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FOURTH
SECTION
DECISION
AS
TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application
no. 29178/95
by Geraldine FINUCANE
against the United Kingdom
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on
2 July 2002 as a Chamber composed of
Mr M. Pellonpää,
President,
Sir
Nicolas Bratza,
Mr
A. Pastor Ridruejo,
Mrs
E. Palm,
Mr
M. Fischbach,
Mr
J. Casadevall,
Mr
S. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section
Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged with the European
Commission of Human Rights on 5 July 1995,
Having
regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the
Convention, by which the competence to examine the
application was transferred to the Court,
Having
regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE
FACTS
The
applicant, Geraldine Finucane, is an Irish national,
who was born in 1950 and lives in Belfast. She was
represented before the Court by Mr P. Madden, a
lawyer practising in Belfast.
A. The
circumstances of the case
The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
At
around 7.25 p.m. on 12 February 1989 the applicant’s
husband, solicitor Patrick Finucane, was killed in front of
her and their three children by two masked men who broke
into their home. She herself was injured, probably by
a ricochet bullet. Patrick Finucane was shot in the head,
neck and chest. Six bullets had struck the head and there
was evidence that one or more of these had been fired within
a range of 15 inches when he was lying on the floor.
The day after the murder, on 13 February 1989, a man
telephoned the press and stated that the illegal loyalist
paramilitary group, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (“UFF”)
claimed responsibility for killing Patrick Finucane, the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (“PIRA”) officer not
the solicitor.
Patrick
Finucane was a solicitor who represented clients from both
sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland and was involved
in a number of high profile cases arising from that
conflict. The applicant believes that it was because
of his work on these cases that prior to his murder he
received death threats delivered, via his clients, by
officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”) and
was targeted for murder. Occasional threats had been made
against Patrick Finucane since the late 1970s. After acting
for Brian Gillen in a case concerning maltreatment in RUC
custody, the threats apparently escalated, and clients
reported that police officers often abused and threatened to
kill him during interrogations at holding centres such as
Castlereagh. On 5 January 1989, five weeks before his death,
one of Patrick Finucane’s clients reported that an RUC
officer had said that Patrick Finucane would meet his end.
On 7 January 1989, another client claimed that he was told
that Finucane was “getting took out” (murdered). His
death came less than four weeks after Douglas Hogg MP, then
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home
Department, in a Committee stage debate on the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill on 17 January
1989 said:
“I
have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there
are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are
unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.”
Investigation
into the killing
After
the shooting, the applicant’s house was cordoned off by
the RUC and a forensic examination of the scene conducted by
experts. Photographs were taken and maps prepared. A scene
of crimes officer examined the car believed to have been
used by those responsible for the shooting which had been
found abandoned.
On
13 February 1989, a consultant in pathology conducted a post
mortem examination.
A
major incident room was set up as the Antrim Road police
station. Many suspected members of the Ulster Freedom
Fighters (UFF) were detained and interviewed about the
murder.
On
4 July 1989, the RUC found the weapon believed to have been
used in the murder. On 5 April 1990, three members of UFF
were convicted of possessing this and another weapon and of
membership of the UFF. The weapon had been stolen from the
Ulster Defence Regiment’s barracks in August 1987 and in
1988 a member of the UDR was convicted of this theft.
Inquest
proceedings
The
inquest into Patrick Finucane’s death commenced on 6
September 1990 and ended the same day. Evidence was
heard from RUC officers involved in investigating the death,
the applicant, two neighbours and a taxi driver whose car
had been hijacked and used by those responsible for the
shooting. The applicant was represented at the inquest by
counsel who was able to question witnesses on her behalf.
After giving evidence, the applicant wished to make a
statement but was refused permission to do so by the Coroner
on grounds that it was not relevant to the proceedings.
Forensic
evidence showed that the victim had been hit at least eleven
times by a 9mm Browning automatic pistol and twice by a .38
Special Revolver. Detective Superintendent (“D/S”)
Simpson of RUC, who was in charge of the murder
investigation, gave evidence that the Browning pistol was
one of thirteen weapons stolen from Palace army barracks in
August 1987 by a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR
– a locally recruited regiment of the British army) who
was subsequently jailed for theft. These weapons found their
way into the hands of three members of the UFF who
were convicted of possession of the weapons and of
membership of the UFF. However, the police were satisfied
that those individuals had not been in possession of the
weapons at the time of Patrick Finucane’s murder.
