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THIRD
SECTION
PARTIAL
DECISION
AS
TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application
no. 40451/98
by Robert KERR
against the
United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section) sitting on
7 December 1999
as a Chamber composed of
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Sir
Nicolas Bratza,
Mr L. Loucaides,
Mr
W. Fuhrmann
,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze, judges,
and
Mrs
S. Dollé
, Section
Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 8
January 1998 by Robert Kerr against the United Kingdom and
registered on 25 March 1998 under file no. 40451/98;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49
of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Irish national, born in 1956 and
living in
Belfast
,
Northern Ireland
.
He is represented before the Court by Ms Angela
Ritchie of Madden and Finucane, a firm of solicitors based
in
Belfast
.
A. Particular circumstances of
the case
The facts of the case, as
submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was arrested at his home in
Belfast
at
9.43 a.m.
on
7 November
1996
. He was
informed that he was being arrested under section 14(1)(b)
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1989 (“the 1989 Act”) because there were reasonable
grounds for suspecting that he had been concerned in the
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
On the applicant's arrest the police seized from his
house three computers, a hand-written note and a short
camcorder tape of Wallace Park, Lisburn. The applicant was
taken to Castlereagh police station where he was questioned
until
12.15 p.m.
on
14 November
1996
when he was
charged. The applicant was subjected to a total of
thirty-nine interviews during his detention. He was
cautioned under Article 5 of the Criminal Evidence (
Northern
Ireland
) Order
1988. He was asked, inter
alia, about his involvement in an explosion at a
barracks in Lisburn on 7 October 1996, his movements on the
date of the explosion, his membership of the Provisional
IRA, the items seized by the police, the purpose to which
the computer equipment was put, his association with other
suspects, the information stored in the computer (which
included electoral lists), the use of the said information
to enable members of the security forces to be identified as
targets for terrorist attacks and the reason for possession
of such information.
The applicant remained silent throughout the
interviews other than to say that he would be maintaining
silence on the basis of legal advice and once to say he did
not recognise the hand-written note recovered from his home.
The
applicant was cautioned and on
14 November
1996
charged
with possession of “any record or document likely to be
useful to terrorists” and conspiring to “collect or
record any information which is of such a nature to be
useful to terrorists in planning or carrying out an act of
violence”. The charges did not specify the “record or
document” or the “information” but the police
maintained these matters would have been clear from the
interviews and the written caution. The applicant was
brought before Belfast Magistrates’ Court on
14 November
1996
and
remanded in custody. He was subsequently remanded on various
occasions after that date following appearances in court.
When on remand the applicant was again interviewed on
12 February
1997
without a
solicitor being present. He was asked about further
information retrieved from computer disks seized at the time
of his arrest. He was questioned, inter
alia, about his knowledge of what was on the computer disks, why he
had information about the British Army and its breakdown
into specialised units, the suggestion that he had the
information for targeting by the Provisional IRA, why he had
information on the disks amounting to an in-depth insight
into the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s "E"
department, and the belief that this information was for use
in training terrorist units. Computer print-outs were
produced to him but he declined to look at them. Neither the
applicant nor his solicitor received advance disclosure of
the evidence or information that was to form the basis of
the questioning.
On
several occasions the applicant's solicitors sought more
specific details about the evidence that had been obtained.
The Director of Public Prosecutions stated in a letter to
the applicant's solicitors dated
6 February
1997
the police
standpoint:
“They
remain of the view that to specify details of the evidence
in this case would be prejudicial to their enquiries, which
are wide ranging and continue. At present therefore the
prima facie case which is held to apply to [the applicant]
is the nature of material found to have been stored on a
computer.
I
appreciate that this lack of detailed information remains a
matter of concern to you and [the applicant].”
