviewed fourteen people in connection with
the murder, but had found that, although their suspicions
were not assuaged, and they remained reasonably certain that
the main perpetrators of the murder were among the suspects,
there was insufficient evidence to sustain a charge of
murder. None of the fourteen persons had any connection with
the security forces. D/S Simpson further stated that none of
the suspects had any connection with the security services.
He rejected the claim made by the UFF that Patrick Finucane
was a member of the Provisional IRA.
20. The
inquest heard evidence that the assassins had used a red
Ford Sierra car, Registration no. VIA 2985, that had been
hijacked by three men from a taxi driver, WR, shortly before
the murder. D/S Simpson stated in evidence that he did not
consider the hijackers to have carried out the murder and
that he considered the precision of the killing to indicate
that the killers had murdered before. He had heard that a
death threat had been made to a prisoner client of the
deceased. He had also seen parts of a report by a group of
international lawyers. This had been investigated by the
Stevens inquiry with whom he liaised closely. Though he did
not know who was interviewed, as it was separate from the
murder investigation, he said that no evidence was found
substantiating the allegation. On further questioning, he
stated that he had only read the report by the international
lawyers that lunchtime and was unaware of the existence of
material linking the security forces to Mr Finucane’s
death.
3. The
Stevens inquiries
21. On
14 September 1989, the Chief Constable of the RUC appointed
John Stevens, then Deputy Chief Constable of the
Cambridgeshire Constabulary, to investigate allegations of
collusion between members of the security forces and
loyalist paramilitaries (“Stevens 1”).
22. While
the applicant stated that it was claimed by the RUC at
Patrick Finucane’s inquest that John Stevens had also
investigated Patrick Finucane’s death, the Government
stated that the inquiry was prompted by events other than
the shooting of Patrick Finucane.
23. On
5 April 1990, John Stevens presented his report to the Chief
Constable of the RUC. While the full report was not made
public, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland made a
statement to the House of Commons on 17 May 1990. He stated,
inter alia, that as a result of the inquiry 94
persons had been arrested, of whom 59 had been reported or
charged with criminal offences. He stated that while the
passing of information to paramilitaries by the security
forces had taken place, it was restricted to a small number
of individuals and was neither widespread nor
institutionalised. Any evidence or allegation of criminal
conduct had been rigorously followed up. No charges had been
laid against members of the RUC, but Mr Stevens had
concluded that there had been misbehaviour by a few members
of the UDR. Mr Stevens had made detailed recommendations
aimed at improving the arrangements for the dissemination
and control of sensitive information.
24. As
a result of the Stevens inquiry, Brian Nelson, who had
worked as an undercover agent providing information to
British military intelligence and who had become the chief
intelligence officer of the Ulster Defence Association (“UDA”),
an illegal loyalist paramilitary group which directed the
activities of the UFF, was arrested. At his trial, the
British authorities claimed that he had got out of hand and
had become personally involved in loyalist murder plots.
Originally he faced thirty-five charges, but thirteen were
dropped and he was eventually convicted of five charges of
conspiracy to murder, for which he was sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment. During the Stevens inquiry, members
of the team had interviewed him. According to the
Government, he had denied any complicity in the murder.
25. In
prison, Brian Nelson allegedly admitted that, in his
capacity as a UDA intelligence officer, he had himself
targeted Patrick Finucane and, in his capacity as a double
agent, had told his British Army handlers about the approach
at the time. It was also alleged that Nelson had passed a
photograph of Patrick Finucane to the UDA before he was
killed. Loyalist sources further alleged that Nelson had
himself pointed out Finucane’s house to the killers. These
allegations were transmitted in a BBC Panorama programme on
8 June 1992 and the transcript of the programme was sent to
the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”).
26. Following
the Panorama programme, the DPP asked the Chief Constable of
the RUC to conduct further inquiries arising from the issues
raised in the programme. In April 1993, John Stevens, then
Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police, was appointed to
conduct a second inquiry (“Stevens 2”). According to the
Government, he made inquiries into the alleged involvement
of Brian Nelson and members of the Army in the death of
Patrick Finucane (see however John Steven’s press
statement paragraph 33 below). The applicant states
that no member of the inquiry team contacted her or her
legal representative, or any former clients of Patrick Finucane,
about the death threats made prior to the murder.
27. On
21 January 1995, John Stevens submitted his final report to
the DPP, having submitted earlier reports on 25 April 1994
and 18 October 1994. On 17 February 1995 the DPP
issued a direction of “no prosecution” to the Chief
Constable of the RUC.
28. In
answer to a parliamentary question published on 15 May 1995,
Sir John Wheeler MP said that the DPP had concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the
prosecution of any person, despite Nelson’s alleged
confession. He refused to place copies of Mr Stevens’
three reports in the House of Commons library, claiming that
police reports were confidential.
4. Civil
proceedings
29. On
11 February 1992, the applicant issued a writ of summons
against the Ministry of Defence and Brian Nelson, claiming
damages on behalf of the estate of the deceased, herself and
other dependants of the deceased. It was alleged that the
deceased’s murder was committed by or at the instigation
of or with the connivance, knowledge, encouragement and
assistance of the first defendant and by the second
defendant, who was at all material times a servant or agent
of the first defendant. It was also alleged that the first
defendant was negligent in the gathering, recording,
retention, keeping safe and dissemination of material
concerning the deceased, and in the warning, protection and
safeguarding of the deceased.
