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Committee on the Administration of Justice &
Anor, Re An Application for Judicial Review [2005] NIQB 25 (18 March 2005)
Ref: KERF5235
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
________
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE AND MARTIN O'BRIEN FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
________
KERR LCJ
Introduction
[1] The Committee on the Administration of Justice
(CAJ) is an independent non-governmental organisation. Its purpose is to secure
the highest standards in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland and,
to that end, it works with domestic and international human rights groups. At
the time that these proceedings were launched, Martin O'Brien was its director.
[2] On 15 March 1999, Rosemary Nelson, a
well-known solicitor and a member of the executive committee of CAJ, was
murdered when a bomb that had been attached to her car exploded. A loyalist
paramilitary group, the Red Hand Commandos, claimed that they had carried out
this atrocity. Following her murder Mr O'Brien lodged a complaint with the
Police Ombudsman's office concerning the failure of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (the RUC) to properly investigate threats made against Mrs Nelson
before she was murdered.
[3] Mrs Nuala O'Loan is the Police Ombudsman for
Northern Ireland. In the course of her investigation into the complaint she
provided certain information to CAJ about the progress of her inquiries. This
prompted a request from CAJ that she disclose to them certain material relevant
to the investigation into Ms Nelson's murder. CAJ also asked the Chief Constable
to provide certain material. Both the Ombudsman and the Chief Constable refused
to provide the material sought. By these judicial review proceedings the
applicants challenge that refusal.
Background
[4] On 10 August 1998 Paul Mageean, legal
officer with CAJ, wrote to Adam Ingram, MP, a minister of state in the Northern
Ireland Office, enclosing two documents, in one of which explicit threats to the
life of Ms Nelson were made. The other document referred to her in a sinister
fashion. Mr Mageean suggested that these documents constituted very definite
threats to the personal safety of Ms Nelson. He called on Mr Ingram to
investigate these threats and to provide the necessary protection for Ms Nelson.
A letter from the minister's private secretary, dated 24 September 1998, in
response to Mr Mageean's letter stated that the documents had been passed
immediately to the Chief Constable's office for investigation. It also mentioned
a scheme run by the Northern Ireland Office by which security measures could be
installed in homes at public expense and gave information as to how Ms Nelson
might apply for inclusion in the scheme.
[5] The documents enclosed with Mr Mageean's
letter were not the first threats that Ms Nelson had received. These had begun
after she started to represent clients detained in police holding centres in
Northern Ireland. Her case was investigated by the United Nations special
rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers when he visited Northern
Ireland in 1997. In a draft of his report, the special rapporteur referred
specifically to Rosemary Nelson as one of a number of lawyers who had complained
of police harassment and threats. It is suggested that her name was removed at
the suggestion of the Chief Constable on the basis that her safety could not be
guaranteed if she was named in the report. On 29 September 1998 Ms Nelson gave
evidence to a subcommittee of the United States Congress about threats to her
and her family.
[6] On 22 March 1999 two detective officers of
the RUC called at the offices of CAJ asking for the originals of the documents
that had been enclosed with Mr Mageean's letter of 10 August 1998. They
explained that they wished to have the documents tested for fingerprint and DNA
traces. On 29 March 1999, Colin Port, the deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk was
appointed by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, the Chief Constable of the RUC to take charge
of the investigation into Ms Nelson's death.
[7] At a meeting in April 1999 of the Police
Authority for Northern Ireland, Sir Ronnie Flanagan was asked whether Ms Nelson
had requested or whether she had been offered security protection. According to
the minutes of the meeting, Sir Ronnie replied that Ms Nelson had not sought
security advice and that, prior to her death, the RUC did not have information
to suggest that she was the subject of a specific terrorist threat. When CAJ
became aware of this statement they challenged the Chief Constable publicly as
to its accuracy. This led to a newspaper article in the Irish Times on 27 May
1999 in which CAJ was quoted as having expressed disbelief at the Chief
Constable's statement. Subsequently a press statement was issued by the RUC
which stated: -
"There is no discrepancy between what the Chief Constable told the Police
Authority in 1999 and the correspondence between the CAJ, the Minister's office
and the Chief Constable's office in August/September 1998. As a result of the
said correspondence, the CAJ was advised by the Minister's office a to how Mrs
Nelson might apply to have protective measures installed at her home; how she
could contact local police crime prevention officers for advice; and even how
she might apply for a personal protection firearm. None of these possibilities
was followed through.
