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Family Press Releases | Judicial Review | European Court of Human Rights Cory Report | Stevens Inquiry | Miscellaneous | Further Reading An Analysis of the U.K. Inquiries Bill and U.S. Provisions for Investigating Matters of Urgent Public Concern
25th January 2005 --
Independence,
Impartiality, and Transparency
The United States has no single legislative framework setting out a
process for investigating matters of public concern, but, like the United
Kingdom, U.S. law provides for such investigations through a number of different
measures. Key to these various
mechanisms in the United States are three controlling principles: investigations
must be independent; investigators must be impartial; and the process of the
investigation and the final recommendations must be made public.
Even those inquiry-like investigations that are established by Executive
Order are subject to judicial review and allow for substantial control by
members of the investigation team. Once
established, they are free from interference by the executive branch.
The United Kingdom’s Inquiries Bill, proposed on November 25, 2004,
violates these principles in ways that existing legislation, the Tribunals of
Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, does not. The
Inquiries Bill grants power to the executive to control all vital aspects of
inquiries, taking the authority to establish inquiries out of the hands of
Parliament and stripping inquiry chairpersons of control over the processes.
By consolidating all inquiries under this legislation and repealing the
1921 Act, the United Kingdom would move away from inquiries as the public now
knows them. Instead, provisions of
the Bill would undermine the purpose of public inquiries: to investigate
publicly matters of public concern, in an independent and impartial way.
The focus in this report on independence
does not simply refer to an inquiry being independent from individuals or a
department that might be implicated in the public controversy or matter being
investigated. Instead, inquiries
should be independent from the government as a whole once they are established.
In ways both direct and indirect, obvious and obscure, government action
is implicated in matters subject to inquiries.
For an inquiry to be successful, it should not only be independent but
also be seen to be independent from government as an institution.
A number of the
above points were raised in the extensive debates in the House of Lords on
December 9, 2004 and in subsequent discussions. We have reviewed the debates and agree with concerns
expressed by various Lords:
•
there should have been pre-legislative scrutiny of draft legislation
before the Bill was introduced; •
it is cause for concern that the Bill takes power from Parliament to
establish inquiries and gives extensive control over all aspects of an inquiry
to an individual minister; •
inquiries should be independent of the minister, and the executive, once
established; •
the Bill goes too far in restricting public access to hearings, evidence,
and final reports; and •
it could be a danger to give a minister untrammeled power to convert an
existing inquiry into one governed by the Bill.
We hope members
of the House of Lords and House of Commons will take these criticisms into
consideration when reviewing the Bill.
We offer this
overview in the hope that a comparative perspective from a discrete yet similar
legal system will shed further light on the strengths and weaknesses of the
pending Bill. In particular, this
paper reviews first, U.S. federal mechanisms of inquiry and second, inquiries
that have occurred in New York City to investigate police corruption.
We believe these show that independence and transparency must be
cornerstones of a successful inquiry process.
The report also analyzes provisions of the Inquiries Bill for their
adherence to democratic standards and, in the conclusion, recommends that the
Bill not be passed into law. I.
U.S. Practice
A.
The Purposes and Characteristics of Inquiries in the United States
The United
States has no single legislative framework establishing an independent process
for probing matters of nationwide concern,[1]
but various measures have a similar function. They include legislative committees, executive
advisory commissions, special prosecutors, Inspector General Offices, and ad
hoc, specific-event public inquiry commissions.
The essential
purpose of all government commissions is to gather information.[2]
Such inquiries are useful when the public’s confidence in the
government can be restored only after a thorough, independent, and impartial
examination of the facts and circumstances giving rise to a particular event or
crisis.[3]
Commissions are for matters of great public importance, historically
where there are allegations of corruption, scandal, disaster, or accident caused
by government malfeasance and resulting in a crisis in public confidence.[4]
An important dimension of this fact-finding function is the dispelling of
rumors, which tend to heighten the sense of crisis.[5]
The commission must tell the public what happened and why, and how
similar occurrences may be prevented in the future.[6]
These commissions ensure government accountability by public exposure of
the workings of government and the setting of acceptable standards of public
administration.[7]
According to
U.S. scholars, for a commission to be truly independent and impartial, in fact
and appearance, as it must be to be credible, the appointing authority must not
control the direction and outcome of the inquiry.[8]
The commission should let the facts dictate the direction of the inquiry.[9]
Individual investigations that have not adhered to these standards have
been publicly discredited.
B.
Nationwide Measures 1.