30. The
applicant’s statement of claim was served on 8 December
1993 and the defence of the Ministry of Defence on 29
December 1993. In its amended defence of 11 October 1995, it
was admitted that Brian Nelson acted as agent for and on
behalf of the Ministry of Defence but claimed that if he had
had any information about the proposed attack on Patrick
Finucane it had not been communicated to the Ministry as he
was required to do.
31. On
22 January 1998, the applicant served further and better
particulars of her case and a request for further and better
particulars of the Ministry of Defence’s case. She served
a list of documents on 8 April 1998. On 20 May 1999, a
supplemental list of documents, verified by an affidavit
sworn by the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of
Defence, was served on the applicant. The applicant
requested copies of those documents which were provided on
20 July 1999. The applicant then requested inspection of the
originals but was informed on 21 October 1999 that the
Ministry of Defence was not in possession of the originals.
5. Recent
developments
(a) The
Stevens 3 Inquiry
32. On
12 February 1999, the Government stated that at a meeting
between the applicant and Dr. Mowlem, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, a paper was handed over to Dr Mowlem
which, it was claimed, contained new material relating to
the murder of Patrick Finucane. This paper was passed to
John Stevens, now Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police who had been appointed by the Chief Constable of the
RUC to conduct an independent investigation into the murder
of the applicant’s husband (“Stevens 3”).
33. On
28 April 1999, at a press conference, John Stevens stated:
“...
in September 1989 ... I was appointed ... to conduct the
so-called ‘Stevens Inquiry’ into breaches of security by
the Security Forces in Northern Ireland.
This
commenced after the theft of montages from Dunmurry Police
Station.
This
Inquiry resulted in 43 convictions and over 800 years of
imprisonment for those convicted.
My
subsequent report contained over 100 recommendations for the
handling of security documents and information.
All
of those recommendations were accepted and have been
implemented.
This
‘Stevens 1’ Inquiry was followed by a ‘Stevens 2’
Inquiry in April 1993...
At
the request of the DPP I was asked to investigate further
matters which solely related to the previous Inquiry and
prosecutions. [The then RUC Chief Constable] referred to our
return as ‘tying up some loose ends’.
At
no time, either in Stevens 2 or in the original Stevens 1
inquiry did I investigate the murder of Patrick Finucane...
However, those inquiries through the so-called double agent,
Brian Nelson, were linked into the murder of Patrick
Finucane.
[The]
Chief Constable of the [RUC] has now asked me to conduct an
independent investigation into the murder of Patrick
Finucane. I am also investigating the associated matters
raised by the British Irish Rights Watch document ‘Deadly
Intelligence’ and the UN Commissioner’s Report. ...”
(b) Criminal
prosecution
34. On
or about 23 June 1999, charges were brought against:
– William
Alfred Stobie for the murder of Patrick Finucane;
– Mark
Barr, Paul Alexander Givens and William Hutchinson for
offences of possession of documents containing information
useful to terrorists.
35. It
was reported by the Committee for the Administration of
Justice that on being charged William Stobie made the
following statement:
“Not
guilty of the charge that you have put to me tonight. At the
time I was police informer for Special Branch. On the night
of the death of Patrick Finucane I informed Special Branch
on two occasions by telephone of a person who was to be
shot. I did not know at the time of the person who was to be
shot.”
36. William
Stobie’s solicitor told the court that his client was a
paid police informer from 1987 to 1990 and that he gave the
police information on two occasions before the Finucane
murder which was not acted upon. He also stated that, at his
client’s trial on 23 January 1991 on firearms charges, the
prosecution offered no evidence and his client was
acquitted. The bulk of the evidence against his client had,
he alleged, been known to the authorities for almost 10
years.
37. On
26 November 2001, it was reported in the press that the
trial of William Stobie had collapsed, when the Lord Chief
Justice returned a verdict of not guilty in the absence of
evidence. The prosecution had informed the court that the
key witness, a journalist, was not capable of giving
evidence due to serious mental illness.
38. On
12 December 2001, William Stobie was shot dead by gunmen,
shortly after having received threats from loyalist
paramilitaries.
39. Further
arrests were reported as being made by officers in the
Stevens inquiry in March 2002, with persons being questioned
in relation to the Finucane murder.
(c) Proposed
international investigation
40. On
24 October 2001, the Government announced in Parliament
that, amongst the measures proposed to the Irish Government
in the context of the Good Friday Agreement, was the
proposal for the United Kingdom and Irish Government to
appoint a judge of international standing from outside both
jurisdictions to undertake an investigation into allegations
of security force collusion in loyalist paramilitary
killings, including that of Patrick Finucane. In light of
the investigation, the judge would decide whether to
recommend a Public Inquiry into any of the killings.
(d) Stevens
3 Inquiry Report
41. On
17 April 2003, Sir John Stephens submitted his report to the
D.P.P. A nineteen page overview with recommendations was
made public. The summary included the following:
“4.6. I
have uncovered enough evidence to lead me to believe that
the murders of Patrick Finucane and Brian Adam Lambert could
have been prevented. I also believe that the RUC
investigation of Patrick Finucane’s murder should have
resulted in the early arrest and detection of his killers.
4.7. I
concluded that there was collusion in both murders and the
circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in
many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep
records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of
intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents
being involved in murder...”