According
to the evidence given by D/S Simpson at the inquest, the
police had interviewed fourteen people in connection with
the murder, but had found that, although their suspicions
were not assuaged, and they remained reasonably certain that
the main perpetrators of the murder were among the suspects,
there was insufficient evidence to sustain a charge of
murder. None of the fourteen persons had any connection with
the security forces. D/S Simpson further stated that none of
the suspects had any connection with the security services.
He rejected the claim made by the UFF that Patrick Finucane
was a member of the Provisional IRA.
The
inquest heard evidence that the assassins had used a red
Ford Sierra car, Registration no. VIA 2985, that had been
hijacked by three men from a taxi driver, WR, shortly before
the murder. D/S Simpson stated in evidence that he did
not consider the hijackers to have carried out the murder
and that he considered the precision of the killing to
indicate that the killers had murdered before. He had heard
that a death threat had been made to a prisoner client of
the deceased. He had also seen parts of a report by a group
of international lawyers. This had been investigated by the
Stevens inquiry with whom he liaised closely. Though he did
not know who was interviewed, as it was separate from the
murder investigation, he said that no evidence was found
substantiating the allegation. On further questioning, he
stated that he had only read the report by the international
lawyers that lunchtime and was unaware of the existence of
material linking the security forces to Mr Finucane’s
death.
The
Stevens inquiries
On
14 September 1989, the Chief Constable of the RUC appointed
John Stevens, then Deputy Chief Constable of the
Cambridgeshire Constabulary, to investigate allegations of
collusion between members of the security forces and
loyalist paramilitaries.
While
the applicant stated that it was claimed by the RUC at
Patrick Finucane’s inquest that John Stevens had also
investigated Patrick Finucane’s death, the Government
stated that the inquiry was prompted by events other than
the shooting of Patrick Finucane. The outcome of the
inquiries has never been made public.
On
5 April 1990, John Stevens presented his report to the Chief
Constable of the RUC. While the full report was not made
public, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland made a
statement to the House of Commons on 17 May 1990. He stated,
inter alia, that as a result of the inquiry 94
persons had been arrested, of whom 59 had been reported or
charged with criminal offences. He stated that while the
passing of information to paramilitaries by the security
forces had taken place, it was restricted to a small number
of individuals and was neither widespread or
institutionalised. Any evidence or allegation of criminal
conduct had been rigorously followed up. No charges had been
laid against members of the RUC, but Mr Stevens had
concluded that there had been misbehaviour by a few members
of the UDR. Mr Stevens had made detailed recommendations
aimed at improving the arrangements for the dissemination
and control of sensitive information.
As
a result of the Stevens inquiry, Brian Nelson, who had
worked as an undercover agent providing information to
British military intelligence and who had become the chief
intelligence officer of the Ulster Defence Association (“UDA”),
an illegal loyalist paramilitary group which directed the
activities of the UFF, was arrested. At his trial, the
British authorities claimed that he had got out of hand and
had become personally involved in loyalist murder plots.
Originally he faced thirty-five charges, but thirteen were
dropped and he was eventually convicted of five charges of
conspiracy to murder, for which he was sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment. During the Stevens inquiry, members
of the team had interviewed him. According to the
Government, he had denied any complicity in the murder.
In
prison, Brian Nelson allegedly admitted that, in his
capacity as a UDA intelligence officer, he had himself
targeted Patrick Finucane and, in his capacity as a double
agent, had told his British Army handlers about the approach
at the time. It was also alleged that Nelson had passed a
photograph of Patrick Finucane to the UDA before he was
killed. Loyalist sources further alleged that Nelson had
himself pointed out Finucane’s house to the killers.
These allegations were transmitted in a BBC Panorama
programme on 8 June 1992 and the transcript of the programme
was sent to the DPP.
Following
the Panorama programme, the DPP asked the Chief Constable of
the RUC to conduct further enquiries arising from the issues
raised in the programme. In April 1993, John Stevens, then
Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police, was appointed to
conduct a second inquiry. According to the Government, he
made inquiries into the alleged involvement of Brian Nelson
and members of the Army in the death of Patrick Finucane
(see however John Steven’s press statement below). The
applicant states that no member of the inquiry team
contacted her or her legal representative, or any former
clients of Patrick Finucane, about the death threats made
prior to the murder.