Legislative Investigations
Congress has
used congressional investigations since the beginning of the republic,[10]
and federal, state, and local legislatures conduct hundreds of investigations
each year.[11]
At the national level, Congress’s oversight keeps the executive branch
from wielding unchecked powers in administering the law.
Congress conducts most of its oversight through committees, holding
formal as well as informal hearings on issues of executive agency action.[12]
The diversity and scope of issues addressed by congressional oversight,
as well as public awareness of oversight through the press, make it matchless in
its importance.[13]
Congressional oversight thus shapes the way that executive agencies
administer the law,[14]
which is essential to the checks and balances in the U.S. system.[15]
The publicity engendered by it is also a significant check on agency
action.[16]
Through
commissions, Congress has the power to inquire into the methods by which the
executive enforces the laws.[17]
The Supreme Court has described this oversight authority as “an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”[18]
The only limitations on this power is that Congress may not reach into
the “exclusive province” of the executive branch and investigations must be
related to a legitimate legislative task.[19]
Separation of powers also prohibits Congress from usurping the functions
of the courts.[20]
Even so, most judicial review of Congressional investigations has been
limited to the consideration of the application of various procedural
protections to witnesses appearing before congressional committees.[21]
For example, in Quinn v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that Fifth Amendment
protections apply to witnesses testifying before congressional committees.[22]
The executive
faces a high barrier in trying to keep information from both the legislative and
judicial branches. In United
States v. Nixon, for example, the Court stated: “Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it
difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by
production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.”[23]
Although
legislative investigating committees are widely used, some committees have
generated great controversy, such as the McCarthy and Watergate hearings.
Controversy has often been a function of partisan composition of some
committees, which are composed only of party members with no private citizens.
Such factors significantly diminishes the value of this type of inquiry,
and has engendered the need for judicial review.[24]
In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, two official government
inquiries took place. One was the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”), created by congressional
legislation (see section C(3) below); the other was a joint inquiry of the
Senate and House intelligence committees. Both
issued reports critical of the nation’s intelligence agencies.[25]
2.
Executive Investigations a.
Executive Advisory Commissions
Executive
advisory committees have historically provided pre-policy advice.[26]
Participants are generally selected from the private sector.[27]
The widespread use of such commissions dates back to President Theodore
Roosevelt, and hundreds of advisory commissions have been formed since then.[28]
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically authorize executive commissions, but the authority is inherent in article II, section 3, which gives the president the duty to recommend legislative initiatives to Congress and the obligation to execute the laws.[29] The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. App. I (1976), regulates and authorizes such commissions currently.[30] State-level executive inquiries generally followed the same path of legal recognition, first through inherent power of the executive and then through legislative authorization.[31]
b.
Special Prosecutors
Executive
department and agency heads may be scrutinized in both non-criminal and criminal
investigations. Non-criminal
investigations are conducted by department and agency Inspectors General.[32]
Criminal investigations are conducted by the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) or a special prosecutor.[33]
In the event
that an incident arises where it would be a conflict of interest for employees
of the Attorney General to investigate a matter, such as a criminal
investigation of a high-level government official, the Attorney General has the
power to appoint outside counsel. Pursuant to statute, the Attorney General may appoint
attorneys to “conduct any kind of legal proceeding . . . which United States
attorneys are authorized by law to conduct,” including attorneys to assist
United States attorneys “when the public interest so requires” and
“subject to removal by the Attorney General.”[34]
In the course
of the Watergate investigation, the Attorney General appointed a special
prosecutor within the DOJ with the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses arising out of the 1972 Presidential election.
The special prosecutor was to have “the greatest degree of independence
that is consistent with the Attorney General’s statutory accountability for
all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the DOJ.”[35]
As the inquiry
proceeded, strong disagreements developed between the executive and the special
prosecutor, and the president directed the Attorney General to fire the special
prosecutor. Both the Attorney
General and his deputy resigned rather than carry out such an order.
The special prosecutor was ultimately removed by the Acting Attorney
General.
As a result of
this conflict, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was passed, which included
the creation of the “special prosecutor,” independent from the Attorney
General.[36]
The special prosecutor provisions of the Act lapsed in 1999; since then
Congress has not acted to renew them. [37]
During the time they were in effect, if the Attorney General uncovered
non-frivolous allegations that the President, Vice President, a member of the
cabinet, or any other government officials had committed a federal crime other
than a petty misdemeanor, the Attorney General could petition for appointment of
a special prosecutor by applying to a special panel of judges of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
[38] Members
of the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress could apply to the
Attorney General for the appointment of a special prosecutor.
