THE PAT FINUCANE ARCHIVE

Family Press Releases | Judicial Review | European Court of Human Rights

Cory Report | Stevens Inquiry | Miscellaneous | Further Reading

Beyond Collusion: The UK Security Forces
and the Murder of Patrick Finucane

Tuesday 12 February 2002 -- 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

PREFACE

This report examines allegations of state involvement in the murder of Patrick Finucane, a prominent Belfast human rights lawyer who was murdered on February 12, 1989. In this report, we piece together the evidence of state involvement that has emerged gradually in the 13 years since Finucane was murdered. We also present new allegations of security force involvement in the killing and subsequent cover-ups. With this report, we hope to force the UK government, by the weight of evidence, to finally carry out a public inquiry into Patrick Finucane's murder.

Over the last ten years, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has conducted a series of missions to examine the human rights situation in Northern Ireland. Based on those missions and extensive outside research, we have published two previous reports on Northern Ireland, the first in 1993 and the second in 1996. Both of these reports considered unfolding allegations of state involvement in Finucane's murder. In addition, our first report, Human Rights and Legal Defense in Northern Ireland, looked into claims that members of the security forces had systematically harassed and intimidated defense lawyers. Our second report, At the Crossroads: Human Rights and the Northern Ireland Peace Process, examined two main issues in addition to the Finucane murder. The first was the continued reliance on emergency legislation by both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland. The second was the role of the judiciary in implementing the emergency law framework and in facilitating the transition to the rule of ordinary law.

The new allegations of state involvement in Finucane's murder discussed in this report are based on information gatduring a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland in June 2001, as well as on a series of follow-up interviews. The members of the mission delegation were Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee; Martin Flaherty, Professor at Fordham Law School; and Meg Satterthwaite, Policing Fellow at the Lawyers Committee, who also conducted a preliminary fact-finding mission. The follow-up interviews were conducted by Fiona Doherty, Policing Fellow at the Lawyers Committee. The report also draws on information gathered during our previous missions to Northern Ireland as well as on the work of other human rights groups and journalists on the Finucane case. The report was written by Meg Satterthwaite and Fiona Doherty.

We would like to thank the many staff members and friends of the Lawyers Committee who participated in our previous missions to Northern Ireland, especially Elisa Massimino, the director of our Washington, D.C. office. Our report would not have been possible without the assistance of local human rights organizations. In particular, we are grateful to Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch, who provided us with invaluable assistance, as she has done for many years. We also record our long-standing debt to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, especially Martin O'Brien, Paul Mageean, Maggie Beirne, and Liz Martin. We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Martin Flaherty. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the family of Patrick Finucane.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
February 12, 2002

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Patrick Finucane was a high-profile solicitor in Northern Ireland in the late 1970s and 1980s. He was well known for his work in representing people arrested under the emergency or anti-terrorism laws and for his use of litigation to challenge the legal framework in which the UK security forces operated. On the evening of February 12, 1989, masked gunmen broke into Finucane's home and shot him 14 times in front of his wife and three children. The next day, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) claimed responsibility for the killing. The UFF is a cover name used by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland.

Over the last 13 years, there have been persistent reports that members of the UK security forces were involved in the Finucane murder. The UK government has firmly resisted calls to establish a public inquiry into the killing, however, claiming that this could prejudice on-going criminal investigations. In addition to the investigation by Northern Ireland's Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), there have been three separate criminal investigations led by Sir John Stevens, the current Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London. The findings of the first two Stevens investigations have remained largely classified and the third, established in 1999, is still ongoing. Despite these official investigations, no one has ever been successfully prosecuted for Patrick Finucane's murder.

Over the last ten years, the Lawyers Committee has conducted a series of missions to Northern Ireland to investigate reports of official collusion in the murder. The evidence that has emerged over this period extends far beyond isolated acts of collusion by individual members of the security forces and implicates the very foundations of the government's security policy in Northern Ireland. There are many allegations that units within both the British Army and the RUC were involved at an institutional level in the murder and subsequent cover-up.

This report is designed to provide a comprehensive look at Patrick Finucane's case on the 13th anniversary of his murder. The report binds together information that has gradually become public over the last 13 years. The report also contains new information about state involvement in the case, such as:

• RUC interrogation notes confirm that the RUC double agent prosecuted for Finucane's murder in 1999 made significant admissions about his involvement in the murder in 1990.

   

• A former member of a covert Army unit claims that both the Army and the RUC knew that the UDA was targeting Patrick Finucane. He also claims that, in the run up to the killing, both the Army and RUC knew of two prior UDA plans to assassinate Finucane. Despite this, Finucane was never warned about the dangers that he faced.

   

• A recently-retired police officer details the many threats he received from officers in the RUC's intelligence division in response to his attempts to pursue the prosecution of a man who had confessed to being one of the two gunmen in the murder.

The Army's Force Research Unit (FRU) and Brian Nelson

The Force Research Unit (FRU) was a covert unit of the British Army that infiltrated agents into republican and loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. FRU officers, operating as "handlers," debriefed and counseled these agents. Documents recording the contacts between FRU agents and their handlers have revealed that the purpose of the FRU, at least with respect to loyalist paramilitary groups, was to redirect the killing power of loyalist paramilitaries away from random sectarian killings towards "legitimate" republican targets.

In 1987, the FRU recruited Brian Nelson to infiltrate the intelligence structure of the UDA. With the active assistance and resources of the FRU, Nelson soon brought new professionalism to the UDA's information-gathering system. According to multiple sources, Brian Nelson prepared targeting information on Patrick Finucane with the knowledge of his FRU handlers. FRU documents pertaining to Nelson were withheld from the Stevens investigations and subsequently found to have been altered. On the night before Stevens planned to arrest Nelson as part of his first investigation, Nelson fled to England and Stevens's offices were destroyed by a fire. According to an FRU whistleblower, that fire was set by the British Army.

RUC Special Branch and William Stobie

A second intelligence agency implicated in the Finucane murder is RUC Special Branch. Repeatedly described as "a force within a force," Special Branch is a unit so secretive that even other RUC officers do not know about its activities. Like the FRU, Special Branch ran agents in Northern Ireland's paramilitary organizations. At the time of the Finucane murder, William Stobie was simultaneously an agent for Special Branch and a quartermaster for the UDA in West Belfast. As quartermaster, Stobie was responsible for supplying weapons for UDA missions in his area.