On
21 January 1995, John Stevens submitted his final report to
the DPP, having submitted earlier reports on 25 April 1994
and 18 October 1994. On 17 February 1995 the DPP issued a
direction of “no prosecution” to the Chief Constable of
the RUC.
In
answer to a parliamentary question published on 15 May 1995,
Sir John Wheeler MP said that the DPP had concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the
prosecution of any person, despite Nelson’s alleged
confession. He refused to place copies of Mr Stevens’
three reports in the House of Commons library, claiming that
police reports were confidential.
Civil
proceedings
On
11 February 1992, the applicant issued a writ of summons
against the Ministry of Defence and Brian Nelson, claiming
damages on behalf of the estate of the deceased, herself and
other dependants of the deceased. It was alleged that the
deceased’s murder was committed by or at the instigation
of or with the connivance, knowledge, encouragement and
assistance of the first defendant and by the second
defendant, who was at all material times a servant or agent
of the first defendant. It was also alleged that the first
defendant was negligent in the gathering, recording,
retention, keeping safe and dissemination of material
concerning the deceased, and in the warning, protection and
safeguarding of the deceased.
The
applicant’s statement of claim was served on 8 December
1993 and the defence of the Ministry of Defence on 29
December 1993. In its amended defence of 11 October 1995, it
was admitted that Brian Nelson acted as agent for and on
behalf of the Ministry of Defence but claimed that if,
however, he had any information about the proposed attack on
Patrick Finucane it had not been communicated to the
Ministry as he was required to do.
On
22 January 1998, the applicant served further and better
particulars of her case and a request for further and better
particulars of the Ministry of Defence’s case. She served
a list of documents on 8 April 1998. On 20 May 1999, a
supplemental list of documents, verified by an affidavit
sworn by the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of
Defence, was served on the applicant. The applicant
requested copies of those documents which were provided on
20 July 1999. The applicant then requested inspection of the
originals but was informed on 21 October 1999 that the
Ministry of Defence was not in possession of the originals.
Recent
developments
The
third Stevens inquiry
On
12 February 1999, the Government state that at a meeting
between the applicant and Dr. Mowlem, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, a paper was handed over to Dr Mowlem
which, it was claimed, contained new material relating to
the murder of Patrick Finucane. This paper was passed to
John Stevens, now Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police who had been appointed by the Chief Constable of the
RUC to conduct an independent investigation into the murder
of the applicant’s husband.
On
28 April 1999, at a press conference, John Stevens stated:
“...
in September 1989... I was appointed... to conduct the
so-called ‘Stevens Inquiry’ into breaches of security by
the Security Forces in Northern Ireland.
This
commenced after the theft of montages from Dunmurry Police
Station.
This
Inquiry resulted in 43 convictions and over 800 years of
imprisonment for those convicted.
My
subsequent report contained over 100 recommendations for the
handling of security documents and information.
All
those recommendations were accepted and have been
implemented.
This
‘Stevens 1’ inquiry was followed by a ‘Stevens 2’
inquiry in April 1993...
At
the request of the DPP I was asked to investigate further
matters which solely related to the previous inquiry and
prosecutions. [The RUC Chief Constable] referred to our
return as ‘tying up some loose ends’.
At
no time, either in Stevens 2 or in the original
Stevens 1 inquiry did I investigate the murder of Patrick
Finucane... However, those inquiries through the so-called
double agent Brian Nelson, were linked to the murder of
Patrick Finucane.
[The]
Chief Constable of the [RUC] has now asked me to conduct an
independent investigation into the murder of Patrick
Finucane. I am also investigating associated matters raised
by the British Irish Rights Watch document “Deadly
Intelligence” and the UN Commissioner’s Report. ...”
Arrests
were reported as being made by officers in the Stevens
inquiry in March 2002, with persons named as being
questioned in relation to the Finucane murder.
Criminal
prosecution
On
or about 23 June 1999, charges were brought against:
– William
Alfred Stobie for the murder of Patrick Finucane;
– Mark
Barr, Paul Alexander Givens and William Gary Hutchinson for
three offences of possession of documents containing
information useful to terrorists.
It
was reported by the Committee for the Administration of
Justice that on being charged William Stobie made the
following statement:
“Not
guilty of the charge that you have put to me tonight. At the
time I was police informer for Special Branch. On the night
of the death of Patrick Finucane I informed Special Branch
on two occasions by telephone of a person who was to be
shot. I did not know at the time of the person who was to be
shot.”