In
view of the refusal to inform the applicant in detail of the
nature and causes of the charges against him, judicial
review proceedings were commenced. The prosecution position
was that maximum secrecy had to be maintained to ensure the
effectiveness of the police investigation. On 8 July 1997
the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Lord Carswell,
sitting in the High Court, held that the prosecution was not
under a duty to provide any further details at that stage of
the investigation. The Lord Chief Justice stated in his
judgment:
“On
being arrested a suspect is entitled to be told the grounds
of his arrest, and it is not in dispute that the arresting
officer discharged this duty in the present case. …
It
would also be open to the applicant to bring an application
in the High Court for bail. On the hearing of such
application the court generally requires counsel appearing
for the Crown to furnish it with some details of the
evidence, sufficient to satisfy the court that there is a
prima facie case against the accused. The applicant has not
chosen to bring an application for bail and accordingly has
not received such information.
What
he claims ... is that there is a further duty imposed upon
the Crown, to give him further details of the charges
against him at some stage or stages after he has been
charged and before the committal proceedings are held. We
cannot accept that the right of an accused to a fair trial
requires the imposition of such an obligation upon the
Crown. The accused will be entitled to full details of the
evidence against him at the time of the committal
proceedings, and to a proper opportunity to prepare himself
for those proceedings. After committal he will be entitled
to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence
for trial. We do not consider that it is a necessary constituent of the
applicant's right to a fair trial that he should receive the
details which he seeks, nor do we consider it unfair to him
that he has not received them at this stage.”
The
applicant was released from custody on 30 August 1997 when
the charges were withdrawn.
B. Relevant Convention and
domestic law and practice
In its
Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment (29
November 1988, Series A no. 145-B), the Court held that
there had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention in the case of all four applicants who had been
detained under section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
1984, which was the predecessor provision of section 14 of
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.
The applicants had been held for periods ranging between six
days and sixteen-and-a-half hours and four days and six
hours without being brought before a judicial authority. The
Court found that even the shortest of the periods of
detention, namely four days and six hours, fell outside the
strict constraints as to time permitted by the first part of
Article 5 § 3. In the Court’s view, the undoubted fact
that the arrest and detention of the applicants were
inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the community
as a whole from terrorism was not on its own sufficient to
ensure compliance with the specific requirements of Article
5 § 3.
Following
that judgment, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe on 23 December 1988 that
the Government had availed themselves of the right of
derogation conferred by Article 15 § 1 to the extent that
the exercise of powers under section 12 of the 1984 Act
might be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Part of that
declaration reads as follows:
“...
Following [the Brogan and Others judgment], the Secretary of
State for the Home Department informed Parliament on 6
December 1988 that, against the background of the terrorist
campaign, and the over-riding need to bring terrorists to
justice, the Government did not believe that the maximum
period of detention should be reduced. He informed
Parliament that the Government were examining the matter
with a view to responding to the judgment. On 22 December
1988, the Secretary of State further informed Parliament
that it remained the Government’s wish, if it could be
achieved, to find a judicial process under which extended
detention might be reviewed and where appropriate authorised
by a judge or other judicial officer. But a further period
of reflection and consultation was necessary before the
Government could bring forward a firm and final view. Since
the judgment of 29 November 1988 as well as previously, the
Government have found it necessary to continue to exercise,
in relation to terrorism connected with the affairs of
Northern Ireland, the powers described above enabling
further detention without charge, for periods of up to 5 days,
on the authority of the Secretary of State, to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation to
enable necessary enquiries and investigations properly to be
completed in order to decide whether criminal proceedings
should be instituted. To the extent that the exercise of
these powers may be inconsistent with the obligations
imposed by the Convention the Government have availed
themselves of the right of derogation conferred by Article
15 § 1 of the Convention and will continue to do so until
further notice...”
In
a further notice dated 12 December 1989 the United Kingdom
informed the Secretary General that a satisfactory procedure
for the review of detention of terrorist suspects involving
the judiciary had not been identified and that the
derogation would therefore remain in place for as long as
circumstances require.
The
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 has
been renewed annually ever since.
Section
14 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1989 provides as follows:
“14. (1) Subject
to subsection (2) below, a constable may arrest without
warrant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for
suspecting to be–
(a) a
person guilty of an offence under section 2, 8, 9, 10 or 11
above;
(b) a
person who is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which
this section applies; or
(c) a
person subject to an exclusion order.
(2) The
acts of terrorism to which this section applies are–
(a) acts
of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland;
and
(b) acts
of terrorism of any other description except acts connected
solely with the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part of
the United Kingdom other than Northern Ireland.