In September 1990, William Stobie was detained for seven days and repeatedly interrogated by officers of the RUC's Criminal Investigations Division (CID). Stobie admitted that several days before Patrick Finucane's murder, a UDA superior had instructed him to supply guns for an operation. Stobie also admitted that he had retrieved the weapons after the murder. During the interrogation, Stobie also explained that he was an agent for Special Branch. He insisted that he had kept his handlers fully informed of developments as they arose and that Special Branch had known the names of the UDA members involved. Despite his admissions, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided on January 16, 1991 not to charge Stobie in connection with Finucane's murder.

Martin Ingram's Allegations

The Lawyers Committee has conducted a series of interviews with a former FRU officer, who spoke to us under the pseudonym Martin Ingram. According to Ingram, there were three separate UDA plans to assassinate Patrick Finucane. The first two plans were thwarted, but the third succeeded. Ingram claims that both the FRU and Special Branch knew that the UDA was targeting Patrick Finucane. He says that they also knew, in the run up to the killing, that there had already been two attempts against his life. Despite this, Finucane was not warned of the dangers that he faced.

Ingram told the Lawyers Committee that he did not know whether the FRU had advance knowledge of the third plan. He explained that although Brian Nelson was responsible for gathering intelligence for UDA killing teams, he would not necessarily have known the date and time of impending attacks. Martin Ingram believed that Special Branch must have had advance knowledge of the third attack, however, given its own sources within the UDA in West Belfast. Ingram told us that Special Branch should have been electronically monitoring the weapons under William Stobie's control. He also told us that he knew with "cast iron certainty" that the leader of the UDA in West Belfast was working for Special Branch at the time of Finucane's murder. This UDA leader, Tommy "Tucker" Lyttle, was in charge of both Nelson and Stobie. Ingram claimed that it was Lyttle who instructed Nelson to compile targeting information on Finucane.

The Possible Instigation of the Murder by RUC Officers

These allegations concerning Lyttle are highly significant in the context of reports that RUC officers actively procured Finucane's murder. In 1992, a source found reliable by the Lawyers Committee informed us that three weeks before Patrick Finucane's murder, RUC officers told three prominent UDA men under police detention that the UDA should target Patrick Finucane. In 1995, BBC journalist John Ware published an article detailing a similar scenario. Ware had interviewed Tucker Lyttle before his death in October 1995. Lyttle confirmed that two RUC detectives had originally suggested the idea of murdering Finucane. Lyttle told Ware that when this suggestion was relayed to him, he was so astonished that he asked a "regular contact" in Special Branch why Finucane was being pushed. Lyttle claimed that this contact had not discouraged the idea that Finucane should be shot.

The Prosecution and Subsequent Murder of William Stobie

In 1999, a few months after Stevens began his third investigation, William Stobie was charged with the murder of Patrick Finucane. In his defense, Stobie claimed that he had not known that Finucane was the target before the murder. He also claimed that he had given his Special Branch handlers enough information to prevent the killing (and in the alternative to apprehend the killers and retrieve the murder weapons). He also claimed that given his 1990 admissions, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) had long possessed the information on which the charges were based. After extensive delays, the DPP ultimately did not offer any evidence in the case. William Stobie was found not guilty on November 26, 2001. The next day, he called for a public inquiry into the murder of Patrick Finucane.

Two weeks later, William Stobie was ambushed outside his home and shot several times at close range, reportedly by the UDA. The UK government knew that Stobie was at risk from the UDA, but failed to protect him. Stobie had repeatedly applied for government protection after his role as a double agent was exposed in 1999. Working in conjunction with Stobie's solicitor, the Lawyers Committee had raised Stobie's need for official protection with many UK government officials. Although Stobie had requested only modest security measures, the government denied his applications.

Cover Up: Special Branch and the Story of Johnston Brown

In late 2000, news surfaced that Special Branch had blocked attempts by fellow RUC officers to prosecute one of the two gunmen in the Finucane murder. These allegations were made by CID officer Johnston Brown. Brown claimed that on October 3, 1991, a prominent loyalist had confessed to being one of the two gunmen in the murder. Instead of pursuing a prosecution, however, Special Branch decided to recruit the confessor as an informer.

In interviews with the Lawyers Committee, Brown explained that he had vigorously opposed Special Branch's decision not to pursue the prosecution. As a result, he and his partner were harassed and threatened by Special Branch officers. In November 1991, for example, he learned that Special Branch officers had tipped off the confessor about Brown's desire to prosecute him, a move that placed Brown's life in immediate danger. In April 1999, Brown told the Stevens III team about the 1991 confession. A Special Branch officer later threatened to have guns planted in his home. Brown told the Lawyers Committee that he still feels very much under threat from Special Branch.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the 13th anniversary of Patrick Finucane's murder, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights calls on the UK government to take the following steps:

I. Abandon the Weston Park Proposal

Following the political negotiations at Weston Park in July 2001, the UK and Irish governments announced that they would jointly appoint "a judge of international standing from outside both jurisdictions to undertake a thorough investigation of collusion" in the murder of Patrick Finucane, as well as in five other controversial cases. The governments revealed that in all six cases, the international judge would be asked to review all the papers, interview "anyone who can help," and report back with recommendations (which could include the establishment of a public inquiry).

The Lawyers Committee is deeply dissatisfied with this proposal. How is one judge - with currently undefined powers - to review the papers and interview witnesses in all six of these complicated cases? The Finucane case, alone, has been active for much of the last 13 years. The Lawyers Committee believes that the international judge proposal will prevent the truth from emerging in these cases for many years to come.

II. Establish a Public Inquiry into Patrick Finucane's Murder

The Lawyers Committee believes that the official investigations into Finucane's murder have not satisfied the requirements of international law. Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, the investigation must be carried out independently from the members of the security forces implicated in the killing. Despite this, we understand that all three Stevens investigations were instigated by the RUC and report back to the RUC.* Article 2 also requires that the investigation have a sufficient element of public scrutiny to secure practical accountability. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also requires an open and accountable investigation. The investigations have remained largely classified, however.

Given the deficiencies of the official investigations to date, we believe that the UK must immediately establish a public inquiry in the Finucane case. Indeed, as the government delays, critical evidence has disappeared and witnesses are afraid for their lives.** On December 12, 2001, William Stobie was murdered shortly after he called for a public inquiry into the killing. The government had refused his applications for protection.

The long list of those who have supported the call for a public inquiry includes the Irish government, the U.S. House of Representatives, the European Parliament, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders. The Lawyers Committee believes that a public inquiry in the Finucane case should be conducted by an independent tribunal operating with the powers of the High Court.