William
Stobie’s solicitor told the court that his client was a
paid police informer from 1987 to 1990 and that he gave the
police information on two occasions before the Finucane
murder which was not acted upon. He also stated that, at his
client’s trial on 23 January 1991 on firearms charges, the
prosecution offered no evidence and his client was
acquitted. The bulk of the evidence against his client had,
he alleged, been known to the authorities for almost 10
years.
On
26 November 2001, it was reported in the press that the
trial of William Stobie had collapsed, when the Lord Chief
Justice returned a verdict of not guilty in the absence of
evidence. The prosecution had informed the court that the
central witness, a journalist, was not capable of giving
evidence.
On
12 December 2001, William Stobie was shot dead by gunmen,
shortly after having received threats from loyalist
paramilitaries.
Proposed
international investigation
On
24 October 2001, the Government announced in Parliament
that, amongst the measures proposed to the Irish Government
in the context of the Good Friday Agreement, was the
proposal for the United Kingdom and Irish Government to
appoint a judge of international standing from outside both
jurisdictions to undertake an investigation into allegations
of security force collusion in loyalist paramilitary
killings, including that of Patrick Finucane. In light of
the investigation, the judge would decide whether to
recommend a Public Inquiry into any of the killings.
B. Relevant
domestic law and practice
1. Inquests
(a) Statutory
provisions and rules
The
conduct of inquests in Northern Ireland is governed by the
Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 and the Coroners
(Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963.
These provide the framework for a procedure within which
deaths by violence or in suspicious circumstances are
notified to the Coroner, who then has the power to hold an
inquest, with or without a jury, for the purpose of
ascertaining, with the assistance as appropriate of the
evidence of witnesses and reports, inter alia, of post
mortem and forensic examinations, who the deceased was
and how, when and where he died.
Pursuant
to the Coroners Act, every medical practitioner, registrar
of deaths or funeral undertaker who has reason to believe
that a person died directly or indirectly by violence is
under an obligation to inform the Coroner (section 7). Every
medical practitioner who performs a post mortem
examination has to notify the Coroner of the result in
writing (section 29). Whenever a dead body is found, or an
unexplained death or death in suspicious circumstances
occurs, the police of that district are required to give
notice to the Coroner (section 8).
Rules
12 and 13 of the Coroners Rules give power to the Coroner to
adjourn an inquest where a person may be or has been charged
with murder or other specified criminal offences in relation
to the deceased.
Where
the Coroner decides to hold an inquest with a jury, persons
are called from the Jury List, compiled by random computer
selection from the electoral register for the district on
the same basis as in criminal trials.
The
matters in issue at an inquest are governed by Rules 15 and
16 of the Coroners Rules:
“15. The
proceedings and evidence at an inquest shall be directed
solely to ascertaining the following matters, namely: -
(a) who
the deceased was;
(b) how,
when and where the deceased came by his death;
(c) the
particulars for the time being required by the Births and
Deaths Registration (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 to be
registered concerning his death.
16. Neither
the coroner nor the jury shall express any opinion on
questions of criminal or civil liability or on any matters
other than those referred to in the last foregoing Rule.”
The
forms of verdict used in Northern Ireland accord with this
recommendation, recording the name and other particulars of
the deceased, a statement of the cause of death (e.g. bullet
wounds) and findings as to when and where the deceased met
his death. In England and Wales, the form of verdict
appended to the English Coroners Rules contains a section
marked “conclusions of the jury/coroner as to the death”
in which conclusions such as “lawfully killed” or
“killed unlawfully” are inserted. These findings involve
expressing an opinion on criminal liability in that they
involve a finding as to whether the death resulted from a
criminal act, but no finding is made that any identified
person was criminally liable. The jury in England and Wales
may also append recommendations to their verdict.
However,
in Northern Ireland, the Coroner is under a duty (section 6(2)
of the Prosecution of Offences Order (Northern Ireland)
1972) to furnish a written report to the DPP where the
circumstances of any death appear to disclose that a
criminal offence may have been committed.