The Chief Constable's answers to the Police Authority in April 1999 refer to the
fact that the RUC itself did not have information to substantiate a threat to
Mrs Nelson's life before her murder. Further in response to a specific question
he said he was unaware of any request made to the Prime Minister's office for
protection to her."
[8] On 3 June 1999 Mr O'Brien wrote to the Chief
Constable. He referred to the correspondence with Mr Ingram and the two
documents enclosed with the letter from Mr Mageean. He asked a number of
questions about whether an investigation had been carried out on foot of the
information that Mr Ingram's secretary had said had been passed to the RUC and,
if so, about the nature of the inquiries conducted. This letter received an
acknowledgment from the Chief Constable's office but no substantive reply.
Ultimately, it was suggested that a meeting might be a better way to deal with
the queries raised and this took place at the Chief Constable's office on 4
October 1999.
[9] Mr O'Brien wrote again to the Chief
Constable on 9 March 2000, reminding him that at the meeting on 4 October 1999,
he had undertaken to send a "written composite response" to the letters about
the Rosemary Nelson case and other matters raised at the meeting. This had not
been forthcoming and Mr O'Brien pointed out that Mr Mageean would be giving
evidence to a US Congressional hearing on 14 March and that it would be helpful
if a written response, particularly in relation to the Nelson case, could be
received before that date.
[10] On 14 March 2000 the Chief Constable wrote
to Mr O'Brien. On the matter of Ms Nelson, he said: -
"I explained at our meeting, having called in Colin Port and John Stevens
respectively in connection with the investigation of the murders of Rosemary
Nelson and Pat Finucane, and having given them such an independent remit, it is
much more appropriate for them rather than me to discuss aspects of their
ongoing investigations which at this stage are appropriate for discussion. The
remit given to them places no obstacle whatever for ongoing interaction between
them and your organisation and others. This is something I very much encourage.
In connection with your letter of 3 June 1999 specifically relating to the
murder of Mrs Nelson, I explained to you at our meeting that the RUC itself had
no intelligence prior to Mrs Nelson's death to indicate a threat of the dreadful
atrocity that was to be carried out. In relation to the documents to which you
refer, as these remain a matter of ongoing investigation, neither I nor Mr Port
believe that it is appropriate to discuss the details you raise while the
investigation is current. You should be aware, however, that in relation to the
threatening note received by Mrs Nelson, nothing of potential forensic value was
lost in the period between the sending of the note and its subsequent forensic
examination. At this stage, nothing has been disclosed in the examination which
has assisted Mr Port's inquiry."
[11] On 19 October 2000 Mr Mageean wrote to the
Chief Constable. Part of that letter is as follows: -
"… we understand that the investigation in relation to the documents is now
complete and that this issue is once again under consideration by your office.
In these circumstances, we would be grateful if you could indicate to us the
outcome of the police inquiries in relation to the documents. You will
understand that we remain concerned to discover what steps, if any, were taken
by the police when they received the threatening documents from Minister
Ingram's office."
[12] An acknowledgement of that letter was sent
from the Chief Constable's office but no substantive reply was received. Mr
O'Brien then wrote to the Chief Constable on 20 November 2000 stating that his
failure to reply to CAJ's queries about the police investigations had reinforced
their suspicions that the threats had not been properly investigated by the
Chief Constable's office. He informed the Chief Constable that, in consequence,
a complaint had been made to the Police Ombudsman.
[13] The complaint to the Ombudsman outlined
the matters set out in summary above. It also dealt in somewhat greater detail
with the matters discussed at the meeting on 4 October 1999. According to the
complaint document, Sir Ronnie had told the CAJ delegation that the RUC had
carried out an assessment of the security risk to Ms Nelson and had concluded
that there was nothing to suggest a threat from loyalist paramilitaries at the
time (presumably when they received the documents from Mr Ingram's office).