III. Commit to the Accountability and Reform of the Security Services

A central element of the 1998 Good Friday agreement was a transformation of the RUC into a police service built around notions of accountability and human rights. These two themes - accountability and respect for human rights - were building blocks for the September 1999 report of the Independent Commission on Policing (the "Patten" Commission). As the government has taken steps to implement police reform, no issue has loomed more important to the success of that effort than creating a visible sense of accountability. In particular there continues to be a widely held perception that police officers and other members of the security forces who act outside the law have not and will not be held accountable for their actions. That perception is particularly stark in relation to the members of intelligence units.

No case better illustrates this problem than the murder of Patrick Finucane. In the 13 years since Finucane was gunned down in his home, the evidence of security force involvement in the murder and subsequent cover up has continued to swell. Despite this, the record demonstrates a decided lack of political will to get at and make public the full truth about what happened. This failure to publicly uncover the truth undercuts the government's commitment to fundamental principles of democratic accountability.

--------------------------

* On November 4, 2001, the RUC's name was changed to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The third Stevens investigation, therefore, will actually report to the Chief Constable of the PSNI.
** Ken Barrett, the man revealed in the press to be the loyalist who confessed to Johnston Brown, reportedly fled Northern Ireland after Stobie's murder, amid allegations that he was a police informer. Brown also fears for his life.

---------------------------

I.                   INTRODUCTION

When Patrick Finucane began practicing law in the mid-1970s, the UK government was shifting strategies in its conflict against the Irish Republican Army (IRA).[1]  Recognizing that hostilities were likely to continue for a long time, the government de-emphasized its military campaign and opened up a new front against the IRA that became known as criminalization.[2]  Under the new policy, paramilitaries were to be brought before the criminal justice system and punished as ordinary criminals.  With the shift in strategy, the government intended not only to place paramilitaries firmly behind bars, but to influence public perceptions of the very nature of the conflict.[3]  The government hoped to delegitimize the IRA’s self-proclaimed “war of liberation” – a war which actively targeted members of the security services[4] – and recast the conflict as a battle between state forces of law and order and rogue elements sowing anarchy through terrorism.  In this battle, IRA suspects were to be portrayed as dangerous criminals rather than the freedom fighters they claimed to be.

Alongside criminalization, the government introduced a new security policy for Northern Ireland.  This policy, one of police primacy, is frequently referred to as Ulsterization.  With Ulsterization, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s almost entirely Protestant police force, replaced the British Army as the lead agency in the government’s efforts to combat paramilitary violence.[5]  The RUC had primary responsibility for arresting and interrogating paramilitary suspects and for gathering the evidence necessary to secure convictions.[6]  

To shore up its twin policies of criminalization and Ulsterization, the UK government expanded the RUC and diluted the protections afforded defendants accused of paramilitary offenses.[7]  Although paramilitaries were to be presented as “ordinary criminals,” they were not to be tried under the ordinary criminal law.  Two main emergency laws, the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA), and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), formed the backbone of a system designed to garner convictions based on readily admissible confessions obtained through extended periods of detention and interrogation.  Under the EPA, for example, defendants charged with “scheduled” offenses – crimes specified in the statute[8] – were tried in special “Diplock” courts before a single judge and no jury.[9]  The EPA also authorized the police to conduct searches and seizures without warrants and to stop and question individuals about their identity and recent movements.  Under the PTA, the government could detain and interrogate individuals for up to seven days without charge.  These powers were to facilitate intelligence gathering as well as to collect evidence for prosecutions.

To preserve this system, the UK government was forced to derogate from some of its international human rights obligations.[10]  The government entered derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[11]  The government decided to derogate from its obligations after the European Court of Human Rights found that the UK had violated the European Convention by detaining a suspected IRA member without charge for a period of four days and six hours.[12]  The government justified its derogations by citing “campaigns of organized terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.” [13]

This dilution of due process rights for individuals charged with scheduled offenses rendered the involvement of defense counsel essential for the protection of those rights that remained.  The heightened importance of criminal defense attorneys also made them vulnerable, however.  In the context of the time, any obstacles to obtaining convictions – even those required by due process – were suspect.  All too often, the fundamental distinction between lawyer and client was lost, and the attorney was seen as an impediment to justice rather than its crucial guarantor.[14]

Patrick Finucane was part of a small community of attorneys in Northern Ireland willing to represent those arrested under the emergency law regime.  His success in a number of high-profile cases helped reveal the limits of the criminalization policy.  Many resented this success, assuming that if Finucane could obtain acquittals of terrorist suspects, then either the legal system was not working, or there was something suspect in the provision of a rigorous defense. 

II.  Patrick Finucane’s Law Practice

      Patrick Finucane grew up in the heavily Catholic nationalist neighborhood of the Falls Road, Belfast and attended university at Trinity College Dublin.  In 1979, he joined Peter Madden to form Madden & Finucane, a law firm engaged in a broad range of civil and criminal work.  Although Finucane took on a wide variety of civil and criminal cases, he became well known for his work in representing people arrested under the emergency laws.  Finucane often represented individuals accused of involvement with the IRA and other republican groups.[15]  His practice included work on behalf of both Protestants and Catholics, however.  He did not use religion or politics as a basis for representation.  Indeed, as his wife Geraldine told the Lawyers Committee in a 1992 interview, “Pat would have represented the people who shot him.”[16]

In addition to assisting individuals arrested under the emergency laws, Finucane used litigation to challenge the legal framework in which the security forces operated.  This work, along with several high-profile criminal defense cases, made Finucane a thorn in the side of the authorities. 

Some of Finucane’s high-profile cases included:

·        Hunger Strikes (1981) – Finucane represented Bobby Sands, the first IRA hunger striker to die in the Maze Prison during a protest calling for political status for persons convicted of paramilitary activity. 

·        Compensation Claims – Finucane was a pioneer in successfully using civil claims for assault and false imprisonment against the police.  Such claims quickly became part of the legal landscape in Northern Ireland. 

·        Habeas Corpus (1988) – Finucane brought the first successful habeas corpus petition in which the detention of an individual under the emergency laws was held to be unlawful because of police mistreatment.

·        Casement Park Trials (1988) – Patrick Finucane successfully represented Patrick McGeown, who was charged with murder and other crimes stemming from the killing of two plainclothes British soldiers.  The two soldiers were killed after driving into the funeral cortege of a person killed by loyalists three days earlier.  All charges against McGeown were dropped at the preliminary inquiry into the case in the magistrate’s court.

·        Prisoner Rights (1989) – Only a month before his death, Finucane won a challenge to the way in which republican and loyalist prisoners were held in solitary confinement.  These prisoners were denied privileges such as reading materials and adequate bedding.

·        Derogation (1989) – Less than two weeks before he was murdered, Finucane filed two applications with the European Commission on Human Rights challenging the legality of the UK’s derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights.