(3) The
power of arrest conferred by subsection (1)(c) above is
exercisable only–
(a) in
Great Britain if the exclusion order was made under section
5 above; and
(b) in
Northern Ireland if it was made under section 6 above.
(4) Subject
to subsection (5) below, a person arrested under this
section shall not be detained in right of the arrest for
more than forty-eight hours after his arrest.
(5) The
Secretary of State may, in any particular case, extend the
period of forty-eight hours mentioned in subsection (4)
above by a period or periods specified by him, but any such
further period or periods shall not exceed five days in all
and if an application for such an extension is made the
person detained shall as soon as practicable be given
written notice of that fact and of the time when the
application was made.
(6) The
exercise of the detention powers conferred by this section
shall be subject to supervision in accordance with Schedule
3 to this Act.
(7) The provisions of this
section are without prejudice to any power of arrest
exercisable apart from this section.”
COMPLAINTS
The
applicant alleges:
1.
A breach of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention in that
he was not informed promptly (or at all) of the reasons for
his arrest and the charges against him.
2.
Breaches of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
firstly, in that he was not brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power and, secondly, in that he did not receive a trial
within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
As to his complaint under Article 5 § 3 concerning
the lawfulness of his detention, the applicant submits that
the respondent State should not be able to rely on the
derogation which it has lodged under Article 15 of the
Convention because:
(a) at
the material time there was no war or public emergency
threatening the life of the nation; and
(b) the
measures taken derogating from its obligations under Article
5 § 3 were not strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation.
3.
A breach of Article 5 § 4 in that he was not
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his
detention could be decided, since as a matter of domestic
law his detention was lawful.
4.
A breach of Article 5 § 5 in that he had no
enforceable right to compensation since his detention was
lawful under domestic law.
5.
Breaches of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) in that he was
not informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause
of the accusations against him.
6.
Breaches of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and 3 (c) in
that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence, was denied access to a solicitor
during interviews and denied adequate disclosure of the case
made against him.
7.
Breaches of Article 3 in that the conditions of his
detention amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment, of
Article 5 § 1 which permits no more deprivation of liberty
than absolutely necessary and Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (b)
and (c) in that the treatment was designed to coerce and was
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.
8.
A breach of Article 13 as he has no effective remedy
in respect of the breaches complained of.
THE LAW
1.
The applicant complained that his rights under
Article 5 of the Convention were violated in various
respects. Article 5 provides in relevant part:
“1. Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the
lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority
on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or
when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
2. Everyone
who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of
any charge against him.
3. Everyone
arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 (c) of this article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial.
4. Everyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of
his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone
who has been the victim of arrest or detention in
contravention of the provisions of this article shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.”
A.
Article 5 § 2
The Court recalls that paragraph 2 of Article 5
contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested
should know why he is being deprived of his liberty. This
provision is an integral part of the scheme of protection
afforded by Article 5: by virtue of paragraph 2 any person
arrested must be told, in simple, non-technical language
that he can understand, the essential legal and factual
grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to
apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance
with paragraph 4. Whilst this information must be conveyed
“promptly” (in French: “dans le plus court délai”), it need not be related in its
entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the
arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the
information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in
each case according to its special features (see the Fox,
Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30
August 1990, Series A no.182, p. 19, § 40).
The Court notes that at the time of his arrest the
applicant was notified of the provision under which he was
being detained. However a bare indication of the legal basis
for an arrest cannot, taken on its own, be sufficient for
the purposes of Article 5 § 2 (see the above-mentioned Fox,
Campbell and Hartley judgment, p. 19, § 41) Following
arrest the applicant was interrogated about his suspected
involvement in a recent bomb explosion at a military
barracks, his membership of a proscribed organisation and
about the use made of the items seized by the police from
his house, in particular computer equipment and the
information stored on the computer.
For the Court, there is no reason to suppose that
these periods of questioning were not such as to enable the
applicant to understand why he was arrested and why he was
suspected of being concerned in the commission, preparation
or instigation of acts of terrorism and to have more than a
reasonable idea of the charges which he was facing. It is to
be observed that, although requested by the Registry to do
so, the applicant has not provided details of when the
interviews took place. However the applicant states that he
was subjected to thirty-nine interviews in all between 9.43
a.m. on 7 November 1996 and 12.15 p.m. on 14 November 1996.