[14] The complaint also detailed a meeting that
the CAJ and other groups had with Mr Port on 21 March 2000. It stated that Mr
Port had indicated a definite line of inquiry in relation to one suspect who, it
was believed, had been the author of one of the documents that had been sent to
Mr Ingram's office by CAJ. This prompted the suggestion that had a proper
investigation of these documents and the originals been undertaken sooner, this
person might have been identified and Rosemary Nelson's death might have been
avoided. The complaint also referred to the publication in a local newspaper on
7 May 2000 of a section of the diary of Billy Wright, a loyalist paramilitary
murdered in HM Prison the Maze in December 1997. This extract should have raised
serious concerns about possible attack on Ms Nelson, CAJ claimed. It was
suggested that the RUC must have had access to the diary after Mr Wright's
murder and that Ms Nelson ought to have been warned about these risks. Moreover,
the existence of the diary cast further doubt, CAJ claimed, on the Chief
Constable's statement to the Police Authority that he was unaware of any
terrorist threat.
[15] The complaint document outlined a number
of steps which, it suggested, the Ombudsman's office should take. Among these
was the submission that several documents should be obtained and that CAJ should
also be given sight of these. The documents were: -
1. The RUC report documenting the actions that the RUC took or failed to take in
connection with the threats against Rosemary Nelson that Minister Ingram
forwarded to the Chief Constable's office;
2. Mr Port's review of the RUC report;
3. The original letter from the Minister to the Chief Constable and all
subsequent related correspondence;
4. A copy of the RUC's security assessment on Rosemary Nelson;
5. A copy of any guidance which exists for carrying out security assessments;
6. A copy of any relevant pages in Mr Wright's diary;
7. A copy of any reports documenting the RUC's investigation of the threats made
against Rosemary Nelson in Mr Wright'
[16] On 24 April 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to the
Police Ombudsman asking for a "general update" on the progress of the
investigation and posing a number of specific queries. The letter also asked
that the Police Ombudsman provide CAJ with a number of documents associated with
the investigation. David Wood, director of investigations in the Police
Ombudsman's office replied on 30 April 2001, answering the queries raised but
making it clear that documents obtained in the course of the investigation could
not be provided to CAJ. The letter ended with this passage: -
"I hope this information is of assistance to you; the investigation is now well
under way after the initial difficulties. I would hope that all documentation
will have been inspected within the next two weeks but I am obviously in the
hands of the RUC. I will be as open as I can with you in respect of the
conclusions reached but you must understand that confidential documents secured
by us during the course of an investigation must remain confidential. You are,
of course, free to request the documentation to which you refer from the RUC but
it must be a matter for the Chief Constable as whether he discloses it to you.
We are given extremely strong powers to require such documentation in order that
the public can be satisfied that in the investigation of complaints we can
achieve such access to ensure all aspects are properly investigated. You can
thus be assured that all apparent avenues of investigation will be pursued."
[17] Further correspondence was exchanged
between Mr O'Brien and Mr Wood on 17 May and 4 June 2001 with Mr O'Brien
renewing his claim to see material obtained by the Police Ombudsman in the
course of the investigation and Mr Wood resisting that claim and pointing out
that documents were received by his office on a confidential basis and it was
for the owners or makers of the documents to decide whether to release the
material to CAJ.
[18] A meeting between representatives of CAJ
and Mr Wood and Mrs O'Loan took place on 22 June. After that meeting, on 10 July
2001, Mr O'Brien wrote a long letter to Mr Wood raising a number of points that
emerged during the meeting and returning to the theme of the production of
documents. The following documents were specified: -
1. The correspondence between the Northern Ireland Office and the RUC following
the dispatch of the material by CAJ to Mr Ingram;
2. The internal review of the RUC investigation and the report of Mr Port on
that review;
3. Documents relating to the assessment by the RUC of the risk to Rosemary
Nelson's life;
4. The criteria for the risk assessment.
[19] Mr O'Brien's letter claimed that recent
jurisprudence in the European Court of Human Rights supported his claim that CAJ
was entitled to see this material. On 20 July 2001 Mr Wood replied. He rejected
the request for disclosure of the materials sought. He referred to recent
judicial authority in Northern Ireland which, he said, supported the stance that
the Police Ombudsman's office had taken on the matter of disclosure but stated
that the office did not operate a blanket policy of refusal to disclose. Each
case was treated on its merits but documents supplied on a confidential basis
would generally not be disclosed.