In taking such cases, Patrick Finucane was acting in accordance with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.  Principle 14 states:

Lawyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and in promoting the cause of justice, shall seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national and international law and shall at all times act freely and diligently in accordance with the law and recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession.

III. Setting the Scene for Murder

A.     Introduction

Patrick Finucane was the target of various forms of threats and intimidation before his death.  Much of this abuse stemmed from official sources, particularly from officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).  Finucane was not the only defense lawyer to report such abuse.   During our 1992 mission to Northern Ireland, the Lawyers Committee interviewed other solicitors who told us that they too had been harassed and threatened by members of the security forces.[17]  Such abuse violates the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.[18]  Under Principle 16, for example, governments must ensure that lawyers “are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference.”  Principle 18 makes clear that “lawyers shall not be identified with their clients or their clients’ causes as a result of discharging their functions.”

B. Harassment and Intimidation of Patrick Finucane

RUC officers allegedly made derogatory comments about Patrick Finucane for years before his murder.  Finucane’s former clients confirm this abuse, as do his own notes of meetings with clients at the special detention centers.  In addition to calling Finucane names, many of the remarks accused him of membership in the IRA.[19]  Initially, Patrick Finucane saw such comments as an interrogation device aimed at pressuring detainees to talk by discrediting their legal representative.  As the comments became more frequent, however, Finucane began to understand that the abuse was directed personally at him.

The prevalence of this abuse is suggested by an encounter described by John Stalker, the former Deputy Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police.   In the mid-1980s, Stalker had led an independent investigation into the alleged “shoot to kill” deaths of six men in 1982.  All six men were killed by RUC officers.  In his 1988 book about that investigation, Stalker recounts a conversation he had in 1984 or 1985 with an RUC sergeant who castigated him for even talking with Finucane:

The sergeant came up to me and said, “May I speak with you Mr Stalker?”  “Do you know who that was you were speaking to?”  I replied, “Yes – it was Martin McCauley[20] and his solicitor.”  The sergeant said, “The solicitor is an IRA man — any man who represents the IRA is an IRA man. . . I have to say that I believe that a senior policeman of your rank should not be seen speaking to the likes of [him].  My colleagues have asked me to tell you that you have embarrassed all of us in doing that.  I will be reporting this conversation and what you have done to my superiors.”[21] 

C. Death Threats

Patrick Finucane also received many death threats during his career.  These threats began in the 1970s but escalated dramatically in the year before his death.  Some of the threats were delivered directly to Finucane, through phone calls to his home.[22]  Others were relayed through his clients.  Over the years, many of Finucane’s clients reported that police officers had threatened the solicitor during interviews at the special detention centers.

Patrick McGeown, one of Finucane’s clients, reported that he was stopped by a joint patrol of the RUC and British Army in 1988, shortly after Finucane secured his release from the Crumlin Road Jail.  An RUC officer pulled him aside and said, “Don’t think you got away with that.  We intend to make sure you won’t be about too long.”  The officer added, “And your mate, Pat, we’ll fix him too.”[23]  This threat took on new significance in December 1988 when a loyalist paramilitary group produced a magazine with articles threatening to kill McGeown and Finucane.  The magazine displayed a photograph of McGeown with a beard.  In 1992, McGeown told us that when he saw the photograph, he realized that it must have come from an official source.  He said that the only time he was other than clean-shaven was when he was in prison.[24]

Brian Gillen, another of Finucane’s clients, told us that after Finucane filed a habeas petition on his behalf, his RUC interrogators remarked, “[I]t would be better if he were dead than defending the likes of you.”  The officers added, “We can give them [detained loyalists paramilitaries] his details along with yours.”  In early 1989, the threats became more insistent.  One client reported that the police asked for details about Finucane and told him, “Finucane is an IRA man.  He’s a dead man.  He’ll be dead within three months.”  Another was informed that “like every other Fenian bastard, he would meet his end.”  A month before he was killed, RUC officers allegedly told another of Finucane’s clients, “Fucking Finucane’s getting took out.”[25]

D. Official Statements

In the context of these threats, an official statement made on the floor of Parliament in early 1989 significantly increased Patrick Finucane’s vulnerability.  Douglas Hogg MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, made the now infamous statement during a debate over the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill.  On January 17, 1989, Hogg said:

I have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA. --[Interruption.]   I repeat that there are in the Province a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.  One has to bear that in mind.[26]

Seamus Mallon,[27] a Member of Parliament from the moderate nationalist Social Democratic & Labour Party (SDLP), immediately rose to challenge Hogg:

That is a remarkable statement for a Minister to make about members of a profession who have borne much of the heat in a traumatic and abnormal situation.  Such words should not be said without the courage to support them.  I find it appalling that the Minister should make such an accusation with such emphasis, and without, it seems, the intention of substantiating it.[28]

Hogg merely reiterated his allegations, however.  He claimed, “I state it on the basis of advice that I have received, guidance that I have been given by people who are dealing with these matters, and I shall not expand on it further.”[29] 

In response, Mallon warned:

I have no doubt that there are lawyers walking the streets or driving on the roads of the North of Ireland who have become targets for assassins’ bullets as a result of the statement that has been made tonight. . . Following the Minister’s statement, people’s lives are in grave danger.  People who have brought cases to the European Court against this legislation will be suspected.  People accused of IRA membership and other activities will be suspected.  We have thrown a blanket over many lawyers in the North of Ireland, and it will be on the head of this Minister and Government if the assassin’s bullet decides to do, by lead, what this Minister has done by word.[30]

Hogg’s statement created an instant uproar in Northern Ireland, particularly among Northern Ireland’s legal community.  As Mallon had emphasized, the statement seemed to buttress loyalists’ claims that defense solicitors were IRA members and therefore “legitimate” targets.  Finucane was murdered less than a month after Hogg made his remarks.

No one within the government or the police has ever explained the basis for Hogg’s allegations.  As a junior minister, Hogg would have been privy to briefings from the RUC and MI5, and it has long been known that he met with RUC officers during a visit to Belfast in January 1989.[31]  Sir John Hermon, RUC Chief Constable at the time of Finucane’s murder, told The Daily Telegraph in 1999 that Hogg’s statement was “based on fact.”[32]  On June 13, 2001, the Guardian reported that in an interview with detectives, Hogg had adamantly denied knowing anything about the loyalist plot to shoot Finucane, although “he conceded that he had been briefed by the RUC about the activities of solicitors in Belfast who allegedly had republican sympathies.”[33]  Although this admission was a significant step toward uncovering the basis for Hogg’s statement, the specifics of this briefing remain shrouded in secrecy.