He
stated that his inquiries with regard to satisfying the test
for prosecution in relation to possible offences arising out
of these matters were continuing.
II. RELEVANT
DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Inquests
1. Statutory
provisions and rules
42. The
conduct of inquests in Northern Ireland is governed by the
Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 and the Coroners
(Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963.
These provide the framework for a procedure within which
deaths by violence or in suspicious circumstances are
notified to the Coroner, who then has the power to hold an
inquest, with or without a jury, for the purpose of
ascertaining, with the assistance as appropriate of the
evidence of witnesses and reports, inter alia, of post
mortem and forensic examinations, who the deceased was
and how, when and where he died.
43. Pursuant
to the Coroners Act, every medical practitioner, registrar
of deaths or funeral undertaker who has reason to believe
that a person died directly or indirectly by violence is
under an obligation to inform the Coroner (section 7). Every
medical practitioner who performs a post mortem
examination has to notify the Coroner of the result in
writing (section 29). Whenever a dead body is found, or an
unexplained death or death in suspicious circumstances
occurs, the police of that district are required to give
notice to the Coroner (section 8).
44. Rules
12 and 13 of the Coroners Rules give power to the Coroner to
adjourn an inquest where a person may be or has been charged
with murder or other specified criminal offences in relation
to the deceased.
45. Where
the Coroner decides to hold an inquest with a jury, persons
are called from the Jury List, compiled by random computer
selection from the electoral register for the district on
the same basis as in criminal trials.
46. The
matters in issue at an inquest are governed by Rules 15 and
16 of the Coroners Rules:
“15. The
proceedings and evidence at an inquest shall be directed
solely to ascertaining the following matters, namely: -
(a) who
the deceased was;
(b) how,
when and where the deceased came by his death;
(c) the
particulars for the time being required by the Births and
Deaths Registration (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 to be
registered concerning his death.
16. Neither
the coroner nor the jury shall express any opinion on
questions of criminal or civil liability or on any matters
other than those referred to in the last foregoing Rule.”
47. The
forms of verdict used in Northern Ireland accord with this
recommendation, recording the name and other particulars of
the deceased, a statement of the cause of death (e.g. bullet
wounds) and findings as to when and where the deceased met
his death. In England and Wales, the form of verdict
appended to the English Coroners Rules contains a section
marked “conclusions of the jury/coroner as to the death”
in which conclusions such as “lawfully killed” or
“killed unlawfully” are inserted. These findings involve
expressing an opinion on criminal liability in that they
involve a finding as to whether the death resulted from a
criminal act, but no finding is made that any identified
person was criminally liable. The jury in England and Wales
may also append recommendations to their verdict.
48. However,
in Northern Ireland, the Coroner is under a duty (section 6(2)
of the Prosecution of Offences Order (Northern Ireland)
1972) to furnish a written report to the DPP where the
circumstances of any death appear to disclose that a
criminal offence may have been committed.
49. Until
recently, legal aid was not available for inquests as they
did not involve the determination of civil liabilities or
criminal charges. Legislation which would have provided for
legal aid at the hearing of inquests (the Legal Aid, Advice
and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, Schedule 1
paragraph 5) has not been brought into force. However, on 25 July
2000, the Lord Chancellor announced the establishment of an
Extra-Statutory Ex Gratia Scheme to make public funding
available for representation for proceedings before Coroners
in exceptional inquests in Northern Ireland. In March 2001,
he published for consultation the criteria to be used in
deciding whether applications for representation at inquests
should receive public funding. This included inter alia consideration
of financial eligibility, whether an effective investigation
by the State was needed and whether the inquest was the only
way to conduct it, whether the applicant required
representation to be able to participate effectively in the
inquest and whether the applicant had a sufficiently close
relationship to the deceased.
50. The
Coroner enjoys the power to summon witnesses who he thinks
it necessary to attend the inquest (section 17 of the
Coroners Act) and he may allow any interested person to
examine a witness (Rule 7). In both England and Wales and
Northern Ireland, a witness is entitled to rely on the
privilege against self-incrimination. In Northern Ireland,
this privilege is reinforced by Rule 9(2) which provides
that a person suspected of causing the death may not be
compelled to give evidence at the inquest.
51. In
relation to both documentary evidence and the oral evidence
of witnesses, inquests, like criminal trials, are subject to
the law of public interest immunity, which recognises and
gives effect to the public interest, such as national
security, in the non-disclosure of certain information or
certain documents or classes of document. A claim of public
interest immunity must be supported by a certificate.
2. The
scope of inquests
52. Rules
15 and 16 (see above) follow from the recommendation of the
Brodrick Committee on Death Certification and Coroners:
“...
the function of an inquest should be simply to seek out and
record as many of the facts concerning the death as the
public interest requires, without deducing from those facts
any determination of blame... In many cases, perhaps the
majority, the facts themselves will demonstrate quite
clearly whether anyone bears any responsibility for the
death; there is a difference between a form of proceeding
which affords to others the opportunity to judge an issue
and one which appears to judge the issue itself.”
53. Domestic
courts have made, inter alia, the following comments:
“...
It is noteworthy that the task is not to ascertain how the
deceased died, which might raise general and far-reaching
issues, but ‘how ... the deceased came by his death’, a
far more limited question directed to the means by which the
deceased came by his death.
...