[20] On 25 September 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to
the Chief Constable informing him of the request that CAJ had made of the Police
Ombudsman for disclosure of the documents enumerated in the letter of 10 July
and of her refusal to disclose them He then asked that the Chief Constable agree
to produce the documents for CAJ. Superintendent Hamill replied on behalf of the
Chief Constable on 18 October 2001. He stated that the Chief Constable
considered that these documents were confidential and he refused to disclose
them.
[21] On 12 December 2001 Mr O'Brien wrote to Mr
Wood after they had met some short time before in order that CAJ representatives
be shown the draft report of the Police Ombudsman into the CAJ complaint. A
number of matters are dealt with in the letter that are not directly relevant to
the issues that arise in this application. Two specific items are germane. Mr
O'Brien complained that the report failed to set out what changes had been made
to procedures as a result of the internal RUC review. He suggested that CAJ
could not determine what these changes were because they had not been supplied
with the relevant documents. He also protested that CAJ was placed at a
disadvantage because they were unaware of the changes suggested by either the
internal review or the review conducted by Mr Port. Apart from these specific
complaints, however, the letter contained a long commentary on, and, at places,
critique of the draft report. It also made a large number of suggestions as to
the amendment of the report and lines of inquiry that might be pursued.
[22] On 21 December 2001 Mr Mageean wrote to
Mrs O'Loan and the Chief Constable asking them to reconsider their refusal to
disclose the documents sought in the letter of 10 July 2001, advising them that
CAJ had received counsel's opinion that there were grounds to challenge the
decision not to disclose these documents by way of judicial review. On 17
January 2002 Superintendent Hamill replied maintaining the Chief Constable's
position as outlined in the letter of 18 October 2001. Mrs O'Loan replied on 13
February 2002 confirming her refusal to disclose the documents.
The judicial review application
[23] The Order 53 statement seeks an order of
certiorari quashing the decisions of the Police Ombudsman and the Chief
Constable refusing to disclose the requested material to the applicants,
together with a declaration that the applicants are entitled to the documents
sought and an order of mandamus compelling their disclosure. A declaration is
also sought against both respondents that they are acting incompatibly with the
applicants' rights under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and that they are therefore in breach of section 6 of
the Human Rights Act 1998.
[24] The grounds on which the relief against
the Ombudsman is sought are that the decision is contrary to article 2 of ECHR
and section 6 of the Human Rights Act and to various sections of the Police
(Northern Ireland) Act 1998; that she fettered her discretion in adopting a
policy of non-disclosure; that she failed to give sufficient weight to the
request made in respect of each document sought; that she erred in law in
considering that the consent of the original source of the documents was
required before it could be disclosed; that by her refusal to provide the
documents the Ombudsman was failing to promote the policy and objects of the
Police (Northern Ireland) Act; and that she failed to give sufficient weight to
the statutory provisions outlined above, the effect that non-disclosure would
have on the applicants' ability to contribute to the investigation, to the
identity of the complainant, to the subject matter of the complaint and to the
benefit that would flow from their having sight of the documents sought.
[25] In relation to the Chief Constable, the
applicants claim that he too acted incompatibly with their article 2 rights;
that he fettered his discretion; that he erred in deciding that confidentiality
was a sufficient reason for non-disclosure and in believing that his supplying
the Ombudsman with the requested material absolved him of the duty to consider
the applicants' request for disclosure; that in reaching his decision not to
disclose the documents requested the Chief Constable failed to have sufficient
regard to the applicants' rights under article 2 of the convention and to the
merits of the request for disclosure; that the decision was "unfair,
unreasonable and unlawful"; and that adequate reasons for it had not been given.