Once appointed,
the special prosecutor had the authority to conduct an independent investigation
of the charges and either dismiss them or, if necessary, proceed with the
prosecution of the official.[39]
He or she was authorized to make reports to Congress.
The Attorney General could only remove special prosecutors for
extraordinary impropriety.[40]
In recent U.S.
history, both statutory and non-statutory special prosecutors have prevented the
executive branch from investigating its own actions and the president from
influencing such an investigation. c.
Inspector Generals
Offices of
Inspector General (“OIGs”) are the lead organizations responsible for audit
oversight of the executive branch.[41]
Like special prosecutors, OIGs have responsibility for conducting special
investigations of broad public interest and importance.[42]
But OIGs are quite different
from special prosecutors because they handle non-criminal matters, focusing on
job-related misconduct by public officials including mismanagement, waste of
funds, abuse of authority, creation or maintenance of dangers to public health
or safety, and prohibited personnel practices.[43]
OIGs do not exist for the sole purpose of conducting a single special
investigations, but are instead permanent institutions subject to meaningful
congressional oversight.[44]
The Inspector
General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 3 (1994), created a unified and powerful
investigative force in the executive departments and agencies.[45]
The Act achieved this by placing existing auditing and investigative
resources under the authority of a relatively strong and independent Inspector
General in each establishment.[46]
The Act codified an idea – and to some extent a practice – that had been
around since the founding of the United States: oversight of agency activity.
As a result, the Inspector General in each department or agency reports
fraud, abuse, waste, and mismanagement to Congress, and can recommend corrective
action.[47]
If a matter is criminal, an Inspector General refers the matter to the
Justice Department.[48]
Inspectors
General are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, “without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of
integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis,
law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”[49]
The confirmation process involves both the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee and the committee having substantive oversight authority over the
individual department or agency in which the IG is located.[50] There is no term of years
for an IG, providing a safeguard against partisan appointments.[51]
The President must justify any removal to both Houses of Congress.[52]
IGs have
substantial autonomy[53]
and no one in the agency is to prevent the IG from carrying out or completing an
audit or investigation.[54]
The OIG determines the scope of any investigation.[55]
Once a matter
comes to our attention and we launch an investigation, we feel an obligation to
conduct the investigation thoroughly and properly and go wherever the facts take
us. This autonomy and independence
may mean that we take the investigation in different directions from what was
originally envisioned by whomever referred it to us. This is an important aspect of IG independence and one that
must be safeguarded carefully. Without
this OIG independence, top management’s desire to limit an inquiry into a
controversy or potential controversy so as to minimize potential embarrassment
– in other words, management’s view of the investigation as a form of damage
control – could compromise the integrity of the OIG investigations.[56]
Examples of
investigations include: a cover-up of conditions at Immigration and
Naturalization Services facilities; acts of racial and criminal conduct at an
outing called “Good Ol’ Boy Roundup” that was attended by many federal law
enforcement officers over a 16-year period; misconduct within the FBI
Laboratory; and CIA participation in creating the crack epidemic.[57]
More recently,
the OIG of the Department of Justice conducted an investigation into treatment
of post-September 11 alien detainees. In
June 2004, that report – which heavily criticized detention conditions and the
investigative process – was released. The
Justice Department had fought any oversight by the judiciary or the media,
requesting that the public trust it in the face of national security threats.
Its own Inspector General’s report demonstrated that government in
secret does not foster justice.
According to
the report, “The clear lesson is that government, in its understandable and
laudable resolve to protect our security, cannot be relied on to protect our
basic rights and liberties. Public
scrutiny and the protections of our court system are necessary to ensure
elemental fairness.[58]
Lawrence Goldman, president of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, commented that: “This is what happens when the checks and
balances of a democratic system of justice – the press, the courts, and
lawyers for accused – are excluded.”
3.
Ad-Hoc Public Inquiries
Similar to
executive advisory commissions, ad-hoc public inquiries are usually created
during times of crisis, scandal, or government misconduct[59]
and are the U.S. mechanism most like the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 1921.[60]
They are created for a shorter duration and under greater public
scrutiny, and their fact-finding function is more critical than their advisory
function.[61]
Important
commissions have been created in this fashion.