[previous judgments] make it clear that when the Brodrick
Committee stated that one of the purposes of an inquest is
‘To allay rumours or suspicions’ this purpose should be
confined to allaying rumours and suspicions of how the
deceased came by his death and not to allaying rumours or
suspicions about the broad circumstances in which the
deceased came by his death.” (Sir Thomas Bingham, MR,
Court of Appeal, R. v. the Coroner for North Humberside
and Scunthorpe ex parte Roy Jamieson, April 1994,
unreported)
“The
cases establish that although the word ‘how’ is to be
widely interpreted, it means ‘by what means’ rather than
in what broad circumstances ... In short, the inquiry must
focus on matters directly causative of death and must,
indeed, be confined to those matters alone ...” (Simon
Brown LJ, Court of Appeal, R. v. Coroner for Western
District of East Sussex, ex parte Homberg and others,
(1994) 158 JP 357)
“...
it should not be forgotten that an inquest is a fact finding
exercise and not a method of apportioning guilt. The
procedure and rules of evidence which are suitable for one
are unsuitable for the other. In an inquest it should never
be forgotten that there are no parties, no indictment, there
is no prosecution, there is no defence, there is no trial,
simply an attempt to establish the facts. It is an
inquisitorial process, a process of investigation quite
unlike a trial...
It
is well recognised that a purpose of an inquest is that
rumour may be allayed. But that does not mean it is the duty
of the Coroner to investigate at an inquest every rumour or
allegation that may be brought to his attention. It is ...
his duty to discharge his statutory role – the scope of
his enquiry must not be allowed to drift into the uncharted
seas of rumour and allegation. He will proceed safely and
properly if he investigates the facts which it
appears are relevant to the statutory issues before him.”
(Lord Lane, Court of Appeal, R. v. South London Coroner
ex parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625)
B. The
Director of Public Prosecutions
54. The
Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP), appointed
pursuant to the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland)
1972 (the 1972 Order) is an independent officer with at
least 10 years’ experience of the practice of law in
Northern Ireland who is appointed by the Attorney General
and who holds office until retirement, subject only to
dismissal for misconduct. His duties under Article 5 of the
1972 Order are inter alia:
“(a) to
consider, or cause to be considered, with a view to his
initiating or continuing in Northern Ireland any criminal
proceedings or the bringing of any appeal or other
proceedings in or in connection with any criminal cause or
matter in Northern Ireland, any facts or information brought
to his notice, whether by the Chief Constable acting in
pursuance of Article 6(3) of this Order or by the Attorney
General or by any other authority or person;
(b) to
examine or cause to be examined all documents that are
required under Article 6 of this Order to be transmitted or
furnished to him and where it appears to him to be necessary
or appropriate to do so to cause any matter arising thereon
to be further investigated;
(c) where
he thinks proper to initiate, undertake and carry on, on
behalf of the Crown, proceedings for indictable offences and
for such summary offences or classes of summary offences as
he considers should be dealt with by him.”
55. Article
6 of the 1972 Order requires inter alia Coroners and
the Chief Constable of the RUC to provide information to the
DPP as follows:
“(2) Where
the circumstances of any death investigated or being
investigated by a coroner appear to him to disclose that a
criminal offence may have been committed he shall as soon as
practicable furnish to the [DPP] a written report of those
circumstances.
(3) It
shall be the duty of the Chief Constable, from time to time,
to furnish to the [DPP] facts and information with respect
to -
(a) indictable
offences [such as murder] alleged to have been committed
against the law of Northern Ireland; ...
and
at the request of the [DPP], to ascertain and furnish to the
[DPP] information regarding any matter which may appear to
the [DPP] to require investigation on the ground that it may
involve an offence against the law of Northern Ireland or
information which may appear to the [DPP] to be necessary
for the discharge of his functions under this Order.”
III. RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
56. Paragraph
9 of the United Nations Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic
and Social Council Resolution 1989/65, (UN Principles on
Extra-Legal Executions) provides, inter alia, that:
“There
shall be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of
all suspected cases of extra legal, arbitrary and summary
executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or
other reliable reports suggest unnatural death in the above
circumstances ...”
57. Paragraphs
10 to 17 of the UN Principles on Extra-Legal Executions
contain a series of detailed requirements that should be
observed by investigative procedures into such deaths.
Paragraph
10 states, inter alia:
“The
investigative authority shall have the power to obtain all
the information necessary to the inquiry. Those persons
conducting the inquiry ... shall also have the authority to
oblige officials allegedly involved in any such executions
to appear and testify ...”
Paragraph
11 specifies:
“In
cases in which the established investigative procedures are
inadequate because of a lack of expertise or impartiality,
because of the importance of the matter or because of the
apparent existence of a pattern of abuse, and in cases where
there are complaints from the family of the victim about
these inadequacies or other substantial reasons, Governments
shall pursue investigations through an independent
commission of inquiry or similar procedure. Members of such
a commission shall be chosen for their recognised
impartiality, competence and independence as individuals. In
particular, they shall be independent of any institution,
agency or person that may be the subject of the inquiry. The
commission shall have the authority to obtain all
information necessary to the inquiry and shall conduct the
inquiry as provided in these principles.”
Paragraph
16 provides, inter alia:
“Families
of the deceased and their legal representatives shall be
informed of, and have access to, any hearing as well as all
information relevant to the investigation and shall be
entitled to present other evidence...”