It can reasonably be inferred from the intense frequency of
the interviews that the applicant was apprised of these
matters within a few hours of his arrest and thus within the
constraints of time imposed by the notion of promptness
within the meaning of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.
The Court would also observe that the charges which
were read out to the applicant on 14 November 1996 pertained
to his possession of records or documents or information for
terrorist purposes and were consistent with the line of
questioning pursued by the police since the beginning of his
detention and with the nature of the materials seized at the
applicant’s house at the time of his arrest. In this
respect, the Court notes that the fact that the applicant
was only notified about the charges against him on 14
November 1996 does not in itself raise an issue under
Article 5 § 2 from the standpoint of the requirement of
promptness. It is to be recalled that that requirement only
comes into play if there is “any charge” against the
applicant. As was noted in the Court’s Murray v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1994 (Series A no.
300-A, p. 27, § 55), facts which raise a suspicion capable
of grounding an arrest need not be of the same level as
those necessary to justify bringing a charge against the
arrestee, which comes at the next stage of the process of
criminal investigation. In the instant case, the applicant
remained silent throughout the period of detention and the
police were unable to make any headway in pursuing their
suspicions against him. It was only towards the end of the
period of detention that they decided to charge him. The
applicant has not contended before the Court that the
purpose of the arrest and detention was not genuinely to
bring him before a competent judicial authority, and for
that reason it does not have to examine whether the period
of detention was deliberately delayed as part of an
intelligence-gathering exercise.
In the light of the above considerations, the Court
finds that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4
thereof.
The Court notes that the applicant also submits that
he was denied, in breach of Article 5 § 2 of the
Convention, details of the evidence on which
the prosecution intended to rely in respect of the charges
against him. He maintains that the refusal to provide him
with such information prejudiced his position by preventing
him from adequately preparing his defence and for this
reason he had been compelled to take judicial review
proceedings. In the Court’s opinion this complaint falls
to be determined in the context of his complaints under
Article 5 § 3, Article 5 § 4 and Article 6 of the
Convention and it will accordingly consider it below.
B.
Article 5 § 3
1.
As to the length of the applicant’s detention
before being brought before a judicial authority
The
applicant maintains that he was arrested on 7 November 1996
and detained until 14 November 1996 when he was charged
and brought before a court. In the applicant’s submission,
this period of detention was in clear breach of Article 5 §
3 of the Convention. Furthermore, although the respondent
Government’s derogation under Article 15 of the Convention
was in force at the relevant time, it could not be said to
be valid since at the time of his arrest the conditions
governing the validity of the derogation were no longer
satisfied. Article 15 of the Convention states:
“1. In
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life
of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law.
2. No
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (§
1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any
High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of
derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken
and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the
Convention are again being fully executed.”
The
Court considers that at this stage it cannot, on the basis
of the case file, determine the admissibility of this
complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance
with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court,
to give notice of this complaint to the respondent
Government.
2.
As to the applicant’s complaint that he was not
brought to trial within a reasonable time or released
pending trial
The Court notes that the applicant did not make a
bail application although he was brought before Belfast
Magistrates’ Court on several occasions during the period
of his remand. The applicant confined himself to challenging
the refusal of the authorities to supply him with full
details of the prosecution’s case against him, with a view
to the preparation of his defence to the charges.
Accordingly the issue submitted to the domestic court was
different to the one which he now raises in his application.
In these circumstances the applicant cannot be considered to
have exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention in respect of his Article 5 § 3
complaint. The complaint is therefore inadmissible under
Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
The Court would further observe that a period of
detention of nine months cannot be considered unreasonable
in length in the context of a person charged with serious
terrorist offences, especially having regard to the fact
that the need for the applicant’s continued detention was
the subject of periodic review over that period.
C.
Article 5 § 4
The applicant contends that he was not entitled to
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
could be decided.