Until
recently, legal aid was not available for inquests as they
did not involve the determination of civil liabilities or
criminal charges. Legislation which would have provided for
legal aid at the hearing of inquests (the Legal Aid, Advice
and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, Schedule 1
paragraph 5) has not been brought into force. However, on 25
July 2000, the Lord Chancellor announced the establishment
of an Extra-Statutory Ex Gratia Scheme to make public
funding available for representation for proceedings before
Coroners in exceptional inquests in Northern Ireland. In
March 2001, he published for consultation the criteria to be
used in deciding whether applications for representation at
inquests should receive public funding. This included inter
alia consideration of financial eligibility, whether an
effective investigation by the State was needed and whether
the inquest was the only way to conduct it, whether the
applicant required representation to be able to participate
effectively in the inquest and whether the applicant had a
sufficiently close relationship to the deceased.
The
Coroner enjoys the power to summon witnesses who he thinks
it necessary to attend the inquest (section 17 of the
Coroners Act) and he may allow any interested person to
examine a witness (Rule 7). In both England and Wales and
Northern Ireland, a witness is entitled to rely on the
privilege against self-incrimination. In Northern Ireland,
this privilege is reinforced by Rule 9(2) which provides
that a person suspected of causing the death may not be
compelled to give evidence at the inquest.
In
relation to both documentary evidence and the oral evidence
of witnesses, inquests, like criminal trials, are subject to
the law of public interest immunity, which recognises and
gives effect to the public interest, such as national
security, in the non-disclosure of certain information or
certain documents or classes of document. A claim of public
interest immunity must be supported by a certificate.
(b) The
scope of inquests
Rules
15 and 16 (see above) follow from the recommendation of the
Brodrick Committee on Death Certification and Coroners:
“...
the function of an inquest should be simply to seek out and
record as many of the facts concerning the death as the
public interest requires, without deducing from those facts
any determination of blame... In many cases, perhaps the
majority, the facts themselves will demonstrate quite
clearly whether anyone bears any responsibility for the
death; there is a difference between a form of proceeding
which affords to others the opportunity to judge an issue
and one which appears to judge the issue itself.”
Domestic
courts have made, inter alia, the following comments:
“...
It is noteworthy that the task is not to ascertain how the
deceased died, which might raise general and far-reaching
issues, but ‘how...the deceased came by his death’, a
far more limited question directed to the means by which the
deceased came by his death.
...
[previous judgments] make it clear that when the Brodrick
Committee stated that one of the purposes of an inquest is
‘To allay rumours or suspicions’ this purpose should be
confined to allaying rumours and suspicions of how the
deceased came by his death and not to allaying rumours or
suspicions about the broad circumstances in which the
deceased came by his death.” (Sir Thomas Bingham, MR,
Court of Appeal, R. v the Coroner for North Humberside
and Scunthorpe ex parte Roy Jamieson, April 1994,
unreported)
“The
cases establish that although the word ‘how’ is to be
widely interpreted, it means ‘by what means’ rather than
in what broad circumstances ... In short, the inquiry must
focus on matters directly causative of death and must,
indeed, be confined to those matters alone ...” (Simon
Brown LJ, Court of Appeal, R. v. Coroner for Western
District of East Sussex, ex parte Homberg and others,
(1994) 158 JP 357)
“...
it should not be forgotten that an inquest is a fact finding
exercise and not a method of apportioning guilt. The
procedure and rules of evidence which are suitable for one
are unsuitable for the other. In an inquest it should never
be forgotten that there are no parties, no indictment, there
is no prosecution, there is no defence, there is no trial,
simply an attempt to establish the facts. It is an
inquisitorial process, a process of investigation quite
unlike a trial...
It
is well recognised that a purpose of an inquest is that
rumour may be allayed. But that does not mean it is the duty
of the Coroner to investigate at an inquest every rumour or
allegation that may be brought to his attention. It is ...
his duty to discharge his statutory role - the scope of his
enquiry must not be allowed to drift into the uncharted seas
of rumour and allegation. He will proceed safely and
properly if he investigates the facts which it
appears are relevant to the statutory issues before him.”