Paragraph
17 provides, inter alia:
“A
written report shall be made within a reasonable time on the
methods and findings of such investigations. The report
shall be made public immediately and shall include the scope
of the inquiry, procedures, methods used to evaluate
evidence as well as conclusions and recommendations based on
findings of fact and on applicable law...”
58. The
“Minnesota Protocol” (Model Protocol for a legal
investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary
executions, contained in the UN Manual on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions) provides, inter alia, in section
B on the “Purposes of an inquiry”:
“As
set out in paragraph 9 of the Principles, the broad purpose
of an inquiry is to discover the truth about the events
leading to the suspicious death of a victim. To fulfil that
purpose, those conducting the inquiry shall, at a minimum,
seek:
(a) to
identify the victim;
(b) to
recover and preserve evidentiary material related to the
death to aid in any potential prosecution of those
responsible;
(c) to
identify possible witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death;
(d) to
determine the cause, manner, location and time of death, as
well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about
the death;
(e) to
distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide
and homicide;
(f) to
identify and apprehend the person(s) involved in the death;
(g) to
bring the suspected perpetrator(s) before a competent court
established by law.”
59. In
section D, it is stated that “In cases where government
involvement is suspected, an objective and impartial
investigation may not be possible unless a special
commission of inquiry is established...”.
THE
LAW
I. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
60. The
applicant complained that there was no effective
investigation into the death of her husband, Patrick
Finucane, which had occurred in circumstances giving rise to
suspicions of collusion of the security forces with his
killers. She invoked Article 2 of the Convention which
provides as relevant in its first paragraph:
“ Everyone’s
right to life shall be protected by law. ...”
A. The
parties’ submissions
1. The
applicant
61. The
applicant submitted that the RUC investigation into her
husband’s death was inter alia hopelessly
inadequate as it failed entirely to explore the possibility
of collusion and as the investigating officers were
hierarchically linked to those against whom allegations were
made. The inquest was also strictly limited in its scope,
involving no key witnesses or any persons suspected of
involvement in the death and could not provide an effective
part of the process of identifying or prosecuting the
perpetrators of any unlawful act. As regarded the first two
Stevens inquiries, neither was concerned with investigating
the murder of Patrick Finucane and neither fulfilled the
requirements of independence, promptness, public scrutiny or
accessibility to the next of kin. The inquiry teams never,
for example, made contact with the applicant’s family, her
husband’s firm of solicitors or any of his clients who had
reported death threats.
62. As
regards the third inquiry, this was commenced ten years
after the murder. So far the Stevens team refused to
disclose to the applicant any material held by it. As
regards her alleged lack of co-operation with various
investigations, she had always taken the position that an
independent judicial inquiry was the appropriate solution.
Nor was the third inquiry sufficiently independent as it,
like the others, had been established by the RUC Chief
Constable at the relevant time and Mr Stevens reported,
according to her understanding, to the Chief Constable.
There was thus a hierarchical connection between the head of
the investigation and the Chief Constable of the force
against whom serious allegations had been made.
63. Further,
the applicant argued that the examination by the DPP of the
evidence throughout the history of the case had been a
secret and undisclosed process, without any reasons given
for decisions not to prosecute. He could not be regarded as
independent due to the relationship between his office and
the police. His decisions not to prosecute also cast grave
doubt on his independence, in particular as the evidence
against Mr Stobie was known to the authorities for at
least 10 years. She referred to the decision not to
prosecute Mr Stobie in 1991 for his role in the Finucane
murder or his involvement in the UDA, the decision not to
offer evidence against Mr Stobie at his trial on arms
charges in January 1991 and the failure to prosecute Brian
Nelson for conspiracy to murder, despite the evidence that
he had passed a photograph of Patrick Finucane to known
killers, or to prosecute Nelson’s army handlers for
collusion despite their knowledge that Patrick Finucane was
targeted.
2. The
Government
64. The
Government accepted that, in light of the previous judgments
(Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no.
24746/94, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95,
Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96
and Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97,
ECHR 2001-III) the RUC investigation, the inquest and
the Stevens inquiries did not cumulatively satisfy the
procedural requirement imposed by Article 2 of the
Convention. They pointed out however that the reports
following the first and second Stevens’ inquiries were not
made public as this would have prejudiced national security.
65. In
any event, the Government stated that the third inquiry
represented the only comprehensive investigation into the
death of Patrick Finucane. This was ongoing, conducted by 18
to 20 police officers from outside Northern Ireland and it
was to report to the DPP. So far, apart from William Stobie,
14 persons had been arrested and interviewed in connection
with murder. While the RUC were resisting the applicant’s
current application for disclosure of material generated in
the third inquiry because of potential prejudice to national
security, the material’s relevance to matters before, or
likely to come before, the courts or to ongoing
investigations, it had been made clear that disclosure would
be reconsidered if it were to become apparent that there
would be no harm to those interests.
66. Furthermore,
the Government submitted that significant efforts had been
made by the Stevens team to keep the applicant as fully
informed as possible. However the applicant refused to meet
with the police or the Stevens’ team and repeatedly
indicated her unwillingness to co-operate with the inquiry.
In those circumstances, the Government argued that although
the first two Stevens inquiries did not satisfy the
procedural obligation in Article 2 as they were not
centrally concerned with the murder of the applicant’s
husband, the third inquiry was so concerned and it was being
conducted with thoroughness. The Government accepted that as
it was occurring some years after the events it did not
satisfy the requirements of promptness and reasonable
expedition.