The Roberts Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Roberts and
members of the military, was established to ascertain and report the facts
relating to the Pearl Harbor attacks and determine responsibility for any U.S.
errors.[62]
The Warren Commission was created by President Johnson in an executive
order and chaired by Chief Justice Earl Warren, to determine the facts
surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination.[63]
This commission, though, failed to satisfy the public because it did not
fix responsibility for the events giving rise to the assassination.[64]
The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11
Commission) was an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional
legislation under the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002.[65]
The Commission was chartered to create a full and complete account of the
circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, attacks, including the
immediate response to the attacks. The Commission was also mandated to provide
recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.[66]
Separation of
powers and procedural protection issues may be implicated by public inquiries if
they usurp the powers of other branches of government or place fundamental
rights of witnesses in jeopardy. Both
presidential and other ad-hoc inquiries have been subject to judicial review in
the United States. For example, two U.S. Courts of Appeals judicially reviewed
the President’s Commission on Organized Crime for constitutionality in light
of the fact that membership on the Commission included federal judges.[67]
One court found that the composition of the Commission violated the
separation of powers doctrine; the other found that it did not.[68]
Subpoena powers of local and federal commissions have also been
challenged in court.
C.
Investigations into Police Corruption in New York City
States, cities, and local governments in the United States have created
commissions to analyze certain situations and recommend governmental reforms.
In New York City, two public investigations specifically addressed the
problem of police corruption: the Knapp Commission in the early 1970s and the
Mollen Commission in the 1990s. 1.
The Knapp Commission
The Knapp
Commission, established in May 1970 by an Executive Order of Mayor John V.
Lindsay, investigated widespread corruption in the New York Police Department at
the time.[69]
A series of articles in the media, based on reports of a few
whistleblowers, led the Mayor to create the Commission and work with the City
Council to create an ordinance to secure funding and subpoena power.[70]
Both the mayor’s executive order and the grant of subpoena power were
challenged judicially, but the New York Supreme Court held that both were valid.[71]
When articles
about police corruption first appeared, the Mayor appointed a committee of
public officials, including the District Attorneys of New York and Bronx
Counties, the Commissioner of Investigations, the Police Commissioner of the
City of New York, and Corporation Counsel, to investigate the matter.[72]
The committee reported that the investigation was too extensive for them
to complete, and the Mayor asked the committee to instead appoint an independent
investigative body from the private sector.
The Commission was then created by an Executive Order.[73]
The Order appointed five members, including Whitman Knapp as Chairman.[74]
Knapp later became a federal district judge in New York.
The Executive Order specified that the Commission would prescribe its own
procedures and staff, within the amounts appropriate for such staff.[75]
The Order also directed all departments and agencies of the City to
furnish the Commission with all services and cooperation it required.[76]
The Mayor
subsequently lobbied the City Council to provide the Commission with
investigatory powers. The Local
Law, adopted by the Council in response, allowed the Commission to administer
oaths or affirmations, to hold public or private hearings, and to compel
testimony and the production of documents by subpoena. [77]
Pursuant to its
investigations, the Commission held a series of public hearings, during which it
interviewed many officers from the police department.[78]
The Commission questioned the Mayor privately, but Commissioner Knapp
publicly defended that decision as being in the best interest of the
Commission’s mission, stating that he wanted to avoid a “political
circus.”[79]
In response to questions about whether the Mayor was interfering or
attempting to squash any part of the investigation, he replied “I can
categorically say there are no grounds for such suspicions.”[80]
This independence was evidenced by the Knapp Commission’s highly
critical statements, both during the investigations and in its final report,
regarding the police department leadership, including Police Commissioners,
Commanders, and the Mayor.[81] 2.
Mollen Commission
Twenty years after the Knapp Commission, credible evidence of
widespread police corruption again surfaced.
Rumors spread about the dishonest and illegal activities of New York
police officers, and public distrust of New York government ran high.
Mayor David Dinkins determined that a citizen’s commission would be the
best vehicle to respond to the concerns of New York’s residents.[82]
Mayor Dinkins created the Mollen Commission by Executive Order on July
24, 1992.[83]
The Order described the allegations of corruption and stated that “an
investigation by the Police Department of these allegations would be subject to
question by the public.”[84]
Therefore, the Mayor created the Commission to inquire into and evaluate
the practices and procedures of investigating corruption in the police
department and to make recommendations to improve the integrity of the
department. The Order specified
that the Commission could take evidence, administer oaths, and conduct other
activities necessary to ascertaining the facts, including holding hearings, both
public and private, as the Commission “deem[ed] appropriate.”[85]
The Commission
was chaired by Milton Mollen, who had previously served as the presiding justice
of the Appellate Division, New York State Supreme Court, and as a deputy mayor.[86]
It was composed of a mixture of former judges and prosecutors, Democrats
and Republicans, including the former head of the NYPD Civilian Complaint Review
Board.[87]
All served without compensation.[88]
In order to be effective, the Commission was given access to police
officers and government employees. It
was authorized to require any officer to attend an examination or hearing
related to his or her duties and to request any documents or files of city
agencies.[89]
The testimony of the officers could not be used against them in a
criminal prosecution.[90]
Although the Mayor created the Commission, and provided for the full
cooperation of city agencies in his order, he and the Commission itself went to
great lengths to emphasize its total independence from New York’s government. The
understanding of New York’s residents that the Commission was independent
allowed the Commission’s report to have its full effect and resulted in people
from other jurisdictions relying on its findings for many years.