(Lord Lane, Court of Appeal, R v. South London Coroner ex
parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625)
2. The
Director of Public Prosecutions
The
Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP), appointed
pursuant to the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland)
1972 (the 1972 Order) is an independent officer with at
least 10 years’ experience of the practice of law in
Northern Ireland who is appointed by the Attorney General
and who holds office until retirement, subject only to
dismissal for misconduct. His duties under Article 5 of the
1972 Order are inter alia:
“(a) to
consider, or cause to be considered, with a view to his
initiating or continuing in Northern Ireland any criminal
proceedings or the bringing of any appeal or other
proceedings in or in connection with any criminal cause or
matter in Northern Ireland, any facts or information brought
to his notice, whether by the Chief Constable acting in
pursuance of Article 6(3) of this Order or by the Attorney
General or by any other authority or person;
(b) to
examine or cause to be examined all documents that are
required under Article 6 of this Order to be transmitted or
furnished to him and where it appears to him to be necessary
or appropriate to do so to cause any matter arising thereon
to be further investigated;
(c) where
he thinks proper to initiate, undertake and carry on, on
behalf of the Crown, proceedings for indictable offences and
for such summary offences or classes of summary offences as
he considers should be dealt with by him.”
Article
6 of the 1972 Order requires inter alia Coroners and
the Chief Constable of the RUC to provide information to the
DPP as follows:
“(2) Where
the circumstances of any death investigated or being
investigated by a coroner appear to him to disclose that a
criminal offence may have been committed he shall as soon as
practicable furnish to the [DPP] a written report of those
circumstances.
(3) It
shall be the duty of the Chief Constable, from time to time,
to furnish to the [DPP] facts and information with respect
to -
(a) indictable
offences [such as murder] alleged to have been committed
against the law of Northern Ireland; ...
and
at the request of the [DPP], to ascertain and furnish to the
[DPP] information regarding any matter which may appear to
the [DPP] to require investigation on the ground that it may
involve an offence against the law of Northern Ireland or
information which may appear to the [DPP] to be necessary
for the discharge of his functions under this Order.”
C. Relevant
international law and practice
Paragraph
9 of the United Nations Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic
and Social Council Resolution 1989/65, (UN Principles on
Extra-Legal Executions) provides, inter alia, that:
“There
shall be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of
all suspected cases of extra legal, arbitrary and summary
executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or
other reliable reports suggest unnatural death in the above
circumstances ...”
Paragraphs
10 to 17 of the UN Principles on Extra-Legal Executions
contain a series of detailed requirements that should be
observed by investigative procedures into such deaths.
Paragraph
10 states, inter alia:
“The
investigative authority shall have the power to obtain all
the information necessary to the inquiry. Those persons
conducting the inquiry ... shall also have the authority to
oblige officials allegedly involved in any such executions
to appear and testify ...”
Paragraph
11 specifies:
“In
cases in which the established investigative procedures are
inadequate because of a lack of expertise or impartiality,
because of the importance of the matter or because of the
apparent existence of a pattern of abuse, and in cases where
there are complaints from the family of the victim about
these inadequacies or other substantial reasons, Governments
shall pursue investigations through an independent
commission of inquiry or similar procedure. Members of such
a commission shall be chosen for their recognised
impartiality, competence and independence as individuals. In
particular, they shall be independent of any institution,
agency or person that may be the subject of the inquiry. The
commission shall have the authority to obtain all
information necessary to the inquiry and shall conduct the
inquiry as provided in these principles.”
Paragraph
16 provides, inter alia:
“Families
of the deceased and their legal representatives shall be
informed of, and have access to, any hearing as well as all
information relevant to the investigation and shall be
entitled to present other evidence ...”
Paragraph
17 provides, inter alia:
“A
written report shall be made within a reasonable time on the
methods and findings of such investigations. The report
shall be made public immediately and shall include the scope
of the inquiry, procedures, methods used to evaluate
evidence as well as conclusions and recommendations based on
findings of fact and on applicable law ...”
The
“Minnesota Protocol” (Model Protocol for a legal
investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary
executions, contained in the UN Manual on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions) provides, inter alia, in section
B on the “Purposes of an inquiry”:
“As
set out in paragraph 9 of the Principles, the broad purpose
of an inquiry is to discover the truth about the events
leading to the suspicious death of a victim. To fulfil that
purpose, those conducting the inquiry shall, at a minimum,
seek:
(a) to
identify the victim;
(b) to
recover and preserve evidentiary material related to the
death to aid in any potential prosecution of those
responsible;
(c) to
identify possible witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death;
(d) to
determine the cause, manner, location and time of death, as
well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about
the death;
(e) to
distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide
and homicide;
(f) to
identify and apprehend the person(s) involved in the death;
(g) to
bring the suspected perpetrator(s) before a competent court
established by law.”