B. The
Court’s assessment
1. General
principles
67. The
obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of
the Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to
“secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by
implication that there should be some form of effective
official investigation when individuals have been killed as
a result of the use of force (see, mutatis mutandis,
the McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment
of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 49, § 161, and Kaya
v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, p. 324, § 86). The
essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the
effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect
the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents
or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths
occurring under their responsibility. What form of
investigation will achieve those purposes may vary in
different circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed,
the authorities must act of their own motion, once the
matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to
the initiative of the next of kin either to lodge a formal
complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any
investigative procedures (see, for example, mutatis
mutandis, İlhan v. Turkey [GC] no. 22277/93,
ECHR 2000-VII, § 63).
68. For
an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State
agents to be effective, it may generally be regarded as
necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out
the investigation to be independent from those implicated in
the events (see, for example, Güleç v. Turkey,
judgment of 27 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, §§
81-82; Oğur v. Turkey, [GC] no. 21954/93,
ECHR 1999-III, §§ 91-92). This means not only a lack of
hierarchical or institutional connection but also a
practical independence (see, for example, Ergı v.
Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports
1998-IV, §§ 83-84, and the recent Northern Irish cases,
for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no.
28883/95, § 128, Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom,
no. 24746/94, § 120, and Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom,
no. 30054/96, § 114, ECHR 2001-III).
69. The
investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is
capable of leading to a determination of whether the force
used in such cases was or was not justified in the
circumstances (for example, Kaya v. Turkey, cited
above, p. 324, § 87) and to the identification and
punishment of those responsible (Oğur v. Turkey,
cited above, § 88). This is not an obligation of result,
but of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable
steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning
the incident, including inter alia eye witness
testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an
autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of
injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings,
including the cause of death (see, for example, Salman v.
Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, ECHR 2000-VII, § 106;
Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94,
ECHR 1999-IV, § 109; Gül v. Turkey, 22676/93, §
89, 14 December 2000, unreported). Any deficiency in
the investigation which undermines its ability to establish
the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will
risk falling foul of this standard (see the recent Northern
Irish cases concerning the inability of inquests to compel
the security force witnesses directly involved in the use of
lethal force, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, § 144, and Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, § 127).
70. A
requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is
implicit in this context (see Yaşa v. Turkey,
judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp.
2439-2440, §§ 102-104; Cakıcı v. Turkey [GC],
no. 23657/94, ECHR 1999-IV, §§ 80, 87 and 106; Tanrıkulu
v. Turkey, cited above, § 109; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey,
no. 22535/93, ECHR 2000-III, §§ 106-107). While there may
be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an
investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response
by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force
may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public
confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in
preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of
unlawful acts (see, for example, Hugh Jordan v. the
United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 108, 136‑140).
71. For
the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of
public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to
secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The
degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case
to case. In all cases, however, the next-of-kin of the
victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent
necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see Güleç
v. Turkey, cited above, p. 1733, § 82; Oğur v. Turkey,
cited above, § 92; Gül v. Turkey, cited above, §
93; and recent Northern Irish cases, for example, McKerr
v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 148).
2. Application
in the present case
72. The
Court recalls that, following the death of Patrick Finucane
on 12 February 1989, an investigation was opened by the
RUC. No prosecutions resulted at that stage. An inquest
opened on 6 September 1990 and closed the same day. Two
police inquiries, Stevens 1 and 2, took place in 1989-1990
and 1993-1995. A third inquiry, Stevens 3, commenced in 1999
and is still ongoing. On 23 June 1999, a criminal
prosecution was brought against William Stobie for the
murder of Patrick Finucane. A verdict of not guilty was
entered on or about 26 November 2001, after the prosecution
offered no evidence.
73. The
applicant has made numerous complaints about these
procedures, alleging that they do not satisfy the procedural
obligation imposed by Article 2 of the Convention. The Court
notes that the Government have accepted, in large part, that
the procedures failed to provide the requisite safeguards,
though they do not agree with all the criticisms made by the
applicant.
(i) The
police investigation
74. Firstly,
concerning the police investigation, the Court notes that
the investigation started immediately after the death and
involved necessary steps to secure evidence at the scene.
The car and gun used in the incident were located though
this did not lead to any charges being brought in respect of
the killing. A number of suspects from the loyalist
paramilitaries, popularly believed to have carried out the
killing, were interviewed. During the inquest, the officer
in charge of the investigation stated that though he was
reasonably certain that the main perpetrators of the murder
were amongst them, there was insufficient evidence to
support a prosecution.
75. It
is not apparent to what extent the initial police
investigation included inquiries into possible collusion by
the security forces in the targeting of Patrick Finucane by
a loyalist paramilitary group. A weapon believed to have
been used in the murder had been stolen from the UDR and a
member of the UDR was convicted of the theft and UFF members
were convicted of possession of the gun. It was therefore
apparent that the weapon had come into the hands of the
loyalists via the security forces. At the inquest however,
the police officer in charge of the investigation stated
that none of the 14 persons interviewed in relation to the
murder had any connection with the security forces.
Allegations of collusion involving the police were also made
from a very early stage, in particular with regard to
threats made by the RUC to Patrick Finucane’s clients.