The Mollen Commission referred to its independence often in statements
and press releases. [91]
In the letter that accompanied its interim report, Judge Mollen thanked
Mayor Dinkins for “the total independence” provided during the
investigations,[92]
and the final report specifically noted the freedom afforded to the Commission.[93]
As a testament to its independence, public hearings by the Commission
occurred just a few weeks before the mayoral elections, despite the political
harm they likely caused the Mayor.[94]
At the end of an initial investigation, the Mollen Commission presented
its findings at public hearings.[95]
It then presented a report to the Mayor’s office that reviewed the
nature of police corruption and the failure of anti-corruption controls, and
made recommendations for reform and more effective means of combating
corruption.[96]
The report was widely discussed in the newspapers.
In one New York Times article, the reporters found the report
“particularly powerful in its criticisms of sergeants and other commanders”
and emphasized that a non-independent commission would not have been able to be
as specific or open about the problems in the system.[97]
The report withheld only information about ongoing investigations by the
Commission.[98]
Judge Mollen, in the opening statement of the Commission’s public
hearings, pointed out that, “Mayor Dinkins found it essential, in the public
interest, to appoint this Commission, with a mandate to ascertain the extent of
corruption and to determine and recommend the best means to deal with it most
effectively.”[99]
He went to emphasize that “it is imperative that the members of the
public have confidence and faith in the integrity of the members of the Police
Department.”[100]
The Mollen Commission, because of its structure, was able to respond to
this mandate and restore public trust. The
Commissioners, although appointed by the Mayor, were not directly associated
with local government or the police department. Neither were the staff of approximately twenty lawyers,
analysts, and investigators hired by the Commission.[101]
A new Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, took office before the final report was
issued, but in the aftermath of the Mollen Commission’s report, the City
Council and the Mayor created the Commission to Combat Police Corruption, an independent
police investigation and audit board
based on the Commission’s recommendations.[102]
Many other cities faced with problems of police corruption have
referenced the Mollen Commission’s findings when creating their responses.
•
•
•
In sum, the
separation of powers doctrine has resulted in the evolution of an inquiry system
in the United States that is not formal or structured, but provides for
democratic checks on all public inquiries.
Once established, inquiries are independent of government; efforts are
made to ensure impartiality of their members; and, except in rare circumstances,
their processes and final reports are made public. II.
The Inquiries Bill As Introduced in the House of Lords
On November 24,
2004, the government laid before the House of Lords the Inquiries Bill.
The Bill raises serious concerns about the independence and impartiality
of future inquiries in the United Kingdom.
If passed into law, it could also erode two fundamental tenets of
democratic governance – transparency and accountability – and have serious
implications for human rights cases in Northern Ireland and around the United
Kingdom.
As drafted, the
Inquiries Bill takes away from the Parliament the ability to establish inquiries
into matters of “public
concern” and cedes all power over such inquiries to the executive.
A government minister would have complete authority over the scope of an
inquiry, selection of panel members, public access to the inquiry, and whether
any resultant findings would be made public. Even when the public’s concern is
regarding the conduct of government officials, only a minister could initiate
and administer an inquiry under the proposed Bill.
This is disturbing even if the establishing minister does not seem to
have a vested interest in the subject matter of the inquiry.
The Inquiries
Bill represents a retreat from meaningful, independent, and transparent public
inquiries in the United Kingdom. By
concentrating power in a single government official who will have control over
the terms of reference and disclosure of information related to the inquiry,
there is loss of accountability
necessary to a successful inquiry. Independence
also suffers when the executive is given discretion to alter the course of an
inquiry, limit the expenses paid, or terminate the appointment of inquiry
members. As a result, inquiries into government misconduct may be manipulated so
that evidence embarrassing to the government could be concealed rather than
revealed. The Bill could have
serious implications for human rights where government actors may perpetrate
abuses, or fail to investigate them, unrestrained by fear of public exposure.