The arguments
[26] For the applicants Mr Treacy QC submitted
that the Chief Constable's refusal to disclose the documents, based as it was on
a sweeping claim that confidentiality countermanded this, could not be
sustained. With the exception of the correspondence passing between the RUC and
the Northern Ireland Office, confidentiality did not attach to any of the
material sought. In any event, no conceivable harm could come even from the
disclosure of that correspondence. It was not suggested that public interest
immunity attached to the documents sought or that any consideration had been
given to their production in a redacted form. Moreover, it was not claimed that
the disclosure of the correspondence between the Northern Ireland Office and the
police or the internal police reviews would have any prejudicial effect. Absent
any detrimental effect to individuals or to the investigation generally, the
duty to disclose to the complainant was, Mr Treacy said, clear.
[27] In advancing the case against the
Ombudsman, Mr Treacy pointed out that Mrs O'Loan in her affidavit suggested that
each request for disclosure "was considered on its own individual merits against
the background of eh restriction on disclosure contained in section 63 of the
1988 [Police (Northern Ireland) Act". In fact, Mr Treacy argued CAJ was an
agency to whom, by virtue of section 63, disclosure should be made.
[28] Mr Treacy suggested that the Ombudsman had
misunderstood the reason that CAJ wanted to have the material. She appeared to
believe that this was for the purpose of monitoring her investigation. This was
not the case. CAJ wished to have the material in order to nullify any
disadvantage that would otherwise accrue to them in contributing to the full and
thorough investigation of their complaint.
[29] On the human rights issues Mr Treacy
argued that CAJ was a victim for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights
Act 1998. He pointed out that article 34 of the convention provides that the
ECtHR may receive applications form any person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of any of the rights
set out in the Convention. To qualify as a victim CAJ need only show that it is
itself directly affected by the decision that it challenges. Alternatively, the
applicants qualified as indirect victims. Ms Nelson was a member of CAJ and it
is affected by her death; CAJ is the complainant in relation to the Ombudsman's
investigation; and its pursuit of the documents is supported by Ms Nelson's
mother. In the further alternative Mr Treacy argued that CAJ was entitled to
bring these proceedings and to rely on article 2 in a representative capacity.
[30] Mr Treacy argued that the disclosure of
the material was necessary in order to fulfil the respondents' obligations under
article 2 of the Convention. The procedural obligations arising under this
article require that the applicants should not be placed at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis the Chief Constable. There needed to be a "sufficient element of
public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in
practice as well as in theory".
[31] For the Chief Constable Mr Morgan QC
submitted that there was a public interest in preserving a confidentiality
dimension to the type of investigation undertaken by the Ombudsman. If documents
such as were sought by CAJ were disclosed this would have an inevitable impact
on the efficacy and success of inquiries such as she conducted into the
complaint in the present case. There was a public interest in recognising this
in order that others would not be discouraged from making complaints or in
co-operating with investigations.
[32] Mr Morgan also argued that the applicants
were not entitled to the victim status that was prerequisite under section 7 of
the Human Rights Act to enable them to rely on Convention rights. He submitted
that the applicants were not entitled to advance a claim based on article 2
unless they could show that they were directly affected and this clearly did not
arise.
[33] for the Ombudsman Mr Brian Fee QC claimed
that so far from seeking to obstruct the applicants' participation in the
investigation she and her staff had gone to considerable lengths to facilitate
it. She was bound, Mr Fee said, to abide by the constraint contained in section
51 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act. She was obliged not to release the
information unless she was satisfied that by doing so she would further the
objectives therein contained.
The relevant statutory provisions
[34] So far as is relevant section 51 of the
Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 provides: -
"51. - (1) For the purposes of this Part there shall be a Police
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.
(2) …
(3) …
(4) The Ombudsman shall exercise his powers under this Part in such manner and
to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to secure-
(a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints
system; and
(b) the confidence of the public and of members of the police force in that
system."