76. In
so far therefore as the investigation was conducted by RUC
officers, they were part of the police force which was
suspected by the applicant and other members of the
community of issuing threats against Patrick Finucane. They
were all under the responsibility of the RUC Chief
Constable, who played a role in the process of instituting
any disciplinary or criminal proceedings (see paragraph 55
above). In the circumstances, there was a lack of
independence attaching to this aspect of the investigative
procedures, which also raises serious doubts as to the
thoroughness or effectiveness with which the possibility of
collusion was pursued.
(ii) The
inquest
77. In
Northern Ireland, as in England and Wales, investigations
into deaths may also be conducted by inquests. Inquests are
public hearings conducted by coroners, independent judicial
officers, normally sitting with a jury, to determine the
facts surrounding a suspicious death. Judicial review lies
from procedural decisions by coroners and in respect of any
mistaken directions given to the jury. There are thus strong
safeguards as to the lawfulness and propriety of the
proceedings. In the case of McCann and Others v. the
United Kingdom (cited above, p. 49, § 162), the Court
found that the inquest held into the deaths of the three IRA
suspects shot by the SAS on Gibraltar satisfied the
procedural obligation contained in Article 2, as it provided
a detailed review of the events surrounding the killings and
provided the relatives of the deceased with the opportunity
to examine and cross-examine witnesses involved in the
operation. However it must be noted that the inquest in that
case was to some extent exceptional when compared with the
proceedings in a number of cases in Northern Ireland (see
the cases of Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, McKerr v.
the United Kingdom, and Kelly and Others v. the
United Kingdom, cited above). The promptness and
thoroughness of the inquest in the McCann case left
the Court in no doubt that the important facts relating to
the events had been examined with the active participation
of the applicants’ highly competent legal representative.
78. In
this case however, the inquest was concerned only with the
immediate circumstances surrounding the shooting of Patrick
Finucane. There was no inquiry into the allegations of
collusion by the RUC or other sections of the security
forces. The applicant was refused permission to make a
statement to the inquest about the threats made by the
police against her husband as the Coroner regarded these
matters as irrelevant. As later events were to show however,
there were indications that informers working for Special
Branch or the security forces knew about, or assisted in,
the attack on Patrick Finucane (see paragraphs 16, 25 and
36, concerning William Stobie and Brian Nelson), which
supported suspicions that the authorities knew or connived
in murder. The inquest accordingly failed to address serious
and legitimate concerns of the family and the public and
cannot be regarded as providing an effective investigation
into the incident or a means of identifying or leading to
the prosecution of those responsible. In that respect, it
fell short of the requirements of Article 2.
(iii) The
Stevens inquiries
79. The
Court recalls that the authorities responded to concerns
arising out of allegations of collusion between the loyalist
organisations and the security forces by instituting special
police inquiries, headed by a senior police officer from
outside Northern Ireland. It is not apparent however that
the first two inquiries, however useful they may have been
in uncovering information, were in fact concerned with
investigating the death of Patrick Finucane with a view to
bringing prosecutions as appropriate. In any event, the
reports were not made public and the applicant has never
been informed of their findings. The necessary elements of
public scrutiny and accessibility of the family are
therefore missing.
80. As
regards the most recent inquiry, Stevens 3, which is
squarely concerned with the Finucane murder, the Government
have admitted that, taking place some ten years after the
event, it cannot comply with the requirement that effective
investigations be commenced promptly and conducted with due
expedition. It is also not apparent to what extent, if any,
the final report will be made public, though a summary
overview has recently been published. The Court does not
find it necessary in light of these defects to consider
further allegations of lack of accessibility of the
applicant to the procedure or lack of independence of the
inquiry from the Police Service in Northern Ireland (which
has replaced the RUC).
(iv) The
DPP
81. The
applicant also alleged that the DPP had shown a lack of
independence in this case. The Court has in previous cases
noted that the DPP, who is the legal officer charged with
the responsibility to decide whether to bring prosecutions
in respect of any possible criminal offences, is not
required to give reasons for any decision not to prosecute
and in this case he did not do so. No challenge by way of
judicial review exists to require him to give reasons in
Northern Ireland, though it may be noted that in England and
Wales, where the inquest jury may still reach verdicts of
unlawful death, the courts have required the DPP to
reconsider a decision not to prosecute in the light of such
a verdict, and will review whether those reasons are
sufficient. This possibility does not exist in Northern
Ireland where the inquest jury is no longer permitted to
issue verdicts concerning the lawfulness or otherwise of a
death.
82. The
Court does not consider it possible at this stage for it to
determine what in fact occurred in 1990-1991 and in 1995
when decisions were taken concerning the prosecution of
persons possibly implicated in the Finucane murder (see
paragraphs 16 and 27 above). However, where the police
investigation procedure is itself open to doubts of a lack
of independence and is not amenable to public scrutiny, it
is of increased importance that the officer who decides
whether or not to prosecute also gives an appearance of
independence in his decision-making. As the Court observed
in Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (judgment cited
above, § 123) the absence of reasons for decisions not
to prosecute in controversial cases may in itself not be
conducive to public confidence and may deny family of the
victim access to information about a matter of crucial
importance to them and prevent any legal challenge of the
decision.
83. Notwithstanding
the suspicions of collusion however, no reasons were
forthcoming at the time for the various decisions not to
prosecute and no information was made available either to
the applicant or the public which might provide re-assurance
that the rule of law had been respected. This cannot be
regarded as compatible with the requirements of Article 2,
unless that information was forthcoming in some other way.