Implication
for Human Rights Cases in Northern Ireland
If passed, the
Inquiries Bill could have an impact on human rights cases in Northern Ireland,
including the four public inquiries recommended by Justice Peter Cory into the
murders of Patrick Finucane,
Rosemary Nelson, Robert Hamill, and Billy Wright.
The British government has announced its intention to hold inquires into
the murders of Rosemary Nelson and Robert Hamill under the Police (Northern
Ireland) Act 1998 and into the murder of Billy Wright under the Prison Act
(Northern Ireland) 1953. Under
Section 14 of the proposed Bill, there is the potential that these inquiries,
which are currently stalled, could be converted so that they too are conducted
under the new legislation.
The government
has yet to agree to institute any inquiry into the 15-year-old murder of human
rights lawyer Patrick Finucane. It
raises serious concerns that the government is rushing to remake the law
governing public inquiries in the United Kingdom and refusing to initiate an
inquiry into the Finucane murder before the new legislation is in place.
Unlike the 1921 Act or other legislation under which a Finucane inquiry
might be brought, the Inquiries Bill includes provisions that restrict public
access and the autonomy of the inquiry panel.
In so doing, the government can prevent embarrassing information from
becoming public and control an inquiry process that it has acknowledged will be
critical of many of its agencies.
Independent
public inquiry into these four murders is essential so that the people of
Northern Ireland may move forward with confidence in the integrity of the
government and its institutions. Any
inquiry that is closely administered by the entity whose alleged misconduct is
the subject of the inquiry will do little to restore public confidence, and its
investigations and findings are likely to be viewed with skepticism.
The
Importance of a Parliamentary Role
An important
restraint on government misconduct will be lost if the inquiry process is
administered by the government without a significant role by members of
Parliament. Parliamentary committee
inquiries may not be affected by this legislation, but they do not necessarily
have the same powers as inquiries under the Bill. It is important that Parliament have the power to establish
and determine the scope of inquiries into matters of utmost public importance.
Indeed,
legislatures and parliaments play a crucial role in promoting transparency and
accountability in government. As
the link between the electorate and the government, they have oversight powers
to ensure that mechanisms for accountability work effectively, that governmental
programs are efficient, corruption is controlled, and the interests, rights and
welfare of citizens are promoted. Likewise,
an inquiry process that is independent and public is an invaluable tool for
promoting transparency and accountability in a democratic society.
Parliament should not agree to surrend its authority over the public
inquiry process – it should not forfeit access to this vital democratic
instrument by passing the Inquiries Bill as drafted.
•
•
•
Below we
present comments on the provisions of the Inquiries Bill that in our view
present the greatest cause for concern regarding damage to human rights and
democracy. Since its most
troublesome aspect is its basic premise – taking power from Parliament and
inquiry panel members, and giving it to the executive – the Bill cannot be
cured by amendment. Rather we
recommend the Bill be rejected in its entirety.
A.
Constitution of Inquiries
The most
fundamental change to the inquiry process implicated by the Bill is the shift of
the authority to establish an inquiry from Parliament to the executive.
This is a major constitutional shift.
The Bill would repeal the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921,
which currently provides that Parliament may establish an independent tribunal
to inquire into matters of public importance, section 46(1), and instead provide
that a government minister may cause an inquiry to be held “where it appears
to him” that there is a matter of
public concern. Section 1(1).
Once set up,
the minister would retain control over the administration of the inquiry and any
disclosure or publication of the inquiry’s findings. The minister would decide who is to be appointed to the
inquiry panel; the minister would appoint the chairperson[103]
and could even replace the chairperson during the inquiry.
Section 6(3). The required impartiality of the members of the inquiry panel
is also left to the minister’s discretion, and he or she could appoint a panel
member where “in the minister’s opinion the person’s interest or
association would be unlikely to influence his decisions.”
Section 8(1). Thus, there
would be nothing beyond the minister’s discretion to ensure that an impartial
and independent panel is appointed. This
clearly could lead to government-friendly individuals being selected for
inquiries, which in turn would weaken public confidence in any findings made and
the inquiry process itself.
The minister
also would decide the starting date and the terms of reference for the inquiry.
Section 5. There is no
requirement that the minister consult with the chairperson or any of the parties
that might have a legitimate interest in the inquiry before setting the terms of
reference for the inquiry. Nor is
there any provision that would permit amendments to the terms of reference
during the course of the inquiry if it became apparent that there were important
matters not included in the initial terms of reference.