The Lawyers Committee believes that Hogg’s statement undercut the government’s commitment to international legal principles protecting defense lawyers.  In particular, it violates the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, which states very clearly, “Lawyers shall not be identified with their clients or their clients’ causes as a result of discharging their functions.”[34]  Despite this, neither Hogg nor the UK government has ever issued an apology for the statement.

I.       The Murder

On Sunday, February 12, 1989, Patrick Finucane, his wife, Geraldine, and their three children aged 9, 13, and 17, were eating dinner and watching television in the kitchen of their home in North Belfast.  At approximately 7:25 p.m., a loud noise burst from the front door.  Finucane and his wife jumped up from the table, and Finucane opened the glass fire door leading to the front hall.  Two masked figures dressed in black with camouflage jackets were advancing down the hall with guns drawn.  Mrs. Finucane, who was standing just behind her husband, tried to activate a panic alarm behind the kitchen door.  According to Finucane’s eldest son, his father’s last act was to throw himself up against the glass door.  Two or three shots shattered the glass and hit Finucane in the chest and stomach, leaving him lying face up on the floor.  The gunmen entered the kitchen and shot Finucane at close range in the head and neck about a dozen more times.  At some point, Mrs. Finucane was wounded in the ankle, probably by a ricocheting bullet.  The children were unharmed physically but witnessed the entire incident. 

Police and neighbors arrived within minutes of the shooting, but Patrick Finucane was already dead.  On Monday, February 13, 1989, a man delivered the following statement to the press by telephone.

The UFF [Ulster Freedom Fighters] claim responsibility for the execution of Pat Finucane, the PIRA [Provisional Irish Republican Army] Officer, not the solicitor.  While Provos continue to execute Loyalists and members of the security forces who share their lunch with them, then there will be inevitable retaliation. 

The UFF is a cover name used by the Ulster Defense Assocation (UDA), Northern Ireland’s largest loyalist paramilitary group.[35]  The UDA has used this cover name since 1973 to claim responsibility for sectarian killings.[36] 

Contrary to the UDA/UFF’s assertion, there has never been any evidence that Patrick Finucane was a member of the IRA.  Indeed, the RUC officer in charge of the murder investigation made clear:  “The Police refute the claim that Mr. Finucane was a member of the PIRA.  He was just a law-abiding citizen going about his professional duties in a professional manner.”[37]  The current police Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, re-emphasized this fact after the March 15, 1999 murder of Rosemary Nelson, the second Northern Ireland human rights lawyer to be killed in ten years.[38]  Flanagan made clear that Nelson and Finucane were both “highly professional solicitors doing nothing more than their professional best to represent the interests of their clients.”[39]

The investigations after the murder revealed that the gunmen arrived in a taxi stolen in the loyalist Forthriver area.[40]  Taxi driver William Reid reported that three men had hijacked his taxi, telling him that it was needed “for the cause.”[41]  Reid also reported that the men had seemed highly nervous.  The car was discovered abandoned on the evening of the murder.

                        For some time leading up to the murder, police roadblocks had been in place close to the Finucane home.[42]  The roadblocks were removed about an hour before the murder.[43]  Whether or not this was a coincidence, it made the murderers’ job much easier, as they were able to approach the house unobstructed and escaped without hindrance.[44]

II.    The CORONER’S Inquest

Coroner John Leckey conducted the inquest into the murder of Patrick Fincuane in September 1990.  At the inquest, Dr. Jack Crane testified that Finucane was struck by 14 bullets to the head, neck, and trunk.  At least one of the bullets that hit Finucane’s head was fired from a range of 15 inches.  At least 11 of the bullets were fired from a 9mm Browning automatic pistol and two were from a .38 special revolver. 

Detective Superintendent Alan Simpson, the officer in charge of the initial RUC investigation, testified that the Browning was one of 13 weapons stolen from Palace Army Barracks in August 1987 by a member of the Army’s Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR).[45] Detective Superintendent Simpson also testified that Finucane’s murder was “unusual both for its ferocity and the fact that he was struck by all 14 shots fired.”  Simpson told the court that the murder was carried out with such precision that he believed the killers must have murdered before.  Indeed, Simpson surmised that the reportedly “nervous” men who hijacked the taxi were not the assassins.  At the inquest, Simpson also revealed that the police had interviewed 14 people in connection with the murder.  He said that none of the 14 interviewed had any connection with the security forces.[46]

Inquests are public hearings in Northern Ireland.  Because of the lack of other public investigative procedures, the inquest has become the most popular legal forum for attempts to challenge the conduct of the security forces in controversial killings.[47]  At Patrick Finucane’s inquest, for example, his widow, Geraldine, attempted to submit a statement concerning threats made to her husband at Castlereagh Detention Centre.  The RUC’s counsel objected, and the coroner excluded the document on grounds of irrelevance.[48]

The inquest system in Northern Ireland has been criticized for its narrow focus and limited powers.  The coroner can determine only the identity of the deceased, the time, place, and method of death.  He or she may not look into the broader circumstances of the death or determine who was responsible.  Indeed, coroners in Northern Ireland cannot compel the attendance of any person suspected of causing the death.[49]  Further, unlike the inquest system in place in England, neither juries nor coroners may reach verdicts such as “unlawful killing.”  Until very recently, legal aid was not available to the family and they were denied all access to statements and documents until just before the relevant witness testified.  In addition, the government often issues Public Interest Immunity Certificates to prevent the disclosure of information and documents it deems important to “national security.”[50]  

In a series of decisions issued on May 4, 2001, the European Court of Human Rights found that there were serious flaws in inquest proceedings in Northern Ireland.[51]  While the Court made clear that its decisions were based on the application of the inquest procedures to the particular facts of the cases, the holdings strongly suggest that the flaws in the Finucane inquest violated Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[52]  Specifically, the Court criticized the coroner’s inability to compel the attendance of particular witnesses, the refusal to address serious and legitimate concerns of the family (such as collusion in the murder), and the proscription of a verdict or findings “which could play an effective role in securing a prosecution in respect of any criminal offence which may have been disclosed” – all elements present in the Finucane inquest.[53]

III. The INITIAL RUC Investigation

Information about the initial police investigation into the murder of Patrick Finucane is limited and comes mostly from the RUC’s testimony at the 1990 inquest.  The RUC refused to talk to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights about its investigation during our first fact-finding mission into the murder in 1992.  At the inquest, the RUC testified that it had interviewed 14 suspects and were “reasonably sure that the main perpetrators of the murder were among these suspects,” despite the fact that “no evidence is presently available to sustain a charge of murder.”  On July 4, 1989, three men were arrested for possessing the Browning pistol used to kill Finucane; all three were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a young offenders’ center.  The RUC reported at the time that none of these three men was involved in the murder.  In our 1993 report, the Lawyers Committee noted, “[I]t is not apparent why, given the RUC’s extraordinary powers of interrogation, it has been unable to tie the weapons to an assassin.”[54]  Indeed, at the time of that report, the police had made no effort to conduct certain basic and obvious investigative tasks, such as interviewing Geraldine Finucane, Peter Madden, or any of Finucane’s clients. 