[35] The relevant parts of section 63 of the Act are: -
"63. - (1) No information received by a person to whom this
subsection applies in connection with any of the functions of the Ombudsman
under this Part shall be disclosed by any person who is or has been a person to
whom this subsection applies except-
(a) to a person to whom this subsection applies;
(b) to the Secretary of State;
(c) to other persons in or in connection with the exercise of any function of
the Ombudsman;
(d) for the purposes of any criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings; or
(e) in the form of a summary or other general statement made by the Ombudsman
which-
(i) does not identify the person from whom the information was received; and
(ii) does not, except to such extent as the Ombudsman thinks necessary in the
public interest, identify any person to whom the information relates.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to-
(a) the Ombudsman; and
(b) an officer of the Ombudsman."
[36] Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, so
far as is relevant, provides: -
"7. - (1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or
proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may-
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate
court or tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,
but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
…
(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a victim of an unlawful act
only if he would be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if
proceedings were brought in the European Court of Human Rights in respect of
that act."
Confidentiality
[37] In Taylor and others v Serious Fraud
Office
[1999] 2 AC 177, documents generated by a
Serious Fraud Office inquiry were disclosed to the solicitors of defendants in a
criminal trial. The solicitors in turn disclosed them to the first plaintiff who
issued proceedings for libel. The House of Lords held that an implied
undertaking applied to material disclosed by the prosecution in criminal
proceedings. Lord Hoffman said at 208: -
"The implied undertaking in civil proceedings is designed to limit the invasion
of privacy and confidentiality caused by compulsory disclosure of documents in
litigation. It is generated by the circumstances in which the documents have
been disclosed, irrespective of their contents. It excludes all collateral use,
whether in other litigation or by way of publication to others."
and at page 211: -
"Many people give assistance to the police and other investigatory agencies,
either voluntarily or under compulsion, without coming within the category of
informers whose identity can be concealed on grounds of public interest. They
will be moved or obliged to give the information because they or the law
consider that the interests of justice so require. They must naturally accept
that the interests of justice may in the end require the publication of the
information, or at any rate its disclosure to the accused for the purposes of
enabling him to conduct his defence. But there seems to me no reason why the law
should not encourage their assistance by offering them the assurance that,
subject to these overriding requirements, their privacy and confidentiality will
be respected."
[38] In Re A's application [2001] NI 335 I
said of these passages: -
"These passages identify the public interest in maintaining confidentiality for
police investigations unless the interests of justice require otherwise. Unless
it can be demonstrated that there are compelling reasons for disclosing the
contents of a police investigation file, its vital confidentiality should be
preserved."
[39] I consider that these remarks hold true
for the investigation of a complaint by the Ombudsman. It is not difficult to
identify the public interest that is at stake here. The nature of the
investigations conducted by the Ombudsman is such that great sensitivity may be
required. Confidentiality can promote rather than detract from the effectiveness
of an inquiry. If witnesses are aware that their statements will be inspected by
other agencies, their incentive to candour may be diminished. Mr Treacy's
arguments focussed on the avowed lack of need for confidentiality in relation to
these particular documents but that, as it seems to me, misses the point. The
effective investigation of complaints must depend to some extent at least on the
knowledge of participants in inquiries such as this that their contributions can
be made confidentially.
[40] Different considerations would of course
apply if it could be demonstrated that by keeping confidential documentation
generated by the investigation a less effective inquiry was likely to ensue. But
that is not the case here. On the contrary, the Police Ombudsman's office has
been assiduous, not to say painstaking, in informing the applicants at every
stage of the inquiry of the state of its progress and it has provided a draft
report and received extensive comment on it. There is no reason to question the
assertions of the office that it has conscientiously pursued every legitimate
line of inquiry.
[41] In R (on the application of Green) v
Police Complaints Authority
[2004] UKHL 6 the claimant lodged a
complaint alleging that he had been deliberately knocked down by a police
officer driving an unmarked police car. The complaints authority supervised the
investigation of the complaint by another police force. It sent a list of all
the witness statements and documents that it would be taking into account. The
claimant asked for disclosure of everything in the list. The authority replied
that it was unable to accede to that request as section 80 (1) (a) of the Police
Act 1996 prohibited the disclosure of any information received by the authority
in connection with its functions (but with certain specified exceptions), and
the relevant exception in section 80 (1) (a), did not apply, as the disclosure
was not necessary "for the proper discharge of the functions of the authority".