In
section D, it is stated that “In cases where government
involvement is suspected, an objective and impartial
investigation may not be possible unless a special
commission of inquiry is established...”.
COMPLAINTS
The
applicant complained that her husband, Patrick Finucane, was
deprived of his life intentionally and that his life was not
protected, in violation of Article 2 of the Convention. She
claimed in particular that no mechanism has been invoked or
provided whereby the circumstances of his death have
received public and independent scrutiny.
THE
LAW
The
applicant complains of the death of her husband and the lack
of effective investigation into his death, invoking Article
2 of the Convention which provides:
“1. Everyone’s
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of
a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation
of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention
of this article when it results from the use of force which
is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in
defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in
order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) in
action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.”
1. Exhaustion
of domestic remedies
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to
exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of
the Convention, pointing out that she had introduced an
action in the civil courts relating to the death of her
husband and these were still pending. They argued that if
the civil proceedings progressed to trial, this would result
in a judicial finding whether or not her allegations were
supported by the facts of the case and a possible award of
damages to her deceased husband’s estate.
The
applicant argued that the justifiable issues before the
Court were not the same as those in the domestic
proceedings. She submitted that the main thrust of her
application was the failure of the respondent Government to
provide the necessary mechanisms whereby the deprivation of
Patrick Finucane’s life would have received proper public
and independent scrutiny. Civil proceedings would not be
adequate or effective to address this.
The
Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are
normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal
system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches
alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently
certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which
they will lack the requisite accessibility and
effectiveness. Article 35 § 1 also requires that the
complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the
Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic
body, at least in substance and in compliance with the
formal requirements laid down in domestic law, but not that
recourse should be had to remedies which are inadequate or
ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, §§
51-52, ECHR 1996-VI, and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey,
no. 21893/93, §§ 65-67, ECHR 1996-IV).
In
the present case, the Court observes that a civil action has
been instituted by the applicant against the Ministry of
Defence alleging inter alia that her husband was
killed by or at the instigation of or with the connivance of
security forces. The Court is aware of the subsidiary nature
of its role and that it must be cautious in taking on the
role of a first instance tribunal of fact, where this is not
rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular
case. Indeed, the object and purpose underlying the
Convention, as set out in Article 1 – that rights and
freedoms should be secured by the Contracting State within
its jurisdiction – would be undermined if applicants were
not encouraged to pursue the means at their disposal within
the State to obtain available redress (see Hugh Jordan v.
the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, dec. 4 April 2000).
Nonetheless,
it notes that the applicant’s complaints in this case
focus essentially on the failure to provide a proper and
adequate investigation into her husband’s death as regards
the suspicions of collusion of members of the security
forces with loyalist paramilitaries. This raises issues
concerning the procedural requirement that the State carry
out an effective investigation into deaths caused by its
agents (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, no.
18984/91, § 161, ECHR 1995-III), including the extent to
which civil proceedings can be of any relevance, depending
as they do on the initiative of the deceased’s relatives
who have to establish their claims to a certain standard of
proof.
While
the applicant’s complaints did originally include an
allegation that the State was responsible for her
husband’s deprivation of life, a matter which is squarely
in issue in the domestic proceedings, the Court considers
that this may be regarded as reflecting her own strong
belief as to events. It finds no suggestion in the
applicant’s recent submissions that she wishes to pursue
this allegation or proposes that this Court should embark on
a fact finding exercise on this aspect of the case. At this
point of time, and against a background of an apparent
dearth of accessible information, the Court is, in any
event, of the opinion that it would not be the appropriate
body to take on the task.
Accordingly,
the Court does not consider that the applicant has failed to
exhaust domestic remedies in respect of her complaints about
the procedural failings at the heart of this case.
2. The
six-month rule
The
Government submitted that, assuming that no effective
remedies existed in respect of the applicant’s complaints,
the six month time-limit imposed by Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention ran from the date of the shooting in February
1989 and her complaint, as many years out of time.
The
applicant argued that an application could not have been
lodged when the investigation was allegedly ongoing. In her
view, the relevant decision activating the six month
time-limit was the publication of the decision not to
prosecute on 15 May 1995.