Thirteen years after the murder, the weapon still has not been tied to the gunmen – at least not publicly – and the RUC’s failure to bring the perpetrators to justice soon after the killing must be viewed in the context of new information.  This information, which is discussed in Chapters 3-6, suggests at least prior knowledge, if not active involvement by members of the security forces in Finucane’s murder.  The Lawyers Committee believes that this information must be brought before a full, independent public inquiry.

IV.              The Stevens Investigations

A.     Introduction

                        In the thirteen years since Patrick Finucane was murdered, the UK government has firmly resisted calls to establish a public inquiry into the killing.  As described in detail in the final chapter, a public inquiry is an investigation by an independent tribunal with full judicial powers. Among the most important attributes of such an inquiry are its transparency to the public and its independence from the security forces implicated in the killing.  These are both basic elements of accountability under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as emphasized by the European Court of Human Rights in its May 4, 2001 judgments on Northern Ireland.[55]  The ultimate goal of such an inquiry would be to publicly uncover the truth about Finucane’s killing.  

The government has repeatedly justified its refusal to establish a public inquiry in Finucane’s case by claiming that a public inquiry could jeopardize on-going criminal investigations.[56]  These investigations, three in number, have all been headed by Sir John Stevens, the current Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London.  As this report goes to press, the third Stevens investigation drags on.  The third Stevens investigation, like the first two, has so far failed to bring anyone to justice for the Finucane murder.

B. Stevens I

The first Stevens investigation was not, in fact, established to investigate the murder of Patrick Finucane.  It was created to examine allegations of collusion following the August 1989 killing of Loughlin Maginn by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), the same UDA cover name used to claim the Finucane murder.  The UFF claimed that Maginn, a 28 year-old Catholic, was a member of the IRA.  When Maginn’s family challenged this, the UFF told the press they were certain Maginn was an IRA man because they had seen RUC intelligence to this effect.  The paramilitaries sought to prove their claims by showing journalists documents they had obtained from sources in the security services.  Instead of assuaging public opinion, the evidence of these leaks created a furor, and the Irish government demanded action. 

Then RUC Chief Constable Hugh Annesley invited John Stevens, at the time Deputy Chief Constable of the Cambridgeshire Police, to examine charges of collusion between members of the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries.  Stevens finished his investigation in May 1990, producing a classified report, a public summary, and recommendations for preventing future leaks.  In the public summary, Stevens made clear that there had been instances of collusion between members of the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries.  Stevens concluded, however, that such collusion was "restricted to a small number of members of the security forces” and was “neither widespread nor institutionalised.”[57]

The first Stevens investigation resulted in the arrest of 94 people, the charging or recommended charging of 59, the prosecution of 47, and a total of 183 convictions for separate offenses.[58]  Many of those prosecuted were charged with offenses such as “the possession of documents likely to be of use to terrorists.”  Many of these were classified documents, such as photo-montages of republican suspects, that were leaked from security force intelligence files. The Lawyers Committee understands that there were approximately 2,000 leaked documents in all.[59]

Most of those charged in connection with Stevens I, however, were the loyalists who had received the leaked documents, as opposed to the members of the security forces who had actually leaked them.[60]  Strikingly, not one of the prosecutions was of an RUC officer, despite the fact that some of the leaked material was from police files.  Stevens reported that he had not uncovered evidence that would “substantiate” charges of police collusion.[61]  In recent years however, information has emerged suggesting that Stevens did recommend charges against two police officers, but the Director of Public Prosecutions determined that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charges.[62] 

The Stevens I investigation did not result in any prosecutions for the murder of Patrick Finucane.  Stevens told the Lawyers Committee in 1992 that limited time, resources, and terms of reference prevented his team from tracking down every lead in the Finucane case.  He indicated that anything that was uncovered would probably have been turned over to the RUC.  The public summary of the investigation did not even mention Patrick Finucane.

C. Stevens II

                        In the year or two following the first Stevens investigation, there was silence concerning Finucane’s murder on the part of the authorities.  In the years since, we have learned that much was happening under cover of that silence.  It took the pioneering work of investigative journalists from the BBC’s Panorama program, however, to break the silence and force the government into action.  On June 8, 1992, the Panorama team aired its findings in a television documentary entitled “The Dirty War.”[63]  

“The Dirty War” exposed the existence and activities of a British Army operative who worked as the chief intelligence officer for the Ulster Defense Association (“UDA”) from 1987 until 1990.  This operative, named Brian Nelson, had been arrested in January 1990 as a result of the first Stevens investigation. [64]   Nelson was indicted on 35 counts of conspiracy to murder, aiding and abetting murder, and lesser offenses.[65]  On January 22, 1990, Nelson pleaded guilty to 20 counts in all, including five counts of conspiracy to murder.  He also pleaded not guilty to two counts of aiding and abetting murder.  The remaining 13 counts were simply left on the books.[66]  The court later sentenced Nelson to ten years in prison on the five counts of conspiracy to murder.  He received lesser sentences on the remaining 15 counts that ran concurrently with the ten year sentence.  

Not one of the 35 counts against Brian Nelson related to the murder of Patrick Finucane.  While some elements of Nelson’s story emerged during his 1990 trial, it was not until Nelson agreed to discuss his activities with BBC investigative journalists John Ware and Geoffrey Seed that the extent of Nelson’s involvement in the Finucane murder began to emerge.  The Panorama program alleged that Nelson had warned the British Army that Patrick Finucane was being considered as a target by the UDA in late 1988.  The program also indicated that Army intelligence played an active role in assisting Nelson’s UDA activities by confirming key facts, updating intelligence files, and providing photographs of UDA targets.   

                        The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) requested a transcript of the Panorama program and wrote to RUC Chief Constable Annesley to ask if the Finucane case should be further investigated.  The Lawyers Committee has learned from a credible source that the DPP did not invoke his statutory powers to require a follow-up investigation.  Shortly thereafter, the Chief Constable called John Stevens back to conduct a second investigation.  Stevens completed his second investigation in 1995, and sent a total of three reports to the DPP.  Neither the terms of reference for the second investigation, nor the reports arising from the investigation, have been made public.