The House of Lords held that the main aim of the authority in carrying out its
functions in supervising the police investigation of alleged misconduct on the
part of police officers was to satisfy the legitimate interests both of
complainants and of the wider public that the investigation of complaints, and
any decisions on taking disciplinary proceedings should be, and should be seen
to be, independent and thorough. In the proper discharge of its functions, the
authority might judge that it was necessary to disclose certain information
derived from an investigation to claimants if their legitimate interests and
those of the wider public were to be met.
[42] At paragraph [73] of his opinion Lord Rodger
of Earlsferry dealt with the need for confidentiality in relation to witness
statements obtained in the course of an investigation into a complaint against
the police as follows: -
"The other factor considered by the Court of Appeal was the desirability of
maintaining the confidentiality of statements given by witnesses. They did not
consider that, in itself, this was a sufficient reason for never disclosing
witness statements. I agree: if disclosure were indeed necessary for the proper
discharge of the authority's functions, then the statements would have to be
disclosed, whether or not they were regarded as confidential. But it should be
recognised that the starting point of section 80 is that information provided to
the authority is to be kept confidential. This mirrors the position with both
the police and the prosecuting authorities. As a general rule, this appears to
be entirely appropriate. Of course, witnesses who give evidence to the police
must expect that, whether favourable or unfavourable to the potential accused,
it will be disclosed and become public in the event of a trial. But, subject to
that, they may have good reasons for being anxious that it should not be
revealed—for example, if it tends to cast doubt on a complainer's trumped-up
allegation against a police officer. The potential risks to such a witness are
obvious. Parliament recognises this legitimate concern in section 80 (1) (c)
which allows information to be disclosed in the form of a summary that does not
identify the person from whom the information was received. Similarly, in
complaints against the police, as in many other cases, the statements will often
show individuals, including the witnesses themselves, in a bad light—behaving,
especially through drink, in ways or in circumstances that they would be ashamed
to see made public. So witnesses will be understandably concerned that their
evidence about their own or others' misdemeanours should be kept confidential
unless there is a trial. The concern will be shared by the other people
involved. The police and prosecutors are expected to respect that concern."
[43] It appears to me that the starting point
in this case should likewise be that information provided to the Ombudsman
should be kept confidential and that, generally, it should only be revealed
where necessary for the proper discharge of her functions. The same
considerations apply to the need for the police to hold confidential materials
that they supply to the Ombudsman for the purpose of her investigation. It could
not be right that the need for confidentiality of those inquiries could be
disregarded in the debate as to whether the Chief Constable should be required
to produce the material requested. The question whether he should be compelled
to hand over these documents to CAJ cannot be isolated from the efficacy of the
Ombudsman's investigations. If it is right (as I believe it to be) that she
should be entitled to guard the effectiveness of her investigation by
withholding those documents, it could not be right that it should be imperilled
by the release of the information from another source. It is, of course, true
that the Ombudsman's office has pointed out that the Chief Constable could have
waived any claim to confidentiality and one may take it from this that she would
not have objected if he had chosen to do so. But the effectiveness of her
investigations must depend on witnesses being able, if they choose, to refuse to
reveal documents that they have supplied for the purpose of the inquiry.
The statutory incentive to confidentiality
[44] The need for confidentiality is, in my
view, frankly recognised in the statutory provisions that deal with the issue.
This is underscored not only by section 63 of the 1998 Police Act but by section
51. The former of these provisions forbids the disclosure of information
received in the course of the inquiry to others than those specified. I do not
accept Mr Treacy's argument that CAJ is included within this group. His argument
appeared to rest on the proposition that CAJ came within the category of "other
persons in or in connection with the exercise of any function of the Ombudsman".
Their claim to be included in this group depended on their status as complainant
but I do not consider that this is a remotely viable argument. CAJ plays no part
in the performance of the Ombudsman's functions.