Under these provisions, there is a great risk that superficial inquiries
into government wrongdoing would be established, in an attempt to satisfy the
public’s demand for an inquiry, without the possibility that they would
effectively investigate and expose misconduct.
Section 36
affords the minister further control over the course of an inquiry: it provides
that the minister would determine the funding of the inquiry.
The minister “may agree to pay” the members of the panel and persons
engaged to provide assistance to the panel.
He or she must meet other expenses reasonably incurred in holding the
inquiry, including publishing the report. But,
the minister would not be obliged to pay the expenses where he or she decides
that the panel was operating outside the terms of reference.
Thus, the minister could cut off funding for the inquiry when he or she
does not approve the course of the investigation.
Section 12
provides that the minister could suspend the inquiry at any time.
Section 13 provides that he or she could end the inquiry by providing
notice to the chairperson even before the investigation is completed.
The proposed Bill makes no reference to this being an exceptional
recourse or to the circumstances in which this power might be invoked.
Presumably, the minister could choose to end an inquiry where the
panel’s findings might prove problematic or embarrassing for the government.
B.
Conversion of Inquiries
Section 14
extends to the minister the power to convert any ongoing inquiry established
under current legislation to an inquiry
under the proposed Bill once passed, subject only to the consent of the person
who originally caused the pending inquiry to be held. It would allow the minister to change the terms of reference
of inquiries commenced before the passing of this legislation, as well as change
the conditions under which members were appointed and alter agreed procedures
and conditions. Although ministers
may intend to use this provision to benefit the public interest – by providing
greater powers to already established inquiries, for example – the Bill does
not ensure that it won’t be used to limit an ongoing inquiry.
Any converted
inquiry, regardless of what was agreed when it was established, will be held
under the terms of the new Act. This
is a very disturbing ex post facto provision;
such laws are constitutionally prohibited in most democracies.
Under Section 14, the inquiries slated to begin into the Nelson, Hamill,
and Wright cases could be converted into inquiries under the new legislation.
It is conceivable that the minister could redefine the terms of
reference, limit public access to the inquiries, and keep secret crucial
findings, thus undermining the central goals of public inquiries in these cases.
C.
Inquiry Proceedings
Section 17 of
the Bill allows the minister to restrict public access to inquiries once they
are underway. Attendance at
an inquiry, or the disclosure or publication of evidence, could be restricted at
the minister’s discretion as “necessary
in the public interest.” Section
17(3)(b). The minister could
issue a restriction notice to the chair at any time before the ending of the
inquiry or issue a restriction order, which can continue indefinitely.
When issuing a restriction order, the minister may consider: how the
restriction might inhibit the allaying of public concern, the risk of harm or
damage that could be avoided or reduced by a restriction; whether conditions of
confidentiality apply; and the extent to which not imposing a restriction would
delay or impair the efficiency or effectiveness of the inquiry or result in
additional costs. Thus under the Bill, the grounds on which a minister could choose to restrict public access or disclosure of information are extremely broad. They include any risk of damage to national security or international relations, and damage to the economic interests of the United Kingdom. A minister’s interpretation of these terms might be broad enough to preclude disclosure of information critical of the government. This provision could allow inquiry-related information to be kept from the public at the discretion of one individual and one branch of government, without regard to the view of the inquiry panel members.
D.
Inquiry Reports
At the end of an inquiry, the chairperson must submit a report signed by
every member of the panel to the minister.
If the report is not unanimous, it must reflect the points of
disagreement. There is no provision
for a dissenting member of a panel to publish a minority report; a member who
disagrees with the panel and will not sign the report has only one alternative
– to resign.[104]
Under the Bill,
the minister may decide whether the chairperson or the minister will have
responsibility for publishing any report and may withhold material in the report
from publication as he or she considers it necessary in the public interest.
The grounds upon which the minister could choose to withhold material
from publication include any risk of damage to national security or
international relations and damage to the economic interests of the United
Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom.
Again, the minister’s interpretation of
any of these terms could well be broad enough to preclude disclosure of
information that may embarrass the government.
The minister would have the authority to suppress the entire report in
the interest of national security, for example, regardless of the wishes of the
chairman and members of the inquiry panel. III.
Conclusion
The purpose of
public inquiries is to investigate matters of great or urgent public importance,
generally in the event of a scandal, accident, or disaster, or where the
government has been accused of misconduct, corruption, or a failure to act.
To restore public confidence in the face of one of these incidents,
inquiries must be independent and transparent.