                        The second Stevens investigation produced few, if any results.  Unlike the first report, the follow-up did not lead to any reforms or prosecutions.  Stevens spoke to a delegation from the Lawyers Committee during a 1995 mission to Northern Ireland.  He stressed that he had conducted a thorough investigation into Nelson's activities, including those relating to the Finucane murder, though he added that he could not discuss specific findings.  He explained that he was not at liberty to say whether he had recommended charges against anyone for the murder, since he was bound by the Official Secrets Act.[67]  He did indicate, however, that he knew “absolutely” who Finucane’s killers were.[68]

                        The exact terms of reference of the first two Stevens investigations are unclear.  Over the years, various representatives of the UK government have given conflicting accounts of the extent to which these investigations concerned Finucane’s murder.  On April 16, 1999, for example, Doug Henderson MP, a junior Minister in the Ministry of Defence, gave the following answer to a Parliamentary Question about the Finucane case: “The murder of Patrick Finucane was investigated both by the RUC and subsequently by the investigation team led by Sir John Stevens, then Deputy Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire.”[69]  Meanwhile, a week later, Stevens told Peter Madden, Finucane’s former law partner, that the first two investigations “primarily related to the activities of the so-called 'double agent' Brian Nelson.  At no time was I given the authority by either the Chief Constable of the RUC or the Director of Public Prosecutions to investigate the murder of Patrick Finucane."[70]  The differing accounts illustrate the UK government’s contradictory stance in arguing that a public inquiry is not required (because the murder has been investigated fully), while also justifying a third investigation led by Stevens (because the first two investigations were not focused on the murder).

D. Stevens III

                        On February 12, 1999, the tenth anniversary of Patrick Finucane’s murder, the London based human rights organization British Irish Rights Watch (BIRW), presented a new report on the Finucane case to the UK and Irish governments.  This confidential report, “Deadly Intelligence,” contained detailed evidence concerning the extent of official collusion in the killing.  Because it includes extensive information about named individuals, “Deadly Intelligence” is not publicly available.  

Two months after BIRW delivered its report to the governments, Stevens was called back for a third investigation.  There is some controversy concerning whether the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or the RUC Chief Constable was responsible for the decision to recall Stevens.  The Lawyers Committee has learned from two credible sources that the RUC Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan ultimately made that decision.[71]  Furthermore, the Lawyers Committee has been informed by a credible source that Stevens will deliver his third report directly to the Chief Constable, who has the authority to determine whether to make the report public (in whole or in part).

Upon his re-appointment, Stevens set up a new investigative team comprised originally of detective officers from the Organised Crime Group, New Scotland Yard, Northumbria Police; and augmented by one police executive who was on the original Stevens investigation.[72]  In the years since, the team has fluctuated in number depending on the immediate focus of the investigation.  No RUC officers were appointed to the team.  Several months after Stevens began the third investigation, he was appointed as the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police.[73]  Although Stevens continues to lead the third investigation, Hugh Orde, a Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, has taken over day-to-day control of operations.  

The terms of reference for the current Stevens investigation are: "to investigate on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Northern Ireland) the document produced by British Irish Rights Watch but also to review the investigation of the murder of Mr. Patrick Finucane in its entirety. You may absorb into your investigation any matter elicited during its progress which appears to you to be linked or otherwise connected to it."  The team was said to be beginning the investigation into the Finucane murder from scratch, not relying on the RUC’s early investigative efforts.[74]

Soon after the third Stevens investigation began, members of Patrick Finucane’s family, including his widow Geraldine, stated publicly that they would not cooperate with the investigation.  The family considers the third investigation a charade, an attempt to stall their long-standing campaign for a full independent public inquiry into the murder.[75]  Family members emphasized that Stevens III is yet another investigation instigated by the RUC and reporting to the RUC.[76]  The family’s lack of confidence in the third investigation was compounded by the continued (and continuing) secrecy surrounding the past two Stevens investigations and the fact that Stevens had not attempted to contact members of the Finucane family during those investigations.

In the almost three years since the third investigation began, the Stevens team has arrested about 30 individuals.  Some of these arrests have resulted in recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions that suspects be prosecuted for various crimes, including weapons possession and the possession of documents likely to be of use to terrorists.[77]  So far, no one has been successfully prosecuted in relation to Patrick Finucane’s murder, however.  And the Stevens III team has made clear that they will probably not be able to bring his killers to justice.  A source close to the investigation told the BBC in June 2001 that the chances of getting the "trigger puller" were "between zero and 5%.”[78]  In November 2001, Hugh Orde, the officer in charge of the day-to-day running of the investigation, told the press that that it was “unlikely” that they would catch the killers.[79]   

One of the arrests made by the Stevens III team did lead to a murder charge, however.  On June 23, 1999, William Stobie, an agent for RUC Special Branch, was charged with the murder of Patrick Finucane.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the charges were later commuted to aiding and abetting, and then after long delays even these charges collapsed.  Evidence has emerged in the last few years suggesting that Stobie was but one player in a much larger system of collusion, and that the Finucane case is only one of a large group of cases in which the intelligence forces overstepped the bounds of law and surrendered basic respect for human rights. 

I.                   Introduction

A.      Institutionalized Collusion

When the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights sent its first mission to Northern Ireland in 1992, we set out to investigate allegations that defense lawyers in Northern Ireland had been systematically harassed and intimidated.  As part of this mission, we investigated reports that members of the security forces had colluded with loyalist paramilitaries in the 1989 murder of Patrick Finucane.  The evidence we uncovered astonished us.  Lurking behind the murder lay an elaborate system of intrigue and double agents – a system controlled by the UK government.  In our 1993 report, we concluded that there was substantial evidence suggesting RUC and British Army collusion in the murder of Patrick Finucane.  Over the last decade, additional evidence has emerged linking the security forces to the murder, and we now return forcefully to the conclusions we first published in 1993.  We believe that the UK government must immediately establish a full, independent public inquiry into the murder of Patrick Finucane.  We believe that no other avenue is legitimate, given the lack of transparency and independence of the many official investigations to date.

Indeed, the evidence that has emerged in the Finucane case has stretched the traditional concept of collusion to its breaking point.  In Northern Ireland, the term collusion conjures up images of an isolated officer or group of officers slipping files to members of paramilitary groups.   According to many sources, what was actually at work in Northern Ireland was much more entrenched.  A complex web of intelligence units infiltrated agents deep within paramilitary organizations.  These agents operated actively as republican and loyalist paramilitaries, while reporting back to their government handlers.  In this context, collusion is an institutionalized phenomenon, one that wears away the boundary between paramilitary and government.  The consequences of institutionalized collusion take many forms, such as the failure to prevent an impending hit, the suggestion of one target instead of another, or the hint that a law-abiding, but troublesome human rights activist might actually be the hired hand of the IRA.