[45] Section 51 requires the Ombudsman to
exercise her powers in a way that will secure the efficiency, effectiveness and
independence of the police complaints system; and the confidence of the public
and of members of the police force in that system. Her judgment that this is
best achieved by keeping confidential material disclosed to her in the course of
her investigations is, in my judgment, unimpeachable. In this connection it is
to be noted that section 80 of the 1996 Act is in strikingly similar terms to
those employed in the 1998 legislation.
The human rights arguments
[46] The first argument to be addressed in this
context is the claim of the applicants to be entitled to rely on the Convention.
In my judgment, that argument can be disposed of simply. Underpinning all the
various formulations advanced on behalf of the applicants must be the
proposition that they are directly affected (in the way that phrase has been
used in Convention terms) by the asserted violation of article 2.
[47] In Klass v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR
ECtHR dealt with the question of victim status in paragraph 33 as follows: -
"33. While Article 24 allows each Contracting State to refer to the Commission
"any alleged breach" of the Convention by another Contracting State, a person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals must, in order to be able
to lodge a petition in pursuance of Article 25 [now article 34], claim "to be
the victim of a violation . . . of the rights set forth in (the) Convention".
Thus, in contrast to the position under Article 24 – where, subject to the other
conditions laid down, the general interest attaching to the observance of the
Convention renders admissible an inter-State application – Article 25 requires
that an individual applicant should claim to have been actually affected by the
violation he alleges (see the judgment of 18 January 1978 in the case of
Ireland v. United Kingdom, Series A no. 25, pp. 90-91, paras. 239 and 240).
Article 25 does not institute for individuals a kind of actio popularis
for the interpretation of the Convention; it does not permit individuals to
complain against a law in abstracto simply because they feel that it
contravenes the Convention. In principle, it does not suffice for an individual
applicant to claim that the mere existence of a law violates his rights under
the Convention; it is necessary that the law should have been applied to his
detriment. Nevertheless, as both the Government and the Commission pointed out,
a law may by itself violate the rights of an individual if the individual is
directly affected by the law in the absence of any specific measure of
implementation."
[48] An applicant may claim to be an indirect
victim, for example when he or she is a close relative (such as a spouse or
parent) of the affected person – see, for instance, McCann v United Kingdom
(1995) 21 EHRR 97, and Campbell and
Cosans v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 531 at 545. But a colleague or friend does not
come within such a category and absent any direct effect on such a colleague or
friend, victim status is not established. It is clear that no direct effect
either on CAJ or Mr O'Brien has been established. I must conclude, therefore,
that they are not entitled to rely on an asserted violation of article 2 of ECHR
for the purpose of these proceedings.
[49] Even if I had decided that it was open to the
applicants to rely on article 2, I would not have found that the respondents'
decision to withhold the material that was sought constituted a violation of the
provision. Much of the Strasbourg jurisprudence relied on to promote that claim
has been usefully reviewed by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R (on the
application of Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept
[2003] 3 WLR 1169. At paragraph [20] of
his opinion, Lord Bingham said: -
"While public scrutiny of police investigations cannot be regarded as an
automatic requirement under article 2 [Jordan v UK (2001) 11 BHRC 1 (para
121)], there must 'be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the
investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in
theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to
case.' …
The European Court has not required that any particular procedure be adopted to
examine the circumstances of a killing by state agents, nor is it necessary that
there be a single unified procedure. But it is 'indispensable' that there be
proper procedures for ensuring the accountability of agents of the state so as
to maintain public confidence and allay the legitimate concerns that arise from
the use of lethal force."
[50] To rely on article 2 to advance their claim to
be entitled to see the requested documents the applicants would have had to show
that the investigation by the Ombudsman was not sufficiently thorough to achieve
these aims. I am satisfied that they have not done so. As I have said the
Ombudsman's office was prepared to go to significant lengths to involve the
applicants at all material stages of the investigation; they have been open to
suggestion and comment and have met representatives of CAJ on a number of
occasions. This approach betokens a willingness to listen and to reassure.
Judged objectively, I consider that it constitutes "proper procedures for
ensuring the accountability of agents of the state".
Conclusions
[51] None of the applicants' claims has been
made out. The application for judicial review must be dismissed.
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