Public exposure ensures accountability, and independence guarantees that
the facts dictate the outcome of the inquiry and bias does not color the
proceedings.
These
principles have been central to inquiry-like mechanisms in the United States,
whether they are local, national, legislative, or executive measures.
In all of the examples covered here – ad-hoc inquiries, legislative
committees, and executive commissions and appointments – transparency,
independence, and checks by way of substantive judicial review or congressional
oversight have prevented the executive from maintaining control over inquiries
once they are established.
The conduct of
the government – in small or large part – will almost always be implicated
in a case that is subject to a public inquiry.
As a consequence, the government should not play a role in inquiries
beyond establishing them. Indeed,
where government is involved in the workings of an inquiry, the integrity of
that proceeding is compromised. It
was surprising and unsettling, therefore, that the Inquiries Bill was written to
allow for ministerial control at every conceivable stage of the inquiry process.
We recommend that the Bill as a whole not be passed into law and that there be further consultation on reforming inquiry legislation. We understand that the Grand Committee of the House of Lords and the government have discussed possible amendments to the Bill. In the event that the Bill is revised, we respectfully recommend that great care is taken to ensure that independence and transparency are guaranteed. [1] Zeev Segal, The Power to Probe Into Matters of Vital Public Importance, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 941, 972 (1984) [2] Carl E. Singley, The Move Commission: The Use of Public Inquiry Commissions to Investigate Government Misconduct and Other Matters of Vital Public Concern, 59 Temp. L.Q. 303, 304 (1986) [3] Id. at 305. [4] Id. at 323. [5] Id. at 305. [6] Id. [7] Id. at 306. [8] Id. at 323-24. [9] Id. at 326. [10] Segal, at 941. [11] Singley, at 308. [12] Charles, Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 199, 207 (1998) [13] Id. at 215. [14] Id. at 200. [15] Alexander Aleinikoff, Non-Judicial Checks on Agency Actions, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1997) [16]
Id. [17] Ronald L. Claveloux, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Conspiracy, 1983 Duke L.J. 1333, 1333 (1983) [18] McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). [19] Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 11-12 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 197 (1957). [20] See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929); Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 193-196 (1880). [21] Singley, at 314. [22] 349 U.S. 155, 161-65 (1955). [23] 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). [24] Id. at 308-09. [25]
Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the
Spymasters Accountable After 9/11, 27 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. L.J. 79, 81 (2004). [26] Singley, at 309. [27]
Id. [28]
Id. [29]
Id. [30] Id. at 310. [31] Id. at 310-11. [32] Dan W. Reicher, Conflict of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 975, 983 (1983). [33] See 28 U.S.C. § 535(a) (1976) (giving the Attorney General and the FBI authority to investigate any violation of the federal criminal code involving government officers or employees); 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (Supp. V. 1981) (the Special Prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978). [34] 28 U.S.C. § 515; 28 U.S.C. § 543. “United States attorneys” here refers to government prosecutors. [35] Atty. Gen. Order No. 517-573, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973). [36] Segal, at 954. [37] The Independent Counsel Statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 at § 599. [38]
Id. [39]
Id. [40] See Angela L. Beasley, The Ethics in Government Act: The Creation of a Quasi-Parliamentary System, 5 Wid. L. Symp. J. 275, 275 (2000). [41] William, Fields, Legal and Functional Influences on the Objectivity of the Inspector General Audit Process, 2 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 97, 98 (1993). [42]
Id. [43] Reicher, at 983. [44] Michael R. Bromwich, Symposium: Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 Geo. L.J. 2027, 2028 (1998). The author, Michael Bromwich, was Inspector General for the Department of Justice. [45] Reicher, at 984. [46]
Id. [47]
Id. [48]
Id. [49] 5 U.S.C. App. 3(a); Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 Cal. W.L. Rev. 243, 248 (1999). [50] Bromwich, at 2029. [51] Bromwich, at 2029. [52] Hartmus, at 248. [53] Id. at 2030. [54] Hartmus, at 248-49. [55] Bromwich, at 2032. [56]
Id (emphasis added).
The author is Michael Bromwich, who was Inspector General of the United
States Department of Justice. [57] Bromwich, at 2031-32. [58]
Daniel Dodson, Inspector General
Report on Post-9/11 Detentions Highlights Result of Denial of Effective
Oversight, 27 Champion 6 (2003). [59] Singley, at 311. [60] Id. at 317. [61]
Id. [62]
Id. [63] Id. at 312. [64]
Id. |