To make sense of institutionalized collusion, it is important to understand the security apparatus that was in place at the time of the Finucane murder.  Drawing on interviews and on information that has become public in recent years, we present a brief sketch below.  The picture remains incomplete because the UK government will not divulge the workings of all the various units in place in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s.  Until this information is made public, we cannot know the true scope of institutionalized collusion in cases like Patrick Finucane’s. 

B. TCGs: Coordination between the Security Forces

                        From the onset of the Troubles,[80] the British Army and the RUC have had overlapping responsibilities when it comes to fighting paramilitary violence.  Each created specialized units for specific types of covert operations.  These units included the RUC’s Special Branch and Special Support Units (SSUs), and the Army’s 14^th Intelligence Company (“Reconaissance Unit”), Special Air Service (SAS), and the Force Research Unit (FRU).  This was all in addition to MI5, the UK intelligence service responsible for domestic security.  With overlapping jurisdictions and a proliferation of specialized units, coordinating efforts was undoubtedly difficult.  To enhance cooperation between the units, the UK government set up integrated intelligence centers called Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs).[81] 

                        Because of the government’s underlying policy of police primacy, the TCGs were under the control of RUC Special Branch, the division of the police responsible for intelligence gathering.[82]  In interviews with the Lawyers Committee, Martin Ingram, a former member of the Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU), gave an account of the ways in which intelligence was passed from the FRU, a covert Army unit, to RUC Special Branch.[83]  Ingram told us that the FRU would pass information to the appropriate regional head of Special Branch, who was ultimately responsible for deciding what needed to be done as a result of this information.[84]  A TCG, which was staffed with members of the various intelligence units, would then implement (or coordinate the implementation of) this decision.[85]

The precise methods and extent to which these various units shared information via the TCGs remains unclear due to their secrecy, however.  While it is not possible to reconstruct the workings of all of the units that were in play at the time of Patrick Finucane’s murder, sufficient information has emerged to demonstrate that both the FRU and Special Branch had agents within the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the loyalist paramilitary organization that carried out the assassination of Patrick Finucane. 

II. Brian Nelson and the BRITISH ARMY

A. The Force Research Unit

The existence of the Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU) first came to light during the 1992 trial of Brian Nelson, the undercover Army operative arrested as a result of the first Stevens investigation.  During the trial and through information that later emerged, it became clear that the FRU operated by infiltrating agents into both republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland.[86]  Once inside, FRU agents were assigned to FRU officers who served as handlers, debriefing and counseling the agents.  According to media accounts, there were about 100 agents handled by 50 officers during the unit’s most active period.[87]  At Nelson’s trial, Lt. Colonel Gordon Kerr, the head of the FRU, revealed that there were no guidelines for the undercover agents’ activities.[88]  It is not clear whether the FRU still operates in Northern Ireland.[89]

According to journalists who have examined documents recording the contacts between FRU agents and their handlers, the FRU’s purpose – at least with respect to loyalist paramilitary organizations – was to refocus the killing power of loyalist paramilitaries away from random sectarian murders towards “legitimate” republican targets.[90]  British Irish Rights Watch has investigated the FRU extensively and summarized its concerns about the unit in these terms:

FRU's activities appear to have gone beyond isolated acts of collusion. Before the late 1980s, loyalist murders were often wholly sectarian and apparently random. After 1988 their capacity for murder increased dramatically and their targeting of victims became very much more precise. There seems very little doubt that FRU played a systematic role in this.[91]   

In September 1999, Ed Moloney, a prominent Northern Ireland journalist,[92] reported that the work of FRU agents was “routinely passed along to the very highest levels of the British government up to and including the present British Prime Minister Tony Blair.”[93]  Moloney claimed that “every week the FRU submits a report of its activities to the Joint Intelligence Committee which reports directly to Ten Downing Street.”[94]  Furthermore, a source with close contacts in the intelligence services told the Lawyers Committee that the FRU’s document system required the archiving of two copies of each document.  Copies that left the unit were recorded, making it extremely unlikely for documents to be lost.  This information indicates that if the regular procedures were followed in the Finucane case, the FRU’s involvement should have been documented.

B. Brian Nelson’s Background and FRU Role

Brian Nelson came from the predominantly Protestant Shankill Road area of West Belfast.  The Lawyers Committee understands that Nelson joined the Black Watch Regiment of the British Army in 1965 and joined the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) in 1972, the year after it was formed.  In 1974, Nelson was convicted of assault, intimidation, and related firearms offenses in connection with the UDA kidnapping and torture of Gerald Higgins, a Catholic man, in March 1973.  Sometime after Nelson was released from prison, he again became active in the UDA.  In 1983, he “offered his services” to British Army intelligence.[95]  In 1985, while still an informer for the British Army, Nelson became the intelligence officer of the West Belfast Brigade of the UDA.  Later that same year, however, Nelson left Northern Ireland and moved to Germany, apparently to begin a new life.

In 1987, the Army recruited Brian Nelson from Germany and brought him back to Northern Ireland to serve as an FRU agent and rejoin the UDA.[96]  The Army paid for the deposit on Nelson’s car and home, paid him a weekly salary, and set him up as a taxi driver.[97]  Specifically, the Army wanted to infiltrate Nelson back into the UDA’s intelligence structure.  Given his past experience, Nelson soon regained his position as intelligence officer for the West Belfast Brigade.  As intelligence officer, he was in charge of maintaining intelligence stores and targeting UDA victims.

With the active assistance and resources of the FRU, Nelson brought new order and professionalism to the UDA’s information-gathering system.  Indeed, Nelson became so adept that he effectively assumed the role of chief intelligence officer for the UDA as a whole.[98]  With FRU assistance, he introduced a system in which all relevant details about a possible UDA target were recorded on a “personality” card, or “P-Card.”[99]  When an assassination was planned, Nelson would hand the P-Card to the murder team.[100]  Furthermore, the FRU reportedly purchased two computers – one for the FRU and the other for Nelson – so that they could share intelligence information more easily by uploading and downloading FRU and UDA materials.[101]

The records of Nelson’s meetings with his handlers reveal that this system was part of a concentrated FRU strategy to ensure that “proper targeting of Provisional IRA members takes place prior to any shooting.”[102]  One such contact form, dated May 3, 1988, states: “6137 [Nelson’s code number] wants the UDA only to attack legitimate targets and not innocent Catholics.  Since 6137 took up his position as intelli