Article
35 § 1 of the Convention requires that the Court may only
deal with a matter where it has been introduced within six
months from the date of the final decision in the process of
exhaustion of domestic remedies. The object of the six month
time limit under Article 35 § 1 is to promote legal
certainty, by ensuring that cases raising issues under the
Convention are dealt with in a reasonable time and that past
decisions are not continually open to challenge. The rule
also affords the prospective applicant time to consider
whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the
specific complaints and arguments to be raised (see, for
example, the Worm v. Austria judgment of 29 August
1997, Reports 1997–V, at p. 1547, §§ 32-33).
Normally,
the six-month period runs from the final decision in the
process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is
clear from the outset however that no effective remedy is
available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of
the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of
knowledge of that act or its effect or prejudice on the
applicant (see e.g. Hilton v. the United Kingdom, no.
12015/86, Commission decision of 6 July 1988, DR 57, p.
108). Furthermore, Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted in
a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court
of his complaint before his position in connection with the
matter has been finally settled at the domestic level (see Paul
and Aubrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec), no.
46477/99, 4 June 2001).
The
Court observes that in the present case information relating
to the death and various investigations into the death have
emerged piecemeal over a number of years. The applicant was
not informed about the progress of the initial RUC
investigation, while the inquest which opened on 6 September
1990 and finished the same day did not inquire into any of
the applicant’s concerns about the threats made against
her husband by the RUC before his death. The first Stevens
inquiry which appears to have concerned general allegations
about collusion between the security forces and the RUC led
to the arrest of 94 persons including Brian Nelson who had
worked as an undercover agent and as a member of a loyalist
paramilitary group. It was after his conviction and
imprisonment on conspiracy to murder charges that he
apparently made claims about his involvement in the Finucane
murder and that the security forces were aware that it was
going to happen in advance. This led to a second Stevens
inquiry which was directed to allegations of collusion
raised by Brian Nelson connected with the Finucane case.
The
Court considers that it cannot be regarded as unreasonable
for the applicant to have awaited the outcome of this
inquiry into concrete information about security force
complicity in the killing before introducing her application
to Strasbourg. It notes that it was on the basis of the
information about Brian Nelson’s involvement that her
solicitors took the step of lodging civil proceedings
against both Nelson and the Ministry of Defence.
Accordingly
as the applicant introduced her application within six
months of the publication in Parliament on 15 May 1995 of
the decision not to prosecute anyone as a result of the
second Stevens inquiry, the Court considers that her
application must be regarded as having been introduced
within the requisite time-limit imposed by Article 35 § 1
of the Convention.
3. Concerning
the substance of the application
The
Government argued that the investigations carried out into
Patrick Finucane’s death satisfied any procedural
requirement imposed by Article 2 of the Convention. It was
the primary responsibility of the police to investigate
violent deaths and the RUC had, in the present case,
conducted a prompt and thorough investigation into the
shooting. The inquest provided a public examination of the
circumstances in which he died, involving the hearing of
evidence and the opportunity for the applicant’s
representative to cross-examine witnesses. A further lengthy
investigation was conducted into the death by Mr Stevens,
and the Director of Public Prosecutions examined the
evidence produced by the inquiry to determine whether any
criminal charges should be brought or any further
investigation taken. Furthermore, civil proceedings were
continuing, which offered the prospect of a further public
hearing at which the factual allegations of the applicant
could be investigated and determined on the evidence.
The
applicant submitted that none of the investigations relied
on by the Government satisfied the requirements imposed by
Article 2 of the Convention. The RUC investigation into the
death was hopelessly inadequate as it failed entirely to
explore the possibility of collusion. The inquest was also
strictly limited in its scope, involving no key witnesses or
any persons suspected of involvement in the death or anyone
from the Stevens inquiry. As regarded the Stevens inquiry,
the inquiry team never made contact with the applicant’s
family, her husband’s firm of solicitors or any of his
clients who had reported death threats and its findings were
never made public. Similarly, the examination by the DPP of
the evidence was a secret and undisclosed process,
giving no reasons for his decision not to prosecute.
Finally, she claimed that civil proceedings could not be
regarded as part of the effective official investigation
envisaged by Article 2 of the Convention.
The
Court finds that complex issues of fact and law arise under
the Convention which should be examined on the merits. The
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and no other grounds
for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
For
these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares
the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of
the case.
Michael
O’Boyle
Matti Pellonpää
Registrar
President
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