This was not the case.
(v) Conclusion
84. The
Court finds that the proceedings for investigating the death
of Patrick Finucane failed to provide a prompt and effective
investigation into the allegations of collusion by security
personnel. There has consequently been a failure to comply
with the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 of
the Convention and there has been, in this respect, a
violation of that provision.
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
85. Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If
the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
86. The
applicant stated that the quantum of any award of
non-pecuniary damage was for the Court to assess on an
equitable basis. She raised concerns however that any award
for damages for just satisfaction, as were made in the other
Northern Ireland cases (Hugh Jordan, McKerr, Kelly
and others and Shanaghan, cited above) would be
regarded as bringing to an end the investigative obligation
imposed by Article 2 of the Convention. She refers in that
regard to the approach adopted by the domestic courts in the
application brought by Jonathan McKerr after the Court’s
judgment in his case for a declaration that State was in
continuing breach of the procedural obligation under Article
2 and for an order of mandamus to compel provision of an
effective investigation. On 26 July 2002, the High Court in
Northern Ireland rejected the application, finding that this
Court would not have exercised its discretion to award just
satisfaction had it envisaged the possibility of restitutio
in integrum through the holding of an effective
investigation and therefore considered that any continuing
obligation had come to an end once the Court issued its
judgment. This decision has since been overturned by the
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal on 10 January 2003,
and an application for leave to appeal by the Crown is
apparently pending to the House of Lords. The applicant
requested the Court to state that awards of just
satisfaction do not bring to an end the rights conferred by
Article 2. Since she would not wish any award of just
satisfaction to jeopardise action taken at a domestic level
to enforcing an investigation at domestic level, she
requested the Court not to make an award of just
satisfaction if it were to agree with the High Court
approach mentioned above.
87. The
Government stated that the applicant had received a very
significant sum, some half a million pounds, under the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and had shown a
certain ambivalence as to whether she wished to claim
non-pecuniary damage. As her main concern was to obtain a
judgment of the Court against the Government, any such
judgment would appear to constitute of itself sufficient
just satisfaction.
88. The
Court would recall that it has awarded non-pecuniary damages
in other similar cases in which it has found a breach of the
procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention (see
the Hugh Jordan, McKerr, Kelly and Others
and Shanaghan cases, cited above). The compensation
referred to by the Government does not relate to the
shortcomings in the official investigation and would not
prevent an award of non-pecuniary damages in that respect.
89. As
regards the applicant’s views concerning provision of an
effective investigation, the Court has not previously given
any indication that a Government should, as a response to
such a finding of a breach of Article 2, hold a fresh
investigation into the death concerned and has on occasion
expressly declined to do so (Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey,
no. 27601/95, judgment of 16 July 2002, § 179). Nor does it
consider it appropriate to do so in the present case. It
cannot be assumed in such cases that a future investigation
can usefully be carried out or provide any redress, either
to the victim’s family or by way of providing transparency
and accountability to the wider public. The lapse of time,
the effect on evidence and the availability of witnesses,
may inevitably render such an investigation an
unsatisfactory or inconclusive exercise, which fails to
establish important facts or put to rest doubts and
suspicions. Even in disappearance cases, where it might be
argued that more is at stake since the relatives suffer from
the ongoing uncertainty about the exact fate of the victim
or the location of the body, the Court has refused to issue
any declaration that a new investigation should be launched
(Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, judgment of 18 June
2002, § 451). It rather falls to the Committee of Ministers
acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address the
issues as to what may practicably be required by way of
compliance in each case (cf. mutatis mutandis, Akdivar
and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 1 April 1998 (Article 50),
Reports 1998–II, p. 723, § 47).
90. In
sum, the Court is unable to make the declaration or
clarifications requested by the applicant with a view to the
consequences of this judgment. As she has stated that in
this event she does not wish any damages to be paid, it will
proceed on the basis that her claim is withdrawn.
B. Costs
and expenses
91. The
applicant claimed 94,020.22 pounds sterling (GBP), inclusive
of value-added tax VAT) for costs and expenses for legal
work done since the introduction of the case in 1995. This
included fees of GBP 31,385.75 for over 207 hours work by a
senior solicitor, GBP 6,580 for over 117 hours work by a
paralegal, GBP 29,375 for fees of senior counsel and GBP 19,583.32
for junior counsel.
92. The
Government submitted that this was grossly excessive. While
the case was complex, many of the legal issues were similar
to those raised in the other Northern Ireland cases. The
claims by lawyers included well over 300 hours by solicitors
plus unspecified hours by two counsel. They considered there
must have been a significant degree of duplication of work
and that the applicant has not demonstrated that these legal
costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
93. The
Court recalls that this case, which has been pending for
some considerable time, has involved several rounds of
written submissions and may be regarded as factually and
legally complex. Nonetheless, no oral hearing has been held.
It finds that the fees claimed to be on the high side when
compared with other cases from the United Kingdom and is not
persuaded that they are reasonable as to quantum. Having
regard to equitable considerations, it awards the sum of
43,000 euros (EUR), plus any value added tax which may be
payable.
C. Default
interest
94. The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR
THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention;
2. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
according to Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 43,000 (forty three thousand euros) in
respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into pounds
sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three
percentage points;
3. Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done
in English, and notified in writing on 1 July 2003, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Michael
O’Boyle
Matti Pellonpää
Registrar
President
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