The Court recalls that, according to its established
case-law, the notion of lawfulness under paragraph 4 has the
same meaning as in paragraph 1, and whether an “arrest”
or “detention” is lawful has to be determined in the
light not only of domestic law, but also of the text of the
Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the
aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 § 1. By
virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 5, arrested or detained
persons are entitled to a review bearing upon the procedural
and substantive conditions which are essential for the
“lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of their
deprivation of liberty (see the above-mentioned Brogan and
Others case, p. 34, § 65).
In its Brogan and Others judgment the Court, with
reference to relevant case-law of the Northern Ireland
courts, concluded that the remedy of habeas
corpus allowed arrested or detained persons to have a
review which fulfilled these requirements (pp. 34-35, §§
63-65). The availability of that remedy has not been
affected by the existence of the above-mentioned derogation
(see the Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 26 May 1993, Series A no. 258-B, p. 65, § 63).
The applicant has not argued that the remedy of habeas corpus would not have afforded him an opportunity to mount an
appropriate challenge to the reasons relied on to justify
his detention in the context of an adversarial procedure
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Lamy v. Belgium judgment of 30 March 1989,
Series A no. 151, pp. 16-17, § 29).
Since the applicant was entitled to take proceedings
to test the lawfulness of his detention in this manner, his
complaint to the contrary is manifestly ill-founded, within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and on
that account it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 4 of the
Convention.
The Court reiterates in this connection its previous
remarks when addressing the applicant’s complaint that he
had not been brought to trial within a reasonable time that
the issue which the applicant argued before the domestic
court regarding the production of the evidence against him
was of an entirely different nature to the point on which he
now relies.
D.
Article 5 § 5
The applicant maintains that since his detention was
lawful under domestic law in the light of the Article 15
derogation introduced by the respondent Government, he had
no enforceable right to compensation.
The Court considers that at this
stage it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine
the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore
necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b)
of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this complaint to
the respondent Government.
E.
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c)
The
applicant further complained that his rights under various
provisions of Article 6 of the Convention had been breached.
The Court would observe that the applicant cannot
claim to have been unlawfully deprived of his right to a
fair trial. The charges against him were dropped and his
case did not proceed to trial.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4
thereof.
F.
Article 3 in
conjunction with Article 5 § 1
The applicant states that throughout his seven-day
detention he was held incommunicado in an atmosphere of
coercion, questioned in the course of thirty-nine
interviews, denied exercise, deprived of sensory relief, and
refused writing and reading materials. He invokes Article 3
of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 § 1
thereof. Article 3 provides:
“No
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”
The Court recalls that, according to its settled
case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of
the Convention. The assessment of that minimum is relative
and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as
the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental
effects (see, among many other authorities, the Ireland v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no.
25, p. 65, § 162).
The Court does not dispute the applicant’s
contention that his detention was austere. However, it
considers that his complaints do not disclose that he was in
any way ill-treated either physically or mentally such as to
disclose an appearance of a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention either alone or in conjunction with Article 5 §
1 thereof.
It follows that
this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and
must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 thereof.
G.
Article 13
The applicant asserts that he had no effective remedy
in respect of the complaints which he raised in his
application to the Court and, for that reason, there had
been a breach of Article 13 of the Convention. Article
13 provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.”
The Court has found that the applicant did not avail
himself of the remedy of habeas
corpus to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and that that
remedy would have satisfied the requirements of Article 5 §
4 of the Convention. It recalls in this connection that
Article 13, as a more general guarantee, does not apply
in cases where the more specific guarantees of Article 5 §
4 apply, Article 5 § 4 being lex
specialis in relation to Article 13 and absorbing its
requirements (see the above-mentioned Brannigan and McBride
judgment, p. 57, § 76).
Having regard to its conclusion on the applicant’s
complaint under Article 5 § 4, the Court finds that this
complaint discloses no appearance of a violation of Article
13 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the
application is also manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be
rejected under Article 35 § 4 thereof.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECIDES
TO ADJOURN the examination of
the applicant’s complaints that he was not brought
promptly before a judicial authority following his arrest
and had no enforceable right under domestic law to
compensation in this respect.
DECLARES
INADMISSIBLE the remainder of
the application.
S. Dollé
J.-P. Costa
Registrar President
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